staying; and he even locked her out of their house in the middle of the night sometime in
PFR CASES
G.R. No. 222541
RACHEL A. DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner
vs.
JOSE O. DEL ROSARIO and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is this petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated May 29,
2015 and the Resolution3 dated December 1, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 102745, which reversed the Decision4 dated April 23, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 136 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 11-891 declaring the marriage of Jose O. Del
Rosario (Jose) and Rachel A. Del Rosario (Rachel) void on the ground of psychological
incapacity pursuant to Article 365 of the Family Code, as amended.6
The Facts
Rachel, then fifteen (15) years old, met Jose, then seventeen (17) years old, sometime in
December 1983 at a party in Bintawan, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya.7 Very soon, they became
romantically involved.8
Sometime in 1988, Rachel went to Hongkong to work as a domestic helper. During this period,
Rachel allegedly provided for Jose's tuition fees for his college education. Rachel and Jose
eventually decided to get married on December 28, 1989 in a civil rites ceremony held in San
Jose City, Nueva Ecija, and were blessed with a son, named Wesley, on December 1, 1993.
On February 19, 1995, they renewed their vows in a church ceremony held in the Philippine
Independent Church, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya. 9
In 1998, Rachel went back to Hongkong to work as domestic helper/caregiver and has been
working there ever since, only returning to the Philippines every year for a vacation. Through
her efforts, she was able to acquire a house and lot in Rufino Homes Subdivision, San Jose,
Nueva Ecija.10
In September 2011, Rachel filed a petition11 for declaration of nullity of marriage before the
RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 11-891, alleging that Jose was psychologically incapacitated
to fulfill his essential marital obligations. In support of her petition, Rachel claimed that: during
their marriage, Jose conspicuously tried to avoid discharging his duties as husband and father.
According to Rachel, Jose was hot tempered and violent; he punched her in the shoulder a few
days before their church wedding, causing it to swell, when she refused to pay for the
transportation expenses of his parents; he hit his own father with a pipe, causing the latter to
fall unconscious, which forced them to leave Jose's parents' house where they were then
December 2007 when she fetched her relatives from the bus terminal, which he refused to
perform. Rachel added that Jose would represent himself as single, would flirt openly, and had
an extra-marital affair which she discovered when Jose mistakenly sent a text message to her
sister, Beverly A. Juan (Beverly), stating: "love, kung ayaw mo na akong magpunta diyan,
pumunta ka na lang dito."12 Another text message read: "Dumating lang ang asawa mo, ayaw
mo na akong magtext at tumawag sa 'yo." On one occasion, she, together with Wesley and
Beverly, caught Jose and the other woman with their child inside their conjugal dwelling.
Finally, she claimed that Jose would refuse any chance of sexual intimacy between them as
they slowly drifted apart.13
Rachel, however, admitted that their married life ran smoothly during its early years, and it was
only later in their marriage that Jose started frequenting bars and engaging in drinking
sessions.14
Rachel also presented the testimonies of Wesley15 and her sisters, Beverly and Jocelyn
Cabusora,16 which corroborated her allegations, as well as the testimony17 of Dr. Nedy L.
Tayag (Dr. Tayag), who prepared the Psychological Report18 (Report) on Rachel. The remarks
section of Dr. Tayag's Report, which was primarily based on her interview with Rachel and
Wesley, stated that Jose suffered from Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD) characterized
by: (a) his lack of empathy and concern for Rachel; (b) his irresponsibility and his pleasure-
seeking attitude that catered only to his own fancies and comfort; (c) his selfishness marked by
his lack of depth when it comes to his marital commitments; and (d) his lack of remorse for his
shortcomings.19
For his part, Jose denied all the allegations in the petition. Jose maintained that: (a) he had
dutifully performed all of his marital and parental duties and obligations to his family; (b) he had
provided for his family's financial and emotional needs; and (c) he contributed to the building
and maintenance of their conjugal home. He claimed that although they occasionally had
misunderstandings, they nevertheless had a blissful relationship, pointing out that their first
major argument was when Rachel decided to go to Hongkong to work; that they continued to
communicate through mail during her stay overseas; and that he remained supportive of
Rachel and would advise her to give her family the financial aid that they need so long as she
would not sacrifice her well-being. Finally, he denied the alleged extra-marital affair and having
laid hand on Rachel and their son.20 Jose presented as well the testimony of Faustino Rigos to
support his allegations.21
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision22 dated April 23, 2014, the RTC declared the marriage between Jose and Rachel
void on the ground of psychological incapacity. It relied on the findings and testimony of Dr.
Tayag, declaring that Jose's APD interferes with his capacity to perform his marital and
paternal duties, as he in fact even refused to take responsibility for his actions, notwithstanding
the overwhelming evidence against him.23
Jose appealed24 to the CA, arguing that his alleged refusal to seek employment, squandering
of their money on vices, violent nature, and infidelity are not the serious, grave, and permanent
psychological condition that incapacitates him to perform his marital obligations required by
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. At most, they are personality
defects, i.e., immaturity, irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness, which may be considered as
grounds for legal separation under Article 5525 of the same code.26
The CA Ruling
In a Decision27 dated May 29, 2015, the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC,28 holding that the
totality of the evidence Rachel presented was not enough to sustain a finding that Jose is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage.29 Particularly, the CA declared that Jose's alleged infidelity, his refusal to seek
employment, his act of squandering their money on his vices, and his temper and alleged
propensity for violence were not so grave and permanent as to deprive him of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond sufficient to nullify the marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code; at best, they showed that Jose was irresponsible, insensitive, or
emotionally immature which nonetheless do not amount to the downright incapacity that the
law requires. Additionally, the CA pointed out that the root cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity, its incapacitating nature, and the incapacity itself were not sufficiently explained as
Dr. Tayag's Report failed to show the relation between Jose's "deprived childhood" and "poor
home condition," on one hand, and grave and permanent psychological malady, on the other.
Finally, it observed that while Dr. Tayag's testimony was detailed, it only offered a general
evaluation on the supposed root cause of Jose's personality disorder. 30
Rachel moved for reconsideration,31 which was, however, denied by the CA in a
Resolution32 dated December 1, 2015; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in reversing the
RTC's finding of psychological incapacity.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social
institution,33 and marriage as the foundation of the family.34 Because of this, the Constitution
decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. In this regard, psychological incapacity as a ground to nullify the marriage under Article
3635 of the Family Code, as amended, should refer to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.36 It should refer to no less than a mental - not merely physical -
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage, which, as
provided under Article 6837 of the Family Code, among others,38 include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity, and render help and support.39 In
other words, it must be a malady that is so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. 40
In Santos v. CA,41 the Court declared that psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code must be characterized by: (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that
the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c)
incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or otherwise the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved.42 The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 in Republic v. Molina43 (Molina) whose salient points are footnoted
below,44 that incorporated the basic requirements the Court established in Santos.
Notwithstanding the Molina guidelines, note, however, that an expert opinion is not absolutely
necessary and may be dispensed with in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the
totality of the evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.45 The evidence need not necessarily
come from the allegedly incapacitated spouse, but can come from persons intimately related to
the spouses, i.e., relatives and close friends, who could clearly testify on the allegedly
incapacitated spouse's condition at or about the time of the marriage.46 In other words,
the Molina guidelines continue to apply but its application calls for a more flexible approach in
considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological
incapacity.47 To be clear, however, the totality of the evidence must still establish the
characteristics that Santos laid down: gravity, incurability, and juridical antecedence.
Thus, in Dedel v. CA,48 the Court declared that therein respondent's emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility could not be equated with psychological incapacity as it was not shown that
these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make her completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity,
or sexual promiscuity.49 In Taring v. Taring,50 the Court emphasized that "irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the
like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as [these] may only be
due to a person's difficulty, refusal, or neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is
not rooted in some psychological illness that Article 36 of the Family Code addresses." 51 The
Court equally did not consider as tantamount to psychological incapacity the emotional
immaturity, irresponsibility, sexual promiscuity, and other behavioral disorders invoked by the
petitioning spouses in Pesca v. Pesca,52 Republic v. Encelan,53 Republic v. De
Gracia,54 and Republic v. Romero,55 to name a few, and thus dismissed their petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage.
The Court maintains a similar view in this case and, thus, denies the petition. Based on the
totality of the evidence presented, there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that
Jose's immaturity, irresponsibility, or infidelity amount to psychological incapacity.
Particularly, the Court notes that Rachel's evidence merely showed that Jose: (1) would often
indulge in drinking sprees; (2) tends to become violent when he gets drunk; (2) avoids
discharging his duties as a father to Wesley and as a husband to Rachel, which includes
sexual intimacy; (3) flirts openly and represented himself as single; and (4) engaged in an
extra-marital affair with a bar girl who he brought to the conjugal dwelling on several occasions.
Significantly, Rachel admitted that their married life ran smoothly in its early years. Dr. Tayag's
findings, on the other hand, simply summarized Rachel and Wesley's narrations as she
diagnosed Jose with APD and proceeded to conclude that Jose's "personality flaw is deemed
to be severe, grave, and have become deeply embedded within his adaptive systems since
early childhood years, thereby rendering such to be a permanent component of his life [and]
[t]herefore x x x incurable and beyond repair despite any form of intervention."56
It should be pointed out that Dr. Tayag's Report does not explain in detail how Jose's APD
could be characterized as grave, deeply rooted in his childhood, and incurable within the
jurisprudential parameters for establishing psychological incapacity. Particularly, the Report did
not discuss the concept of APD which Jose allegedly suffers from, i.e., its classification, cause,
symptoms, and cure, or show how and to what extent Jose exhibited this disorder or how and
to what extent his alleged actions and behavior correlate with his APD, sufficiently clear to
conclude that Jose's condition has no definite treatment, making it incurable within the law's
conception. Neither did the Report specify the reasons why and to what extent Jose's APD is
serious and grave, and how it incapacitated him to understand and comply with his marital
obligations.1awp++i1 Lastly, the Report hastily concluded that Jose had a "deprived childhood"
and "poor home condition" that automatically resulted in his APD equivalent to psychological
incapacity without, however, specifically identifying the history of Jose's condition antedating
the marriage, i.e., specific behavior or habits during his adolescent years that could explain his
behavior during the marriage.
Moreover, Dr. Tayag did not personally assess or interview Jose to determine, at the very
least, his background that could have given her a more accurate basis for concluding that his
APD is rooted in his childhood or was already existing at the inception of the marriage. To be
sure, established parameters do not require that the expert witness personally examine the
party alleged to be suffering from psychological incapacity provided corroborating evidence are
presented sufficiently establishing the required legal parameters. 57 Considering that her Report
was based solely on Rachel's side whose bias cannot be doubted, the Report and her
testimony deserved the application of a more rigid and stringent standards which the RTC
failed to apply.
In sum, Dr. Tayag's assessment, even when taken together with the various testimonies, failed
to show that Jose's immaturity, irresponsibility, and infidelity rise to the level of psychological
incapacity that would justify the nullification of the parties' marriage. To reiterate and
emphasize, psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect"
in the performance of the marital obligations; it is not enough that a party prove that the other
failed to meet the responsibility and duty of a married person.58 There must be proof of a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person - an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying
with the obligations essential to marriage - which must be linked with the manifestations of the
psychological incapacity.59
A final note. It is well to reiterate that Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, is not a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the grounds for divorce manifest
themselves;60 a marriage, no matter how unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage. Thus,
absent sufficient evidence establishing psychological incapacity within the context of Article 36,
the Court is compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 29, 2015 and the Resolution
dated December 1, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 102745 are
hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed under
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LEONEN, J.:
A writ of execution lies against the pension benefits of a retired officer of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, which is the subject of a deed of assignment drawn by him granting support to
his wife and five (5) children. The benefit of exemption from execution of pension benefits is a
statutory right that may be waived, especially in order to comply with a husband's duty to
provide support under Article XV of the 1987 Constitution and the Family Code.
Petitioner Edna Mabugay-Otamias (Edna) and retired Colonel Francisco B. Otamias (Colonel
Otamias) were married on June 16, 1978 and had five (5) children.[1]
On September 2000, Edna and Colonel Otamias separated due to his alleged infidelity. [2] Their
children remained with Edna.[3]
On August 2002, Edna filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Colonel Otamias before the Provost
Marshall Division of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.[4] Edna demanded monthly support
equivalent to 75% of Colonel Otamias' retirement benefits.[5] Colonel Otamias executed an
Affidavit, stating:
That sometime in August or September 2002, I was summoned at the Office of the Provost
Marshal, Philippine Army, in connection with a complaint affidavit submitted to said Office by
my wife Mrs. Edna M. Otamias signifying her intention 75% of my retirement benefits from the
AFP;
 In a letter[13] dated April 3, 2006, the Armed Forces of the Philippines Pension and Gratuity
That at this point, I can only commit 50% of my retirement benefits to be pro-rated among my Management Center (AFP PGMC) informed Edna that a court order was required for the AFP
wife and five (5) children; PGMC to recognize the Deed of Assignment.[14]

That in order to implement this compromise, I am willing to enter into Agreement with my wife In another letter[15] dated April 17, 2006, the AFP PGMC reiterated that it could not act on
covering the same; Edna's request to receive a portion of Colonel Otamias' pension "unless ordered by [the]
appropriate court."[16]
That I am executing this affidavit to attest to the truth of the foregoing facts and whatever legal
purpose it may serve.[6] Heeding the advice of the AFP PGMC, Edna, on behalf of herself and Jeffren M. Otamias and
Jemwel M. Otamias (Edna, et al.), filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro,
On February 26, 2003, Colonel Otamias executed a Deed of Assignment where he waived 50%
Misamis Oriental an action for support, docketed as F.C. Civil Case No. 2006-039.[17]
of his salary and pension benefits in favor of Edna and their children.[7] The Deed of
Assignment was considered by the parties as a compromise agreement.[8] It stated:
The trial court's Sheriff tried to serve summons on Colonel Otamias several times, to no
avail.[18] Substituted service was resorted to.[19] Colonel Otamias was subsequently declared in
This Assignment, made and executed unto this 26th day of February 2003 at Fort Bonifacio,
Makati City, by the undersigned LTC Francisco B. Otamias, 0-0-111045 (INP) PA, of legal age, default for failure to file a responsive pleading despite order of the trial court.[20]
married and presently residing at Dama De Noche St., Pembo, Makati City.
The trial court ruled in favor of Edna, et al. and ordered the automatic deduction of the amount
of support from the monthly pension of Colonel Otamias.[21]
WITNESSETH
The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision stated:
WHEREAS, the undersigned affiant is the legal husband of EDNA M. OTAMIAS and the father
ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, and in consonance with the legal obligation of the
of Julie Ann, Jonathan, Jennifer, Jeffren and Jemwel all residing at Patag, Cagayan de Oro
defendant to the plaintiffs, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, through its Finance Center
City;
and/or appropriate Finance Officer thereof, is thereby ordered to release to Edna Mabugay
Otamias and minor Jemwel M. Otamias, herein represented by his mother Edna, their fifty
WHEREAS, the undersigned will be retiring from the military service and expects to receive
(50%) per cent share of each of the monthly pension due to Colonel Francisco B. Otamias, AFP
retirement benefits from the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
PA (Retired).
WHEREAS, the undersigned had expressed his willingness to give a share in his retirement
Defendant Francisco Otamias is also ordered to pay plaintiff Edna M. Otamias, fifty (50%) per
benefits to my wife and five (5) abovenamed children,
cent of whatever retirement benefits he has already received from the Armed Forces of the
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the undersigned Philippines AND the arrears in support, effective January 2006 up to the time plaintiff receives
her share direct from the Finance Center of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
hereby stipulated the following:

