LAND TITLES AND DEEDS (Atty.

Espina)
Case Digests
Chapter I Legal Basis and Nature of Land Registration
Regalian Doctrine
Cruz vs. Sec. Facts  Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful
of DENR. GR. deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
No. 135385. regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
December 6,  After due deliberation on the petition, 7 members of the Court voted to dismiss, and 7 to grant the petition. As the votes were equally divided and the
2000. necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon but the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7
of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Issue
Ruling Puno, J – SEPARATE OPINION
The Concept of Native Title
Native title is defined as:
"Sec. 3 [l]. Native Title- refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as memory reaches, have been held under a claim
of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the
Spanish Conquest."
Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a claim of private ownership as far back as memory reaches.
These lands are deemed never to have been public lands and are indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest.
The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains (which also include ancestral lands) by virtue of native title shall be recognized and respected. Formal
recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title
of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated.
Like a torrens title, a CADT is evidence of private ownership of land by native title. Native title, however, is a right of private ownership peculiarly
granted to ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands and domains. The IPRA categorically declares ancestral lands and domains held by native title as never to
have been public land. Domains and lands held under native title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to have never been public lands and are private.
In Cariño v. Insular Government, the court reasoned that "[e]very presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the present. It
might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim
of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public
land. Certainly in a case like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt."
 The court thus laid down the presumption of a certain title held (1) as far back as testimony or memory went, and (2) under a claim of private
ownership. Land held by this title is presumed to "never have been public land."
Thus, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. Section 3 of
Article XII on National Economy and Patrimony of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into four categories: (a) agricultural, (b)
forest or timber, (c) mineral lands, and (d) national parks. Section 5 of the same Article XII mentions ancestral lands and ancestral domains but it does
not classify them under any of the said four categories. To classify them as public lands under any one of the four classes will render the entire IPRA law
a nullity. The spirit of the IPRA lies in the distinct concept of ancestral domains and ancestral lands. The IPRA addresses the major problem of the
ICCs/IPs which is loss of land. Land and space are of vital concern in terms of sheer survival of the ICCs/IPs.
The 1987 Constitution mandates the State to "protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands" and that "Congress
provide for the applicability of customary laws x x x in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain." It is the recognition of the ICCs/IPs
distinct rights of ownership over their ancestral domains and lands that breathes life into this constitutional mandate.
The Concept of Native Title does not Violate the Regalian Doctrine
1. The right of the ICCs/IPs to transfer land is limited only to ancestral lands and not to ancestral domains.
Section 7 (a) defines the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over their ancestral domains which covers (a) lands, (b) bodies of water traditionally and
actually occupied by the ICCs/IPs, (c) sacred places, (d) traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and (e) all improvements made by them at any time
within the domains. The right of ownership includes the following rights: (1) the right to develop lands and natural resources; (b) the right to stay in the
territories; (c) the right to resettlement in case of displacement; (d) the right to regulate the entry of migrants; (e) the right to safe and clean air and water;
(f) the right to claim parts of the ancestral domains as reservations; and (g) the right to resolve conflict in accordance with customary laws.
Section 8 governs their rights to ancestral lands. Unlike ownership over the ancestral domains, Section 8 gives the ICCs/IPs also the right to transfer
the land or property rights to members of the same ICCs/IPs or non-members thereof. This is in keeping with the option given to ICCs/IPs to secure a
torrens title over the ancestral lands, but not to domains.
The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to
alienate the same.
2. The Right of ICCs/IPs to Develop Lands and Natural Resources Within the Ancestral Domains Does Not Deprive the State of Ownership Over the
Natural Resources and Control and Supervision in their Development and Exploitation.
The Regalian doctrine on the ownership, management and utilization of natural resources is declared in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, viz:
"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
 shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The
State may directly undertake such activities, or, it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens,
or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens.
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domains. The
right of ICCs/IPs in their ancestral domains includes ownership, but this "ownership" is expressly defined and limited in Section 7 (a) as:
"Sec. 7. a) Right of ownership- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred
places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains;"
Indeed, the right of ownership under Section 7 (a) does not cover "waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all other natural resources" enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution as belonging to the State.
The non-inclusion of ownership by the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in Section 7(a) complies with the Regalian doctrine.
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right to "manage and
conserve" them for future generations, "benefit and share" the profits from their allocation and utilization, and "negotiate the terms and conditions for
their exploration" for the purpose of "ensuring ecological and environmental protection and conservation measures."… Simply stated, the ICCs/IPs'
rights over the natural resources take the form of management or stewardship.
The rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives the ICCs/IPs, as owners and
occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small-scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their
large-scale development and exploitation. Section 57 does not mandate the State to automatically give priority to the ICCs/IPs. The State has several
options and it is within its discretion to choose which option to pursue.
Sec. of Facts There are two consolidated petitions.
DENR vs. Yap.  G.R. No. 167707: a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
GR. No. 167707. Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of
October 8, 2008. Boracay for titling purposes.
 This arose from the Proclamation No. 1801 issued by Marcos declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines,
as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA
implementing the said proclamation.
 Respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied
lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on
 them. They alleged that under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in
their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
 The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory relief, arguing that Boracay Island was
an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as "public forest," which was not available for disposition
pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code, as amended.
 G.R. No. 173775: during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay
Island into 400 hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The
Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which
shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
 Petitioners-claimants who are landowners in Boracay filed petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation 1064. They allege
that the Proclamation infringed on their prior vested rights over portions of Boracay. They alleged that they have been in continued possession of their
respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into
agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act
No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act. Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.
Issue WON private claimants’ continued possession for 10 years under Act No. 926 create a presumption that the land is alienable. NO
Ruling Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, ruled:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of
lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the
Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the
"issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of
imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the
assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that the government’s title to public land sprung from the
Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain
whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the
government and the friar lands."
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private
individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.
Issue WON Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain (prior to Proclamation No. 1064). YES
Ruling PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a
public forest as "a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the determination of
which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not." Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso
facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach resorts on the island; that the island has already been stripped of its
forest cover; or that the implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the island’s tourism industry, do not negate its character as public forest.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution classifying lands of the public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks," do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and
underbrushes.
The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry is particularly instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators
or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms,
and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status
and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect
title do not apply.
There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a classification of lands of the public domain as
appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes. At any rate,
the Court is tasked to determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced
by beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not been automatically converted from public forest to alienable agricultural
land.
Issue WON Private claimants are entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141. NO
Ruling There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since
time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural
land. The island remained an unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered State property.
 Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801,
must fail because of the absence of the second element of alienable and disposable land. Their entitlement to a government grant under our present
Public Land Act presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and disposable. This is clear from the wording of the law itself.
Where the land is not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were
classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands
in Boracay since June 12, 1945.
We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief that private claimants complied with the requisite period of
possession.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first element of possession. We note that the earliest of the tax
declarations in the name of private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that
the period of possession and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.
REGALIAN DOCTRINE AND ITS LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber. Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the
following divisions: agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as
may be provided by law, giving the government great leeway for classification. Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution
classification with one addition: national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated. Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006,
Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the
public domain.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of
land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been
acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain. Necessarily, it is up to the
State to determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of the
plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted
such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and
again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into
 disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have
been "officially delimited and classified."
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration
(or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. There must still be a positive
act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The
records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government
proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that
lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed.
They call for proof.
Republic vs. Facts:  On June 2, 1930, the CFI of Cagayan issued Decree No. 381298 in favor of Sps. Carag covering a parcel of land. On July 19, 1938, pursuant to said
CA, et. al. GR. Decree, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan issued OCT No. 11585 in the name of Sps. Carag. (Later, to discharge the encumbrance stated in the
No. 155450. Decree, two new OCTs were issued, one in the name of Cagayan, and the other, in the name of Sps. Carag.)
August 6, 2008.  On May 19, 1994, Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayad and others filed with the Regional office of the DENR a letter petition requesting the DENR
(Spouses Carag to initiate the filing of an action for the annulment of the Decree on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of
Case) the subject property which was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of the issuance of the Decree.
 Pursuant to the DENR’s findings that the covered land was found to be still within the timberland area at the time of the issuance of the Decree, the
DENR filed with the CA a complaint for annulment of judgment, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles.
 CA dismissed the complaint because of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, there being no allegations which are jurisdictional.
 The DENR brought the petition to the SC. It argues that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch of the Government, not the trial courts, had the
power to declassify or reclassify lands of the public domain. Thus, annulment of judgment is proper on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial
court.
Issue: WON the CFI, which ordered Decree No. 381298, had jurisdiction to adjudicate to Sps. Carag the disputed portion of the subject property. YES
Ruling Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable. In Aldecoa v. Insular Government, we ruled:
 From the language of the foregoing provisions of law, it is deduced that, with the exception of those comprised within the mineral and
timber zone, all lands owned by the State or by the sovereign nation are public in character, and per se alienable and, provided they are
not destined to the use of the public in general or reserved by the Government in accordance with law, they may be acquired by any private
or juridical person x x x
Thus, unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved by the State for some public purpose in accordance with law, all Crown
lands were deemed alienable.
In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had been declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved for some public purpose in
accordance with law, during the Spanish regime or thereafter. The land classification maps petitioner attached to the complaint also do not show that in
1930 the disputed portion was part of the forest zone or reserved for some public purpose. The certification of the National Mapping and Resources
Information Authority, dated 27 May 1994, contained no statement that the disputed portion was declared and classified as timber land.
The law prevailing when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930 was Act No. 2874, which provides:
SECTION 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to
time classify the lands of the public domain into -
(a) Alienable or disposable
(b) Timber and
(c) Mineral lands
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their government and disposition.
Petitioner has not alleged that the Governor-General had declared the disputed portion of the subject property timber or mineral land pursuant to
Section 6 of Act No. 2874.
It is true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition only those lands which have been declared alienable or disposable. Section 8 provides:
Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and classified and, when
practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for [1] public or quasi-public uses, [2] not appropriated by the Government, [3] nor in
any manner become private property, [4] nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid
law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the Governor-General may, for reasons of
Atty. Espina: No need for
classification of lands if you prove public interest, declare lands of the public domain open to disposition before the same have had their boundaries established or been surveyed,
that the land is already private or may, for the same reasons, suspend their concession or disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the Legislature.
property. The Regalian Doctrine However, Section 8 provides that lands which are already private lands, as well as lands on which a private claim may be made under any law,
will not apply if the property is
are not covered by the classification requirement in Section 8 for purposes of disposition. This exclusion in Section 8 recognizes that during the
already private, just like in native
title.
 Spanish regime, Crown lands were per se alienable unless falling under timber or mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for some public purpose in
accordance with law.
Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification requirement in Section 8, trial courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate these lands to
private parties. Petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had not become private property prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874. Neither has
petitioner alleged that the disputed portion was not land on which a private right may be claimed under any existing law at that time.
… when the trial court issued the decision for the issuance of Decree No. 381928 in 1930, the trial court had jurisdiction to determine whether the
subject property, including the disputed portion, applied for was agricultural, timber or mineral land. The trial court determined that the land was
agricultural and that spouses Carag proved that they were entitled to the decree and a certificate of title. The government, which was a party in the
original proceedings in the trial court as required by law, did not appeal the decision of the trial court declaring the subject land as agricultural. Since the
trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, its decision rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago, is now final and beyond review.
The finality of the trial court’s decision is further recognized in Section 1, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution which provides:
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or
utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is
owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government
established under this Constitution.
Thus, even as the 1935 Constitution declared that all agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain belong to the State, it recognized
that these lands were "subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established
under this Constitution." When the Commonwealth Government was established under the 1935 Constitution, spouses Carag had already an existing
right to the subject land, including the disputed portion, pursuant to Decree No. 381928 issued in 1930 by the trial court.
Purpose and Meaning of the Torrens System of Registration
Legarda vs. Facts  The plaintiff-appellants are Consuelo Legarda and her husband Mauro Prieto.
Saleeby. GR.  The defendant-appellee is N.M. Saleeby who is the purchaser of the land owned by Teus, the predecessor-in-interest.
No. 8936.  The parties are owners of adjoining lots in Ermita, Manila. Between their lots is a stone wall which has existed for a number of years. Said wall is
October 8, 2008. located on the lot of the plaintiffs.
 That sometime, the plaintiffs had successfully registered their lot in the Court of Land Registration which decreed them an original certificate provided
under the torrens system. Said registration and certificate included the said stone wall.
 That later, Teus also registered the lot occupied by him. By that, he also got an original certificate under the torrens system which also included the
stone wall.

Issue
Ruling
Atty. Espina: Purpose of the
Torrens System: Publicity,
Priority, Security.
To quiet title to the land. To
put stop to any legal question.
For the convenience in the
registration.
It is a proceeding in rem.
 After several months later, when the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been
included in the certificate granted to the defendant, they petition the Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error.
 The lower court denied said petition upon the theory that during the pendency of the petition for the registration of Teus’ land, they failed to make any
objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall.
 The plaintiff appealed to the SC. The defendant, as appellee, opposes by arguing that when the notice of the application of Teus was served, they
became defendant in a proceeding initiated by Teus. Through their failure to appear and contest his right thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default
judgment against them, they became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to Teus.
Who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it? THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which
were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem
that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa,"
to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of course, it cannot be denied that the proceeding for the registration of land under the torrens system is
judicial.
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary action. All the world are parties, including the
government. After the registration is complete and final and there exists no fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may claim an interest. The
rights of all the world are foreclosed by the decree of registration. The government itself assumes the burden of giving notice to all parties. To
permit persons who are parties in the registration proceeding (and they are all the world) to again litigate the same questions, and to again cast doubt
upon the validity of the registered title, would destroy the very purpose and intent of the law. The registration, under the torrens system, does not give
the owner any better title than he had. If he does not already have a perfect title, he cannot have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered.
The certificate of registration accumulates in open document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The
certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few
exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, EXCEPT in some direct proceeding permitted
by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. A registered title can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in
a collateral proceeding and not even by a direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a particular parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the same
between the same parties. In view of the fact that all the world are parties, it must follow that future litigation over the title is forever barred; there can
be no persons who are not parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule, EXCEPT as to rights which are noted in the certificate or which arise
subsequently, and with certain other exceptions which need not be dismissed at present. A title once registered cannot be defeated, even by an
 adverse, open, and notorious possession. Registered title under the torrens system cannot be defeated by prescription (section 46, Act No. 496).
The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the registration.
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular
Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description "To all
whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any
proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest
therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree
(of registration), provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest.
It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not be opened, for any reason, in any court, except for fraud, and not even for
fraud, after the lapse of one year. If then the decree of registration can not be opened for any reason, except for fraud, in a direct proceeding for that
purpose, may such decree be opened or set aside in a collateral proceeding by including a portion of the land in a subsequent certificate or decree of
registration? We do not believe the law contemplated that a person could be deprived of his registered title in that way.
…Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes and the real intent of the torrens system, we are of the opinion and
so decree that in case land has been registered under the Land Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date shall prevail.
It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize such damages, taking into consideration al of
the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them. In the present case, the appellee was the first negligent (granting that he was the
real owner, and if he was not the real owner he can not complain) in not opposing the registration in the name of the appellants. He was a party-
defendant in an action for the registration of the lot in question, in the name of the appellants, in 1906. "Through his failure to appear and to oppose such
registration, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against him, he became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to the
appellants. He had his day in court and should not be permitted to set up his own omissions as the ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly
entered by a court of competent jurisdiction." Granting that he was the owner of the land upon which the wall is located, his failure to oppose the
registration of the same in the name of the appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against impugning the validity of that judgment.
There is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the appellee should be applied to the appellants than to him.
Issue WON the defendant is an innocent purchaser and thus has a greater right over the plaintiffs. NO
Ruling The first original certificate is recorded in the public registry. It is never issued until it is recorded. The record [is] notice to all the world. All persons
are charged with the knowledge of what it contains. All persons dealing with the land so recorded, or any portion of it, must be charged with notice
of whatever it contains. The purchaser is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which the record
discloses. This rule is so well established that it is scarcely necessary to cite authorities in its support.
 When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included
therein.
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is
irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record would
have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and object of the law
requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any more
than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the
public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation.
We do not believe that the phrase "innocent purchaser should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an "innocent purchaser"
because of the facts contained in the record of the first original certificate. The rule should not be applied to the purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor
of which is not the owner of the original certificate, or his successors. He, in nonsense, can be an "innocent purchaser" of the portion of the land included
in another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what the record contains precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior registry
there cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in a prior original certificate and in a name other than that of the vendor, or his
successors. In order to minimize the difficulties we think this is the safe rule to establish. We believe the phrase "innocent purchaser," used in said
sections, should be limited only to cases where unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a certificate under the torrens system. When
land is once brought under the torrens system, the record of the original certificate and all subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all the world.
