Criminal Law Cases 1

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 17584 March 8, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GREGORIO SANTIAGO, defendant-appellant.
L. Porter Hamilton for appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
Having caused the death of Porfirio Parondo, a boy 7 years old, by striking him with automobile
that he was driving, the herein appellant was prosecuted for the crime of homicide by reckless
negligence and was sentenced to suffer one year and one day of prision correccional, and to
pay the costs of the trial.
Not agreeable with that sentence he now comes to this court alleging that the court below
committed four errors, to wit:
1. The trial court erred in not taking judicial notice of the fact that the appellant was
being prosecuted in conformity with Act No. 2886 of the Philippine Legislature and that
the Act is unconstitutional and gave no jurisdiction in this case.
2. The lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint after the presentation of the
evidence in the case, if not before, for the reason that said Act No. 2886 is
unconstitutional and the proceedings had in the case under the provisions of the Act
constitute a prosecution of appellant without due process of law.
3. The court a quo erred in not finding that it lacked jurisdiction over the person of the
accused and over the subject- matter of the complaint.
4. The trial court erred in finding the appellant guilty of the crime charged and in
sentencing him to one year and one day of prison correccional and to the payment of
costs.
With regard to the questions of fact, we have to say that we have examined the record and find
that the conclusions of the trial judge, as contained in his well-written decision, are sufficiently
sustained by the evidence submitted.
The accused was driving an automobile at the rate of 30 miles an hour on a highway 6 meter
wide, notwithstanding the fact that he had to pass a narrow space between a wagon standing
on one side of the road and a heap of stones on the other side where they were two young
boys, the appellant did not take the precaution required by the circumstances by slowing his
machine, and did not proceed with the vigilant care that under the circumstances an ordinary
prudent man would take in order to avoid possible accidents that might occur, as unfortunately
did occur, as his automobile ran over the boy Porfirio Parondo who was instantly killed as the
result of the accident.
These facts are so well established in the records that there cannot be a shade of doubt about
them.
Coming now to the other assignments of error, it will be seen that they deal with the
fundamental questions as to whether or not Act No. 2886, under which the complaint in the
present case was filed, is valid and constitutional.
This Act is attacked on account of the amendments that it introduces in General Orders No. 58,
the defense arguing that the Philippine Legislature was, and is, not authorized to amend
General Orders No. 58, as it did by amending section 2 thereof because its provisions have the
character of constitutional law. Said section 2 provides as follows:
All prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the United States against the
persons charged with the offenses. (G. O. No. 58, sec. 2 ).
Act No. 2886, which amends it, by virtue of which the People of the Philippine Island is made
the plaintiff in this information, contains the following provisions in section 1:
SECTION 1. Section two of General Orders, Numbered Fifty-eight, series of nineteen

hundred, is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 2. All prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the People of
the Philippine Islands against the persons charged with the offense."
Let us examine the question.
For practical reasons, the procedure in criminal matters is not incorporated in the Constitutions
of the States, but is left in the hand of the legislatures, so that it falls within the realm of public
statutory law.
As has been said by Chief Justice Marshall:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the Subdivisions of which its great
powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution,
would partake of a prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the
human mind. It would probably never be understood by the public. (M'Culloch vs.
Maryland [1819], 4 Wheat., 316, 407; 4 L. ed., 579.)
That is why, in pursuance of the Constitution of the United States, each States, each State has
the authority, under its police power, to define and punish crimes and to lay down the rules of
criminal procedure.
The states, as a part of their police power, have a large measure of discretion in creating
and defining criminal offenses. . . .
A Statute relating to criminal procedure is void as a denial of the equal protection of the
laws if it prescribes a different procedure in the case of persons in like situation. Subject
to this limitation, however, the legislature has large measure of discretion in prescribing
the modes of criminal procedure. . . . (12 C.J., 1185, 1186. See Collins vs. Johnston, 237
U.S., 502; 35 s. Ct. Rep. 649; 59 L. ed., 1071; Shevlin-Carpenter Co. vs. Minnesota, 218
U.S., 57; 30 S. Ct. Rep., 663; 54 L. ed., 930; Lynn vs. Flancders, 141 Ga., 500; 81 S.E., 205.)
This power of the States of the North American Union was also granted to its territories such as
the Philippines:
The plenary legislative power which Congress possesses over the territories and
possessions of the United States may be exercised by that body itself, or, as is much
more often the case, it may be delegated to a local agency, such as a legislature, the
organization of which proceeds upon much the same lines as in the several States or in
Congress, which is often taken as a model, and whose powers are limited by the Organic
Act; but within the scope of such act is has complete authority to legislate, . . . and in
general, to legislate upon all subjects within the police power of the territory. (38 Cyc.,
205-207.)
The powers of the territorial legislatures are derived from Congress. By act of Congress
their power extends "to all rightful subjects of legislation not inconsistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States;" and this includes the power to define and
punish crimes. (16 C. J., 62.)
And in the exercise of such powers the military government of the army of occupation,
functioning as a territorial legislature, thought it convenient to establish new rules of procedure
in criminal matters, by the issuance of General Orders No. 58, the preamble of which reads:
In the interests of justice, and to safeguard the civil liberties of the inhabitants of these
Islands, the criminal code of procedure now in force therein is hereby amended in certain
of its important provisions, as indicated in the following enumerated sections. (Emphasis
ours.)
Its main purpose is, therefore, limited to criminal procedure and its intention is to give to its
provisions the effect of law in criminal matters. For that reason it provides in section 1 that:
The following provisions shall have the force and effect of law in criminal matters in the
Philippine Islands from and after the 15th day of May, 1900, but existing laws on the
same subjects shall remain valid except in so far as hereinafter modified or repealed
expressly or by necessary implication.
From what has been said it clearly follows that the provisions of this General Order do not the
nature of constitutional law either by reason of its character or by reason of the authority that
enacted it into law.
It cannot be said that it has acquired this character because this order was made its own by the
Congress of the United States for, as a matter of fact, this body never adopted it as a law of its
own creation either before the promulgation of Act No. 2886, herein discussed, or, to our
knowledge, to this date.
Since the provisions of this General Order have the character of statutory law, the power of the
Legislature to amend it is self-evident, even if the question is considered only on principle. Our
present Legislature, which has enacted Act No. 2886, the subject of our inquiry, is the legal
successor to the Military Government as a legislative body.
Since the advent of the American sovereignty in the Philippines the legislative branch of our
government has undergone transformations and has developed itself until it attained its
present form. Firstly, it was the Military Government of the army of occupation which, in
accordance with international law and practice, was vested with legislative functions and in fact
did legislate; afterwards, complying with the instructions of President McKinley which later
were ratified by Congress (sec. 1 of the Act of July 1, 1902) the legislative powers of the Military
Government were transferred to the Philippine Commission; then, under the provisions of
section 7 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, the Philippine Assembly was created and it
functioned as a co legislative body with the Philippine Commission. Finally, by virtue of the
provisions of sections 12 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, known as the Jones Law,
the Philippine Commission gave way to the Philippine Senate, the Philippine Assembly became
the House of Representatives, and thus was formed the present Legislature composed of two
Houses which has enacted the aforesaid Act No. 2886.
As a matter of fact, Act No. 2886 is not the first law that amends General Orders No. 58. The
Philippine Commission, at various times, had amended it by the enactment of laws among
which we may cite Act No. 194, regarding preliminary investigation, Act No. 440 relating to
counsels de oficio and Act No. 590 about preliminary investigations by justices of the peace of
provincial capitals. Later on, and before the enactment of Act No. 2886, herein controverted,
the Legislature had also amended this General Orders No. 58 by the enactment of Act No. 2677
regarding appeals to the Supreme Court of causes originating in the justice of the peace courts
and by Act No. 2709 which deals with the exclusion of accused persons from the information in
order to be utilized as state's witnesses.
These amendments repeatedly made by the Philippine Commission as well as by our present
Legislature are perfectly within the scope of the powers of the said legislative bodies as the
successors of the Military Government that promulgated General Orders No. 58.
No proof is required to demonstrate that the present Legislature had, and had, the power to
enact and amend laws. (U.S. vs. Bull. 15 Phil., 7.) That it has the power to legislate on criminal
matters is very evident from the wording of section 7 of the Jones Law which says:
That the legislative authority herein provided shall have power, when not inconsistent
with this Act, by due enactment to amend, alter, modify, or repeal any law, civil or
criminal, continued in force by this Act as it may from time to time see fit.
It is urged the right to prosecute and punish crimes is an attributed of sovereignty. This
assertion is right; but it is also true that by reason of the principle of territoriality as applied in
the suppression, of crimes, such power is delegated to subordinate government subdivisions
such as territories. As we have seen in the beginning, the territorial legislatures have the power
to define and punish crimes, a power also possessed by the Philippine Legislature by virtue of
the provisions of sections 7, already quoted, of the Jones Law. These territorial governments
are local agencies of the Federal Government, wherein sovereignty resides; and when the
territorial government of the Philippines prosecutes and punishes public crimes it does so by
virtue of the authority delegated to it by the supreme power of the Nation.
This delegation may be made either expressly as in the case of the several States of the Union
and incorporated territories like Porto Rico and Hawaii, or tacitly as is the case with the
Philippines, which is an organized territory though not incorporated with the Union. (Malcolm,
Philippine Constitutional Law, 181-205.)
This tacit delegation to our Government needs no demonstration. As a matter of fact, the
crimes committed within our territory, even before section 2 of General Orders No. 58 was
amended, were prosecuted and punished in this jurisdiction as is done at present; but then as
now the repression of crimes was done, and is still done, under the sovereign authority of the
United States, whose name appears as the heading in all pleadings in criminal causes and in
other judicial papers and notarial acts.
The use of such a heading is prescribed for civil cases in form 1 of section 784 of the Code of
Civil Procedure; in criminal causes the constant practice followed in this jurisdiction established
its use; and in notarial matters its use is provided by section 127 of Act No. 496. This long
continued practice in criminal matters and the legal provision relating to civil cases and notarial
acts have not been amended by any law, much less by Act No. 2886, the subject of the present
inquiry.
There is not a single constitutional provision applicable to the Philippines prescribing the name
to be used as party plaintiff in criminal cases.
The fact that the political status of this country is as yet undetermined and in a transitory stage,
is, in our opinion, responsible for the fact that there is no positive provision in our
constitutional law regarding the use of the name of the People of the Philippine Islands, as
party plaintiff, in criminal prosecutions, as is otherwise the case in the respective constitutional
charters of the States of the Union and incorporated territories — a situation which must not
be understood as depriving the Government of the Philippines of its power, however delegated,
to prosecute public crimes. The fact is undeniable that the present government of the
Philippines, created by the Congress of the United States, is autonomous.
This autonomy of the Government of the Philippines reaches all judicial actions, the case at bar
being one of them; as an example of such autonomy, this Government, the same as that of
Hawaii and Porto Rico (People of Porto Rico vs. Rosaly y Castillo [1913], 227 U.S., 270; 57 L. ed.,
507; 33 Sup. Ct. Rep., 352) cannot be sued without its consent. (Merritt vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands, 34 Phil., 311; L. S. Moon & Co. vs. Harrison, p. 27, ante.) The doctrine, laid
down in these cases, acknowledges the prerogative of personality in the Government of the
Philippines, which, if it is sufficient to shield it from any responsibility in court in its own name
unless it consents thereto, it should be also, as sufficiently authoritative in law, to give that
government the right to prosecute in court in its own name whomsoever violates within its
territory the penal laws in force therein.
However, limiting ourselves to the question relative to the form of the complaint in criminal
matters, it is within the power of the Legislature to prescribe the form of the criminal complaint
as long as the constitutional provision of the accused to be informed of the nature of the
accusation is not violated.
Under the Constitution of the United States and by like provisions in the constitutions of
the various states, the accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him . . .
It is within the power of the legislatures under such a constitutional provision to

prescribe the form of the indictment or information, and such form may omit averments
regarded as necessary at common law. (22 Cyc., 285.)
All these considerations a priori are strengthened a posteriori by the important reason disclosed
by the following fact — that the Congress has tacitly approved Act No. 2886. Both the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, section 86, and the Jones Law, last paragraph of section 19, provide
that all the laws enacted by the Government of the Philippines or its Legislature shall be
forwarded to the Congress of the United States, which body reserves the right and power to
annul them. And presuming, as legally we must, that the provisions of these laws have been
complied with, it is undisputed that the Congress of the United States did not annul any of
those acts already adverted to — Nos. 194, 440, 490 (of the Philippine Commission), and 2677,
2709 and the one now in question No. 2886 (of the present Legislature) — all of which were
amendatory of General Orders No. 58. The Act now under discussion (No. 2886) took effect on
February 24, 1920, and the criminal complaint in this case was filed on May 10, 1920. The
silence of Congress regarding those laws amendatory of the said General Order must be
considered as an act of approval.
If Congress fails to notice or take action on any territorial legislation the reasonable
inference is that it approves such act. (26 R.C.L., 679; vide Clinton vs. Englebrcht, 13
Wall., 434; 20 [L. ed.] 659; Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S., 549; 33 S. Ct. Rep., 585; 57 [L. ed.],
960; Nixon vs. Reid, 8 S.d., 507; 67 N.W., 57; 32 L.R.A., 315.)
Furthermore, supposing for the sake of argument, that the mention of the People of the
Philippine Islands as plaintiff in the title of the information constitutes a vice or defect, the
same is not fatal when, as in the present case, it was not objected to in the court below.
An indictment must, in many states under express statutory or constitutional provision,

