Week 7.
September 4
Litigation: Forms Commonly Attached to a Common Pleading
Aim: Any member of the Philippine Bar should be fully oriented with pleadings used
in litigation while in law school thus we shall look deeply at pleadings. We shall go to
the relevant (and latest) rules and jurisprudence regarding pleadings and pay close
attention to what it states as regards form and contents of pleadings. Then, we shall
look at sample initiatory pleadings to complete our examination therein.
III. Litigation in General
A. Pleadings
1. In General. Rules of Court (RoC). Rule 6
2. RULE 6
3. Kinds Of Pleadings
4. Section 1. Pleadings defined. — Pleadings are the written statements of the
respective claims and defenses of the parties submitted to the court for
appropriate judgment. (1a)
5. Section 2. Pleadings allowed. — The claims of a party are asserted in a
complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint, or
complaint-in-intervention.
6. The defenses of a party are alleged in the answer to the pleading asserting a
claim against him.
7. An answer may be responded to by a reply. (n)
8. Section 3. Complaint. — The complaint is the pleading alleging the plaintiff's
cause or causes of action. The names and residences of the plaintiff and
defendant must be stated in the complaint. (3a)
9. Section 4. Answer. — An answer is a pleading in which a defending party
sets forth his defenses. (4a)
10. Section 5. Defenses. — Defenses may either be negative or affirmative.
11. (a) A negative defense is the specific denial of the material fact or facts
alleged in the pleading of the claimant essential to his cause or causes of
action.
12. (b) An affirmative defense is an allegation of a new matter which, while
hypothetically admitting the material allegations in the pleading of the
claimant, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by him. The affirmative
defenses include fraud, statute of limitations, release, payment, illegality,
statute of frauds, estoppel, former recovery, discharge in bankruptcy, and
any other matter by way of confession and avoidance. (5a)
13. Section 6. Counterclaim. — A counterclaim is any claim which a defending
party may have against an opposing party. (6a)
14. Section 7. Compulsory counterclaim. — A compulsory counterclaim is one
which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is
connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter
of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such
a counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the court both as to the
amount and the nature thereof, except that in an original action before the
Regional Trial Court, the counter-claim may be considered compulsory
regardless of the amount. (n)
15. Section 8. Cross-claim. — A cross-claim is any claim by one party against a
co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein. Such cross-
claim may include a claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or
may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the
action against the cross-claimant. (7)
16. Section 9. Counter-counterclaims and counter-crossclaims. — A counter-
claim may be asserted against an original counter-claimant.
17. A cross-claim may also be filed against an original cross-claimant. (n)
18. Section 10. Reply. — A reply is a pleading, the office or function of which is
to deny, or allege facts in denial or avoidance of new matters alleged by way
of defense in the answer and thereby join or make issue as to such new
matters. If a party does not file such reply, all the new matters alleged in the
answer are deemed controverted.
19. If the plaintiff wishes to interpose any claims arising out of the new matters
so alleged, such claims shall be set forth in an amended or supplemental
complaint. (11)
20. Section 11. Third, (fourth, etc.)—party complaint. — A third (fourth, etc.) —
party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file
against a person not a party to the action, called the third (fourth, etc.) —
party defendant for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in
respect of his opponent's claim. (12a)
21. Section 12. Bringing new parties. — When the presence of parties other
than those to the original action is required for the granting of complete relief
in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order
them to be brought in as defendants, if jurisdiction over them can be
obtained. (14)
22. Section 13. Answer to third (fourth, etc.)—party complaint. — A third (fourth,
etc.) — party defendant may allege in his answer his defenses,
counterclaims or cross-claims, including such defenses that the third (fourth,
etc.) — party plaintiff may have against the original plaintiff's claim. In proper
cases, he may also assert a counterclaim against the original plaintiff in
respect of the latter's claim against the third-party plaintiff. (n)
a.) What are pleadings? Sec. 1
b.) What are the pleadings allowed in ordinary civil actions? Sec. 2
23. Formal requirements of pleadings
a.) Form and Size of document
(i) RoC. Rule 136, Sec. 15 and 16; see SC Resolution dated November 24 1992 with
respect to these two sections
Section 15. Unprinted papers. — All unprinted documents presented to the superior
courts of the Philippines shall be written on paper of good quality twelve and three
inches in length by eight and one-half inches in width, leaving a margin at the top and
the left-hand side not less than one inch and one-half in width. Papel catalan, of the
first and second classes, legal cap, and typewriting paper of such weight as not to
permit the writing of more than one original and two carbons at one time, will be
accepted, provided that such papers is of the required size and of good quality.