We believe that the purchaser from the owner of the later certificate, and his successors, should be required to resort to his vendor for damages, in
case of a mistake like the present, rather than to molest the holder of the first certificate who has been guilty of no negligence. The holder of the first
original certificate and his successors should be permitted to rest secure in their title, against one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who
had full and complete knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land included in the second original certificate, by reason of the facts contained in the
public record and the knowledge with which he is charged and by reason of his negligence, should suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such purchase,
rather than he who has obtained the first certificate and who was innocent of any act of negligence.
Bishop vs. Facts  In dispute are certain portions of a parcel of land situated in Calapacuan, Subic, Zambales, with a total area of 1,652 square meters. These portions
CA. GR. No. are in the possession of the petitioners. The entire parcel is registered in the name of the private respondents under TCT No. T-29018.
86787. May 8,  On January 22, 1985, the private respondents sued the petitioners for recovery of possession of the lots in question, invoking their rights as registered
1992 owners of the land. The petitioners, then defendants, claimed that the lots were part of the public domain and could not have been registered under
the Torrens system. They alleged their long and continuous possession of the lots and produced tax declarations in their names; some of them alleged
they had acquired the lots by virtue of valid contracts of sale; and another based on inheritance.
 The Trial Court and the CA rendered judgment in favor of private respondents for being the registered owners
  The petitioners came to the SC alleging that:
1. The land in question is part of the public domain and could not have been validly registered under the Torrens system.
2. The petitioners have acquired title to their respective lots by laches.
3. In the alternative, they should be considered builders in good faith entitled to the rights granted by Articles 448, 546, 547 and 548 of the NCC.
Issue WON the lots in question are part of the public domain and therefore could not have been validly registered. NO
Ruling …the Court notes that the private respondents' title is traceable to an Original Certificate of Title issued way back in 1910 or eighty-two years ago.

Atty. Espina: Characteristics of That certificate is now incontrovertible and conclusive against the whole world. The presumption of regularity applies to the issuance of that
the title: certificate. This presumption covers the finding that the land subject of the certificate was private in nature and therefore registrable under the
Torrens system.
1. Indefeasible
2. Incontrovertible To sustain an action for annulment of a Torrens certificate for being void ab initio, it must be shown that the registration court had not acquired
3. imprescriptible jurisdiction over the case and that there was actual fraud in securing the title. Neither of these requirements has been established by the petitioners. All
they submitted was the certification of the Bureau of Forestry that the land in question was alienable and disposable public land. The trial court was
correct in ruling that this deserved scant consideration for lack of legal basis. To be sure, a certification from an administrative body cannot prevail
against court decision declaring the land to be registrable.
xxx an action to invalidate a certificate of title on the ground of fraud prescribes after the expiration of one (1) year from the entry of the decree of
registration and cannot now be resorted to by the petitioners at this late hour. And collaterally at that.
The strange theory submitted by the petitioners that the owner of registered land must also possess it does not merit serious attention. The non-
presentation by the private respondents of their tax declarations on the land is no indication that they have never acquired ownership thereof or have lost
it by such omission.
Issue WON the petitioners have acquired title to the lots by laches. NO
Ruling As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right to eject any person illegally occupying their property. This
right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were aware of the petitioners' occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that
possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely
tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches.
In urging laches against the private respondents for not protesting their long and continuous occupancy of the lots in question, the petitioners are in
effect contending that they have acquired the said lots by acquisitive prescription. It is an elementary principle that the owner of a land registered under
the Torrens system cannot lose it by prescription.
Issue WON petitioners can be considered as builders in good faith. NO
 Ruling A builder in good faith is one who is unaware of any flaw in his title to the land at the time he builds on it. This definition cannot apply to the
petitioners because they knew at the very outset that they had no right at all to occupy the subject lots.
NGA vs. Facts  Petitioner – National Grains Authority (NGA)
IAC. GR. No. L-  Private Respondents - Melecio Magcamit, Emelita Magcamit, and Nena Cosico
68741. January  Sps. Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizardo, as owners of a parcel of land situated in Laguna, sold for P30,000 said property in favor of private
28, 1988. respondents. As a result of which they executed into Kasulatan ng Bilihang Mabiling Muli (Deed of Conditional Sale with Right of Repurchase). This
sale was recorded in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna.
 The sale was then made absolute by the Spouses in favor of the private respondents for the sum of P90,000 – P50,000 was paid upon the execution of
Kasulatan ng Bilihan Tuluyan (Deed of Absolute Sale), while the P40,000 was to be paid the moment that the certificate of title is issued. After
which, private respondents entered into a peaceful, adverse and open possession of the subject property. The Deeds of Absolute Sale, however, was
not recorded.
 Years later, an OCT covering the property was issued and in the name of the Spouses without the knowledge of the private respondents. Said spouses
executed a SPA in favor of one Ramirez authorizing the latter to mortgage the property with the petitioner, NGA.
 The property was subsequently foreclosed and sold in a public auction with petitioner as the highest and successful bidder. Thus, a Certificate of Sale
was issued in favor of NGA. NGA subsequently obtained under his name a TCT from the Register of Deeds.
 It was only later that private respondents learned that a title in the name of the Spouses had been issued and that the property had been mortgaged in
favor of the petitioner.
 All efforts to obtain settlement and its respective claim failed, the private respondents filed a complaint before the CFI against the petitioner and the
Spouses, praying, among others, that they be declared the owners of the property, and if the petitioner is declared the owner, then, to order it to
reconvey or transfer the ownership to them. They claim a better right to the property in question by virtue of the Conditional Sale, later changed to a
deed of Absolute Sale which although unregistered under the Torrens System allegedly transferred to them the ownership and the possession of the
property in question.
 The petitioner, in his answer, maintained that it was never a privy to any transaction between the private respondents and the Spouses, and thus it is a
purchaser in good faith and for value of the property. It argues that the title is now indefeasible.
 CFI judged in favor of the petitioner. CA reversed the decision and sided with the private respondents.
Issue WON petitioner NGA is the lawful owner of the subject property. YES
Ruling TITLE UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM; IN REM; INDEFEASIBLE
It is axiomatic, that while the registration of the conditional sale with right of repurchase may be binding on third persons, it is by provision of law
"understood to be without prejudice to third party who has better right" (Section 194 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344). In this
case, it will be noted that the third party NGA, is a registered owner under the Torrens System and has obviously a better right than private respondents
and that the deed of absolute sale with the suspensive condition is not registered and is necessarily binding only on the spouses Vivas and Lizardo and
private respondents.
Time and time again, this Court has ruled that the proceedings for the registration of title to land under the Torrens System is an action in
rem not in personam, hence, personal notice to all claimants of the res is not necessary in order that the court may have jurisdiction to deal with
and dispose of the res. Neither may lack of such personal notice vitiate or invalidate the decree or title issued in a registration proceeding, for the State,
as sovereign over the land situated within it, may provide for the adjudication of title in a proceeding in rem or one in the nature of or akin a to
proceeding in rem which shall be binding upon all persons, known or unknown. It is thus evident that respondents' right over the property was barred
by res judicata when the decree of registration was issued to spouses Vivas and Lizards. It does not matter that they may have had some right even the
right of ownership, BEFORE the grant of the Torrens Title.
Thus, under Section 44 of P.D. 1529, every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every
subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the same free from all encumbrances
EXCEPT those noted on the certificate and any of the encumbrances which may be subsisting, and enumerated in the law. Under said provision,
claims and liens of whatever character, except those mentioned by law as existing, against the land prior to the issuance of certificate of title, are cut off
by such certificate if not noted thereon, and the certificate so issued binds the whole world, including the government. Under said ruling, if the
purchaser is the only party who appears in the deeds and the registration of titles in the property registry, no one except such purchaser may be deemed
by law to be the owner of the properties in question. Moreover, no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired
by prescription or adverse possession.
It does not appear that private respondents' claim falls under any of the exceptions provided for under Section 44 of P.D. 1529 which can be enforced
against petitioner herein.
The only exception to this rule is where a person obtains a certificate of title to a land belonging to another and he has full knowledge of the
rights of the true owner. He is then considered as guilty of fraud and he may be compelled to transfer the land to the defrauded owner so long as the
property has not passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
It will be noted that the spouses Vivas and Lizardo never committed any fraud in procuring the registration of the property in question. On the
contrary, their application for registration which resulted in the issuance of OCT No. 1728 was with complete knowledge and implied authority of
private respondents who retained a portion of the consideration until the issuance to said spouses of a certificate of title applied for under the Torrens Act
and the corresponding delivery of said title to them. The question therefore, is not about the validity of OCT No. 1728 but in the breach of contract
between private respondents and the Vivas spouses…
 Under the circumstances, the Regional Trial Court could not have erred in ruling that plaintiffs (private respondents herein) complaint insofar as it
prays that they be declared owners of the land in question cannot prosper in view of the doctrine of indefeasibility of title under the Torrens
System, because it is an established principle that a petition for review of the decree of registration will not prosper even if filed within one year
from the entry of the decree if the title has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value (Pres. Decree No. 1529, Sec. 32). The setting
aside of the decree of registration issued in land registration proceedings is operative only between the parties to the fraud and the parties defrauded and
their privies, but not against acquirers in good faith and for value and the successors in interest of the latter; as to them the decree shall remain in full
force and effect forever .
Ruling NGA AS INNOCENT PURCHASER
…Petitioner NGA was never a privy to this transaction. Neither was it shown that it had any knowledge at the time of the execution of the mortgage,
of the existence of the suspensive condition in the deed of absolute sale much less of its violation. Nothing appeared to excite suspicion. The Special
Power of Attorney was regular on its face; the OCT was in the name of the mortgagor and the NGA was the highest bidder in the public auction.
Unquestionably, therefore, the NGA is an innocent purchaser for value, first as an innocent mortgagee under Section 32 of P.D. 1529 and later as
innocent purchaser for value in the public auction sale.
Private respondents claim that NGA did not even field any representative to the land which was not even in the possession of the supposed
mortgagors, nor present any witness to prove its allegations in the ANSWER nor submit its DEED OF MORTGAGE to show its being a mortgages in
good faith and for value.
Such contention is, however, untenable. Well settled is the rule that all persons dealing with property covered by a torrens certificate of title are not
required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title. When there is nothing on the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership
Atty. Espina: The Double
of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore further than what the torrens title upon its face indicates in quest
Mirror Principle
for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto (Centeno vs. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 545 [1985]).
D.B.T. Mar- Facts  Petitioner – D.B.T. Mary-Bay Construction, Inc.; the current owner of a parcel of land conveyed by B.C. Regalado to the former through a dacion en
Bay pago. The parcel of land (Psu-123169) is included in TCT 200519.
Construction,  Private Respondents – Ricaredo, Angelito, etc; the alleged owners and the claimant of the subject land.
Inc. v. Panes.  Private Respondent filed a complaint for Quieting of Title with Cancellation of the TCT and all titles derived thereat against petitioner, B.C.
594 SCRA 578. Regalado, and other persons.
(2009)  Private Respondents alleged that they are the lawful owner and claimant of the subject property which they had declared for taxation purposes in
their name. They also claimed that they had been, and still are, in actual possession of the portions of the subject property, and their possession
preceded the Second World War. They alleged that it was discovered by the Mapping Services of the LRA that there existed an overlapping of
portions of the land subject of Ricaredo’s application, with the subdivision plan of B.C. Regalado. In essence, respondents alleged that B.C.
 Regalado and DBT used the derivative titles which covered properties located far from Pasong Putik, Novaliches, Quezon City where the subject
property is located, and B.C. Regalado and DBT then offered the same for sale to the public. Respondents thus submitted that B.C Regalado and
DBT through their deliberate scheme, in collusion with others, used (LRC) Pcs-18345 as shown in the consolidation-subdivision plan to include the
subject property covered by Lot Plan Psu-123169.
 The RD of Quezon City admitted that he committed a grave mistake when he earlier said that TCT 200519 covered only one lot. He discovered that
the TCT actually cover 54 lots. Then, he opposes that respondents’ allegation that several lots of the estate were not included.
 RTC, through judge Bacalla, decided in favor of the respondents. It give credit to respondents’ testimony that they occupied the subject property
since 1936 in the concept of an owner, giving them equitable ownership over the same by virtue of an approved plan. It also considered the findings
that the subject property was declared under the name of Ricaredo for taxation purposes. It added that the subject property per survey should not
have been included in the TCT registered in the name of B.C. Regalado and ceded to DBT.
 RTC, through judge Juanson, reversed the court’s decision and held that prescription does not run against registered land, hence, a title once
registered cannot be defeated even by OCEN possession.
 The CA reversed the RTC and reinstated its first decision (Bacalla’s).
Issue WON DBT have a better right than the respondents over the subject property. YES
Ruling It is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that no title to registered land in derogation of the rights of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
Article 1126 of the Civil Code in connection with Section 46 of Act No. 496 (The Land Registration Act), as amended by Section 47 of P.D. No.
1529 (The Property Registration Decree), clearly supports this rule. Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against his
hereditary successors. Possession is a mere consequence of ownership where land has been registered under the Torrens system, the efficacy and
integrity of which must be protected. Prescription is rightly regarded as a statute of repose whose objective is to suppress fraudulent and stale claims
from springing up at great distances of time and surprising the parties or their representatives when the facts have become obscure from the lapse of time
or the defective memory or death or removal of witnesses.
Thus, respondents' claim of acquisitive prescription over the subject property is baseless. Under Article 1126 of the Civil Code, acquisitive
prescription of ownership of lands registered under the Land Registration Act shall be governed by special laws. Correlatively, Act No. 496, as amended
by PD No. 1529, provides that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by adverse possession.
Consequently, in the instant case, proof of possession by the respondents is immaterial and inconsequential.
Moreover, it may be stressed that there was no ample proof that DBT participated in the alleged fraud. DBT is an innocent purchaser for value and
good faith which, through a dacion en pago duly entered into with B.C. Regalado, acquired ownership over the subject property, and whose rights must
be protected under Section 32 of P.D. No. 1529.
 It must also be noted that portions of the subject property had already been sold to third persons who, like DBT, are innocent purchasers in good faith
and for value, relying on the certificates of title shown to them, and who had no knowledge of any defect in the title of the vendor, or of facts sufficient
to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the subject property. To disregard these circumstances simply on the basis of alleged
continuous and adverse possession of respondents would not only be inimical to the rights of the aforementioned titleholders, but would ultimately
wreak havoc on the stability of the Torrens system of registration.
A final note. While the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring title, but merely a system of registration of titles to lands, justice and equity
demand that the titleholder should not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the State's agents, in the absence of proof of
his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to
any question as to the legality of the title, except claims that were noted in the certificate at the time of the registration or that may arise subsequent
thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system would forever be sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration officials, who are
ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their duties. Thus, where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus
issued, acquire rights over the property, the court cannot disregard those rights and order the cancellation of the certificate. [Otherwise] The effect of
such outright cancellation will be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title. The sanctity of the Torrens system must be preserved;
otherwise, everyone dealing with the property registered under the system will have to inquire in every instance on whether the title had been regularly
or irregularly issued, contrary to the evident purpose of the law. Every person dealing with the registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor, and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind [beyond] the certificate to determine the condition of the property-
[Double Mirror Doctrine]
Chapter II Land Registration Commission and its Registries of Deeds
The Land Registration Authority
Baranda vs. Facts  Respondent Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso filed a motion for reconsideration of the respondent judge’s order stating therein:
Gustilo GR. No. That the undersigned hereby asks for a reconsideration of the said order based on the second paragraph of Section 77 of P.D. 1529, to wit:
81163. "At any time after final judgment in favor of the defendant or other disposition of the action such as to terminate finally all
September 26, rights of the plaintiff in and to the land and/or buildings involved, in any case in which a memorandum or notice of Lis
1988. Pendens has been registered as provided in the preceding section, the notice of Lis Pendens shall be deemed cancelled upon the
registration of a certificate of the clerk of court in which the action or proceeding was pending stating the manner of disposal
thereof."
That the lis pendens under Entry No. 427183 was annotated on T-106098, T-111560, T-111561 and T-111562 by virtue of a case
docketed as Civil Case No. 15871, now pending with the Intermediate Court of Appeals, entitled, "Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Sr.,
Maria Provido and Perfecto Provido, Plaintiffs, versus Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, Respondents."
 That under the above-quoted provisions of P.D. 152, the cancellation of subject Notice of Lis Pendens can only be made or deemed
cancelled upon the registration of the certificate of the Clerk of Court in which the action or proceeding was pending, stating the manner of
disposal thereof.
Considering that Civil Case No. 15871, upon which the Notice of Lis Pendens was based is still pending with the Intermediate Court of
Appeals, only the Intermediate Court of Appeals and not this Honorable Court in a mere cadastral proceedings can order the cancellation of
the Notice of Lis Pendens.