show by its title or by proper recitals in the caption or elsewhere that the prosecution is
in the name and by the authority of the state, the commonwealth, or the people of the
state, according to the practice in the particular jurisdictions; but omissions or defects in
this respect may be supplied or cured by other parts of the records, and the omissions
of such a recital or defects therein, even when required by the constitution or by
statute, is a defect of form within a statute requiring exceptions for defect of form to be
made before trial. (23 Cyc., 237, 238.)
We hold that the provisions of sections 2 of General Orders No. 58, as amended by Act No.
2886, do not partake of the same character as the provisions of a constitution; that the said Act
No. 2886 is valid and is not violative of any constitutional provisions and that the court a quo
did not commit any of the errors assigned.
The sentence appealed from is hereby affirmed, the appellant being furthermore sentenced to
the accessory penalties prescribed in article 61 of the Penal Code, and to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased in the sum of P1,000 and to the payment of the costs of both instances. So
ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur in the result.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 113213 August 15, 1994
PAUL JOSEPH WRIGHT, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE JOSE DE LA RAMA, RTC, BRANCH 139, MAKATI, M.M.
and HON. FRANK DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, respondents.
Rodrigo E. Mallari for petitioner.
Aurora Salva Bautista collaborating for petitioner.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A paramount principle of the law of extradition provides that a State may not surrender any
individual for any offense not included in a treaty of extradition. This principle arises from the
reality of extradition as a derogation of sovereignty. Extradition is an intrusion into the
territorial integrity of the host State and a delimitation of the sovereign power of the State
within its own territory. 1 The act of extraditing amounts to a "delivery by the State of a person
accused or convicted of a crime, to another State within whose territorial jurisdiction, actual or
constructive, it was committed and which asks for his surrender with a view to execute
justice." 2 As it is an act of "surrender" of an individual found in a sovereign State to another
State which demands his surrender 3 , an act of extradition, even with a treaty rendered
executory upon ratification by appropriate authorities, does not imposed an obligation to
extradite on the requested State until the latter has made its own determination of the validity
of the requesting State's demand, in accordance with the requested State's own interests.
The principles of international law recognize no right of extradition apart from that arising from
treaty. 4 Pursuant to these principles, States enter into treaties of extradition principally for the
purpose of bringing fugitives of justice within the ambit of their laws, under conventions
recognizing the right of nations to mutually agree to surrender individuals within their
jurisdiction and control, and for the purpose of enforcing their respective municipal laws. Since
punishment of fugitive criminals is dependent mainly on the willingness of host State to
apprehend them and revert them to the State where their offenses were
committed, 5 jurisdiction over such fugitives and subsequent enforcement of penal laws can be
effectively accomplished only by agreement between States through treaties of extradition.
Desiring to make more effective cooperation between Australia and the Government of the
Philippines in the suppression of crime, 6 the two countries entered into a Treaty of Extradition
on the 7th of March 1988. The said treaty was ratified in accordance with the provisions of
Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in a Resolution adopted by the Senate on
September 10, 1990 and became effective thirty (30) days after both States notified each other
in writing that the respective requirements for the entry into force of the Treaty have been
complied with. 7
The Treaty adopts a "non-list, double criminality approach" which provides for broader
coverage of extraditable offenses between the two countries and (which) embraces crimes
punishable by imprisonment for at least one (1) year. Additionally, the Treaty allows extradition
for crimes committed prior to the treaty's date of effectivity, provided that these crimes were
in the statute books of the requesting State at the time of their commission.
Under the Treaty, each contracting State agrees to extradite. . . "persons

. . . wanted for prosecution of the imposition or enforcement of a sentence in the Requesting
State for an extraditable offense." 8 A request for extradition requires, if the person is accused
of an offense, the furnishing by the requesting State of either a warrant for the arrest or a copy
of the warrant of arrest of the person, or, where appropriate, a copy of the relevant charge
against the person sought to be extradited. 9
In defining the extraditable offenses, the Treaty includes all offenses "punishable under the
Laws of both Contracting States by imprisonment for a period of at least one (1) year, or by a
more severe penalty." 10 For the purpose of the definition, the Treaty states that:
(a) an offense shall be an extraditable offense whether or not the laws of the
Contracting States place the offense within the same category or denominate
the offense by the same terminology;
(b) the totality of the acts or omissions alleged against the person whose
extradition is requested shall be taken into account in determining the
constituent elements of the offense. 11
Petitioner, an Australian Citizen, was sought by Australian authorities for indictable crimes in
his country. Extradition proceedings were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, which
rendered a decision ordering the deportation of petitioner. Said decision was sustained by the
Court of Appeals; hence, petitioner came to this Court by way of review on certiorari, to set
aside the order of deportation. Petitioner contends that the provision of the Treaty giving
retroactive effect to the extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law which violates
Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. He assails the trial court's decision ordering his
extradition, arguing that the evidence adduced in the court below failed to show that he is
wanted for prosecution in his country. Capsulized, all the principal issues raised by the
petitioner before this Court strike at the validity of the extradition proceedings instituted by the
government against him.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, 12 are undisputed:
On March 17, 1993, Assistant Secretary Sime D. Hidalgo of the Department of

Foreign Affairs indorsed to the Department of Justice Diplomatic Note No.
080/93 dated February 19, 1993 from the Government of Australia to the
Department of Justice through Attorney General Michael Duffy. Said Diplomatic
Note was a formal request for the extradition of Petitioner Paul Joseph Wright
who is wanted for the following indictable crimes:
1. Wright/Orr Matter — one count of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary

to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958; and
2. Wright/Cracker Matter — Thirteen (13) counts of Obtaining Properties by

Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958; one
count of attempting to Obtain Property by Deception contrary to Section 321(m)
of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958; and one count of Perjury contrary to Section 314
of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958, which crimes were allegedly committed in the
following manner:
The one (1) count of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to

Section 81 (1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 constitutes in
Mr. Wright's and co-offender, Herbert Lance Orr's, dishonesty in
obtaining $315,250 from Mulcahy, Mendelson and Round
Solicitors (MM7R), secured by a mortgage on the property in
Bangholme, Victoria owned by Ruven Nominees Pty. Ltd., a
company controlled by a Rodney and a Mitchell, by falsely
representing that all the relevant legal documents relating to the
mortgage had been signed by Rodney and Janine Mitchell.
The thirteen (13) counts of Obtaining Property by Deception

contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958
constitutes in Mr. Wright's and co-offender Mr. John Carson
Craker's receiving a total of approximately 11.2 in commission
(including $367,044 in bonus commission) via Amazon Bond Pty.
Ltd., depending on the volume of business written, by submitting
two hundred fifteen (215) life insurance proposals, and paying
premiums thereon (to the acceptance of the policies and payment
of commissions) to the Australian Mutual Provident (AMP) Society
through the Office of Melbourne Mutual Insurance, of which
respondent is an insurance agent, out of which life proposals
none are in existence and approximately 200 of which are alleged
to have been false, in one or more of the following ways:
( i ) some policy-holders signed up only because they were told

the policies were free (usually for 2 years) and no payments were
required.
(ii) some policy-holders were offered cash inducements ($50 or

$100) to sign and had to supply a bank account no longer used (at
which a direct debit request for payment of premiums would
apply). These policy-holders were also told no payments by them
were required.
(iii) some policy-holders were introduced through the "Daily

Personnel Agency", and again were told the policies were free for
2 years as long as an unused bank account was applied.
(iv) some policy-holders were found not to exist.
The one count of Attempting to Obtain Property by Deception

contrary to Section 321(m) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958
constitutes in Mr. Wright's and Mr. Craker's attempting to cause
the payment of $2,870.68 commission to a bank account in the
name of Amazon Bond Pty. Ltd. by submitting one proposal for
Life Insurance to the AMP Society, the policy-holder of which does
not exist with the end in view of paying the premiums thereon to
insure acceptance of the policy and commission payments.
The one count of Perjury contrary to Section 314 of Victorian

Crimes Act of 1958 constitutes in Mr. Wright's and Mr. Craker's
signing and swearing before a Solicitor holding a current
practicing certificate pursuant to the Legal Profession Practice Act
(1958), a Statutory Declaration attesting to the validity of 29 of
the most recent Life Insurance proposals of AMP Society and
containing three (3) false statements.
Pursuant to Section 5 of PD No. 1069, in relation to the Extradition Treaty

concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and Australia on September
10, 1990, extradition proceedings were initiated on April 6, 1993 by the State
Counsels of the Department of Justice before the respondent court.
In its Order dated April 13, 1993, the respondent court directed the petitioner to
appear before it on April 30, 1993 and to file his answer within ten days. In the
same order, the respondent Judge ordered the NBI to serve summons and cause
the arrest of the petitioner.
The respondent court received return of the warrant of arrest and summons
signed by NBI Senior Agent Manuel Almendras with the information that the
petitioner was arrested on April 26, 1993 at Taguig, Metro Manila and was
subsequently detained at the NBI detention cell where petitioner, to date,
continue to be held.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed his answer.
In the course of the trial, the petitioner testified that he was jobless, married to a
Filipina, Judith David, with whom he begot a child; that he has no case in
Australia; that he is not a fugitive from justice and is not aware of the offenses
charged against him; that he arrived in the Philippines on February 25, 1990
returned to Australia on March 1, 1990, then back to the Philippines on April 11,
1990, left the Philippines again on April 24, 1990 for Australia and returned to
the Philippines on May 24, 1990, again left for Australia on May 29, 1990 passing
by Singapore and then returned to the Philippines on June 25, 1990 and from
that time on, has not left the Philippines; and that his tourist visa has been
extended but he could not produce the same in court as it was misplaced, has
neither produced any certification thereof, nor any temporary working visa.
The trial court, in its decision dated 14 June 1993, granting the petition for extradition
requested by the Government of Australia, concluding that the documents submitted by the
Australian Government meet the requirements of Article 7 of the Treaty of Extradition and that
the offenses for which the petitioner were sought in his country are extraditable offenses under
Article 2 of the said Treaty. The trial court, moreover, held that under the provisions of the
same Article, extradition could be granted irrespective of when the offense — in relation to the
extradition — was committed, provided that the offense happened to be an offense in the
requesting State at the time the acts or omissions constituting the same were committed. 13
Petitioner challenged the decision of the Regional Trial Court before the Court of Appeals
assigning the following errors:
I. THAT THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING

RETROACTIVE FORCE AND EFFECT TO THE EXTRADITION TREATY DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE RESPONDENT SHOW THAT THE
ALLEGED OFFENSES FOR WHICH PETITIONER IS SOUGHT TO BE EXTRADITED
TOOK PLACE IN 1988-1989 AT THE TIME THERE WAS NO EXTRADITION TREATY
BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AUSTRALIA.
II. THAT THE ACT OF THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE IN GIVING

RETROACTIVE FORCE AND EFFECT TO THE EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AUSTRALIA AMOUNTS TO AN "EX POST
FACTO LAW" AND VIOLATES SECTION 21, ARTICLE VII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION.
III. THAT THE HON. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING THE
EXTRADITION OF PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED
DO NOT SHOW THAT PETITIONER IS WANTED FOR PROSECUTION IN AUSTRALIA.
IV. THAT THE HON. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION,
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, IN MISINTERPRETING THE EXTENDED
STAY OF PETITIONER AS EVIDENCE OF PETITIONER'S DESIGN TO HIDE AND EVADE
PROSECUTION IN AUSTRALIA.
V. THAT THE HON. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING THE

