Constantino jr vs cuisa
For their first constitutional argument,
FACTS:
During the Corazon Aquino regime, her
administration came up with a scheme to reduce
the country’s external debt. The solution resorted
to was to incur foreign debts. Three restructuring
programs were sought to initiate the program for
foreign debts, they are basically buyback programs
and bond-conversion programs. The spouses
Renato Constantino, Jr. and Lourdes Constantino,
as a taxpayers, and in behalf of their minor
children who are Filipino citizens, together with
FFDC (Freedom From Debt Coalition) averred that
the buyback and bond-conversion schemes were
onerous and they do not constitute the loan
“contract” or “guarantee” contemplated in Sec.
20, Art. VII of the Constitution. And assuming that
the President has such power, unlike other powers
which may be validly delegated by the President,
the power to incur foreign debts is expressly
reserved by the Constitution in the person of the
President, hence, the respondents herein, Central
Bank Governor Jose Cuisia et al, cannot incur debts
for the Philippines nor such power can be
delegated to them. Constantino argued that the
gravity by which the exercise of the power will
affect the Filipino nation requires that the
President alone must exercise this power. They
argue that the requirement of prior concurrence
of an entity specifically named by the Constitution,
the Monetary Board, reinforces the submission
that not respondents but the President “alone and
personally”• can validly bind the country. Hence,
they would like Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant
to the said scheme.
ISSUE: First, they object to the debt-relief
contracts entered into pursuant to the Financing
Program as beyond the powers granted to the
President under Section 20,
Second, according to petitioners even assuming
that the contracts under the Financing Program
are constitutionally permissible, yet it is only the
President who may exercise the power to enter
into these contracts and such power may not be
delegated to respondents.
1 3RD EXAM – POWERS OVER SOVEREIGN AFFAIRS PP 307-311
HELD: 1.
petitioners submit that the buyback and bond-
conversion schemes do not constitute the loan
"contract" or "guarantee" contemplated in the
Constitution and are consequently prohibited.
The language of the Constitution is simple and
clear as it is broad. It allows the President to
contract and guarantee foreign loans. It makes no
prohibition on the issuance of certain kinds of
loans or distinctions as to which kinds of debt
instruments are more onerous than others. This
Court may not ascribe to the Constitution
meanings and restrictions that would unduly
burden the powers of the President. The plain,
clear and unambiguous language of the
Constitution should be construed in a sense that
will allow the full exercise of the power provided
therein. It would be the worst kind of
judicial legislation if the courts were to
misconstrue and change the meaning of the
organic act.
2. Petitioners assert that the power to pay public
debts lies with Congress and was deliberately
withheld by the Constitution from the President. It
is true that in the balance of power between the
three branches of government, it is Congress that
manages the country’s coffers by virtue of its
taxing and spending powers. However, the law-
making authority has promulgated a law ordaining
an automatic appropriations provision for debt
servicing by virtue of which the President is
empowered to execute debt payments without
the need for further appropriations. Regarding
these legislative enactments, this Court has held,
viz:
“Congress ... deliberates or acts on the budget
proposals of the President, and Congress in the
exercise of its own judgment and wisdom
formulates an appropriation act precisely
following the process established by the
Constitution, which specifies that no money may
be paid from the Treasury except in accordance
with an appropriation made by law.”
3. Petitioners’ position is negated both by explicit
constitutional and legal imprimaturs, as well as the
doctrine of qualified political agency.
The evident exigency of having the Secretary of
Finance implement the decision of the President
to execute the debt-relief contracts is made
manifest by the fact that the process of
establishing and executing a strategy for managing
the government’s debt is deep within the realm of
the expertise of the Department of Finance,
primed as it is to raise the required amount of
funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and
meet any other sovereign debt management
goals.
If, as petitioners would have it, the President were
to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign
borrowing power, he/she would have to pause
from running the country long enough to focus on
a welter of time-consuming detailed activities–the
propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans,
studying and choosing among the many methods
that may be taken toward this end, meeting
countless times with creditor representatives to
negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the
Monetary Board, explaining and defending the
negotiated deal to the public, and more often than
not, flying to the agreed place of execution to sign
the documents. This sort of constitutional
interpretation would negate the very existence of
cabinet positions and the respective expertise
which the holders thereof are accorded and would
unduly hamper the President’s effectivity in
running the government.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., et al. vs. Office of
the Executive Secretary
Facts:
1. The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to
compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and
the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the
signed copy of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court to the Senate of the
Philippinesfor its concurrence pursuant to Sec. 21,
Art VII of the 1987 Constitution.