 Respondent Judge Tito Gustilo set aside his previous order and granted the Acting Register of Deeds' motion for reconsideration.
 The petitioners filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction to compel the respondent judge to
reinstate his order directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the new certificates of titles issued in the name
of the petitioners.
Issue WON the duty of the RD to annotate and/or cancel the notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of title is ministerial. YES
Ruling Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for
registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration. ... . If the instrument is not registrable, he shall
forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the ground or reasons therefore, and advising him of his
right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree."
Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance
of any deed, mortgage or other instrument presented to him for registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the action taken by the
Register of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the question shall be submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by the Register of
Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the Register of Deeds. ... ."
The statute concerning the function of the Register of Deeds to register instruments in a torrens certificate of title is clear and leaves no room for
construction. According to Webster's Third International Dictionary of the English Language — the word shall means "ought to, must, ...obligation used
to express a command or exhortation, used in laws, regulations or directives to express what is mandatory." Hence, the function of a Register of Deeds
with reference to the registration of deeds encumbrances, instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting Register of Deeds did
not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the respondent Judge's Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis
pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over the subject parcel of land. In case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken in
pursuance of any deed ... or other instrument presented to him, he should have asked the opinion of the Commissioner of Land Registration now, the
Administrator of the National Land Title and Deeds Registration Administration in accordance with Section 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
 Balbin vs. Facts  On Nov. 15, 1961, petitioners, Aurelio and Francisco Balbin, presented to the RD of Ilocus Sur a duplicate copy of the registered owner’s certificate
Register of of title (OCT No. 548) and an instrument entitled Deed of Donation inter-vivos. They requested that the Deed be annotated on the OCT which in
Deeds of Ilocus effect makes him the owner of the 2/3 portion of a parcel of land owned by Cornelio Balbin
Sur. GR. No.  The RD denied the requested annotation for failure of the petitioners to present the three co-owner’s duplicate certificates of title No. 548 which
20611. May 8, have been issued by the RD in the name of Florentino Gabayan, Roberto Bravo, and Juana Gabayan who appears to be vendees of the parcel of land.
1969. It appears that in the memorandum of encumbrances on the certificate, three separate sales of undivided portions of the land were earlier executed by
Cornelio Babin in favor of the said vendees.
 Unsatisfied, petitioners referred the matter to the Commissioner of Land Registration, who subsequently upheld the action of the Register of Deeds.
Without presenting those three (3) other duplicates of the title, petitioners would want to compel annotation of the deed of donation upon the copy in
their possession, citing section 55 of Act 496, which provides that "the production of the owner's duplicate certificate of title whenever any voluntary
instrument is presented for registration shall be conclusive authority from the registered owner to the register of deeds to make a memorandum of
registration in accordance with such instrument." Under this provision, according to petitioners, the presentation of the other copies of the title is not
required, first, because it speaks of "registered owner" and not one whose claim to or interest in the property is merely annotated on the title
Issue WON the Deed of Donation can be annotated on the OCT No. 548 without first surrendering the three other duplicates of the title previously issued
to other persons. NO
Ruling Section 55, obviously assumes that there is only one duplicate copy of the title in question, namely, that of the registered owner himself, such that its
production whenever a voluntary instrument is presented constitutes sufficient authority from him for the register of deeds to make the corresponding
memorandum of registration. In the case at bar, the three other copies of the title were in existence, presumably issued under section 43 * of Act 496. As
correctly observed by the Land Registration Commissioner, petitioners' claim that the issuance of those copies was unauthorized or illegal is beside the
point, its legality being presumed until otherwise declared by a court of competent jurisdiction. There being several copies of the same title in existence,
it is easy to see how their integrity may be adversely affected if an encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on the
others. The law itself refers to every copy authorized to be issued as a duplicate of the original, which means that both must contain identical entries of
the transactions, particularly voluntary ones, affecting the land covered by the title. If this were not so, if different copies were permitted to carry
differing annotations, the whole system of Torrens registration would cease to be reliable.
PROCEDURES IN THE RD
It appears that there is a case pending in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (CC No. 2221), wherein the civil status of the donor Cornelio Balbin
and the character of the land in question are in issue, as well as the validity of the different conveyances executed by him. The matter of registration of
the deed of donation may well await the outcome of that case, and in the meantime the rights of the interested parties could be protected by filing the
proper notices of lis pendens.
 Almirol vs. Facts  Petitioner Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land situated in Esperanza, Agusan, and covered by OCT P-1237. He thus went
Register of to the office of the RD of Agusan to register the deed of sale and to secure in his name a TCT.
Deeds of  The RD refused registration on the ground that the OCT is registered in the name of Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo (deceased), and by
Agusan. GR. legal presumption, is considered conjugal property and it is thus necessary that the property be first liquidated and settled.
No. L-22486.  In view of such refusal, petitioner went to the CFI on a petition for mandamus to compel the RD to register on the ground that it is the ministerial duty
March 20, 1968. of the RD to perform the acts required by petitioner.
 CFI dismissed the petition. Hence, the present appeal by petitioner.
Issue WON respondent RD could refuse registration on the ground of the alleged invalidity of the deed. NO
Ruling Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent evince a sincere desire on his part to maintain inviolate the law on succession and transmission of
rights over real properties, these do not constitute legal grounds for his refusal to register the deed. Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the
register of deeds to determine; this function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction.
Whether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not the duty of a Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of competent
jurisdiction. (Gabriel vs. Register of Deeds of Rizal, et al., L-17956, Sept. 30, 1953).
. . . the supposed invalidity of the contracts of lease is no valid objection to their registration, because invalidity is no proof of their non-
existence or a valid excuse for denying their registration. The law on registration does not require that only valid instruments shall be registered.
How can parties affected thereby be supposed to know their invalidity before they become aware, actually or constructively, of their existence
or of their provisions? If the purpose of registration is merely to give notice, then questions regarding the effect or invalidity of instruments are
expected to be decided after, not before, registration. It must follow as a necessary consequence that registration must first be allowed, and
validity or effect litigated afterwards.
Indeed, a register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act 1151 from exercising his personal judgment and discretion when
confronted with the problem of whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid. For under the said section, when he is in doubt as
to the proper step to be taken with respect to any deed or other instrument presented to him for registration, all that he is supposed to do is to submit and
certify the question to the Commissioner of Land Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step to be taken on the
doubtful question. Section 4 of R.A. 1151 reads as follows:
Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration. — When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper
step to be taken or memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument presented to him for registration, or where
any party in interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds with reference to any such matter, the question shall be submitted to the
Commissioner of Land Registration either upon the certification of the Register of Deeds, stating the question upon which he is in doubt, or
upon the suggestion in writing by the party in interest; and thereupon the Commissioner, after consideration of the matter shown by the records
 certified to him, and in case of registered lands, after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or
memorandum to be made. His decision in such cases shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds: Provided, further, That when
a party in interest disagrees with the ruling or resolution of the Commissioner and the issue involves a question of law, said decision may be
appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty days from and after receipt of the notice thereof.
TN: The mandamus was still dismissed because the remedy is to submit the question to the Commissioner of Land Registration.
Chapter III Original Registration
1. Application
a. Who may apply
Section 14(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
Ong vs. Facts  Petitioner Charles Ong filed an Application for Registration of Title over a lot in Pangasinan, alleging that he, together with his brothers, are co-
Republic. G.R. owners of the lot, having acquired the same by purchased on August 24, 1998. They alleged that the lot is presently unoccupied. BUT they also
No. 175746. alleged that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and peaceful possession of the lot in the concept of owners for more
March 21, 2008 than 30 years.
 Respondent opposed the application and the allegations. The Trial Court ruled in favor of petitioner. The CA ruled in favor of respondent, hence this
petition.
Issue WON the petitioner, together with his brothers, have registrable ownership over the subject lot. NO
Ruling SEC. 14. Who may apply. –The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. xxx
Thus, pursuant to the aforequoted provision of law, applicants for registration of title must prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain, and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
…petitioner failed to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The records show that petitioner and his brothers bought the subject lot from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998,who in
turn purchased the same from spouses Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen on January 16, 1997. The latter bought the subject lot from Cynthia, Agustin
 Jr., Jasmin, Omir and Lauro, all surnamed Cacho, on July 10, 1979. The earliest tax declaration which was submitted in evidence was Tax Declaration
No. 25606 issued in 1971 in the names of spouses Agustin Cacho and Eufrosinia Baustista.
Even if we were to tack petitioner’s claim of ownership over the subject lot to that of their alleged predecessors-in-interest, spouses Agustin Cacho
and Eufrosinia Baustista in 1971, still this would fall short of the required possession from June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Further, as correctly pointed by the Court of Appeals, possession alone is not sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain
because the law requires possession and occupation. As held in Republic v. Alconaba:
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to
make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the
law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be
a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally
exercise over his own property.
Petitioner admitted that after he and his brothers bought the subject lot from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil in 1998, neither he nor his
brothers ACTUALLY occupied the subject lot.
Canete vs. Facts  Petitioners filed a complaint for cancellation of title to property covered by several TCTs and the OCT from which they originated. They alleged that
Genuino Ice said titles are spurious, fictitious and were issued under mysterious circumstances considering that the holders thereof were never in actual, adverse
Company. GR. and physical possession of the property, rendering them ineligible to acquire title to the said property under the Friar Lands Act. They later filed an
No. 154080. Jan. Amended Complaint asserting that they are among those who have been in actual, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession in concept of owners
22, 2008. of unregistered parcels of land which is a portion of a friar land known as “Piedad Estate”. They sought that they be declared as bona fide occupants
of the property in litigation pursuant to the provisions of Friar Lands Act and other existing laws.
 Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action because petitioners are not rea parties-in-interest.
 The trial court denied the motion to dismiss as well as the MOR. The CA, however, granted the respondent’s petition for certiorari and dismissed the
Second Amended Complaint.
Issue WON the Amended Complaint fails to state a cause of action or WON the petitioners are Real Parties-in-Interest to bring the complaint. NO
Ruling One who acquires land under the Friar Lands Act, as well as his successors-in-interest, may not claim successional rights to purchase by reason of
occupation from time immemorial, as this contravenes the historical fact that friar lands were bought by the Government of the Philippine Islands,
pursuant to an Act of Congress of the United States, approved on July 1, 1902, not from individual persons but from certain companies, a society and a
religious order. Under the Friar Lands Act, only "actual settlers and occupants at the time said lands are acquired by the Government" were given

Atty. Espina: If there is already
a title over the land, you
cannot avail of judicial
proceeding through Sec 14(1)
You must only show some
grant, purchase, or any form of
conveyance to you. This
applies to Friar Lands because
there is already a title.
Malabanan Facts
vs. Republic.
GR. No. 177987.
April 29, 2009.
preference to lease, purchase, or acquire their holdings, in disregard of the settlement and occupation of persons before the government acquired the
lands.
[P]etitioners claim that they are bona fide occupants of the subject property within the contemplation of the Friar Lands Act, having allegedly been in
actual, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession of the property, although it is not stated for how long and since when.
They do not pray to be declared owners of the subject property – despite their alleged adverse possession – but only to be adjudged as the "bona
fide occupants" thereof. In other words, petitioners concede the State’s ownership of the property.
If petitioners are to be believed, they would possess a mere inchoate interest in the properties covered by the subject titles, a mere expectancy
conditioned upon the fact that if the questioned titles are cancelled and the property is reverted to the State, they would probably or possibly be given
preferential treatment as qualified buyers or lessees of the property under the Friar Lands Act. But this certainly is not the "interest" required by law that
grants them license or the personality to prosecute their case. Only to the State does the privilege belong.
Section 14(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws
*See the second issue for prescription relating to Sec 14(2)
 Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering the property in Cavite which he purchased from Velazco. He claimed that the
property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessor-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial
confirmation of title. He prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain by presenting a certification from the
CENRO.
 The RTC granted the application for land registration. The OSG appealed the judgment to the CA.
 The CA reversed the RTC. In dismissing the application for registration, it cited Republic vs. Herbierto, and declared that under Sec. 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree, any period of possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and
should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. It noted that the CENRO certification stated the property had been declared
alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982. Velazco’s possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing
Malabanan’s period of possession.
 Petitioners, before the SC, rely on the ruling in Republic v. Naguit, which was handed down just four months prior to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest
that the discussion in Herbieto cited by the Court of Appeals is actually obiter dictum. Petitioners argue that Naguit remains the controlling doctrine,
especially when the property in question is agricultural land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior to the declaration of
the alienable property as disposable may be counted in reckoning the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act and the Property
Registration Decree.
  The OSG has adopted the position that for one to acquire the right to seek registration of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, it is
not enough that the applicant and his/her predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945; the
alienable and disposable character of the property must have been declared also as of 12 June 1945.
 (Since they cannot avail of Sec. 14(1) due to failure to prove possession from June 12, 1945, or earlier) Petitioner raised as an alternative that they
have right for registration in accordance with respect to Section 14(2). They submit that OCEN possession of an alienable land of the public domain
for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into private property, thus placing it under the coverage of Section 14(2). They submit that it would
not matter whether the land sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain so long as, at the time of the
application, the property had already been "converted" into private property through prescription.
Issue WON the land should be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to
the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier? At any time prior to the filing as long as the applicant has
been in OCEN possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Ruling The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which was adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as
pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands actually declared
alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
under a bona fide claim of ownership long before that date.
… the Court in Naguit explained:
[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to
release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need
to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been
classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative
over the property.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona fide claim of ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect
titles than what would be feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is significant, especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and
reach of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
(The Court still denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient evidence possession and occupation
of the property on his part and on the part of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.)
Issue For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, WON possession of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years
ipso jure convert the land into private property by virtue of prescription? NO. Possession, for more than 30 years of alienable land of the public
domain does not convert, through prescription, the land into private property.
Ruling SECTION 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
xxx (2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On
the other hand, among the public domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The Constitution
itself proscribes private ownership of timber or mineral lands.
The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: "[p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character
shall not be the object of prescription."
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2) [of the NCC], and thus incapable of
acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of
a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.
Issue WON the period of possession prior to the conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in
favor of the possessors? NO
Ruling The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of possession before the public domain land becomes patrimonial
may be counted for the purpose of completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion property before it becomes patrimonial cannot be
the object of prescription according to the Civil Code. As the application for registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the framework of
prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that possession during the time that the land was still classified as public dominion property can be
counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration.
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14(1) and Section 14(2)? There is no inconsistency. Section 14(1)
mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Registration under Section
14(1) is extended under the aegis of the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under Section 14(2) is made
available both by the Property Registration Decree and the Civil Code.
 (MOR) Ruling To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands of the public domain, namely:
Malabanan vs. (1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands
Republic. GR. that are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;
No. 177987. (2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
September 3, (a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through any of the exclusive modes enumerated
2013. under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, the agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the
application, provided the applicant’s possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a
conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all the conditions essential to a government grant arises, and the applicant
becomes the owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of
the public domain and has become private property.
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or for the development of
national wealth are removed from the sphere of public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of
private ownership that may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the
mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted to private
ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113,
Civil Code) that property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.
Sec 14(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws
Republic vs. Facts  Defendant-appellant Heirs of Abrille are owners of a parcel of land in the City of Davao, under TCTs issued by the Registry of Deeds of Davao City.
Heirs of Abrille.  One of the lands covered by the TCTs increased in area as a result of the drying up of the Davao River by reason of the change of its course. The
GR. No. L- deceased Abrille during her lifetime caused the subdivision of the said parcel of land under subdivision plan (LRC Psa-69322), which includes the
39248. May 7, increased portion, and which was approved by the Land Registration Commissioner (LRC). After which, in the strength of the approval by the LRC,
1976. the CFI of Davao made an order directing the Register of Deeds to correct the area of Certificate of Title covering the subject land and to cancel the
same and issue new TCTs in lieu thereof.
 Thereafter, the petitioner instituted an ordinary civil action for annulment of certificate of title against the Estate of Abrille, later substituted by his
heirs.
 The Trial Court cancelled the subject Certificates of Title. It denied the legal effect of the subdivision plan on ground of lack of notice to interested
persons. The CA certified the case to the SC for consideration and final disposition.
  Plaintiff-appellee maintains that the approval of the subdivision plan, which includes the increased in area, by the defendant-appellant LRC does not
lend validity to the said subdivision plan; and that the issuance of the four transfer certificates of title over the increased area in question is improper
and invalid notwithstanding the conformity of the LRC and the subsequent order of the CFI of Davao, Branch IV, approving the subdivision plan
concerned, as the required giving of notice to all parties interested in defendant-appellant's petition for approval of subdivision plan was not at all
followed. The registration of the increased area of land must be done through the proper land registration proceedings, and not pursuant to a mere
approval of the Subdivision Plan which includes the increased area.