Documents written with ink shall not be of more than twenty-five lines to one page.
Typewritten documents shall be written double spaced. One side only of the page will
be written upon, and the different sheets will be sewn together, firmly, by five stitches
in the left -hand border in order to facilitate the formation of the expediente, and they
must not be doubled.
Section 16. Printed papers. — All papers require by these rules to be printed shall be
printed with blank ink on unglazed paper, with pages six inches in width by nine
inches in length, in pamphlet form. The type used shall not be smaller than twelve
point. The paper used shall be of sufficient weight to prevent the printing upon one
side from being visible upon the other.
(ii) A.M. No. 11-9-4-SC or the Efficient Use of Paper Rule
Whereas, to produce 500 reams of paper, twenty trees are cut and 100,000 liters of
water are used, water that is no longer reusable because it is laden with chemicals and
is just released to the environment to poison our rivers and seas;
Whereas, there is a need to cut the judicial system’s use excessive quantities of costly
paper, save our forests, avoid landslides, and mitigate the worsening effects of climate
change that the world is experiencing;
Whereas, the judiciary can play a big part in saving our trees, conserving precious
water and helping mother earth;
NOW, THEREFORE, the Supreme Court En Banc hereby issues and promulgates the
following:
Sec. 1. Title of the Rule– This rule shall be known and cited as the Efficient Use of
Paper Rule.
Sec. 2. Applicability. – This rule shall apply to all courts and quasi-judicial bodies under
the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court.
Sec. 3. Format and Style. – a) All pleadings, motions and similar papers intended for
the court and quasi-judicial body’s consideration and action (court-bound papers) shall
written in single space with one-and-a –half space between paragraphs, using an easily
readable font style of the party’s choice, of 14-size font, and on a 13 –inch by 8.5- inch
white bond paper; and
b) All decisions, resolutions and orders issued by courts and quasi-judicial bodies under
the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court shall comply with these
requirements. Similarly covered are the reports submitted to the courts and transcripts
of stenographic notes.
Sec. 4. Margins and Prints .— The parties shall maintain the following margins on all
court-bound papers: a left hand margin of 1.5 inches from the edge; an upper margin
of 1.2 inches from the edge; a right hand margin of 1.0 inch from the edge; and a lower
margin of 1.0 inch from the edge. Every page must be consecutively numbered.
Sec. 5. Copies to be filed. – Unless otherwise directed by the court, the number of
court- bound papers that a party is required or desires to file shall be as follows:
a. In the Supreme Court, one original (properly marked) and four copies, unless the
case is referred to the Court En Banc, in which event, the parties shall file ten additional
copies. For the En Banc, the parties need to submit only two sets of annexes, one
attached to the original and an extra copy. For the Division, the parties need to submit
also two sets of annexes, one attached to the original and an extra copy. All members
of the Court shall share the extra copies of annexes in the interest of economy of paper.
Parties to cases before the Supreme Court are further required, on voluntary basis for
the first six months following the effectivity of this Rule and compulsorily afterwards
unless the period is extended, to submit, simultaneously with their court-bound papers,
soft copies of the same and their annexes (the latter in PDF format) either by email to
the Court’s e-mail address or by compact disc (CD). This requirement is in preparation
for the eventual establishment of an e-filing paperless system in the judiciary.
b. In the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, one original (properly marked) and
two copies with their annexes;
c. In the Court of Tax Appeals, one original (properly marked) and two copies with
annexes. On appeal to the En Banc, one Original (properly marked) and eight copies
with annexes; and
d. In other courts, one original (properly marked) with the stated annexes attached to
it.