1. That the undersigned will give to my legal wife and five (5) children FIFTY PERCENT (50%) IT IS SO ORDERED.[22]
of my retirement benefits to be pro rated among them. The Armed Forces of the Philippines, through the Office of the Judge Advocate General, filed a
Manifestation/Opposition[23] to the Decision of the trial court, but it was not given due course
2. That a separate check(s) be issued and to be drawn and encash [sic] in the name of the legal due to its late filing.[24]
wife and five (5) children pro-rating the fifty (50%) percent of my retirement benefits.
Edna, et al., through counsel, filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution [25] dated
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 26th day of February 2003 at Fort February 22, 2008. The trial court granted the Motion, and a writ of execution was issued by
Bonifacio, Makati City.[9] the trial court on April 10, 2008.[26]
Colonel Otamias retired on April 1, 2003.[10]
The Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center (AFP Finance Center), through the Office
of the Judge Advocate General, filed a Motion to Quash [27]the writ of execution and argued that
The agreement was honored until January 6, 2006.[11]
Edna alleged that "the A[rmed] F[orces]
the AFP Finance Center's duty to disburse benefits is ministerial. It releases benefits only upon
[of the] Philippines] suddenly decided not to honor the agreement"[12] between Colonel
Otamias and his legitimate family. the AFP PGMC's approval.[28]
The trial court denied the Motion to Quash and held that:
Under the law and existing jurisprudence, the "right to support" is practically equivalent to the
"right to life." The "right to life" always takes precedence over "property rights." The "right to
support/life" is also a substantive right which always takes precedence over
technicalities/procedural rules. It being so, technical rules must yield to substantive justice.
Besides, this Court's Decision dated February 27, 2007 has long acquired finality, and as such,
is ripe for enforcement/execution.
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the instant Motion is hereby DENIED. [29]
The AFP PGMC moved for reconsideration of the order denying the Motion to Quash,[30] but
the Motion was also denied by the trial court in the Order[31] dated August 6, 2008.
A Notice of Garnishment was issued by the trial court on July 15, 2008 and was received by the
AFP PGMC on September 9, 2008.[32]
The AFP PGMC filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. [33]
The Court of Appeals granted[34] the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition and partially
nullified the trial court's Decision insofar as it directed the automatic deduction of support
from the pension benefits of Colonel Otamias.
The Court of Appeals discussed that Section 31[35] of Presidential Decree No. 1638, otherwise
known as the AFP Military Personnel Retirement and Separation Decree of 1979, "provides for
the exemption of the monthly pension of retired military personnel from execution and
attachment[,]"[36] while Rule 39, Section 13 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 13. Property exempt from execution. Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the
following property, and no other, shall be exempt from execution:
....
(1) The right to receive legal support, or money or property obtained as such support, or any
pension or gratuity from the Government[.]
The Court of Appeals also cited Pacific Products, Inc. vs. Ong:[37]
[M]oneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer
of the Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled
to a specific portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that
every consideration of public policy forbids it.[38]
In addition, the AFP PGMC was not impleaded as a party in the action for support; thus, it is
not bound by the Decision.[39]
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City dated February 27, 2007 in Civil Case No. 2006-039
is PARTIALLY NULLIFIED in so far as it directs the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Finance Center to automatically deduct the financial support in favor of private respondents,
Edna Otamias and her children Jeffren and Jemwel Otamias, from the pension benefits of
Francisco Otamias, a retired military officer. The Order dated June 10, 2008, Order dated
August 6, 2008 and Writ of Execution dated April 10, 2008, all issued by the court a quo are
likewise SET ASIDE. Perforce, let a writ of permanent injunction issue enjoining the
implementation of the assailed Writ of Execution dated April 10, 2008 and the corresponding
Notice of Garnishment dated July 15, 2008. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[40] (Emphasis in the original)
Edna, et al. moved for reconsideration, but the Motion was denied by the Court of Appeals.[41]
Edna, et al. filed before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari[42] on November 11, 2009.
In the Resolution[43] dated January 20, 2010, this Court required respondent to comment.
In the Resolution[44] dated August 4, 2010, this Court noted the Comment filed by the Office of
the Solicitor General and required Edna, et al. to file a reply. [45]
A Reply[46] was filed on September 27, 2010.
Edna, et al. argue that the Deed of Assignment Colonel Otamias executed is valid and legal. [47]
They claim that Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638[48] "does not include
support";[49] hence, the retirement benefits of Colonel Otamias can be executed upon.
Edna, et al. also argue that the Court of Appeals erred in granting respondent's Petition because
it effectively rendered the Deed of Assignment of no force and effect. [50] On the other hand, the
trial court's Decision implements the Deed of Assignment and Edna, et al.'s right to support. [51]
Further, the AFP PGMC had already recognized the validity of the agreement and had made
payments to them until it suddenly stopped payment.[52]After Edna, et al. obtained a court
order, the AFP PGMC still refused to honor the Deed of Assignment. [53]
The Armed Forces of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argues that it
was not a party to the case filed by Edna, et al.[54] Thus, "it cannot be compelled to release part
of the monthly pension benefits of retired Colonel Otamias in favor of [Edna, et al.]." [55]
The Office of the Solicitor General avers that the AFP PGMC never submitted itself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court.[56] It was not a party to the case as the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over the AFP PGMC.[57]
The Office of the Solicitor General also argues that Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638
and Rule 39, Section 13(1) of the Rules of Court support the Court of Appeals Decision that
Colonel Otamias' pension benefits are exempt from execution.[58]
Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 "does not deprive the survivor/s of a retired or
separated officer or enlisted man of their right to support."[59]Rather, "[w]hat is prohibited is
for respondent [AFP PGMC] to segregate a portion of the pension benefit in favor of the
retiree's family while still in the hands of the A[rmed] F[orces] [of the] Philippines]."[60]
Thus, the AFP PGMC "cannot be compelled to directly give or issue a check in favor of [Edna, et
al.] out of the pension gratuity of Col. Otamias."[61]
In their Reply,[62] Edna, et al. argue that the Armed Forces of the Philippines should not be
allowed to question the legal recourse they took because it was an officer of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines who had advised them to file an action for support. [63]
They argue that the phrase "while in the active service" in Section 31 of Presidential Decree No.
1638 refers to the "time when the retired officer incurred his accountabilities in favor of a
private creditor[,]"[64] who is a third person. The phrase also "serves as a timeline designed to
separate the debts incurred by the retired officer after his retirement from those which he
incurred prior thereto."[65]
Further, the accountabilities referred to in Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 refer to
debts or loans, not to support.[66]
The issues for resolution are:
First, whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the AFP Finance Center cannot be
directed to automatically deduct the amount of support needed by the legitimate family of
Colonel Otamias; and
Second, whether Colonel Otamias' pension benefits can be executed upon for the financial
support of his legitimate family.
The Petition is granted.
I to the Petition are the affidavits of the wives of retired members of the military, who have
Article 6 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
The concept of waiver has been defined by this Court as:
a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal right,
advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have
enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by
him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered and such person forever
deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such
right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it. [67]
In determining whether a statutory right can be waived, this Court is guided by the following
pronouncement:
[T]he doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character, and, since the word
'waiver' covers every conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter
which affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner or
which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred
with statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in
the individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights of
others, and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden
by law, and does not contravene public policy; and the principle is recognized that
everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule made solely for
the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with
and relinquished without infringing on any public right, and without detriment to the
community at large[.][68] (Emphasis in the original)
When Colonel Otamias executed the Deed of Assignment, he effectively waived his right to
claim that his retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The right to receive retirement
benefits belongs to Colonel Otamias. His decision to waive a portion of his retirement benefits
does not infringe on the right of third persons, but even protects the right of his family to
receive support.
In addition, the Deed of Assignment should be considered as the law between the parties, and
its provisions should be respected in the absence of allegations that Colonel Otamias was
coerced or defrauded in executing it. The general rule is that a contract is the law between
parties and parties are free to stipulate terms and conditions that are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.[69]
The Deed of Assignment executed by Colonel Otamias was not contrary to law; it was in
accordance with the provisions on support in the Family Code. Hence, there was no reason for
the AFP PGMC not to recognize its validity.
Further, this Court notes that the AFP PGMC granted the request for support of the wives of
other retired military personnel in a similar situation as that of petitioner in this case. Attached
received a portion of their husbands' pensions.[70]
One affidavit stated:
4. That when I consulted and appeared before the Office of PGMC, I was
instructed to submit a Special Power of Authority from my husband so they
can release part of his pension to me;
5. That my husband signed the Special Power of Attorney at the PGMC ceding
50% of his pension to me; the SPA form was given to us by the PGMC and the
same was signed by my husband at the PGMC; . . .
....
 7. That the amount was deposited directly to my account by the PGMC- Finance
Center AFP out of the pension of my husband;
8. That only the Special Power of Attorney was required by the PGMC in order for
them to segregate my share of my husband's pension and deposit the same to
my account[.][71]
The other affidavit stated:
8. That my husband signed the Special Power of Attorney at the PGMC ceding
50% of his pension to me; the SPA form was given to us by the PGMC and the
same was signed by my husband at the PGMC[.] [72]
In addition, the AFP PGMC's website informs the public of the following procedure:
Tanong: My husband-retiree cut-off my allotment. How can I have it restored?
Sagot: Pension benefits are separate properties of the retiree and can not [sic] be subject of a
Court [sic] Order for execution nor can they be assigned to any third party (Sec. 31, PD 1638, as
amended). However, a valid Special Power of Attorney (SPA) by the retiree himself
empowering the AFP Finance Center to deduct certain amount from his lumpsum [sic] or
pension pay as the case maybe, as a rule, is a valid waiver of rights which can be effectively
implemented by the AFP F[inance] C[enter].[73]
Clearly, the AFP PGMC allows deductions from a retiree's pension for as long as the retiree
executes a Special Power of Attorney authorizing the AFP PGMC to deduct a certain amount for
the benefit of the retiree's beneficiary.
It is curious why Colonel Otamias was allowed to execute a Deed of Assignment by the
administering officer when, in the first place, the AFP PGMC's recognized procedure was to
execute a Special Power of Attorney, which would have been the easier remedy for Colonel
Otamias' family.
Instead, Colonel Otamias' family was forced to incur litigation expenses just to be able to
receive the financial support that Colonel Otamias was willing to give to Edna, et al.
II
Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 provides:
Section 31. The benefits authorized under this Decree, except as provided herein, shall not be
subject to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or any tax whatsoever; neither shall they be
assigned, ceded, or conveyed to any third person: Provided, That if a retired or separated
officer or enlisted man who is entitled to any benefit under this Decree has unsettled money
and/or property accountabilities incurred while in the active service, not more than fifty per
centum of the pension gratuity or other payment due such officer or enlisted man or his
survivors under this Decree may be withheld and be applied to settle such accountabilities.
Under Section 31, Colonel Otamias' retirement benefits are exempt from execution. Retirement
benefits are exempt from execution so as to ensure that the retiree has enough funds to support
himself and his family.
On the other hand, the right to receive support is provided under the Family Code. Article 194
of the Family Code defines support as follows:
Art. 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph
shall include his schooling or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the
age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to and
from place of work.
The provisions of the Family Code also state who are obliged to give support, thus:
Art. 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are obliged to
support each other to the whole extent set forth in the preceding article:
(1) The spouses;
(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
(3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the
latter;
(4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the
latter; and
(5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half- blood.
Art. 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether of the full or half-blood, are
likewise bound to support each other to the full extent set forth in Article 194 except only when
the need for support of the brother or sister, being of age, is due to a cause imputable to the
claimant's fault or negligence.
Art. 197. For the support of legitimate ascendants; descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate; and brothers and sisters, whether legitimately or illegitimately related, only the
separate property of the person obliged to give support shall be answerable provided that in
case the obligor has no separate property, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership,
if financially capable, shall advance the support, which shall be deducted from the share of the
spouses obliged upon the liquidation of the absolute community or of the conjugal
partnership[.]
The provisions of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court that are applicable to this case are in apparent
conflict with each other. Section 4 provides that judgments in actions for support are
immediately executory. On the other hand, Section 13(1) provides that the right to receive
pension from government is exempt from execution, thus:
RULE 39
EXECUTION, SATISFACTION, AND EFFECT OF JUDGMENTS
....
SEC. 4. Judgments not stayed by appeal. — Judgments in actions for injunction, receivership,
accounting and support, and such other judgments as are now or may hereafter be declared to
be immediately executory, shall be enforceable after their rendition and shall not, be stayed by
an appeal taken therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the trial court. On appeal therefrom,
the appellate court in its discretion may make an order suspending, modifying, restoring or
granting the injunction, receivership, accounting, or award of support.
The stay of execution shall be upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as may be considered
proper for the security or protection of the rights of the adverse party.
....
SEC. 13. Property exempt from execution. — Except as otherwise expressly provided by law,
the following property, and no other, shall be exempt from execution:
....
(1) The right to receive legal support, or money or property obtained as such support, or
any pension or gratuity from the Government;
....
But no article or species of property mentioned in this section shall be exempt from execution
issued upon a judgment recovered for its price or upon a judgment of foreclosure of a mortgage
thereon. (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the Family Code, Colonel Otamias is obliged to give support to his family, petitioners
in this case. However, he retired in 2003, and his sole source of income is his pension.
Judgments in actions for support are immediately executory, yet under Section 31 of
Presidential Decree No. 1638, his pension cannot be executed upon.
However, considering that Colonel Otamias has waived a portion of his retirement benefits
through his Deed of Assignment, resolution on the conflict between the civil code provisions on
support and Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 should be resolved in a more
appropriate case.
III
Republic v. Yahon[74] is an analogous case because it involved the grant of support to the spouse
of a retired member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
In Republic v. Yahon, Daisy R. Yahon filed a Petition for the Issuance of Protection Order
under Republic Act No. 9262.[75] She alleged that she did not have any source of income
because her husband made her resign from her job.[76] The trial court issued a temporary
restraining order, a portion of which stated:
To insure that petitioner [Daisy R. Yahon] can receive a fair share of respondent's
retirement and other benefits, the following agencies thru their heads are
directed to WITHHOLD any retirement, pension [,] and other benefits of
respondent, S/SGT. CHARLES A. YAHON, a member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines assigned at 4ID, Camp Evangelista, Patag, Cagayan de Oro City until further orders
from the court:
1. Commanding General/Officer of the Finance Center of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City;
2. The Management of RSBS, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City;
3. The Regional Manager of PAG-IBIG, Mortola St., Cagayan de Oro City.[77] (Emphasis in the
original)
The trial court subsequently granted Daisy's Petition and issued a permanent protection
order[78] and held:
Pursuant to the order of the court dated February 6, 2007, respondent, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon
is directed to give it to petitioner 50% of whatever retirement benefits and other claims that
may be due or released to him from the government and the said share of petitioner shall be
automatically deducted from respondent's benefits and claims and be given directly to the
petitioner, Daisy R. Yahon.
Let copy of this decision be sent to the Commanding General/Officer of Finance Center of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City; the Management of
RSBS, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City and the Regional Manager of PAG-IBIG, Mortola
St., Cagayan de Oro City for their guidance and strict compliance.[79]
In that case, the AFP Finance Center filed before the trial court a Manifestation and Motion
stating that "it was making a limited and special appearance"[80] and argued that the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Hence, the Armed Forces
of the Philippines is not bound by the trial court's ruling.[81]
The Armed Forces of the Philippines also cited Pacific Products, where this Court ruled that:
A rule, which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of public officers,
although it may be due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees
in the process of garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of its sovereignty may not
be sued in its own courts except by express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its
officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another
reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the
disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in
garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still another reason which covers
both of the foregoing is that every consideration of public policy forbids it. [82] (Citations
omitted)
This Court in Republic v. Yahon denied the Petition and discussed that because Republic Act
No. 9262 is the later enactment, its provisions should prevail,[83] thus:
We hold that Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later enactment, should be construed as
laying down an exception to the general rule above stated that retirement benefits are exempt
from execution. The law itself declares that the court shall order the withholding of a
percentage of the income or salary of the respondent by the employer, which shall be
automatically remitted directly to the woman "[n]otwithstanding other laws to the
contrary"[84] (Emphasis in the original)
IV
The 1987 Constitution gives much importance to the family as the basic unit of society, such
that Article XV[85] is devoted to it.
The passage of the Family Code further implemented Article XV of the Constitution. This Court
has recognized the importance of granting support to minor children, provided that the filiation
of the child is proven. In this case, the filiation of Jeffren M. Otamias and Jemwel M. Otamias
was admitted by Colonel Otamias in the Deed of Assignment.[86]
Even before the passage of the Family Code, this Court has given primary consideration to the
right of a child to receive support. In Samson v. Yatco,[87]a petition for support was dismissed
with prejudice by the trial court on the ground that the minor asking for support was not
present in court during trial. An appeal was filed, but it was dismissed for having been filed out
of time. This Court relaxed the rules of procedure and held that "[i]f the order of dismissal with
prejudice of the petition for support were to stand, the petitioners would be deprived of their
right to present and nature support."[88]
In Gan v. Reyes,[89] Augustus Caezar R. Gan (Gan) questioned the trial court's decision
requiring him to give support and claimed that that he was not the father of the minor seeking
support. He also argued that he was not given his day in court. This Court held that Gan's
arguments were meant to delay the execution of the judgment, and that in any case, Gan
himself filed a Motion for Leave to Deposit in Court Support Pendente Lite:
In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are always the paramount concerns. There
may be instances where, in view of the poverty of the child, it would be a travesty of justice to
refuse him support until the decision of the trial court attains finality while time continues to
slip away. An excerpt from the early case of De Leon v. Soriano is relevant, thus:
The money and property adjudged for support and education should and must be given
presently and without delay because if it had to wait the final judgment, the children may in the
meantime have suffered because of lack of food or have missed and lost years in school because
of lack of funds. One cannot delay the payment of such funds for support and education for the
reason that if paid long afterwards, however much the accumulated amount, its payment
cannot cure the evil and repair the damage caused. The children with such belated payment for
support and education cannot act as gluttons and eat voraciously and unwisely, afterwards, to
make up for the years of hunger and starvation. Neither may they enrol in several classes and
schools and take up numerous subjects all at once to make up for the years they missed in
school, due to non-payment of the funds when needed.[90]
V
The non-inclusion of the AFP PGMC or the AFP Finance Center in the action for support was
proper, considering that both the AFP PGMC and the AFP Finance Center are not the persons
obliged to give support to Edna, et al. Thus, it was not a real party-in-interest.[91] Nor was the
AFP PGMC a necessary party because complete relief could be obtained even without
impleading the AFP PGMC.[92]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated May 22,
2009 and Resolution dated August 11, 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 02555-MIN
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court Decision dated February 27,
2007 in F.C. Civil Case No. 2006-039 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ.,concur.
Brion, J., on official leave.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 183994 June 30, 2014
WILLIAM CO a.k.a. XU QUING HE, Petitioner,
vs.
NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, represented by ELIZABETH UY,1 Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules on
Civil Procedure (Rules) are the April 30, 2008 2 and August 1, 20083 Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 102975, which dismissed the petition and denied the motion
for reconsideration, respectively. In effect, the CA affirmed the January 28, 2008 Decision 4 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 121 of Caloocan City, which annulled and set aside the
Orders dated September 4, 20065 and November 16, 20066 of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Branch 50 of Caloocan City, permanently dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59,
206661-77 and 209634.
The facts are simple and undisputed:
Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products, represented by Elizabeth Uy (Uy), is the private
complainant in Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 for Violation of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang 22 filed against petitioner William Co (Co), which were raffled to the
MeTC Branch. 49 of Caloocan City. In the absence of Uy and the private counsel, the cases
were provisionally dismissed on June 9, 2003 in open court pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules).7 Uy received a copy of the June9, 2003
Order on July 2, 2003, while her counsel-of-record received a copy a day after.8 On July 2,
2004, Uy, through counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the Criminal Cases.9 Hon. Belen B. Ortiz,
then Presiding Judge of the MeTC Branch 49, granted the motion on October 14, 2004 and
denied Co’s motion for reconsideration.10 When Co moved for recusation, Judge Ortiz inhibited
herself from handling the criminal cases per Order dated January 10, 2005.11The cases were,
thereafter, raffled to the MeTC Branch 50 of Caloocan City. On March 17, 2005, Co filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order (TRO)/writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) before the RTC of Caloocan City challenging
the revival of the criminal cases.12 It was, however, dismissed for lack of merit on May 23,
2005.13 Co’s motion for reconsideration was, subsequently, denied on December 16,
2005.14 Co then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme
Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 171096.15 We dismissed the petition per Resolution
dated February 13, 2006.16There being no motion for reconsideration filed, the dismissal
became final and executory on March 20, 2006.17
Before the MeTC Branch 50 where Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634
were re-raffled after the inhibition of Judge Ortiz, Co filed a "Motion for Permanent Dismissal"
on July 13, 2006.18 Uy opposed the motion, contending that the motion raised the same issues
already resolved with finality by this Court in G.R. No. 171096. 19In spite of this, Judge Esteban
V. Gonzaga issued an Order dated September 4, 2006 granting Co’s motion. 20 When the court
subsequently denied Uy’s motion for reconsideration on November 16, 2006,21 Uy filed a
petition for certiorari before the RTC of Caloocan City. On January 28, 2008, Hon. Judge
Adoracion G. Angeles of the RTC Branch 121 acted favorably on the petition, annulling and
setting aside the Orders dated September 4, 2006 and November 16, 2006 and directing the
MeTC Branch 50 to proceed with the trial of the criminal cases. 22 Co then filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA, which, as aforesaid, dismissed the petition and denied his motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this present petition with prayer for TRO/WPI.
According to Co, the following issues need to be resolved in this petition:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST
PETITIONER ONTHE GROUND OF DENIAL OF HIS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL
CONSTITUTES FINAL DISMISSAL OF THESE CASES;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE METC ACTED WITH JURISDICTION IN REVIVING THE
CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST PETITIONER WHICH WERE DISMISSED ON THE
GROUND OF DENIAL OF HIS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL; and
3. ASSUMING POR GRATIA ARGUMENTITHE CASES WERE ONLY
PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED:
a. WHETHER THE ONE-YEAR TIMEBAR OF THEIR REVIVAL IS
COMPUTED FROM ISSUANCE OF THE ORDER OF PROVISIONAL
DISMISSAL;
b. WHETHER THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF DAYS IN A YEAR IS THE BASIS
FOR COMPUTING THE ONE-YEAR TIME BAR;
c. WHETHER THE PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED CASES AGAINST
PETITIONER ARE REVIVED IPSO FACTO BY THE FILING OF MOTION TO
REVIVE THESE CASES.23
Co argues that the June 9, 2003 Order provisionally dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59,
206661-77 and 209634 should be considered as a final dismissal on the ground that his right to
speedy trial was denied. He reasons out that from his arraignment on March 4, 2002 until the
initial trial on June 9, 2003, there was already a "vexatious, capricious and oppressive" delay,
which is in violation of Section 6 of Republic Act 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) 24 and Section
2, Paragraph 2, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure25 mandating that the
entire trial period should not exceed 180 days from the first day of trial. As the dismissal is
deemed final, Co contends that the MeTC lost its jurisdiction over the cases and cannot
reacquire jurisdiction over the same based on a mere motion because its revival would already
put him in double jeopardy.
Assuming that the criminal cases were only provisionally dismissed, Co further posits that such
dismissal became permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003 Order, not after
notice to the offended party. He also insists that both the filing of the motion to revive and the
trial court’s issuance of the order granting the revival must be within the one-year period.
Lastly, even assuming that the one-year period to revive the criminal cases started on July 2,
2003 when Uy received the June 9, 2003 Order, Co asserts that the motion was filed one day
late since year 2004 was a leap year.
The petition is unmeritorious.
At the outset, it must be noted that the issues raised in this petition were also the meat of the
controversy in Co’s previous petition in G.R. No. 171096, which We dismissed per Resolution
dated February 13, 2006. Such dismissal became final and executory on March 20, 2006.
While the first petition was dismissed mainly due to procedural infirmities, this Court
nonetheless stated therein that "[i]n any event, the petition lacks sufficient showing that
respondent court had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment to warrant the
exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case." Hence, upon the
finality of Our February 13, 2006 Resolution in G.R. No. 171096, the same already constitutes
as res judicata between the parties. On this ground alone, this petition should have been
dismissed outright.
Even if We are to squarely resolve the issues repeatedly raised in the present petition, Co’s
arguments are nonetheless untenable on the grounds as follows:
First, Co’s charge that his right to a speedy trial was violated is baseless. Obviously, he failed
to show any evidence that the alleged "vexatious, capricious and oppressive" delay in the trial
was attended with malice or that the same was made without good cause or justifiable motive
on the part of the prosecution. This Court has emphasized that "‘speedy trial’ is a relative term
and necessarily a flexible concept."26 In determining whether the accused's right to speedy trial
was violated, the delay should be considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings. 27 The
factors to balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion
of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay. 28 Surely, mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not suffice as the realities of everyday life
must be regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum, and that
particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. 29 "While
the Court recognizes the accused's right to speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy
administration of justice, we cannot deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity to fairly
prosecute criminals. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable
length of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial."30
Second, Co is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph of Section 8,
Rule 117 of the Rules, which are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in
the second paragraph thereof, to wit: (1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the
accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both
the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; (2) the offended
party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; (3) the court issues an
order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and (4) the public prosecutor
is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.31 In this case, it is
apparent from the records that there is no notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of
Criminal Cases Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 or of the hearing thereon which was
served on the private complainant at least three days before said hearing as mandated by
Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules.32 The fact is that it was only in open court that Co moved for
provisional dismissal "considering that, as per records, complainant had not shown any interest
to pursue her complaint."33 The importance of a prior notice to the offended party of a motion
for provisional dismissal is aptly explained in People v. Lacson:34
x x x It must be borne in mind that in crimes involving private interests, the new rule requires
that the offended party or parties or the heirs of the victims must be given adequate a priori
notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of the criminal case. Such notice may be
served on the offended party or the heirs of the victim through the private prosecutor, if there is
one, or through the public prosecutor who in turn must relay the notice to the offended party or
the heirs of the victim to enable them to confer with him before the hearing or appear in court
during the hearing. The proof of such service must be shown during the hearing on the motion,
otherwise, the requirement of the new rule will become illusory. Such notice will enable the
offended party or the heirs of the victim the opportunity to seasonably and effectively comment
on or object to the motion on valid grounds, including: (a) the collusion between the
prosecution and the accused for the provisional dismissal of a criminal case thereby depriving
the State of its right to due process; (b) attempts to make witnesses unavailable; or (c) the
provisional dismissal of the case with the consequent release of the accused from detention
would enable him to threaten and kill the offended party or the other prosecution witnesses or
flee from Philippine jurisdiction, provide opportunity for the destruction or loss of the
prosecution’s physical and other evidence and prejudice the rights of the offended party to
recover on the civil liability of the accused by his concealment or furtive disposition of his
property or the consequent lifting of the writ of preliminary attachment against his property.35
Third, there is evident want of jurisprudential support on Co’s supposition that the dismissal of
the cases became permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003 Order and not
after notice to the offended party. When the Rules states that the provisional dismissal shall
become permanent one year after the issuance of the order temporarily dismissing the case, it
should not be literally interpreted as such. Of course, there is a vital need to satisfy the basic
requirements of due process; thus, said in one case:
Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall become
permanent one year after the issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the
provision should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one
year after service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the
prosecution without the criminal case having been revived. The public prosecutor cannot be
expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal. 36
We hasten to add though that if the offended party is represented by a private counsel the
better rule is that the reckoning period should commence to run from the time such private
counsel was actually notified of the order of provisional dismissal. When a party is represented
by a counsel, notices of all kinds emanating from the court should be sent to the latter at
his/her given address.37 Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules analogously provides that if any party
has appeared by counsel, service upon the former shall be made upon the latter.38
Fourth, the contention that both the filing of the motion to revive the case and the court order
reviving it must be made prior to the expiration of the one-year period is unsustainable. Such
interpretation is not found in the Rules. Moreover, to permit otherwise would definitely put the
offended party at the mercy of the trial court, which may wittingly or unwittingly not comply.
Judicial notice must be taken of the fact that most, if not all, of our trial court judges have to
deal with clogged dockets in addition to their administrative duties and functions. Hence, they
could not be expected to act at all times on all pending decisions, incidents, and related
matters within the prescribed period of time. It is likewise possible that some of them,
motivated by ill-will or malice, may simply exercise their whims and caprices in not issuing the
order of revival on time.
Fifth, the fact that year 2004 was a leap year is inconsequential to determine the timeliness of
Uy’s motion to revive the criminal cases. What is material instead is Co’s categorical admission
that Uy is represented by a private counsel who only received a copy of the June 9, 2003
Order on July 3, 2003. Therefore, the motion was not belatedly filed on July 2, 2004. Since the
period for filing a motion to revive is reckoned from the private counsel's receipt of the order of
provisional dismissal, it necessarily follows that the reckoning period for the permanent
dismissal is likewise the private counsel's date of receipt of the order of provisional dismissal.
And Sixth, granting for the sake of argument that this Court should take into account 2004 as a
leap year and that the one-year period to revive the case should be reckoned from the date of
receipt of the order of provisional dismissal by Uy, We still hold that the motion to revive the
criminal cases against Co was timely filed. A year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of
whether it is a regular year or a leap year.39 Equally so, under the Administrative Code of 1987,
a yearis composed of 12 calendar months. The number of days is irrelevant. This was our
ruling in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc.,40 which was
subsequently reiterated in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of
Asia, Inc.,41 thus:
x x x [In] 1987, EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter
VIII, Book I thereof provides:
Sec. 31.Legal Periods.- "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; "month" of
thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed
according to the number of days the specific month contains; "day", to a day of twenty-four
hours and; "night" from sunrise to sunset. (emphasis supplied)
A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days
it may contain." It is the "period of time running from the beginning of a certain numbered day
up to, but not including, the corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there is not
a sufficient number of days in the next month, then up to and including the last day of that
month." To illustrate, one calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be from January 1,
2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be from February 1,
2008 until February 29, 2008.42
Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the
one-year period reckoned from the time Uy received the order of dismissal on July2, 2003
consisted of 24 calendar months, computed as follows:
1st calendar month July 3, 2003 to August 2, 2003
2nd calendar month August 3, 2003 to September 2, 2003
3rd calendar month September 3, 2003 to October 2, 2003
4th calendar month October 3, 2003 to November 2, 2003
5th calendar month November 3, 2003 to December 2, 2003
6th calendar month December 3, 2003 to January 2, 2004
7th calendar month January 3, 2004 to February 2, 2004
8th calendar month February 3, 2004 to March 2, 2004
9th calendar month March 3, 2004 to April 2, 2004
10th calendar month April 3, 2004 to May 2, 2004
11th calendar month May 3, 2004 to June 2, 2004
12th calendar month June 3, 2004 to July 2, 2004
In the end, We find it hard to disregard the thought that the instant petition was filed as a
dilatory tactic to prosecute Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634. As
correctly pointed out by Uy since the time when the "Motion for Permanent Dismissal" was
filed, the issues raised herein were already resolved with finality by this Court in G.R. No.
171096. Verily, Co, acting through the guidance and advice of his counsel, Atty. Oscar C.
Maglaque, adopted a worthless and vexatious legal maneuver for no purpose other than to
delay the trial court proceedings. It appears that Atty. Maglaque’s conduct contravened the
Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to observe the rules of procedure
and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice (Rule 10.03, Canon 10) as well as not to
unduly delay a case or misuse court processes (Rule 12.04, Canon 12). The Lawyer’s Oath
also upholds in particular:
x x x I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor
give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity
as well to the courts as to my clients x x x.1âwphi1
This Court has repeatedly impressed upon counsels that the need for the prompt termination of
litigation is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice. In Spouses Aguilar v.
Manila Banking Corporation,43 We said:
The Court reminds petitioners' counsel of the duty of lawyers who, as officers of the court, must
see to it that the orderly administration of justice must not be unduly impeded. It is the duty of a
counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman on the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on
the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is
his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the
incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his
client's propensity to litigate. A lawyer’s oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his
duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.44
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The April 30, 2008 and August 1,
2008 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 102975, which
affirmed the January 28, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121 of Caloocan
City, annulling and setting aside the Orders dated September 4, 2006 and November 16, 2006
of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 50 of Caloocan City that permanently dismissed
Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs of suit
to be paid by the petitioner.
The Commission on Bar Discipline-Integrated Bar of the Philippines is DIRECTED to
investigate Atty. Oscar C. Maglaque for his acts that appear to have violated the Lawyer's
Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Rule on Forum Shopping.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN
WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the
criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed
as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise
known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
The following facts are culled from the records:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem
contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they were
blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the
instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.3
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree
issued by the appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18)
months old.5 Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.6
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in
the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or
less).7 However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never
gave support to the son, Roderigo.8
Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu,
and since then, have been residing thereat.9 Respondent and his new wife established a
business known as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan,
Cebu City.10 To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu
City.11
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from
respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter. 12
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A.
No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.13 Respondent
submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also submitted her reply-
affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution
recommending the filing of an information for the crime charged against herein respondent.
The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states
that:
That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of
Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately deprive,
refuse and still continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14)
year old minor, of financial support legally due him, resulting in economic abuse to the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.15
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order
against respondent.16Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted
bail.17 Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which
respondent filed his Opposition.18 Pending the resolution thereof, respondent was
arraigned.19 Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the
protection order, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction
over the offense charged; and (2) prescription of the crime charged. 20
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the
instant criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien, the
dispositive part of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an
offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case
DISMISSED.
The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional liberty
is hereby cancelled (sic) and ordered released.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s
obligation to support their child under Article 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so
makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in the Philippines
who are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the obligor’s nationality."24
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:
x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in the
memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the
accused is a foreign national he is not subject to our national law (The Family Code) in regard
to a parent’s duty and obligation to givesupport to his child. Consequently, he cannot be
charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to support his child. Unless it is
conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies to a foreigner who fails to give support tohis
child, notwithstanding that he is not bound by our domestic law which mandates a parent to
give such support, it is the considered opinion of the court that no prima faciecase exists
against the accused herein, hence, the case should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262
for his unjustified failure to support his minor child.27
At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition despite
the fact that the same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in
Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation,28 which lays down the instances when a
ruling of the trial court may be brought on appeal directly to the Supreme Court without
violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:
x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition
with this Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation was
one that petitioners found themselves in when they filed the instant Petition to raise only
questions of law. In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from
decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41,
whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered
by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on
certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of appeal is taken to the
[Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of
appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
The third mode of appealis elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law."
(Emphasis supplied)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the
doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution
of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. 29
Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law – the response
thereto concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts,
i.e.,whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law; and whether or not he can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to do so.
It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law
concerning the liability of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions
punishable under special criminal laws, specifically in relation to family rights and duties. The
inimitability of the factual milieu of the present case, therefore, deserves a definitive ruling by
this Court, which will eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases. Furthermore, dismissing
the instant petition and remanding the same to the CA would only waste the time, effort and
resources of the courts. Thus, in the present case, considerations of efficiency and economy in
the administration of justice should prevail over the observance of the hierarchy of courts.
Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we
do not fully agree with petitioner’s contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative
that the legal obligation to support exists.
Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to
support his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree
issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code,31 respondent is not excused from complying
with his obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented
by petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support.32 Respondent
also added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated topetitioner for any
financial support.33
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 34 of the New
Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 35 of
the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine
laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only
applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they
are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties. 36
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties.
Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu
that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to
give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.37
In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that –
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are
governed by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they belong even when
staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).39
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son
under Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in
Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s
son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has
the burden of proving the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that
being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of
and capacity to support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing
his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands
does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or
after the issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals, 42 has already
enunciated that:
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized
to takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.43
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the
doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved
is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as
our local or domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the
obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is
presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to
support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign
land as well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality
principle on the matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent
does not completely show that he is notliable to give support to his son after the divorce decree
was issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioner’s allegation that under the second page of the
aforesaid covenant, respondent’s obligation to support his child is specifically stated, 46 which
was not disputed by respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent
states that parents have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not
punishable by law, said law would still not find applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank of
America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation,47 to wit:
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly
pleaded and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the
jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find
applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public
policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have
for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by
laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our
jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent
—
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable
injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function
of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental
principles of Conflict of Laws.48
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation
to support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly
enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of
financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support
his former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longerbe
considered marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her
marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered
still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et.
seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis
added)50
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under
Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support topetitioner’s
son, to wit:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence
against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her
child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's
freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of
physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include,
butnot limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally
due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial
support; x x x x
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her
child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial
support or custody of minor childrenof access to the woman's child/children. 51
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is
considered anact of violence against women and children.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in
petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the
New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of
public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine
territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this
score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his
child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are
residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the
offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the
respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not admitting, that there
is a legal basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability
has been extinguished on the ground of prescription of crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No.
9262, which provides that:
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in
twenty (20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.
The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a
continuing offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the
crime charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.
Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioner’s
child calls for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth
and falsehood of facts being admitted, we hereby remand the determination of this issue to the
RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and September
1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings
based on the merits of the case.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
March 8, 2016
G.R. No. 221697
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 221698-700
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND AMADO D.
VALDEZ Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court with extremely urgent application for an ex parte issuance of temporary
restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction assailing the
following: (1) 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
Second Division; (2) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-
001 (DC); (3) 11 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division; and ( 4) 23
December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-
007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) for having been issued without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Facts
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn
infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3
September 1968. Parental care and custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his
relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Three days after, 6 September 1968,
Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as a foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar
of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner
was given the name "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar." 1
When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a.
Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her
adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court
granted their petition and ordered that petitioner's name be changed from "Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." Although necessary
notations were made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's foundling certificate reflecting the court
decreed adoption,2 the petitioner's adoptive mother discovered only sometime in the second
half of 2005 that the lawyer who handled petitioner's adoption failed to secure from the OCR-
Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating petitioner's new name and the name of her
adoptive parents. 3 Without delay, petitioner's mother executed an affidavit attesting to the
lawyer's omission which she submitted to the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a
new Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe. 4
Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered as a voter with the
local COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13 December 1986, she received her COMELEC
Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. 5
On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No. F927287 6 by the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5 April 1993 and 19 May 1998, she
renewed her Philippine passport and respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos. L881511
and DD156616.7
Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies at the University
of the Philippines8 but she opted to continue her studies abroad and left for the United States of
America (U.S.) in 1988. Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston College in Chestnuts Hill,
Massachusetts where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies. 9
On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a
citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan
City. 10 Desirous of being with her husband who was then based in the U.S., the couple flew
back to the U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony or on 29 July 1991. 11
While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16 April
1992.12 Her two daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both
born in the Philippines on 10 July 1998 and 5 June 2004, respectively. 13
On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. 14 She obtained U.S.
Passport No. 017037793 on 19 December 2001. 15
On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with Hanna to support her
father's candidacy for President in the May 2004 elections. It was during this time that she gave
birth to her youngest daughter Anika. She returned to the U.S. with her two daughters on 8 July
2004. 16
After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed back to the
Philippines upon learning of her father's deteriorating medical condition. 17 Her father slipped
into a coma and eventually expired. The petitioner stayed in the country until 3 February 2005
to take care of her father's funeral arrangements as well as to assist in the settlement of his
estate.18
According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her father was a severe blow to her entire
family. In her earnest desire to be with her grieving mother, the petitioner and her husband
decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines sometime in the first quarter of
2005.19 The couple began preparing for their resettlement including notification of their
children's schools that they will be transferring to Philippine schools for the next
semester;20coordination with property movers for the relocation of their household goods,
furniture and cars from the U.S. to the Philippines;21 and inquiry with Philippine authorities as to
the proper procedure to be followed in bringing their pet dog into the country. 22 As early as
2004, the petitioner already quit her job in the U.S.23
Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 200524 and without delay, secured
a Tax Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Her three (3) children
immediately followed25 while her husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending
projects as well as to arrange the sale of their family home there.26
The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her mother's place until she and her husband
purchased a condominium unit with a parking slot at One Wilson Place Condominium in San
Juan City in the second half of 2005.27 The corresponding Condominium Certificates of Title
covering the unit and parking slot were issued by the Register of Deeds of San Juan City to
petitioner and her husband on 20 February 2006.28 Meanwhile, her children of school age
began attending Philippine private schools.
On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S. to supervise the disposal of
some of the family's remaining household belongings.29 She travelled back to the Philippines
on 11 March 2006.30
In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of the
family's change and abandonment of their address in the U.S. 31 The family home was
eventually sold on 27 April 2006.32 Petitioner's husband resigned from his job in the U.S. in
April 2006, arrived in the country on 4 May 2006 and started working for a major Philippine
company in July 2006.33
In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square meter lot in Corinthian Hills,
Quezon City where they built their family home34 and to this day, is where the couple and their
children have been residing.35 A Transfer Certificate of Title covering said property was issued
in the couple's name by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on 1June 2006.
On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003.36 Under the same Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to
reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her
three minor children on 10 July 2006.37 As can be gathered from its 18 July 2006 Order, the BI
acted favorably on petitioner's petitions and declared that she is deemed to have reacquired
her Philippine citizenship while her children are considered as citizens of the
Philippines.38 Consequently, the BI issued Identification Certificates (ICs) in petitioner's name
and in the names of her three (3) children. 39
Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31 August
2006.40 She also secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport bearing the No.
XX4731999.41 This passport was renewed on 18 March 2014 and she was issued Philippine
Passport No. EC0588861 by the DFA.42
On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the
Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). 43 Before assuming her post,
petitioner executed an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America
and Renunciation of American Citizenship" before a notary public in Pasig City on 20 October
2010,44 in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225. 45 The
following day, 21 October 2010 petitioner submitted the said affidavit to the BI46 and took her
oath of office as Chairperson of the MTRCB.47 From then on, petitioner stopped using her
American passport.48
On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila
an "Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States."49 On that day, she
accomplished a sworn questionnaire before the U.S. Vice Consul wherein she stated that she
had taken her oath as MTRCB Chairperson on 21 October 2010 with the intent, among others,
of relinquishing her American citizenship.50 In the same questionnaire, the petitioner stated that
she had resided outside of the U.S., specifically in the Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to
29 July 1991 and from May 2005 to present.51
On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of
Nationality of the United States" effective 21 October 2010.52
On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC)
for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered "6 years and 6 months" to the
question "Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013."53 Petitioner obtained the
highest number of votes and was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013. 54
On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine Diplomatic Passport No. DE0004530. 55
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016
Elections. 56 In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her
residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and
eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005.57 The petitioner attached to her COC an
"Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship" subscribed and sworn to before a
notary public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015. 58
Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered the filing of
several COMELEC cases against her which were the subject of these consolidated cases.
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697
A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a petition
to deny due course or cancel said COC which was docketed as SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and
raffled to the COMELEC Second Division.59She is convinced that the COMELEC has
jurisdiction over her petition.60 Essentially, Elamparo's contention is that petitioner committed
material misrepresentation when she stated in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen and that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months up to the day before the 9 May 2016 Elections.61
On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be considered as a natural-
born Filipino on account of the fact that she was a foundling.62 Elamparo claimed that
international law does not confer natural-born status and Filipino citizenship on
foundlings.63 Following this line of reasoning, petitioner is not qualified to apply for reacquisition
of Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen to begin
with.64Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was a natural-born Filipino, she is deemed to
have lost that status when she became a naturalized American citizen.65 According to
Elamparo, natural-born citizenship must be continuous from birth.66
On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed out that petitioner was bound by the
sworn declaration she made in her 2012 COC for Senator wherein she indicated that she had
resided in the country for only six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as of May 2013 Elections.
Elamparo likewise insisted that assuming arguendo that petitioner is qualified to regain her
natural-born status under R.A. No. 9225, she still fell short of the ten-year residency
requirement of the Constitution as her residence could only be counted at the earliest from July
2006, when she reacquired Philippine citizenship under the said Act. Also on the assumption
that petitioner is qualified to reacquire lost Philippine Citizenship, Elamparo is of the belief that
she failed to reestablish her domicile in the Philippines. 67
Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she countered that:
(1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo's petition as it was actually a
petition for quo warranto which could only be filed if Grace Poe wins in the Presidential
elections, and that the Department of Justice (DOJ) has primary jurisdiction to revoke
the BI's July 18, 2006 Order;
(2) the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not contain allegations
which, if hypothetically admitted, would make false the statement in her COC that she
is a natural-born Filipino citizen nor was there any allegation that there was a willful or
deliberate intent to misrepresent on her part;
(3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in the COC regarding her
citizenship and residency qualifications for:
a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations show that foundlings were
considered citizens;
b. foundlings are presumed under international law to have been born of
citizens of the place where they are found;
c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine citizenship under the provisions
of R.A. No. 9225;
d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her American citizenship prior to the