Issue WON it is necessary to bring the increased area under the land registration proceedings. YES
Ruling Certainly, the step taken by defendant-appellant in petitioning the court for the approval of their Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322 and then Psd-
71236 to include the questioned increased area of 82,127 square meters is, to say the least, unwarranted and irregular. This is so, for the increased area in
question, which is not a registered land but formerly a river bed, is so big as to give allowance for a mere mistake in area of the original registration of
the tracts of land of the defendant-appellant formerly belonging to and registered in the name of their grandfather, Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna. In
order to bring this increase in area, which the parties admitted to have been a former river bed of the Davao River, under the operation and
coverage of the Land Registration Law, Act 496, proceedings in registrations of land title should have been filed instead of an ordinary approval
of subdivision plan.
It should be remembered that recourse under Section 44 of Act 496, which the predecessor-in-interest (Luisa Villa Abrille) of the herein defendant-
appellant took, is good only insofar as it covers previously registered lands. In the instant case, part of the tracts of land, particularly the area of 82,127
square meters, has not yet been brought under the operation of the Torrens System. Worse still, the approval of Subdivision Plans (LRC) Psd-69322 and
Psd-71236 was without notice to all parties in interest, more particularly the Director of Lands.
For an applicant to have his imperfect or incomplete title or claim to a land to be originally registered under Act 496, the following requisites should
all be satisfied: xxx
Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect of Incomplete Titles
Susi vs. Facts This was an action commenced in the CFI of Pampanga by a complaint filed by Valentin Susi against Angela Razon and the Director of Lands.
Razon. GR. No. The facts show that:
24066. Dec. 9, - On Dec 18,1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold the land in question, then a fish pond, to Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza.
1925. - On Sep. 5, 1899, after being in possession for about 8 years, and the fish pond having been destroyed, Garcia and Mendoza sold the
land to Valentin Susi.
- Even before the execution of the deed of sale, Susi had already paid its price and sown “bacawan” on said land, availing himself of the
firewood gathered.
 - The possession and occupation of the said persons had been open, continuous, adverse and public, without any interruption, except
during the revolution or disturbance.
- On Sep. 13, 1913, Angela Razon commenced an action in the CFI to recover the possession of the land wherein the trial court rendered
judgment in favor of Susi and against Razon.
- On Aug. 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied to the Director of Lands for the purchase of the land. Susi filed an opposition thereto,
asserting his possession of the land.
- The Director of Lands overruled Susi and sold the land to Razon. By virtue of the grant, the Register of Deeds issued the proper
certificate of title to Angela Razon
- Angela Razon subsequently initiated an action for forcible entry and unlawful detainer against Susi which was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
- Due to said events, Valenti Susi prays for judgment (1) declaring him the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of land, (2) annulling
the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of Razon, on the ground that the land is private property, and (3) ordering the cancellation of
certificate of title.
- The Director of Lands denied the allegations and as defense, alleged that the land was a property of the Gov’t of the US under the
administration and control of the Philippines before its sale to Razon.
Issue WON the land was part of the public dominion of the state before its sale to Angela Razon. NO
Ruling It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the land in question openly, continuously, adversely, and publicly,
personally and through his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years. While the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga against Angela Razon in the forcible entry case does not affect the Director of Lands, yet it is controlling as to Angela Razon and rebuts her
claim that she had been in possession thereof.
When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof personally and
through his predecessors for thirty-four years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made said land a fish pond when he sold it
on December 18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he began to possess and occupy it, the period of time being so long that it is beyond the reach of
memory. These being the facts, the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Cariño vs. Government of the Philippine
Islands (212 U. S., 449 ), is applicable here. In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b)
of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for
he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly,
continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said
Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant,
 but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts,
an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in
question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin
Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a
land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any
right.
If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become, by operation of law, private property of the plaintiff, there
lacking only the judicial sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover possession thereof and hold it.
Director of Facts  ACME Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc. is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines. It initiated the registration of the land, through
Lands vs. IAC. judicial confirmation of title under CA 141. It asserts that it acquired the land on October 29, 1962 from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members
GR. No. L- of Dumagat tribe. That the possession of the Infiels over the land is established to date back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan. That
73002. Dec. 29, the possession of the applicant Acme is continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to the present.
1986.  The controversy stems from the fact that the registration proceeding was instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect and
which prohibits private corporations from holding lands of the public domain except in leases not exceeding 1,000 hectares.
Issue WON ACME has the right to register the subject lands, through judicial confirmation of title under CA 141, in spite of the prohibition of 1973
Constitution. YES
Ruling The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were
then still part of the public domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already private lands, the constitutional
prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations obviously does not apply.
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29,
1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition, there being nothing in
the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring
and owning private lands.
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of the character and duration
prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself that the possessor(s) "... shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title ...." No proof
being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to
ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but
simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a
 conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became complete. As was so well put in Carino, "...
(T)here are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost.
The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations
from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly
valid and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed
to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor,
personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public
Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of Commented [o1]: WHAT???? How is th
Malabanan nga case nga prescription cou
the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby
the time of the declaration of the State th
acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land. longer needed for public service, devt of n
become patrimonial.
Republic vs. Facts  Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner without any objection from any private person or
CA and Naguit. even the government until she filed her application for registration.
GR. No. 144057.  On September 27, 1997, the MCTC rendered a decision ordering that the subject parcel be brought under the operation of the Property Registration
Jan. 17, 2005. Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that the title thereto registered and confirmed in the name of Naguit.
 Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should have already been established since June 12, 1945
or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase
"under a bonafide claim of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are
immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located.
Issue WON it is necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable
before the applicant’s OCEN possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start. NO
Ruling We are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioner’s position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the
OSG’s view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to
original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually
inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable.
The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an
independent state.
 Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to
release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need
to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been
classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative
over the property.
Republic vs. Herbieto. GR. No. 156117. May 26, 2005 Superseded by Naguit based on Malabanan
Diaz v. Facts  Petitioner’s late mother, Garcia, filed an application for registration of a vast tract of land located in Nueva Ecija and Palayan City in the CFI on 1976.
Republic. GR. She alleged possession of land as owner and worked, developed and harvested the agricultural products and benefits of the same continuously,
No. 181502. publicly and adversely for more or less 26 years.
February 2,  The RP, represented by OSG, opposed the application because the land in question was within the Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation (FMMR),
2010. established by Proclamation No. 237 in 1995. Thus, it was inalienable as it formed part of the public domain.
 The CFI ruled in favor of Garcia notwithstanding that in 1975 the SC has already ruled in Director of Lands vs. Reyes that the property subject of
Garcia’s application was inalienable as it formed part of a military reservation. Moreover, in that case, the existence of Possessory Information Title
No. 216 which is the basis of the claimant in the Reyes case was not proven.
 On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the CFI. It observed that Garcia also traced her ownership of the land in question to the Possessory
Information Title No. 216. As Garcia’s right to the property was largely dependent on the existence and validity of the possessory information title,
the probative value of which had already been passed upon by the SC in Reyes, and inasmuch as the land was situated inside a military reservation,
the CA concluded that she did no validly acquired title thereto.
 In the petition for review, petitioner argues that Proclamation 237 itself recognized that its effectivity is subject to private rights, if any there be.
Hence, petitioner’s private rights to the property prior to the establishment of the FMMR, must be respected.
Issue WON the ruling in Reyes that the subject land is part of the public domain constitutes res judicata to the case at hand. YES
Ruling The Court agrees with the Republic’s position that Reyes is applicable to this case.
To Constitute res judicata , the following elements must concur:
(1) The former judgment or order must be final; (2) The judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) It must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and (4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of
causes of action.
 The first three requisites have undoubtedly been complied with. However, the petitioner takes exception to the fourth requisite, particularly on the
issue of identity of parties. In her petition for review filed in this Court, she contends that since the applicant in the two cases are different, the merits of
the two cases should, accordingly, be determined independently of each other.
This contention is erroneous.
The facts obtaining in this case closely resemble those in Aquino vs. Director of Lands. xxx The question in that case, as well as in this one, was
whether our decision in the case in which another person was the applicant constituted res judicata as against his successors-in-interest.
We ruled there, as we so rule now, that in registration cases filed under the provisions of the Public Land Act for the judicial confirmation of an
incomplete and imperfect title, an order dismissing an application for registration and declaring the land as part of the public domain constitutes res
judicata, not only against the adverse claimant, but also against all persons.
Issue Notwithstanding the application of Reyes, WON the Proclamation recognizes Petitioner’s private ownership over the subject lands, prior to the
establishment of the FMMR. NO
Ruling By way of background, we recognized in Reyes that the property where the military reservation is situated is forest land.
Concomitantly, we stated therein, and we remind petitioner now, that forest lands are not registrable under CA 141.
However, it is true that forest lands may be registered when they have been reclassified as alienable by the President in a clear and categorical
manner xxx coupled with possession by the claimant as well as that of her predecessors-in-interest. Unfortunately for petitioner, she was not able to
produce such evidence. Accordingly, her occupation thereof xxx could not have ripened into ownership of the subject lad. This is because prior to the
conversion of forest land as alienable land, any occupation or possession thereof cannot be counted in reckoning compliance with the thirty-year
possession requirement under CA 141 xxx. The rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest
land is released through an official proclamation to that effect. Then and only then will it form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain.
As earlier stated, we had already recognized the same land to be public forest even before the FMMR was established. Xxx Therefore, even if
possession was for more than 30 years, it could never ripen into ownership.
But even assuming that the land in question was alienable land before it was established as a military reservation, there was nevertheless still a dearth
of evidence with respect to its occupation by petitioner and her predecessor-in-interest for more than 30 years. Xxx Furthermore, the fact that the
possessory information title on which petitioner also bases her claim of ownership was found to be inexistent in Reyes, thus rendering its probative value
suspect, further militates against granting her application for registration.
Sps. Fortuna Facts  Sps. Fortuna filed an application for registration of land situated in San Fernando, La Union in RTC. The Sps. claimed that they, through themselves
v. Republic. and their predecessors-in-interest, have been in quiet, peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted possession of the lot for more than 50 years, and submitted
as evidence the lot’s survey plan, technical description, and certificate of assessment.
GR. No. 173423.  RTC granted the application. CA reversed the decision, finding that the Sps. failed to show that they complied with the length of possession that the
March 5, 2014. law requires, i.e., since June 12, 1945.
 In the present petition, they contend that the applicable law is Sec. 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended by RA No. 1942 which was later amended by
PD No. 1073 and carried in Sec. 14(1) of the PRD. They allege that PD No. 1073 and the PRD should be deemed effective only on May 24, 1977 and
January 17, 1979, respectively. By these dates, they claim to have already satisfied the 30-year requirement under the RA No. 1942 amendment,
requiring 30 years of OCEN possession to acquire imperfect title, since their predecessor’s possession dates back, at the latest, to 1947.
Issue To determine WON the Sps. have the right for registration of land through judicial confirmation of title, the following issues are answered:
(1) WON the subject lot has been sufficiently established to be alienable and disposable public land. NO
Ruling Public land that has not been classified as alienable agricultural land remains part of the inalienable public domain. Thus, it is essential for any
applicant for registration of title to land derived through public grant to establish foremost the alienable and disposable nature of the land. The PLA
provisions on the grant and disposition of alienable public lands, specifically, Sections 11 and 48(b), will find application only from the time that a
public land has been classified as agricultural and declared as alienable and disposable.
Under Section 6 of the PLA, the classification and the reclassification of public lands are the prerogative of the Executive Department. The President,
through a presidential proclamation or executive order, can classify or reclassify a land to be included or excluded from the public domain. The
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary is likewise empowered by law to approve a land classification and declare such
land as alienable and disposable.
Accordingly, jurisprudence has required that an applicant for registration of title acquired through a public land grant must present incontrovertible
evidence that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable by establishing the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or
a statute.
In this case, the CA declared that the alienable nature of the land was established by the notation in the survey plan, xxx it also relied on the
Certification dated July 19, 1999 from the DENR Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) that "there is, per record, neither
any public land application filed nor title previously issued for the subject parcel." However, we find that neither of the above documents is evidence of
a positive act from the government reclassifying the lot as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain.
Mere notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the covered properties’ alienable and disposable character. These
notations, at the very least, only establish that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved alienable and disposable area
per verification through survey by the proper government office. The applicant, however, must also present a copy of the original classification of
the land into alienable and disposable land, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the President.
 The survey plan and the DENR-CENRO certification are not proof that the President or the DENR Secretary has reclassified and released the public
land as alienable and disposable. The offices that prepared these documents are not the official repositories or legal custodian of the issuances of the
President or the DENR Secretary declaring the public land as alienable and disposable.
For failure to present incontrovertible evidence that Lot No. 4457 has been reclassified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain though
a positive act of the Executive Department, the spouses Fortuna’s claim of title through a public land grant under the PLA should be denied.
Issue (2) WON Sps. Fortuna were able to prove that they possessed the lot for the required number of years. NO
Ruling xxx applicants must prove that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since May 8, 1947.
Even if the Court assumes that Lot No. 4457 is an alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain, the spouses Fortuna’s application
for registration of title would still not prosper for failure to sufficiently prove that they possessed the land since May 8, 1947.
Notably, Section 48(b) of the PLA speaks of possession and occupation. "Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention
of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When,
therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a
mere fiction." Nothing in Tax Declaration No. 8366 shows that Pastora exercised acts of possession and occupation such as cultivation of or fencing off
the land. Indeed, the lot was described as "cogonal.
Amendments or boundaries or area
Benin vs. Facts:  The plaintiffs discovered for the first time, in 1953, that their lands had either been fraudulently or erroneously included, by direct or constructive
Tuazon. GR. fraud, in what appears as Parcel No. 1 (known as Santa Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Land Records of the province of
No. L-26127. Rizal in the names of the original applicants for registration, now defendants, all surnamed de la Paz.
June 25, 1974  Prompted by the complaint of the plaintiffs, the trial court ruled that the Court of Land Registration had no jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC
No. 7681, which effected the Decree and the OCT, because during the registration proceedings, after the original application and notice of hearing had
been duly published, the plan of Parcel 1 was amended and no publication regarding the amended plan was made. The trial court pointed out that the
area and the description of Parcel 1 in Decree of Registration No. 17431 are not identical with the area and description of Parcel 1 applied for and
published in the Official Gazette. The trial court stressed on the point that publication is one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court to
hear and decide an application for registration and to order the issuance of a decree of registration, as provided in Act 496 (Land Registration Act).
Issue: WON publication is required after the amendment was made in the technical description of the land. GR: Yes. XPN: Amendment is done to
exclude a portion or to decrease the area.
 Ruling: We believe that the lower court erred when it held that the Land Registration Court was without jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC No. 7681.
Under Section 23 of Act 496, the registration court may allow, or order, an amendment of the application for registration when it appears to the court
that the amendment is necessary and proper. Under Section 24 of the same act the court may at any time order an application to be amended by striking
out one or more parcels or by severance of the application. The amendment may be made in the application or in the survey plan, or in both, since the
application and the survey plan go together. If the amendment consists in the inclusion in the application for registration of an area or parcel of land not
previously included in the original application, as published, a new publication of the amended application must be made. The purpose of the new
publication is to give notice to all persons concerned regarding the amended application. Without a new publication the registration court cannot acquire
jurisdiction over the area or parcel of land that is added to the area covered by the original application, and the decision of the registration court would be
a nullity insofar as the decision concerns the newly included land. The reason is because without a new publication, the law is infringed with respect to
the publicity that is required in registration proceedings, and third parties who have not had the opportunity to present their claim might be prejudiced in
their rights because of failure of notice. But if the amendment consists in the exclusion of a portion of the area covered by the original application and
the original plan as previously published, a new publication is not necessary. In the latter case, the jurisdiction of the court over the remaining area is not
affected by the failure of a new publication.
Dream Village Facts  Fort Bonifacio - a military base but some portions thereof are proclaimed to be AandD
vs. Bases  The inhabitants of Dream Village applied for registration. But the Dream Village sits on abandoned C5 road located outside the AandD portion of Fort
Development Bonifacio. They alleged that the deviation of the route of the C5 Road from the original plan made the abandoned area as AandD and that their
Authority. G.R. continuous occupation of the land give them the right to register the same by virtue of prescription.
No. 192896. July Issue (I cannot find any issue regarding amendments. But this is the topic discussed by Atty. Espina)
24, 2013. Ruling The mere fact that the original plan for C-5 Road to cross Swo-00-0001302 was abandoned by deviating it northward to traverse the southern part of
Libingan ng mga Bayani does not signify abandonment by the government of the bypassed lots, nor that these lots would then become alienable and
disposable. They remain under the title of the BCDA, even as it is significant that under Section 8(d) of R.A. No. 7227, a relocation site of 30.5 has. was
to be reserved for families affected by the construction of C-5 Road. It is nowhere claimed that Lots 10, 11 and 13 of Swo-00-0001302 are part of the
said relocation site. These lots border C-5 Road in the south, making them commercially valuable to BCDA, a farther argument against a claim that the
government has abandoned them to Dream Village.
