HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN v. REPUBLIC, GR No.
179987, 2009- classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was
04-29
Facts:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land
registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-
452-D, Silang Cadastre
Malabanan... claimed that he had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco,[3] and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful
possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years.
Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan himself
and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco
testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two
hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco.
The Republic of the Philippines likewise did... not present any
evidence to controvert the application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a
Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community
Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated
that the subject property was "verified... to be within the Alienable
or Disposable land
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing
that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC
had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in
the... manner and for the length of time required by law for
confirmation of imperfect title.
The appellate court held that under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree any period of possession prior to the...
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the
period of possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since the
CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was
declared alienable and... disposable only on 15 March 1982, the
Velazcos' possession prior to that date could not be factored in the
computation of the period of possession.
Issues:
Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their
names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree or both?
Ruling:
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2)
are more extensive. The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil
Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of the State refers to
"patrimonial property," while Section 14(2) speaks of "private lands."
It observes that the Court has yet to decide a case that presented
Section 14(2) as a ground for application for registration, and that the
30-year possession period refers to the period of possession under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, and not the concept of...
prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG further submits that,
assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public
lands, said period should be reckoned from the time the public land
was declared alienable and disposable.
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that
the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service
or the development of the national wealth or that the property has
been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration,
the... property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains
property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus
incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable
and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no...
longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin
to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by
Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President
is... duly authorized by law.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish
that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive
evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his...
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property
since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date
back their possession, according to their own evidence the Tax
Declarations they presented in particular is to the year 1948. Thus,
they cannot... avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for
registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or
disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer
intended for public use service or for the development of the
national... evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code.
The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable
land of the public domain does not change its status as property of
the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it
is... insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN v. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 179987
September 3, 2013 Possession, Property Registration Decree,
Regalia Doctrine
NOVEMBER 13, 2018
FACTS:
Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering
the property he purchased from Eduardo Velazco, claiming that the
property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been
in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession
and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling
him to the judicial confirmation of his title.
The application was granted by the RTC. However, the OSG for the
Republic appealed the judgment to the CA, which reversed the RTC
Judgment.
Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA,
his heirs elevated the said decision to this Court through a petition
for review on certiorari.
The petition was denied.
Petitioners and the Republic filed Motions for Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
What are the classifications of public lands?
Whether or not petitioners were able to prove that the property was
an alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