filing of her COC for President in the May 9, 2016 Elections and that the same
is in full force and effect and has not been withdrawn or recanted;
e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that she did not possess natural-
born status;
f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she reestablished her domicile in
the Philippines as early as May 24, 2005;
g. she could reestablish residence even before she reacquired natural-born
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225;
h. statement regarding the period of residence in her 2012 COC for Senator
was an honest mistake, not binding and should give way to evidence on her
true date of reacquisition of domicile;
i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to usurp the sovereign right of the
Filipino people to decide a purely political question, that is, should she serve
as the country's next leader.68
After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the petition was deemed submitted for
resolution.
On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution finding that
petitioner's COC, filed for the purpose of running for the President of the Republic of the
Philippines in the 9 May 2016 National and Local Elections, contained material representations
which are false. The fallo of the aforesaid Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the instant Petition to Deny Due
Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate
of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and
Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llamanzares is
hereby CANCELLED.69
Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015 Resolution was filed by petitioner which
the COMELEC En Banc resolved in its 23 December 2015 Resolution by denying the same. 70
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700
This case stemmed from three (3) separate petitions filed by Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad),
Antonio P. Contreras (Contreras) and Amado D. Valdez (Valdez) against petitioner before the
COMELEC which were consolidated and raffled to its First Division.
In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure,71 docketed as SPA No. 15-002 (DC), Tatad alleged that petitioner lacks the
requisite residency and citizenship to qualify her for the Presidency. 72
Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, persons of
unknown parentage, particularly foundlings, cannot be considered natural-born Filipino citizens
since blood relationship is determinative of natural-born status.73 Tatad invoked the rule of
statutory construction that what is not included is excluded. He averred that the fact that
foundlings were not expressly included in the categories of citizens in the 193 5 Constitution is
indicative of the framers' intent to exclude them.74 Therefore, the burden lies on petitioner to
prove that she is a natural-born citizen.75
Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international conventions or treaties to support her
claim that foundlings have a nationality.76 According to Tatad, international conventions and
treaties are not self-executory and that local legislations are necessary in order to give effect to
treaty obligations assumed by the Philippines.77 He also stressed that there is no standard
state practice that automatically confers natural-born status to foundlings.78
Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed that petitioner cannot avail of the option to
reacquire Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 because it only applies to former natural-
born citizens and petitioner was not as she was a foundling.79
Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad concluded that she did not comply with the ten
(10) year residency requirement.80 Tatad opined that petitioner acquired her domicile in
Quezon City only from the time she renounced her American citizenship which was sometime
in 2010 or 2011.81 Additionally, Tatad questioned petitioner's lack of intention to abandon her
U.S. domicile as evinced by the fact that her husband stayed thereat and her frequent trips to
the U.S.82
In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of petitioner, docketed as SPA
No. 15-139 (DC), Valdez alleged that her repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 did not bestow upon
her the status of a natural-born citizen.83 He advanced the view that former natural-born
citizens who are repatriated under the said Act reacquires only their Philippine citizenship and
will not revert to their original status as natural-born citizens.84
He further argued that petitioner's own admission in her COC for Senator that she had only
been a resident of the Philippines for at least six (6) years and six (6) months prior to the 13
May 2013 Elections operates against her. Valdez rejected petitioner's claim that she could
have validly reestablished her domicile in the Philippines prior to her reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. In effect, his position was that petitioner did not meet the ten (10) year residency
requirement for President.
Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against petitioner, Contreras' petition, 85 docketed as
SPA No. 15-007 (DC), limited the attack to the residency issue. He claimed that petitioner's
2015 COC for President should be cancelled on the ground that she did not possess the ten-
year period of residency required for said candidacy and that she made false entry in her COC
when she stated that she is a legal resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven
(11) months by 9 May 2016.86 Contreras contended that the reckoning period for computing
petitioner's residency in the Philippines should be from 18 July 2006, the date when her petition
to reacquire Philippine citizenship was approved by the BI. 87 He asserted that petitioner's
physical presence in the country before 18 July 2006 could not be valid evidence of
reacquisition of her Philippine domicile since she was then living here as an American citizen
and as such, she was governed by the Philippine immigration laws.88
In her defense, petitioner raised the following arguments:
First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed outright for failure to state a cause of action. His
petition did not invoke grounds proper for a disqualification case as enumerated under
Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.89 Instead, Tatad completely relied on the
alleged lack of residency and natural-born status of petitioner which are not among the
recognized grounds for the disqualification of a candidate to an elective office. 90
Second, the petitions filed against her are basically petitions for quo warranto as they focus on
establishing her ineligibility for the Presidency.91 A petition for quo warranto falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and not the COMELEC. 92
Third, the burden to prove that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen is on the
respondents.93 Otherwise stated, she has a presumption in her favor that she is a natural-born
citizen of this country.
Fourth, customary international law dictates that foundlings are entitled to a nationality and are
presumed to be citizens of the country where they are found.94 Consequently, the petitioner is
considered as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.95
Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has every right to be repatriated under
R.A. No. 9225 or the right to reacquire her natural-born status.96 Moreover, the official acts of
the Philippine Government enjoy the presumption of regularity, to wit: the issuance of the 18
July 2006 Order of the BI declaring her as natural-born citizen, her appointment as MTRCB
Chair and the issuance of the decree of adoption of San Juan RTC.97 She believed that all
these acts reinforced her position that she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.98
Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first quarter of 2005, she started reestablishing her
domicile of choice in the Philippines as demonstrated by her children's resettlement and
schooling in the country, purchase of a condominium unit in San Juan City and the construction
of their family home in Corinthian Hills.99
Seventh, she insisted that she could legally reestablish her domicile of choice in the Philippines
even before she renounced her American citizenship as long as the three determinants for a
change of domicile are complied with.100She reasoned out that there was no requirement that
renunciation of foreign citizenship is a prerequisite for the acquisition of a new domicile of
choice.101
Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing in the residency portion of her COC for Senator
was a mistake made in good faith.102
In a Resolution103 promulgated on 11 December 2015, the COMELEC First Division ruled that
petitioner is not a natural-born citizen, that she failed to complete the ten (10) year residency
requirement, and that she committed material misrepresentation in her COC when she
declared therein that she has been a resident of the Philippines for a period of ten (10) years
and eleven (11) months as of the day of the elections on 9 May 2016. The COMELEC First
Division concluded that she is not qualified for the elective position of President of the Republic
of the Philippines. The dispositive portion of said Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
to GRANT the Petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD
SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of the COMELEC First Division's
Resolution. On 23 December 2015, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner instituted the present petitions
for certiorari with urgent prayer for the issuance of an ex parte temporary
restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. On 28 December
2015, temporary restraining orders were issued by the Court enjoining the COMELEC and its
representatives from implementing the assailed COMELEC Resolutions until further orders
from the Court. The Court also ordered the consolidation of the two petitions filed by petitioner
in its Resolution of 12 January 2016. Thereafter, oral arguments were held in these cases.
3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the 1
December 2015 Resolution of the Second Division.
4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the 11
December 2015 Resolution of the First Division.
The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions emanated are
tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner is a
QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the 9 May 2016 National Elections.
The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of petitioner should be denied due
course or cancelled "on the exclusive ground" that she made in the certificate a false material
representation. The exclusivity of the ground should hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC
and restrain it from going into the issue of the qualifications of the candidate for the position, if,
as in this case, such issue is yet undecided or undetermined by the proper authority. The
COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof
of the candidate.
We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our Republic, particularly its provisions in Article IX,
C, Section 2:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city
officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal
officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective
barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares and to ANNUL
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests
and SET ASIDE the:
involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and
not appealable.
1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered through its Second Division, in SPA
No. 15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares.
elections, including determination of the number and location of polling places,
appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.
2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered through its First Division, in the
consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC)
and instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the
entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest,
Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez,
peaceful, and credible elections.
petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent.
 (5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or
coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform
or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on
Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those
which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or
refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by
any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political
parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute
interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional
ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in
addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for
inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute
cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting
election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election
spending, including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be
posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses,
malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has
deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or
disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the
conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
Not any one of the enumerated powers approximate the exactitude of the provisions of Article
VI, Section 17 of the same basic law stating that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed
of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate
or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the
basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which provides that:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.
The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of the President, the
Vice-President, Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives was made clear
by the Constitution. There is no such provision for candidates for these positions.
Can the COMELEC be such judge?
The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on
Elections,104 which was affirmatively cited in the En Banc decision in Fermin v. COMELEC105 is
our guide. The citation in Fermin reads:
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of
candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule
25 § 1, the following:
Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing
law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification
may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied
by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a
substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rule-making power under Art. IX,
A, §6 of the Constitution, cannot do it. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the
COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially
involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. [Art.
IX, C, §2(3)]
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for
disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but
also in their consequences are proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for a
declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated, are based on
grounds specified in § 12 and §68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in §40 of the Local
Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate
or from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a
candidate from the race either from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other
hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes
for holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is
to remove the incumbent from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply
that he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public
office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473)
That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in §2 of the Law does not imply that he does not
suffer from any of [the] disqualifications provided in §4.
Before we get derailed by the distinction as to grounds and the consequences of the respective
proceedings, the importance of the opinion is in its statement that "the lack of provision for
declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule". Justice
Mendoza lectured in Romualdez-Marcos that:
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for
determining before election the qualifications of a candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for
determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified
as a candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending,
commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which should be determined lest he
wins because of the very acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is why it is
provided that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted
for; if he has been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason
he has been voted for and he has won, either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will
be set aside.
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates' eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in
this case, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the
term of the office. This is amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No.
120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination of Aquino's residence was
still pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the
summary character proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law
makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its
officers. The law is satisfied if candidates state in their certificates of candidacy that they are
eligible for the position which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to
be made after the election and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving
charges of false representations made in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given
jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for
President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No.
7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of
the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress of the President and Vice
President, as the case may be.106
To be sure, the authoritativeness of the Romualdez pronouncements as reiterated
in Fermin, led to the amendment through COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, on 25 September
2012 of its Rule 25. This, the 15 February1993 version of Rule 25, which states that:
Grounds for disqualification. -Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a
candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act
declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate.107
was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:
Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is declared by final
decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found by the Commission to be suffering from any
disqualification provided by law or the Constitution.
A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to or Cancel a
Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate, or a
combination thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.
Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of absence of an
authorized proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of candidate. Such
that, as presently required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a declaration by a final
judgment of a competent court that the candidate sought to be disqualified "is guilty of or found
by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution."
Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are flipsides of
one to the other. Both do not allow, are not authorizations, are not vestment of jurisdiction, for
the COMELEC to determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts of qualification must
beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before an authority properly vested with
jurisdiction. The prior determination of qualification may be by statute, by executive order or by
a judgment of a competent court or tribunal.
If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering from a
disqualification "provided by law or the Constitution," neither can the certificate of candidacy be
cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false representations regarding his or her
qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified, such prior
authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of the representation can be found.
The only exception that can be conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or
unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. Such are, anyway, bases equivalent to prior
decisions against which the falsity of representation can be determined.
The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in a proceeding under Rule 23 that
deals with, as in this case, alleged false representations regarding the candidate's citizenship
and residence, forced the COMELEC to rule essentially that since foundlings 108 are not
mentioned in the enumeration of citizens under the 1935 Constitution,109 they then cannot be
citizens. As the COMELEC stated in oral arguments, when petitioner admitted that she is a
foundling, she said it all. This borders on bigotry. Oddly, in an effort at tolerance, the
COMELEC, after saying that it cannot rule that herein petitioner possesses blood relationship
with a Filipino citizen when "it is certain that such relationship is indemonstrable," proceeded to
say that "she now has the burden to present evidence to prove her natural filiation with a
Filipino parent."
The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE.
At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither unknown nor
unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on
Paternity and Filiation.110 That said, there is more than sufficient evider1ce that petitioner has
Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of proof
was on private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private
respondents should have shown that both of petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission
that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her because such status did not exclude the
possibility that her parents were Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high
probability, if not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.
The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are unknown, but
whether such parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128:
Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue
as to induce belief in its existence or no-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be
allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability of
improbability of the fact in issue.
The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics Authority
(PSA)111 that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines was
15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the country was 10,558,278. The statistical
probability that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born Filipino
was 99.83%. For her part, petitioner presented census statistics for Iloilo Province for 1960 and
1970, also from the PSA. In 1960, there were 962,532 Filipinos and 4,734 foreigners in the
province; 99.62% of the population were Filipinos. In 1970, the figures were 1,162,669 Filipinos
and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. Also presented were figures for the child producing ages (15-
49). In 1960, there were 230,528 female Filipinos as against 730 female foreigners
or 99.68%. In the same year, there were 210,349 Filipino males and 886 male aliens,
or 99.58%. In 1970, there were 270,299 Filipino females versus 1, 190 female aliens,
or 99.56%. That same year, there were 245,740 Filipino males as against only 1,165 male
aliens or 99.53%. COMELEC did not dispute these figures. Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim
admitted, during the oral arguments, that at the time petitioner was found in 1968, the majority
of the population in Iloilo was Filipino.112
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that she was
abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City.1âwphi1 She also has typical
Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval
face.
There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary course
of nature and the ordinary habits of life.113 All of the foregoing evidence, that a person with
typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where the population
of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a 99%
chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than ample
probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents are Filipinos. That probability and
the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence.
To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm. In the
words of the Solicitor General:
Second. It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do not come to the Philippines so
they can get pregnant and leave their newborn babies behind. We do not face a situation
where the probability is such that every foundling would have a 50% chance of being a Filipino
and a 50% chance of being a foreigner. We need to frame our questions properly. What are
the chances that the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be foreigners? Almost
zero. What are the chances that the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be
Filipinos? 99.9%.
According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010 to 2014, on a yearly average, there
were 1,766,046 children born in the Philippines to Filipino parents, as opposed to 1,301
children in the Philippines of foreign parents. Thus, for that sample period, the ratio of non-
Filipino children to natural born Filipino children is 1:1357. This means that the statistical
probability that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born Filipino is 99.93%.
From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines is 15,986 while the
total number of Filipinos born in the Philippines is 15,558,278. For this period, the ratio of non-
Filipino children is 1:661. This means that the statistical probability that any child born in the
Philippines on that decade would be a natural born Filipino is 99.83%.
We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to crunch the numbers for us, but I am
confident that the statistical probability that a child born in the Philippines would be a natural
born Filipino will not be affected by whether or not the parents are known. If at all, the likelihood
that a foundling would have a Filipino parent might even be higher than 99.9%. Filipinos
abandon their children out of poverty or perhaps, shame. We do not imagine foreigners
abandoning their children here in the Philippines thinking those infants would have better
economic opportunities or believing that this country is a tropical paradise suitable for raising
abandoned children. I certainly doubt whether a foreign couple has ever considered their child
excess baggage that is best left behind.
To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just because there
may be a theoretical chance that one among the thousands of these foundlings might be the
child of not just one, but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just
doesn't make any sense. Given the statistical certainty - 99.9% - that any child born in the
Philippines would be a natural born citizen, a decision denying foundlings such status is
effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no reason why this Honorable Court should use
an improbable hypothetical to sacrifice the fundamental political rights of an entire class of
human beings. Your Honor, constitutional interpretation and the use of common sense are not
separate disciplines.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935
Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which
would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the
enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the framers.
In Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,114 this Court held that:
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the
framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely
assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the
explanation offered by the framers.115
As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the deliberations of the 1934
Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the
enumeration. The following exchange is recorded:
Sr. Rafols: For an amendment. I propose that after subsection 2, the following is inserted: "The
natural children of a foreign father and a Filipino mother not recognized by the father.
xxxx
President:
[We] would like to request a clarification from the proponent of the amendment. The gentleman
refers to natural children or to any kind of illegitimate children?
Sr. Rafols:
To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes natural children of unknown
parentage, natural or illegitimate children of unknown parents.
Sr. Montinola:
For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown parents." Current codes consider them
Filipino, that is, I refer to the Spanish Code wherein all children of unknown parentage born in
Spanish territory are considered Spaniards, because the presumption is that a child of
unknown parentage is the son of a Spaniard. This may be applied in the Philippines in that a
child of unknown parentage born in the Philippines is deemed to be Filipino, and there is no
need ...
Sr. Rafols:
There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are [required] to be Filipino.
Sr. Montinola:
But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no [more] need for amendment.
Sr. Rafols:
The amendment should read thus:
"Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a Filipino mother recognized by one, or the
children of unknown parentage."
Sr. Briones:
The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines of unknown parentage.
Sr. Rafols:
The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person] does not recognize the child, is not
unknown.
President:
Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?
Sr. Rafols:
I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would exclude the children of a
Filipina with a foreigner who does not recognize the child. Their parentage is not unknown and
I think those of overseas Filipino mother and father [whom the latter] does not recognize,
should also be considered as Filipinos.
President:
The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from the Gentleman from Cebu, Mr.
Briones.
Sr. Busion:
Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this matter in the hands of the
Legislature?
Sr. Roxas:
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and far in between, that the
constitution need [not] refer to them. By international law the principle that children or people
born in a country of unknown parents are citizens in this nation is recognized, and it is not
necessary to include a provision on the subject exhaustively.116
Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because there was any objection
to the notion that persons of "unknown parentage" are not citizens but only because their
number was not enough to merit specific mention. Such was the account,117 cited by petitioner,
of delegate and constitution law author Jose Aruego who said:
During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an amendment to
include as Filipino citizens the illegitimate children with a foreign father of a mother who
was a citizen of the Philippines, and also foundlings; but this amendment was defeated
 primarily because the Convention believed that the cases, being too few to warrant the
inclusion of a provision in the Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by
statutory legislation. Moreover, it was believed that the rules of international law were
already clear to the effect that illegitimate children followed the citizenship of the
mother, and that foundlings followed the nationality of the place where they were
found, thereby making unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of the proposed
amendment.
This explanation was likewise the position of the Solicitor General during the 16 February 2016
Oral Arguments:
We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But note that what was declined was the
proposal for a textual and explicit recognition of foundlings as Filipinos. And so, the way to
explain the constitutional silence is by saying that it was the view of Montinola and Roxas
which prevailed that there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos.
Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's or Roxas' views were legally correct. Framers
of a constitution can constitutionalize rules based on assumptions that are imperfect or even
wrong. They can even overturn existing rules. This is basic. What matters here is that
Montinola and Roxas were able to convince their colleagues in the convention that there is no
more need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos because they are already impliedly so
recognized.
In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of linguistic efficiency and
the avoidance of redundancy. The policy is clear: it is to recognize foundlings, as a class, as
Filipinos under Art. IV, Section 1 (3) of the 1935 Constitution. This inclusive policy is carried
over into the 1973 and 1987 Constitution. It is appropriate to invoke a famous scholar as he
was paraphrased by Chief Justice Fernando: the constitution is not silently silent, it is silently
vocal. 118
The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers "worked to create a just and
humane society," that "they were reasonable patriots and that it would be unfair to impute upon
them a discriminatory intent against foundlings." He exhorts that, given the grave implications
of the argument that foundlings are not natural-born Filipinos, the Court must search the
records of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions "for an express intention to deny foundlings
the status of Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish to use the constitution to discriminate
against foundlings to show that the constitution really intended to take this path to the dark side
and inflict this across the board marginalization."
We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings. On the
contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. All
exhort the State to render social justice. Of special consideration are several provisions in the
present charter: Article II, Section 11 which provides that the "State values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human rights," Article XIII, Section 1 which
mandates Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3 which requires the State to defend the "right of
children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms
of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development."
Certainly, these provisions contradict an intent to discriminate against foundlings on account of
their unfortunate status.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws
do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must
be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the
Civil Code which provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status, conditions, legal
capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad."
Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the
adoptee is a Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis v. Republic,119 a child left by an unidentified mother was
sought to be adopted by aliens. This Court said:
In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no court may
entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the case and over the
parties, but also over the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of
petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the
status of a natural person is determined by the latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we
have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not
over the status of the petitioners, who are foreigners.120 (Underlining supplied)
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules to
Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise
known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act
Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other
Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's A.M. No.
02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino children" and include
foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.
It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to the
issuance of a foundling certificate under these laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts
to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at
best. This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born citizens are those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having to perform an act" means that the act
must be personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling status is
done not by the child but by the authorities.121 Secondly, the object of the process is the
determination of the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the
process is certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine
citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino
mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.
In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner is a foundling, as
evidenced by a Foundling Certificate issued in her favor. 122 The Decree of Adoption issued on
13 May 1974, which approved petitioner's adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe, expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife, Rosario Militar, as her "foundling
parents," hence effectively affirming petitioner's status as a foundling.123
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an
international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or
incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into
a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. 124 On the other
hand, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of
the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations. Generally accepted principles of international law include international custom as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations.125 International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result from the
combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part
of States; and a psychological element known as the opinionjuris sive necessitates (opinion as
to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. 126 "General principles of law
recognized by civilized nations" are principles "established by a process of reasoning" or
judicial logic, based on principles which are "basic to legal systems generally,"127 such as
"general principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice," and the
"general principle against discrimination" which is embodied in the "Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the
Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation."128 These are the same core
principles which underlie the Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Bill of Rights.129
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this Court as part of
the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State. 130 Article 15
thereof states:
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change
his nationality.
The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC).
Article 7 of the UNCRC imposes the following obligations on our country:
Article 7
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a
name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to know and be cared
for by his or her parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their
national law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in
particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.
In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide for the right of every child "to acquire a nationality:"
Article 24
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion,
national or social origin, property or birth, the right, to such measures of protection as are
required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant
nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at
the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the application of our present naturalization
laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the
applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old.
The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally
accepted principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on
Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is
presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth," to wit:
Article 14
A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth. If the
child's parentage is established, its nationality shall be determined by the rules applicable in
cases where the parentage is known.
A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory of the
State in which it was found. (Underlining supplied)
The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where
he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness:
Article 2
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, be considered to have been born within the territory of parents possessing the
nationality of that State.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention
on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their principles are not binding. While
the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15(1) ofwhich131effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930
Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article 15(1) of the UDHR. 132 In Razon v. Tagitis, 133 this
Court noted that the Philippines had not signed or ratified the "International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the proscription
against enforced disappearances in the said convention was nonetheless binding as a
"generally accepted principle of international law." Razon v. Tagitis is likewise notable for
declaring the ban as a generally accepted principle of international law although the convention
had been ratified by only sixteen states and had not even come into force and which needed
the ratification of a minimum of twenty states. Additionally, as petitioner points out, the Court
was content with the practice of international and regional state organs, regional state practice
in Latin America, and State Practice in the United States.
Another case where the number of ratifying countries was not determinative is Mijares v.
Ranada, 134 where only four countries had "either ratified or acceded to"135 the 1966
"Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters" when the case was decided in 2005. The Court also pointed out that that
nine member countries of the European Common Market had acceded to the Judgments
Convention. The Court also cited U.S. laws and jurisprudence on recognition of foreign
judgments. In all, only the practices of fourteen countries were considered and yet, there was
pronouncement that recognition of foreign judgments was widespread practice.
Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively takes into account the fact that "generally
accepted principles of international law" are based not only on international custom, but also on
"general principles of law recognized by civilized nations," as the phrase is understood in
Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness, equity and the policy against
discrimination, which are fundamental principles underlying the Bill of Rights and which are
"basic to legal systems generally,"136 support the notion that the right against enforced
disappearances and the recognition of foreign judgments, were correctly considered as
"generally accepted principles of international law" under the incorporation clause.
Petitioner's evidence137 shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and South America,
and Europe have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizen. Forty-two (42) of
those countries follow the jus sanguinis regime. Of the sixty, only thirty-three (33) are parties to
the 1961 Convention on Statelessness; twenty-six (26) are not signatories to the Convention.
Also, the Chief Justice, at the 2 February 2016 Oral Arguments pointed out that in 166 out of
189 countries surveyed (or 87.83%), foundlings are recognized as citizens. These
circumstances, including the practice of jus sanguinis countries, show that it is a generally
accepted principle of international law to presume foundlings as having been born of nationals
of the country in which the foundling is found.
Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally accepted principle
of international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court's Rules on
Adoption, expressly refer to "Filipino children." In all of them, foundlings are among the Filipino
children who could be adopted. Likewise, it has been pointed that the DFA issues passports to
foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows that even the executive
department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on
Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our
Constitution. The presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the
presumption that their parents are nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data provided
by the PSA show, that presumption is at more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.
In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of nationality of
foundlings were designed to address the plight of a defenseless class which suffers from a
misfortune not of their own making. We cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a
country which calls itself civilized and a member of the community of nations. The Solicitor
General's warning in his opening statement is relevant:
.... the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable Court that those treaties
and conventions were drafted because the world community is concerned that the situation of
foundlings renders them legally invisible. It would be tragically ironic if this Honorable Court
ended up using the international instruments which seek to protect and uplift foundlings a tool
to deny them political status or to accord them second-class citizenship.138
The COMELEC also ruled139 that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under the provisions of
R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. The COMELEC
reasoned that since the applicant must perform an act, what is reacquired is not "natural-born"
citizenship but only plain "Philippine citizenship."
The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards consistent jurisprudence on the matter of
repatriation statutes in general and of R.A. No. 9225 in particular.
In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, 140 repatriation was explained as follows:
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such in several cases. They
include Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC141 where we described it as an
"abbreviated repatriation process that restores one's Filipino citizenship x x x." Also included
is Parreno v. Commission on Audit,142 which cited Tabasa v. Court of Appeals,143where we said
that "[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born
citizenship. Parreno v. Commission on Audit144 is categorical that "if petitioner reacquires his
Filipino citizenship (under R.A. No. 9225), he will ... recover his natural-born citizenship."
The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition of natural citizens as
implying "that natural-born citizenship must begin at birth and remain uninterrupted and
continuous from birth." R.A. No. 9225 was obviously passed in line with Congress' sole
prerogative to determine how citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to
decree that natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is not
for the COMELEC to disagree with the Congress' determination.
More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous was
already rejected in Bengson III v. HRET145 where the phrase "from birth" was clarified to mean
at the time of birth: "A person who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a
natural-born citizen thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an act to "acquire or perfect" one's
citizenship. In Bengson III v. HRET, this Court pointed out that there are only two types of
citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen and naturalized, and that there is no
third category for repatriated citizens:
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that
there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are
naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have
to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a
natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for
persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor
is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the
reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the
reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization
proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As
such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of
Representatives.146
The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is reserved to this Court. And while
we may always revisit a doctrine, a new rule reversing standing doctrine cannot be
retroactively applied. In Morales v. Court of Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.,147 where
we decreed reversed the condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it "should be prospective in
application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws of the
Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines." This Court
also said that "while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a
general rule, recognized as good law prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's
reliance thereupon should be respected."148
Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that petitioner committed a
falsehood when she put in the spaces for "born to" in her application for repatriation under R.A.
No. 9225 the names of her adoptive parents, and this misled the BI to presume that she was a
natural-born Filipino. It has been contended that the data required were the names of her
biological parents which are precisely unknown.
This position disregards one important fact - petitioner was legally adopted. One of the effects
of adoption is "to sever all legal ties between the biological parents and the adoptee, except
when the biological parent is the spouse of the adoptee."149 Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner
was also entitled to an amended birth certificate "attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the
child of the adopter(s)" and which certificate "shall not bear any notation that it is an amended
issue."150 That law also requires that "[a]ll records, books, and papers relating to the adoption
cases in the files of the court, the Department [of Social Welfare and Development], or any
other agency or institution participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly
confidential."151 The law therefore allows petitioner to state that her adoptive parents were her
birth parents as that was what would be stated in her birth certificate anyway. And given the
policy of strict confidentiality of adoption records, petitioner was not obligated to disclose that
she was an adoptee.
Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of petitioner, which it cannot make in the
same case for cancellation of COC, it resorted to opinionatedness which is,
moreover, erroneous. The whole process undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in grave abuse
of discretion.
On Residence
The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the issue of whether or not petitioner
committed false material representation when she stated in her COC that she has before and
until 9 May 2016 been a resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months.
Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months
on the day before the 2016 elections, is true.
The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years' residence in the
Philippines before the day of the elections. Since the forthcoming elections will be held on 9
May 2016, petitioner must have been a resident of the Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten
(10) years. In answer to the requested information of "Period of Residence in the Philippines up
to the day before May 09, 2016," she put in "10 years 11 months" which according to her
pleadings in these cases corresponds to a beginning date of 25 May 2005 when she returned
for good from the U.S.
When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile, which is the
Philippines. There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily
presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain there; and 3. an intention to abandon the
old domicile.152 To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place
of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite
period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place
chosen for the new domicile must be actual.153
Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their
U.S. domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence include petitioner's
former U.S. passport showing her arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return to the Philippines
every time she travelled abroad; e-mail correspondences starting in March 2005 to September
2006 with a freight company to arrange for the shipment of their household items weighing
about 28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry
inquiring how to ship their dog to the Philippines; school records of her children showing
enrollment in Philippine schools starting June 2005 and for succeeding years; tax identification
card for petitioner issued on July 2005; titles for condominium and parking slot issued in
February 2006 and their corresponding tax declarations issued in April 2006; receipts dated 23
February 2005 from the Salvation Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation of items from
petitioner's family; March 2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal Service confirming request for change
of address; final statement from the First American Title Insurance Company showing sale of
their U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted to the U.S.
Embassy where petitioner indicated that she had been a Philippine resident since May 2005;
affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that
she and her family stayed with affiant until the condominium was purchased); and Affidavit
from petitioner's husband (confirming that the spouses jointly decided to relocate to the
Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish some work and to sell
the family home).
The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even listed by the COMELEC,
particularly in its Resolution in the Tatad, Contreras and Valdez cases.
However, the COMELEC refused to consider that petitioner's domicile had been timely
changed as of 24 May 2005. At the oral arguments, COMELEC Commissioner Arthur Lim
conceded the presence of the first two requisites, namely, physical presence and animus
manendi, but maintained there was no animus non-revertendi.154 The COMELEC disregarded
the import of all the evidence presented by petitioner on the basis of the position that the
earliest date that petitioner could have started residence in the Philippines was in July 2006
when her application under R.A. No. 9225 was approved by the BI. In this regard, COMELEC
relied on Coquilla v. COMELEC,155 Japzon v. COMELEC156 and Caballero v.
COMELEC. 157 During the oral arguments, the private respondents also added Reyes v.
COMELEC.158 Respondents contend that these cases decree that the stay of an alien former
Filipino cannot be counted until he/she obtains a permanent resident visa or reacquires
Philippine citizenship, a visa-free entry under a balikbayan stamp being insufficient. Since
petitioner was still an American (without any resident visa) until her reacquisition of citizenship
under R.A. No. 9225, her stay from 24 May 2005 to 7 July 2006 cannot be counted.
But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four cases are very different from her
situation. In Coquilla v. COMELEC,159 the only evidence presented was a community tax
certificate secured by the candidate and his declaration that he would be running in the
elections. Japzon v. COMELEC160 did not involve a candidate who wanted to count residence
prior to his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. With the Court decreeing that residence is
distinct from citizenship, the issue there was whether the candidate's acts after reacquisition
sufficed to establish residence. In Caballero v. COMELEC, 161 the candidate admitted that his
place of work was abroad and that he only visited during his frequent vacations. In Reyes v.
COMELEC,162 the candidate was found to be an American citizen who had not even reacquired
Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 or had renounced her U.S. citizenship. She was
disqualified on the citizenship issue. On residence, the only proof she offered was a seven-
month stint as provincial officer. The COMELEC, quoted with approval by this Court, said that
"such fact alone is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency."
It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in the four cases cited by the
respondents, the Court had no choice but to hold that residence could be counted only from
acquisition of a permanent resident visa or from reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In
contrast, the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together leads to no other
conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the house,
taking the children from U.S. schools, getting quotes from the freight company, notifying the
U.S. Post Office of the abandonment of their address in the U.S., donating excess items to the
Salvation Army, her husband resigning from U.S. employment right after selling the U.S.
house) and permanently relocate to the Philippines and actually re-established her residence
here on 24 May 2005 (securing T.I.N, enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying
property here, constructing a residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips abroad,
her husband getting employed here). Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to
reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family's actual continuous stay in the Philippines over
the years, it is clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.
In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against petitioner that she had entered the
Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan. A closer look at R.A. No. 6768 as amended, otherwise
known as the "An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program," shows that there is no overriding
intent to treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who must leave after one year. Included in the
law is a former Filipino who has been naturalized abroad and "comes or returns to the
Philippines." 163 The law institutes a balikbayan program "providing the opportunity to avail of
the necessary training to enable the balikbayan to become economically self-reliant members
of society upon their return to the country"164in line with the government's "reintegration
program."165 Obviously, balikbayans are not ordinary transients.
Given the law's express policy to facilitate the return of a balikbayan and help him reintegrate
into society, it would be an unduly harsh conclusion to say in absolute terms that
the balikbayan must leave after one year. That visa-free period is obviously granted him to
allow him to re-establish his life and reintegrate himself into the community before he attends
to the necessary formal and legal requirements of repatriation. And that is exactly what
petitioner did - she reestablished life here by enrolling her children and buying property while
awaiting the return of her husband and then applying for repatriation shortly thereafter.
No case similar to petitioner's, where the former Filipino's evidence of change in domicile is
extensive and overwhelming, has as yet been decided by the Court. Petitioner's evidence of
residence is unprecedented. There is no judicial precedent that comes close to the facts of
residence of petitioner. There is no indication in Coquilla v. COMELEC,166 and the other cases
cited by the respondents that the Court intended to have its rulings there apply to a situation
where the facts are different. Surely, the issue of residence has been decided particularly on
the facts-of-the case basis.
To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of residence of petitioner, the
COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months
by 9 May 2016 in her 2015 COC was false because she put six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months
as "period of residence before May 13, 2013" in her 2012 COC for Senator. Thus, according to
the COMELEC, she started being a Philippine resident only in November 2006. In doing so, the
COMELEC automatically assumed as true the statement in the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC
as false.
As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood the date required in the
2013 COC as the period of residence as of the day she submitted that COC in 2012. She said
that she reckoned residency from April-May 2006 which was the period when the U.S. house
was sold and her husband returned to the Philippines. In that regard, she was advised by her
lawyers in 2015 that residence could be counted from 25 May 2005.
Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period of residence before
13 May 2013) as inquiring about residence as of the time she submitted the COC, is bolstered
by the change which the COMELEC itself introduced in the 2015 COC which is now "period of
residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016." The COMELEC would not
have revised the query if it did not acknowledge that the first version was vague.
That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier than the sale of her U.S.
house and the return of her husband is plausible given the evidence that she had returned a
year before. Such evidence, to repeat, would include her passport and the school records of
her children.
It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a binding and
conclusive admission against petitioner. It could be given in evidence against her, yes, but it
was by no means conclusive. There is precedent after all where a candidate's mistake as to
period of residence made in a COC was overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v.
COMELEC,167 the candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period of residence where
the required period was a minimum of one year. We said that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a
statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not
an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification requirement." The
COMELEC ought to have looked at the evidence presented and see if petitioner was telling the
truth that she was in the Philippines from 24 May 2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty, it
would have seen that the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC both correctly stated
the pertinent period of residency.
The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that petitioner actually and
physically returned here on 24 May 2005 not because it was false, but only because
COMELEC took the position that domicile could be established only from petitioner's
repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 in July 2006. However, it does not take away the fact that in
reality, petitioner had returned from the U.S. and was here to stay permanently, on 24 May
2005. When she claimed to have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months,
she could do so in good faith.
For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to hide anything. As already
stated, a petition for quo warranto had been filed against her with the SET as early as August
2015. The event from which the COMELEC pegged the commencement of residence,
petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under R.A. No. 9225, was an established fact to repeat, for
purposes of her senatorial candidacy.
Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6) months in the 2012 COC,
petitioner recounted that this was first brought up in the media on 2 June 2015 by Rep. Tobias
Tiangco of the United Nationalist Alliance. Petitioner appears to have answered the issue
immediately, also in the press. Respondents have not disputed petitioner's evidence on this
point. From that time therefore when Rep. Tiangco discussed it in the media, the stated period
of residence in the 2012 COC and the circumstances that surrounded the statement were
already matters of public record and were not hidden.
Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also brought up in the SET petition for quo
warranto. Her Verified Answer, which was filed on 1 September 2015, admitted that she made
a mistake in the 2012 COC when she put in six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as she
misunderstood the question and could have truthfully indicated a longer period. Her answer in
the SET case was a matter of public record. Therefore, when petitioner accomplished her COC
for President on 15 October 2015, she could not be said to have been attempting to hide her
erroneous statement in her 2012 COC for Senator which was expressly mentioned in her
Verified Answer.
The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even hint at an intention to hide the
2012 statement and have it covered by the 2015 representation. Petitioner, moreover, has on
her side this Court's pronouncement that:
Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not necessarily
constitute material misrepresentation which is the sole ground for denying due course to, and
for the cancellation of, a COC. Further, as already discussed, the candidate's
misrepresentation in his COC must not only refer to a material fact (eligibility and qualifications
for elective office), but should evince a deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact
which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must be made with an intention to
deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications to run for public office. 168
In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism, virtually ignored a good number
of evidenced dates all of which can evince animus manendi to the Philippines and animus non
revertedi to the United States of America. The veracity of the events of coming and staying
home was as much as dismissed as inconsequential, the focus having been fixed at the
petitioner's "sworn declaration in her COC for Senator" which the COMELEC said "amounts to
a declaration and therefore an admission that her residence in the Philippines only commence
sometime in November 2006"; such that "based on this declaration, [petitioner] fails to meet the
residency requirement for President." This conclusion, as already shown, ignores the standing
jurisprudence that it is the fact of residence, not the statement of the person that determines
residence for purposes of compliance with the constitutional requirement of residency for
election as President. It ignores the easily researched matter that cases on questions of
residency have been decided favorably for the candidate on the basis of facts of residence far
less in number, weight and substance than that presented by petitioner.169 It ignores, above all
else, what we consider as a primary reason why petitioner cannot be bound by her declaration
in her COC for Senator which declaration was not even considered by the SET as an issue
against her eligibility for Senator. When petitioner made the declaration in her COC for Senator
that she has been a resident for a period of six (6) years and six (6) months counted up to the
13 May 2013 Elections, she naturally had as reference the residency requirements for election
as Senator which was satisfied by her declared years of residence. It was uncontested during
the oral arguments before us that at the time the declaration for Senator was made, petitioner
did not have as yet any intention to vie for the Presidency in 2016 and that the general public
was never made aware by petitioner, by word or action, that she would run for President in
2016. Presidential candidacy has a length-of-residence different from that of a senatorial
candidacy. There are facts of residence other than that which was mentioned in the COC for
Senator. Such other facts of residence have never been proven to be false, and these, to
repeat include:
[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005. (petitioner's] husband however stayed
in the USA to finish pending projects and arrange the sale of their family home.
Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her mother in San Juan City. [Petitioner]
enrolled Brian in Beacon School in Taguig City in 2005 and Hanna in Assumption College in
Makati City in 2005. Anika was enrolled in Learning Connection in San Juan in 2007, when she
was already old enough to go to school.
In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband acquired Unit 7F of One Wilson Place
Condominium in San Juan. [Petitioner] and her family lived in Unit 7F until the construction of
their family home in Corinthian Hills was completed.
Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's] mother discovered that her former lawyer
who handled [petitioner's] adoption in 1974 failed to secure from the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating [petitioner's] new name and stating
that her parents are "Ronald Allan K. Poe" and "Jesusa L. Sonora."
In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to the US in order to supervise the disposal of
some of the family's remaining household belongings.1a\^/phi1 [Petitioner] returned to the
Philippines on 11 March 2006.
In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband informed the United States Postal Service of the
family's abandonment of their address in the US.
The family home in the US was sole on 27 April 2006.
In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned from his work in the US. He returned to the
Philippines on 4 May 2006 and began working for a Philippine company in July 2006.
In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a vacant lot in Corinthian Hills, where they
eventually built their family home.170
In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its intention to let the case fall
under the exclusive ground of false representation, to consider no other date than that
mentioned by petitioner in her COC for Senator.
All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner for her candidacy as
President of the Republic, the questioned Resolutions of the COMELEC in Division and En
Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased with grave abuse of discretion from root to fruits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, to wit:
1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the COMELEC Second Division, in SPA No. 15-
001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent, stating that:
[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9,
2016 National and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares is hereby GRANTED.
2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the COMELEC First Division, in the
consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio
P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and
SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; stating that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
to GRANT the petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD
SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections.
3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015
Resolution of the Second Division stating that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
to DENY the Verified Motion for Reconsideration of SENATOR MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD
SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES. The Resolution dated 11 December 2015 of the Commission
First Division is AFFIRMED.
4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015
Resolution of the First Division.
are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA
POE-LLAMANZARES is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the
National and Local Elections of 9 May 2016.
SO ORDERED. Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ writer of the opinion of the Court.
Associate Justice
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
WE CONCUR: Chief Justice