For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if
when it is "intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth."
Thus, under Article 422 of the Civil Code, public domain lands become patrimonial property only if there is a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable, together with an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth. Only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public
 dominion begin to run. Also under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, it is provided that before acquisitive prescription can
commence, the property sought to be registered must not only be classified as alienable and disposable, it must also be expressly declared by the State
that it is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth, or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Absent
such an express declaration by the State, the land remains to be property of public dominion.
Survey of the Land
Republic v. Facts  Respondent sought for the registration of his land through judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Sarmiento. GR  The petitioner objected such contending that the lot does not form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.
No. 169397.  To discharge the burden, respondent relies on the blue print copy of the conversion and subdivision plan approved by the DENR Center which bears
March 13, 2007. the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer that "this survey is inside the alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623,
certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry."
Issue WON the notation in the survey plan constitutes as incontrovertible evidence that the land is alienable and disposable. NO
Ruling This proof is not sufficient. xxx Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in
question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor's assertion, petitioners
have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable.
Carpo vs. Facts  The opposing parties respectively hold two TCTs which can be traced from two titles covering the same property. There is an overlapping of the
Ayala Land. technical descriptions of the two titles.
G.R. No.  Petitioners herein alleged that the title of respondent is not valid because of lack of the requisite survey plan approved by the Director of the Bureau
166577. of Lands.
February 3, Issue How to determine which title prevails?
2010. Ruling In this jurisdiction, it is settled that "(t)he general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in
date prevails x x x. In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person
claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of,
or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof x x x.
It is admitted that a survey plan is one of the requirements for the issuance of decrees of registration, but upon the issuance of such decree, it can
most certainly be assumed that said requirement was complied with by ALI’s original predecessor-in-interest at the time the latter sought original
registration of the subject property. Moreover, the land registration court must be assumed to have carefully ascertained the propriety of issuing a decree
in favor of ALI’s predecessor-in-interest, under the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by public officers. The court upon
which the law has conferred jurisdiction, is deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction, and to have exercised it
effectively. This is as it should be, because once a decree of registration is made under the Torrens system, and the time has passed within which that
 decree may be questioned the title is perfect and cannot later on be questioned. There would be no end to litigation if every litigant could, by repeated
actions, compel a court to review a decree previously issued by another court forty-five (45) years ago. The very purpose of the Torrens system would be
destroyed if the same land may be subsequently brought under a second action for registration, as what the court a quo did when it faulted ALI’s failure
to allege that its predecessor-in-interest submitted a survey plan approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands in the original land registration case.
The Court need not emphasize that it is not for ALI to allege in its pleadings, much less prove, that its predecessor-in-interest complied with the
requirements for the original registration of the subject property. A party dealing with a registered land need not go beyond the Certificate of Title to
determine the true owner thereof so as to guard or protect his or her interest. Hence, ALI was not required to go beyond what appeared in the transfer
certificate of title in the name of its immediate transferor. It may rely solely, as it did, on the correctness of the certificate of title issued for the subject
property and the law will in no way oblige it to go behind the certificate of title to determine the condition of the property. This is the fundamental nature
of the Torrens System of land registration, to give the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need
of inquiring further.
It cannot be gainsaid that the issuance of OCT No. 242 was a result of the registration decree of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, pursuant to land
registration proceedings in Case No. 976. In the absence of proof to the contrary, OCT No. 242 and its derivatives, including ALI’s TCT No. T-41262,
enjoy the presumption of regularity and ALI need not allege or prove that its title was regularly issued. That is precisely the nature of such a
presumption, it dispenses with proof.
The presumption of regularity enjoyed by the registration decree issued in Case No. 976 and OCT No. 242 includes the presumption that all the
requisites for the issuance of a valid title had been complied with. ALI need not allege or prove that a duly approved survey plan accompanied the
issuance of OCT No. 242 in 1950 because it is presumed. It is the party who seeks to overcome the presumption who would have the burden to present
adequate and convincing evidence to the contrary. This, petitioners did not even attempt to do.
* So AYALA’s title prevail for it is earlier on time and the lack of survey plan is not duly proved since the existence of title gives the presumption that
the requirements for registration was complied.
5. Publication, Opposition and Default
a. Notice of Initial Hearing
Director of Facts  Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree
Lands vs. CA (PD) No. 1529. The CA ordered the registration of the title in the name of respondent.
and Abistado.  Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial hearing shall be published both in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper
GR No. 102858. of general circulation.
July 28, 1997.  Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with the requirement of publication in a newspaper of general circulation is a
mere procedural defect. They add that publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction.
 WON the notice of initial hearing in land registration must be published both in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation. YES
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing reads as follows:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. -- The court shall, within five days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date
and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
1. By publication. -- Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a
notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided,
however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all
persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and `to all whom it may concern.' Said notice
shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be
granted.
An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied with.
Proof Required in Registration Proceedings
Republic vs. Facts  Respondents maintain that the annotations appearing on the survey plan of the subject land serves as sufficient proof that the land is within the
dela Paz. GR alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.
No. 171631.  To prove their continuous and uninterrupted possession of the subject land, they presented several tax declarations, the oldest is 1949, issued in the
November 15, name of their predecessors-in-interest. In addition, respondents presented a tax clearance issued by the Treasurer's Office of the City of Taguig to
2010. show that they are up to date in their payment of real property taxes.
Issue Is the annotation in the survey plan sufficient to prove that the land is alienable and disposable? NO
Are tax declarations alone sufficient proof of possession and occupation of the land? NO
Ruling x x x (As to proof that the land is alienable and disposable) x x x
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration
(or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators,
and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable.
xxx the Court has [also] held that he [applicant] must present a certificate of land classification status issued by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO), or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the
 DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and disposable, and that it is within the approved area per
verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the land
is alienable and disposable.
Clearly, the surveyor's annotation presented by respondents is not the kind of proof required by law to prove that the subject land falls within the
alienable and disposable zone.
x x x (As to proof of possession and occupation) x x x
An applicant in a land registration case cannot just harp on mere conclusions of law to embellish the application but must impress thereto the facts
and circumstances evidencing the alleged ownership and possession of the land. x x x
Well settled is the rule that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when not supported
by any other evidence. The fact that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for registration or
of their predecessors-in-interest does not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.
Republic vs. Issue Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a
CA and Lapina. vendor who has complied with the requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?
GR No. 108998.
Ruling The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the concept above
August 24, 1994.
stated, must be either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law are complied with, the
possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. As
such, the land ceases to be a part of the public domain and goes beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of.
In other words, the Torrens system was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land. It merely confirms, but does not
confer ownership. As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, private respondents were able to establish the nature of possession of their
predecessors-in-interest. Evidence was offered to prove that their predecessors-in-interest had paid taxes on the subject land and introduced
improvements thereon. A certified true copy of the affidavit executed by Cristeta Dazo and her sister Simplicia was also formally offered to prove that
the subject parcels of land were inherited by vendor Cristeta Dazo from her father Pedro Dazo with the conformity of her only sister Simplicia.
Likewise, a report from the Bureau of Lands was presented in evidence together with a letter from the Bureau of Forest Development, to prove that the
questioned lots were part of the alienable and disposable zone of the government and that no forestry interest was affected.
In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of the acquisition of the properties and by virtue
thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the process, the possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time held by their
predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act. In addition, private respondents have constructed a house of strong materials on the contested
property, now occupied by respondent Lapiñas mother.
 [T]he Constitution itself allows private respondents to register the contested parcels of land in their favor xxx to wit:
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship
may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.
Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the relevant provision of which provides:
Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter
into a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of one thousand square meters, in the
case of urban land, or one hectare in the case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence.
Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for registration of the properties in question, said properties as
discussed above were already private lands; consequently, there could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof by respondents in view of what
the Constitution ordains. The parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the public domain. They are already private in character since
private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation thereof under claim of ownership
prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a
transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence (BP
185).
Issuance of Decree
Republic vs. Facts On 10 April 1997, respondent Lourdes Abiera Nillas (Nillas) filed a Petition for Revival of Judgment with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Nillas. GR No. Dumaguete City. It was alleged that despite the multiple transfers to Nillas, and the fact that her parents have been in open and continuous possession of
159595. January the subject property since the 1977 sale, no decree of registration has ever been issued over the subject lot despite the rendition of the 1941 CFI
23, 2007. Decision. Thus, Nillas sought the revival of the 1941 Decision and the issuance of the corresponding decree of registration for the lot.
The OSG objected, arguing in main that the right of action to revive judgment had already prescribed. The OSG notes that Article 1144 of the Civil
Code establishes that an action upon judgment must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. Further, Section 6 of Rule 39
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure establishes that a final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the
date of its entry, after which time it may be enforced by action before it is barred by statute of limitations.
Issue WON the prescription and laches applies to the registration of land. NO
Ruling Rule 39, as invoked by the Republic, applies only to ordinary civil actions, not to other or extraordinary proceedings not expressly governed by the
Rules of Civil Procedure but by some other specific law or legal modality such as land registration cases. Unlike in ordinary civil actions governed by
the Rules of Civil Procedure, the intent of land registration proceedings is to establish ownership by a person of a parcel of land, consistent with the
purpose of such extraordinary proceedings to declare by judicial fiat a status, condition or fact. Hence, upon the finality of a decision adjudicating such
ownership, no further step is required to effectuate the decision and a ministerial duty exists alike on the part of the land registration court to order the
issuance of, and the LRA to issue, the decree of registration.
x x x it is precisely because PD No. 1529 does not specifically provide for execution of judgments in the sense ordinarily understood and applied in
civil cases, the reason being there is no need for the prevailing party to apply for a writ of execution in order to obtain the title, that Rule 39 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure is not applicable to land registration cases in the first place. Section 39 of PD No. 1529 reads:
SEC. 39. Preparation of Decree and Certificate of Title. - After the judgment directing the registration of title to land has become final, the court
shall, within fifteen days from entry of judgment, issue an order directing the Commissioner to issue the corresponding decree of registration and
certificate of title. The clerk of court shall send, within fifteen days from entry of judgment, certified copies of the judgment and of the order of the court
directing the Commissioner to issue the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title, and a certificate stating that the decision has not been
amended, reconsidered, nor appealed, and has become final. xxx The decree of registration shall be signed by the Commissioner, entered and filed in the
Land Registration Commission. The original of the original certificate of title shall also be signed by the Commissioner and shall be sent, together with
the owner’s duplicate certificate, to the Register of Deeds of the city or province where the property is situated for entry in his registration book.
The provision lays down the procedure that interposes between the rendition of the judgment and the issuance of the certificate of title. No
obligation whatsoever is imposed by Section 39 on the prevailing applicant or oppositor even as a precondition to the issuance of the title. The
obligations provided in the Section are levied on the land court (that is to issue an order directing the Land Registration Commissioner to issue in turn
the corresponding decree of registration), its clerk of court (that is to transmit copies of the judgment and the order to the Commissioner), and the Land
Registration Commissioner (that is to cause the preparation of the decree of registration and the transmittal thereof to the Register of Deeds). All these
obligations are ministerial on the officers charged with their performance and thus generally beyond discretion of amendment or review.
The failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do their part in the issuance of the decree of registration cannot oust the prevailing party
from ownership of the land. Neither the failure of such applicant to follow up with said authorities can. The ultimate goal of our land registration system
is geared towards the final and definitive determination of real property ownership in the country, and the imposition of an additional burden on the
owner after the judgment in the land registration case had attained finality would simply frustrate such goal.
Clearly, the peculiar procedure provided in the Property Registration Law from the time decisions in land registration cases become
final is complete in itself and does not need to be filled in. From another perspective, the judgment does not have to be executed by motion or
enforced by action within the purview of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Following these premises, it can even be posited that in theory, there would have been no need for Nillas, or others under similar circumstances, to
file a petition for revival of judgment, since revival of judgments is a procedure derived from civil procedure and proceeds from the assumption that the
judgment is susceptible to prescription. The primary recourse need not be with the courts, but with the LRA, with whom the duty to issue the decree of
registration remains. If it is sufficiently established before that body that there is an authentic standing judgment or order from a land registration court
 that remains unimplemented, then there should be no impediment to the issuance of the decree of registration. However, the Court sees the practical
value of necessitating judicial recourse if a significant number of years has passed since the promulgation of the land court's unimplemented decision or
order, as in this case. Even though prescription should not be a cause to bar the issuance of the decree of registration, a judicial evaluation would allow
for a thorough examination of the veracity of the judgment or order sought to be effected, or a determination of causes other than prescription or laches
that might preclude the issuance of the decree of registration.
Ting vs. Facts  In LRC No. N-983, the court made a decision, which became final and executory, granting the application by Lirio and Atienza for registration of title
Heirs of Lirio. of the subject lot.
GR No. 168913.  Subsequently, petitioner Ting filed with the RTC an application for registration of title to the same lot. The RTC dismissed the application on the
March 14, 2007. ground of res judicata.
 Petitioner argues that although the decision in LRC No. N-983 had become final and executory on January 29, 1977, no decree of registration has
been issued by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), and as no action for revival of the said decision was filed by respondents after the lapse of the
ten-year prescriptive period, "the cause of action in the dormant judgment passed into extinction. Petitioner thus concludes that an "extinct" judgment
cannot be the basis of res judicata.
Issue WON the LRC judgment which lapsed into ten years without the Decree being issued can still be the basis of res judicata. YES
Ruling Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree provides:
SEC. 30. When judgment becomes final; duty to cause issuance of decree. – The judgment rendered in a land registration
proceeding becomes final upon the expiration of thirty days to be counted from the date of receipt of notice of the judgment. An appeal may be taken
from the judgment of the court as in ordinary civil cases.
After judgment has become final and executory, it shall devolve upon the court to forthwith issue an order in accordance with Section 39 of this
Decree to the Commissioner for the issuance of the decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title in favor of the person adjudged
entitled to registration.
In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private land, with or without opposition, the judgment of the court confirming the title
of the applicant or oppositor, as the case may be, and ordering its registration in his name constitutes, when final, res judicata against the whole world. It
becomes final when no appeal within the reglementary period is taken from a judgment of confirmation and registration.
The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration court’s approval in LRC No. N-983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza’s
application for registration of the lot settled its ownership, and is binding on the whole world including petitioner.
This provision (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration
case. This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and his
failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party.
 In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a
parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to
enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to
oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action,
except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse or
losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.
When OCT Takes Effect
Manotok Facts As evident on the face of OCT No. 994, the decree of registration was issued on 19 April 1917, and actually "received for transcription" by the
Realty vs. CLT Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917. Interestingly, even as CLT admits that there is only one OCT No. 994, that which the Solicitor General had presented
Realty. GR No. to the Court, it maintains that the OCT should be deemed registered as of the date of issuance of the decree of registration, 19 April 1917, instead of the
123346. date it was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917. The argument is based on the theory that it is "the decree of registration
December 14, [that] produces legal effects," though it "is entered before the transmittal of the same for transcription at the Register of Deeds
2007 Issue Which is the true date of OCT No. 994, 17 April 1917 or 3 May 1917? or When should the OCT takes effect?
Ruling The process involved is what this Court called "the method of giving a paper title." It is spelled out in detail in Sections 41 and 42 of Act No. 496,
otherwise known as the Land Registration Act:
SEC. 41. Immediately upon the entry of the decree of registration the clerk shall send a certified copy thereof, under the seal of the court, to the
register of deeds x x x and the register of deeds shall transcribe the decree in a book to be- called the 'registration book,' in which a leaf, or leaves, in
consecutive order, shall be devoted exclusively to each title. The entry made by the register of deeds in this book in each case shall be the original
certificate of title, and shall be signed by him and sealed with the seal of the court. x x x
SEC. 42. The certificate first registered in pursuance of the decree of registration in regard to any parcel of land shall be entitled in the registration
book 'Original certificate of title, entered pursuant to decree of the Court of Land Registration, dated at' (stating time and place of entry of decree and the
number of case). This certificate shall take effect upon the date of the transcription of the decree. X x x
x x x this Court in two vintage and sound rulings made it plain that the original certificate of title is issued on the date the decree of registration is
transcribed. In the first ruling, it was held that there is a marked distinction between the entry of the decree and the entry of the certificate of title; the
entry of the decree is made by the chief clerk of the land registration and the entry of the certificate of title is made by the register of deeds. Such
difference is highlighted by Sec. 31 of Act No. 496 as it provides that the certificate of title is issued in pursuance of the decree of registration. In the
second, it was stressed that what stands as the certificate of the title is the transcript of the decree of registration made by the registrar of deeds in the
registry.