EXTRADITION OF PETITIONER WITHOUT SPECIFYING IN HIS ORDER OR DECISION
THE SPECIFIC CHARGES FOR WHICH PETITIONER IS TO STAND TRIAL IN
AUSTRALIA.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision on September 14, 1993 and denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration on December 16, 1993. 14 Reiterating substantially the
same assignments of error which he interposed in the Court of Appeals, petitioner challenges in
this petition the validity of the extradition order issued by the trial court as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals under the Treaty. Petitioner vigorously argues that the trial court order
violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. He avers that for the
extradition order to be valid, the Australian government should show that he "has a criminal
case pending before a competent court" in that country "which can legally pass judgement or
acquittal or conviction upon him."
Clearly, a close reading of the provisions of the Treaty previously cited, which are relevant to
our determination of the validity of the extradition order, reveals that the trial court committed
no error in ordering the petitioner's extradition. Conformably with Article 2, Section 2 of the
said Treaty, the crimes for which the petitioner was charged and for which warrants for his
arrest were issued in Australia were undeniably offenses in the Requesting State at the time
they were alleged to have been committed. From its examination of the charges against the
petitioner, the trial court correctly determined that the corresponding offenses under our penal
laws are Articles 315(2) and 183 of the Revised Penal Code on swindling/estafa and false
testimony/perjury, respectively. 15
The provisions of Article 6 of the said Treaty pertaining to the documents required for
extradition are sufficiently clear and require no interpretation. The warrant for the arrest of an
individual or a copy thereof, a statement of each and every offense and a statement of the acts
and omissions which were alleged against the person in respect of each offense are sufficient to
show that a person is wanted for prosecution under the said article. All of these documentary
requirements were dully submitted to the trial court in its proceedings a quo. For purposes of
the compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, the signature and official seal of the Attorney-
General of Australia were sufficient to authenticate all the documents annexed to the
Statement of the Acts and Omissions, including the statement itself. 16 In conformity with the
provisions of Article 7 of the Treaty, the appropriate documents and annexes were signed by
"an officer in or of the Requesting State" 17 "sealed with . . . (a) public seal of the Requesting
State or of a Minister of State, or of a Department or officer of the Government of the
Requesting State," 18 and "certified by a diplomatic or consular officer of the Requesting State
accredited to the Requested State." 19 The last requirement was accomplished by the
certification made by the Philippine Consular Officer in Canberra, Australia.
The petitioner's contention that a person sought to be extradited should have a "criminal case
pending before a competent court in the Requesting State which can legally pass judgement of
acquittal or conviction" 20 stretches the meaning of the phrase "wanted for prosecution"
beyond the intended by the treaty provisions because the relevant provisions merely require "a
warrant for the arrest or a copy of the warrant for the arrest of the person sought to be
extradited." 21 Furthermore, the 'Charge and Warrant of Arrest Sheets' attest to the fact that
petitioner is not only wanted for prosecution but has, in fact, absconded to evade arrest and
criminal prosecution. Since a charge or information under the Treaty is required only when
appropriate, i.e., in cases where an individual charged before a competent court in the
Requesting State thereafter absconds to the Requested State, a charge or a copy thereof is not
required if the offender has in fact already absconded before a criminal complaint could be
filed. As the Court of Appeals correctly noted, limiting the phrase "wanted for prosecution" to
person charged with an information or a criminal complaint renders the Treaty ineffective over
individuals who abscond for the purpose of evading arrest and prosecution. 22
This brings us to another point raised by the petitioner both in the trial court and in the Court of
Appeals. May the extradition of the petitioner who is wanted for prosecution by the
government of Australia be granted in spite of the fact that the offenses for which the
petitioner is sought in his country were allegedly committed prior to the date of effectivity of
the Treaty.
Petitioner takes the position that under Article 18 of the Treaty its enforcement cannot be
given retroactive effect. Article 18 states:
ENTRY INTO FORCE AND TERMINATION
This Treaty shall enter into force thirty (30) days after the date on which the
Contracting States have notified each other in writing that their respective
requirements for the entry into force of this Treaty have been complied with.
Either contracting State may terminate this Treaty by notice in writing at any
time and it shall cease to be in force on the one hundred and eightieth day after
the day on which notice is given.
We fail to see how the petitioner can infer a prohibition against retroactive enforcement from
this provision. The first paragraph of Article 18 refers to the Treaty's date of effectivity; the
second paragraph pertains to its termination. Absolutely nothing in the said provision relates
to, much less, prohibits retroactive enforcement of the Treaty.
On the other hand, Article 2(4) of the Treaty unequivocally provides that:
4. Extradition may be granted pursuant to provisions of this Treaty irrespective

of when the offense in relation to which extradition is requested was committed,
provided that:
(a) it was an offense in the Requesting State at the time of the acts or omissions
constituting the offense; and
(b) the acts or omissions alleged would, if they had taken place in the Territory of
the Requested State at the time of the making of the request for extradition,
have constituted an offense against the laws in force in that state.
Thus, the offenses for which petitioner is sought by his government are clearly extraditable
under Article 2 of the Treaty. They were offenses in the Requesting State at the time they were
committed, and, irrespective of the time they were committed, they fall under the panoply of
the Extradition Treaty's provisions, specifically, Article 2 paragraph 4, quoted above.
Does the Treaty's retroactive application violate the Constitutional prohibition against ex post
facto laws? Early commentators understood ex post facto laws to include all laws of
retrospective application, whether civil or criminal. 23 However, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase,
citing Blackstone, The Federalist and other early U.S. state constitutions in Calder
vs. Bull 24 concluded that the concept was limited only to penal and criminal statutes. As
conceived under our Constitution, ex post facto laws are 1) statutes that make an act
punishable as a crime when such act was not an offense when committed; 2) laws which, while
not creating new offenses, aggravate the seriousness of a crime; 3) statutes which prescribes
greater punishment for a crime already committed; or, 4) laws which alter the rules of evidence
so as to make it substantially easier to convict a defendant. 25 "Applying the constitutional
principle, the (Court) has held that the prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which
affects the substantial rights of the accused." 26 This being so, there is no absolutely no merit in
petitioner's contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining the Treaty's retroactive
application with respect to offenses committed prior to the Treaty's coming into force and
effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. As the Court of Appeals
correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal
procedural statute. "It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of
an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the
time the treaty was ratified." 27
In signing the Treaty, the government of the Philippines has determined that it is within its
interests to enter into agreement with the government of Australia regarding the repatriation
of persons wanted for criminal offenses in either country. The said Treaty was concurred and
ratified by the Senate in a Resolution dated September 10, 1990. Having been ratified in
accordance with the provision of the 1987 Constitution, the Treaty took effect thirty days after
the requirements for entry into force were complied with by both governments.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of respondent Court of Appeals, we

hereby AFFIRM the same and DENY the instant petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., is on leave.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 145184 March 14, 2008
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS, represented by

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT through ATTY. ORLANDO L.
SALVADOR, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as OMBUDSMAN; DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES' MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS AND OFFICERS AT THE TIME - RAFAEL
SISON, JOSEPH TENGCO, ALICE REYES, VICENTE PATERNO, JOSEPH EDRALIN, ROBERTO
ONGPIN, VERDEN DANGILAN, RODOLFO MANALO; BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS
INTEGRATED CIRCUITS PHILIPPINES, INC. QUERUBE MAKALINTAL,* AMBROSIO MAKALINTAL,
VICENTE JAYME, ANTONIO SANTIAGO, EDGAR QUINTO, HORACIO MAKALINTAL, ALFREDO DE
LOS ANGELES, JOSE REY D. RUEDA, RAMONCITO MODESTO, GERARDO
LIMJUCO, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, (the Committee),

representing the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), through Atty. Orlando
L. Salvador (Atty. Salvador) filed this Petition for Certiorari seeking to nullify the September 3,
1999 Resolution1 of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-0-95-0443, dismissing the criminal
complaint filed against private respondents, and the June 6, 2000 Order2 denying its
reconsideration.
On October 8, 1992, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee), which reads:
WHEREAS, Sec. 28, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that "Subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure
of all transactions involving public interest";
WHEREAS, Sec. 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that "The right of the state to
recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from
their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel";
WHEREAS, there have been allegations of loans, guarantees, or other forms of financial
accommodation granted, directly or indirectly, by government owned and controlled bank or
financial institutions, at the behest, command or urging by previous government officials to the
disadvantage and detriment of the Philippine government and the Filipino people;
ACCORDINGLY, an "Ad-Hoc FACT FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS" is hereby created to

be composed of the following:
Chairman of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government - Chairman
The Solicitor General - Vice-Chairman
Representative from the

Office of the Executive Secretary - Member

Department of Finance - Member

Department of Justice - Member

Development Bank of the Philippines - Member

Philippine National Bank - Member

Asset Privatization Trust - Member
Government Corporate Counsel - Member

Philippine Export and Foreign
Loan Guarantee Corporation - Member
The Ad Hoc Committee shall perform the following functions:
1. Inventory all behest loans; identify the lenders and borrowers, including the principal
officers and stockholders of the borrowing firms, as well as the persons responsible for
granting the loans or who influenced the grant thereof;
2. Identify the borrowers who were granted "friendly waivers", as well as the
government officials who granted these waivers; determine the validity of these
waivers;
3. Determine the courses of action that the government should take to recover those
loans, and to recommend appropriate actions to the Office of the President within sixty
(60) days from the date hereof.
The Committee is hereby empowered to call upon any department, bureau, office, agency,
instrumentality or corporation of the government, or any officer or employee thereof, for such
assistance as it may need in the discharge of its function.
By Memorandum Order No. 61 dated November 9, 1992, the functions of the Committee were
subsequently expanded by including in its investigation, inventory and study all non-performing
loans, whether behest or non-behest. It likewise provided for the following criteria which might
be utilized as frame of reference in determining a behest loan, to wit:
1. It is under-collateralized;
2. The borrower corporation is undercapitalized;
3. Direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials like presence of marginal

notes;
4. Stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation are identified as cronies;
5. Deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended;
6. Use of corporate layering;
7. Non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being sought; and
8. Extraordinary speed in which the loan release was made.
Moreover, a behest loan may be distinguished from a non-behest loan in that while both may
involve civil liability for non-payment or non-recovery, the former may likewise entail criminal
liability.
Several loan accounts were referred to the Committee for its investigation, including the loan
transactions between Comptronics Philippines, Inc. (CPI), now Integrated Circuits Philippines
(ICPI), and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).
After examining and studying the loan transactions, the Committee determined that they bore
the characteristics of a behest loan as defined under Memorandum Order No. 61.
Consequently, Atty. Orlando L. Salvador, Consultant of the Committee, and representing the
PCGG, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a sworn complaint3 for violation of Section
3(e)(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the
Concerned Members of the DBP Board of Governors, and Concerned Directors and Officers of
ICPI, namely, Querube Makalintal, Ambrosio C. Makalintal, Vicente R. Jayme, Antonio A.
Santiago, Edgar L. Quinto, Horacio G. Makalintal, Alfredo F. delos Angeles, Josery D. Ruede,
Manuel Tupaz, Alberto T. Perez and Gerardo A. Limjuco (private respondents).
Atty. Salvador alleged that ICPI applied for an industrial loan (foreign currency loan) of
US$1,352,400.00, or ₱10,143,000.00, from DBP. The loan application was approved on August
6, 1980 under DBP Board Resolution No. 2924. Atty. Salvador claimed that there was undue
haste in the approval of the loan. He also alleged that prior to its approval, ICPI was granted an
interim loan of ₱1,786,000.00 to cover the project’s initial financing requirement. He added
that the ICPI’s industrial loan was under-collateralized and ICPI was undercapitalized at the time
the loan was granted. ICPI’s paid up capital by then was only ₱3,000,000.00, while the
appraised value of the machinery and equipment offered as collaterals was only ₱5,943,610.00.
Atty. Salvador concluded that ICPI was undeserving of the concession given to it, and the
approval of the loan constitutes a violation of Section 3(e)(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
On March 13, 1996, Atty. Salvador filed a Supplementary Complaint Affidavit, 4 to include in his
complaint ICPI’s interim loan of ₱1,786,000.00, which he claimed was granted with undue haste
and without collateral, except a promissory note and comfort letter signed by DBP Chairman
Rafael Sison. He added that the stockholders, officers and agents are identified cronies, since
the Chairman of the Board – Querube Makalintal – was, at the same time, the then Speaker of
the Interim Batasang Pambansa. He named Rafael A. Sison, Jose Tengco, Alice Ll. Reyes, and
Casimiro Tanedo as the ones responsible for the approval of the loan who should, thus, be
charged, along with the officers and directors of ICPI, for violation of R.A. No. 3019.
After evaluating the evidence submitted by the Committee, the Ombudsman issued the
assailed Memorandum, finding that:
After going over the record, we find no probable cause to warrant the filing of the instant case
in court.
To start with, the cause of action has prescribed.
The loan in [question] was entered into between ICPI and DBP sometime in August 1980, while
the complaint was filed on February 17, 1995 only, or after the lapse of almost fifteen years.
Under Section 11, RA 3019, offenses committed before March 16, 1982, prescribed in ten (10)
years.
The transaction was duly documented and the instruments drawn in support thereof were duly
registered and open to public scrutiny, the prescriptive period of any legal action in connection
with the said transaction commenced to run from the date the same was registered sometime
in 1980.
xxxx
Complainant’s allegation that the questioned loans were not covered by sufficient collaterals is
negated by the evidence on record. It appears from the Executive Summary attached to the
complaint that ICPI loans were secured by the following, to wit: (a) Machinery and Equipment
to be acquired valued at ₱5,943,610.00; (b) The Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee
Corporation guarantee up to 70% of the proposed DBP loan or ₱7,100,000.00; (c) By the Joint
and several signatures with ICPI, Philippine Underwriter Finance Corporation; Atrium Capital
Corporation, Mr. Ambrocio and Querube Macalintal. The value of the machineries and
equipment and the amount guaranteed by Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee
Corporation have a total amount ₱13,043,610.00. ICPI’s paid up capital in the amount
of ₱3,000,000.00 was also considered as additional security. The aggregate value of ICPI’s
securities was therefore ₱16,043,610.00, while the total amount of loans granted was only
₱10,143,000.00. Clearly, therefore, the loans granted to ICPI were not undercollaterized (sic).
Moreover, ICPI had an authorized capital stock of ₱10 Million of which ₱3 Million had been paid
up or more than 25% of the authorized capital. It cannot be said that the corporation is
undercapitalized.
In fine, the questioned loans were not considered behest loans within the purview of
Memorandum Order No. 61, dated November 9, 1992 (Broadening the Scope of the Ad-Hoc
Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans Created Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 13,
dated October 8, 1992).
Finally, the aforesaid Administrative and Memorandum Orders both issued by the President in
1992, may not be retroactively applied to the questioned transactions which took place in 1980
because to do so would be tantamount to an ex post facto law which is proscribed by the
Constitution.5
Thus, the Ombudsman disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, let the instant complaint be, as the same is hereby,
DISMISSED.
SO RESOLVED.6
A motion for reconsideration was filed, but the Ombudsman denied the same on June 6, 2000.7
Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Before tackling the issues raised by the petitioner, this Court takes notice of a serious
procedural flaw. Joseph Edralin, Roberto Ongpin, Verden Dangilan and Rodolfo Manalo were
impleaded as respondents in this petition. However, they were not made respondents in the
proceedings before the Ombudsman. Neither was there any allegation in the sworn-complaint
and supplementary complaint executed by Atty. Salvador before the Ombudsman that Edralin,
Ongpin, Dangilan and Manalo had any participation in, or were responsible for, the approval of
the questioned loan. As such, they cannot be made respondents for the first time in this
petition. Accordingly, we dismiss the petition as against them.
With the procedural issue resolved, this Court now comes to the issues raised by the petitioner.
Petitioner alleges that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that (i) the offenses subject of its criminal complaint had
prescribed; (ii) Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are ex post facto
laws; and (iii) there is no probable cause to indict private respondents for violation under
Section 3(e)(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
The computation of the prescriptive period for offenses involving the acquisition of behest
loans had already been laid to rest in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans v. Desierto,8 thus:
[I]t was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations of
R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because, as alleged, the
public officials concerned connived or conspired with the "beneficiaries of the loans." Thus, we
agree with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the offenses with which the
respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from the discovery of the
commission thereof and not from the day of such commission.9
The ruling was reiterated in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Ombudsman Desierto,10 wherein the Court explained:
In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the February 1986 EDSA
Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the government as the
aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the time the questioned transactions
were made. Moreover, no person would have dared to question the legality of those
transactions. Thus, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the date of
discovery of the offense in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc
Committee on Behest Loans.11
The Sworn Statement filed by Atty. Salvador did not specify the exact dates when the alleged
offenses were discovered. However, the records show that it was the Committee that
discovered the same. As such, the discovery could not have been made earlier than October 8,
1992, the date when the Committee was created. The complaint was filed on February 17,
1995, less than three (3) years from the presumptive date of discovery. Thus, the criminal
offenses allegedly committed by the private respondents had not yet prescribed when the
complaint was filed.
Likewise, we do not agree with the Ombudsman’s declaration that Administrative Order No. 13
and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be applied retroactively to the questioned transactions
because to do so would violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.
An ex post facto law has been defined as one — (a) which makes an action done before the
passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c) which
changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime
when it was committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or
different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order
to convict the defendant;12 or (e) which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only, but
in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when exercised was lawful; or (f)
which deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty.13
The constitutional proscription of ex post facto laws is aimed against the retrospectivity of
penal laws. Penal laws are acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish
penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for
their punishment.14
Administrative Order No. 13 does not mete out a penalty for the act of granting behest loans. It
merely creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact- Finding Committee on Behest Loans and provides
for its composition and functions. Memorandum Order No. 61, on the other hand, simply
provides the frame of reference in determining the existence of behest loans. Not being penal
laws, Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as
ex-post facto laws.
Furthermore, in Estarija v. Ranada,15 in which petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality of