See Concurring Opinion --------------------------------------------------------------

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

See Dissenting Opinion Please see Concurring Opinion

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
EN BANC

Please see Separate Dissenting

G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
Opinion See Dissenting opinion
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE ARTURO D. BRION
CASTRO Associate Justice JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their
Associate Justice minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and
MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
I join J. Caguioa's Opinion HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Associate Justice
Associate Justice Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education,
Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior
Pls. see Dissenting Opinion and Local Government, Respondents.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice x---------------------------------x

(I concur with the Dissenting Opinion G.R. No. 204934

See Dissenting Opinion
of Justice Perlas-Bernabe)
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
BIENVENIDO L. REYES ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its
Associate Justice
Associate Justice President, Maria Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B .
Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C.
See Separate Concurring Opinion See Concurring Opinion Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria Felisa
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol
Associate Justice Associate Justice Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Therese
Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel F emando C. Tangsingco,
Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta
See Concurring Opinion & Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Ramon Carlos
ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor & Mildred C. Castor
Associate Justice for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph
Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho
& Zara Z. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Margarita Racho,
CERTIFICATION
Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho &
Francine V. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Michael Racho,
Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses
David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor child
Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas
and Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws &
Katrina R. Laws, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education,
Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare
and Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and
NEDA Director-General, THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its
Chairperson, Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE
CORPORATION, represented by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE OF
PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Alfonso Umali, THE
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Oscar
Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by
its President Donato Marcos,Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204957
TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S.
AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204988
SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D.,
as President and in his personal capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented
by Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of the school board and in his personal
capacity, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP. NACES,
Phd., ANTHONY G. NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I.
YAP,Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205003
EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE
PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON.
SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205043
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, DILG SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS
SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205138
PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its
National President, Atty. Ricardo M . Ribo, and in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas,
Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F.
Mateo, Rolly Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido C.
Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno and Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education,
HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government,
HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and
Development, HON. ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General, National Economic and
Development Authority, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO, Director-General, Food and Drugs
Administration, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation,
and THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on
Women, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205478
REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO,
M.D., AND JOSEPHINE MILLADO-LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors For
Life, and ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G. MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD,
WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY LIACCO
collectively known as Filipinos For Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary of the Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the
Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department
of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205491
SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for
themselves, their Posterity, and the rest of Filipino posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205720
PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as
Executive Director, and in her personal capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z.
CORTES, ARIEL A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA, CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL
ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO
III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 206355
MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA
BORROMEO-GARCIA, STELLAACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI CATALUNA
CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207111
JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO,
JOSEPH MARTIN Q. VERDEJO, ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-
GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education,
Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior
and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207172
COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI
SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA ISABELLE BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS
FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N. RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education,
Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior
and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207563
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary
of the Department of Health, and HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department
of Budget and Management,Respondents.
 DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And
this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to
protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs , and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent
with the liberty of others and with the common good."1
To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a developed
country, leaving our people beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment.
While governmental policies have been geared towards the revitalization of the economy, the
bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to be a problem that concerns not only the poor,
but every member of society. The government continues to tread on a trying path to the
realization of its very purpose, that is, the general welfare of the Filipino people and the
development of the country as a whole. The legislative branch, as the main facet of a
representative government, endeavors to enact laws and policies that aim to remedy looming
societal woes, while the executive is closed set to fully implement these measures and bring
concrete and substantial solutions within the reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the
judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental body that merely casts its
watchful eyes on clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to adjudicate. Passive, yet
reflexive when called into action, the Judiciary then willingly embarks on its solemn duty to
interpret legislation vis-a-vis the most vital and enduring principle that holds Philippine society
together - the supremacy of the Philippine Constitution.
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth
control, abortion and contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed
views on the subjects and their perceived consequences freely circulate in various media.
From television debates2 to sticker campaigns,3 from rallies by socio-political activists to mass
gatherings organized by members of the clergy4 - the clash between the seemingly antithetical
ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in
every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health
Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various
sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword
that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its
decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14)
petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention, to wit:
(1) Petition for Certiorari andProhibition,5
filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong
and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and
taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming
Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned educational institution (Jmbong);
(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines,
Inc., through its president, Atty. Maria Concepcion S. Noche7 and several others8 in
their personal capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations unborn (ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and
Valeriano S. Avila, in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City,
Inc.,11 Rosevale Foundation, Inc.,12 a domestic, privately-owned educational institution,
and several others,13 in their capacities as citizens (Serve Life);
(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);
(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic
Xybrspace Apostolate of the Philippines,16 in their capacities as a citizens and
taxpayers (Olaguer);
(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of
Xseminarians Inc.,18 and several others19 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers
(PAX);
(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others,21 in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Echavez);
(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny
C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on
behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity as a
member of the Bar (Tatad);
(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation
Inc.24 and several others,25 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf
of its associates who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);
(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys.
Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia
Causing, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF);
(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several
others,29 in their capacities as citizens (Juat) ;
(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc.
and several others,31in their capacities as citizens (CFC);
(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim
in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Tillah); and
 (15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a
citizen and a taxpayer (Alcantara); and
(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an
accredited political party.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality
of RH Law on the following GROUNDS:
• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners,
notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law
would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and
injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution
which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from conception.35
• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous
products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides universal access to
contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and other
health problems.36
• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the
RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the
use of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use
of public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included
in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom. 37
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution,
imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer
patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide
full and correct information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against
their religious beliefs and convictions.38
In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law
(RH-IRR),39 provides that skilled health professionals who are public officers such as, but not
limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical officers, medical specialists,
rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural health midwives,
who are specifically charged with the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as
conscientious objectors.40
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in
schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs. 41
While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they
argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling
state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to
free speech.42
• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According
to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude
because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to provide
forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under threat of criminal
prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment.43
The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical
practitioner would effectively be forced to render reproductive health services since the lack of
PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the majority of the public would no longer be able to
avail of the practitioners services.44
• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH
Law discriminates against the poor as it makes them the primary target of the
government program that promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that,
rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to
introduce contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor. 45
• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution. In imposing the penalty of imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it
is vague because it does not define the type of conduct to be treated as "violation" of
the RH Law.46
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process
by removing from them (the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what
kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer." 47 It ignores the
management prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in
accordance with their own discretion and judgment.
• The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full
range of family planning methods is plainly to curtail his right to expound only his own
preferred way of family planning. The petitioners note that although exemption is
granted to institutions owned and operated by religious groups, they are still forced to
refer their patients to another healthcare facility willing to perform the service or
procedure.48
• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the
Constitution. It is contended that the RH Law providing for mandatory reproductive
health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their children in
accordance with their beliefs.49
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive
health procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes
the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-being of their
family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a
miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to determine whether their child should use
contraceptives.50
• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative
authority. The petitioners question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power
to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the
Emergency Drugs List (EDL).51
• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ),
Article VI of the Constitution.52
• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53
• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs)
and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH
Law, providing for reproductive health measures at the local government level and the
ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local
Government Code and R.A . No. 9054.54
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-
intervention in defense of the constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the petitions in behalf of the
respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,56 former officials of the Department of Health
Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez,57 the Filipino
Catholic Voices for Reproductive Health (C4RH),58 Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros,59 and Atty.
Joan De Venecia60 also filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention in conjunction with
several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted leave to
intervene.61
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for
the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or
controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some
petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions
for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took
effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the
Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed
legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013. 62
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to
determine and/or identify the pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which
these issues were to be discussed in the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on
August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the
SQAO was ordered extended until further orders of the Court. 63
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty
(60) days and, at the same time posed several questions for their clarification on some
contentions of the parties.64
The Status Quo Ante
(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws
Prior to the RH Law
Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation and
distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the country
enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution
of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed,
they could not be sold, dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and
distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner."65
In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to
"dispensing of abortifacients or anti-conceptional substances and devices." Under Section 37
thereof, it was provided that "no drug or chemical product or device capable of provoking
abortion or preventing conception as classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be
delivered or sold to any person without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."
On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population, which
recognized that the population problem should be considered as the principal element for long-
term economic development, enacted measures that promoted male vasectomy and tubal
ligation to mitigate population growth.67 Among these measures included R.A. No. 6365,
approved on August 16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population,
Creating the Commission on Population and for Other Purposes. " The law envisioned that
"family planning will be made part of a broad educational program; safe and effective means
will be provided to couples desiring to space or limit family size; mortality and morbidity rates
will be further reduced."
To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential
Decree. (P.D.) No. 79,68 dated December 8, 1972, which, among others, made "family planning
a part of a broad educational program," provided "family planning services as a part of over-all
health care," and made "available all acceptable methods of contraception, except abortion, to
all Filipino citizens desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods evolved
from being a component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of
public health, particularly, reproductive health.69 Under that policy, the country gave priority to
one's right to freely choose the method of family planning to be adopted, in conformity with its I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the
adherence to the commitments made in the International Conference on Population and controversy.
Development.70 Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna
Carta for Women, " which, among others, mandated the State to provide for comprehensive 1] Power of Judicial Review
health services and programs for women, including family planning and sex education.71
2] Actual Case or Controversy
The RH Law
3] Facial Challenge
Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at
an uncontrollable pace. From a paltry number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the
4] Locus Standi
population of the country reached over 76 million in the year 2000 and over 92 million in
2010.72 The executive and the legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not adequate.
To rein in the problem, the RH Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and 5] Declaratory Relief
the marginalized, access and information to the full range of modem family planning methods,
and to ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples' right to reproductive health be 6] One Subject/One Title Rule
achieved. To make it more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health providers to
provide information on the full range of modem family planning methods, supplies and II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
services, and for schools to provide reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH
Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates. 1] Right to Life

Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the 2] Right to Health
current laws on contraception, women's health and population control.
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo
4] The Family
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional.
Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the government sponsored contraception program,
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life,
which the State is mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo
ante - the situation prior to the passage of the RH Law - must be maintained."73 It explains: 6] Due Process

x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As 7] Equal Protection
provided under Republic Act No. 5921 and Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of
contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by a physician. 8] Involuntary Servitude
What the Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant under the RH Law is the role that the State
and its agencies - the entire bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay 9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
officials in the remotest areas of the country - is made to play in the implementation of the
contraception program to the fullest extent possible using taxpayers' money. The State then 10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM
will be the funder and provider of all forms of family planning methods and the implementer of
the program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of, and universal access to, a full range
of family planning methods, devices and supplies.74 DISCUSSION

ISSUES Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves
the Court to resolve some procedural impediments.
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has
synthesized and refined them to the following principal issues:
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.
The Power of Judicial Review
In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should
submit to the legislative and political wisdom of Congress and respect the compromises made
in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian democratic process" 75 and
"characterized by an inordinate amount of transparency." 76 The OSG posits that the authority
of the Court to review social legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the
Constitution vests the discretion to implement the constitutional policies and positive norms
with the political departments, in particular, with Congress.77 It further asserts that in view of the
Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council,78 the remedies of certiorari
and prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the acts of the
legislature.79
Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering
that the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the
government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. It claims that the
RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure.80
In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the
Executive and the Legislature, it is often sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial
power and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the
principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental
principle in our system of government, which obtains not through express provision but by
actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.81
Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines;82 (b) the executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines;83 and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.84 The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft
strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three branches of government. 85
In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of
powers which imposes upon the courts proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions
and of their respect for the other branches of government, in striking down the acts of the
Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of
courtesy and caution.86
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political
instability, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not
entirely obliterated.87 In order to address this, the Constitution impresses upon the Court to
respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and
authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a very
limited and specific point - to determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative
branches are null because they were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion. 88 Thus, while
the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may
do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results. 89 The Court
must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and principles
embodied in the Constitution.
In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be
limited, the Constitution makes no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to
judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and
goes back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the
legislative and the executive branches, since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom
but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in consonance with their respective authorities
and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no
constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions
under review.90 This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly
provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases supplied]
As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to
review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, as there is
no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling was later
on applied in Macalintal v. COMELEC,92 Aldaba v. COMELEC,93 Magallona v. Ermita,94 and
countless others. In Tanada, the Court wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only
the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is
judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of
the Constitution is upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of
constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal
issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied]
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial
review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the
balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the definition
and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them. To him, judicial
review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation - or instrument of intervention - of
the judiciary in that balancing operation.95
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled
authority to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete
with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there
must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.96
Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any actual case or
controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented.97 They claim that the questions
raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been
charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the
petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation.98 In short, it is contended that
judicial review of the RH Law is premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe
for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to
an advisory opinion.99 The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions
to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be
justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal
right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real,
tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and
substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of
facts.100
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of
ripeness.101 A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the
existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action.
He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of the act complained of 102
In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the
Philippines,103 where the constitutionality of an unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on
the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was argued that the Court has no
authority to pass upon the issues raised as there was yet no concrete act performed that could
possibly violate the petitioners' and the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled
that the fact of the law or act in question being not yet effective does not negate ripeness.
Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a singular
violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the
same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules
have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been
passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated
earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute. 104
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or
medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague
violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from
the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the
matter NOW.
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions,
contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating
measure.105
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment
Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only
protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment.106 These include religious
freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.107 After all, the fundamental right to
religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the
right to one's freedom of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally
maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of
facial challenges to strictly penal statues,108 it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not
only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights.109 The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the
U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.110 Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever
vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the
constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned
above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take
cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass
constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no
actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government,
acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino
people.
Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It
contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the
assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against them,111 and the government has yet
to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive.112
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and
their status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged
governmental act.113 It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. 114
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge
the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits
one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of
third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party
standing.115
Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers,
and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest."116
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,117 the Court held that in cases of paramount
importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirement may
be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the
party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases, 118 ordinary
citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive
orders although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the
public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-
applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus s tandi
requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured
or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of
transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural
technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing
non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in
the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or
any other government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR:119
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for
prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we
set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot
deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral
well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an
imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of
procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
(Emphasis supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to
the bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH
Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom
of religion and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that
the issues of contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division among
a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of
transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly,
considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue,
the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined
in the Constitution are being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the
mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.
Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory
relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that most of the
petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as
petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case
has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as
petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.121
One Subject-One Title
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates
Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule.
According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed
legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent - to
act as a population control measure.123
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population
control measure,124 and that the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive
health" are both interrelated as they are inseparable.125
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as
principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the
reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women and
children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH
Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with
access to information on the full range of modem family planning products and methods. These
family planning methods, natural or modem, however, are clearly geared towards the
prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of
births in the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as
well. A large portion of the law, however, covers the dissemination of information and
provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and
quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all
intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception
pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law. 126 Indeed, remove the
provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses its very
foundation.127 As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled birth
attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and management
of reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta
for Women."128
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E.
Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was
written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in
the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all
the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and
where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of
the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather
than technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases
supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both
"reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the
overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of
Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all
persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to
sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the
right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves
in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of
responsible parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so
uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the
enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in
omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act."129
Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood"
which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as
stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought
to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.
II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1-The Right to Life
Position of the Petitioners
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn
child under Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to
abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion.130
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the
RH Law considers contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus, sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after
fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution to
afford protection to the fertilized ovum which already has life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal
contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and
effective family planning products and supplies, medical research shows that contraceptives
use results in abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has life.131
As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert
that the State sanction of contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an affront to the
dignity of man.132
Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to certify that the product or supply is not to be used as an abortifacient,
the assailed legislation effectively confirms that abortifacients are not prohibited. Also
considering that the FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise or administer the use of
these products and supplies to prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a
certification that it shall not be used for abortifacient purposes. 133
Position of the Respondents
For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the
Constitution was simply the prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not
violate the Constitution since the said law emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient"
reproductive health care services, methods, devices products and supplies shall be made
accessible to the public.134
According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are
not abortifacients by enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due consideration
to various studies and consultations with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other
experts in the medical field, it is asserted that the Court afford deference and respect to such a
determination and pass judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on determined
as an abortive.135
For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life is
not violated considering that various studies of the WHO show that life begins from the
implantation of the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is constitutional
since the law specifically provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation
of the fertilized ovum are allowed.136
The Court's Position
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life. 137
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and,
therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes
and transcends any authority or the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of
the Constitution provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines
is not of recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate
The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18,
1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent fertilization, 138 to the
promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation,139 and the ratification of numerous
international agreements, the country has long recognized the need to promote population
control through the use of contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic development.
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other family planning methods
evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one centered on the
promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.140
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health
and the overall promotion of the family's well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No.
6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the
"The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the
Philippine national population program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles:
"principle of no-abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion."141 As will be discussed later,
these principles are not merely grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from
the constitutional protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and guarantee
religious freedom.
When Life Begins*
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is
a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing
and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that the individual
members of the Court could express their own views on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase
of Section 12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and
the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive
the support of the Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is
undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is
no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when life
begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently
disregarded the scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving
the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with
"fertilization" of the female ovum by the male sperm.142 On the other side of the spectrum are
those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the
uterus.143
Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
their plain and ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar
Council:144
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute
are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that
the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it,
based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non
est recedendum - from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words
in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained; and
second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of
the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the
rule of law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which,
as described and defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at
fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant,
formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization that results in a new entity capable of developing
into a being like its parents.145
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the
female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of survival and
maturation under normal conditions.146
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel
Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano, 147 it was
written:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before
he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the
life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the
child being delivered, qualifies as death. [Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said
that the State "has respect for human life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and
substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision, the fetus
was referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child.149
Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers
regarding the term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their
deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization." The records reflect the following:
Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:
"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the
moment of conception."
When is the moment of conception?
xxx
Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the
sperm that there is human life. x x x.150
xxx
As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life, it
was explained:
Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that needs
to be answered is: Is the fertilized ovum alive? Biologically categorically says yes, the fertilized
ovum is alive. First of all, like all living organisms, it takes in nutrients which it processes by
itself. It begins doing this upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these nutrients, it grows
from within. Thirdly, it multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process of cell
division. All these processes are vital signs of life. Therefore, there is no question that
biologically the fertilized ovum has life.
The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the moment
of conception, the nuclei of the ovum and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes
from the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the sperm to form a total of 46 chromosomes.
A chromosome count of 46 is found only - and I repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the
fertilized ovum is human.
Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized
ovum is both alive and human, then, as night follows day, it must be human life. Its nature is
human.151
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the
moment of fertilization" was not because of doubt when human life begins, but rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us here
before with the scientific phrase "fertilized ovum" may be beyond the comprehension of some
people; we want to use the simpler phrase "from the moment of conception."152
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the
Constitution, it was discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a
Constitution, without specifying "from the moment of conception."
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the
Commissioner's own admission, he would leave it to Congress to define when life begins. So,
Congress can define life to begin from six months after fertilization; and that would really be
very, very, dangerous. It is now determined by science that life begins from the moment of
conception. There can be no doubt about it. So we should not give any doubt to Congress,
too.153
Upon further inquiry, it was asked:
Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is
one of the questions I was going to raise during the period of interpellations but it has been
expressed already. The provision, as proposed right now states:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment
of conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the
sperm?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.
Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain
contraceptives that we know today are abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of the
so-called contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has already
occurred, the next process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take
root. What happens with some contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the fertilized
ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we take the provision as it is proposed, these so called
contraceptives should be banned.
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called abortifacient
and, therefore, would be unconstitutional and should be banned under this provision.
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not
these certain contraceptives are abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the provision as it is
now proposed, they are already considered abortifacient.154
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution
emphasized that the State shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn
child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male
sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended
that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine when life
begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all
contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas,
spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized that the
determination of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact which
should be left to the courts to decide on based on established evidence. 155
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be
deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the
union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to
fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.
As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point
that I would like not only to protect the life of the unborn, but also the lives of the millions of
people in the world by fighting for a nuclear-free world. I would just like to be assured of the
legal and pragmatic implications of the term "protection of the life of the unborn from the
moment of conception." I raised some of these implications this afternoon when I interjected in
the interpellation of Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask that question again for a
categorical answer.
I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of
conception" we are also actually saying "no," not "maybe," to certain contraceptives which are
already being encouraged at this point in time. Is that the sense of the committee or does it
disagree with me?
Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is
no unborn yet. That is yet unshaped.
Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives, Atty. Noche:
such as the intra-uterine device which actually stops the egg which has already been fertilized
from taking route to the uterus. So if we say "from the moment of conception," what really Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am
occurs is that some of these contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized. discussing here Section 12, Article II, Your Honor, yes.

Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization. Justice Bersamin:

Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156 Alright.

The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by Atty. Noche:
petitioners during the oral arguments. There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy,
even condoms are not classified as abortifacients.157 And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor. 158

Atty. Noche:
Medical Meaning

Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet. That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical,
Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy
Justice Bersamin: usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable zygote." 159

There is no life. It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which
the embryo develops."160
Atty. Noche:
The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics), 161 used by medical
So, there is no life to be protected. schools in the Philippines, also concludes that human life (human person) begins at the
moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm resulting in the formation of a
Justice Bersamin: new individual, with a unique genetic composition that dictates all developmental stages that
ensue.
To be protected.
Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development begins
after the union of male and female gametes or germ cells during a process known as
Atty. Noche:
fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence of events that begins with the contact of a
sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their
Under Section 12, yes. pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to
form a new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the
Justice Bersamin: beginning, or primordium, of a human being."162