 Otherwise stated, what is actually issued by the register of deeds is the certificate of title itself, not the decree of registration, as he is precisely the
recipient from the land registration office of the decree for transcription to the certificate as well as the transcriber no less. Since what is now
acknowledged as the authentic OCT No. 994 indicates that it was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on 3 May 1917, it is that
date that is the date of registration since that was when he was able to transcribe the decree in the registration book, such entry made in the book being
the original certificate of title. Moreover, it is only after the transcription of the decree by the register of deeds that the certificate of title is to take effect.
To guide the proceedings before this Special Division of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court made the following binding conclusions:
"First, there is only one OCT 994. As it appears on the record, that mother title was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May
1917, and that should be the date which should be reckoned as the ate of registration of the title. It may also be acknowledged, as appears on the title,
that OCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance of the decree of registration on 19 April 1917, although such dated cannot be considered as the date of the
title or the date when the title took effect.
Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 is void, for such mother title is inexistent. x x x
Third. The decision of this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals cannot apply to the cases at bar, especially in
regard to their recognition of an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, a title which we now acknowledge as inexistent. Neither could the conclusions in
MWSS or Gonzaga with respect to an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 bind any other case operating under the factual setting the same as or similar
to that at bar.
Manotok Realty vs. CLT Realty. GR No. 123346. Resolution (March 31, 2009).
Angeles vs. Facts  Petitioner filed a mandamus seeking respondents Secretary of Justice, the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), and the Register
Sec of Justice. of Deeds (RD) of Quezon City to comply with the RTC’s order to, among others, issue transfer certificates of title in the names of all the co-owners,
GR No. 142549. including petitioner, for twelve (12) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 105,969 m2 more or less.
March 9, 2010  The RDs refused to comply with the RTC Order because they were still awaiting word from the LRA Administrator who, with the directive of the
DOJ, refused to allow the issuance in view of the impression that such will lead to double titling.
 Petitioner alleges that compliance with a final judicial order is a purely ministerial duty, that she and her co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. C-424 cannot
avail of the benefits granted to them by the Order, and that she has no "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, other than
this action.
Issue WON the RD can compelled by mandamus to comply with the RTC order. NO. (But GR: yes, XPN: no, as explained in this case)
Ruling It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a
discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or to which a substantial doubt exists.
[However] we find our discussion in Laburada v. Land Registration Authority instructive, to wit:
 That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable. Rather than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in the
performance of its duty, the LRA's reaction is reasonable, even imperative. Considering the probable duplication of titles over the same parcel
of land, such issuance may contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of registration. x x x
x
x x x Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when the petitioners' legal right to the performance of the particular act which is
sought to be compelled is clear and complete. Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by
law or is inferable as a matter of law. If the right is clear and the case is meritorious, objections raising merely technical questions will be
disregarded. But where the right sought to be enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in this case, mandamus cannot issue.
As can be gleaned from the above discussion, the issuance by the LRA officials of a decree of registration is not a purely ministerial duty in cases
where they find that such would result to the double titling of the same parcel of land. In the same vein, we find that in this case, which involves the
issuance of transfer certificates of title, the Register of Deeds cannot be compelled by mandamus to comply with the RTC Order since there were
existing transfer certificates of title covering the subject parcels of land and there was reason to question the rights of those requesting for the issuance of
the TCTs.
Classification of Public Lands
Director of The issue in this appeal is whether the lots in question may be registered under Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended. NO
Lands vs. CA Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership. Xxx [The] positive act of the government is needed to declassify land which
and Bisnar. GR is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an
No. 83609. official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
October 26, apply.
1989. With these rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court which determines the classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural,
forest or mineral but the Executive Branch of the government, through the Office of the President.
Leonardo de castro vs. Mayor Yap. GR No. 167707. October 8, 2008 See case of Sec. of DENR vs. Yap. Same case.
Republic vs. Facts Respondent submitted two certifications issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The 3 June 1997 Certification by
TAN Properties. the CENRO xxx certified that lot 10705 xxx with an area of 596,116 square meters falls within the ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ZONE xxx. The
GR No. 154953. second certification in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, which was issued by the Regional Technical Director, Forest Management Services
June 26, 2008 of the DENR (FMS-DENR), stated "that the subject area falls within an alienable and disposable land xxx.
Issue WON respondent proved that the land is alienable and disposable. NO
Ruling The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20, dated 30 May 1988, delineated the functions and authorities of the
offices within the DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares.
 The Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) issues certificate of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares.
DAO No. 38, dated 19 April 1990, amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988 [but] retained the authority of the CENRO xxx as well as the authority of the
PENRO xxx. In this case, xxx [the] area covered by Lot 10705-B is over 50 hectares (564,007 square meters). The CENRO certificate covered the entire
Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters which, as per DAO No. 38, series of 1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as
alienable and disposable.
The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no authority under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to issue certificates of land classification. Xxx Hence,
the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, has no probative value.
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove
that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land
subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the
applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because
the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Republic vs. Facts  Respondents applied for registration of the subject lot bounded in the southeast by the Paranaque River. He alleged that the property had been
Santos. GR No. formed through accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for more than 30 years.
160453.  The City of Parañaque (the City) opposed the application for land registration, stating that it needed the property for its flood control program; that
November 12, title to the property could not be registered in favor of the applicants for the reason that the property was an orchard that had dried up and had not
2012. resulted from accretion.
 The RTC and the CA granted the application for registration.
Issue WON the subject lot is registrable. NO
Ruling Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. The deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual
and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.
Accordingly, respondents should establish the concurrence of the elements of accretion to warrant the grant of their application for land registration.
There are several other causes, including the drying up of the river bed. The drying up of the river bed was, in fact, the uniform conclusion of both
lower courts herein. In other words, respondents did not establish at all that the increment of land had formed from the gradual and imperceptible deposit
of soil by the effects of the current. Also, it seems to be highly improbable that the large volume of soil that ultimately comprised the dry land with an
area of 1,045 square meters had been deposited in a gradual and imperceptible manner by the current of the river in the span of about 20 to 30 years xxx.
The only plausible explanation for the substantial increment was that Lot 4988-B was the dried-up bed of the Parañaque River. Xxx That land was
definitely not an accretion. The process of drying up of a river to form dry land involved the recession of the water level from the river banks, and the
dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil on the river banks through the effects of the
current. In accretion, the water level did not recede and was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian owners had no legal right to
claim ownership of Lot 4998-B.
Article 419 of the Civil Code distinguishes property as being either of public dominion or of private ownership. Article 420 of the Civil Code lists the
properties considered as part of public dominion, namely: (a) those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; and (b) those which belong to the State, without being for public use,
and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. As earlier mentioned, Article 502 of the Civil Code declares that
rivers and their natural beds are of public dominion.
[Therefore] The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership. Article 502 of the Civil Code expressly
declares that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of the State. It follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong
to the State as its property of public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that the dried-up river beds should belong to some other
person.
Non-Registrable Properties
 Santulan vs. Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 dated April 30. 1936. which was issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources upon the recommendation of
Exec. Secretary. the Director of Lands for the disposition of alienable lands of the public domain, provides:
GR No. L- 32. Preference of the Reparian Owner — The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands, marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon
28021. 107 Phil shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to apply for such lands adjoining his property as may not be needed for the public
567. Dec. 15, service, subject to the laws and regulations governing lands of this nature, provided that he applies therefor within sixty (60) days from the date he receives a
1977 communication from the Director of Lands advising him of his preferential right.
The word "riparian" in paragraphs 32 and 4 of the departmental regulations is used in a broad sense as referring to any property having a water frontage. Strictly
speaking, "riparian" refers to rivers. A riparian owner is a person who owns land situated on the bank of a river.
But in paragraphs 32 and 4, the term "riparian owner" embraces not only the owners of lands on the banks of rivers but also the littoral owners, meaning the
owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters. The littoral is the coastal region including both the land along the coast and the water near
the coast or the shore zone between the high and low watermarks.
This case is governed by the precedent established in the case of Gonzalo Monzon, which, as already noted, is similar to this cm since the foreshore land involved
in the Monzon case is adjacent to the foreshore land involved in this case.
In the Monzon case, the Office of the President, applying the oft-cited paragraph 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 held that Monzon, the littoral owner of
the registered land abutting upon the foreshore land, has the preferential right to lease the foreshore land.
That rule in paragraph 32 is in consonance with article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 which provides that, while lands added to the shores by accretions
and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea form part of the public domain, such lands, "when they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not
necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coast guard service", shall be declared by the Government "to be the
property of the owner of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof"
The reason for that preferential right is the same as the justification for giving accretions to the riparian owner, which is that accretion compensates the riparian
owner for the diminutions which his land suffers by reason of the destructive force of the waters. So, in the case of littoral lands, he who loses by the encroachments
of the sea should gain by its recession
Republic vs. CA Facts Petitioner alleged that fraud was committed by private respondent when she misrepresented that she and her predecessors-in-interest had been in
and Lastimado. possession of the land publicly, peacefully, exclusively and adversely against the whole world as owner for more than forty years when, in fact, the
GR No. L- subject land was inside the former U.S. Military Reservation, which was formally turned over to the Republic of the Philippines.
39473. April 30, Ruling If the allegation of petitioner that the land in question was inside the military reservation at the time it was claimed is true, then, it cannot be the
1979 object of any cadastral proceeding nor can it be the object of reopening under Republic Act No. 931. Similarly, if the land in question, indeed forms part
of the public forest, then, possession thereof, however long, cannot convert it into private property as it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the Cadastral Court to register under the Torrens System.
Chavez vs. PEA. Facts  Then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the
GR No. 133250. Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of 1,915,894 square meters." Subsequently, the Register of
July 9, 2002 Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three
reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Parañaque City.
 PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the
reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in the Master Development Plan
of the Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. On April 28,
1995, the Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through then
Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.
 Under the Amended JVA, AMARI will acquire and own a maximum of 367.5 hectares of reclaimed land which will be titled in its name.
 Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting
the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations.
Issue WON AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and own under the Amended JVA 367.5 hectares of reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas in
Manila Bay in view of Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. NO
(But our topic is concerned about the discussion on the submerged and reclaimed lands)
Ruling (AS TO THE CHARACTER OF THE RECLAIMED LANDS)
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the "lands of the public domain,
waters x x x and other natural resources" and consequently "owned by the State." As such, foreshore and submerged areas "shall not be alienated,"
unless they are classified as "agricultural lands" of the public domain. The mere reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable
natural resources of the State into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law or presidential proclamation officially
classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be classified
as alienable or disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or quasi-public use.
Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides that "only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and
classified." The President has the authority to classify inalienable lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain,
pursuant to Section 6 of CA No. 141. In Laurel vs. Garcia, xxx the Court still ruled that, under Article 422 of the Civil Code, a property of public
dominion retains such character until formally declared otherwise.
PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, authorized the issuance of special land patents for lands reclaimed by PEA from the foreshore or
submerged areas of Manila Bay. On January 19, 1988 then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 in the name of PEA for the
157.84 hectares comprising the partially reclaimed Freedom Islands. PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent
covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. PD No. 1085 and President Aquino's issuance of a land patent also constitute a declaration that the Freedom Islands are no longer needed for
public service. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified
parties.
At the time then President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, PEA had already reclaimed the Freedom Islands although subsequently there were
partial erosions on some areas. The government had also completed the necessary surveys on these islands. Thus, the Freedom Islands were no longer
part of Manila Bay but part of the land mass. Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into "agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks." Being neither timber, mineral, nor national park lands, the reclaimed Freedom Islands necessarily
fall under the classification of agricultural lands of the public domain. Under the 1987 Constitution, agricultural lands of the public domain are the only
natural resources that the State may alienate to qualified private parties.
(AS TO THE OTHER ISSUES including the CHARACTER OF SUBMERGED LANDS and the validity of the of the JVA)
We can now summarize our conclusions as follows:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA,
are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these
lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution
and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as
alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification
and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public
domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are
inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such
transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such
transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other
than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed
lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable
 lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Chavez vs. NHA Facts President Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a Joint Venture Agreement with RBI. The NHA and RBI entered into a Joint Venture
and Regis Agreement (JVA) for the development of the Smokey Mountain dumpsite and the reclamation of the area across R-10 based on Presidential Decree No.
Romero. GR (PD) 757 which mandated NHA "[t]o undertake the physical and socio-economic upgrading and development of lands of the public domain identified
No. 164527. for housing.
Aug. 15, 2007 Petitioner opposes, alleging that the reclaimed foreshore and submerged parcels of land are inalienable public lands which are beyond the commerce
of man. He alleged further that, assuming arguendo that the subject reclaimed foreshore and submerged parcels of land were already declared alienable
lands of the public domain, respondent R-II builders still could not acquire the same because there was never any declaration that the said lands were no
longer needed for public use.
Ruling (Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands considered as inalienable and outside the commerce of man)
The reclaimed lands across R-10 were classified alienable and disposable lands of public domain of the State for the following reasons, viz:
First, there were three (3) presidential proclamations classifying the reclaimed lands across R-10 as alienable or disposable hence open to disposition
or concession, to wit: x x x
Secondly, Special Patents Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598 issued by the DENR anchored on Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 issued by President Ramos,
without doubt, classified the reclaimed areas as alienable and disposable.
As early as 1999, this Court in Baguio v. Republic laid down the jurisprudence that: It is true that, once a patent is registered and the corresponding
certificate of title is issued, the land covered by them ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property, and the Torrens Title issued
pursuant to the patent becomes indefeasible upon the expiration of one year from the date of issuance of such patent.
(Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed lands when there was no declaration that said lands are no longer needed for public use)
Even if it is conceded that there was no explicit declaration that the lands are no longer needed for public use or public service, there was however an
implicit executive declaration that the reclaimed areas R-10 are not necessary anymore for public use or public service when President Aquino through
MO 415 conveyed the same to the NHA partly for housing project and related commercial/industrial development intended for disposition to and
enjoyment of certain beneficiaries and not the public in general and partly as enabling component to finance the project.
President Ramos, in issuing Proclamation No. 39, declared, though indirectly, that the reclaimed lands of the Smokey Mountain project are no longer
required for public use or service, thus: These parcels of land of public domain are hereby placed under the administration and disposition of the
National Housing Authority to develop, subdivide and dispose to qualified beneficiaries, as well as its development for mix land use
(commercial/industrial) to provide employment opportunities to on-site families and additional areas for port related activities.
Remedies
 Remedies Available in a Registration Case
Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration (Rule 31, Rules of
Petition for Relief from Judgment (Rule 38, Rules of Court)
Appeal
Remedies under the Property Registration Decree, in cases of fraudulent registration
Petition for review of decree (Section 32)
Republic vs. Facts  Private respondents registered the subject lots and subsequently obtained the corresponding decree and title.
CA, (G. R. No.  Petitioner (Rep. of the PH) filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the title and all subsequent titles emanating therefrom. It claimed that the
113549, July 5, title was obtained through fraud and the land registration court did not acquire jurisdiction over the land for lack of republication of the amended plan.
1996)  The CA held that OCT No. 3947 was conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Government and all its branches (Sec. 38, Act No. 496) as
to all matters contained therein (Sec. 47, Act No. 496), and one (1) year after its transcription which is the date of its effectivity (Sec. 42, Act No. 496),
said certificate of title became incontrovertible (Sec. 38, Act No. 496).
Issue WON the RP is barred by prescription to bring the action for annulment of OCT No. 3947 and all its derivative certificates of title. NO
Ruling First, the one-year period provided for in Section 38 of Act No. 496 merely refers to a petition for review and is reckoned from the entry of the
decree.
In the second place, there are other remedies available to an aggrieved party after the said one-year period, e.g., reconveyance, covered by Section 65
of Act No. 496 which, inter alia, provides that "in all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies
against the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title." Likewise, an action
for damages is sanctioned in cases where the property has been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value, which may be filed within four years from
discovery of the fraud. Recourse may also be had against the Assurance Fund.
Finally, prescription never lies against the State for the reversion of property which is part of the public forest or of a forest reservation which was
registered in favor of any party. Then too, public land registered under the Land Registration Act may be recovered by the State at any time. In Republic
vs. Animas, we ruled:
Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to the state in accordance with
Section 101 of the Public Land Act. Prescription does not lie against the state in such cases for the Statute of Limitations does not run
against the state. The right of reversion or reconveyance to the state is not barred by prescription.
We therefore hold that since the land applied for by the spouses Ribaya was part of the public forest and released only on 31 December 1930, the
land registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the land, which was not yet alienable and disposable. Hence, the State's action to annul the
certificates of title issued thereunder and for the reversion of the land is not barred by prescription.