Sec. 6. Annexes Served on Adverse Party. – A party required by the rules to serve a
copy of his court-bound on the adverse party need not enclose copies of those annexes
that based on the record of the court such party already has in his possession. In the
event a party requests a set of the annexes actually filed with the court, the part who
filed the paper shall comply with the request within five days from receipt.
Sec. 7. Date of Effectivity. – This rule shall take effect on January 1, 2013 after
publication in two newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
Manila, November 13, 2012.
3. Basic Content of Pleadings
1. a.) Caption and Title. Rule 7, Sec. 1
Section 1. Caption. — The caption sets forth the name of the court, the title of
the action, and the docket number if assigned.
The title of the action indicates the names of the parties. They shall all be named
in the original complaint or petition; but in subsequent pleadings, it shall be
sufficient if the name of the first party on each side be stated with an appropriate
indication when there are other parties.
Their respective participation in the case shall be indicated. (1a, 2a)
2. b.) Body. Rule 7, Sec. 2 (a)-(d)
Section 2. The body. — The body of the pleading sets fourth its designation, the
allegations of the party's claims or defenses, the relief prayed for, and the date of
the pleading. (n)
(a) Paragraphs. — The allegations in the body of a pleading shall be divided into
paragraphs so numbered to be readily identified, each of which shall contain a
statement of a single set of circumstances so far as that can be done with
convenience. A paragraph may be referred to by its number in all succeeding
pleadings. (3a)
(b) Headings. — When two or more causes of action are joined the statement of
the first shall be prefaced by the words "first cause of action,'' of the second by
"second cause of action", and so on for the others.
When one or more paragraphs in the answer are addressed to one of several
causes of action in the complaint, they shall be prefaced by the words "answer to
the first cause of action" or "answer to the second cause of action" and so on;
and when one or more paragraphs of the answer are addressed to several
causes of action, they shall be prefaced by words to that effect. (4)
(c) Relief. — The pleading shall specify the relief sought, but it may add a
general prayer for such further or other relief as may be deemed just or
equitable. (3a, R6)
(d) Date. — Every pleading shall be dated. (n)
3. c.) Prayer. Rule 7, Sec. 2 (c)
1. (i) Purpose
2. (ii) Request for Specific Relief
(i) Prince Transport, Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. 167291, January 12, 2001
FACTS: Respondents were hired either as drivers, conductors, mechanics or
inspectors, except for respondent Diosdado Garcia (Garcia), who was assigned as
Operations Manager. in addition to their regular monthly income, respondents also
received commissions equivalent to 8 to 10% of their wages; sometime in October
1997, the said commissions were reduced to 7 to 9%; this led respondents and other
employees of PTI to hold a series of meetings to discuss the protection of their interests
as employees; these meetings led petitioner Renato Claros, who is the president of
PTI, to suspect that respondents are about to form a union; in order to block the
continued formation of the union, PTI caused the transfer of all union members and
sympathizers to one of its sub-companies, Lubas Transport (Lubas)
Petitioners, on the other hand, denied the material allegations of the complaints
contending that herein respondents were no longer their employees, since they all
transferred to Lubas at their own request; petitioners have nothing to do with the
management and operations of Lubas as well as the control and supervision of the
latter's employees; Subsequently, the complaints filed by respondents were
consolidated. On October 25, 2000, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision. The Labor
Arbiter ruled that petitioners are not guilty of unfair labor practice. Respondents filed a
Partial Appeal with the NLRC. NLRC modified the decision of the labor arbiter.
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the NLRC denied it in its
Resolution. Respondents then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA
assailing the Decision and Resolution of the NLRC. On December 20, 2004, the CA
rendered the herein assailed Decision which granted respondents' petition. The CA
ruled that petitioners are guilty of unfair labor practice; that Lubas is a mere
instrumentality, agent conduit or adjunct of PTI. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the CA denied it via its Resolution. Hence, the instant petition for
review on certiorari.