So you have no objection to condoms? The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same position. They wrote:
"Although life is a continuous process, fertilization is a critical landmark because, under
Atty. Noche: ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human organism is thereby formed.... The
combination of 23 chromosomes present in each pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in the
Not under Section 12, Article II. zygote. Thus the diploid number is restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The embryo
now exists as a genetic unity."
Justice Bersamin:
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on the
Reproductive Health Bill (Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:
Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?
 CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA maintains
its strong position that fertilization is sacred because it is at this stage that conception, and thus
human life, begins. Human lives are sacred from the moment of conception, and that
destroying those new lives is never licit, no matter what the purported good outcome would be.
In terms of biology and human embryology, a human being begins immediately at fertilization
and after that, there is no point along the continuous line of human embryogenesis where only
a "potential" human being can be posited. Any philosophical, legal, or political conclusion
cannot escape this objective scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the
life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well defined "moment of conception."
This conclusion is objective, consistent with the factual evidence, and independent of any
specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view of human life or of human embryos.164
Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from
Fertilization
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and
more importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable
conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being
commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman
that life begins at implantation.165 According to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct
and successive stages in the reproductive process. They are not identical and
synonymous."166 Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities confirm that the
implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after
implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected."167
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It
does not pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized
ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a living human being complete with DNA and 46
chromosomes.168 Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience by those who
had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH
Law but also to the Constitution.
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.
If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or
device that would prevent the implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be
provocative and further aggravate religious-based divisiveness.
It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life
of the unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure
legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent
of the Framers was captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission. Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of the
unborn from conception, explained:
The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by
Congress or any pro-abortion decision passed by the Supreme Court.169
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes
abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any determination, at this stage, when life
begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the
moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with provisions
that embody the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded
safe travel to the uterus for implantation.170
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised
Penal Code, which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:
1] xx x.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be
defined as follows:
xxx.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services
and supplies that contribute to reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive
health-related problems. It also includes sexual health, the purpose of which is the
enhancement of life and personal relations. The elements of reproductive health care include
the following:
xxx.
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;
xxx.
2] xx x.
Section 4. x x x.
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely
and responsibly whether or not to have children; the number, spacing and timing of their
children; to make other decisions concerning reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion and
violence; to have the information and means to do so; and to attain the highest standard of
sexual health and reproductive health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do
not include abortion, and access to abortifacients.
3] xx x.
SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law, presidential
decree or issuance, executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation
contrary to or is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act including Republic Act No. 7392,
otherwise known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.
The RH Law and Abortifacients
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be
clear, Section 4(a) of the RH Law defines an abortifacient as:
Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of
fertilization. By using the word " or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that
prevent implantation, but also those that induce abortion and those that induce the destruction
of a fetus inside the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device that either:
(a) Induces abortion; or
(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, upon
determination of the FDA.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent
with the Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has
a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law, first,
prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed exhaustively
above, refers to that which induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and,
second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb (third kind).
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and
be implanted in the mother's womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend
to mean at all that life only begins only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does
not declare either that protection will only be given upon implantation, as the petitioners
likewise suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum
which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it becomes
existent - all the way until it reaches and implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life is only
recognized and afforded protection from the moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is
nothing to prevent any drug or device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to
implantation.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum,
the RH Law does not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at
fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall , its
viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It
started earlier. And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is,
which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb, is an abortifacient.
Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any
product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA
that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be used as an
abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a
drug or device will not all be used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in
every instance when the contraceptive product or supply will be used. 171
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient
contraceptives, however, the Court finds that the proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend
to the legislative intent and mean that "any product or supply included or to be included in the
EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on
the condition that it cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the
proviso under the second paragraph of the same section that provides:
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means
emergency contraceptive pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that will be used for such purpose
and their other forms or equivalent.
Abortifacients under the RH-IRR
At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused
their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law defines
"abortifacient" as follows:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined
as follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.
Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:
Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of
a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA). [Emphasis supplied]
Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family
planning method, device, or health product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents
pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from
being implanted in the mother's womb in doses of its approved indication as determined by the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as
"abortifacient" only those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb.172
This cannot be done.
In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they
pointed out, with the insertion of the word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-
IRR173 must be struck down for being ultra vires.
Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is
indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be
declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way
for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With such
qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered
as an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of
the implantation of the fertilized ovum.
For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of
contraceptives which are actually abortifacients because of their fail-safe mechanism.174
Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these
contraceptives cannot act as abortive. With this, together with the definition of an abortifacient
under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared policy against abortion, the undeniable
conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be
those contraceptives that do not have the primary action of causing abortion or the destruction
of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb, but also those that do not have the secondary action of acting
the same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the
principle that laws should be construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the
RH Law and its implementing rules must be consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion.
Thus, the word " primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To
uphold the validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those
contraceptives that have the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively "open the
floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn
from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution." 175
To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the
constitutional protection of life must be upheld.
2-The Right to Health
The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the
inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and
supplies in the National Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the same in the regular purchase
of essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals.176Citing various studies on the
matter, the petitioners posit that the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly
increased in women who use oral contraceptives as compared to women who never use them.
They point out that the risk is decreased when the use of contraceptives is discontinued.
Further, it is contended that the use of combined oral contraceptive pills is associated with a
threefold increased risk of venous thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of ischematic
stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial infarction.177 Given the definition of
"reproductive health" and "sexual health" under Sections 4(p) 178 and (w)179 of the RH Law, the
petitioners assert that the assailed legislation only seeks to ensure that women have
pleasurable and satisfying sex lives.180
The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-
executory, it being a mere statement of the administration's principle and policy. Even if it were
self-executory, the OSG posits that medical authorities refute the claim that contraceptive pose
a danger to the health of women.181
The Court's Position
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the
Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15,
Article II of the Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of
the people, viz:
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health
development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services
available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to
provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory
system and undertake appropriate health, manpower development, and research, responsive
to the country's health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their
rehabilitation, self-development, and self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of
society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or
hazardous products.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the
provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered
self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing
provisions.182 In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of
the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has
always been, that –
... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should
be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated
to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply
refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question
contraception and contraceptives per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A.
No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited
when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician - be maintained.185
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the
provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law
and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the
observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the
unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of
contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With
R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only
contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public. As aptly explained by respondent
Lagman:
D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription
108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be
dispensed and used without prescription.
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or Distribution
of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the
Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines
and for Other Purposes" are not repealed by the RH Law and the provisions of said Acts are
not inconsistent with the RH Law.
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices
are particularly governed by RA No. 4729 which provides in full:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or
otherwise distribute whether for or without consideration, any contraceptive drug or device,
unless such sale, dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical
company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:
"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used
exclusively for the purpose of preventing fertilization of the female ovum: and
 "(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced into
the female reproductive system for the primary purpose of preventing conception.
"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be
punished with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than
six months or more than one year or both in the discretion of the Court.
"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
"Approved: June 18, 1966"
111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:
"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine,
pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever nature and kind or device shall be compounded,
dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be made available to the consuming public except
through a prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy, duly established in accordance with the
provisions of this Act.
112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other relevant
statutes, the pretension of the petitioners that the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated
proliferation of contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is completely unwarranted and
baseless.186 [Emphases in the Original. Underlining supplied.]
In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:
The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which
provides:
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure,
distribute to LGUs and monitor the usage of family planning supplies for the whole country. The
DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate local government bodies to plan and implement this
procurement and distribution program. The supply and budget allotments shall be based on,
among others, the current levels and projections of the following:
(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their
children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.
Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program
consistent with the overall provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the
provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will
procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the
actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription
of a qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not
be indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible means. As
pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the
government in supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for
any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use. 187
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the
FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or
devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that food and
medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the Court
finds that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the
various kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as
expounded herein, to be determined as the case presents itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal
contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of
Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the
mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated,
and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a
particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The
provision of the third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a
particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives,
intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family
planning products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory.
There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-
abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies. There can be no
predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-
abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific examination.
3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech
Position of the Petitioners:
1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the
constitutional proscription, there are those who, because of their religious education and
background, sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not, are evil. Some
of these are medical practitioners who essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not only the
use of contraceptives but also the willing participation and cooperation in all things dealing with
contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is gravely opposed to marital
chastity, it is contrary to the good of the transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of
the spouses; it harms true love and denies the sovereign rule of God in the transmission of
Human life."188
The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the
expenditure of their taxes on contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom since
contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs.189
2. On Religious Accommodation and
The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious
sentiments by making provisions for a conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is
nonetheless violated because the law also imposes upon the conscientious objector the duty to
refer the patient seeking reproductive health services to another medical practitioner who
would be able to provide for the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring
the conscientious objector to cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do without violating
his/her religious beliefs.190
They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the
recognition is unduly limited, because although it allows a conscientious objector in Section 23
(a)(3) the option to refer a patient seeking reproductive health services and information - no
escape is afforded the conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a patient
seeking reproductive health procedures. They claim that the right of other individuals to
conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in public health facilities referred to in Section
7; b) public officers involved in the implementation of the law referred to in Section 23(b ); and
c) teachers in public schools referred to in Section 14 of the RH Law, are also not recognize. 191
Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the
requirement to refer the matter to another health care service provider is still considered a
compulsion on those objecting healthcare service providers. They add that compelling them to
do the act against their will violates the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 1
7 of the law are too secular that they tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the
use of contraceptives with abortive effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-bono
reproductive health services to indigents encroach upon the religious freedom of those upon
whom they are required.192
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the
person seeking reproductive health care services to another provider infringes on one's
freedom of religion as it forces the objector to become an unwilling participant in the
commission of a serious sin under Catholic teachings. While the right to act on one's belief may
be regulated by the State, the acts prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts which produce
neither harm nor injury to the public.193
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify
regulation of religious freedom because it mentions no emergency, risk or threat that
endangers state interests. It does not explain how the rights of the people (to equality, non-
discrimination of rights, sustainable human development, health, education, information, choice
and to make decisions according to religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the
demands of responsible parenthood) are being threatened or are not being met as to justify the
impairment of religious freedom.194
Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to
attend family planning and responsible parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of
compliance. They claim that the provision forces individuals to participate in the implementation
of the RH Law even if it contravenes their religious beliefs.195 As the assailed law dangles the
threat of penalty of fine and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions, the
petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to provide, support and facilitate access and
information to contraception against their beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The Respondents' Positions
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a specific
mode or type of contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor
sanctions any religion or belief.196 They point out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the
public interest by providing accessible, effective and quality reproductive health services to
ensure maternal and child health, in line with the State's duty to bring to reality the social
justice health guarantees of the Constitution, 197 and that what the law only prohibits are those
acts or practices, which deprive others of their right to reproductive health. 198 They assert that
the assailed law only seeks to guarantee informed choice, which is an assurance that no one
will be compelled to violate his religion against his free will.199
The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed, the
petitioners are effectively going against the constitutional right to religious freedom, the same
right they invoked to assail the constitutionality of the RH Law.200 In other words, by seeking
the declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that the Court
recognize only the Catholic Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods and impose
this on the entire citizenry.201
With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, it being a carefully balanced compromise
between the interests of the religious objector, on one hand, who is allowed to keep silent but
is required to refer -and that of the citizen who needs access to information and who has the
right to expect that the health care professional in front of her will act professionally. For the
respondents, the concession given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient
accommodation to the right to freely exercise one's religion without unnecessarily infringing on
the rights of others.202
Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer
is limited in duration, location and impact.203
Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the respondents claim that it
is a reasonable regulation providing an opportunity for would-be couples to have access to
information regarding parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is
argued that those who object to any information received on account of their attendance in the
required seminars are not compelled to accept information given to them. They are completely
free to reject any information they do not agree with and retain the freedom to decide on
matters of family life without intervention of the State.204
For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family planning is
the only method acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and
surveys on the matter, they highlight the changing stand of the Catholic Church on
contraception throughout the years and note the general acceptance of the benefits of
contraceptives by its followers in planning their families.
The Church and The State
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of
people of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us
that our government, in law and in practice, has allowed these various religious, cultural, social
and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced minority groups and is
tolerant towards all - the religious people of different sects and the non-believers. The
undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to
be, and to whom they call for guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law.
Thus, the preamble of the present Constitution reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just
and humane society, and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations,
promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and
our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a
regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this
Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their spirituality innate in
our nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As
this is embodied in the preamble, it means that the State recognizes with respect the influence
of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of morality.205 Moreover, in
recognition of the contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions
contain benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of
church property, salary of religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious
instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not
encroach into the affairs of the church, and vice-versa. The principle of separation of Church
and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual
respect.1âwphi1 Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much
less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and
discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and
convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its
beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another,
the Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense,
which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God which metaphorically
symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious congregations
collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect
the State from the pursuit of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the following
mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:
Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.
Section 29.
xxx.
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or
dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the
armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or
favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among
religious groups."206 Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of
public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the
human conscience.207 Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited
from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and faith. 208 Explaining
the concept of religious freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers
Union209 wrote:
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets
or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of
any creed or the practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148,
1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost
amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to
protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent
with the liberty of others and with the common good. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is
to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the
religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect.
(Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates
conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and effect to
advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious
observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden.
(Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory
purposes. They have a single goal-to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and
practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause
prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and
practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny government the
power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and
practices.210
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of
religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on
one's belief. The first part is absolute. As explained in Gerona v. Secretary of Education: 211
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and
thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds.
One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may
appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal
standards. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a
stretch of road to travel.212
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be
enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the
belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare."213
Legislative Acts and the
Free Exercise Clause
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to
the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v.
Escritor, (Escritor)214 where it was stated "that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether
mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine
Constitution."215 In the same case, it was further explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions,
accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of
religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. "The
purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or
institution's religion."216 "What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration
of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its
'burdensome effect,' whether by the legislature or the courts."217
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test
is proper.218Underlying the compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a
fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict scrutiny. 219 In Escritor, it
was written:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the
first case on the Free Exercise Clause, American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear
and present danger" test but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in
subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced that the test of
permissibility of religious freedom is whether it violates the established institutions of society
and law. The Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test as well as the
doctrine that a law of general applicability may burden religious exercise provided the law is the
least restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law. The case also used, albeit
inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano , German went back to the
Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate danger" test and overruled
the Gerona test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and present
danger" test in the maiden case of A merican Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases
which employed the "clear and present danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test involved,
in one form or another, religious speech as this test is often used in cases on freedom of
expression. On the other hand, the Gerona and German cases set the rule that religious
freedom will not prevail over established institutions of society and law. Gerona, however,
which was the authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag which employed the
"grave and immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only case that employed the
"compelling state interest" test, but as explained previously, the use of the test was
inappropriate to the facts of the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia
ni Cristo where the "clear and present danger" and "grave and immediate danger" tests were
appropriate as speech has easily discernible or immediate effects. The Gerona and German
doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality
approach, thus not appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case
involves purely conduct arising from religious belief. The "compelling state interest" test is
proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects
on the state's interests: some effects may be immediate and short-term while others delayed
and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive
evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the
state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental right
that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of
all human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free
Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited
government is premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the
Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a just and humane society and
establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount
interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests which balances a right
with just a colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling
interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires
the state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state
to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In determining
which shall prevail between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be
the guide. The "compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while
at the same time affording protection to the paramount interests of the state. This was the test
used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the
"compelling state interest" test, by upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks to
protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in the
original. Underlining supplied.]
The Court's Position
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of
contraceptives or one's participation in the support of modem reproductive health measures is
moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according to one's
dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine,
form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably
ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts." 220 The jurisdiction of
the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court
makes in the case at bench should be understood only in this realm where it has authority.
Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as
vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law
contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.
At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs
and convictions. It is replete with assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets
of his religion or defy his religious convictions against his free will. Provisions in the RH Law
respecting religious freedom are the following:
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to
equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the
right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and
the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood. [Section 2,
Declaration of Policy]
2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the
family which in turn is the foundation of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:
(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the
demands of responsible parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of
family planning, including effective natural and modern methods which have been proven
medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and
evidence-based medical research standards such as those registered and approved by the
FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government
measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also provide funding
support to promote modern natural methods of family planning, especially the Billings
Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and their religious convictions.
[Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the
number of children they desire with due consideration to the health, particularly of women, and
the resources available and affordable to them and in accordance with existing laws, public
morals and their religious convictions. [Section 3CDJ
5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that
are in accordance with their religious convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration
the State's obligations under various human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's
organizations, civil society, faith-based organizations, the religious sector and communities is
crucial to ensure that reproductive health and population and development policies, plans, and
programs will address the priority needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized. [Section
3(i)]
7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and
aspirations of the family and children. It is likewise a shared responsibility between parents to
determine and achieve the desired number of children, spacing and timing of their children
according to their own family life aspirations, taking into account psychological preparedness,
health status, sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with their religious convictions.
[Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives.
To some medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an
anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be
respected.
The Establishment Clause
and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with
religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They can
neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can
they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause
the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance
its population control program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of
contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to
pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any one
religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The
demarcation line between Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things
that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's.221
The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly
respects diverse religious beliefs in line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the same
conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said
provisions commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer a
person seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare
provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government
legislation or practice, the compelling state interest test in line with the Court's espousal of the
Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case, the conscientious
objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the
RH Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in
the accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of
conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious
freedom has been burdened. As in Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war
plagues a conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to the law and the
abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a clean conscience yet
under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an illustration of the predicament of medical
practitioners whose religious beliefs are incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the
religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner,
against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem reproductive health products,
services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been
compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas
(Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for
the inviolability of the human conscience.222
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false
compromise because it makes pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an act
that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what
they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the
offensive act by indirect participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free
speech, it being an externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the
right to be silent. With the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection
that should be afforded to individuals in communicating their beliefs to others as well as the
protection for simply being silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to
utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. 223 While the RH Law
seeks to provide freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees
the liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden,
whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion.224
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one
hand, and the interest of the State, on the other, to provide access and information on
reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods to enable the people to
determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the
strong view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be
accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance
with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious
belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the
constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the
case of Doogan and Wood v. NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board,225 that the
midwives claiming to be conscientious objectors under the provisions of Scotland's Abortion
Act of 1967, could not be required to delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor ward
who were involved in abortions.226 The Inner House stated "that if 'participation' were defined
according to whether the person was taking part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this would actually
mean more complexity and uncertainty."227
While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same -
they could not be forced to assist abortions if it would be against their conscience or will.
Institutional Health Providers
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group and health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of
the RH Law penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to
refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for
being violative of the freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in
relation to Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of information regarding programs
and services and in the performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom
of health care service providers should be respected.
In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive
Secretary228 it was stressed:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And
this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to
protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent
with the liberty of others and with the common good."10
The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure
compliance. Without set consequences for either an active violation or mere inaction, a law
tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an effective
implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly chooses to stamp
its disapproval. The punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to
refer a patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a
patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee
which the Court cannot allow.
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:
Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers,
chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their
office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and
these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection
clause should be equally protective of the religious belief of public health officers. There is no
perceptible distinction why they should not be considered exempt from the mandates of the
law. The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all
medical practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector.
After all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that
guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even if one acquires employment in the
government.
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of
human values. The mind must be free to think what it wills, whether in the secular or religious
sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or through the media and, thus, seek
other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more permanent aggrupation. Embraced in
such concept then are freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and
petition, and freedom of association.229
The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH
Law itself but also because it is violative of the equal protection clause in the Constitution.
Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict between the RH-IRR and the RH Law, the
law must prevail.
Justice Mendoza:
I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52, you
mentioned RH Law is replete with provisions in upholding the freedom of religion and
respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this with qualifications. Now, you have
read, I presumed you have read the IRR-Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Bill?
Congressman Lagman:
Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not thoroughly
dissected the nuances of the provisions.
Justice Mendoza:
I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in the
IRR it says: " .... skilled health professionals such as provincial, city or municipal health officers,
chief of hospitals, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their
office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and
these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors." Do you agree with this?
Congressman Lagman:
I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.
Justice Mendoza:
In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can be
conscientious objectors, skilled health professionals cannot be considered conscientious
objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not against the constitutional right to the religious
belief?
Congressman Lagman:
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must prevail. 230
Compelling State Interest
The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense of
the subject provisions, were able to: 1] demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain
conscientious objectors in their choice of services to render; and 2] discharge the burden of
proof that the obligatory character of the law is the least intrusive means to achieve the
objectives of the law.
Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG
was curiously silent in the establishment of a more compelling state interest that would
rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objector's right not to adhere to an action contrary to
his religious convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence and
evasion. The Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes disclose the following:
Justice De Castro:
Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Yes, Justice.
Justice De Castro:
... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling State
interest in imposing this duty to refer to a conscientious objector which refuses to do so
because of his religious belief?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Ahh, Your Honor, ..
Justice De Castro:
What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State interest,
this is an ordinary health legislation involving professionals. This is not a free speech matter or
a pure free exercise matter. This is a regulation by the State of the relationship between
medical doctors and their patients.231
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise
clause of the conscientious objectors, however few in number. Only the prevention of an
immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the
infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and
immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.232
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to
act or not to act according to what one believes. And this freedom is violated when one is
compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from acting according to one's belief. 233
Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in
the perceived scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing,
number and spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future event that is contingent on
whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the information, product, method or supply
given to her or whether she even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the
burden placed upon those who object to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the
moment a patient seeks consultation on reproductive health matters.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the
conscientious objector's religious freedom, the respondents have failed to demonstrate "the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override a person's
fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented any
government effort exerted to show that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state
objective is the least intrusive means.234 Other than the assertion that the act of referring would
only be momentary, considering that the act of referral by a conscientious objector is the very
action being contested as violative of religious freedom, it behooves the respondents to
demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State to achieve its objective
without violating the rights of the conscientious objector. The health concerns of women may
still be addressed by other practitioners who may perform reproductive health-related
procedures with open willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to
perform an act in utter reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of
constitutional freedoms.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the
right to health is protected. Considering other legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or
the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No.
9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of women
in relation to health services and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on
comprehensive health services and programs for women, in fact, reads:
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall,
at all times, provide for a comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health
services and programs covering all stages of a woman's life cycle and which addresses the
major causes of women's mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for
comprehensive health services, due respect shall be accorded to women's religious
convictions, the rights of the spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions, and the demands of responsible parenthood, and the right of women to protection
from hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and substances.
Access to the following services shall be ensured:
(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy
and infant health and nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;
(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health
services without prejudice to the primary right and duty of parents to educate
their children;
(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including
sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and AIDS;
(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and
cervical cancers, and other gynecological conditions and disorders;
(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related
complications;
(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children
victims and survivors shall be provided with comprehensive health services
that include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and legal interventions and
assistance towards healing, recovery, and empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant
to ethical norms and medical standards;
(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and
(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of
women and girls. In addition, healthy lifestyle activities are encouraged and
promoted through programs and projects as strategies in the prevention of
diseases.
(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women in all
sectors with appropriate, timely, complete, and accurate information and education on all the
above-stated aspects of women's health in government education and training programs, with
due regard to the following:
(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth
and the development of moral character and the right of children to be brought
up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the enrichment and
strengthening of character;
(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility
awareness.
As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling state
interest was "Fifteen maternal deaths per day, hundreds of thousands of unintended
pregnancies, lives changed, x x x."235 He, however, failed to substantiate this point by concrete
facts and figures from reputable sources.
The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the Filipino
maternal mortality rate dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although there was still no
RH Law at that time. Despite such revelation, the proponents still insist that such number of
maternal deaths constitute a compelling state interest.
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs
for Filipino women, they could not be solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable
stranglehold on religious beliefs in exchange for blind conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law.
While generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health
care procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made
in life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In these
situations, the right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral
by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing
the life of a mother in grave danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban, representing
CFC, manifested: "the forced referral clause that we are objecting on grounds of violation of
freedom of religion does not contemplate an emergency." 237
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally
obliged always to try to save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one
should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the
House of Representatives of the principle of double-effect wherein intentional harm on the life
of either the mother of the child is never justified to bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict
situation between the life of the child and the life of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged
always to try to save both lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the
mother) when it is medically impossible to save both, provided that no direct harm is intended
to the other. If the above principles are observed, the loss of the child's life or the mother's life
is not intentional and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of abortion
or murder. The mother is never pitted against the child because both their lives are equally
valuable.238
Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of
the child may be resorted to even if is against the religious sentiments of the medical
practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden imposed upon a medical practitioner in this
case would have been more than justified considering the life he would be able to save.
Family Planning Seminars
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a condition for the issuance of a
marriage license, the Court finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the
government. A cursory reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of the
petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar
on parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the
type of family planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether they be natural or
artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those who receive any information during their
attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept the information given to them,
are completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to
decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.
4-The Family and the Right to Privacy
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions
of the Constitution by intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates
disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather than promote its solidarity and total
development.240
The Court cannot but agree.
The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social
institution. In fact, one article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the family.
ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly,
it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the
demands of responsible parenthood;
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection
from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development;
The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and implementation
of policies and programs that affect them.
In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains
provisions which tend to wreck the family as a solid social institution. It bars the husband
and/or the father from participating in the decision making process regarding their common
future progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their authority over their minor daughter
simply because she is already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.
The Family and Spousal Consent
Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...
(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of
legal age on the ground of lack of consent or authorization of the following persons in the
following instances:
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement, the
decision of the one undergoing the procedures shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]
The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and
vasectomy which, by their very nature, should require mutual consent and decision between
the husband and the wife as they affect issues intimately related to the founding of a family.
Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the "right of the
spouses to found a family." One person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared
by both spouses. In the same Section 3, their right "to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that affect them " is equally recognized.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving
absolute authority to the spouse who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse
from participating in the decision would drive a wedge between the husband and wife, possibly
result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing
the population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to protect
marriage as an inviolable social institution.241
Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to
the couple, not just one of them. Any decision they would reach would affect their future as a
family because the size of the family or the number of their children significantly matters. The
decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both
spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed
private right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the
State should see to it that they chart their destiny together as one family.
As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise
known as the "Magna Carta for Women," provides that women shall have equal rights in all
matters relating to marriage and family relations, including the joint decision on the number and
spacing of their children. Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law
states, is a shared responsibility between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not
be allowed to betray the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family by giving
to only one spouse the absolute authority to decide whether to undergo reproductive health
procedure.242
The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy
and such state intervention would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by
the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to privacy was first recognized in Marje v.
Mutuc,243 where the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right to
privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it
is fully deserving of constitutional protection."244 Marje adopted the ruling of the US Supreme
Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,245 where Justice William O. Douglas wrote:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties, older
than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way
of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or
social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions.
Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a
criminal offense on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to
privacy of married persons. Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed
by couples. Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy."246
At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.
The Family and Parental Consent
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be
undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law
provides:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – x x x.
No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural
or artificial: Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to modern methods of family
planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the minor is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a
parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the decision making process of
the minor with regard to family planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental
authority is already cut off just because there is a need to tame population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and
guidance of her own parents. The State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it
comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no longer relevant is
clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional
mandate to protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government." 247 In this regard,
Commissioner Bernas wrote:
The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It imports
the assertion that the right of parents is superior to that of the State.248 [Emphases supplied]
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their
minor-child or the right of the spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well affect the
very purpose of marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in
the violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and
strongly-held Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition
that the State affords couples entering into the special contract of marriage to as one unit in
forming the foundation of the family and society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care
and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their parental
authority.
First Exception: Access to Information
Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second
paragraph of Section 7 or with respect to the consenting spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a
distinction must be made. There must be a differentiation between access to information about
family planning services, on one hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and
modern family planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is
concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the
minor referred to under the exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable
her to take proper care of her own body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother as that of
the unborn child. Considering that information to enable a person to make informed decisions
is essential in the protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to such information with
respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this situation, the fear that parents might be
deprived of their parental control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise
parental guidance and control over their minor child and assist her in deciding whether to
accept or reject the information received.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening
cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the
minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be put at
grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized that no person should be denied
the appropriate medical care urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right
to life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii) 249 should be struck down. By
effectively limiting the requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures,"
it denies the parents their right of parental authority in cases where what is involved are "non-
surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an
abused child as provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be
deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of this right would be
an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family.
5 - Academic Freedom
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the
teaching of Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of
fine and/or imprisonment violates the principle of academic freedom . According to the
petitioners, these provisions effectively force educational institutions to teach reproductive
health education even if they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their
students.250 Citing various studies conducted in the United States and statistical data gathered
in the country, the petitioners aver that the prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase
of out-of-wedlock births; divorce and breakdown of families; the acceptance of abortion and
euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of society; and promotion of promiscuity
among the youth.251
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is
premature because the Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a
curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education. One can only speculate on the
content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents and
whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their
apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court
declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary
right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of
moral character shall receive the support of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and
the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role
of parents in preparing the youth to become productive members of society. Notably, it places
more importance on the role of parents in the development of their children by recognizing that
said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior
to that of the State.252
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral
development of the youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the importance of
developing the youth and their important role in nation building.253 Considering that Section 14
provides not only for the age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but also for values
formation; the development of knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination;
sexual abuse and violence against women and children and other forms of gender based
violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and emotional changes in adolescents; women's
rights and children's rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and development; and
responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4(t) of the
RH Law itself provides for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and
physical and emotional changes among adolescents - the Court finds that the legal mandate
provided under the assailed provision supplements, rather than supplants, the rights and duties
of the parents in the moral development of their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education
program shall be developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations, school
officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said that it will be in line with the
religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that the
petitioners' contention that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is
without merit.254
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their
participation in the reproductive health education program provided under Section 14 of the RH
Law on the ground that the same violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its
judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
6 - Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due
process clause of the Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private
health service provider" among those who may be held punishable but does not define who is
a "private health care service provider." They argue that confusion further results since Section
7 only makes reference to a "private health care institution."
The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals
operated by religious groups from rendering reproductive health service and modern family
planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these institutions are also exempt from giving
reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering reproductive health
procedures under Section 23(a)(2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of
incorrect information, but at the same time fails to define "incorrect information."
The arguments fail to persuade.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its
application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to
avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.255 Moreover, in determining whether
the words used in a statute are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance with their
plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part
of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be
construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.256
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service
provider," reference must be made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public
health service provider," viz:
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly
licensed and accredited and devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for
health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals suffering
from illness, disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical
and nursing care; (2) public health care professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a
midvvife; (3) public health worker engaged in the delivery of health care services; or (4)
barangay health worker who has undergone training programs under any accredited
government and NGO and who voluntarily renders primarily health care services in the
community after having been accredited to function as such by the local health board in
accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .
Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of
"private health care service provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious
reason that they are used synonymously.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to
render reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, includes exemption
from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health
procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to
be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family
planning methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive
health information and to render reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and
"methods" are broad enough to include the providing of information and the rendering of
medical procedures.
The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care
service providers who intentionally withhold, restrict and provide incorrect information regarding
reproductive health programs and services. For ready reference, the assailed provision is
hereby quoted as follows:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally
provide incorrect information regarding programs and services on reproductive health including
the right to informed choice and access to a full range of legal, medically-safe, non-
abortifacient and effective family planning methods;
From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model
or with established rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty,
morality or propriety; and failing to coincide with the truth. 257 On the other hand, the word
"knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness that is intentional. 258 Used together in
relation to Section 23(a)(l), they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or
misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive
health. Public health and safety demand that health care service providers give their honest
and correct medical information in accordance with what is acceptable in medical practice.
While health care service providers are not barred from expressing their own personal opinions
regarding the programs and services on reproductive health, their right must be tempered with
the need to provide public health and safety. The public deserves no less.
7-Egual Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the
Constitution as it discriminates against the poor because it makes them the primary target of
the government program that promotes contraceptive use . They argue that, rather than
promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that
would effectively reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the
RH Law dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding principles 259 and
definition of terms260 of the law.
They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive
health education program imposed by the RH Law renders it unconstitutional.
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to expound on the
concept of equal protection. Thus:
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of
right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of
the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to
provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process
clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the
sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed." It "requires public bodies and inst itutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a
similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a
state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the
express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted
authorities." "In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to
govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences
that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature.
Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive
departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through
whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according
to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to
all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all
persons who naturally belong to the class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all
the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations
imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the
sense that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree.
Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the
classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class
differs from the other members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all
others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him."
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to
preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to
embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not
leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification.
[Emphases supplied; citations excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care
program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11,
Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of
the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health
development of the people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health
development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services
available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to
provide free medical care to paupers.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who
are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the
contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH
Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As
Section 3(1) explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is
incidental to the advancement of reproductive health."
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does
not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise
that the assailed law seeks to charge couples with the duty to have children only if they would
raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into its provisions shows that what the law
seeks to do is to simply provide priority to the poor in the implementation of government
programs to promote basic reproductive health care.
With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory
reproductive health education program under Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact
that the children of those who are less fortunate attend public educational institutions does not
amount to substantial distinction sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the other hand,
substantial distinction rests between public educational institutions and private educational
institutions, particularly because there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private
educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their
sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.
8-Involuntary Servitude
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the
constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the
assailed legislation requiring private and non-government health care service providers to
render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive health services, actually amounts to
involuntary servitude because it requires medical practitioners to perform acts against their
will.262
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly
be considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service
providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services. Moreover,
the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of the government, the
accreditation of medical practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken.
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public
interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to
protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine is
not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the
people. A fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress 263 to prescribe the qualifications
for the practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the
public morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even
to the point of revoking such right altogether.264
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence
of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion.265 A reading
of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only encourages private and non-
government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other than
non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise.
Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to
choose which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or
whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them
to render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was made a
prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an
unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the
furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that
conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and
convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.
9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA
The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to
determine whether or not a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List
(EDL).266
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but
also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is the only
government entity empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do so. It should
be understood that health services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are
associated with what is ordinarily understood as "health products."
In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration
shall be under the Office of the Secretary and shall have the following functions, powers and
duties:
"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and
regulations issued pursuant to the same;
"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;
"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of
this Act;
"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products
standards, and to recommend standards of identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and
fill of container;
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis
for the issuance of appropriate authorization and spot-check for compliance with
regulations regarding operation of manufacturers, importers, exporters, distributors,
wholesalers, drug outlets, and other establishments and facilities of health products, as
determined by the FDA;
"x x x
"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance
of appropriate authorizations to ensure safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters,
wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and non-consumer users of health products to
report to the FDA any incident that reasonably indicates that said product has caused
or contributed to the death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer, a patient, or
any person;
 "(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for health
products, whether or not registered with the FDA Provided, That for registered health
products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty (30) days and may be extended
for sixty ( 60) days only after due process has been observed;
"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product
found to have caused death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer or patient,
or is found to be imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to
require all concerned to implement the risk management plan which is a requirement
for the issuance of the appropriate authorization;
x x x.
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to
enable the agency to carry out the mandates of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole
agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines available to the public, the FDA was
equipped with the necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the
principle of necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health
and safety by permitting only food and medicines that are safe includes "service" and
"methods." From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the
public be given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient,
and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards.
The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of
Justice,267 as follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability
of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth
of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation
has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings,
the legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the
required direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.
10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon
the powers devolved to local government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local
Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining
to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue
exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon
them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies
and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall
likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective
provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and
responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them from the national agencies
on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective
jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical exception of
cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services.268 Thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and
infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and services funded by the
National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws,
pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources,
are not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local government
unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects,
facilities, programs and services. [Emphases supplied]
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an
LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for
which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual general
appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the
jurisdiction of the LGU.269 A complete relinquishment of central government powers on the
matter of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government
Code itself weighs against it.270
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the
establishment of health care facilities,271 the hiring of skilled health professionals,272 or the
training of barangay health workers,273 it will be the national government that will provide for the
funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national government still
has the say when it comes to national priority programs which the local government is called
upon to implement like the RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide
these services. There is nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as making
the availability of these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said
that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national government upon the
autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.
The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be
equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover,
Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded to
by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the autonomous
region, refer to the policy statements for the guidance of the regional government. These
provisions relied upon by the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be exercised by
the regional government, which can, in no manner, be characterized as an abdication by the
State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the general welfare. After all, despite
the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence,
as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship between the
national and the regional governments.274 Except for the express and implied limitations
imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and
plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general concern or
common interest.275
11 - Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law,276 suffice it to say that the
Court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only
guidepost is the Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated from what is
perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or
ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate
body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by
theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are interested in
the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or present. 277 Unless, a
natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down
a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,278 the very case cited by the petitioners, it was explained
that the Court is not duty-bound to examine every law or action and whether it conforms with
both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only in the
most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is applicable.279
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does
not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control
program of the government by providing information and making non-abortifacient
contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the poor.
Facts and Fallacies
and the Wisdom of the Law
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to
provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality
reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out,
however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit
of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is
a recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot
be allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves
enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and open-
minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that
what it seeks to address is the problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let
it be said that the cause of these perennial issues is not the large population but the unequal
distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the
country's wealth remains in the hands of the very few.
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The
European and Asian countries, which embarked on such a program generations ago , are now
burdened with ageing populations. The number of their young workers is dwindling with
adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent a significant human capital
which could have helped them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These countries
are now trying to reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one, Singapore, even
with incentives, is failing.
And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas
Filipino Workers. This is because we have an ample supply of young able-bodied workers.
What would happen if the country would be weighed down by an ageing population and the
fewer younger generation would not be able to support them? This would be the situation when
our total fertility rate would go down below the replacement level of two (2) children per
woman.280
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use
coercive measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to
solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say
what the law is as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying what the
law should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It is not the province
of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to question the policies adopted by the
legislative branch. Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that
may arise from the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial
legislation if that would be necessary in the premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution
and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate function of interpreting the law, guided
by the Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Court's
function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying
what the law is, as enacted by the lawmaking body.281
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement
of the prior existing contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures.
Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as entirely unconstitutional, there will still be the
Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the reproductive
health for women or The Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating
of the assailed legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-abortion" and "non-coercion" in the Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
adoption of any family planning method should be maintained.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order,
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which
No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions have been herein declared as constitutional.
which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
SO ORDERED.
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require
private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening Associate Justice
case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a WE CONCUR:
miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from
their parents or guardian/s;
Tingnan ang aking opinyong
Sumasang-ayon at Sumasalungat
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or Chief Justice
refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive
health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
See Concurring Opinion
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined Associate Justice
Associate Justice
under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the
consent of the spouse;
With Separate concurring opinion
See: Separate Concurring Opinion
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they ARTURO D. BRION
CASTRO
limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures. Associate Justice
Associate Justice

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section
5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined Associate Justice Associate Justice
under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same
facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs; See Concurring and dissenting See Concurring Opinion
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 Associate Justice Associate Justice
.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support
reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs; Associate Justice Associate Justice

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering
See Concurring and Dissenting
of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious See concurring and dissenting
Opinion
objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and BIENVENIDO L. REYES
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier
"primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and,
 See Separate dissent On December 17, 1996, Maria Imelda Lopez, an auditor of the Commission on
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN Audit (COA), conducted a cash examination of the accounts handled by petitioner as instructed
Associate Justice by her superior, Sherelyn Narag. As a result, Lopez came across deposit slips dated
September 19, 1996 and November 29, 1996 bearing the amounts of ₱11,300.00 and
CERTIFICATION ₱81,348.20, rcspectively.5 Upon close scrutiny, she noticed that said deposit slips did not bear
a stamp of receipt by the LBP nor was it machine validated. Suspicious about what she found,
she and Narag verified all the reports and other documents turned-over to them by
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the petitioner.6 On the basis of said findings, Narag sent a letter to the LBP to confirm the
writer of the opinion of the Court. remittances made by petitioner. After adding all the deposits made and upon checking with the
teller's blotter, Nadelline Orallo, the resident auditor of LBP, found that no deposits were made
by petitioner for the account of DOTC on September 19, 1996 for the amount of ₱11,300.00
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO and November 29, 1996 for the amount of ₱81,340.20. 7
Chief Justice
Thereafter, the LBP's officer-in-charge, Rebecca R. Sanchez, instructed the bank's teller,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Catalina Ngaosi, to conduct their own independent inquiry. It was discovered that on
September 19, 1996, the only deposit in favor of the DOTC was that made by its Ifugao office
EN BANC in the Lagawe branch of the LBP.8 This prompted Lopez to write to petitioner informing her that
the two (2) aforesaid remittances were not acknowledged by the bank. The auditors then found
December 5, 2017 that petitioner duly accounted for the ₱81,348.20 remittance but not for the ₱11,300.00.
Dissatisfied with petitioner's explanation as to the whereabouts of the said remittance, Narag
reported the matter to the COA Regional Director who, in turn wrote to the LBP for
G.R. No. 217874
confirmation. The LBP then denied receiving any ₱11,300.00 deposit on September 19, 1996
from petitioner for the account of the DOTC.9 Thus, the COA demanded that she pay the said
OPHELIA HERNAN, Petitioner, amount. Petitioner, however, refused. Consequently, the COA filed a complaint for
vs. malversation of public funds against petitioner with the Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN,, Respondent which, after due investigation, recommended her indictment for the loss of
₱11,300.00.10 Accordingly, petitioner was charged before the RTC of Baguio City in an
DECISION Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:

PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolution1 dated February 2, 2015 and Decision2 dated
November 13, 2009 of the Sandiganbayan 2nd Division which affirmed, with modification, the
Decision dated June 28, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),Branch 7, Baguio City
convicting petitioner of the crime of malversation of public funds in Criminal Case No. 15722-R.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In October 1982, petitioner Ophelia Hernan joined the Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC),Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) in Baguio City wherein she
served as an accounting clerk. In September 1984, she was promoted to the position of
Supervising Fiscal Clerk by virtue of which she was designated as cashier, disbursement and
collection officer.3 As such, petitioner received cash and other collections from customers and
clients for the payment of telegraphic transfers, toll foes, and special message fees. The
collections she received were deposited at the bank account of the DOTC at the Land Bank of
the Philippines (LBP), Baguio City Branch.4
That on or about September 16, 1996, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of
Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court, the above-named
accused, a public officer, being then the Disbursing Officer of the Department of Transportation
and Communications, Baguio City, and as such an accountable officer, entrusted with and
responsible for the amount of ₱1 1,300.00 which accused received and collected for the
DOTC, and intended for deposit under the account of DOTC with the Land Bank of the
Philippines-Baguio City, by reason of her position, while in the performance of her official
functions, taking advantage of her position, did then and there, wilfully, feloniously, and
unlawfully misappropriate or consent, or through abandonment or negligence, permit other
persons to take such amount of ₱11,300.00 to the damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
Upon arraignment on July 31, 1998, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
Hence, trial on the merits ensued.
To establish its case, the prosecution presented the testimonies of two (2) COA auditors,
namely, Maria Lopez and Sherelyn Narag as well as three (3) LBP employees, namely,
Rebecca Sanchez, Catalina Ngaosi, and Nadelline Orallo.12 In response, the defense
presented the lone testimony of petitioner, which can be summarized as follows:
On September 19, 1996, petitioner and her supervisor, Cecilia Paraiso, went to the LBP
Baguio branch and personally deposited the exact amount of ₱11,300.00 with accomplished
deposit slips in six (6) copies.13 Since there were many clients who came ahead of her, she
decided to go with her usual arrangement of leaving the money with the teller and telling her
that she would just come back to retrieve the deposit slip. Thus, she handed the money to
Teller No. 2, whom she identified as Catalina Ngaosi. Upon her return at around 3 o'clock in
the afternoon, she retrieved four (4) copies of the deposit slip from Ngaosi. She noticed that the
same had no acknowledgment mark on it. Being contented with the initials of the teller on the
deposit slips, she returned to her office and kept them in her vault. It was only during the cash
count conducted by auditor Lopez when she found out that the said amount was not remitted to
the account of the LBP. When demand was made on her to return the amount, she requested
that she be allowed to pay only after investigation of a complaint of Estafa that she would file
with the National Bureau of Investigation against some personnel of the bank, particularly
Catalina Ngaosi.14 The complaint, however, was eventually dismissed.15
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the
Information. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered convicting accused
Ophelia Hernan of Malversation and hereby sentences her, after applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, to suffer imprisonment from 7 years, 4 months, and 1 day of prision
mayor medium period, as minimum, to 11 years, 6 months and 21 days of prision mayor as
maximum period to reclusion temporalmaximum period, as maximum, and to pay a fine of
₱11,300.00.
Accused Ophelia Hernan is further sentenced to suffer the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification.
Likewise, accused Ophelia Hernan is hereby ordered to pay back to the government the
amount of ₱11,300.00 plus legal interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum to be computed
from the date of the filing of the Information up to the time the same is actually paid.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.16
Erroneously, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed her conviction
but modified the penalty imposed. Upon motion, however, the CA set aside its decision on the
finding that it has no appellate jurisdiction over the case. Instead, it is the Sandiganbayan
which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over petitioner occupying a position lower than
Salary Grade 27.17 Petitioner's new counsel, Atty. Leticia Gutierrez Hayes-Allen, then appealed
the case to the Sandiganbayan. In a Decision dated November 13, 2009, the Sandiganbayan
affirmed the RTC's judgment of conviction but modified the penalty imposed, the dispositive
opinion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with
the modifications that the indeterminate penalty to be imposed on the accused should be from
6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to 11 years, 6 months, and 21 days of prision
mayor as maximum, together with the accessory penalties under Article 42 of the Revised
Penal Code, and that interest of only 6% shall be imposed on the amount of ₱11,300.00 to be
restored by the accused.
SO ORDERED.18
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated December 21, 2009 alleging that during the
trial before the RTC, her counsel was unable to elicit many facts which would show her
innocence. Said counsel principally failed to present certain witnesses and documents that
would supposedly acquit her from the crime charged. The Sandiganbayan, however, denied
the motion in a Resolution dated August 31, 2010 on the ground that evidence not formally
offered before the court below cannot be considered on appeal.19
On June 26, 2013, the Resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration became final
and executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments.20 On July 26, 2013,
petitioner's new counsel, Atty. Meshack Macwes, filed an Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case
with Leave of Court and with Prayer to Stay the Execution.21 In a Resolution22 dated December
4, 2013, however, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion and directed the execution of the
judgment of conviction. It noted the absence of the following requisites for the reopening of a
case: (1) the reopening must be before finality of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is
issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a
hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and (5) the
presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty (30) days
from the issuance of the order.23
Unfazed, petitioner filed on January 9, 2014 a Petition for Reconsideration with Prayer for
Recall of Entry of Judgment in lieu of the Prayer for Stay of Execution of Judgment praying for
a reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan' s recent Resolution, that the case be reopened for
further reception of evidence, and the recall of the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013.24 In
a Resolution dated February 2, 2015, the Sandiganbayan denied the petition for lack of merit.
According to the said court, the motion is clearly a third motion for reconsideration, which is a
prohibited pleading under the Rules of Court. Also, the grounds raised therein were merely a
rehash of those raised in the two previous motions. The claims that the accused could not
contact her counsel on whom she merely relied on for appropriate remedies to be filed on her
behalf, and that she has additional evidence to present, were already thoroughly discussed in
the August 31, 2010 and December 4, 2013 Resolutions. Moreover, the cases relied upon by
petitioner are not on point.25
On May 14, 2015, petitioner filed the instant petition invoking the following arguments:
 I.
THE SANDIGANBA YAN GRAVELY ERRED AS IT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN CONCLUDING
THAT THE MOTION TO REOPEN WAS FILED OUT OF TIME CONSIDERING TI-IE
EXTRAORDINARY AND EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CASE.
II.
THE SANDIGANBA YAN GRAVELY ERRED AS IT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT
THE EVIDENCE INTENDED TO BE PRESENTED BY PETITIONER SHOULD HER MOTTON
FOR REOPENING BE GRANTED, WAS PASSED UPON BY THE TRIAL COURT.
III.
THE SANDIGANBA YAN GRAVELY ERRED AS IT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN PRONOUNCING
THAT THE MOTION TO REOPEN AND THE PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY
PETITIONER ARE CONSIDERED AS THE SECOND AND THIRD MOTIONS TO THE
DENIAL OF THE DECISION.
Petitioner posits that her counsel, Atty. Hayes-Allen, never received the August 31, 2010
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying her Motion for Reconsideration. This is because
notice thereof was erroneously sent to said counsel's previous office at Poblacion, La Trinidad,
Benguet, despite the fact that it was specifically indicated in the Motion for Reconsideration
that the new office is at the Public Attorney's Office of Tayug, Pangasinan, following her
counsel's appointment as public attorney. Thus, since her counsel was not properly notified of
the subject resolution, the entry of judgment is premature.26 In support of her assertion, she
cites Our ruling in People v. Chavez,27 wherein We held that an entry of judgment without
receipt of the resolution is premature.
Petitioner also claims that during trial, she could not obtain the necessary evidence for her
defense due to the fact that the odds were against her. Because of this, she asks the Court to
relax the strict application of the rules and consider remanding the case to the lower court for
further reception of evidence.28 In particular, petitioner seeks the reception of an affidavit of a
certain John L. Ziganay, an accountant at the Depaiiment of Science and
Technology (DOST), who previously worked at the DOTC and COA, as well as two (2) deposit
slips. According to petitioner, these pieces of evidence would show that the ₱11,300.00
deposited at the Lagawe branch of the LBP was actually the deposit made by petitioner and
not by a certain Lanie Cabacungan, as the prosecution suggests. This is because the
₱11,300.00 deposit made by Cabacungan consists of two (2) different amounts, which, if
proper accounting procedure is followed, shall be recorded in the bank statement as two (2)
separate amounts and not their total sum of ₱11,300.00.29 Thus, the Sandiganbayan's denial of
petitioner's motion to reopen the case is capricious, despotic, and whimsical since the
admission of her additional evidence will prevent a miscarriage.
Finally, petitioner denies the Sandiganbayan's ruling that her motion to reopen and petition for
reconsideration are considered as a second and third motion for reconsideration, and are thus,
prohibited pleadings. This is because the additional evidence she seeks to introduce were not
available during the trial of her case.
The petition is devoid of merit.
At the outset, the Court notes that as pointed out by respondent Office of the Special
Prosecutor, petitioner's resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
an improper remedy. In determining the appropriate remedy or remedies available, a party
aggrieved by a cou1i order, resolution or decision must first correctly identify the nature of the
order, resolution or decision he intends to assail.30 It bears stressing that the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari can be availed of only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.31 If the Order or Resolution sought to be
assailed is in the nature of a final order, the remedy of the aggrieved party would be to file a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Otherwise, the appropriate
remedy would be to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.32 Petitioner, in the instant case,
seeks to assail the Sandiganbayan's Resolutions dated December 4, 2013 and February 2,
2015 wherein said court denied her motion to reopen the malversation case against her. Said
resolutions are clearly final orders that dispose the proceedings completely. The instant petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 is, therefore, improper.
Even if We assume the propriety of petitioner's chosen action, the Court still cannot grant the
reliefs she prays for, specifically: (1) the reversal of the Sandiganbayan's December 4, 2013
and February 2, 2015 Resolutions denying her motion to reopen and petition for
reconsideration; (2) the reopening of the case for further reception of evidence; and (3) the
recall of the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013.33
First of all, there is no merit in petitioner's claim that since her counsel was not properly notified
of the August 31, 2010 Resolution as notice thereof was erroneously sent to her old office
address, the entry of judgment is premature. As the Court sees it, petitioner has no one but
herself to blame. Time and again, the Court has held that in the absence of a proper and
adequate notice to the court of a change of address, the service of the order or resolution of a
court upon the parties must be made at the last address of their counsel on record. 34 It is the
duty of the party and his counsel to device a system for the receipt of mail intended for them,
just as it is the duty of the counsel to inform the court officially of a change in his address. 35 If
counsel moves to another address without informing the court of that change, such omission or
neglect is inexcusable and will not stay the finality of the decision. The court cannot be
expected to take judicial notice of the new address of a lawyer who has moved or to ascertain
on its own whether or not the counsel of record has been changed and who the new counsel
could possibly be or where he probably resides or holds office.36
Here, it is undisputed that petitioner's counsel failed to inform the court of the change in her
office address from Poblacion, La Trinidad, Benguet, to the Public Attorney's Office in Tayug,
Pangasinan. The fact that said new address was indicated in petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration does not suffice as "proper and adequate notice" to the court. As previously
stated, courts cannot be expected to take notice of every single time the counsel of a party
changes address. Besides, it must be noted that petitioner even expressly admitted having
received the subject resolution "sometime in September or October 2010."37 Easily, she could
have informed her counsel of the same. As respondent posits, it is not as if petitioner had no
knowledge of the whereabouts of her counsel considering that at the time of the filing of her
Motion for Reconsideration, said counsel was already with the PA0.38 Moreover, the Court
cannot permit petitioner's reliance on the Chavez case because there, petitioner did not receive
the resolution of the Court of Appeals through no fault or negligence on his paii.39 Here,
however, petitioner's non-receipt of the subject resolution was mainly attributable not only to
her counsel's negligence but hers, as well. Thus, the Court deems it necessary to remind
litigants, who are represented by counsel, that they should not expect that all they need to do is
sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case. They should give the necessary assistance
to their counsel for what is at stake is their interest in the case. It is, therefore, their
responsibility to check the status of their case from time to time. 40
To recall, petitioner, on December 21, 2009, filed her Motion for Reconsideration seeking a
reversal of the Sandiganbayan's November 13, 2009 Decision which affirmed the RTC's ruling
convicting her of the crime of malversation. In a Resolution dated August 31, 2010, the
Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Said resolution became final in
the absence of any pleading filed thereafter, and hence, was recorded in the Book of Entries of
Judgments on June 26, 2013. Subsequently, on July 12, 2013, petitioner, through her new
counsel, filed an Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case with Leave of Court and with Prayer to
Stay the Execution, which was denied through the Sandiganbayan's Resolution dated
December 4, 2013.41 Undeterred, petitioner filed her Petition for Reconsideration with Prayer
for Recall of Entry of Judgment in lieu of the Prayer for the Stay of Execution of Judgement on
January 9, 2014 which was likewise denied in the Sandiganbayan's February 2, 2015
Resolution.
It seems, therefore, that petitioner waited almost an entire three (3) year period from the denial
of her Motion for Reconsideration to act upon the malversation case against her through the
filing of her urgent motion to reopen. In fact, her filing of said motion may very well be
prompted only by her realization that the case has finally concluded by reason of the entry of
judgment. Stated otherwise, the Court is under the impression that had she not heard of the
recording of the August 31, 2010 Resolution in the Book of Entries of Judgments on June 26,
2013, petitioner would not even have inquired about the status of her case. As respondent puts
it, the urgent motion to reopen appears to have been filed as a substitute for the lost remedy of
an appeal via a petition for review on certioraribefore the Court.42 On this inexcusable
negligence alone, the Court finds sufficient basis to deny the instant petition.
Second of all, petitioner's claim that the Sandiganbayan's denial of her motion to reopen the
case is capricious, despotic, and whimsical since the admission of her additional evidence will
prevent a miscarriage has no legal nor factual leg to stand on. Section 24, Rule 119 and
existing jurisprudence provide for the following requirements for the reopening a case: (l) the
reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by the
judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a hearing is
conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of
additional and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty days from the issuance of
the order.43
But as the Sandiganbayan ruled, the absence of the first requisite that the reopening must be
before the finality of a judgment of conviction already cripples the motion.1âwphi1 The records
of the case clearly reveal that the August 3l, 2010 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration had already become final and executory and, in fact,
was already recorded in the Entry Book of Judgments on June 26, 2013. Moreover, petitioner's
supposed predicament about her former counsel failing to present witnesses and documents
should have been advanced before the trial court.44 It is the trial court, and neither the
Sandiganbayan nor the Court, which receives evidence and rules over exhibits formally
offered.45 Thus, it was, indeed, too late in the day to advance additional allegations for
petitioner had all the opportunity to do so in the lower court. An appellate court will generally
not disturb the trial court's assessment of factual matters except only when it clearly overlooked
certain facts or where the evidence fails to substantiate the lower court's findings or when the
disputed decision is based on a misapprehension of facts.46
Ultimately, it bears stressing that the Court does not find that the Sandiganbayan acted in a
capricious, despotic, or whimsical manner when it denied petitioner's motion to reopen
especially in view of the fact that the rulings it seeks to refute are legally sound and
appropriately based on the evidences presented by the parties. On this score, the elements of
malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are: (1) that
the offender is a public officer; (2) that he had the custody or control of funds or property by
reason of the duties of his office; (3) that those funds or property were public funds or prope1iy
for which he was accountable; and (4) that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or
consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.
This article establishes a presumption that when a public officer fails to have duly forthcoming
any public funds with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, it
shall be prima facieevidence that he has put such missing funds to personal uses. 47
As duly found by the trial court, and affinned by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner's defense that
she, together with her supervisor Cecilia Paraiso, went to the LBP and handed the subject
₱11,300.00 deposit to the teller Ngaosi and, thereafter, had no idea as to where the money
went failed to overcome the presumption of law. For one, Paraiso was never presented to
corroborate her version. For another, when questioned about the subject deposit, not only did
petitioner fail to make the same readily available, she also could not satisfactorily explain its
whereabouts. Indeed, in the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is
sufficient proof that the accountable officer had received public funds, that she did not have
them in her possession when demand therefor was made, and that she could not satisfactorily
explain her failure to do so.48 Thus, even if it is assumed that it was somebody else who
misappropriated the said amount, petitioner may still be held liable for malversation. The Comi
quotes, with approval, the trial court's ruling, viz.:
Even if the claim of Hernan, i.e., that she actually left the amount of ₱11,300.00 and the
corresponding deposit slip with the Bank Teller Ngaosi and she came back to retrieve
the deposit slip later, is to be believed and then it came out that the said ₱11,300.00 was
not credited to the account of DOTC with the Land Bank and was in fact missing, still
accused Hernan should be convicted of malversation because in this latter situation she
permits through her inexcusable negligence another person to take the money. And this
is still malversation under Article 217.49
Said ruling was, in fact, duly reiterated by the Sandiganbayan in its Decision, thus:
Shifting our gaze to the possibility that it was the bank teller Catalina Ngaosi who
misappropriated the amount and should therefore be held liable, as the accused would want to
poltray, the Court doubts the tenability of that position. As consistently ruled by jurisprudence, a
public officer may be held liable for malversation even if he does not use public property or
funds under his custody for his personal benefit, but consents to the taking thereof by another
person, or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted such taking. The accused, by her
negligence, simply created the opportunity for the misappropriation. Even her
justification that her deposits which were not machine-validated were nonetheless
acknowledged by the bank cannot fortify her defense. On the contrary, it all the more
emphasizes her propensity for negligence each time that she accepted deposit slips
which were not machinevalidated, her only proof of receipt of her deposits. 50
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan's finding that petitioner's
motion to reopen and petition for reconsideration are practically second and third motions for
reconsideration from its Decision dated November 13, 2009. Under the rules, the motions are
already prohibited pleadings under Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court due to the fact that
the grounds raised in the petition for reconsideration are merely a rehash of those raised in the
two (2) previous motions filed before it. These grounds were already thoroughly discussed by
the Sandiganbayan in its subject resolutions. Hence, as duly noted by the Sandiganbayan, in
the law of pleading, courts are called upon to pierce the form and go into the substance, not to
be misled by a false or wrong name given to a pleading because the title thereof is not
controlling and the court should be guided by its averments.51 Thus, the fact that the pleadings
filed by petitioner are entitled Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case with Leave of Court and with
Prayer to Stay Execution and Petition for Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of Entry of
Judgment in lieu of the Prayer for Stay of Execution of Judgment does not exempt them from
the application of the rules on prohibited pleadings.
Let it be remembered that the doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental
principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of
courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final on some definite date fixed
by law. The only exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-
called nunc pro tune entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and
whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which render its execution
unjust and inequitable.52 None of the exceptions is present in this case.
Indeed, every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final, executory and
unappealable. Just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period,
the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case
by the execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which is the "life of the law." To frustrate it by
dilatory schemes on the part of the losing party is to frustrate all the efforts, time and
expenditure of the courts. It is in the interest of justice that this Court should write finis to this
litigation.53
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds that it is still necessary to reopen the instant
case and recall the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan, not for
further reception of evidence, however, as petitioner prays for, but in order to modify the
penalty imposed by said court. The general rule is that a judgment that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be
made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.54 When, however,
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable, the Court may sit en bane and give due regard to such exceptional circumstance
warranting the relaxation of the doctrine of immutability. The same is in line with Section
3(c),55 Rule II of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, which provides that cases raising
novel questions of law are acted upon by the Court en bane. To the Court, the recent passage
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10951 entitled An Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property
and Damage on which a Penalty is Based and the Fines Imposed Under the Revised Penal
Code Amending for the Purpose Act No. 3815 Otherwise Known as the "Revised Penal Code"
as Amended which accordingly reduced the penalty applicable to the crime charged herein is
an example of such exceptional circumstance. Section 40 of said Act provides:
SEC. 40. Article 217 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act. No. 1060, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
ART. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. - Any public
officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property,
shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through
abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or
property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation
of such funds or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of pnswn correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved in the misappropriation or malversation docs not exceed Forty thousand pesos
(₱40,000.00).
xxxx
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total
value of the property embezzled.
Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, therefore, We have here a novel situation wherein the
judgment convicting the accused, petitioner herein, has already become final and executory
and yet the penalty imposed thereon has been reduced by virtue of the passage of said law.
Because of this, not only must petitioner's sentence be modified respecting the settled rule on
the retroactive effectivity of laws, the sentencing being favorable to the accused,56 she may
even apply for probation,57 as long as she does not possess any ground for
disqualification,58 in view of recent legislation on probation, or R.A. No. 10707 entitled An Act
Amending Presidential Decree No. 968, otherwise known as the "Probation Law of 1976," As
Amended. allowing an accused to apply for probation in the event that she is sentenced to
serve a maximum term of imprisonment of not more than six (6) years when a judgment of
conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty is appealed or reviewed, and such judgment
is modified through the imposition of a probationable penalty. 59
Thus, in order to effectively avoid any injustice that petitioner may suffer as well as a possible
multiplicity of suits arising therefrom, the Court deems it proper to reopen the instant case and
recall the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan, which imposed the
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to eleven (11) years, six
(6) months, and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum. Instead, since the
amount involved herein is ₱11,300.00, which does not exceed ₱40,000.00, the new penalty
that should be imposed is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, which has
a prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day, to six (6) years. The Court,
however, takes note of the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
appreciated by the Sandiganbayan in favor of petitioner.60 Hence, taking into consideration the
absence of any aggravating circumstance and the presence of one (1) mitigating circumstance,
the range of the penalty that must be imposed as the maximum term should be prision
correccional medium to prision correccional maximum in its minimum period, or from two (2)
years, four (4) months, and one (1) day, to three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty (20)
days, in accordance with Article 6461 of the RPC. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the range of the minimum term that should be imposed upon petitioners is anywhere within the
period of arresto mayor, maximum to prision correccional minimum with a range of four (4)
months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. Accordingly, petitioner is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum,
to three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty (20) days prision correccional, as maximum.
On a final note, judges, public prosecutors, public attorneys, private counsels, and such other
officers of the law are hereby advised to similarly apply the provisions of RA No. 10951
whenever it is, by reason of justice and equity, called for by the facts of each case. Hence, said
recent legislation shall find application in cases where the imposable penalties of the affected
crimes such as theft, qualified theft, estafa, robbery with force upon things, malicious mischief,
malversation, and such other crimes, the penalty of which is dependent upon the value of the
object in consideration thereof, have been reduced, as in the case at hand, taking into
consideration the presence of existing circumstances attending its commission. For as long as
it is favorable to the accused, said recent legislation shall find application regardless of whether
its effectivity comes after the time when the judgment of conviction is rendered and even if
service of sentence has already begun. The accused, in these applicable instances, shall be
entitled to the benefits of the new law warranting him to serve a lesser sentence, or to his
release, if he has already begun serving his previous sentence, and said service already
accomplishes the term of the modified sentence. In the latter case, moreover, the Court, in the
interest of justice and expediency, further directs the appropriate filing of an action before the
Court that seeks the reopening of the case rather than an original petition filed for a similar
purpose.
Indeed, when exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage of the instant amendatory
law imposing penalties more lenient and favorable to the accused, the Court shall not hesitate
to direct the reopening of a final and immutable judgment, the objective of which is to correct
not so much the findings of guilt but the applicable penalties to be imposed.
Henceforth: (1) the Directors of the National Penitentiary and Correctional Institution for
Women are hereby ordered to determine if there are accused serving final sentences similarly
situated as the accused in this particular case and if there are, to coordinate and communicate
with the Public Attorney's Office and the latter, to represent and file the necessary pleading
before this Court in behalf of these convicted accused in light of this Court's pronouncement;
(2) For those cases where the accused are undergoing preventive imprisonment, either the
cases against them are non-bailable or cannot put up the bail in view of the penalties
imposable under the old law, their respective counsels are hereby ordered to file the necessary
pleading before the proper courts, whether undergoing trial in the RTC or undergoing appeal in
the appellate courts and apply for bail, for their provisional liberty; (3) For those cases where
the accused are undergoing preventive imprisonment pending trial or appeal, their respective
counsels are hereby ordered to file the necessary pleading if the accused have already served
the minimum sentence of the crime charged against them based on the penalties imposable
under the new law, R.A. No. 10951, for their immediate release in accordance with A.M. No.
12-11-2-SC or the Guidelines For Decongesting Holding Jails By Enforcing The Rights Of
Accused Persons To Bail And To Speedy Trial; 62 and (4) Lastly, all courts, including appellate
courts, are hereby ordered to give priority to those cases covered by R.A. No. 10951 to avoid
any prolonged imprisonment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Resolution dated
February 2, 2015 and Decision dated November 13, 2009 of the Sandiganbayan 2nd Division
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.Petitioner is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum term, to three (3) years,
six (6) months, and twenty (20) days prision correccional, as maximum term.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for
dissemination to the First and Second Level courts, and also to the Presiding Justices of the
appellate courts, the Department of Justice, Office of the Solicitor General, Public Attorney's
Office, Prosecutor General's Office, the Directors of the National Penitentiary and Correctional
Institution for Women, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information, guidance,
and appropriate action.
Likewise, let the Office of the President, the Senate of the Philippines, and the House of
Representatives, be furnished copies of this Decision for their information.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals[1] modifying that of
the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City[2] declaring respondent Alicia F.
Llorente (herinafter referred to as Alicia), as co-owners of whatever property she and the
deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as Lorenzo) may have acquired during the
twenty-five (25) years that they lived together as husband and wife.
The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy
from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957.[3]
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as
Paula) were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur.[4]
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula
stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.[5]
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate
of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court,
Southern District of New York.[6]
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted
an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines. [7] He
discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was living in and having an adulterous
relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.[8]
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of
Nabua as Crisologo Llorente, with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the
line for the fathers name was left blank.[9]
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple
drew a written agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United
States Navy as part of Lorenzos salary and all other obligations for Paulas daily maintenance
and support would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with
judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal
property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her
adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo
peacefully. The agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paulas
father and stepmother. The agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.[10]
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for
divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San
Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the
proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County
of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of
divorce.[11]
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.[12]
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.[13] Apparently, Alicia had
no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not
oppose the marriage or cohabitation.[14]
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife. [15] Their twenty-
five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente. [16]
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized
by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses
Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his
property to Alicia and their three children, to wit:
(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential house and
lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL the personal
properties and other movables or belongings that may be found or existing therein;
(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F.
Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real properties
whatsoever and wheresoever located, specifically my real properties located at Barangay Aro-
Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras,
Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines
Sur;
(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my
children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real
properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal, Philippines;
(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or personal
properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other persons, but could
only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and among themselves;
(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last Will and
Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my children in the order of
age, if of age;
(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served (sic)
without bond;
(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions heretofore
executed, signed, or published, by me;
(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the Llorentes
Side should ever bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and
my children with respect to any real or personal properties I gave and bequeathed respectively
to each one of them by virtue of this Last Will and Testament.[17]
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur,
a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved
that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate.[18]
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator
Lorenzo was still alive.[19]
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will
to probate.[20]
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died. [21]
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition [22]
for letters of
administration over Lorenzos estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzos
surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired during their marriage, (3) that
Lorenzos will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her
legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property.[23]
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a
petition for the issuance of letters testamentary. [24]
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due
course to Paulas petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.[25]
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper Bicol Star. [26]
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:
Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the late
Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he
contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so
the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she
is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will especially said so her
relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so
declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void
and declares her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal
properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the
estate and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all
surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also entitled to the remaining
free portion in equal shares.
Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased,
Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor
upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a return
to the court within three (3) months a true and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights,
and credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to the possession of
any other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies and
charges on the same, or such dividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court;
to render a true and just account of her administration to the court within one (1) year, and at
any other time when required by the court and to perform all orders of this court by her to be
performed.
On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be
granted.
SO ORDERED.[27]
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted
decision.[28]
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicias motion for reconsideration but
modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children legitimate or
otherwise of Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him. [29] Amending its decision of
May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo,
entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate.[30]
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. [31]
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with modification
the decision of the trial court in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased may have
acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.
SO ORDERED.[32]
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration
of the decision.[33]
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,[34] denied the motion for lack of merit.
 Hence, this petition.[35]
The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments raised, [36] the
issue is simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to the trial
court for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at
the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4)
death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity
of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it
is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the
country wherein said property may be found. (emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.[37]
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the
foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where
the case was referred back to the law of the decedents domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven,
in the same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that American law
follows the domiciliary theory hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of
Lorenzos will.[38]
First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated in Article 16
of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law governing
the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the union has its own
law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It can therefore refer to no other
than the law of the State of which the decedent was a resident. [39] Second, there is no showing
that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in
favor of Alice, who in the trial courts opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will
out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of
whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already
probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is
fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[40] we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the
same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid
according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,[41] that once proven
that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner,
the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to
inherit from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,[42] we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects
may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be
reversed.[43] We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula
was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce
(as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of
the trial court.
Validity of the Will
 The Civil Code provides:
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the
Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws
shall be observed in their execution. (underscoring ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her
is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was
a foreigner, not covered by our laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal
capacity.[44]
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best
proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in
accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the
will was duly probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs
may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to
the decedent's national law.[45]
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R.
SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and
RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N.
Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego, made
final on December 4, 1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the
intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorentes will and determination of the parties successional rights
allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate
dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
January 13, 2016
G.R. No. 207406
NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a judicial declaration of
nullity of their first marriage. If they proceed with the second marriage without the judicial
declaration, they are guilty of bigamy regardless of evidence of the nullity of the first marriage.
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Court of Appeals
Decision2 dated July 18, 2012 and Resolution3 dated June 3, 2013. The Court of Appeals
affirmed with modification the Decision4 of Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
convicting petitioner Norberto Abella Vitangcol (Norberto) of bigamy punished under Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code.5 Norberto was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two
(2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as maximum.6
In the Information dated April 29, 2008, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila charged
Norberto with bigamy.7The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about December 4, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being
then legally married to GINA M. GAERLAN, and without such marriage having been legally
dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or
subsequent marriage with ALICE G. EDUARDO-VITANGCOL which second marriage has all
the legal requisites for its validity with the said accused NORBERTO ABELLA VITANGCOL
knowing fully well prior to and at the time of the celebration of the second marriage he was
already married to the said GINA M. GAERLAN.
Contrary to law.8
Norberto was arraigned, pleading not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued. 9
According to the prosecution, on December 4, 1994, Norberto married Alice G. Eduardo (Alice)
at the Manila Cathedral in Intramuros. Born into their union were three (3) children. 10
After some time, Alice "began hearing rumors that [her husband] was previously married to
another woman[.]"11 She eventually discovered that Norberto was previously married to a
certain Gina M. Gaerlan (Gina) on July 17, 1987, as evidenced by a marriage contract
registered with the National Statistics Office. Alice subsequently filed a criminal Complaint for
bigamy against Norberto.12
On the other hand, Norberto alleged that he and Alice became romantically involved sometime
in 1987.13 "After much prodding by their friends and relatives, [he and Alice] decided to get
married in 1994."14
Before finalizing their marriage plans, however, Norberto revealed to Alice that he had a "fake
marriage"15 with his college girlfriend, a certain Gina Gaerlan.16 Nevertheless, despite
Norberto’s revelation, Alice convinced him that they proceed with the wedding. Thus, Norberto
and Alice were married on December 4, 1994 and, thereafter, had three children. 17
Sometime in 2007, Norberto heard rumors from their household workers that Alice was having
an affair with a married man. He was able to confirm the affair after hearing Alice in a phone
conversation with her paramour.18
Norberto then sought advice from his business lawyer who later on convinced Alice to end the
affair. The lawyer also warned Alice of the possible criminal liability she may incur if she
continued seeing her paramour.19
Allegedly in retaliation to the threat of criminal action against her, Alice filed the criminal
Complaint for bigamy against Norberto.20
Finding that Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice despite his subsisting valid
marriage with Gina, Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila convicted Norberto of
bigamy. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated September 1, 2010 reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby finds accused Norberto Abella
Vitangcol GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY defined and penalized
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum imprisonment to twelve
(12) years of prision mayor as maximum imprisonment.
SO ORDERED.21
On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the guilty verdict against Norberto but modified the
penalty imposed in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The dispositive portion
of the Court of Appeals Decision dated July 18, 2012 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila, Branch 25, dated September 1, 2010 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION of
the penalty to which appellant is previously sentenced. Accordingly, he is now meted to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.22
Norberto filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 23 which the Court of Appeals denied in the
Resolution dated June 3, 2013.24
Norberto filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this court. The People of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Comment25 to which Norberto
filed a Reply.26
Norberto argues that the first element of bigamy is absent in this case.27 He presents as
evidence a Certification28from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states that
the Office has no record of the marriage license allegedly issued in his favor and his first wife,
Gina. He argues that with no proof of existence of an essential requisite of marriage—the
marriage license—the prosecution fails to establish the legality of his first marriage.29
In addition, Norberto claims that the legal dissolution of the first marriage is not an element of
the crime of bigamy. According to Norberto, nothing in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
that punishes bigamy mentions that requirement.30 Stating that "[a]ny reasonable doubt must
be resolved in favor of the accused[,]"31 Norberto prays for his acquittal.32
The prosecution counters that it has proven the existence of Norberto’s prior valid marriage
with Gina as evidenced by the marriage contract they had executed. The prosecution likewise
proved that the first marriage of Norberto with Gina was not legally dissolved; that while his first
marriage was subsisting, Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice; and that the
second marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first. Norberto,
therefore, should be convicted of bigamy.33
The issue for our resolution is whether the Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar
that it has no record of the marriage license issued to petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol and his
first wife Gina proves the nullity of petitioner’s first marriage and exculpates him from the
bigamy charge.
The Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the marriage
license is suspect. Assuming that it is true, it does not categorically prove that there was no
marriage license. Furthermore, marriages are not dissolved through mere certifications by the
civil registrar. For more than seven (7) years before his second marriage, petitioner did nothing
to have his alleged spurious first marriage declared a nullity. Even when this case was
pending, he did not present any decision from any trial court nullifying his first marriage.
I
Bigamy is punished under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code:
ARTICLE 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
For an accused to be convicted of this crime, the prosecution must prove all of the following
elements:
[first,] that the offender has been legally married;
[second,] that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
[third,] that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
[lastly,] that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 34
The prosecution allegedly fails to prove the validity of his first marriage with Gina because the
civil registrar of the municipality where they were married had no record of the marriage license
allegedly issued in their favor.
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. Petitioner
was still legally married to Gina when he married Alice. Thus, the trial court correctly convicted
him of the crime charged.
Based on the marriage contract presented in evidence, petitioner’s first marriage was
solemnized on July 17, 1987. This was before the Family Code of the Philippines became
effective on August 3,1988.35 Consequently, provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines36 govern the validity of his first marriage.
Article 53 of the Civil Code enumerates the requisites of marriage, the absence of any of which
renders the marriage void from the beginning:37
Article 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
The fourth requisite—the marriage license—is issued by the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.38 The marriage license
represents the state’s "involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of
which the general public is interested."39
To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, "the law requires that the
absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very
least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license
was issued to the parties."40
Petitioner presents a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which
states:
[A]fter a diligent search on the files of Registry Book on Application for Marriage License and
License Issuance available in this office, no record could be found on the alleged issuance of
this office of Marriage License No. 8683519 in favor of MR. NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL and
MS. GINA M. GAERLAN dated July 17, 1987.41
This Certification does not prove that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a
marriage license. It does not categorically state that Marriage License No. 8683519 does not
exist.42
Moreover, petitioner admitted the authenticity of his signature appearing on the marriage
contract between him and his first wife, Gina.43 The marriage contract between petitioner and
Gina is a positive piece of evidence as to the existence of petitioner’s first marriage. 44This
"should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to [the] absence of any
record of the marriage[.]"45
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Castro46 was originally an action for the declaration of nullity
of a marriage.47 As part of its evidence, the plaintiff presented a certification that states that the
marriage license "cannot be located as said license . . . does not appear from [the local civil
registrar’s] records."48
This court held that "[t]he certification . . . enjoys probative value, [the local civil registrar] being
the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license."49
This court further said that "[u]naccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to
Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of ‘due search and inability to find’
sufficiently proved that [the local civil registrar] did not issue [a] marriage license . . . to the
contracting parties."50
The circumstances in Castro and in this case are different. Castro involved a civil case for
declaration of nullity of marriage that does not involve the possible loss of liberty. The
certification in Castro was unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion, there being no
prosecution for bigamy involved. On the other hand, the present case involves a criminal
prosecution for bigamy. To our mind, this is a circumstance of suspicion, the Certification
having been issued to Norberto for him to evade conviction for bigamy.
The appreciation of the probative value of the certification cannot be divorced from the purpose
of its presentation, the cause of action in the case, and the context of the presentation of the
certification in relation to the other evidence presented in the case. We are not prepared to
establish a doctrine that a certification that a marriage license cannot be found may substitute
for a definite statement that no such license existed or was issued. Definitely, the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite should be fully aware of the repercussions of those words. That
the license now cannot be found is not basis per se to say that it could not have been issued.
A different view would undermine the stability of our legal order insofar as marriages are
concerned. Marriage licenses may be conveniently lost due to negligence or consideration.
The motivation to do this becomes greatest when the benefit is to evade prosecution.
This case is likewise different from Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño.51 In Cariño, the marriage
contract between Santiago Cariño and his first wife, Susan Nicdao, bore no marriage license
number.52 In addition, the local civil registrar certified that it has no record of any marriage
license issued to Santiago Cariño and Susan Nicdao.53 This court declared Santiago Cariño’s
first marriage void for having been solemnized without a marriage license.54
In this case, there is a marriage contract indicating the presence of a marriage license number
freely and voluntarily signed and attested to by the parties to the marriage as well as by their
solemnizing officer. The first marriage was celebrated on July 17, 1987. The second marriage
was entered into on December 4, 1994. Within a span of seven (7) years, four (4) months, and
17 (seventeen) days, petitioner did not procure a judicial declaration of the nullity of his first
marriage. Even while the bigamy case was pending, no decision declaring the first marriage as
spurious was presented. In other words, petitioner’s belief that there was no marriage license is
rendered untrue by his own actuations.
This factual context makes the use and issuance of the Certification from the Office of the Civil
Registrar suspect. The prosecution has to prove that despite the existence of a valid first
marriage, petitioner nevertheless contracted a second or subsequent marriage. The admission
of a marriage contract with proof of its authenticity and due execution suffices to discharge the
burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that a prior marriage exists. The burden of
evidence will, thus, pass on to the defense. Mere presentation of a certification from the civil
registrar that the marriage license cannot be found is not enough to discharge the burden of
proving that no such marriage license was issued.
The parties clearly identified Marriage License No. 8683519 in the marriage contract. 55 There is
no evidence to show that the number series of that license is spurious or is not likely to have
been issued from its source. There is no proof as to whether the licenses issued before or after
the document in question still exists in the custody of the civil registrar. There is no evidence
that relates to the procedures for safekeeping of these vital documents. This would have
shown whether there was unfettered access to the originals of the license and, therefore,
would have contributed to the proper judicial conclusion of what the manifestation by the civil
registrar implies.
This court cannot grant the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of
official functions to the civil registrar for the purposes sought by petitioner. In other words, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions is too remotely detached to the
conclusion that there is no marriage license.
At best, the presumption of regularity in the performance of the civil registrar’s function without
the context just discussed can lead to the conclusion that he in good faith could not find the
marriage license in his office. This presumption does not mean that the marriage license did
not exist. Nor does it mean that the marriage license was issued.
However, even the conclusion of good faith is difficult to accept. There was a marriage contract
duly executed by petitioner and his first spouse as well as by the solemnizing officer. The
marriage contract is in the custody of the civil registrar. The presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions by a public officer should likewise be applicable to infer a
conclusion that the marriage license mentioned in that contract exists.
Conviction in a charge of bigamy will result to a legitimate imposition of a penalty amounting to
a deprivation of liberty. It is not a far-fetched conclusion—although this is not always the
case—that a well-connected accused will use all means, fair or foul, to achieve an acquittal.
Many criminal cases can turn on documentary evidence the issuance of which is within the
discretion of a government employee. The temptations for the employee to issue a document,
which may be accurate but which he knows the accused will be able to use for a different
purpose, can easily be created by an accused. Much of the bases of this conclusion will
depend on how the trial court judge evaluates the demeanor of the witnesses. We can defer to
that discretion as much as to make our own judgment based on evidence conclusively
admitted and weighed by the trial court. Using both, we have no reason to disturb the
conclusions of the trial court.
II
Assuming without conceding that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage
license, petitioner remains liable for bigamy. Petitioner’s first marriage was not judicially
declared void. Nor was his first wife Gina judicially declared presumptively dead under the Civil
Code.56 The second element of the crime of bigamy is, therefore, present in this case.
As early as 1968, this court held in Landicho v. Relova, et al.57 that
parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent
courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage
is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.58
The commission that drafted the Family Code considered the Landicho ruling in wording Article
40 of the Family Code:59
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.1avvphi1
Should the requirement of judicial declaration of nullity be removed as an element of the crime
of bigamy, Article 349 of Revised Penal Code becomes useless. "[A]ll that an adventurous
bigamist has to do is to . . . contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by
simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void
for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first."60 Further, "[a] party may even enter
into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite—usually the marriage license—and
thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of
the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void."61
For these reasons, the Landicho ruling remains good law. It need not be revisited by this court
En Banc as petitioner insists.62
The third element of bigamy is likewise present in this case. Petitioner admitted that he
subsequently married Alice G. Eduardo on December 4, 1994.63 As for the last element of
bigamy, that the subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity, it is
presumed. The crime of bigamy was consummated when petitioner subsequently married Alice
without his first marriage to Gina having been judicially declared void. 64
With all the elements of bigamy present in this case, petitioner was correctly convicted of the
crime charged.1âwphi1
III
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty that may be imposed
on petitioner is that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the Revised Penal Code. On the other hand, the minimum term of the penalty shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the
offense. The court then has the discretion to impose a minimum penalty within the range of the
penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty. As for the maximum penalty, the attending
circumstances are considered.65
The imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor.66 The penalty next lower to that is prision
correccional. Prision correccional ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years;67 hence, the minimum penalty can be any period within this range.
As for the maximum penalty, it should be within the range of prision mayor in its medium
period, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Prision mayor in its medium
period ranges from eight (8) years and one (1) day to 10 years.
Petitioner was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4)
months of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum. The ranges of the minimum and maximum penalties are within the ranges
as previously computed. The indeterminate penalty imposed was proper.
Nevertheless, "[k]eeping in mind the basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law ‘to uplift
and redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of
personal liberty and economic usefulness[,]’"68 we lower the minimum of the indeterminate
penalty to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional. Petitioner is, thus, sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated July 18, 2012 and Resolution dated June 3, 2013 in CA-G.R. CR No. 33936
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol is sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum
to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
January 8, 2018
G.R. No. 210766
MARIA CONCEPCION N. SINGSON a.k.a. CONCEPCION N. SINGSON, Petitioner
vs.
BENJAMIN L. SINGSON, Respondent
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the August 29, 2013 Decision2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) and its January 6, 2014 Resolution3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 96662, which
reversed and set aside the November 12, 2010 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Parañaque City, Branch 260, in Civil Case No. 07-0070.
Factual Antecedents
On February 27, 2007, Maria Concepcion N. Singson a.k.a. Concepcion N. Singson (petitioner)
filed a Petition5 for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code of
the Philippines6 (Family Code). This was docketed as Civil Case No. 07-0070.
It was alleged therein that on July 6, 1974, petitioner and Benjamin L. Singson (respondent)
were married before the Rev. Fr. Alfonso L. Casteig at St. Francis Church, Mandaluyong,
Rizal; that said marriage produced four children, all of whom are now of legal age; that when
they started living together, petitioner noticed that respondent was "dishonest, unreasonably
extravagant at the expense of the family's welfare, extremely vain physically and
spiritually,"7 and a compulsive gambler; that respondent was immature, and was w1ab1e to
perform his paternal duties; that respondent was also irresponsible, an easy-going man, and
guilty of infidelity; that respondent's abnormal behavior made him completely unable to render
any help, support, or assistance to her; and that because she could expect no help or
assistance at all from respondent she was compelled to work doubly hard to support her family
as the sole breadwinner.
Petitioner also averred that at the time she filed this Petition, respondent was confined at Metro
Psych Facility,8 a rehabilitation institution in Pasig City; and that respondent's attending
psychiatrist, Dr. Benita Sta. Ana-Ponio (Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio), made the following diagnosis on
respondent:
Based on history, mental status examination and observation, he is diagnosed to be suffering
from Pathological Gambling as manifested by:
a. preoccupation with gambling, thinking of ways to get money with which to gamble as
seen in his stealing and pawning jewelries and appliances[;]
b. needs to gamble with increasing amounts of money in order to achieve the desired
effect[;]
c. lies to family members or others to conceal the extent of [his] involvement with
gambling[;]
d. committed illegal acts such as forging the signature of his wife, issuing bouncing
checks in order to finance his gambling[;]
e. has jeopardized his relationship with his wife, lost the respect of his children, lost a
good career in banking because of gambling[;]
f. [relies] on his parents, his wife, and siblings to provide money to relieve a desperate
fmancial situation caused by gambling[;]
While he apparently had Typhoid fever that resulted [in] behavioral changes as a young boy, it
would be difficult to say that the psychotic episodes he manifested in 2003 and 2006 [are]
etiologically related to the general medical condition that occurred in his childhood.
Furthermore, [respondent] manifests an enduring pattern of behavior that deviates markedly
from the expectations of our culture as manifested in the following areas:
a. his ways of perceiving and interpreting [his own] self, other people, and events[;]
b. his emotional response[;]
c. his poor impulse control[;]
Such pattern is inflexible and pervasive and has led to significant impairment in social,
occupational and interpersonal relationship. In [respondent's] case, this has persisted for
several years, and can be traced back [to] his adolescence since he started gambling while in
high school. He is therefore diagnosed to be suffering from Personality Disorder.
All these[,] put together, [hinder respondent] from performing his marital obligations. 9
Petitioner moreover asserted that respondent came from a "distraught" family and had a
"dysfunctional" childhood;10that respondent had all the love, care, and protection of his parents
as the youngest child for some time; but that these parental love, care and protection were,
however, transferred to his youngest brother who was born when respondent was almost five
years old; and that these factors caused respondent emotional devastation from which he
never recovered.
Petitioner added that unknown to her, respondent even as a high school student, was already
betting on jai alai. She also claimed that she tried to adjust to respondent's personality
disorders, but that she did not attain her goal.
Finally, petitioner claimed that she and respondent did not enter into any ante-nuptial
agreement to govern their prope1ty relations as husband and wife and that they had no
conjugal assets or debts.
On June 19, 2007, respondent filed his Answer.11
Traversing petitioner's allegations, respondent claimed that "psychological incapacity" must be
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability, which are not present in the
instant case because petitioner's allegations are not supported by facts.
Respondent further averred that it was not true that he failed to render any help, support or
assistance to petitioner and their family; that the family home where petitioner and their
children are living was in fact his own capital property; that his shortcomings as mentioned by
petitioner do not pertain to the most grave or serious cases of personality disorders that would
satisfy the standards required to obtain a decree of nullity of marriage; that petitioner's
complaint is nothing more than a complaint of a woman with an unsatisfactory marriage who
wants to get out of it; that contrary to petitioner's claim that he is a good-for-nothing fellow, he
has a college degree in business administration, and is a bank employee, and, that it was
money problem, and not his alleged personality disorder, that is the wall that divided him and
petitioner.
Respondent also claimed that petitioner failed to lay the basis for the conclusions of the
psychiatrist to the effect that he is suffering from pathological gambling and personality
disorder; that petitioner's allegation that he came from a distraught family and that he suffered
emotional devastation is vague, and bereft of particular details, and even slanderous; and that
assuming that he had not acted the way petitioner expected him to conduct himself, his actions
and behavior are not psychological illnesses or personality disorders, but simply physical
illnesses of the body, akin to hypertension and allied sicknesses, and that these physical
illnesses are not at all incurable psychiatric disorders that were present at the time of his
marriage with petitioner.
Respondent furthermore claimed that he and petitioner had conjugal assets and debts; that the
land where their family home is built came from his earnings, hence the family home is their
conjugal property; that he and petitioner also have a house and lot in Tagaytay City, as well as
bank accounts that are in petitioner's name only; and he and petitioner also have investments
in shares of stocks, cars, household appliances, furniture, and jewelry; and that these are
conjugal assets because they came from petitioner's salaries and his (respondent's) own
inheritance money.
Respondent moreover alleged that before the filing of the present Petition, petitioner had
caused him to be admitted into the Metro Psych Facility for treatment; that on account of his
confinement and treatment in this psychiatric facility, he has incurred medical expenses and
professional medical fees; and that since it is petitioner who manages all their finances and
conjugal assets it stands to reason that he should be awarded '"spousal support."
On July 25, 2007, the RTC issued its Pre-Trial Order.12
Trial thereafter ensued. Petitioner's witnesses included herself, her son, Jose Angelo Singson
(Jose), and Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio.
On February 23, 2010, petitioner filed her Formal Offer of Evidence which included a
photocopy of the marriage contract; the birth certificates of their four children; her son Jose’s
Judicial Affidavit dated April 2, 2008; a photocopy of Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's Judicial Affidavit
dated June 25, 2008; Clinical Summary of respondent issued by Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio dated
February 11, 2007 (Clinical Summary); her (petitioner's) own Judicial Affidavit dated April 2,
2008; a photocopy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 179751 registered in the names of
the parties' four children:, and a notarized document entitled "Summary of Sources and Uses
of Funds for tJ1e period November 1999 to March 31, 2008" executed by petitioner and
described as a detailed summary of expenses paid for with the proceeds of respondent's share
in the sale of the latter's house in Magallanes Village.13
Respondent filed his Comment thereon.14
On March 29, 2010, the RTC admitted petitioner’s exhibits.15
On May 13, 2010, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss 16 "on the ground that the totality of
evidence presented by petitioner did not establish [his] psychological incapacity x x x to comply
with the essential martial obligations x x x".17 Petitioner filed her Opposition18 thereto, and
respondent tendered his Comment thereon.19
On May 17, 2010, the RTC denied respondent’s Motion to Dismiss and stood pat on its March
29, 2010 Order.20
During the September 30, 2010 hearing, respondent’s counsel manifested that his client was
waiving the right to present countervailing evidence. Respondent’s counsel also moved that the
Petition at bar be submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence already on the record.
The RTC thus declared the case submitted for decision.21
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision of November 12, 2010, the RTC granted the Petition and declared the marriage
between petitioner and respondent void ab initio on the ground of the latter’s psychological
incapacity. The RTC disposed thus-
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is GRANTED. Judgment is
hereby rendered[:]
1. DECLARING null and void ab initio the marriage between MARIA
CONCEPCION v. SINGSON a.k.a. CONCEPCION N. SINGSON and BENJAMIN L
SINGSON solemnized on JULY 6, 1974 in Mandaluyong City or any other marriage between
them on the ground of psychological' incapacity of the respondent.
2. ORDERING the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City and the National Statistics Office
to cancel the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent as appearing in the Registry
of Marriage.
There are no other issues in this case.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrars ofMandaluyong City and
Parañaque City, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Office of the Civil Register General
(National Statistics Office) and the Office of the City Prosecutor, Parañaque City.
SO ORDERED.22
The RTC ruled that the requisites warranting a finding of psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the family Code are present in the instant case because the totality of evidence showed
that respondent is suffering from a psychological condition that is grave, incurable, and has
juridical antecedence.
The RTC also found that the combined testimonies of petitioner and Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio
convincingly showed that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital obligations; that respondent's inability to perform his marital obligations as set out in
Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code, was essentially due to a psychological abnormality arising
from a pathological and utterly irresistible urge to gamble.
The RTC cited "[Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's] findings [which] reveal that respondent is suffering
from Personality Disorder known as Pathological Gambling."23 It ruled that it has been
shown that this personality disorder was present at the time of celebration of marriage but
became manifest only later; that because of this personality disorder respondent had already
jeopardized his relationship with his family; and that respondent's psychological disorder
hinders the performance of his obligations as a husband and as a father.
Lastly, the RTC found that the only property owned in common by spouses was donated in
favor of the parties' children as evidenced by TCT No.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of this verdict.
But in its older dated January 6, 2011,24 the RTC denied respondent's motion for
reconsideration. It reiterated that the expert witness had adequately established that
respondent is suffering from "Pathological Gambling Personality Disorder'' which is grave,
permanent, and has juridical antecedence. On February 4, 2011, respondent filed a Notice of
Appeal25 which was given due course by the RTC in its order26 dated February 28, 2011.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision of August 29, 2013, the CA overturned the RTC, and disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 12 November 2010 issued by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 260, Parañaque City in Civil Case No. 07-0070, declaring the
marriage between Maria Concepcion N. Singson and Benjamin L. Singson null and void ab
initio, is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Instead, the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.27
The CA held that the totality of evidence presented by petitioner failed to establish
respondent's alleged psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations,
which in this case, was not at all proven to be grave or serious, much less incurable, and
furthermore was not existing at the time of the marriage. What is more, the CA declared that
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage, and
against its dissolution and nullity, in obedience to the mandate of the Constitution and statutory
laws; and that in this case, petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proving that respondent
is suffering from a serious or grave psychological disorder that completely disables or
incapacitates him from understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital
union.
According to the CA, psychological incapacity is the downright or utter incapacity or inability to
take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations. The CA did not go along with
the RTC, which placed heavy reliance on Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's finding that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations due to a personality
disorder known as pathological gambling. The CA held that, contrary to petitioner's claim that
respondent's pathological gambling was grave or serious, the evidence in fact showed that the
latter was truly capable of carrying out the ordinary duties of a married man because he had a
job, had provided money for the family from the sale of his own property, and he likewise
provided the land on which the family home was built, and he also lives in the family home with
petitioner and their children.
On top of these, the CA ruled that it is settled that mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations, or ill will on the part of a spouse, is different from incapacity
rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness; that the evidence at bar showed
that respondent's alleged pathological gambling arose after the marriage; that in fact petitioner
admitted that she was not aware of any gambling by respondent before they got married; that
petitioner moreover acknowledged that respondent was a kind and a caring person when he
was courting her; that petitioner likewise admitted that respondent also brought petitioner to the
hospital during all four instances when she gave birth to their four children.
In other words, the CA found that respondent's purported pathological gambling was not
proven to be incurable or permanent since respondent has been undergoing treatment since
2003 and has been responding to the treatment.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration28 of the CA's Decision. But her motion was denied by the
CA in its Resolution of January 6, 2014.29
Issue
Hence, the instant recourse with petitioner raising the following question –
[WHETHER] THE [CA] ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE [RTC].30
Petitioner's Arguments
In praying for the reversal of the assailed CA Decision and Resolution, and in asking for the
reinstatement of the RTC Decision, petitioner argues in her Petition,31 Reply,32 and
Memorandum33 that respondent's psychological incapacity had been duly proved in court,
including its juridical antecedence, incurability, and gravity.
First, petitioner maintains that respondent failed to perform the marital duties of mutual love,
respect, and support; that Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's expert findings are corroborated by the
testimonies of petitioner end her son Jose both of whom demonstrated that respondent’s
psychological incapacity is grave or serious rendering him incapable to perform the essential
marital obligations; that for his pan, respondent had adduced no proof that he (respondent) is
capable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage for the reason that everything
that the family had saved and built had been squandered by respondent; and that respondent's
confinement at the rehabilitation facility is itself proof of the gravity or seriousness of his
psychological incapacity.
Second, petitioner contends that respondent’s psychological incapacity preceded the marriage,
as shown in Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio’s Clinical Summary, which pointed out that such psychological
incapacity, which included pathological gambling, can be traced back when respondents was
already betting on jai alai even in high school, and this was not known to his family; that the
Clinical Summary was based on information provided not only by petitioner, but by
respondent’s sister, and by respondent himself; that such juridical antecedence was neither
questioned nor overthrown by countervailing evidence; and that the root cause could be traced
back to respondent’s flawed relationship with his parents which developed into a psychological
disorder that existed before the marriage.
Third, petitioner insists that this Court can take judicial notice of the fact that personality
disorders are generally incurable and permanent, and must continuously be treated medically;
that in this case the Clinical Summary; had pointed out that respondent's understanding of his
gambling problem is only at the surface level; and that in point of fact Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio had
affirmed that personality disorders are incurable.
Respondent’s Arguments
In his Comment34 and Memorandum,35 respondent counters that the assailed CA Decision
should be affirmed. He argues that the grounds cited by petitioner are the self-same grounds
raised by petitioner before the RTC and the CA; that petitioner's evidence indeed failed to
prove convincingly that he (respondent) is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations, hence there is no basis to declare the parties' marriage void ab
initio.
Our Ruling
The Petition will not succeed.
It is axiomatic that the validity of marriage and the unity of the family are enshrined in our
Constitution and statutory laws, hence any doubts attending the same are to be resolved in
favor of the continuance and validity of the marriage and that the burden of proving the nullity
of the same rests at all times upon the petitioner.36 "The policy of the Constitution is to protect
and strengthen the family as the basic social institution, and marriage as the foundation of the
family. Because of this, the Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties."37
Article 1 of the Family Code describes marriage as "a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life" and as "the foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution."
In the instant case, petitioner impugns the inviolability of this social institution by suing out
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As
amended by Executive Order 227)
Petitioner's case will thus be examined in light of the well-entrenched case law rulings
interpreting and construing the quoted Article, to wit:
'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, should refer to no less than a mental - not merely physical - incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the
Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment
of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. In Santos v. CA (Santos), the Court first declared
that psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating
the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage); and (c)
incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved). The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic of the Phils. v. CA, x
x x [also known as the Molina guidelines]. These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements
that the Court established in Santos.38
In setting aside the RTC's ruling, the CA in this case held that petitioner failed to prove that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
because she failed to establish that such incapacity was grave and serious, and that it existed
at the time of the marriage, and that it is incurable. We agree.
At the outset, this Court is constrained to peruse the records because of the conflicting findings
between the trial court and the appellate court.39 We thus did peruse and review the records,
and we are satisfied that the CA correctly found that respondent has the capability and ability
to perform his duties as a husband and father as against the RTC' s rather general statement
that respondent's psychological or personality disorder hinders the performance of his basic
obligations as a husband and a father.
We agree with the CA that the evidence on record does not establish that respondent's
psychological incapacity was grave and serious as defined by jurisprudential parameters since
"[respondent] had a job; provided money for the family from the sale of his property; provided
the land where the family home was built on; and lived in the family home with petitioner- A: It is located in United Paranaque.
appellee and their children."40
Q: Where in United Paranaque?
Upon the other hand, petitioner herself testified that respondent had a job as the latter "was
working at a certain point."41 This is consistent with the information in Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's A: No. 2822 Daang Hari.
Clinical Summary and testimony, which were both included in petitioner's formal offer of
evidence, respecting the parties' relationship history that petitioner and respondent met at the Q: Are you staying in that property?
bank where petitioner was applying for a job and where respondent was employed as a credit
investigator prior to their courtship and their marriage.42
A: We are staying in that property.
It is significant to note moreover that petitioner also submitted as part of her evidence a
notarized summary dated February 18, 2010 which enumerated expenses paid for by the xxxx
proceeds of respondent's share in the sale of his parents' home in Magallanes, Makati City
which amounted to around ₱2.9 million. Although petitioner was insinuating that this amount [Respondent's counsel to the Witiress, petitioner]
was insufficient to cover the family expenses from 1999 to 2008, we note that she admitted
under oath that the items for their family budget, such as their children's education, the Q: How about the house there, in the United Parañaque [property], who owns it?
payments for association dues, and for electric bills came from this money.
A: It was donated to the children.
And no less significant is petitioner's admission that respondent provided the land upon which
the family home was built, thus - xxxx