2. The Rome Statute established the Int'l Criminal
Court which will have jurisdiction over the most
2 3RD EXAM – POWERS OVER SOVEREIGN AFFAIRS PP 307-311
serious crimes as genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression as
defined by the Statute. The Philippines through
the Chargie du Affairs in UN. The provisions of the
Statute however require that it be subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval of the
signatory state.
Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty,
under both domestic and international law, is a
function of the Senate, hence it is the duty of the
Executive Department to transmit the signed copy
to the senate to allow it to exercise its discretion.
ISSUE:
whether the Executive Secretary and the
Department of Foreign Affairs have a ministerial
duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the
Rome Statute signed by a member of the
Philippine Mission to the United Nations even
without the signature of the President.
RULING:
In our system of government, the President, being
the head of state, is regarded as the sole
organ and authority in external relations and is the
country’s sole representative with foreign nations.
As the chief architect of foreign policy, the
President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with
respect to international affairs. Hence, the
President is vested with the authority to deal with
foreign states and governments, extend or
withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic
relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise
transact the business of foreign relations. In the
realm of treaty-making, the
President has the sole authority to negotiate with
other states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole
authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the
Constitution provides a limitation to his power by
requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the
members of the Senate for the validity of the
treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no treaty
or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate."
The participation of the legislative branch in the
treaty-making process was deemed essential to
provide a check on the executive in the field of
foreign relations.By requiring the concurrence of
the legislature in the treaties entered into by the
President, the Constitution ensures a healthy
system of
checks and balance necessary in the nation’s
pursuit of political maturity and growth. Justice
Isagani Cruz, in his book on International Law,
describes the treaty-making process in this wise:
The usual steps in the treaty-making process are:
negotiation, signature, ratification, and exchange
of the instruments of ratification. The treaty may
then be submitted for registration and publication
under the U.N. Charter, although this step is not
essential to the validity of the agreement as
between the parties.
Negotiation may be undertaken directly by the
head of state but he now usually assigns this task
to his authorized representatives. These
representatives are provided with credentials
known as full powers, which they exhibit to the
other negotiators at the start of the formal
discussions. It is standard practice for one of the
parties to submit a draft of the proposed treaty
which, together with the counter-proposals,
becomes the basis of the subsequent negotiations.
The negotiations may be brief or protracted,
depending on the issues involved, and may even
"collapse" in case the parties are unable to come
to an agreement on the points under
consideration.
If and when the negotiators finally decide on the
terms of the treaty, the same is opened for
signature. This step is primarily intended as a
means of authenticating the instrument and for
the purpose of symbolizing the good faith of the
parties; but, significantly, it does not indicate the
final consent of the state in cases where
ratification of the treaty is required. The document
3 3RD EXAM – POWERS OVER SOVEREIGN AFFAIRS PP 307-311
is ordinarily signed in accordance with the
alternat, that is, each of the several negotiators is
allowed to sign first on the copy which he will bring
home to his own state.
Ratification, which is the next step, is the formal
act by which a state confirms and accepts the
provisions of a treaty concluded by its
representatives. The purpose of ratification is to
enable the contracting states to examine the
treaty more closely and to give them an
opportunity to refuse to be bound by it should
they find it inimical to their interests. It is for this
reason that most treaties are made subject to the
scrutiny and consent of a department of the
government other than that which negotiated
them.
The last step in the treaty-making process is the
exchange of the instruments of ratification, which
usually also signifies the effectivity of the treaty
unless a different date has been agreed upon by
the parties. Where ratification is dispensed with
and no effectivity clause is embodied in the treaty,
the instrument is deemed effective upon its
signature.