ISSUE : WON THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING
THAT PETITIONERS PRINCE TRANSPORT, INC. AND MR. RENATO CLAROS AND
LUBAS TRANSPORT ARE ONE AND THE SAME CORPORATION AND THUS,
LIABLE IN SOLIDUM TO RESPONDENTS
HELD: The Court agrees with the CA that Lubas is a mere agent, conduit or adjunct of
PTI. A settled formulation of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is that when two
business enterprises are owned, conducted and controlled by the same parties, both
law and equity will, when necessary to protect the rights of third parties, disregard the
legal fiction that these two entities are distinct and treat them as identical or as one and
the same. In the present case, it may be true that Lubas is a single proprietorship and
not a corporation. However, petitioners attempt to isolate themselves from and hide
behind the supposed separate and distinct personality of Lubas so as to evade their
liabilities is precisely what the classical doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity
seeks to prevent and remedy. What is telling is the fact that in a memorandum issued
by PTI, dated January 22, 1998, petitioner company admitted that Lubas is one of its
sub-companies. Moreover, petitioners failed to refute the contention of respondents
that despite the latters transfer to Lubas of their daily time records, reports, daily income
remittances of conductors, schedule of drivers and conductors were all made,
performed, filed and kept at the office of PTI. In fact, respondents identification cards
bear the name of PTI. It may not be amiss to point out at this juncture that in two
separate illegal dismissal cases involving different groups of employees transferred by
PTI to other companies, the Labor Arbiter handling the cases found that these
companies and PTI are one and the same entity; thus, making them solidarily liable for
the payment of backwages and other money claims awarded to the complainants
therein.
(iii) Damages
(i) Manchester Development Corporation v. CA, No. L-75919, May 7, 1987,
149 SCRA 562
Acting on the motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Second Division of
January 28,1987 and another motion to refer the case to and to be heard in oral
argument by the Court En Banc filed by petitioners, the motion to refer the case to the
Court en banc is granted but the motion to set the case for oral argument is denied.
Petitioners in support of their contention that the filing fee must be assessed on the
basis of the amended complaint cite the case of Magaspi vs. Ramolete. 1 They
contend that the Court of Appeals erred in that the filing fee should be levied by
considering the amount of damages sought in the original complaint.
The environmental facts of said case differ from the present in that —
1. The Magaspi case was an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a
parcel of land with damages.2While the present case is an action for torts and
damages and specific performance with prayer for temporary restraining order, etc.3
2. In the Magaspi case, the prayer in the complaint seeks not only the annulment of
title of the defendant to the property, the declaration of ownership and delivery of
possession thereof to plaintiffs but also asks for the payment of actual moral,
exemplary damages and attorney's fees arising therefrom in the amounts specified
therein. 4However, in the present case, the prayer is for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the action against the
defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by the plaintiffs for the
property in question, to attach such property of defendants that maybe sufficient to
satisfy any judgment that maybe rendered, and after hearing, to order defendants to
execute a contract of purchase and sale of the subject property and annul defendants'
illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff, ordering defendants jointly and severally to
pay plaintiff actual, compensatory and exemplary damages as well as 25% of said
amounts as maybe proved during the trial as attorney's fees and declaring the tender
of payment of the purchase price of plaintiff valid and producing the effect of payment
and to make the injunction permanent. The amount of damages sought is not
specified in the prayer although the body of the complaint alleges the total amount of
over P78 Million as damages suffered by plaintiff.5
3. Upon the filing of the complaint there was an honest difference of opinion as to the
nature of the action in the Magaspi case. The complaint was considered as primarily
an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land. The damages
stated were treated as merely to the main cause of action. Thus, the docket fee of
only P60.00 and P10.00 for the sheriff's fee were paid. 6
In the present case there can be no such honest difference of opinion. As maybe
gleaned from the allegations of the complaint as well as the designation thereof, it is
both an action for damages and specific performance. The docket fee paid upon filing
of complaint in the amount only of P410.00 by considering the action to be merely
one for specific performance where the amount involved is not capable of pecuniary
estimation is obviously erroneous. Although the total amount of damages sought is
not stated in the prayer of the complaint yet it is spelled out in the body of the
complaint totalling in the amount of P78,750,000.00 which should be the basis of
assessment of the filing fee.