[Respondent's counsel to the witness, petitioner] [COURT to the witness, petitioner]

Q: Does [respondent] [own] any real property? Q: Based on the document, who is the registered owner?

A: No. A: It says there, [respondent], Your Honor.

Q: He does not [own] any real property? Q: Who owns it now?

A: No. A: The children because it was donated [to them].43

Q: Showing to you Transfer Certificate of Title No. 413513 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal What's more, petitioner and respondent likewise lived together as husband and wife since their
which has been transferred with the Register of Deeds of Paranaque and is now re-numbered marriage on July 6,1974 (and in the company of their four children, too). In fact, shunting aside
as S-25470, which is in the name of [respondent], Filipino, of legal age, single. the time that respondent was under treatment at the Metro Psych Facility, petitioner did not
allege any instance when respondent failed to live with them.
xxxx
To the foregoing, we ought to add the fact that petitioner herself admitted, that respondent
[COURT to the witness, petitioner] likewise brought her to the hospital during all four instances that she gave birth to their
children.44
Q: Who owned this property?
By contrast, petitioner did not proffer any convincing proof that respondent’s mere confinement
A: Based on the document, it's Benjamin Singson. at the rehabilitation center confirmed the gravity of the latter’s psychological incapacity.

Q: Where is this property located? Neither does petitioner’s bare claim that respondent is a pathological gambler, is irresponsible,
and is unable to keep a job, necessarily translate into unassailable proof that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. It is settled that
"[p]sychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the
difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will." 45 "[I]t is not
enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it
is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some
psychological, not physical, illness."46
Nor can Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's testimony in open court and her Clinical Summary be taken for
gospel truth in regard to the charge that respondent is afflicted with utter inability to appreciate
his marital obligations. That much is clear from the following testimony –
[Petitioner's counsel to the witness, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio]
Q: Madam Witness, do you know the respondent in this case, Benjamin Singson?
A: Yes. [S]ir, [respondent] has been my patient since 2003, during his first admission and again
[in] 2006, [S]ir.
Q: So, he was confined twice in your facility, [M]adam witness?
A: Yes, [S]ir.
Q: Why was he confined, Madam witness?
A: He was initially confined because of problems with gambling and subsequently because of
[behavioral] problem, [S]ir.
xxxx
Q: What was the cause of his second confinement, Madam [W]itness?
A: Initially, he was able to cope after discharged. However, [in] September of 2006, he knocked
on the doors of the maids in the middle of the night. And in one occasion, he got his car in the
garage and drove out bumping the car parked right across the garage and he [also kept]
takfr1g things out from his cabinet. And if the maids would clean [these], he [would]
immediately take them out again. So, he was brought to the facility in October because of his
uncontrolled behavior, [S]ir.
xxxx
Q: So, what [were] your clinical findings on the state of the respondent, Benjamin Singson,
Madam witness?
A: Based on history, mental status examination and observations during his stay, I found that
[respondent] is suffering from pathological gambling. Also, with his history of typhoid fever
when he was younger, it is difficult to attribute the behavioral changes that he manifested in
2003 and 2006. Aside from pathological gambling, [respondent] is suffering from a personality
disorder, [S]ir.
Q: What are the results or symptoms of this personality disorder with [regard] to [respondent's
dealings] with other people, with his wife and his family, [M]adam witness?
A: Your Honor, may I read from my report to refresh my memory.
COURT: Go ahead.
A: Because of his maladaptive behavior, [respondent] sees [sic] his problems which [makes]
his personal[,] family[,] and social life[,] and even his vocational pleasure [suffer]. He was pre-
occupied with gambling, thinking of ways to get money with which to gamble as seen in his
stealing and pawning jewelries and appliances. He needs to amble with increasing amounts of
money in order achieve his desired effects into gambling, [S]ir.
COURT: Your findings, Dr., are incorporated in your report?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
[Cross-examination of Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio by respondent’s counsel]
Q: Who were the ones who made the examination, Madam witness?
A: I made the examination, [S]ir, and also the psychologist did the psychological testing, [S]ir.
Q: Now, in your opinion as an expert witness, Madam witness, which we would like to request
[from] this Honorable Court, later on, that you present your credentials as expert witness, you
concluded that the respondent is suffering from personality disorder?
A: Yes,[S]ir.
Q: What does this mean in layman’s language, [M]adam witness?
A: Personality disorder is a maladaptive pattern of behavior that has distracted his ability to
perform his functions as a married man to his wife as a father to his children and as a person
who is supposed to be employed productively, [S]ir.47
Futhermore, "[h]abitual drunkenness, gambling and failure to find a job, [while undoubtedly
negative traits are nowhere nearly the equivalent of ‘psychological incapacity’], in the absence
of [incontrovertible] proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some
debilitating psychological condition or illness."48
We now turn to the second point. Again, in view of the contrasting findings of the trial court and
appellate court,49 we take recourse to the records to assist us in evaluating the perspective
postures taken by the parties.
Here again, well-entrenched is the rule that "there must be proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor that effectively incapacitated the respondent spouse from complying with the
basic marital obligations x x x."50 "A cause has to be shown and linked with the manifestations
of the psychological incapacity."51
Again we agree with the CA that the RTC did not clearly or correctly lay down the bases or
premises for this particular finding relative to respondent's psychological incapacity, thus:
Second, there is also sufficient evidence to prove that the respondent's inabilities to perform his
marital obligations was a result of not mere intentional refusal on his part but are caused by
psychological abnormality. Such psychological incapacity of the respondent has been shown
as already present at the time of celebration of marriage but became manifest only after the
solemnization. x x x.52
As heretofore mentioned, the medical basis or evidence adverted to by the RTC did not
specifically identify the root cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity. In fact, Dr.
Sta. Ana-Ponio did not point to a definite or a definitive cause, viz. "with his history of typhoid
fever when he was younger, it is difficult to attribute the behavioral changes that he manifested
in 2003 and 2006."53 Besides, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio admitted that it was not she herself, but
another psychologist who conducted the tests.54 And this psychologist was not presented by
petitioner. More than that, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's testimony regarding respondent's alleged
admission that he was allegedly betting on jai alai when he was still in high school is essentially
hearsay as no witness having personal knowledge of that fact was called to the witness stand.
And, although Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio claimed to have interviewed respondent's sister in
connection therewith, the latter did testify in court. And we are taught that "[t]he stringency by
which the Court assesses the sufficiency of psychological evaluation reports is necessitated by
the pronouncement in our Constitution that marriage is an inviolable institution protected by the
State."55
Equally bereft of merit is petitioner's claim that respondent's alleged psychological incapacity
could be attributed to the latter's family or childhood, which are circumstances prior to the
parties' marriage; no evidence has been adduced to substantiate this fact. Nor is there basis
for upholding petitioner's contention that respondent's family was "distraught" and that
respondent's conduct was "dysfunctional"; again, there is no evidence to attest to this. These
are very serious charges which must be substantiated by clear evidence which, unfortunately,
petitioner did not at all adduce. Indeed, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio did not make a specific finding that
this was the origin of respondent's alleged inability to appreciate marital obligations.
Needless to say, petitioner cannot lean upon her son Jose's testimony that his father's
psychological incapacity existed before or at the time of marriage.1âwphi1 It has been held that
the parties' child is not a very reliable witness in an Article 36 case as "he could not have been
there when the spouses were married and could not have been expected to know what was
happening between his parents until long after his birth."56
To support her Article 36 petition, petitioner ought to have adduced convincing, competent and
trustworthy evidence to establish the cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity
and that the same antedated their marriage.57 If anything, petitioner failed to successfully
dispute the CA's finding that she was not aware of any gan1b1ing by respondent before they
got married and that respondent was a kind and caring person when he was courting her.58
Against this backdrop, we must uphold the CA's declaration that petitioner failed to prove that
respondents alleged psychological incapacity is serious or grave and that it is incurable or
permanent.
To be sure, this Court cannot take judicial notice of petitioner's assertion that "personality
disorders are generally incurable" as this is not a matter that courts are mandated to take
judicial notice under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.59
"'Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties or one of them, by
reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing at the time the marriage was
celebrated, was incapacitated to fulfill the obligations of marital life (and thus could not then
have validly entered into a marriage), then we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the
marital tie."60 This is the situation here.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The August 29, 2013 Decision and January 6, 2014
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96662 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
February 10, 2016
G.R. No. 199194
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, In its Decision24 dated January 31, 2011 in Spec. Proc. No. 045-08, the RTC held that Jose
vs. had established by preponderance of evidence that he is entitled to the relief prayed for under
JOSE B. SAREÑOGON, JR., Respondent. Article 41 of the Family Code.25 The RTC found that Netchie had disappeared for more than
four years, reason enough for Jose to conclude that his wife was indeed already dead. 26 The
DECISION dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