 Eland Facts Respondents filed a complaint for Quieting of Title with Writ of PI with the RTC against petitioner Eland. Respondents claimed that they are the
Philippines, Inc. owners in fee simple of the subject land for having been in continuous, public, and adverse possession as owners of the said lot for at least 30 years.
vs. Garcia. (GR They were not aware of any person or entity who had a legal or equitable interest or claim on the same lot until the time they were requesting that the lot
No. 173289. be declared for tax purposes. They found out that the lot was the subject of a land registration proceeding that had already been decided by the same
February 17, court where their complaint was filed. They also found out that Decree No. N-217313, LRC Record No. N-62686, was already issued on August 20,
2010) 1997 to the petitioner. They averred that they were not notified of the said land registration case; thus, they claimed the presence of misrepresentation
amounting to actual or extrinsic fraud.
Issue WON the action for Quieting of Title is the proper remedy to question the Decree of the LRC in favor of petitioner. NO
Ruling Anent the propriety of the filing of an action for the quieting of title, the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of the decree of registration come into
question. Under Sec. 32 of P.D. No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree:
Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by
reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing
judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or
interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for
reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in
no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose
rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to
include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.
Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any
person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other
persons responsible for the fraud.
As borne out by the records and undisputed by the parties, OCT No. 0-660 of petitioner was issued on August 29, 1997 pursuant to a Decree issued
on August 20, 1997, while the complaint for the quieting of title in Civil Case No. TG-1784 was filed and docketed on March 5, 1998; hence, applying
the above provisions, it would seem that the period of one (1) year from the issuance of the decree of registration has not elapsed for the review thereof.
However, a closer examination of the above provisions would clearly indicate that the action filed, which was for quieting of title, was not the proper
remedy.
Courts may reopen proceedings already closed by final decision or decree when an application for review is filed by the party aggrieved within one
year from the issuance of the decree of registration. However, the basis of the aggrieved party must be anchored solely on actual fraud.
 The right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud is
recognized by law as a valid and legal basis for reopening and revising a decree of registration. One of the remedies available to him is a petition for
review. To avail of a petition for review, the following requisites must be satisfied:
(a) The petitioner must have an estate or interest in the land;
(b) He must show actual fraud in the procurement of the decree of registration;
(c) The petition must be filed within one year from the issuance of the decree by the Land Registration Authority; and
(d) The property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value.
A mere claim of ownership is not sufficient to avoid a certificate of title obtained under the Torrens system. An important feature of a certificate
of title is its finality. The proceedings whereby such a title is obtained are directed against all persons, known or unknown, whether actually served with
notice or not, and includes all who have an interest in the land. If they do not appear and oppose the registration of their own estate or interest in the
property in the name of another, judgment is rendered against them by default, and, in the absence of fraud, such judgment is conclusive. If an interest in
the land will not by itself operate to vacate a decree of registration, a fortiori, fraud is not alone sufficient to do so.
[T]he petition for review must be filed within one year from entry of the decree of registration. As written:
As long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Authority and period of one year has not elapsed from the date of entry of
such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration case continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the
registration court. After the lapse of said period, the decree becomes incontrovertible and no longer subject to reopening or review.
The one-year period stated in Sec. 32 within which a petition to re-open and review the decree of registration refers to the decree of registration
described in Section 31, which decree is prepared and issued by the Land Registration Administrator.
The provision of Section 31 that every decree of registration shall bind the land, quiet title thereto, and be conclusive upon and against all persons,
including the national government, and Sec. 32 that the decree shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority or other disability or by
any proceeding in court, save only in cases of actual fraud and then only for one year from the entry of the decree, must be understood as referring to
final and unappealable decrees of registration. A decision or, as it is sometimes called after entry, a decree of a registration court, does not become final
and unappealable until fifteen days after the interested parties have been notified of its entry, and during that period may be set aside by the trial judge on
motion for new trial, upon any of the grounds stated in the Rules of Court. An appeal from the decision of the trial court prevents the judgment from
becoming final until that decree is affirmed by the judgment of the appellate court.
A petition for review under Section 32 is a remedy separate and distinct from a motion for new trial and the right to the remedy is not
affected by the denial of such a motion irrespective of the grounds upon which it may have been presented. Thus, where petitioners acquired their
interest in the land before any final decree had been entered, the litigation was therefore in effect still pending and, in these circumstances, they can
hardly be considered innocent purchasers in good faith. 1avvphi1
 In the present case, the one-year period before the Torrens title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible has not yet expired; thus, a review of the
decree of registration would have been the appropriate remedy.
Serna vs. C.A Facts Dionisia Fontanilla was the original owner of the subject land. She sold the land to her daughter Rosa Fontanilla who began paying realty estate
(G.R. No. property taxes thereon. Rosa then sold the land to her nephew, private respondent Santiago Fontanilla, but the instrument evidencing the sale was not
124605. June 18, registered. Private respondent constructed a house of strong materials on the subject land. Then private respondent went to the US and stayed there for
1999) three years.
While private respondent was absent in the country, petitioners successfully registered the subject land in their name.
Thus, respondent filed an action for reconveyance with damages and sought the annulment of the OCT issued to petitioners.
Issue WON the action for reconveyance is meritorious. YES
Ruling "Adjudication of land in a registration (or cadastral) case does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one (1) year after the
entry of the final decree." After the lapse of said period, the decree becomes incontrovertible and no longer subject to reopening or review.
However, the right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud is
recognized by law as a valid and legal basis for reopening and revising a decree of registration.
The fraud contemplated by the law is actual and extrinsic fraud, which includes an intentional omission of a fact required by law. For fraud to justify
a review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral, and the facts upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the
judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. Persons who were fraudulently deprived of their opportunity to be heard in the original registration case
are entitled to a review of a decree of registration.
"An action based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years. This means that petitioners should have enforced the trust within ten
(10) years from the time of its creation or upon the alleged fraudulent registration of the property." Discovery of the fraud must be deemed to have taken
place from the issuance of the certificate of title "because registration of real property is considered a "constructive notice to all persons" and it shall be
counted "from the time of such registering, filing or entering."
In the present case, respondents came to know of the fraud in securing title to the land sometime after its registration, however, an innocent purchaser
for value had not acquired the property. Extrinsic fraud attended the application for the land registration. It was filed when respondents were out of the
country and they had no way of finding out that petitioners applied for a title under their name.
Fortunately, respondents' action for reconveyance was timely, as it was filed within ten (10) years from the issuance of the torrens title over the
property.
Action For Reconveyance
Section 53 and 96
 Roque vs. Held: The essence of an action for reconveyance is to seek the transfer of the property which was wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s
Aguada (G.R. name to its rightful owner or to one with a better right. Thus, it is incumbent upon the aggrieved party to show that he has a legal claim on the property superior to that
No. 193787, of the registered owner and that the property has not yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
April 7, 2014) Sps. Roque claim that the subject portion covered by the 1977 Deed of Conditional Sale between them and Rivero, et al. was wrongfully included in the
certificates of title covering Lot 18089, and, hence, must be segregated therefrom and their ownership thereof be confirmed.
Examining its provisions, the Court finds that the stipulation above-highlighted shows that the 1977 Deed of Conditional Sale is actually in the nature of a contract
to sell and not one of sale contrary to Sps. Roque’s belief. In this relation, it has been consistently ruled that where the seller promises to execute a deed of absolute
sale upon the completion by the buyer of the payment of the purchase price, the contract is only a contract to sell even if their agreement is denominated as a Deed of
Conditional Sale, as in this case. This treatment stems from the legal characterization of a contract to sell, that is, a bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller,
while expressly reserving the ownership of the subject property despite delivery thereof to the prospective buyer, binds himself to sell the subject property exclusively
to the prospective buyer upon fulfillment of the condition agreed upon, such as, the full payment of the purchase price. Elsewise stated, in a contract to sell, ownership
is retained by the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price.
Here, it is undisputed that Sps. Roque have not paid the final installment of the purchase price.57 As such, the condition which would have triggered the parties’
obligation to enter into and thereby perfect a contract of sale in order to effectively transfer the ownership of the subject portion from the sellers (i.e., Rivero et al.) to
the buyers (Sps. Roque) cannot be deemed to have been fulfilled. Consequently, the latter cannot validly claim ownership over the subject portion even if they had
made an initial payment and even took possession of the same.
 Emma Ver Held: Based on the foregoing, the preponderance of evidence in this case is in petitioners’ favor. The spouses Cuevas only sold the subject property to them in
Reyes vs. 1976, and did not sell it a second time to private respondent in 1992. As a consequence, the rules on the double sale of registered property are not relevant herein. The
Montemayor Court then proceeds to rule on the consequence of private respondent’s fraudulent registration of the subject property in her name.
(G.R. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10 November 1992, a forged deed, is a nullity and conveys no title. Paragraph 2 of Section 53 of Presidential Decree No. 1529
No.166516, reads:
Sept. 3, 2009) In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud without prejudice,
however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title. After the entry of the decree of registration on the original petition or application, any
subsequent registration procured by the presentation of a forged duplicate certificate of title, or of a forged deed or other instrument, shall be null and void.
Insofar as a person who fraudulently obtained a property is concerned, the registration of the property in said person’s name would not be sufficient to vest in him
or her the title to the property. A certificate of title merely confirms or records title already existing and vested. The indefeasibility of the Torrens title should not be
used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real property. Good faith must concur with registration because, otherwise, registration would be an
exercise in futility. A Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration is a constructive notice of title binding
upon the whole world. The legal principle is that if the registration of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the land is registered holds it as a mere trustee.
It has long been established that the sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is to bring an
ordinary action in an ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages. "It is one
thing to protect an innocent third party; it is entirely a different matter and one devoid of justification if deceit would be rewarded by allowing the perpetrator to enjoy
the fruits of his nefarious deed." Reconveyance is all about the transfer of the property, in this case the title thereto, which has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another person's name, to its rightful and legal owner, or to one with a better right. Evidently, petitioners, being the rightful owners of the subject
property, are entitled to the reconveyance of the title over the same.
[A]n action for reconveyance is an action in personam available to a person whose property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in another’s
name. Reconveyance is always available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent person for value.
A judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a property to another is in personam; it is binding only against the parties and their successors in interest by
title subsequent to the commencement of the action.
Since private respondent’s fraudulent registration of the subject property in her name violated petitioners’ right to remain in peaceful possession of the subject
property, petitioners are entitled to nominal damages under Article 2221 of the Civil Code xxx. The award of attorney’s fees is also in order because private
respondent acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy petitioners’ plainly valid, just and demandable claim.
 Gasataya vs. Facts  Respondent Editha Mabasa’s father, Buenaventura Mabasa, was granted a homestead patent on subject lots. Buenaventura Mabasa mortgaged these
Mabasa lots to secure a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). Because of his failure to pay his indebtedness, DBP foreclosed on the lots
(G.R.No.148147, and sold them at public auction where it emerged as the highest bidder. DBP then obtained titles to the lots. DBP allowed respondent to reacquire the
Feb. 16, 2007) foreclosed properties through a deed of conditional sale for ₱25,875.
 Subsequently, respondent entered into an agreement with petitioner’s father, Sabas Gasataya, for the latter to assume payment of her obligation to
DBP.
 Upon representation by Sabas Gasataya that respondent’s obligation to DBP had already been settled, respondent was induced to enter into another
agreement with Sabas denominated as "Deed of Sale of Fishpond Lands with Right to Repurchase."
 Eight years after the execution of the above deed of sale with right to repurchase, respondent discovered that Sabas Gasataya had stopped paying
DBP. As a result, DBP revoked her right to repurchase the subject lots. DBP later on held a public auction of the properties where petitioner
participated and bid the highest price and eventually acquired titles to the lots.
 Respondent then filed a complaint in the RTC for reconveyance of titles of lands with damages against petitioner and Sabas Gasataya (Gasatayas).
She claimed that the latter deliberately reneged on his commitment to pay DBP to: (1) revoke her right to repurchase the lots under the deed of
conditional sale and (2) subject the properties to another public auction where petitioner could bid.
 The CA ruled in favor of respondents, thus, the present petition. Petitioner contests the CA decision affirming the trial court’s order to reconvey his
titles on the disputed lots to respondent who, according to him, is not the owner thereof.
Issue WON the CA’s order to reconvey the titles to respondent, who is not the owner thereof, is valid. YES
Ruling Reconveyance is available not only to the legal owner of a property but also to the person with a better right than the person under whose name said
property was erroneously registered. While respondent is not the legal owner of the disputed lots, she has a better right than petitioner to the contested
lots on the following grounds: first, the deed of conditional sale executed by DBP vested on her the right to repurchase the lots and second, her right to
repurchase them would have subsisted had they (the Gasatayas) not defrauded her.
The registration of the properties in petitioner’s name did not obliterate the fact that fraud preceded and facilitated such registration. Actual or
positive fraud proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by means of misrepresentation of material facts, which in this case was the conscious
representation by petitioner’s father (Sabas Gasataya) that respondent’s obligation to DBP had already been settled. It is fraud to knowingly omit or
conceal a fact, upon which benefit is obtained, to the prejudice of another. Consequently, fraud is a ground for reconveyance.
Moreover, the law only protects an innocent purchaser for value and not one who has knowledge of and participation in the employment of fraud. An
innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in that same
property, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any notice of another person’s claim. Obviously, petitioner
was not an innocent purchaser for value.
 Re: 4-yr period and 10-yr period to file action
(Amerol vs. Facts The only issue for resolution is the prescriptive period of an action for reconveyance of real property which has been wrongfully or erroneously
Bagumbayan registered under the Torrens System in another's name. In other words, what is the prescriptive period for the action to reconvey the title to real property
(G.R. No. L- arising from an implied or constructive trust and, corrolarily reference. The petitioners herein, defendants in the trial court, assert that they have ten years
33261, Sept. 30, to bring the action, while the respondent, plaintiff in the court below, claims the prescriptive period is four years.
1987) Ruling Indubitably, the act of respondent in misrepresenting that he was in actual possession and occupation of the property in question, obtaining a patent
and Original Certificate of Title No. P- 466 in his name, created an implied trust in favor of the actual possessor of the said property. The Civil Code
provides:
ARTICLE 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is by force of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
In this case, the land in question was patented and titled in respondent's name by and through his false pretenses. Molok Bagumbaran fraudulently
misrepresented that he was the occupant and actual possessor of the land in question when he was not because it was Liwalug Datomanong. Bagumbaran
falsely pretended that there was no prior applicant for a free patent over the land but there was — Liwalug Datomanong. By such fraudulent acts, Molok
Bagumbaran is deemed to hold the title of the property in trust and for the benefit of petitioner Liwalug Datomanong. Notwithstanding the irrevocability
of the Torrens title already issued in the name of respondent, he, even being already the registered owner under the Torrens system, may still be
compelled under the law to reconvey the subject property to Liwalug Datomanong. After all, the Torrens system was not designed to shield and protect
one who had committed fraud or misrepresentation and thus holds title in bad faith. Further, contrary to the erroneous claim of the
respondent, 9 reconveyance does not work to set aside and put under review anew the findings of facts of the Bureau of Lands. In an action for
reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property, in this case the title
thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's name, to its rightful and legal owner, 10 or to one with a better right.
That is what reconveyance is all about.
Yet, the right to seek reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust is not absolute. It is subject to extinctive prescription. 11 Happily, both
parties agree on this point. The seeming impediment however, is that while the petitioners assert that the action prescribes in ten years, the respondent
avers that it does in only four years.
xxx Significantly, the three cases cited by the respondent to buttress his position and support the ruling of the trial court have a common
denominator, so to speak. The cause of action assailing the frauds committed and impugning the Torrens titles issued in those cases, all accrued prior to
the effectivity of the present Civil Code. The accrual of the cause of action in Fabian was in 1928, in Miguel, February, 1950, and in Ramirez, 1944. It
must be remembered that before August 30, 1950, the date of the effectivity of the new Civil Code, the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190)
governed prescription.
 In contrast, under the present Civil Code, we find that just as an implied or constructive trust is an offspring of the law (Art. 1456, Civil Code), so is
the corresponding obligation to reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor of the true owner. In this context, and vis-a-vis prescription, Article
1144 of the Civil Code is applicable.
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance
of the Torrens title over the property.
Sanjorjo vs. Facts The heirs of Maximo Sanjorjo filed a complaint for cancellation of titles under tax declarations and reconveyance of possessions of the lots conveyed
Quijano(G.R. to the respondents by way of free patents. The respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, averring that the order of Regional
No. 140457, Director of the DENR approving the withdrawal of the heirs of Guillermo Sanjorjo constitutes a bar to the action filed by the petitioners. The trial court
January 19, dismissed the petition, which the CA affirmed on appeal.
2005) Issue WON the action for reconveyance should prosper. YES
Ruling We agree with the petitioners that their action against the private respondents was not barred by Section 32 of PD No. 1529. We agree with the ruling
of the CA that the torrens title issued on the basis of the free patents became as indefeasible as one which was judicially secured upon the expiration of
one year from date of issuance of the patent. The order or decision of the DENR granting the application for a free patent can be reviewed only within
one year thereafter, on the ground of actual fraud via a petition for review in the RTC provided that no innocent purchaser for value has acquired the
property or any interest thereon. However, an aggrieved party may still file an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust, which
prescribe in ten years from the date of the issuance of the Certificate of Title over the property provided that the property has not been acquired by an
innocent purchaser for value.