RULING:
1.Classifications of land according to ownership.
Land, which is an immovable property, may be classified as either of
public dominion or of private ownership. Land is considered of public
dominion if it either:
(a) is intended for public use; or
(b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended
for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth.
Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although
of such character but no longer intended for public use or for public
service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State. Land that
is other than part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces,
cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a
private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first
introduced into the country from the West by Spain through the Laws
of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State. This means that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the
inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to
have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.
A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such
reclassification, and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands
under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the
courts. If, however, public land will be classified as neither
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when public
land is no longer intended for public service or for the development
of the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from
the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion must
be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a
Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law to that effect. Thus, until the Executive
Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or
until Congress or the President declares that the State no longer
intends the land to be used for public service or for the development
of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
2. Petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that
they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the
land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character
and period of possession – possession and occupation that is open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier –
the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private
property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and
disposable.
Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land
has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be
ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President
issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth.
CASE DIGEST: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REMMAN
ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by RONNIE P. INOCENCIO. G.R. No.
199310; February 19, 2014.
FACTS: On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises, Inc.
(respondent), filed an application with the RTC for judicial
confirmation of title over two parcels of land, Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077
situated in Barangay Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila.
On December 13, 2001, the RTC granted respondent's application for
registration. Thereafter, following the required publication and
posting, a scheduled hearing was set. However, on May 30, 2002,
only the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) appeared as
oppositor. Hence, the RTC issued an order of general default except
LLDA, which was given 15 days to submit its comment/opposition to
the respondent's application for registration.
On June 4, 2002, the LLDA filed its Opposition to the respondent's
application for registration, asserting that the lots are not part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. On the other
hand, the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), on July 16, 2002,
likewise filed its Opposition,alleging that the respondent failed to
prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject
parcels of land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Respondent's witnesses showed that the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession of the said parcels of land long before June
12, 1945. The respondent purchased Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 from
Conrado Salvador (Salvador) and Bella Mijares (Mijares), respectively,
in 1989. The subject properties were originally owned and possessed
by Veronica Jaime (Jaime), who cultivated and planted different kinds
of crops in the said lots, through her caretaker and hired farmers,
since 1943. Sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the said parcels of land to
Salvador and Mijares, who continued to cultivate the lots until the
same were purchased by the respondent in 1989.
The respondent likewise alleged that the subject properties are
within the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, as
evidenced by the certifications issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
On the other hand, the LLDA alleged that the respondent's
application for registration should be denied since the subject parcels
of land are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain; it pointed out that pursuant to Section 41(11) of Republic
Act No. 4850(R.A. No. 4850), lands, surrounding the Laguna de Bay,
located at and below the reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters are
public lands which form part of the bed of the said lake. Engr.
Magalonga, testifying for the oppositor LLDA, he found out that the
elevations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are below 12.50 m. That upon
actual area verification of the subject properties on September 25,
2002, Engr. Magalonga confirmed that the elevations of the subject
properties range from 11.33 m to 11.77 m.
On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr. Flotildes, who claimed
that, based on the actual topographic survey of the subject
properties he conducted upon the request of the respondent, the
elevations of the subject properties, contrary to LLDA's claim, are
above 12.50 m.
The RTC granted the respondent's application for registration of title
to the subject properties. The RTC found that the respondent was
able to prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain.
The RTC opined that the elevations of the subject properties are very
much higher than the reglementary elevation of 12.50 m and, thus,
not part of the bed of Laguna Lake.
The RTC likewise found that the respondent was able to prove that it
and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject properties as early
as 1943.
The petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of
the RTC. The CA likewise pointed out that the respondent was able to
present certifications issued by the DENR, attesting that the subject
properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, which was not disputed by the petitioner. Hence, the
instant petition.
ISSUE: Did the CA err in affirming the RTC Decision which granted the
application for registration filed by the respondent?
HELD: Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to public land acquired
under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, or the
Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073.Under Section 14(1) of
P.D. No. 1529, applicants for registration of title must sufficiently
establish: first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and
alienable lands of the public domain; second, that the applicant and
his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and
third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that the
subject property forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, the respondent presented two certifications
issued by Calamno, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part
of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. However,
the said certifications presented by the respondent are insufficient to
prove that the subject properties are alienable and disposable.
In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 578 Phil. 441
(2008).The Court clarified that, in addition to the certification issued
by the proper government agency that a parcel of land is alienable
and disposable, applicants for land registration must prove that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the
land of public domain as alienable and disposable. They must present
a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary
and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the records.
Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by
respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable
and disposable.
Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that the
respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that it and
its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the subject properties
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Cerquena testified for the respondents that the subject properties
were originally owned by Jaime who supposedly possessed and
cultivated the same since 1943; that sometime in 1975, Jaime sold
the subject properties to Salvador and Mijares who, in turn, sold the
same to the respondent in 1989.
The foregoing are but unsubstantiated and self-serving assertions of
the possession and occupation of the subject properties by the
respondent and its predecessors-in-interest; they do not constitute
the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence of possession and occupation
of the subject properties required by Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529.
For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No.
1529, proof of specific acts of ownership must be presented to
substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the land subject of the
application. Applicants for land registration cannot just offer general
statements which are mere conclusions of law rather than factual
evidence of possession. Actual possession consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party
would actually exercise over his own property. Valiao v. Republic,
G.R. No. 170757, November 28, 2011
"A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant
does not constitute possession under claim of ownership. For him,
possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a
presumptive grant from the state. The possession of public land,
however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers
title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations
with regard to public land does not operate against the state, unless
the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under
claim of ownership for the required number of
years." Del Rosario v. Republic of the Philippines, 432 Phil. 824
Further, the Court notes that the tax declarations over the subject
properties presented by the respondent were only for 2002. The
respondent failed to explain why, despite its claim that it acquired
the subject properties as early as 1989, and that its predecessors-in-
interest have been in possession of the subject property since 1943,
it was only in 2002 that it started to declare the same for purposes of
taxation. "While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership." Aide v.
Bernal, G.R. No. 169336, March 18, 2010 GRANTED.
REPUBLIC VS. CA AND NAGUIT
FACTS: Corazon Naguit filed a petition for registration of title which
seeks judicial confirmation of her imperfect title over a parcel of land
in Nabas, Aklan. It was alleged that Naguit and her predecessors-in-
interest have occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner
without any objection from any private person or even the
government until she filed her application for registration. The
MCTC rendered a decision confirming the title in the name of Naguit
upon failure of Rustico Angeles to appear during trial after filing his
formal opposition to the petition. The Solicitor General,
representing the Republic of the Philippines, filed a motion for
reconsideration on the grounds that the property which is in open,
continuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable.
Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership
since the subject land was declared as alienable and disposable only
on October 15, 1980. The alienable and disposable character of the
land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.
ISSUE: Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14 (1) of the
Property Registration Decree that the subject land be first classified
as alienable and disposable before the applicant’s possession under
a bona fide claim of ownership could even start.
RULING: Section 14 (1) merely requires that the property sought to
be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the
application for registration of title is filed. There are three
requirements for registration of title, (1) that the subject property is
alienable and disposable; (2) that the applicants and their
predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous, and exclusive
possession and occupation, and; (3) that the possession is under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945. There must be a
positive act of the government through a statute or proclamation
stating the intention of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative
over the property, thus, declaring the land as alienable and
disposable. However, if there has been none, it is presumed that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the property and the
possession of the land no matter how long would not ripen into
ownership through acquisitive prescription. To follow the Solicitor
General’s argument in the construction of Section 14 (1) would
render the paragraph 1 of the said provision inoperative for it
would mean that all lands of public domain which were not
declared as alienable and disposable before June 12, 1945 would
not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length
of unchallenged possession by the occupant. In effect, it
precludes the government from enforcing the said provision as
it decides to reclassify lands as alienable and disposable. The land
in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted
with coconut trees now over fifty years old. The inherent nature of
the land but confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence
agricultural. There is no impediment to the application of Section
14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. Naguit had the right
to apply for registration owing to the continuous possession by her
and her predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945.