Petitioners’ arguments equate the signing of the
treaty by the Philippine representative with
ratification. It should be underscored that the
signing of the treaty and the ratification are two
separate and distinct steps in the treaty-making
process. As earlier discussed, the signature is
primarily intended as a means of authenticating
the instrument and as a symbol of the good faith
of the parties. It is usually performed by the state’s
authorized representative in the diplomatic
mission. Ratification, on the other hand, is the
formal act by which a state confirms and accepts
the provisions of a treaty concluded by its
representative. It is generally held to be an
executive act, undertaken by the head of the state
or of the government.
Petitioners’ submission that the Philippines is
bound under treaty law and international law to
ratify the treaty which it has signed is without
basis. The signature does not signify the final
consent of the state to the treaty. It is the
ratification that binds the state to the provisions
thereof. In fact, the Rome Statute itself requires
that the signature of the representatives of the
states be subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval of the signatory states. Ratification is the
act by which the provisions of a treaty are formally
confirmed and approved by a State. By ratifying a
treaty signed in its behalf, a state expresses its
willingness to be bound by the provisions of such
treaty. After the treaty is signed by the state’s
representative, the President, being accountable
to the people, is burdened with the responsibility
and the duty to carefully study the contents of the
treaty and ensure that they are not inimical to the
interest of the state and its people. Thus, the
President has the discretion even after the signing
of the treaty by the Philippine representative
whether or not to ratify the same. The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties does not
contemplate to defeat or even restrain this power
of the head of states. If that were so, the
requirement of ratification of treaties would be
pointless and futile. It has been held that a state
has no legal or even moral duty to ratify a treaty
which has been signed by its plenipotentiaries.
There is no legal obligation to ratify a treaty, but it
goes without saying that the refusal must be based
on substantial grounds and not on superficial or
whimsical reasons. Otherwise, the other state
would be justified in taking offense.
It should be emphasized that under our
Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the
President, subject to the concurrence of the
Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited
only to giving or withholding its consent, or
concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within
the authority of the President to refuse to submit
a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its
consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it.
Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty
which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step
that should not be taken lightly, such decision is
within the competence of the President alone,
which cannot be encroached by this Court via a
writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction
over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the
performance of his official duties. The Court,
therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus
prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its
jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the
government to transmit the signed text of Rome
Statute to the Senate
4 3RD EXAM – POWERS OVER SOVEREIGN AFFAIRS PP 307-311
GO TEK vs. DEPORTATION BOARD
FACTS:
It was alleged in the complaint that in December,
1963 certain agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) searched an office located at
1439 O'Donnel Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila believed
to be the headquarters of a guerilla unit of the
"Emergency Intelligence Section, Army of the
United States" and that among those arrested
thereat was Go Tek an alleged sector commander
and intelligence and record officer of that guerilla
unit.
It was further alleged that fake dollar checks were
found in Go Tek's possession and that, therefore,
he had violated article 168 of the Revised Penal
Code and rendered himself an undesirable alien.
As deportation proceedings were underway, he
filed for the prohibition of the same against the
Deportation Board.
ISSUE:
whether the Deportation Board can entertain a
deportation proceeding based on a ground which
is not specified in section 37 of the Immigration
Law and although the aliens has not yet been
convicted of the offense imputed to him.
RULING:
We hold that the Board has jurisdiction to
investigate Go Tek for illegal possession of fake
dollar checks (as well as his alleged "guerilla"
activities) in spite of the fact that he has not yet
been convicted of illegal possession thereof under
article 168 of the Revised Penal Code and
notwithstanding that act is not the grounds for the
deportation of undesirable aliens as enumerated
in section 37 of the Immigration Law. The charge
against Go Tek before- the Board was not
premature.
The aforementioned obiter dictum the Qua Chee
Gan case invoked by Go Tek and relied upon by the
trial court, is not of this case. In the Qua Chee Gan
case the aliens were with economic sabotage
which is a ground for deportation under Republic
Act No. 503.
Under existing law; the deportation of an
undesirable alien may be effected (1) by order of
the President, after due investigation, pursuant to
section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code and
(2) by the Commissioner of Immigration upon
recommendation of the Board of Commissioners
under section 37 of the immigration Law (Qua
Chee Gan vs- Deportation Board,).
The President's power to deport aliens derives
from Sec. 69 of the Rev. Adm. Code which does not
specify the grounds for deportation of aliens but
only provides that it be ordered after due
investigation.