Article 1456 of the New Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property through fraud becomes by operation of law a trustee of an implied trust
for the benefit of the real owner of the property. The presence of fraud in this case created an implied trust in favor of the petitioners, giving them the
right to seek reconveyance of the property from the private respondents.
The petitioners’ action for reconveyance may not be said to have prescribed, for, basing the present action on implied trust, the prescriptive period is
ten years. The questioned titles were obtained on August 29, 1988 and November 11, 1988. The petitioners commenced their action for reconveyance on
September 13, 1993. Since the petitioners’ cause of action is based on fraud, the complaint filed on September 13, 1993 is, therefore, well within the
prescriptive period.
 An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner. All that must be
alleged in the complaint are two facts which, admitting them to be true, would entitle the plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land, namely, (1) the
plaintiff was the owner of the land and, (2) that the defendant had illegally dispossessed him of the same. In their complaint, the petitioners clearly
asserted that their predecessors-in-interest have long been the absolute and exclusive owners of the lots in question and that they were fraudulently
deprived of ownership thereof when the private respondents obtained free patents and certificates of title in their names.
Action for Damages (Section 32)
Recovery from the Assurance Fund (Section 95)
Development  As creditor, the Development Bank of the Philippines filed a complaint against one of its debtors, Lourdes Gaspar Bautista, for the recovery of a sum
Bank of the of money representing the unpaid mortgage indebtedness. Such mortgage debt was [supposedly] already satisfied by the creditor bank when it
Philippines vs. extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and acquired the title of the property. However, thereafter, the title was nullified in a judicial proceeding, the
Bautista (G.R. land in question being adjudged as belonging to another claimant, without, however, such debtor, having been cited to appear in such court action.
No. L-21362,  The lower court dismissed the complaint for recovery of a sum of money because the due process requirement was flagrantly disregarded, since she
Nov. 29, 1968) was not a party in such action where her title was set aside, such a judgment could in no wise be binding on her and be the source of a claim by the
appellant bank.
What is the right of a creditor which previously satisfied its claim by foreclosing extrajudicially on a mortgage executed by the debtor, whose title
was thereafter nullified in a judicial proceeding where she was not brought in as a party?
Such dismissal is in accordance with law. There is no occasion for us to repudiate the lower court.
The fundamental due process requirement having been disregarded, appellee Bautista could not in any wise be made to suffer, whether directly or
indirectly, from the effects of such decision. After appellant bank had acquired her title by such extrajudicial foreclosure sale and thus, through its own
act, seen to it that her obligation had been satisfied, it could not thereafter, seek to revive the same on the allegation that the title in question was
subsequently annulled, considering that she was not made a party on the occasion of such nullification.
If it were otherwise, then the cardinal requirement that no party should be made to suffer in person or property without being given a hearing would
be brushed aside. The doctrine consistently adhered to by this Court whenever such a question arises in a series of decisions is that a denial of due
process suffices to cast on the official act taken by whatever branch of the government the impress of nullity.
According to the Civil Code: "The vendor shall not be obliged to make good the proper warranty, unless he is summoned in the suit for eviction at
the instance of the vendee. "While not directly in point, the principle on which the above requirement is based sustains the decision of the lower court. In
effect, appellant bank would hold appellee Bautista liable for the warranty on her title, its annullment having the same effect as that of an eviction. In
such a case, it is wisely provided by the Civil Code that appellee Bautista, as vendor, should have been summoned and given the opportunity to defend
herself. In view of her being denied her day in court, it would to be respected, that she is not "obliged to made good the proper warranty."
 In the suit before the lower court, the Director of Lands and the National Treasurer of the Philippines were likewise made defendants by appellant
bank because of its belief that if no right existed as against appellee Bautista, recovery could be had from the Assurance Fund. Such a belief finds no
support in the applicable, law, which allows recovery only upon a showing that there be no negligence on the part of the party sustaining any loss or
damage or being deprived of any land or interest therein by the operation of the Land Registration Act. This certainly is not the case here, plaintiff-
appellant being solely responsible for the light in which it now finds itself. Accordingly, the Director of Lands and the National Treasurer of the
Philippines are likewise exempt from any liability.
Other remedies available
Action for cancellation or reversion (Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act)
Cawis vs. Facts The DENR approved the sales patent application of Andrada over the subject lot which he transferred to Peralta. Petitioners filed a complaint before
Cerilles (G.R. the trial court alleging fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation in the issuance of the sales patent and the original certificate of title. They claimed that they
No. 170207, had interest in the lots as qualified beneficiaries who met the conditions prescribed in RA 730 to construct a residential house on the lot, which was
April 19, 2010) required in the Order of Award and set as a condition precedent for the issuance of the sales patent.
Issue WON the actual occupants of the subject parcels of lands have standing to question the validity of the sales patent and the original certificate of title
issued over Lot No. 47. NO
WON the issuance of sales patent to Andrada was issued through fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. NO
Ruling Private persons have no right or interest over land considered public at the time the sales application was filed. They have no personality to question
the validity of the title. We further stated that granting, for the sake of argument, that fraud was committed in obtaining the title, it is the State, in a
reversion case, which is the proper party to file the necessary action.
In this case, it is clear that Lot No. 47 was public land when Andrada filed the sales patent application. Any subsequent action questioning the
validity of the award of sales patent on the ground of fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation should thus be initiated by the State. The State has not done
so and thus, we have to uphold the validity and regularity of the sales patent as well as the corresponding original certificate of title issued based on the
patent.
At any rate, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, may directly resolve the issue of alleged fraud in the acquisition of a sales patent
although the action is instituted by a private person. In this connection, the 19 May 1987 letter of the Director of Lands to petitioner Vicente Cawis is
instructive:
As to your allegation that the award in favor of applicant-respondent (Andrada) should be cancelled as he failed to introduce improvements on the
land, we find the said contention to be untenable. Somewhere in your letter dated July 11, 1983, you stated that you took possession of the lot in
question in the early 1950’s, introduced improvements thereon, and resided therein continuously up to the present. By your own admission, it would
 appear that you were the ones who made it impossible for Mr. Andrada to take possession of the said lot and to improve the same. This being the
case, the failure of the applicant-respondent (Andrada) to introduce improvements on the land in question is not attributable to him.
In view of the foregoing facts and circumstances, we regret to inform you that we cannot reconsider our position on this matter. It is further advised
that you vacate the premises and remove all your improvements thereon so that the applicant-awardee (Andrada) can take immediate possession of the
land in question.
Clearly then, fraud cannot be imputed to Andrada. His supposed failure to introduce improvements on Lot No. 47 is simply due to petitioners’ refusal
to vacate the lot. It appears from the factual finding of the Director of Lands that petitioners are the ones in bad faith.
Republic vs. CA Facts Solicitor General filed for the government a complaint for annulment, cancellation of titles and for reversion of the subject lot on the ground that the
and Alpuerto decision of the court dated August 3, 1966 adjudicating the lot to Perpetuo Alpuerto, its order for the issuance of the decree of registration dated
(G.R. No. L- September 22, 1966, as well as the Original Certificate of Title No. 013541 and all the transfer certificates of title derived therefrom, are all null and void
45202, Sept. 11, and without legal effect because the court had no jurisdiction to allocate the subject land, which is inalienable.
1980) Ruling In the first place, the land in question is not within the jurisdiction of the Director of Lands but of the Director of Forestry. Although the Public Land
Act vests upon the Director of Lands, subject to the immediate control of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, direct executive control of the
survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form of concession or disposition and management of the lands of the public domain (Sec. 4,
Commonwealth Act No. 141), the same law explicitly states that timber and mineral lands shall be governed by special laws. And the Forestry Law
(Secs. 1814-1842, Revised Administrative Code, as amended) now vests in the Director of Forestry (now Director of Forest Development under P.D.
No. 705) the jurisdiction and authority over forest or timberland.
"Where the land covered by the homestead application of petitioner was still within the forest zone or under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Forestry, the Director of Lands had no jurisdiction to dispose of said land under the provisions of the Public Land Law, and the petitioner acquired no
right to the land." It follows that "if a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands which cannot be registered
under the Torrens system, or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because it is a public forest, the grantee does not, by
virtue of the said certificate of title alone, become the owner of the land illegally included".
The patent or title thus issued is void at law, since the officer who issued it had no authority to do so.
Under these circumstances, the certificate of title may be ordered cancelled and the cancellation may be pursued through an ordinary action therefor.
This action cannot be barred by the prior judgment of the land registration court, since the said court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. And if
there was no such jurisdiction, then the principle of res judicata does not apply. For it is a well-settled rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to
a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur xxx it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over
the parties xxx.
 This is because the Director of Forestry was not notified of the proceedings. Under the law, the Director of Forestry is the official clothed with
jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation, protection, management, reproduction, reforestation, occupancy, and use of all forests and forest
resources (Sec. 1816, Revised Administrative Code, as amended).
In any case, even granting that the said official was negligent, the doctrine of estoppel cannot operate against the State. "It is a well-settled rule in our
jurisdiction that the Republic or its government is usually not estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents.
Consequently, the State may still seek the cancellation of the title issued to Perpetuo Alpuerto and his successors-interest pursuant to Section 101 of
the Public Land Act. Such title has not become indefeasible, for prescription cannot be invoked against the State.
Annulment of Judgments, Final Orders or Resolutions (Rule 47, Rules of Court)
Yujuico vs. Femina Castro successfully obtained a judgment in the LRC Case No. N-8239 for the registration and confirmation of her title over a parcel of land.
Republic (G.R. The order for the issuance of a decree of registration became final, and Decree No. N-150912 was issued by the Land Registration Commission (LRC).
No. 168661, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 10215 was issued in the name of Castro on May 29, 1974. She then sold the land to Jesus S. Yujuico where a
October 26, TCT was issued in the latter’s name. Annotations at the back of TCT show that Yujuico had mortgaged the lot several entities to secure various loans.
2007) On June 8, 2001, the petitioner, through the OSG, filed a Complaint for Annulment and Cancellation of Decree No. N-150912 with the Parañaque
City RTC. It alleged that when the land registered to Castro the land was still a portion of Manila Bay. It then argued that, first, since the subject land
was still underwater, it could not be registered in the name of Fermina Castro; second, the land registration court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate
inalienable lands, thus the decision adjudicating the subject parcel of land to Fermina Castro was void; and third, the titles of Yujuico and Carpio, being
derived from a void title, were likewise void.
The RTC dismissed the complaint holding that the matter was already decided in LRC Case No. N-8239, and that after 28 years without being
contested, the case had already become final and executory. The CA reversed the RTC’s decision.
WON the Complaint for Annulment and Cancellation of Decree No. N-150912 is meritorious. NO
(Annulment of Judgment; Jurisdiction)
An action for reversion seeks to restore public land fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals or corporations to the mass of public
domain. This remedy is provided under Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141 (Public Land Act) which became effective on December 1, 1936. Said law
recognized the power of the state to recover lands of public domain. Section 124 of CA No. 141 reads:
SEC. 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract made or executed in violation of any of the provisions of
Sections xxx shall be unlawful and null and void from its execution and shall produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title,
patent, or permit originally issued, recognized or confirmed, actually or presumptively, and cause the reversion of the property and its
improvements to the State.
Pursuant to Section 124 of the Public Land Act, reversion suits are proper in the following instances, to wit:
 1. Alienations of land acquired under free patent or homestead provisions in violation of Section 118, CA No. 141;
2. Conveyances made by non-Christians in violation of Section 120, CA No. 141; and
3. Alienations of lands acquired under CA No. 141 in favor of persons not qualified under Sections 121, 122, and 123 of CA No. 141.
From the foregoing, an action for reversion to cancel titles derived from homestead patents or free patents based on transfers and conveyances in
violation of CA No. 141 is filed by the OSG pursuant to its authority under the Administrative Code with the RTC. It is clear therefore that reversion
suits were originally utilized to annul titles or patents administratively issued by the Director of the Land Management Bureau or the Secretary of the
DENR.
While CA No. 141 did not specify whether judicial confirmation of titles by a land registration court can be subject of a reversion suit, the
government availed of such remedy by filing actions with the RTC to cancel titles and decrees granted in land registration applications.
The situation changed on August 14, 1981 upon effectivity of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129 which gave the Intermediate Appellate Court the
exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of RTCs.
When the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure became effective on July 1, 1997, it incorporated Rule 47 on annulment of judgments or final orders and
resolutions of the RTCs. The two grounds for annulment under Sec. 2, Rule 47 are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. If based on extrinsic fraud, the
action must be filed within four (4) years from its discovery, and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel as provided by
Section 3, Rule 47. Thus, effective July 1, 1997, any action for reversion of public land instituted by the Government was already covered by Rule
47.
The instant Civil Case No. 01-0222 for annulment and cancellation of Decree No. N-150912 and its derivative titles was filed on June 8, 2001 with
the Parañaque City RTC. It is clear therefore that the reversion suit was erroneously instituted in the Parañaque RTC and should have been
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The proper court is the CA which is the body mandated by BP Blg. 129 and prescribed by Rule 47 to handle
annulment of judgments of RTCs.
(Exception of Doctrine of Estoppel)
Assuming that the Parañaque RTC has jurisdiction over the reversion case, still the lapse of almost three decades in filing the instant case, the
inexplicable lack of action of the Republic and the injury this would cause constrain us to rule for petitioners. While it may be true that estoppel does not
operate against the state or its agents, deviations have been allowed. In Manila Lodge No. 761 v. Court of Appeals, we said:
Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in rare and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked
where they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. They must be applied with circumspection
and should be applied only in those special cases where the interests of justice clearly require it. Nevertheless, the government must not be
allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations
x x x, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as against private individuals.
 In Republic v. Court of Appeals, where the title of an innocent purchaser for value who relied on the clean certificates of the title was sought to be
cancelled and the excess land to be reverted to the Government, we ruled that "[i]t is only fair and reasonable to apply the equitable principle of
estoppel by laches against the government to avoid an injustice to innocent purchasers for value." We explained:
Likewise time-settled is the doctrine that where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title, acquire rights
over the property, courts cannot disregard such rights and order the cancellation of the certificate. Such cancellation would impair public
confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire in every
instance whether the title has been regularly issued or not. This would be contrary to the very purpose of the law, which is to stabilize land titles.
Equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities when as in this case, the lot was already alienated to innocent buyers for value and the
government did not undertake any act to contest the title for an unreasonable length of time.
Republic v. Court of Appeals is reinforced by our ruling in Republic v. Umali, where, in a reversion case, we held that even if the original grantee of a
patent and title has obtained the same through fraud, reversion will no longer prosper as the land had become private land and the fraudulent acquisition
cannot affect the titles of innocent purchasers for value.
Considering that innocent purchaser for value Yujuico bought the lot in 1974, and more than 27 years had elapsed before the action for reversion was
filed, then said action is now barred by laches.
While the general rule is that an action to recover lands of public domain is imprescriptible, said right can be barred by laches or estoppel. Section 32
of PD 1592 recognized the rights of an innocent purchaser for value over and above the interests of the government. Section 32 provides:
SEC. 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value.—The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised xxx
subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government xxx deprived of land xxx by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of
First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of the entry of such
decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land
or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in
this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrances for value.
In this petition, the LRC (now LRA), on May 30, 1974, issued Decree No. N-150912 in favor of Fermina Castro and OCT No. 10215 was issued by
the Rizal Registrar of Deeds on May 29, 1974. OCT No. 10215 does not show any annotation, lien, or encumbrance on its face. Relying on the clean
title, Yujuico bought the same in good faith and for value from her. He was issued TCT No. 445863 on May 31, 1974. There is no allegation that
Yujuico was a buyer in bad faith, nor did he acquire the land fraudulently. He thus had the protection of the Torrens System that every subsequent
purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those noted on
the certificate and any of the x x x encumbrances which may be subsisting. The same legal shield redounds to his successors-in-interest, the Yujuicos
and Carpio, more particularly the latter since Carpio bought the lot from Jesus Y. Yujuico for value and in good faith.
 Likewise protected are the rights of innocent mortgagees for value, the PISO, Citibank, N.A., PDC, RCBC, PCIB, and DBP. Even if the mortgagor’s
title was proved fraudulent and the title declared null and void, such declaration cannot nullify the mortgage rights of a mortgagee in good faith.
More on the issue of laches. Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due
diligence could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled thereto has either abandoned or declined to assert it.
When respondent government filed the reversion case in 2001, 27 years had already elapsed from the time the late Jesus Yujuico purchased the land
from the original owner Castro. After the issuance of OCT No. 10215 to Castro, no further action was taken by the government to question the issuance
of the title to Castro until the case of Public Estates Authority, brought up in the oral argument before this Court on September 6, 2000.