DEL CASTILLO, J.: VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
respondent presumptively dead for purposes of remarriage of petitioner.
A petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy to
challenge a trial court's declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 ofThe Family Code of SO ORDERED.27
the Philippines1 (Family Code).2
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
This Petition for Review on Certiorari3assails the October 24, 2011 Decision4 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR. SP No. 04158-MIN dismissing the Petition for Certiorari filed by On April 19, 2011, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), elevated the
petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic). judgment of the RTC to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari28 under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
Factual Antecedents
In its Decision29 of October 24, 2011, the CA held that the Republic used the wrong recourse
On November 4, 2008, respondent Jose B. Sareñogon, Jr. (Jose) filed a Petition 5 before the by instituting a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ozamiz6 City-Branch 15 for the declaration of presumptive death perceived no error at all in the RTC’s judgment granting Jose’s Petition for the declaration of
of his wife, Netchie S.7 Sareñogon (Netchie).8 the presumptive death of his wife, Netchie. The CA thus held in effect that the Republic’s
appeal sought to correct or review the RTC’s alleged misappreciation of evidence which could
not translate into excess or lack of jurisdiction amounting to grave abuse of discretion. 30 The
In an Amended Order dated Februrary 11, 2009, the RTC set the Petition for initial hearing on
CA noted that the RTC properly caused the publication of the Order setting the case for initial
April 16, 2009. It likewise directed the publication of said Order in a newspaper of general
hearing.31 The CA essentially ruled that, "[a] writ of certiorari may not be used to correct a
circulation in the cities of Tangub, Ozamiz and Oroquieta, all in the province of Misamis
lower court’s evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. In other words, it is not a remedy
Occidental. Nobody opposed the Petition.9 Trial then followed.10
for mere errors of judgment, which are correctible by an appeal."32 The CA then disposed of
the case in this wise:
Jose testified that he first met Netchie in Clarin, Misamis Occidental in 1991. 11 They later
became sweethearts and on August 10, 1996, they got married in civil rites at the Manila City
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed.
Hall.12 However, they lived together as husband and wife for a month only because he left to
work as a seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic helper. 13 For three months,
he did not receive any communication from Netchie.14 He likewise had no idea about her SO ORDERED.33
whereabouts.15 While still abroad, he tried to contact Netchie’s parents, but failed, as the latter
had allegedly left Clarin, Misamis Occidental.16 He returned home after his contract Issues
expired.17 He then inquired from Netchie’s relatives and friends about her whereabouts, but
they also did not know where she was.18 Because of these, he had to presume that his wife The Republic filed the instant Petition34 raising the following issues:
Netchie was already dead.19 He filed the Petition before the RTC so he could contract another
marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code.20
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN ITS
ASSAILED DECISION BECAUSE:
Jose’s testimony was corroborated by his older brother Joel Sareñogon, and by Netchie’s aunt,
Consuelo Sande.21These two witnesses testified that Jose and Netchie lived together as I
husband and wife only for one month prior to their leaving the Philippines for separate
destinations abroad.22 These two added that they had no information regarding Netchie’s
location.23 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
DISMISSING THE REPUBLIC’S PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE
65, ON THE GROUND THAT THE PROPER REMEDY SHOULD HAVE BEEN TO APPEAL
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
THE RTC DECISION, BECAUSE IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENTS OR
DECISIONS ARE NOT APPEALABLE UNDER THE EXPRESS PROVISION OF LAW.
II
THE ALLEGED EFFORTS OF RESPONDENT IN LOCATING HIS MISSING WIFE DO NOT
SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORT A "WELLFOUNDED BELIEF" THAT RESPONDENT’S ABSENT
WIFE X X X IS PROBABLY DEAD.35
Petitioner’s Arguments
The Republic insists that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is
the proper remedy to challenge an RTC’s immediately final and executory Decision on a
presumptive death.36
The Republic claims that based on jurisprudence, Jose’s alleged efforts in locating Netchie did
not engender or generate a well-founded belief that the latter is probably dead.37 It maintains
that even as Jose avowedly averred that he exerted efforts to locate Netchie, Jose inexplicably
failed to enlist the assistance of the relevant government agencies like the Philippine National
Police, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Bureau of
Immigration, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, or the Overseas Workers
Welfare Administration.38 It likewise points out that Jose did not present any disinterested
person to corroborate his allegations that the latter was indeed missing and could not be
found.39 It also contends that Jose did not advert to circumstances, events, occasions, or
situations that would prove that he did in fact make a comprehensive search for Netchie. 40 The
Republic makes the plea that courts should ever be vigilant and wary about the propensity of
some erring spouses in resorting to Article 41 of the Family Code for the purpose of terminating
their marriage.41
Finally, the Republic submits that Jose did not categorically assert that he wanted to have
Netchie declared presumptively dead because he intends to get married again, an essential
premise of Article 41 of the Family Code.42
Respondent’s Arguments
Jose counters that the CA properly dismissed the Republic’s Petition because the latter’s
petition is erected upon the ground that the CA did not correctly weigh or calibrate the evidence
on record, or assigned to the evidence its due worth, import or significance; and that such a
ground does not avail in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court.43 Jose also contends that the Republic should have instead filed a motion for
reconsideration44 of the RTC’s Decision of January 31, 2011, reasoning out that a motion for
reconsideration is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law. Jose furthermore submits that
the RTC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in granting his petition because it even dutifully
complied with the publication requirement.45 He moreover argues that to sustain the present
petition would allow the executive branch to unduly make inroads into judicial
territory.46 Finally, he insists that the trial court’s factual findings are entitled to great weight and
respect as these were arrived after due deliberation.47
This Court’s Ruling
This Court finds the Republic’s petition meritorious.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court is the proper
remedy to question the RTC’s Decision
in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death
In the 2005 case of Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,48 we held that the RTC’s Decision on a
Petition for declaration of presumptive death pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code is
immediately final and executory. Thus, the CA has no jurisdiction to entertain a notice of
appeal pertaining to such judgment.49 Concurring in the result, Justice (later Chief Justice)
Artemio Panganiban further therein pointed out that the correct remedy to challenge the RTC
Decision was to institute a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and not a petition for review
under Rule 45.50
We expounded on this appellate procedure in Republic v. Tango:51
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments rendered in
summary proceedings under the Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions
thereon.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE
FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family
Code:
ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in
all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be
decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters two
and three of the same title. It states:
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary
proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
ART. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall
be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had
of the trial court’s judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that
an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a
writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such
concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. x x
x52 (Citation omitted; Underscoring supplied)
"In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground
that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the Decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate
the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court."53
In fact, in Republic v. Narceda,54 we held that the OSG availed of the wrong remedy when it
filed a notice of appeal under Rule 42 with the CA to question the RTC’s Decision declaring the
presumptive death of Marina B. Narceda.55
Above all, this Court’s ruling in Republic v. Cantor56 made it crystal clear that the OSG properly
availed of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to challenge the RTC’s Order therein declaring
Jerry Cantor as presumptively dead.1âwphi1
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the Republic correctly availed of certiorari under Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court in assailing before the CA the aforesaid RTC’s Decision.
The "well-founded belief" requisite
under Article 41 of the Family Code is
complied with only upon a showing that
sincere honest-to-goodness efforts had
indeed been made to ascertain whether
the absent spouse is still alive or is
already dead
We now proceed to determine whether the RTC properly granted Jose’s Petition.
Article 41 of the Family Code pertinently provides that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there
is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a)
In Republic v. Cantor,57 we further held that:
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-
founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code,
there are four essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive
years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances
laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and,
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee.58
(Underscoring supplied)
With respect to the third element (which seems to be the element that in this case invites
extended discussion), the holding is that the –
mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), or lack of news that
such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate [by the absentee spouse or invocation of
the] general presumption on absence under the Civil Code [would] not suffice. This conclusion
proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse
the burden of proving the additional and more stringent requirement of "well-founded belief"
which can only be discharged upon a due showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries
and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse’s whereabouts but, more importantly, that
the absent spouse is [either] still alive or is already dead.
xxxx
The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the
circumstances of each particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-
case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that
his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent
spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the
circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a
mere passive one).59 (Emphasis omitted; underscoring supplied)
In the case at bar, the RTC ruled that Jose has "well-founded belief" that Netchie was already
dead upon the following grounds:
(1) Jose allegedly tried to contact Netchie’s parents while he was still out of the country, but did
not reach them as they had allegedly left Clarin, Misamis Occidental;
(2) Jose believed/presumed that Netchie was already dead because when he returned home,
he was not able to obtain any information that Netchie was still alive from Netchie’s relatives
and friends;
(3) Jose’s testimony to the effect that Netchie is no longer alive, hence must be presumed
dead, was corroborated by Jose’s older brother, and by Netchie’s aunt, both of whom testified
that he (Jose) and Netchie lived together as husband and wife only for one month and that
after this, there had been no information as to Netchie’s whereabouts.
In the above-cited case of Republic v. Cantor,60 this Court held that the present spouse (Maria
Fe Espinosa Cantor) merely conducted a "passive search" because she simply made
unsubstantiated inquiries from her in-laws, from neighbors and friends. For that reason, this
Court stressed that the degree of diligence and reasonable search required by law is not met
(1) when there is failure to present the persons from whom the present spouse allegedly made
inquiries especially the absent spouse’s relatives, neighbors, and friends, (2) when there is
failure to report the missing spouse’s purported disappearance or death to the police or mass
media, and (3) when the present spouse’s evidence might or would only show that the absent
spouse chose not to communicate, but not necessarily that the latter was indeed dead. 61 The
rationale for this palpably stringent or rigorous requirement has been marked out thus:
x x x [T]he Court, fully aware of the possible collusion of spouses in nullifying their marriage,
has consistently applied the "strict standard" approach. This is to ensure that a petition for
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not used as a tool to
conveniently circumvent the laws. Courts should never allow procedural shortcuts and should
ensure that the stricter standard required by the Family Code is met. x x x
The application of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative if we consider the
State’s policy to protect and strengthen the institution of marriage. Since marriage serves as
the family’s foundation and since it is the state’s policy to protect and strengthen the family as a
basic social institution, marriage should not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of the
parties. x x x
x x x [I]t has not escaped this Court’s attention that the strict standard required in petitions for
declaration of presumptive death has not been fully observed by the lower courts. We need
only to cite the instances when this Court, on review, has consistently ruled on the sanctity of
marriage and reiterated that anything less than the use of the strict standard necessitates a
denial. To rectify this situation, lower courts are now expressly put on notice of the strict
standard this Court requires in cases under Article 41 of the Family Code." (Citations omitted) 62
Given the Court’s imposition of "strict standard" in a petition for a declaration of presumptive
death under Article 41 of the Family Code, it must follow that there was no basis at all for the
RTC’s finding that Jose’s Petition complied with the requisites of Article 41 of the Family Code,
in reference to the "well-founded belief" standard. If anything, Jose’s pathetically anemic efforts
to locate the missing Netchie are notches below the required degree of stringent diligence
prescribed by jurisprudence. For, aside from his bare claims that he had inquired from alleged
friends and relatives as to Netchie’s whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness stand
specific individuals or persons whom he allegedly saw or met in the course of his search or
quest for the allegedly missing Netchie. Neither did he prove that he sought the assistance of
the pertinent government agencies as well as the media. Nor did he show that he undertook a
thorough, determined and unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least two years (and what
those years were), and naming the particular places, provinces, cities, barangays or
municipalities that he visited, or went to, and identifying the specific persons he interviewed or
talked to in the course of his search.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 24, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 04158-MIN is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The respondent’s
Petition in said Spec. Proc. No. 045-08 is accordingly DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
April 18, 2016
G.R. No. 189607
RENATO A. CASTILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 in CA-GR. CV No. 90153 and the
Resolution2 that affirmed the same. The CA reversed the Decision3 dated 23 March 2007
issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 84.
The RTC had granted the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between the parties on
the ground that respondent had a previous valid marriage before she married petitioner. The
CA believes on the other hand, that respondent was not prevented from contracting a second
marriage if the first one was an absolutely nullity, and for this purpose she did not have to await
a final decree of nullity of the first marriage.
The only issue that must be resolved by the Court is whether the CA was correct in holding
thus and consequentially reversing the RTC's declaration of nullity of the second marriage.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista
(Bautista). On 6 January 1979, respondent married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo
(Renato).
On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage,4 praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to
Bautista and her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The CA states
in its Decision that petitioner did not pursue the ground of psychological incapacity in the RTC.
The reason for this finding by the CA while unclear, is irrelevant in this Petition.
Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended among others that her marriage to Bautista
was null and void as they had not secured any license therefor, and neither of them was a
member of the denomination to which the solemnizing officer belonged.5
On 3 January 2002, respondent filed an action to declare her first marriage to Baustista void.
On 22 January 2003, the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 260 rendered its
Decision6 declaring that Lea's first marriage to Bautista was indeed null and void ab
initio. Thereafter, the same court issued a Certificate of Finality saying that the Decision dated
22 January 2003 had become final and executory. 7
On 12 August 2004, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence8 claiming that the proof adduced
by petitioner was insufficient to warrant a declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground
that it was bigamous. In his Opposition, 9 petitioner countered that whether or not the first
marriage of respondent was valid, and regardless of the fact that she had belatedly managed
to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity, she still could not deny that at the time she entered
into marriage with him, her previous marriage was valid and subsisting. The RTC thereafter
denied respondent's demurrer in its Order 10 dated 8 March 2005.
In a Decision 11 dated 23 March 2007, the RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void ab initio on the ground that it was a bigamous marriage under Article
41 of the Family Code. 12 The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby declares the
marriage between RENATO A. CASTILLO and LEA P. DE LEON-CASTILLO contracted on
January 6, 1979, at the Mary the Queen Parish Church, San Juan, Metro Manila, is hereby
declared NULL AND VOID AB INITIO based on bigamous marriage, under Article 41 of the
Family Code. 13
The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting when she married
Renato on 6 January 1979, makes her marriage to Renato bigamous, thus rendering it void ab
initio. The lower court dismissed Lea's argument that she need not obtain a judicial decree of
nullity and could presume the nullity of a prior subsisting marriage. The RTC stressed that so
long as no judicial declaration exists, the prior marriage is valid and existing. Lastly, it also said
that even if respondent eventually had her first marriage judicially declared void, the fact
remains that the first and second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was
annulled, since Lea failed to obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her first marriage to Bautista
before contracting her second marriage with Renato. 14
Petitioner moved for reconsideration insofar as the distribution of their properties were
concerned. 15 His motion, however, was denied by the RTC in its Order16 dated 6 September
2007. Thereafter, both petitioner17 and Respondent18 filed their respective Notices of Appeal.
In a Decision19 dated 20 April 2009, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and
Order and upheld the validity of the parties' marriage. In reversing the RTC, the CA said that
since Lea's marriages were solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code on 3 August 1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law since it is the law in effect
at the time the marriages were celebrated, and not the Family Code.20 Furthermore, the CA
ruled that the Civil Code does not state that a judicial decree is necessary in order to establish
the nullity of a marriage.21
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the CA's Decision was likewise denied in the
questioned CA Resolution22dated 16 September 2009.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Respondent filed her Comment23 praying that the CA Decision finding her marriage to
petitioner valid be affirmed in toto, and that all properties acquired by the spouses during their
marriage be declared conjugal. In his Reply to the Comment,24 petitioner reiterated the
allegations in his Petition.
OUR RULING
We deny the Petition.
The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the law
in effect at the time of its celebration.25 In this case, the law in force at the time Lea contracted
both marriages was the Civil Code. The children of the parties were also born while the Civil
Code was in effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve this case using
the provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles
80,2681,27 82,28 and 83 (first paragraph);29 and those on voidable marriages are Articles 83
(second paragraph),30 8531and 86.32
Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the following ways:
(1) a void marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage from the beginning - while in a
voidable marriage, the marriage is valid until annulled by a competent court; (2) a void
marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable marriage can be ratified by cohabitation; (3) being
nonexistent, a void marriage can be collaterally attacked, while a voidable marriage cannot be
collaterally attacked; (4) in a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and the offspring
are natural children by legal fiction, while in voidable marriage there is conjugal partnership and
the children conceived before the decree of annulment are considered legitimate; and (5) "in a
void marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is necessary," while in a voidable
marriage there must be a judicial decree.33
Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases
of People v. Mendoza, 34 People v. Aragon, 35 and Odayat v. Amante, 36 that the Civil Code
contains no express provision on the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void
marriage. 37
In Mendoza (1954), appellant contracted three marriages in 1936, 1941, and 1949. The second
marriage was contracted in the belief that the first wife was already dead, while the third
marriage was contracted after the death of the second wife. The Court ruled that the first
marriage was deemed valid until annulled, which made the second marriage null and void for
being bigamous. Thus, the third marriage was valid, as the second marriage was void from its
performance, hence, nonexistent without the need of a judicial decree declaring it to be so.
This doctrine was reiterated in Aragon (1957), which involved substantially the same factual
antecedents. In Odayat ( 1977), citing Mendoza and Aragon, the Court likewise ruled that no
judicial decree was necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages under Article 80 of
the Civil Code.
It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered the rulings in Odayat,
Mendoza, and Aragon inapplicable to marriages celebrated after 3 August 1988. A judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now expressly required where the nullity of a
previous marriage is invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage. 38 A second
marriage contracted prior to the issuance of this declaration of nullity is thus considered
bigamous and void. 39 In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, we explained the policy behind the
institution of this requirement:
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the State." In more
explicit terms, the Family Code characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life." So crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and peace of the
nation that their "nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation." As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the
purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the
perception of both parties or of one that their union is so defective with respect to the
essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no
legal effect - and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be
reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds
for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could
conceive. For such a socially significant institution, an official state pronouncement
through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only
would such an open and public declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity
of the contract of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable through records
accessible to everyone.40(Emphases supplied)1âwphi1
However, as this Court clarified in Apiag v. Cantero41 and Ty v. Court of Appeals, 42 the
requirement of a judicial decree of nullity does not apply to marriages that were
celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code, particularly if the children of the parties
were born while the Civil Code was in force. In Ty, this Court clarified that those cases continue
to be governed by Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon, which embodied the then-prevailing rule:
x x x. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for
entering into a second marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage was void since he
was merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of
the first marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since the second
marriage took place and all the children thereunder were born before the promulgation of
Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at that time.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in
1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and
Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent,
there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second
marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondent's second marriage to
petitioner is valid.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the
present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As
held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be
impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner
and the children is patent x x x. (Citations omitted)
As earlier explained, the rule in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon is applicable to this case. The
Court thus concludes that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the
invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a marriage license. That
there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the second
marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code.
Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC of Parañaque City declaring the nullity of
Lea's first marriage only serves to strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to
Renato is valid.
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the CA did not err in upholding the validity of the
marriage between petitioner and respondent. Hence, we find no reason to disturb its ruling.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated 20 April 2009 and Resolution dated 16 September 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90153
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice, Chairperson
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EN BANC
November 21, 2017
A.C. No. 5573
GIZALE O. TUMBAGA, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. MANUEL P. TEOXON, Respondent
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by complainant Gizale O. Tumbaga
against respondent Atty. Manuel P. Teox.on, charging him with gross immorality, deceitful and
fraudulent conduct, and gross misconduct. The parties hereto paint contrastive pictures not
only of their respective versions of the events but also of their negative portrayals of each
other's character. They are, thus, separately outlined below.
The Complaint
In a verified complaint1 dated October 9, 2001 filed directly with the Court, complainant
narrated that she met respondent sometime in September 1999. He was then the City Legal
Officer of Naga City from whom complainant sought legal advice. After complainant consulted
with him a few times, he visited her often at her residence and brought gifts for her son, Al
Greg Tumbaga. Respondent even volunteered to be the godfather of Al Greg. In one of his
visits, respondent assured complainant's mother that although he was already married to
Luzviminda Balang,2his marriage was a sham because their marriage contract was not
registered. In view of respondent's persistence and generosity to her son, complainant believed
his representation that he was eligible to marry her.
Complainant averred that on December 19, 1999, she moved in with respondent at the Puncia
Apartment in Naga City. In April 2000, she became pregnant. Respondent allegedly wanted to
have the baby aborted but complainant refused. After the birth of their son, Billy John,
respondent spent more time with them. He used their apartment as a temporary law office and
he lived there for two to three days at a time.
After Billy John was baptized, complainant secured a Certificate of Live Birth from the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Naga City and gave it to respondent to sign. He hesitantly signed it and
volunteered to facilitate its filing. After respondent failed to file the same, complainant secured
another form and asked respondent to sign it twice. On February 15, 2001, the Certificate of
Live Birth was registered.
Thereafter, complainant related that respondent rarely visited them. To make ends meet, she
decided to work in a law office in Naga City. However, respondent compelled her to resign,
assuring her that he would take care of her financial needs. As respondent failed to fulfill his
promise, complainant sought assistance from the Office of the City Fiscal in Naga City on the
second week of March 2001. In the early morning of the conference set by said office,
respondent gave complainant an affidavit of support and told her there was no need for him to
appear in the conference. Complainant showed the affidavit to Fiscal Elsa Mampo, but the
latter advised her to have the respondent sign the affidavit again. Fiscal Mampo was unsure of
the signature in the affidavit as she was familiar with respondent's signature. Complainant
confronted respondent about the affidavit and he half-heartedly affixed his true signature
therein.
In May 2001, complainant went to respondent's office as he again reneged on his promise of
support. To appease her anger, respondent executed a promissory note. However, he also
failed to honor the same.
In June· 2001, complainant moved out of the Puncia Apartment as respondent did not pay the
rentals therefor anymore. In the evening of September 9, 2001, respondent raided
complainant's new residence, accompanied by three SWAT members and his wife. Visibly
drunk, respondent threatened to hurt complainant with the bolo and the lead pipe that he was
carrying if she will not return the personal belongings that he left in their previous apartment
unit. As respondent barged into the apartment, complainant sought help from the SWAT
members and one of them was able to pacify respondent. Respondent's wife also tried to
attack complainant, but she too was prevailed upon by the SWAT members. The incident was
recorded in the police blotter.
To corroborate her allegations, complainant attached the following documents to her complaint,
among others: (a) pictures showing respondent lying in a bed holding Billy John, 3 respondent
holding Billy John in a beach setting,4complainant holding Billy John in a beach
setting,5 respondent holding Billy John in a house setting,6 and respondent and complainant
seated beside each other in a restaurant7 ; (b) the Certificate of Live Birth of Billy John with an
Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity showing respondent's signature 8 ; (c) the
affidavit of support9 executed by respondent; (d) the promissory note10 executed by
respondent; (e) the police blotter entry11dated September 9, 2001; and (f) copies of
pleadings12 showing the signature of respondent.
Respondent's Answer
In his answer,13 respondent denied the allegations in the complaint. He asserted that
complainant merely wanted to exact money from him.
Respondent alleged that he became the godfather of complainant's son, Al Greg, but he was
only one of four sponsors. He began to visit complainant's residence to visit his godson. He
also denied being the father of Billy John since complainant supposedly had several live-in
partners. He cited the affidavit of Antonio Orogo, complainant's uncle, to attest to his
allegations. According to the affidavit, Al Greg is the son of the complainant's live-in partner
named Orac Barrameda. Cpmplainant allegedly used Al Greg to extort money from Alfrancis
Bichara, the former governor of Albay, with whom complainant also had a sexual relationship.
Respondent denied that he lived together with complainant at the Puncia Apartment since he
was already married. As complainant was his kumadre, he would pass by her house whenever
he visited the house of Representative Sulpicio S. Roco, Jr. Respondent was then a member
of Representative Roco's legislative staff. Sometimes, respondent would leave a bag of
clothing in complainant's house to save money for his fare in going to the office of
Representative Roco in the House of Representatives in Quezon City. In one instance,
complainant and her mother refused to return one of his bags such that he was forced to file a
replevin case. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Naga City decided the case in his
favor.
Respondent also claimed that complainant falsified his signature in the Certificate of Live Birth
of Billy John so he filed a complaint for the cancellation of his acknowledgment therein.
Complainant allegedly made it look like he appeared before Notary Public Vicente Estela on
February 15, 2001, but he argued that it was physically impossible for him to have done so as
he attended a hearing in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Libmanan, Camarines Sur that day.
He also contended that complainant forged his signature in the Affidavit of Support.
As to the pictures of respondent with Billy John, he argued that the same cannot prove
paternity. He explained that in one of his visits to Al Greg, complainant left Billy John in his care
to keep the child from falling off the bed. However, complainant secretly took his picture as he
was lying in the bed holding Billy John. As to his picture with Billy John taken at the beach,
respondent alleged that at that time complainant gave Billy John to respondent as she wanted
to go swimming. While he was holding the child, complainant secretly took their picture.
Respondent accused complainant of taking the pictures in order to use the same to extort
money from him. This is the same scheme allegedly used by complainant against her previous
victims, who paid money to buy peace with her.
Respondent further alleged that politics was also involved in the filing of the complaint as
complainant was working in the office of then Representative Luis Villafuerte, the political
opponent of Representative Roco.
Respondent attached to his answer the following documents, among others: (a) the affidavit of
Antonio Orogo14 ; (b) the Decision15 dated May 8, 2006 of the MTCC of Naga City in Civil Case
No. 11546, which is the replevin case; (c) copies of the Minutes of Proceedings 16 and the
Order17 of the RTC of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, both dated January 15, 2001, showing that
respondent attended a hearing therein on said date; and (d) a photocopy18 of respondent's
credit card and automated teller machine (ATM) card showing his signature.
The Proceedings before the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline
The parties appeared before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline for a few hearings and the
marking of their respective. evidence. Complainant marked the following documents, among
others, in addition to those already attached to the complaint: (a) a picture 19 showing
respondent seated in a restaurant with complainant hugging him; (b) a receipt 20 issued by the
Clerk of Court of the MTCC of Naga City, enumerating the objects (consisting mostly of items
of clothing) returned by complainant to respondent in the replevin case; and (c)
receipts21 purportedly showing respondent's payment of the rentals for complainant's
apartment unit.
On motion of complainant, the IBP issued an order22 directing respondent, complainant, and
Billy John to undergo DNA testing in the DNA laboratory of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) to determine the child's paternity. Upon motion23 from respondent, however, the IBP
annulled its prior order in the interest of the speedy disposition of the case. 24
On November 14, 2008, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued its Report and
Recommendation,25 finding that respondent maintained an illicit affair with complainant and
that he should be meted the penalty of suspension for a period of two (2) years.
In the Resolution No. XVIII-2009-1526 dated February 19, 2009, the IBP Board of Governors
approved the above recommendation and increased the recommended period of suspension to
three (3) years.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration27 of the above resolution. Attached thereto were:
(a) the affidavits28 of Representative Roco and respondent's wife, Minda B. Teoxon, which
allegedly refuted complainant's contention that respondent lived with complainant at the Puncia
Apartment in Naga City; (b) the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) dated May 10, 2005 29 in
Civil Case No. 11546 for replevin, wherein complainant supposedly admitted to her past
relationships; and (c) a letter30 from the University of Nueva Caceres that informed respondent
that he was chosen to be the recipient of its Diamond Achiever Award.
The IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for reconsideration in its Resolution No. XX-
2012-53931 dated December 14, 2012.
The IBP thereafter transmitted the record of the case to the Court for final action.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court agrees with the conclusion of the IBP that the actuations of respondent in this case
showed his failure to live up to the good moral conduct required of the members of the legal
profession.
We held in Advincula v. Advincula32 that:
The good moral conduct or character must be possessed by lawyers at the time of their
application for admission to the Bar, and must be maintained until retirement from the practice
of law. In this regard, the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxxx
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
xxxx
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession.
Accordingly, it is expected that every lawyer, being an officer of the Court, must not only be in
fact of good moral character, but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading
lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a
member of the Bar and officer of the Court is required not only to refrain from adulterous
relationships or keeping mistresses but also to conduct himself as to avoid scandalizing the
public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is to
remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, whoever is enrolled in its ranks
should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing
fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as
the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning.
Immoral conduct has been described as conduct that is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to
show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. To be
the basis of disciplinary action, such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral,
that is, it must be so corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances
as to shock the common sense of decency. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides for the imposition of the penalty of
disbarment or suspension if a member of the Bar is found guilty of committing grossly immoral
conduct, to wit:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. - A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
.conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. x x x.
In order to justify the imposition of the above administrative penalties on a member of the Bar,
his/her guilt must first be established by substantial evidence.33 As explained in Re: Rafael
Dimaano,34 substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
After a thorough review of the records of the case, the Court upholds the findings of the IBP as
there is indeed substantial evidence that respondent committed gross immorality by
maintaining an extramarital affair with complainant.
One of the key pieces of evidence that the IBP considered in ruling against respondent is the
Decision dated May 8, 2006 of the MTCC of Naga City in Civil Case No. 11546 for replevin.
In said case, respondent made it appear that he was merely seeking to recover personal
belongings that he left behind at one time in complainant's house. The items included a
traveling bag with various articles of clothing and file folders of cases that he was handling. He
also tried to recover the pieces of furniture that he allegedly bought for the complainant, which
the latter failed to reimburse as promised. These include a brass bed with foam mattress, a
plastic dining table with six plastic chairs, a brass sala set with a center table, and a plastic
drawer. For her defense, complainant argued that the respondent gradually left the items of
clothing in their apartment unit during the period that they cohabited therein from time to time.
She also said that the furniture were gifts to her and Billy John.
In its decision, the MTCC did rule in favor of respondent.1âwphi1 However, the following
elucidation by the MTCC is quite telling:
To the Court, this is one case that should not have been brought to court because [respondent]
could have resorted to a more diplomatic or tactful way of retrieving his personal belongings
rather than going on record with a lot of pretext and evasion as if the presiding judge is too
naive to appreciate human nature and the truth. [Respondent] would have done well if he was
gentleman, candid and responsible enough to admit his misadventure and accept responsibility
for his misdeeds rather than try to distort facts and avoid facing the truth. It is not manly.
Of course, the [MTCC] is fully convinced that the personal belongings listed in the complaint
[are] owned by him and the [furniture] that were eventually sold by [complainant] was bought
by him, even without showing any receipts for it. However, the [MTCC] is not persuaded by his
allegation that he left his bag with [complainant] because he was in a hurry in going to Manila.
He boldly declared in [the trial court] that he has three residences in Naga City and of all places
he had to leave his shirt and underwear with a lady whom he had visited "only twice".
[Respondent] could deny all the way up to high heaven that he has no child with [complainant]
but the [MTCC] will forever wonder why the latter would refuse to part with the shirts and pants
unless she is a bareface extortionist. But to the [MTCC], she did not appear to be so. In fact,
the [MTCC] had the occasion to observe [complainant] with two little handsome boys who
appeared to be her sons. Hence, this lends credence to the fact that she might have really
demanded money in exchange for the shirts and pants to support her children.
Be that as it may, the [MTCC] is duty bound to apply the law. There is no issue on the
ownership of the personal belongings contained in a bag allegedly left by the [respondent] in
the house of [complainant].
xxxx
However, as far as the [furniture] is concerned, like the brass bed, sala set, dining table and
plastic drawer, the [MTCC] is not persuaded by [respondent's] claim that he meant to be paid
by [complainant] for it. [Respondent] is a lawyer and although he is not engage[d] in the buying
and selling of [furniture] he should have known that if he really intended to be paid back for it,
he should have asked [complainant] to [sign] a promissory note or even a memorandum. As it
is, he failed to show any evidence of such an undertaking. That it was a gift of love is more like
it.35
The IBP posited that the above ruling was more than sufficient to prove that respondent tried to
distort the truth that he and complainant did live together as husband and wife in one
apartment unit. The Court agrees with the IBP on this matter.
The MTCC plainly disbelieved respondent's claim that he merely left his bag of clothing in
complainant's house before he left for his place of work in Metro Manila - a claim which he
likewise made in the present case. The trial court further posited that the pieces of furniture
sought to be recovered by respondent were indeed bought by him but the same were
intentionally given to complainant out of love. Clearly, the MTCC was convinced that
respondent and complainant were involved in an illicit relationship that eventually turned sour
and led to the filing of the replevin case.
A perusal of the above decision reveals that the findings and conclusions therein were arrived
at by the MTCC after a trial on the merits of the case. In other words, the trial court first heard
the parties and received their respective evidence before it rendered a decision. As such, the
trial court cannot be accused of arriving at the aforementioned findings lightly.
Accordingly, the Court finds no reason to mistrust the observations and findings of the MTCC.
Respondent did not even point out any reason for us to do so. While the issues in the replevin
case and the instant administrative case are indeed different, they share a common factual
backdrop, i.e., the parties' contrasting account of the true nature of their relationship. From the
evidence of both parties, the MTCC chose the complainant's version of the events. Incidentally,
it was respondent himself who brought to light the existence of the MTCC decision in the
replevin case when he attached the same to his answer in the present case to substantiate his
narration of facts. Thus, he cannot belatedly plead that the decision be disregarded after the
statements and findings therein were used against him .
Complainant further attached pictures of respondent with her and Billy John as proof of their
romantic relations. A perusal of these pictures convinces this Court that while the same cannot
indeed prove Billy John's paternity, they are nevertheless indicative of a relationship between
complainant ~d respondent that is more than merely platonic.
One of the annexed pictures shows the couple in a restaurant setting, smiling at the camera
while seated beside each other very closely that their arms are visibly touching. Another picture
shows the couple in the same setting, this time with complainant smiling as she embraced
respondent from behind and they were both looking at the camera. From the facial expressions
and the body language of respondent and complainant in these pictures, the same unfailingly
demonstrate their unmistakable closeness and their lack of qualms over publicly displaying
their affection towards one another. Thus, the attempts of respondent to downplay his
relationship with complainant flop miserably. Curiously, respondent did not bother to explain
the aforesaid pictures.
In his answer to the complaint, respondent only managed to comment on the pictures of
himself with Billy John. Even then, respondent's accounts as to these pictures are too flimsy
and incredible to be accepted by the Court. Respondent previously admitted to the
genuineness of the pictures but not to the alleged circumstances of the taking
thereof.36 However, respondent's allegation that the pictures were surreptitiously taken by
complainant falls flat on its face. The pictures clearly show that he and Billy John were looking
directly at the camera when the pictures were taken. Moreover, the angles from which the
pictures were taken suggest that the person taking the same was directly in front of respondent
and Billy John.
In his motion for reconsideration of the IBP Board of Governors Resolution No. XVIII-2009-15,
respondent further argued that the pictures were not conclusive and the admission of the same
was not in accordance with the Rules of Court as nobody testified on the circumstances of the
taking of the pictures and the accuracy thereof.37 The IBP correctly disregarded this argument
given that technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied in administrative
proceedings. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict
judicial sense.38
With respect to the affidavit of support, the promissory note, and the Certificate of Live Birth of
Billy John that contained an Affidavit of Acknowledgment/ Admission of Paternity, respondent
likewise failed to provide sufficient controverting evidence therefor.
In the affidavit of support and the promissory note, respondent supposedly promised to provide
monetary support to Billy John, whom he acknowledged as his illegitimate son. Respondent
verbally repudiated said documents, pointing out that the same were typewritten while he used
a computer in his office, not a typewriter.39 Respondent further accused complainant of
falsifying his signatures therein and, to prove his charge, he submitted photocopies of his credit
card and A TM card that allegedly showed his customary signatures.
The Court, still, finds this refutation wanting. To the naked eye, the sample signatures in the
credit card and A TM card do appear to be different from the ones in the affidavit of support,
the promissory note, and the Certificate of Live Birth. However, we likewise compared the
sample signatures to respondent's signatures in his pleadings before the IBP and other
documents submitted in evidence and we find that the signatures in the two sets appear to be
likewise dissimilar, which suggests respondent uses several different signatures. Thus,
respondent's claim of forgery is unconvincing. Moreover, as the IBP noted, the records of the
case do not indicate if he filed criminal charges against complainant for her alleged acts of
falsification.
As to the Certificate of Live Birth of Billy John, respondent did file a complaint for the
cancellation of his acknowledgment therein. Thus, the Court will no longer discuss the parties'
arguments regarding the validity of respondent's signature in said certificate of birth as the
issue should be threshed out in the proper proceeding.
In his answer to the complaint, respondent attached the affidavit of Antonio Orogo in order to
belie complainant's allegations and that she merely wanted to exact money from respondent. In
the affidavit, Orogo claimed that respondent did not live with complainant in the Puncia
Apartment in Naga City. Orogo further accused complainant and her mother of engaging in the
practice of extorting money from various men since she was just 11 years old. The alleged
instances of extortion involved the complainant falsely accusing one man of rape and falsely
claiming to another man that he was the father of her first child.
The Court can hardly ascribe any credibility to the above affidavit. Given the materiality of
Orogo's statements therein, not to mention the gravity of his accusations against complainant
and her mother, he should have been presented as a witness before the IBP investigating
commissioner in order to confirm his affidavit and give complainant the opportunity to cross-
examine him. For whatever reason, this was not done. As it is, Orogo's affidavit lacks
evidentiary value. In Boyboy v. Yabut,40 we cautioned that:
It is not difficult to manufacture charges in the affidavits, hence, it is imperative that their
truthfulness and veracity be tested in the crucible of thorough examination. The hornbook
doctrine is that unless the affiants themselves take the witness stand to affirm the averments in
their affidavits, those affidavits must be excluded from the proceedings for being inadmissible
and hearsay x x x. (Citation omitted.)
In like manner, the Court cannot give much weight to the affidavits of Representative Roco and
Minda B. Teoxon, both of whom attested to the statements of respondent regarding his places
of residence during the time material to this case. It should be stressed that said affidavits were
executed only on June 15, 2009 or about four months after the IBP Board of Governors issued
its Resolution No. XVIII-2009-15 on February 19, 2009, which affirmed respondent's culpability
for grossly immoral conduct. This attenuates the credibility of the statements as the same were
only given as corroborative statements at so late a time given the relevancy thereof.
In the face of the accusations and the evidence offered against him, respondent was duty-
bound to meet the same decisively head-on. As the Court declared in Narag v. Narag41 :
While the burden of proof is upon the complainant, respondent has the duty not only to himself
but also to the court to show that he is morally fit to remain a member of the bar. Mere denial
does not suffice. Thus, when his moral character is assailed, such that his right to continue
practicing his cherished profession is imperiled, he must meet the charges squarely and
present evidence, to the satisfaction of the investigating body and this Court, that he is morally
fit to have his name in the Roll of Attorneys. x x x. (Citation omitted.)
Unfortunately, respondent failed to prove his defense when the burden of evidence shifted to
him. He could neither provide any concrete corroboration of his denials in this case nor
satisfactorily prove his claim that complainant was merely extorting money from him.
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent should be held liable for having illicit
relations with complainant. As to whether respondent also sired complainant's second child,
Billy John, the Court finds that the same was not sufficiently established by the evidence
presented in this case. The paternity and/or acknowledgement of Billy John, if indeed he is
respondent's illegitimate child, must be alleged and proved in separate proceedings before the
proper tribunal having jurisdiction to hear the same.
As to the penalty that should be imposed against respondent in this case, the Court had
occasion to rule in Samaniego v. Ferrer,42 that:
We have considered such illicit relation as a disgraceful and immoral conduct subject to
disciplinary action. The penalty for such immoral conduct is disbarment, or indefinite or definite
suspension, depending on the circumstances of the case. Recently, in Ferancullo v.
Ferancullo, Jr., we ruled that suspension from the practice of law for two years was an
adequate penalty imposed on the lawyer who was found guilty of gross immorality. In said
case, we considered the absence of aggravating circumstances such as an adulterous
relationship coupled with refusal to support his family; or maintaining illicit relationships with at
least two women during the subsistence of his marriage; or abandoning his legal wife and
cohabiting with other women. (Citations omitted.)
However, considering respondent's blatant attempts to deceive the courts and the IBP
regarding his true relationship with complainant, we agree with the IBP Board of Governors
that the proper penalty in this instance is a three-year suspension from the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Manuel P. Teoxon GUILTY of gross
immorality and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years
effective upon notice hereof, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
offense shall be punished with a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of the
Philippine Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

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