4. When this under-re assessment of the filing fee in this case was brought to the
attention of this Court together with similar other cases an investigation was
immediately ordered by the Court. Meanwhile plaintiff through another counsel with
leave of court filed an amended complaint on September 12, 1985 for the inclusion of
Philips Wire and Cable Corporation as co-plaintiff and by emanating any mention of
the amount of damages in the body of the complaint. The prayer in the original
complaint was maintained. After this Court issued an order on October 15, 1985
ordering the re- assessment of the docket fee in the present case and other cases
that were investigated, on November 12, 1985 the trial court directed plaintiffs to
rectify the amended complaint by stating the amounts which they are asking for. It
was only then that plaintiffs specified the amount of damages in the body of the
complaint in the reduced amount of P10,000,000.00. 7 Still no amount of damages
were specified in the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted.
On the other hand, in the Magaspi case, the trial court ordered the plaintiffs to pay the
amount of P3,104.00 as filing fee covering the damages alleged in the original
complaint as it did not consider the damages to be merely an or incidental to the
action for recovery of ownership and possession of real property. 8 An amended
complaint was filed by plaintiff with leave of court to include the government of the
Republic as defendant and reducing the amount of damages, and attorney's fees
prayed for to P100,000.00. Said amended complaint was also admitted. 9
In the Magaspi case, the action was considered not only one for recovery of
ownership but also for damages, so that the filing fee for the damages should be the
basis of assessment. Although the payment of the docketing fee of P60.00 was found
to be insufficient, nevertheless, it was held that since the payment was the result of
an "honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee"
the court "had acquired jurisdiction over the case and the proceedings thereafter had
were proper and regular." 10 Hence, as the amended complaint superseded the
original complaint, the allegations of damages in the amended complaint should be
the basis of the computation of the filing fee. 11
In the present case no such honest difference of opinion was possible as the
allegations of the complaint, the designation and the prayer show clearly that it is an
action for damages and specific performance. The docketing fee should be assessed
by considering the amount of damages as alleged in the original complaint.
As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that a case is deemed filed
only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court
. 12 Thus, in the present case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case
by the payment of only P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the
complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. 13 For an legal purposes there is
no such original complaint that was duly filed which could be amended.
Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent
proceedings and actions taken by the trial court are null and void.
The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present case that the basis of
assessment of the docket fee should be the amount of damages sought in the original
complaint and not in the amended complaint.
The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it frowns at the
practice of counsel who filed the original complaint in this case of omitting any
specification of the amount of damages in the prayer although the amount of over
P78 million is alleged in the body of the complaint. This is clearly intended for no
other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the
docket clerk in the assessment of the filing fee. This fraudulent practice was
compounded when, even as this Court had taken cognizance of the anomaly and
ordered an investigation, petitioner through another counsel filed an amended
complaint, deleting all mention of the amount of damages being asked for in the body
of the complaint. It was only when in obedience to the order of this Court of October
18, 1985, the trial court directed that the amount of damages be specified in the
amended complaint, that petitioners' counsel wrote the damages sought in the much
reduced amount of P10,000,000.00 in the body of the complaint but not in the prayer
thereof. The design to avoid payment of the required docket fee is obvious.
The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a repetition of this
unethical practice.
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and
other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not
only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be
considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to
comply with this requirement shall not bib accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise
be expunged from the record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not
thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based
on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi
case 14 in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and
reversed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of merit. SO
ORDERED.
(ii) SC Circular No. 7, March 24, 1988 reiterating Manchester
TO: JUDGE AND CLERKS OF COURT OF THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURTS, SHARI'A DISTRICT COURTS AND SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURTS; AND
THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
SUBJECT: ALL COMPLAINTS MUST SPECIFY THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES
SOUGHT NOT ONLY IN THE BODY OF THE PLEADING, BUT ALSO IN THE
PRAYER IN ORDER TO BE ACCEPTED AND ADMITTED FOR FILING. THE
AMOUNT OF DAMAGES SO SPECIFIED IN THE COMPLAINT SHALL BE THE
BASIS FOR ASSESSING THE AMOUNT OF THE FILING FEES.