R.A. No. 6770 in his motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s decision, we had occasion
to state that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction to entertain questions on the constitutionality
of a law. The Ombudsman, therefore, acted in excess of its jurisdiction in delving into the
constitutionality of the subject administrative and memorandum orders.
Now, on the merits of the case.
Private respondents were charged with violation of Section 3(e)(g) of R.A. No. 3019. The
pertinent provisions read:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of officers or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
xxxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit
thereby.
Petitioner asserts that the loan transaction between DBP and ICPI bore the characteristics of a
behest loan. It claims that the loan was under-collateralized and ICPI was under-capitalized
when the questioned loan was hastily granted. Petitioner believes that there exists probable
cause to indict the private respondents for violation of Section 3(e)(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
Case law has it that the determination of probable cause against those in public office during a
preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman. 16 The
Ombudsman is empowered to determine, in the exercise of his discretion, whether probable
cause exists, and to charge the person believed to have committed the crime as defined by law.
As a rule, courts should not interfere with the Ombudsman’s investigatory power, exercised
through the Ombudsman Prosecutors, and the authority to determine the presence or absence
of probable cause, except when the finding is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.17
For one to have violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the following elements must be
established: 1) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or
official functions; 2) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
inexcusable negligence; and 3) he must have caused undue injury to any party, including the
government, or given any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference, in the
discharge of his functions.18 Evidently, mere bad faith or partiality and negligence per se are not
enough for one to be held liable under the law. It is required that the act constitutive of bad
faith or partiality must, in the first place, be evident or manifest, while the negligent deed
should be both gross and inexcusable. Further, it is necessary to show that any or all of these
modalities resulted in undue injury to a specified party.19
On the other hand, to be liable under Section 3(g), there must be a showing that private
respondents entered into a grossly disadvantageous contract on behalf of the government.
Petitioner did not satisfy either criterion.
It is clear from the records that the DBP officers studied and evaluated ICPI’s request for an
interim loan and an industrial loan, and they were convinced that ICPI was deserving of the
grant, considering the viability and economic desirability of its project. Petitioners failed to
demonstrate that DBP did not exercise sound business judgment when it approved the loan.
Neither was there any proof that the conditions imposed for the loan were specially designed in
order to favor ICPI.
The Chapter on Human Relations of the Civil Code directs every person, inter alia, to observe
good faith, which springs from the fountain of good conscience.20 Well-settled is the rule that
good faith is presumed. Specifically, a public officer is presumed to have acted in good faith in
the performance of his duties.
Mistakes committed by a public officer are not actionable, absent a clear showing that he was
motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith.21 "Bad faith" does not simply
connote bad moral judgment or negligence. There must be some dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a sworn duty through some motive
or intent, or ill will. It partakes of the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill will for ulterior
purposes.22 Petitioners utterly failed to show that private respondents’ actions fit such
description.
Neither was there any convincing proof offered to demonstrate that the contracts were grossly
disadvantageous to the Government, or that they were entered into to give ICPI unwarranted
benefits and advantages.
Petitioner asserts that ICPI was undeserving of the accommodation given by DBP. To support
this allegation, petitioners quoted a portion of the credit evaluation report, which reads:
Investigations conducted by DBP’s Credit Department revealed adverse findings on ICPI and Mr.
Gene Vicente Tamesis, who until recently, has been the principal stockholder and executive
officer of subject Corporation. x x x Mr. Tamesis, however, has since transferred all of his
shareholdings to Mr. Ambrosio G. Makalintal. Aware of Mr. Tamesis’ unfavorable credit
standing, ICPI’s management has, further, caused him to yield his position as Chairman of the
Board in favor of Mr. Querube C. Makalintal, former Justice of the Supreme Court and presently
Speaker of the Interim Batasang Pambansa.23
But we note that the said credit investigation report goes further, and states:
With the responsible management of the Makalintals and the conversion of substantial
liabilities of ICPI into equity (subject-firm’s major creditors, namely, Philippine Underwriters
Finance Corporation and Atrium Capital Corporation have both agreed, in principle, to convert
their claims into equity), the corporation can now operate on a clean credit slate and stands a
good chance of meeting its credit obligations.24
There is, thus, no solid basis for petitioners to claim that ICPI did not deserve the concession
given by DBP.
Contrary to what petitioner wants to portray, the contracts between ICPI and DBP were not
behest loans. ICPI was not under-capitalized and the loan was not under-collateralized at the
time of its approval. Likewise, the approval can hardly be depicted as one done with undue
haste.
The records show that in 1979, Atrium Capital Corporation and Philippine Underwriter’s
Corporation agreed on the conversion of their ₱8,500,000.00 worth of creditor’s equity into
capital stocks.25 Then, in 1980, the individual stockholders paid their respective subscriptions
amounting to ₱3,000,000.00, thereby increasing ICPI’s paid up capital to ₱11,500,000.00 as of
April 23, 1980.26 This belies petitioners’ claim that, at that time, ICPI was under-capitalized.
Similarly, the industrial loan was sufficiently collateralized at the time of its approval. It was
granted on the condition that the assets intended for acquisition by ICPI would serve as
collateral. The Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation (PEFLGC) also
guaranteed 70% of the loan extended. ICPI was further required to assign to DBP not less than
67% of its total subscribed and outstanding voting shares, which should be maintained at all
times and should subsist during the existence of the loan. As additional security, ICPI’s majority
stockholders, namely, Integrated Circuits Philippine, Inc. (ICP) of Philippine Underwriters
Finance Corporation, Atrium Corporation (AC), Ambrosio G. Makalintal and Querube Makalintal
were also made jointly and severally liable to DBP. DBP was also given the right to designate its
comptroller in ICP.27
Petitioner’s insistence that DBP excluded the joint and several liabilities of the majority
stockholders of ICP and AC and of Querube Makalintal has to be rejected. It is true that DBP’s
Industrial Project Department recommended the amendment of this condition. However, no
proof was offered to prove that the DBP Board of Directors approved such
recommendation.1avvphi1
Petitioner also points to the alleged non-implementation of the guarantee by PEFLGC to

demonstrate that the loan was under-collateralized at the time of its approval. But the
evidence28 presented shows that the PEFLGC approved the guarantee, although the approval
lapsed in 1985. Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that, at the time of the approval of the loan, there
was a guarantee by PEFLGC. Besides, even if we exclude as security the guarantee of PEFLGC,
the loan still had sufficient collaterals at the time of its approval.
The contention that the loan was hastily granted also fails to persuade. The supplemental
complaint alleged that the interim loan was granted on April 6, 1980. However, there was no
allegation, much less proof, as to when ICPI applied for this interim loan. In the absence of such
proof, we cannot conclude that the same was hastily granted.
Neither does the industrial loan appear to have been hastily granted. Admittedly, the interim
loan granted on April 6, 1980 formed part of ICPI’s application for industrial or foreign currency
loan in the amount of US$1,352,400.00. Logically then, we can assume that ICPI’s application
was filed earlier than April 6, 1980, the date of the approval of the interim loan. DBP, however,
approved the industrial loan only on August 6, 1980. The processing period of more than four
months is inconsistent with the claim that the loan was hastily granted.29
In sum, petitioner does not persuade us that the contract between ICPI and DBP was a behest
loan.
Finally, we note that petitioner did not specify the precise role played by, or the participation
of, each of the private respondents in the alleged violation of R.A. No. 3019. No concrete or
overt acts of the ICP’s directors and officers, particularly of Mr. Querube Makalintal, were
specifically alleged or mentioned in the complaint and its supplement, and no proof was
adduced to show that they unduly influenced the directors and concerned officials of DBP.
Neither were circumstances shown to indicate a common criminal design of either the officers
of DPB or ICPI, nor that they colluded to cause undue injury to the government by giving
unwarranted benefits to ICPI.
The Ombudsman can hardly be faulted for not wanting to proceed with the prosecution of the
offense, convinced that he does not possess the necessary evidence to secure a conviction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Memorandum and Order of the Ombudsman
in OMB-0-95-0443, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 December 27, 1972
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. SIMEON. FERRER (in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch
I), FELICIANO CO alias LEONCIO CO alias "Bob," and NILO S. TAYAG alias Romy Reyes alias
"Taba," respondents.
Solicitor R. Mutuc for respondent Feliciano Co.
Jose W. Diokno for respondent Nilo Tayag.
CASTRO, J.:p
I. Statement of the Case
Posed in issue in these two cases is the constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion

Act,1 which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and other "subversive
associations," and punishes any person who "knowingly, wilfully and by overt acts affiliates
himself with, becomes or remains a member" of the Party or of any other similar "subversive"
organization.
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was
filed against the respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. On March 10
Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted a preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie case
against Co, directed the Government prosecutors to file the corresponding information. The
twice-amended information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27, recites:
That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the Municipality of Capas,

Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above named accused, feloniously became an officer and/or ranking
leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal
organization aimed to overthrow the Government of the Philippines by means of
force, violence, deceit, subversion, or any other illegal means for the purpose of
establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the government
under the control and domination of an alien power, by being an instructor in
the Mao Tse Tung University, the training school of recruits of the New People's
Army, the military arm of the said Communist Party of the Philippines.
That in the commission of the above offense, the following aggravating

circumstances are present, to wit:
(a) That the crime has been committed in contempt of or with insult to public
authorities;
(b) That the crime was committed by a band; and afford impunity.
(c) With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.
Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.
Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the same court,
sharing the respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion. After preliminary
investigation was had, an information was filed, which, as amended, reads:
The undersigned provincial Fiscal of Tarlac and State Prosecutors duly designated
by the Secretary of Justice to collaborate with the Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac,
pursuant to the Order dated June 5, above entitled case, hereby accuse Nilo S.
Tayag, alias Romy Reyes alias TABA, ARTHUR GARCIA, RENATO (REY) CASIPE,
ABELARDO GARCIA, MANUEL ALAVADO, BENJAMIN BIE alias COMMANDER
MELODY and several JOHN DOES, whose identities are still unknown, for
violation of REPUBLIC ACT No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion
Law, committed as follows:
That in or about March 1969 and for sometime prior thereto and thereafter, in
the Province of Tarlac, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and
elsewhere in the Philippines, the above-named accused knowingly, wilfully and
by overt acts organized, joined and/or remained as offices and/or ranking
leaders, of the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN, a subversive organization as defined
in Republic Act No. 1700; that BENJAMIN BIE and COMMANDER MELODY, in
addition thereto, knowingly, wilfully and by over acts joined and/or remained as
a member and became an officer and/or ranking leader not only of the
Communist Party of the Philippines but also of the New People's Army, the
military arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines; and that all the above-
named accused, as such officers and/or ranking leaders of the foretasted
subversive organizations, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, did then and there knowingly, wilfully and feloniously commit
subversive and/or seditious acts, by inciting, instigating and stirring the people to
unite and rise publicly and tumultuously and take up arms against the
government, and/or engage in rebellious conspiracies and riots to overthrow the
government of the Republic of the Philippines by force, violence, deceit,
subversion and/or other illegal means among which are the following:
1. On several occasions within the province of Tarlac, the accused conducted

meetings and/or seminars wherein the said accused delivered speeches
instigating and inciting the people to unite, rise in arms and overthrow the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, by force, violence, deceit,
subversion and/or other illegal means; and toward this end, the said accused
organized, among others a chapter of the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN in barrio
Motrico, La Paz, Tarlac for the avowed purpose of undertaking or promoting an
armed revolution, subversive and/or seditious propaganda, conspiracies, and/or
riots and/or other illegal means to discredit and overthrow the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines and to established in the Philippines a Communist
regime.
2. The accused NILO TAYAG alias ROMY REYES alias TABA, together with
FRANCISCO PORTEM alias KIKO Gonzales and others, pursued the above
subversive and/or seditious activities in San Pablo City by recruiting members for
the New People's Army, and/or by instigating and inciting the people to organize
and unite for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines through armed revolution, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal
means, and establishing in the Philippines a Communist Government.
That the following aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the

offense: (a) aid of armed men or persons to insure or afford impunity; and (b)
craft, fraud, or disguise was employed.
On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the statute on the grounds
that (1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces more than one subject not
expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it denied him the equal protection of the laws.
Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its resolution of September 15,
1970, declared the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague
and overboard, and dismissed the informations against the two accused. The Government
appealed. We resolved to treat its appeal as a special civil action for certiorari.
II. Is the Act a Bill of Attainder?
Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex port facto law
shall be enacted."2 A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without
trial.3 Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. 4 The
constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of
powers 5 by confining legislatures to
rule-making 6 and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. 7 History in
perspective, bills of attainder were employed to suppress unpopular causes and political
minorities, 8 and it is against this evil that the constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling
out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to
stigmatized statute as a bill of attainder. 9
In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned by the court a quo as a bill of
attainder because it "tars and feathers" the Communist Party of the Philippines as a "continuing
menace to the freedom and security of the country; its existence, a 'clear, present and grave
danger to the security of the Philippines.'" By means of the Act, the trial court said, Congress
usurped "the powers of the judge," and assumed "judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt
of the CCP without any of the forms or safeguards of judicial trial." Finally, according to the trial
court, "if the only issue [to be determined] is whether or not the accused is a knowing and
voluntary member, the law is still a bill of attainder because it has expressly created a
presumption of organizational guilt which the accused can never hope to overthrow."
1. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the
Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment.
What it does is simply to declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of
the Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership in
the outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of the Philippines" issued solely for
definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines
but also to "any other organization having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is
not on individuals but on conduct. 10
This feature of the Act distinguishes it from section 504 of the U.S. Federal Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 11 which, in U.S. vs. Brown, 12 was held to be a bill of
attainder and therefore unconstitutional. Section 504 provided in its pertinent parts as follows:
(a) No person who is or has been a member of the Communist

Party ... shall serve —
(1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive board or similar

governing body, business agent, manager, organizer, or other employee (other
than as an employee performing exclusively clerical or custodial duties) of any
labor organization.
during or for five years after the termination of his membership in the
Communist Party....
(b) Any person who wilfully violates this section shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
This statute specified the Communist Party, and imposes disability and penalties on its
members. Membership in the Party, without more, ipso facto disqualifies a person from
becoming an officer or a member of the governing body of any labor organization. As the
Supreme Court of the United States pointed out:
Under the line of cases just outlined, sec. 504 of the Labor Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act plainly constitutes a bill of attainder. Congress
undoubtedly possesses power under the Commerce Clause to enact legislation
designed to keep from positions affecting interstate commerce persons who may
use of such positions to bring about political strikes. In section 504, however,
Congress has exceeded the authority granted it by the Constitution. The statute
does not set forth a generally applicable rule decreeing that any person who
commits certain acts or possesses certain characteristics (acts and characteristics
which, in Congress' view, make them likely to initiate political strikes) shall not
hold union office, and leaves to courts and juries the job of deciding what
persons have committed the specified acts or possessed the specified
characteristics. Instead, it designates in no uncertain terms the persons who
possess the feared characteristics and therefore cannot hold union office without
incurring criminal liability — members of the Communist Party.
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 US 1, 6 L ed 2d 625,

81 S CT 1357, lend a support to our conclusion. That case involved an appeal
from an order by the Control Board ordering the Communist Party to register as
a "Communist-action organization," under the Subversive Activities Control Act
of 1950, 64 Stat 987, 50 USC sec. 781 et seq. (1958 ed). The definition of
"Communist-action organization" which the Board is to apply is set forth in sec. 3
of the Act:
[A]ny organization in the United States ... which (i)is substantially directed,
dominated, or controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization
controlling the world Communist movement referred to in section 2 of this title,
and(ii) operates primarily to advance the objectives of such world Communist
movement... 64 Stat 989, 50 USC sec. 782 (1958 ed.)
A majority of the Court rejected the argument that the Act was a bill of
attainder, reasoning that sec. 3 does not specify the persons or groups upon
which the deprivations set forth in the Act are to be imposed, but instead sets
forth a general definition. Although the Board has determined in 1953 that the
Communist Party was a "Communist-action organization," the Court found the
statutory definition not to be so narrow as to insure that the Party would always
come within it:
In this proceeding the Board had found, and the Court of Appeals has sustained
its conclusion, that the Communist Party, by virtue of the activities in which it
now engages, comes within the terms of the Act. If the Party should at anytime
choose to abandon these activities, after it is once registered pursuant to sec. 7,
the Act provides adequate means of relief. (367 US, at 87, 6 L ed 2d at 683)
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to
charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their
punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The
Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, wilfully
and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and with
specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Government by force
deceit, and other illegal means and place the country under the control and domination of a
foreign power.
As to the claim that under the statute organization guilt is nonetheless imputed despite the
requirement of proof of knowing membership in the Party, suffice it to say that is precisely the
nature of conspiracy, which has been referred to as a "dragneet device" whereby all who
participate in the criminal covenant are liable. The contention would be correct if the statute
were construed as punishing mere membership devoid of any specific intent to further the
unlawful goals of the Party. 13 But the statute specifically required that membership must
be knowing or active, with specific intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party. That is
what section 4 means when it requires that membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to
have been acquired "knowingly, wilfully and by overt acts." 14 The ingredient of specific intent
to pursue the unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by "overt acts." 15This constitutes an
element of "membership" distinct from the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former requires
proof of direct participation in the organization's unlawful activities, while the latter requires
proof of mere adherence to the organization's illegal objectives.
2. Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities, this feature is
not enough to render it a bill of attainder. A statute prohibiting partners or employees of
securities underwriting firms from serving as officers or employees of national banks on the
basis of a legislative finding that the persons mentioned would be subject to the temptation to
commit acts deemed inimical to the national economy, has been declared not to be a bill of
attainder. 16 Similarly, a statute requiring every secret, oath-bound society having a
membership of at least twenty to register, and punishing any person who becomes a member
of such society which fails to register or remains a member thereof, was declared valid even if
in its operation it was shown to apply only to the members of the Ku Klux Klan. 17
In the Philippines the validity of section 23 (b) of the Industrial Peace Act, 18 requiring labor
unions to file with the Department of Labor affidavits of union officers "to the effect that they
are not members of the Communist Party and that they are not members of any organization
which teaches the overthrow of the Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional
method," was upheld by this Court. 19
Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable
members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does
it become a bill of attainder. 20 It is upon this ground that statutes which disqualified those who
had taken part in the rebellion against the Government of the United States during the Civil
War from holding office, 21 or from exercising their profession, 22 or which prohibited the
payment of further compensation to individuals named in the Act on the basis of a finding that
they had engages in subversive activities, 23 or which made it a crime for a member of the
Communist Party to serve as an officer or employee of a labor union, 24 have been invalidated
as bills of attainder.
But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally acknowledged to be certain as

to be "judicially noticeable," the legislature may apply its own rules, and judicial hearing is not
needed fairly to make such determination. 25
In New York ex rel. Bryant vs. Zimmerman, 26 the New York legislature passed a law requiring
every secret, oath-bound society with a membership of at least twenty to register, and
punishing any person who joined or remained a member of such a society failing to register.
While the statute did not specify the Ku Klux Klan, in its operation the law applied to the KKK
exclusively. In sustaining the statute against the claim that it discriminated against the Ku Klux
Klan while exempting other secret, oath-bound organizations like masonic societies and the
Knights of Columbus, the United States Supreme Court relied on common knowledge of the
nature and activities of the Ku Klux Klan. The Court said:
The courts below recognized the principle shown in the cases just cited and
reached the conclusion that the classification was justified by a difference
between the two classes of associations shown by experience, and that the
difference consisted (a) in a manifest tendency on the part of one class to make
the secrecy surrounding its purpose and membership a cloak for acts and
conduct inimical to personal rights and public welfare, and (b) in the absence of
such a tendency on the part of the other class. In pointing out this difference one
of the courts said of the Ku Klux Klan, the principal association in the included
class: "It is a matter of common knowledge that this organization functions
largely at night, its members disguised by hoods and gowns and doing things
calculated to strike terror into the minds of the people;" and later said of the
other class: "These organizations and their purposes are well known, many of
them having been in existence for many years. Many of them are oath-bound
and secret. But we hear no complaint against them regarding violation of the
peace or interfering with the rights of others." Another of the courts said: "It is a
matter of common knowledge that the association or organization of which the
relator is concededly a member exercises activities tending to the prejudice and
intimidation of sundry classes of our citizens. But the legislation is not confined
to this society;" and later said of the other class: "Labor unions have a recognized
lawful purpose. The benevolent orders mentioned in the Benevolent Orders Law
have already received legislative scrutiny and have been granted special
privileges so that the legislature may well consider them beneficial rather than
harmful agencies." The third court, after recognizing "the potentialities of evil in
secret societies," and observing that "the danger of certain organizations has
been judicially demonstrated," — meaning in that state, — said: "Benevolent
orders, labor unions and college fraternities have existed for many years, and,
while not immune from hostile criticism, have on the whole justified their
existence."
We assume that the legislature had before it such information as was readily
available including the published report of a hearing, before a committee of the
House of Representatives of the 57th Congress relating to the formation,
purposes and activities of the Klu Klux Klan. If so it was advised — putting aside
controverted evidence — that the order was a revival of the Ku Klux Klan of an
earlier time with additional features borrowed from the Know Nothing and the
A. P. A. orders of other periods; that its memberships was limited to native-born,
gentile, protestant whites; that in part of its constitution and printed creed it
proclaimed the widest freedom for all and full adherence to the Constitution of
the United States; in another exacted of its member an oath to shield and
preserve "white supremacy;" and in still another declared any person actively
opposing its principles to be "a dangerous ingredient in the body politic of our
country and an enemy to the weal of our national commonwealth;" that it was
conducting a crusade against Catholics, Jews, and Negroes, and stimulating
hurtful religious and race prejudices; that it was striving for political power and
assuming a sort of guardianship over the administration of local, state and
national affairs; and that at times it was taking into its own hands the
punishment of what some of its members conceived to be crimes. 27
In the Philippines the character of the Communist Party has been the object of continuing
scrutiny by this Court. In 1932 we found the Communist Party of the Philippines to be an illegal
association. 28 In 1969 we again found that the objective of the Party was the "overthrow of the
Philippine Government by armed struggle and to establish in the Philippines a communist form
of government similar to that of Soviet Russia and Red China." 29 More recently, in Lansang vs.
Garcia, 30 we noted the growth of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the organization
of Communist fronts among youth organizations such as the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) and
the emergence of the New People's Army. After meticulously reviewing the evidence, we said:
"We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a sizeable group of men who have
publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and have thus been and still are engaged in
rebellion against the Government of the Philippines.
3. Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it may fall within the
ambit of the prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also necessary that it must apply
retroactively and reach past conduct. This requirement follows from the nature of a bill of
attainder as a legislative adjudication of guilt. As Justice Frankfurter observed, "frequently a bill
of attainder was ... doubly objectionable because of its ex post fact features. This is the historic
explanation for uniting the two mischiefs in one
clause — 'No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.' ... Therefore, if [a statute] is
a bill of attainder it is also an ex post facto law. But if it is not an ex post facto law, the reasons
that establish that it is not are persuasive that it cannot be a bill of attainder." 31
Thus in Gardner vs. Board of Public Works, 32 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of the
Charter of the City of Los Angeles which provided:
... [N]o person shall hold or retain or be eligible for any public office or
employment in the service of the City of Los Angeles, in any office or department
thereof, either elective or appointive, who has within five (5) years prior to the
effective date of this section advised, advocated, or taught, or who may, after
this section becomes effective, become a member of or affiliated with any
group, society, association, organization or party which advises, advocates or
teaches or has within said period of five (5) years advised, advocated, or taught
the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States of
America or of the State of California.
In upholding the statute, the Court stressed the prospective application of the Act to the
petitioner therein, thus:
... Immaterial here is any opinion we might have as to the charter provision
insofar as it purported to apply retrospectively for a five-year period to its
effective date. We assume that under the Federal Constitution the Charter
Amendment is valid to the extent that it bars from the city's public service
persons who, subsequently to its adoption in 1941, advise, advocate, or reach
the violent overthrow of the Government or who are or become affiliated with
any group doing so. The provisions operating thus prospectively were a
reasonable regulation to protect the municipal service by establishing an
employment qualification of loyalty to the State and the United States.
... Unlike the provisions of the charter and ordinance under which petitioners
were removed, the statute in the Lovett case did not declare general and
prospectively operative standards of qualification and eligibility for public
employment. Rather, by its terms it prohibited any further payment of
compensation to named individuals or employees. Under these circumstances,
viewed against the legislative background, the statute was held to have imposed
penalties without judicial trial.
Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is that Congress thereby assumed judicial
magistracy, them it must be demonstrated that the statute claimed to be a bill of attainder
reaches past conduct and that the penalties it imposes are inescapable. As the U.S. Supreme
Court observed with respect to the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950:
Nor is the statute made an act of "outlawry" or of attainder by the fact that the
conduct which it regulates is described with such particularity that, in
probability, few organization will come within the statutory terms. Legislatures
may act to curb behaviour which they regard as harmful to the public welfare,
whether that conduct is found to be engaged in by many persons or by one. So
long as the incidence of legislation is such that the persons who engage in the
regulated conduct, be they many or few, can escape regulation merely by
altering the course of their own present activities, there can be no complaint of
an attainder. 33
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of the Anti-Subversion Act. Section 4 thereof
expressly states that the prohibition therein applies only to acts committed “After the approval
of this Act." Only those who "knowingly, wilfully and by overt acts affiliate themselves with,
become or remain members of the Communist Party of the Philippines and/or its successors or
of any subversive association “after June 20, 1957, are punished. Those who were members of
the Party or of any other subversive association at the time of the enactment of the law, were
given the opportunity of purging themselves of liability by renouncing in writing and under oath
their membership in the Party. The law expressly provides that such renunciation shall operate
to exempt such persons from penal liability. 34 The penalties prescribed by the Act are therefore
not inescapable.
III. The Act and the Requirements of Due Process
1. As already stated, the legislative declaration in section 2 of the Act that the Communist Party
of the Philippines is an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government is intended
not to provide the basis for a legislative finding of guilt of the members of the Party but rather
to justify the proscription spelled out in section 4. Freedom of expression and freedom of
association are so fundamental that they are thought by some to occupy a “preferred position"
in the hierarchy of constitutional values. 35 Accordingly, any limitation on their exercise must be
justified by the existence of a substantive evil. This is the reason why before enacting the
statute in question Congress conducted careful investigations and then stated its findings in the
preamble, thus:
... [T]he Communist Party of the Philippines although purportedly a political