REPUBLIC V.S. T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC., GR No. 154953, 2008-06-26
Facts:
This case originated from an Application for Original Registration of
Title filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc. covering Lot 10705-B of the
subdivision plan Csd-04-019741 which is a portion of the
consolidated Lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre
All adjoining owners and all government agencies and offices
concerned were notified of the initial hearing.
On 15 November 1999, the trial court issued... an Order [8] of General
Default against the whole world except as against petitioner.
In its 16 December 1999 Decision, the trial court adjudicated the land
in favor of respondent.
Petitioner appealed from the trial court's Decision. Petitioner alleged
that the trial court erred in granting the application for registration
absent clear evidence that the applicant and its predecessors-in-
interest have complied with the period of possession and occupation
as... required by law.
In its 21 August 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto
the trial court's Decision.
Issues:
The issues may be summarized as follows:
Whether the land is alienable and disposable;
Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
the land in the concept of an owner since June 1945 or earlier; and
Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration of the land
under the Public Land Act.
Ruling:
Respondent Failed to Prove... that the Land is Alienable and
Disposable
Petitioner argues that anyone who applies for registration has the
burden of overcoming the presumption that the land forms part of
the public domain. Petitioner insists that respondent failed to prove
that the land is no longer part of the public domain.
In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The 3
June 1997 Certification by the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Offices (CENRO), Batangas City,[16] certified that
"lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre situated at Barangay San
Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas with an area of 596,116 square
meters falls within the ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ZONE under
Project No. 30, Land Classification Map No. 582 certified [on] 31
December 1925." The... second certification [17] in the form of a
memorandum to the trial court, which was issued by the Regional
Technical Director, Forest Management Services of the DENR (FMS-
DENR), stated "that the subject area falls within an alienable and
disposable land,... Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas, Batangas certified on
Dec. 31, 1925 per LC No. 582."
The certifications are not sufficient.
the CENRO issues certificates of land... classification status for areas
below 50 hectares.
The Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO)
issues certificate of land classification status for lands covering over
50 hectares.
In this case, respondent applied for registration of Lot 10705-B. The
area covered by Lot 10705-B is over 50 hectares (564,007 square
meters). The CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot 10705 with an
area of 596,116 square meters which,... as per DAO No. 38, series of
1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and
disposable.
Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director,
FMS-DENR, in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, has no
probative value.
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a
land is alienable and disposable.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR,
certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable
and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such
government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the
facts stated therein.
The DENR Secretary certified that based on Land Classification Map
No. 582, the land became alienable and disposable on 31 December
1925. However, the certificate on the... blue print plan states that it
became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985.
There was No Open, Continuous, Exclusive, and Notorious
Possession and Occupation in the Concept of an Owner
Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy had been in possession of
the land before 1945. Yet, Evangelista only worked on the land for
three years.
he admitted that he did not know the exact relationship between
Kabesang Puroy and Fortunato, which is rather unusual for neighbors
in a small community.
in this case, we find Evangelista's uncorroborated testimony
insufficient to prove that respondent's predecessors-in-interest had
been in possession... of the land in the concept of an owner for more
than 30 years.
Land Application by a Corporation
Petitioner asserts that respondent, a private corporation, cannot
apply for registration of the land of the public domain in this case.
The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
SET ASIDE the 21 August 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 66658 and the 16 December 1999 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 in Land
Registration Case No. T-635. We DENY the application for...
registration filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc.
Principles:
The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly
of private dominion presumably belong to the State.[14] The onus to
overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the
land subject of an application for... registration is alienable and
disposable rests with the applicant.

The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land
of the public domain as alienable and... disposable, and that the land
subject of the application for registration falls within the approved
area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO.

In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of

the original classification approved by the

DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of

the official records.