The State has the inherent power to deport
undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228
U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That
power may be exercise by the Chief Executive
"when he deems such action necessary for the
peace and domestic tranquility of the nation
Justice Johnson's is that there the Chief Executive
rinds that there are aliens whose continued in the
country is injurious to the public interest he may,
even in the absence of express law, deport them
Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board
FACTS: Qua Chee Gan et. al. were charged before
the Deportation Board for buying US dollars w/out
permit from the Central Bank. Board issued
warrants of arrest for the aliens pending
investigation. Qua Chee Gan et al argue that Board
has no jurisdiction.They contest the power of the
President to deport aliens and, consequently, the
delegation to the Deportation Board of the
ancillary power to investigate, on the ground that
such power is vested in the Legislature. They also
assail the Board’s authority to order theissuance
of warrants of arrest.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Deportation Board
also has authority to file warrants of arrest.
RULING:
Under Commonwealth Act No. 613 (Immigration
Act of 1940), the Commissioner of Immigration
was empowered to effect the arrest and expulsion
5 3RD EXAM – POWERS OVER SOVEREIGN AFFAIRS PP 307-311
of an alien, after previous determination by the
Board of Commissioners of the existence of
ground or grounds therefor (Sec- 37). With the
enactment of this law, however, the legislature did
not intend to delimit or
concentrate the exercise of the power to deport
on the Immigration Commissioner alone
While it may really be contended that the
aforequoted provision did not expressly confer on
the President the authority to deport undesirable
aliens, unlike the express grant to the
Commissioner of Immigration under
Commonwealth Act No. 613, but merely lays down
the procedure to be observed should there be
deportation proceedings, the fact that such a
procedure was provided for before the President
can deport an alien-which provision was expressly
declared exempted from the repealing effect of
the Immigration Act of 1940-is a clear indication of
the recognition, and inferentially a ratification, by
the legislature of the existence of such power in
the Executive. And the, exercise of this power by
the chief Executive has been
sanctioned by this Court in several decisions
Under the present and existing laws, therefore,
deportation of an undesirable alien may be
effected in two ways: by order of the President,
after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of
the Revised Administrative Code, and by the
Commissioner of Immigration, upon
recommendation by the Board of Commissioners,
under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.
There seems to be no doubt that the President's
power of investigation may be delegated. This is
clear from a reading of Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides for a "prior
investigation, conducted by said Executive (the
President) or his authorized agent." The first
executive order on the subject was that of
Governor General Frank Murphy (No. 494, July 26,
1934), constituting a board to take action on
complaints against foreigners, to conduct
investigations and thereafter make
recommendations. By virtue of Executive Order
No. 33 dated May 29, 1936, President Quezon
created the Deportation Board primarily to receive
complaints against aliens charged to be
undesirable, to conduct investigation pursuant to
Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code and
the rules and regulations therein provided, and
make the corresponding recommendation. Since
then, the Deportation Board has been conducting
the

investigation as the authorized agent of the

President.

The exercise of the power to order the arrest of an

individual demands the exercise of discretion by
the one issuing the same, to determine whether
under specific circumstances, the curtailment of
the liberty of such person is warranted. The fact
that the Constitution itself, as well as the statute
relied upon, prescribe the manner by which the
warrant may be issued, conveys the intent to make
the issuance of such warrant dependent upon
conditions the determination of the existence of
which requires the use of discretion by the person
issuing the same. In other words, the discretion of
whether a warrant of arrest shall issue or not is
personal to the one upon whom the authority
devolves. And authorities are to the effect that
while ministerial duties may be delegated, official
functions requiring the exercise of discretion and
judgment, may not be so delegated. Indeed, an
implied grant of power, considering that no
express authority was granted by the law on the
matter under discussion, that would serve the
curtailment or limitation on the fundamental right
of a person, such as his security to life and liberty,
must be viewed with caution, if we are to give
meaning to the guarantee contained in the
Constitution. If this is so, then guarantee a
delegation of that implied power, nebulous as it is,
must be rejected as inimical to the liberty of the
people. The guarantees of human rights and
freedom can not be made to rest precariously on
such a shaky foundation

6 3RD EXAM – POWERS OVER SOVEREIGN AFFAIRS PP 307-311