party, is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines not only by force and violence but also by deceit,
subversion and other illegal means, for the purpose of establishing in the
Philippines a totalitarian regime subject to alien domination and control;
... [T]he continued existence and activities of the Communist Party of the
Philippines constitutes a clear, present and grave danger to the security of the
Philippines;
... [I]n the face of the organized, systematic and persistent subversion, national
in scope but international in direction, posed by the Communist Party of the
Philippines and its activities, there is urgent need for special legislation to cope
with this continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country.
In truth, the constitutionality of the Act would be open to question if, instead of making these
findings in enacting the statute, Congress omitted to do so.
In saying that by means of the Act Congress has assumed judicial magistracy, the trial court
failed to take proper account of the distinction between legislative fact and adjudicative fact.
Professor Paul Freund elucidates the crucial distinction, thus:
... A law forbidding the sale of beverages containing more than 3.2 per cent of
alcohol would raise a question of legislative fact, i.e., whether this standard has a
reasonable relation to public health, morals, and the enforcement problem. A
law forbidding the sale of intoxicating beverages (assuming it is not so vague as
to require supplementation by rule-making)would raise a question of
adjudicative fact, i.e., whether this or that beverage is intoxicating within the
meaning of the statute and the limits on governmental action imposed by the
Constitution. Of course what we mean by fact in each case is itself an ultimate
conclusion founded on underlying facts and on criteria of judgment for weighing
them.
A conventional formulation is that legislative facts — those facts which are

relevant to the legislative judgment — will not be canvassed save to determine
whether there is a rational basis for believing that they exist, while adjudicative
facts — those which tie the legislative enactment to the litigant — are to be
demonstrated and found according to the ordinary standards prevailing for
judicial trials. 36
The test formulated in Nebbia vs. new York, 37 and adopted by this Court in Lansang vs.
Garcia, 38 is that 'if laws are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose,
and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and
judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio." The recital of legislative
findings implements this test.
With respect to a similar statement of legislative findings in the U.S. Federal Subversive
Activities Control Act of 1950 (that "Communist-action organizations" are controlled by the
foreign government controlling the world Communist movement and that they operate
primarily to “advance the objectives of such world Communist movement"),the U.S. Supreme
Court said:
It is not for the courts to re-examine the validity of these legislative findings and
reject them....They are the product of extensive investigation by Committees of
Congress over more than a decade and a half. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S.502, 516, 530. We certainly cannot dismiss them as unfounded irrational
imaginings. ... And if we accept them, as we must as a not unentertainable
appraisal by Congress of the threat which Communist organizations pose not
only to existing government in the United States, but to the United States as a
sovereign, independent Nation. ...we must recognize that the power of Congress
to regulate Communist organizations of this nature is
extensive. 39
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of the legislative findings articulated in the Anti-
Subversion Act.
That the Government has a right to protect itself against subversion is a proposition too plain to
require elaboration. Self-preservation is the "ultimate value" of society. It surpasses and
transcends every other value, "for if a society cannot protect its very structure from armed
internal attack, ...no subordinate value can be protected" 40 As Chief Justice Vinson so aptly said
in Dennis vs. United States: 41
Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the argument that there is a 'right'
to rebellion against dictatorial governments is without force where the existing
structure of government provides for peaceful and orderly change. We reject
any principle of governmental helplessness in the face of preparation for
revolution, which principle, carried to its logical conclusion, must lead to
anarchy. No one could conceive that it is not within the power of Congress to
prohibit acts intended to overthrow the government by force and violence.
2. By carefully delimiting the reach of the Act to conduct (as explicitly described in section 4
thereof), Congress reaffirmed its respect for the rule that "even through the governmental
purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly
stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved." 42 The
requirement of knowing membership, as distinguished from nominal membership, has-been
held as a sufficient basis for penalizing membership in a subversive organization. 43 For, as has
been stated:
Membership in an organization renders aid and encouragement to the

organization; and when membership is accepted or retained with knowledge
that the organization is engaged in an unlawful purpose, the one accepting or
retaining membership with such knowledge makes himself a party to the
unlawful enterprise in which it is engaged. 44
3. The argument that the Act is unconstitutionally overbroad because section 2 merely speaks
of "overthrow “of the Government and overthrow may be achieved by peaceful means,
misconceives the function of the phrase “knowingly, wilfully and by overt acts" in section 4.
Section 2 is merely a legislative declaration; the definitions of and the penalties prescribed for
the different acts prescribed are stated in section 4 which requires that membership in the
Communist Party of the Philippines, to be unlawful, must be acquired "knowingly, wilfully and
by overt acts." Indeed, the first "whereas" clause makes clear that the overthrow contemplated
is "overthrow not only by force and violence but also be deceit, subversion and other illegal
means." The absence of this qualification in section 2 appears to be due more to an oversight
rather than to deliberate omission.
Moreover, the word "overthrow' sufficiently connotes the use of violent and other illegal
means. Only in a metaphorical sense may one speak of peaceful overthrow of governments,
and certainly the law does not speak in metaphors. In the case of the Anti-Subversion Act, the
use of the word "overthrow" in a metaphorical sense is hardly consistent with the clearly
delineated objective of the "overthrow, “namely, "establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian
regime and place [sic] the Government under the control and domination of an alien power."
What this Court once said in a prosecution for sedition is appropos: "The language used by the
appellant clearly imported an overthrow of the Government by violence, and it should be
interpreted in the plain and obvious sense in which it was evidently intended to be understood.
The word 'overthrow ‘could not have been intended as referring to an ordinary change by the
exercise of the elective franchise. The use of the whip [which the accused exhorted his
audience to use against the Constabulary], an instrument designed to leave marks on the sides
of adversaries, is inconsistent with the mild interpretation which the appellant would have us
impute to the language." 45
IV. The Act and the Guaranty of Free Expression
As already pointed out, the Act is aimed against conspiracies to overthrow the Government by
force, violence or other illegal means. Whatever interest in freedom of speech and freedom of
association is infringed by the prohibition against knowing membership in the Communist Party
of the Philippines, is so indirect and so insubstantial as to be clearly and heavily outweighed by
the overriding considerations of national security and the preservation of democratic
institutions in his country.
The membership clause of the U.S. Federal Smith Act is similar in many respects to the
membership provision of the Anti-Subversion Act. The former provides:
Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group, or

assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or
destruction of any such government by force or violence; or becomes or is a
member of, or affiliated with, any such society, group or assembly of persons,
knowing the purpose thereof —
Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years,
or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States or any
department or agency thereof, for the five years next following his
conviction.... 46
In sustaining the validity of this provision, the "Court said in Scales vs. United States: 47
It was settled in Dennis that advocacy with which we are here concerned is not
constitutionally protected speech, and it was further established that a
combination to promote such advocacy, albeit under the aegis of what purports
to be a political party, is not such association as is protected by the first
Amendment. We can discern no reason why membership, when it constitutes a
purposeful form of complicity in a group engaging in this same forbidden
advocacy, should receive any greater degree of protection from the guarantees
of that Amendment.
Moreover, as was held in another case, where the problems of accommodating the exigencies
of self-preservation and the values of liberty are as complex and intricate as in the situation
described in the legislative findings stated in the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities Control Act
of 1950,the legislative judgment as to how that threat may best be met consistently with the
safeguards of personal freedoms is not to be set aside merely because the judgment of judges
would, in the first instance, have chosen other methods. 48 For in truth, legislation, "whether it
restrains freedom to hire or freedom to speak, is itself an effort at compromise between the
claims of the social order and individual freedom, and when the legislative compromise in
either case is brought to the judicial test the court stands one step removed from the conflict
and its resolution through law." 49
V. The Act and its Title
The respondent Tayag invokes the constitutional command that "no bill which may be enacted
into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." 50
What is assailed as not germane to or embraced in the title of the Act is the last proviso of
section 4 which reads:
And provided, finally, That one who conspires with any other person to
overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, or the
government of any of its political subdivisions by force, violence, deceit,
subversion or illegal means, for the purpose of placing such Government or
political subdivision under the control and domination of any lien power, shall be
punished by prision correccional to prision mayor with all the accessory penalties
provided therefore in the same code.
It is argued that the said proviso, in reality, punishes not only membership in the Communist
Party of the Philippines or similar associations, but as well "any conspiracy by two persons to
overthrow the national or any local government by illegal means, even if their intent is not to
establish a totalitarian regime, but a democratic regime, even if their purpose is not to place
the nation under an alien communist power, but under an alien democratic power like the
United States or England or Malaysia or even an anti-communist power like Spain, Japan,
Thailand or Taiwan or Indonesia."
The Act, in addition to its main title ("An Act to Outlaw the Communist Party of the Philippines
and Similar Associations, Penalizing Membership Therein, and for Other Purposes"), has a short
title. Section 1 provides that "This Act shall be known as the
Anti-Subversion Act."Together with the main title, the short title of the statute unequivocally
indicates that the subject matter is subversion in general which has for its fundamental purpose
the substitution of a foreign totalitarian regime in place of the existing Government and not
merely subversion by Communist conspiracies.
The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an index of its contents, and need not recite the
details of the Act. 51 It is a valid title if it indicates in broad but clear terms the nature, scope,
and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. 52 A narrow or technical construction
is to be avoided, and the statute will be read fairly and reasonably in order not to thwart the
legislative intent. We hold that the Anti-Subversion Act fully satisfies these requirements.
VI. Conclusion and Guidelines
In conclusion, even as we uphold the validity of the Anti-Subversion Act, we cannot

overemphasize the need for prudence and circumspection in its enforcement, operating as it
does in the sensitive area of freedom of expression and belief. Accordingly, we set the
following basic guidelines to be observed in any prosecution under the Act. The Government, in
addition to proving such circumstances as may affect liability, must establish the following
elements of the crime of joining the Communist Party of the Philippines or any other subversive
association:
(1) In the case of subversive organizations other than the Communist Party of the Philippines,
(a) that the purpose of the organization is to overthrow the present Government of the
Philippines and to establish in this country a totalitarian regime under the domination of a
foreign power; (b) that the accused joined such organization; and (c) that he did so knowingly,
wilfully and by overt acts; and
(2) In the case of the Communist Party of the Philippines, (a) that the CPP continues to pursue
the objectives which led Congress in 1957 to declare it to be an organized conspiracy for the
overthrow of the Government by illegal means for the purpose of placing the country under the
control of a foreign power; (b) that the accused joined the CPP; and (c) that he did so wilfully,
knowingly and by overt acts.
We refrain from making any pronouncement as to the crime or remaining a member of the
Communist Party of the Philippines or of any other subversive association: we leave this matter
to future determination.
ACCORDINGLY, the questioned resolution of September15, 1970 is set aside, and these two
cases are hereby remanded to the court a quo for trial on the merits. Costs de oficio.
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., concurs in the result.
Makasiar and Antonio, JJ., took no part.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 83341 January 30, 1990
ARNEL P. MISOLAS, petitioner,