In "Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals", No. L-75919, May 7,
1987, 149 SCRA 562, this Court condemned the practice of counsel who in filing the
original complaint omitted from the prayer any specification of the amount of damage
although the amount of over P78 million is alleged in the body of the complaint. This
Court observed that "(T)his is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the
payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk, in the assessment
of the filing fees. This fraudulent practice was compounded when, even as this Court
had taken cognizance of the anomaly and ordered an investigation, petitioner through
another counsel filed an amended complaint, deleting all mention of the amount of
damages being asked for in the body of the complaint. . . . ."
For the guidance of all concerned, the WARNING given by the Court in the afore-
cited case is reproduced hereunder:
The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a repetition of
this unethical practice.
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers
and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being
prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and
said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any
case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be
accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading
will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the
docket fee based on the amount sought (115 SCRA 193) in so far as it is
inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
Strict compliance with this Circular is hereby enjoined.
Let this be circularized to all the courts hereinabove named and to the President and
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which is hereby directed
to disseminate this Circular to all its members. March 24, 1988.
(iv) Alternative Remedies
 d.) Jurat
e.) Verification. RoC. Rule 7, Sec. 4
Section 4. Verification. — Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule,
pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit .(5a)
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his knowledge and belief.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information
and belief", or upon "knowledge, information and belief", or lacks a proper verification,
shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. (6a)
f.) Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. RoC. Rule 7, Sec. 5
Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party shall
certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for
relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith:
(a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the
same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other
pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if
he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein
his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and
after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of
the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice
to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his
counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be
ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as
well as a cause for administrative sanctions. (n)
(i) Can you do a Combined Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping?
(ii) Cosco Philippines Shopping Inc. v. Kemper Insurance Co., G.R. 179488,
April 23, 2012
Facts:This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set
aside the decision of the CA.Kemper is a foreign insurance company
based in Illinois, USA with no license to engage in business in the
Philippines. While petitioner is a domestic shipping company.1998,
Kemper insured the shipment of imported frozen boneless beef. Upon
arrival in Manila port, a portion of the shipment was rejected by reason of
spoilage arising from the alleged temperature fluctuations of Cosco
containers.So, Genosi (the buyer) filed a claim against both Cosco and
Kemper. Thereafter, Kemper paid the claim of Genosi. Hence, in 1999.
Kemper filed a complaint for insurance loss and damage against Cosco
alleging that that despite the repeated demands, Cosco failed and
refused to pay the value loss sustained due to the fault of Cosco's
container.In response, Cosco insisted that Kemper had no capacity to
sue since it was doing business in the Philippines without the required
license. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending that the same was
filed by Atty. Lat who failed to show his authority to sue and sign the
corresponding certification against forum shopping.2002, RTC granted
the motion to dismiss saying that Atty. Lat has no special power of
attorney. Motion for reconsideration was denied. On appeal by
respondent, CA reversed and set aside the trial court's order, saying that
the certificate for non-forum shopping is mandatory and it must be side
not by the counsel but by the plaintiff or principal party concerned. CA
also ordered that the case be in the RTC for further proceedings.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was later denied by the CA, hence
this present petition.
Issue: CA erred in their decision saying that Atty. Lat was properly
authorized by the respondent to sign the certificate.
Held: Petition is meritorious.
Certification of non-forum shopping must be signed by the parties or if the
principal cannot sign, the behalf must be duly authorized. In case of a
corporation, the lawyer assigned must have a personal knowledge of the
facts.In this case, since this is a corporation, it must show that the board
of directors has duly authorized Atty. Lat. However, there is no proof that
respondent authorized Atty. Lat to sign the certification.G.R. No.
179488"x x x. Since the court has no jurisdiction over the complaint and
respondent, petitioner is not estopped from challenging the trial court's
jurisdiction, even at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings.
This is so because the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel.[29]
In Regalado v. Go,[30] the Court held that laches should be clearly
present for the Sibonghanoy[31] doctrine to apply, thus: Laches is
defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it.
The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the landmark
doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction
by estoppel is the exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches may
be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which
the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such
controversies, laches should have been clearly present; that is, lack of
jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the
presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined
to assert it.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first
time in a motion to dismiss filed by the Surety almost 15 years after the
questioned ruling had been rendered. At several stages of the
proceedings, in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, the
Surety invoked the jurisdiction of the said courts to obtain affirmative
relief and submitted its case for final adjudication on the merits. It was
only when the adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals
that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction.[32] The factual
setting attendant in Sibonghanoy is not similar to that of the present case
so as to make it fall under the doctrine of estoppel by laches. Here, the
trial court's jurisdiction was questioned by the petitioner during the pre-
trial stage of the proceedings, and it cannot be said that considerable
length of time had elapsed forlaches to attach. x x x."
(iii) Vda De Formosa v. PNB, G.R. No. 154704, June 1, 2011
DOCTRINE:
• The Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping should be signed by all the Petitioners or
Plaintiffs in a case, and that the signing by only one of them is insufficient.
• The attestation on Non-Forum Shopping requires personal knowledge by the party
executing the same, and the lone signing Petitioner cannot be presumed to have
personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his co-petitioners of any action or
claim the same as similar to the current petition.
EMERGENCY RECIT:
• Nellie and her late husband obtained a loan from PNB, secured by a real estate
mortgage. After some time, Nellie and her 5 children executed an SPA in favor or
Malcaba, authorizing him to secure all papers and documents pertaining to the loan
with real estate mortgage. The Fromosos eventually sold the mortgaged real
properties to Malcaba. Malcaba went to PNB to pay the loan and satisfy the obligation
of the Formosos. PNB refused the tender of payment. This prompted Petitioners to
filed a complaint for specific performance against PNB, for it to accept the payment
tendered. RTC, ruled in favor of Petitioners. However, Petitioners still filed a Petition
for Relief. RTC, denied the petition. Petitioners appealed to the CA but the latter
denied the petition for failure to comply with rule on the Verification and Certification
of Non-Forum Shopping.
FACTS:
• Nellie Panelo Vda. De Formoso (Nellie) and her 5 children executed a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Primitivo Malcaba (Malcaba) authorizing him,
among others, to secure all papers and documents including the owner’s copies of
the titles of real properties pertaining to the loan with Real Estate Mortgage originally
secured by Nellie and her late husband, Benjamin, from PNB.
• The Formosos sold the subject mortgaged real properties to Malcaba though a
Deed of Absolute Sale. Subsequently, Malcaba and his lawyer went to PNB to fully
pay the loan obligation including interests.
• PNB, however, allegedly refused to accept Malcaba’s tender of payment and to
release the mortgage or surrender the titles of the subject mortgaged real properties.
• Petitioners filed a complaint for Specific Performance against PNB in the RTC,
praying, among others, that PNB be ordered to accept the amount tendered by
Malcaba, as full settlement of the loan obligation of the Formosos.
• OCT. 1999: RTC: Rendered a decision in favor of Petitioners.
o Prayer to order PNB to accept the amount tendered GRANTED
o Prayer for exemplary or corrective damages, attorney’s fees, and annual
interest, and daily interest, were DENIED for lack of evidence
• PNB:
o Filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied for failure to comply
with Rule 15, Sec. 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (ROCP).
o Filed a Notice of Appeal but it was dismissed for being filed out of time.
• NOV. 1999: Petitioners received their copy of the decision,
• JAN. 2001: Petitioners filed their Petition for Relief questioning the RTC decision,
that there was no testimonial evidence presented to warrant the award for moral and
exemplary damages.
o They reasoned out that they could not then file a motion for
reconsideration because they could not get hold of a copy of the transcript of
stenographic notes.
• AUG. 2001: RTC: Denied the petition for lack of merit.
• Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC.
Petitioners appealed to the CA challenging the RTC order dated AUG. 2001.