vs.
HON. BENJAMIN V. PANGA, as Judge of RTC Branch 33, Cadlan Pili, Camarines Sur and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Soliman M. Santos, Jr. counsel de oficio for petitioner.
CORTES, J.:
This petition for certiorari ascribes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction to the respondent judge who denied petitioner's motion to quash the information
filed against him as well as his motion for reconsideration.
The case brings into focus our laws on subversion and subversion-related offenses.
The controversy arose from the following facts:
After receiving information from an unidentified informant that members of the New People's
Army (NPA) were resting in a suspected "underground house" in Foster Village, Del Carmen,
Pili, Camarines Sur, elements of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) raided said house in the early
morning of August 8, 1987. Three persons were inside the house, petitioner and two women
known by the aliases "Ka Donna" and "Ka Menchie" but the women were able to escape in the
confusion during the raid. The house was searched and the raiders found in a red bag under a
pillow allegedly used by petitioner a .20 gauge Remington shotgun and four live rounds of
ammunition. Petitioner was arrested and brought to the PC headquarters. On September 4,
1987, an information charging petitioner with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition
under Presidential Decree No. 1866 was filed by the provincial fiscal. The information alleged
that the firearm and ammunition were used in furtherance of subversion so as to qualify the
offense under the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, which provides:
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with
the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion, the penalty of death shall be
imposed.
Upon arraignment, the petitioner, with the assistance of counsel de oficio pleaded "not guilty"
to the charge. However, a few days later, the same counsel (also his counsel in this petition)
filed a motion to withdraw the plea on the ground that there was basis for the filing of a motion
to quash. Respondent judge gave petitioner time to file a motion to quash.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash on the following grounds:
(1) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense because the information does not
charge the proper offense since from the allegations the offense that may be charged is
either subversion or rebellion; and
(2) that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the person of petitioner because of
violations of his constitutional rights, i.e, his arrest and the seizure of the firearm and
ammunition were illegal.
Respondent judge denied the motion to quash for lack of merit in an order dated January 7,
1988. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but such was denied on February 15, 1988.
Hence, this petition.
1. The petition, reiterating the grounds alleged in the motion to quash, centers on the
argument that the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, which penalizes illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition committed in furtherance of, or incident to, or
in connection with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection, or subversion, should be
stricken down as unconstitutional. In the words of petitioner:
Unconstitutional because it is violative of the due process clause, particularly

substantive due process against arbitrary laws. Arbitrary because it disregards the
overwhelming weight of national as well as international laws and jurisprudence behind
the Hernandez (99 Phil. 515) and Geronimo (100 Phil. 90) rulings on the doctrine of
absorption of common crimes in rebellion.
If murder is absorbed in rebellion, with more reason should illegal possession of

firearms be absorbed in rebellion and for that matter subversion.
While it is true that subversion is an entirely different and distinct crime from rebellion,
both are recognized as political offenses. So much so that in the Guidelines for the Grant
of Pardon to Political Detainees/Prisoners, the latter are defined as those charged
detained or imprisoned for rebellion or subversion, among others.
The idea of absorption of illegal possession of firearms in subversion is also bolstered by

the fact that in Republic Act 1700, as amended, subversion or its penalty is qualified
when the subversive "takes up arms against the Government."
It cannot be said that P.D. No. 1866 is an exception to
the Hernandez and Geronimo rulings. On the contrary, it is the other way around by
virtue of the overwhelming weight of national as well as international laws and
jurisprudence which form part of the law and legal system of the land.
xxx xxx xxx
... an armed subversive or rebel is to be distinguished from a common criminal illegally

possessing a firearm. The former should be charged with subversion or rebellion,
absorbing his illegal possession of firearm. His illegal possession of firearm is not the
main thing. It is only incidental to his involvement in subversion or rebellion. (Petition,
pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 5-6).
Republic Act No. 1700, as amended, provides in Section 4 that "if such member [of the
Communist Party of the Philippines and/or its successor or of any subversive association] takes
up arms against the Government, he shall be punished by prision mayor to reclusion
perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided therefor in the Revised Penal Code." Thus,
given the particular facts of the case, petitioner could be charged either under P.D. No. 1866 or
R.A. No. 1700. But as bluntly pointed out by petitioner:
. . . It is a matter of public knowledge that the military has even admitted its policy or
practice of charging armed subversives or rebels with "qualified" illegal possession of
firearms instead of subversion or rebellion for two reasons: (1) the former is easier to
prosecute than the latter, and (2) the former has a higher penalty than the latter.
[Petition, p. 6; Rollo, p. 6].
Undeniably, it is easier to prove that a person has unlawfully possessed a firearm and/or
ammunition under P.D. No. 1866 than to establish that he had knowingly, wilfully and by overt
acts affiliated himself with, became or remained a member of the Communist Party of the
Philippines and/or its successor or of any subversive organization under R.A. No. 1700, as
conviction under the latter "requires that membership must be knowing or active, with specific
intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party' [People v. Ferrer, G.R. Nos. L-32613-14,
December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 382].
However, that the same act may be penalized under two different statutes with different
penalties, even if considered highly advantageous to the prosecution and onerous to the
accused, will not necessarily call for the invalidation of the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D.
No. 1866 which provides for the higher penalty.
Neither would the doctrines enunciated by the Court in Hernandez and Geronimo, and People v.
Rodriguez [107 Phil. 659] save the day for petitioner.
In Hernandez, the accused were charged with the complex crime of rebellion with murder,
arson and robbery while in Geronimo, the information was for the complex crime of rebellion
with murder, robbery and kidnapping. In those two cases the Court held that aforestated
common crimes cannot be complexed with rebellion as these crimes constituted the means of
committing the crime of rebellion. These common crimes constituted the acts of "engaging in
war" and "committing serious violence" which are essential elements of the crime of rebellion
[See Arts. 134-135, Revised Penal Code] and, hence, are deemed absorbed in the crime of
rebellion. Consequently, the accused can be held liable only for the single crime of rebellion.
On the other hand, in Rodriguez, the Court ruled that since the accused had already been
charged with rebellion, he can no longer be charged for illegal possession of firearms for the
same act of unauthorized possession of firearm on which the charge of rebellion was based, as
said act constituted the very means for the commission of rebellion. Thus, the illegal possession
of the firearm was deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion.
However, in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the qualified offense of
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under P.D. 1866. HE IS NOT BEING CHARGED
WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER
IS HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
FIREARMS. Thus, the rulings of the Court in Hernandez, Geronimo and Rodriquez find no
application in this case.
Even the dictum in Hernandez that,
... national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the
proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are
divested of their character as "common" offenses and assume the political complexion
of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be
punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the crime, to justify
the imposition of the greater penalty. [At 541.]
which petitioner relies on, cannot find application in this case considering that the Legislature
had deemed it fit to provide for two distinct offenses: (1) illegal possession of firearms qualified
by subversion (P.D. No. 1866) and (2) subversion qualified by the taking up of arms against the
Government (R.A. No. 1700), which the Legislature has the power to do. The practical result of
this may be harsh or it may pose grave difficulty on an accused in instances similar to those that
obtain in the present case, but the wisdom of the Legislature in the lawful exercise of its power
to enact laws is something that the Court cannot inquire into as it would be in derogation of the
principle of separation of powers. In the words of Chief Justice Fernando:
xxx xxx xxx
6. Nor could such a provision be nullified on the allegation that it constitutes "an insult
to the personal integrity and official dignity" of public officials. On its face, it cannot thus
be stigmatized. As to its being unnecessary, it is well to remember that this Court, in the
language of Justice Laurel, "does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation." As expressed by Justice Tuazon: "It is not the province of the
courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common
sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern." There can be no objection
then to the observation of Justice Montemayor: "As long as laws do not violate any
Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of
whether or not they are wise or salutary." For they, according to Justice Labrador, "are
not supposed to override legitimate policy and ..., never inquire into the wisdom of the
law.
It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on

Elections, that only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action
taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. That is as it ought to be. The
principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective
authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There
would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the
discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there be
adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be the
courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain
unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity
of the challenged provisions likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if valid
and cogent, on its wisdom cannot be sustained. [Morfe v. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-2038 id.
January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424, 450-451].
Then, that P.D. No. 1866 was enacted by deposed former President Marcos (pursuant to his
law-making powers under the 1973 Constitution) is not by itself a legal argument for its
invalidation. The 1987 Constitution expressly provides that "[a]ll existing laws, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations, letters of instruction, and other executive issuances not
inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked."
[Art. XVIII, Sec. 3].
The remedy lies with the present Legislature to correct the situation through remedial
legislation if it finds a failure of logic and reason in the existing statutes on political offenses.
. . . If remedial measures are deemed necessary, let Congress provide the same. Courts
have no authority to grant relief against the evils that may result from the operation of
unwise or imperfect legislation, unless its flaw partakes of the nature of a constitutional
infirmity ... Nin Bay Mining Co. v. Municipality of Roxas, Palawan, G.R. No. L-20125, July
20,1965,14 SCRA 660, 666].
That the facts charged comply with the elements of the offense penalized in the third
paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 is not disputed. But petitioner asserts that the nature of
his alleged acts requires that he be charged with subversion or with rebellion instead of
qualified illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, perhaps in view of the lower penalty
for subversion and rebellion. Quashal of the information cannot be had on this ground, the
matter of what offense to charge in the information being within the prosecutor's sound
discretion. As the Court stated in the case of People v. Pineda [G.R. No. L-26222, July 21, 1967,
20 SCRA 748]:
. . . The question of instituting a criminal charge is one addressed to the sound discretion
of the investigating Fiscal. The information he lodges in court must have to be supported
by the facts brought about by an inquiry made by him. It stands to reason then to say
that in a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who
did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's
should normally prevail. In this regard, he ordinarily cannot be subject to dictation. . . .
[At 756].
In sum, petitioner's case for the declaration of unconstitutionality of the third paragraph of
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 is wanting in legal basis.
In this separate opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento espouses the view that P.D. No. 1866 should be
struck down as unconstitutional for being a bill of attainder.
Initially, it must be pointed out that the petition never challenged P.D. No. 1866 on that ground.
As discussed earlier, petitioner objected to P.D. 1866 on the ground of substantive due process.
Established rules of constitutional litigation would, therefore, bar an inquiry based on the
theory that P.D. No. 1866 constitutes a bill of attainder. It must also be noted that while
petitioner challenges only the third paragraph of section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, Mr. Justice
Sarmiento would have the other portions of the law invalidated. Again, this is impermissible.
But even if a challenge on the ground that P.D. 1866 is a bill of attainder could be appropriately
considered, it will still be met with little success. The Court, in People v. Ferrer, supra, defined a
bill of attainder as a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a
particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of
certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or
otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial. This last element, the total lack of court intervention in
the finding of guilt and the determination of the actual penalty to be imposed, is the most
essential [Id. at pp. 395-397; 400-401]. P.D. No. 1866 does not possess the elements of a bill of
attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial. Nowhere in the
measure is there a finding of guilt and an imposition of a corresponding punishment. What the
decree does is to define the offense and provide for the penalty that may be imposed,
specifying the qualifying circumstances that would aggravate the offense. There is no
encroachment on the power of the court to determine after due hearing whether the
prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the offense of illegal possession of
firearms has been committed and that the qualifying circumstance attached to it has been
established also beyond reasonable doubt as the Constitution and judicial precedents require.
The presumption of constitutionality attaches to legislative acts [Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47
Phil. 387 (1925); Morfe v. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 425]. Before a
statute or a portion thereof may be declared unconstitutional, "it must be shown that the
statute violates the constitution clearly, palpably plainly, and in such a manner as to leave no
doubt or hesitation in the mind of the Court." [SINCO PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 525 (11th ed.,
1960, citing Sharpless v. Mayor, 21 Pa. 147; also quoted in Alba v. Evangelists, 100 Phil. 683
(1957)]. "Thus, to justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach
of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication." [Peralta v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. L-47771, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30, 55]., Absent a clear showing that the challenged
measure ousts the courts from the function of passing upon the question of guilt or innocence
of the accused and an unequivocal demonstration that P.D. No. 1866, by legislative fiat,
declares the petitioner guilty of a crime and imposes directly the penalty prescribed hereunder,
the challenge will have to be rejected.
Neither can the Court strike down P.D. No. 1866 for snowing the possibility of a second
jeopardy, as Mr. Justice Sarmiento suggests. It must be pointed out that at the time this
petition was filed, there had been no previous conviction, acquittal or dismissal. Hence, the
question of a second or double jeopardy does not arise. This is manifest from the Constitution,
which provides:
Sec. 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If
an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. [Art. III.]
More particularly, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated
without Ms express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint
or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal
of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the
offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for
any offense which necessarily includes or is necessary included in the offense charged in
the former complaint or information.
xxx xxx xxx
The right against double jeopardy is a matter which the accused may raise in a motion to quash
[Sec. 3(h) Rule 117]. But, precisely, petitioner's motion to quash filed in the trial court did not
raise the issue of double jeopardy because it had not arisen. The Court cannot anticipate that
the opportunity for a second jeopardy will still arise if he is acquitted or convicted as charged
under P.D. 1866.
Moreover, even if such a subsequent or second jeopardy does arise, P.D. No. 1866 will not be
rendered unconstitutional. That an accused will be exposed to double jeopardy if he is
prosecuted under another law is not a ground to nullify that law. Double jeopardy is merely a
defense that an accused may raise to defeat a subsequent prosecution or conviction for the
same offense.
2. The thrust of petitioner's contention that the trial court had not acquired jurisdiction
over his person is that his constitutional rights against unlawful arrest and unreasonable
searches and seizures had been violated. He asserts that he was arrested in
contravention of the clear provisions on arrests in the Revised Rules of Court. He
concludes that since his arrest was unlawful, the search pursuant thereto which yielded
the shotgun and the live rounds of ammunition was also illegal.
When the case was assigned to the ponente, she had intended to consider and to resolve this
issue, it having been squarely raised in the petition. However, in an unexpected turn of events,
petitioner filed a Manifestation dated September 18, 1989, wherein he averred:
1. He has filed a bond in the trial court and the same was approved on September 14,
1989.
2. He is well aware that the filing of a bail bond has the effect of waiving the right to
question the irregularity of an arrest (Callanta vs. Villanueva, 77 SCRA 377; Bagcal vs.
Villaraza, 120 SCRA 525).
3. Be that as it may, the irregularity of the arrest was only a secondary issue in the
instant Petition. The principal issue is still the unconstitutionality of the third paragraph
of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 insofar as it penalizes illegal possession of firearms 'in
furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection
or subversion'.
The Court takes this to mean that petitioner is submitting the case for decision on the sole issue
that P.D. No. 1866 is unconstitutional and is abandoning the issue of the legality of the search
and his arrest.
In view thereof, the Court finds it unnecessary to resolve the second issue.
WHEREFORE, in view of petitioner's failure to clearly and unequivocally establish that the third
paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 violates the Constitution, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan. C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Regalado, J., In the result.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I join Justice Sarmiento's dissent, with these additional brief observations. As I submitted in
Guazon v. De Villa, G.R. No. 80508, we should not unreasonably inhibit ourselves on technical
grounds when a constitutional question is presented to us for resolution. An unconstitutional
act is illegal per se and must be slain on sight. It should not be reprieved simply because it has
not been properly challenged, to be struck down only if and when all the formal requirements
are satisfied. If and when. In the meantime, the lawless act continues to corrode the
Constitution, and all because we have refused to act.
SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:
It perplexes me why this dissent should first of all merit what appears to be repartees from the
majority. I am but casting a contrary vote, which, after all, is in performance of a constitutional
duty.1
I am also concerned at how this case has journeyed from ponente to ponente and opinion to
opinion, which, rather than expedited its resolution, has delayed it-at the expense of the
accused-petitioner.
I was originally assigned to write the decision in this case, and as early as June, 1989, I was
ready. On June 14, 1989, I started circulating a decision granting the petition and declaring
Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1878-A, unconstitutional
and of no force and effect. Meanwhile, Madame Justice Irene Cortes disseminated a dissent. By
July 18, 1989, my ponencia had been pending in the office of the Chief Justice for promulgation.
It carried signatures of concurrence of eight 2 Justices (including mine), a slim majority, but a
majority nonetheless. Five Justices, on the other hand, joined Justice Cortes in her dissent. The
Chief Justice did not sign the decision on his word that he was filing a dissent of his own.
Subsequently, and as events would soon unfold quickly and dramatically, the Chief Justice
returned my decision to the Court en banc, and declared that unless somebody changed his
mind, he was promulgating my decision. Justice Edgardo Paras, who was one of the eight who
had stamped their imprimatur on my decision, indicated that he did not want to "clip the wings
of the military" and that he was changing his mind. This sudden reversement under the
circumstances surrounding its manifestation, took me aback for which I strongly voiced my
protest for a case (although the majority is very slim) that I had thought was a settled matter.
I am aware that similar events in the Supreme Court are nothing uncommon. The following are
the ringing words of my distinguished colleague, Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, but they
could just as well have been mine, as far as the instant controversy is concerned, and I could
not have put it any better:
It has taken all of a year and four months to what, I hope, will see the final disposition of
this case, notwithstanding periodic reminders for an earlier resolution. It is this delay
that has caused me a great deal of concern. It is, to me, a crying example of justice
delayed and is by no means "much ado about nothing," ... Nor is the question involved
"none too important." ... The bone of contention is whether or not a criminal complaint,
which is an offense against the State, may be dismissed on the basis of an amicable
settlement between the complainant and the accused, who is a public officer.
As assigned initially, I was to prepare the opinion of the Court. My original "ponencia"
annulling the Order of respondent Municipal Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu dismissing the
criminal case against respondent Mayor Emiliano Caruncho, granting the petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus, and ordering respondent Municipal Judge to reinstate and
proceed with the trial on the merits of the criminal case against respondent Mayor
without further delay, was circulated beginning July 30, 1982. 3
The following is my dissenting opinion based mainly on my original ponencia.
I hold to be unconstitutional Presidential Decree No. 1866, "CODIFYING THE LAWS ON

ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE. DEALING IN, ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION,
OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES, AND IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN
VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR RELEVANT PURPOSES," specifically, sections 1 and 3 thereof,
thus:
SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of

Firearms and Ammunition or Instruments used or Intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms and Ammunition. — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of
firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in
the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of
death shall be imposed.
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with
imposed.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other responsible officer of
any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall wilfully or
knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity
to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the
preceding paragraphs.
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any
licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor. 4
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 3. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Explosives.

— The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall
be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, assemble, deal in,
acquire, dispose or possess handgrenade(s) rifle grenade(s) and other explosives,
including but not limited to "pillbox bombs", molotov cocktail bombs", "firebombs", or
other incendiary devices capable of producing destructive effect on contiguous objects
or causing injury or death to any person.
Any person who commits any of the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code or special
laws with the use of the aforementioned explosives, detonation agents or incendiary
devices, which results in the death of any person or persons shall be punished with the
penalty of death.
If the violation of this Section is ill furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with
imposed.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon the owner, president, manager, or director or other responsible officer of
ally public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall wilfully or
knowingly allow any of the explosives owned by such firm, company, corporation or
entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violation the provisions of the
preceding paragraphs. 5
I find, first and foremost, the law to be a bill of attainder the aforequoted provisions
specifically, as it has been defined, that is, "a legislative enactment which inflicts punishment
without trial. 6 It is a bill of attainder so I submit, because it presumes the accused, upon
conviction, to be guilty as well-of the crimes (murder and homicide under the second paragraph
of Section One, and the rebellion, insurrection, and subversion under the third paragraph of
Section Three) that supposedly merely qualify the offense of "illegal possession" (or "illegal
manufacture" as the case may be) when the accused has not been tried and found guilty of
either crimes in any judicial proceeding. In the case at bar, the fact that the petitioner has been
charged with illegal possession of firearms "in furtherance of subversion" means that the
petitioner has committed subversion, notwithstanding the fact that he is not standing trial for
subversion.
I am aware that this suit has been brought on the theory that the charge of "illegal possession"
against the accused supposedly offends the rulings in People v. Hernandez 7 People v.
Geronimo 8 and People v. Rodriguez 9and not, rather, on the constitutionality of Presidential
Decree No. 1866 as amended. It is my view, however, that the case is nonetheless ripe for
constitutional adjudication albeit the constitutional question has not been asserted. It has
indeed been held:
But we must state that the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sound
discretion, may determine the time when a question affecting the constitutionality of a statute
should be presented. (In ReWoolsey [1984], 95 N.Y., 135,144.) Thus, in criminal cases, although
there is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may be raised for the first
time at any stage of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. (12 C.J., p. 786.) Even
in civil cases, it has been held that is it the duty of a court to pass on the constitutional
question, though raised for the first time on appeal, if it appears that a determination of the
question is necessary to a decision of the case. (McCabes Adm'x vs. Maysville & B.S.R. Co.
[1910], 136 Ky., 674; 124 S.W., 892; Lohmeyer vs. St. Louis Cordage Co., [1908]. 214 Mo., 685;
113 S.W., 1108; Carmody vs. St. Louis Transit co [1905],188 Mo., 572; 87 S.W., 913.) 10
The fact that the accused has not been charged with the complex crime of subversion and
illegal possession of firearms (which cannot be done) does not, to me, acquit the Decree. The
fact that "in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the qualified offense of
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. . " 11 to me, makes a good scrabble game, but it
is nothing else. There is no gainsaying the fact that the conviction of the petitioner (assuming
that the petitioner is convicted) under the statute, will carry with it the stain of subversion
although he had not been charged with subversion. This, so I submit, does violence to due
process and the constitutional guaranty against hazy accusations.12
I likewise find the law to be vague and in violation of the double jeopardy clause of the Charter.
It is vague because it is unsure which offense to punish: Illegal Possession or Subversion. It
states that subversion merely qualifies the primary offense of "illegal possession" yet, if this is
so, the accused may still be held guilty of subversion later. However, if the accused has been
found liable for illegal possession in furtherance of subversion, it means that he is also guilty of
subversion, which would clearly not require a subsequent prosecution.
The very efforts of this Court to make anything out of this strange animal have not been, so I
submit, encouraging. In one case, 13 a prosecution for illegal possession of unlicensed firearm
used in parricide under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 9 (which sired Presidential
Decree No. 1866), it was held that "[t]he offense of 'Illegal Possession of Unlicensed Firearm
used in Parricide" includes the lesser offense of Parricide." 14 If this were so, then, subversion
would have been an ingredient of "illegal possession". So also, conviction thereof should be an
abatement of any proceeding for the other, yet, in a subsequent ruling, 15 it was said that
"illegal possession" used in the commission of homicide "does not operate to extinguish [any]
criminal liability for" homicide. Apparently, as the state of the law stands now, "illegal
possession" (or "manufacture") does not stop a later prosecution for subversion (or murder or
homicide), (as Tangan tells us) but just as apparently, we would have made possible a
prosecution for a crime which constitutes but an element of the "primary offense" (as
Lazaro tells us), possible.
Clearly, the statute allows the possibility of a double jeopardy. I submit that while double
jeopardy is a matter of defense, the fact alone that the law permits such a possibility is
sufficient to assail it for breach of due process.
The fact that the accused has posted bail is of no moment. It would not have, for me, rescued
the statute from constitutional infirmity, notwithstanding the petitioner's "acceptance" (by
posting bail) of the legality of the proceedings against him.
Presidential Decree No. 1866, it has to be noted, was not passed by the regular legislature. It is
one of the many presidential issuances which had served the Marcos dictatorship, and served it
well, as an instrument of repression during the years of dissent and resistance. Because of it,
many courageous freedom fighters perished or languished in various places of detention
throughout our country. It is unfortunate that this oppressive Presidential Decree has been
allowed to remain in our statute books after the apparatus of dictatorship had been dismantled
and supposed freedom attained, and sadly, it is still being used as incessantly as in the previous
regime. It is an anachronism in the broad democratic space or what little we have of it today. I
am, accordingly, for striking the Decree down.

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 17584 March 8, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

L. Porter Hamilton for appellant.

SECTION 1. Section two of General Orders, Numbered Fifty-eight, series of nineteen

Let us examine the question.

As has been said by Chief Justice Marshall:

It is within the power of the legislatures under such a constitutional provision to

An indictment must, in many states under express statutory or constitutional provision,

Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña and Villamor, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 113213 August 15, 1994

PAUL JOSEPH WRIGHT, petitioner,

Rodrigo E. Mallari for petitioner.

Aurora Salva Bautista collaborating for petitioner.

Under the Treaty, each contracting State agrees to extradite. . . "persons

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, 12 are undisputed:

On March 17, 1993, Assistant Secretary Sime D. Hidalgo of the Department of

1. Wright/Orr Matter — one count of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary

2. Wright/Cracker Matter — Thirteen (13) counts of Obtaining Properties by

The one (1) count of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to

The thirteen (13) counts of Obtaining Property by Deception

( i ) some policy-holders signed up only because they were told

(ii) some policy-holders were offered cash inducements ($50 or

(iii) some policy-holders were introduced through the "Daily

(iv) some policy-holders were found not to exist.

The one count of Attempting to Obtain Property by Deception

The one count of Perjury contrary to Section 314 of Victorian

Pursuant to Section 5 of PD No. 1069, in relation to the Extradition Treaty

Thereafter, the petitioner filed his answer.

I. THAT THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING

II. THAT THE ACT OF THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE IN GIVING

V. THAT THE HON. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING THE

ENTRY INTO FORCE AND TERMINATION

4. Extradition may be granted pursuant to provisions of this Treaty irrespective

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of respondent Court of Appeals, we

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 145184 March 14, 2008

PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS, represented by

The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, (the Committee),

ACCORDINGLY, an "Ad-Hoc FACT FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS" is hereby created to

Commission on Good Government - Chairman

The Solicitor General - Vice-Chairman

Representative from the

Representative from the

Representative from the

Representative from the

Representative from the

Representative from the

Government Corporate Counsel - Member

Representative from the

The Ad Hoc Committee shall perform the following functions:

2. The borrower corporation is undercapitalized;

3. Direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials like presence of marginal

4. Stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation are identified as cronies;

5. Deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended;

6. Use of corporate layering;

7. Non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being sought; and

8. Extraordinary speed in which the loan release was made.

To start with, the cause of action has prescribed.

Thus, the Ombudsman disposed:

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Furthermore, in Estarija v. Ranada,15 in which petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality of

Now, on the merits of the case.