• CA: Dismissed the petition.
o The Verification and Certification of Non-forum shopping was signed by
only one (Macalba) of the many Petitioners.
o There was no shooing that the one who signed was empowered to act for
the rest.
o Therefore, it cannot be presumed that the one who signed knew to the
best of his knowledge whether his co-petitioners had the same or similar
claims or actions filed or pending.
o The certification of non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge of
the party who executed the same and that Petitioners must show reasonable
cause for failure to personally sign the certification.
• Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the present
petition.
ISSUE:
1. WON the Petitioners petition for certiorari that they filed before the CA substantially
complied with the requirements provided for under the 1997 ROCP on Verification
and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping?
2. WON the CA erred in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari when it should have the
petition due course in so far as Malcaba is concerned because he signed the
certification?
HELD/RATIO:
1. NO.
• The Petition for Certiorari filed with the CA stated the following names as Petitoners:
Nellie Vda. De Fromoso, Ma. Theresa Formoso-Pescador, Roger Fromoso, Mary
Jane Formoso, Bernard Formoso, Benjamin Formoso, and Primitivo Malcaba.
• Admittedly, among the 7 petitioners mentioned, only Malcaba signed the Verification
and Certification of Non-forum Shopping in the subject petition.
• There was no proof that Malcaba was authorized by his co-petitioners to sign for
them.
• There was no SPA shown by the Formosos authorizing Malcaba as their attorney-
infact in filing a Petition for Review on Certiorari. Neither could the Petitioners give at
least a reasonable explanation as to why only he signed the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping.
• In Docena vs. Lapsesura, the Court ruled that:
o The Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping should be signed by all the
Petitioners or Plaintiffs in a case, and that the signing by only one of them is
insufficient.
o The attestation on Non-Forum Shopping requires personal knowledge by
the party executing the same, and the lone signing Petitioner cannot be
presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his co-
petitioners of any action or claim the same as similar to the current petition.
• In Athena Computers Inc., and Joselito R. Jimenez vs. Wesnu, the Court ruled that:
o The certification against forum shopping is fatally defective, not having been duly
signed by both Petitioners and thus warrants the dismissal of the Petition for
Certiorari.
2. CA did not err in its decision.
• The Petitioners were given a chance by the CA to comply with the Rules when they
filed their motion for reconsideration, but they refused to so.
o Despite the opportunity given to them to make them all sign the verification
and certification of non-forum shopping, they still failed to comply.
o Thus, the CA was constrained to deny their motion and affirm the earlier
resolution.
• Indeed, liberality and leniency were accorded in some cases.
o In these cases, however, those who did not sign were relatives of the lone
signatory, so unlike in this case, where Malcaba is not a relative who is
similarly situated with the other Petitioners and who cannot speak for them.
o In the case of Heirs of Domingo Hernandez, Sr. vs. Plaridel Mingoa, Sr.
the Court ruled that:
§ Here, all the Petitioners are immediate relatives who share a
common interest in the land sought to be recovered and a common
cause of action raising the same arguments in support thereof.
§ There was sufficient basis, therefore for Domingo Hernandez,
Jr. to speak for and in behalf of his co-petitioners when he certified
that they had not filed any action or claim in another Court or
Tribunal involving the same issues.
§ Thus, the Verification/Certification that Hernandez, Jr. executed
constitutes substantial compliance under the Rules.
(iv) SC Administrative Circular No. 4-94, February 8, 1994 entitled
“Additional Requisites for Civil Complaints, Petitions and Other Initiatory
Pleadings filed in all Courts and Agencies, Other than the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals, to Prevent Forum Shopping or Multiple Filing of
Such Pleadings” in relation to SC Revised Circular No. 28-91, February 8,
1994 entitled “Additional Requisites for Petitions filed with the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals to Prevent Forum Shopping or Appeals to
Prevent Forum Shopping or Multiple Filing of Petitions and Complaints”
TO: COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN, COURT OF TAX
APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURTS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL, ALL MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT
PROSECUTION SERVICE AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED
BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL REQUISITES FOR CIVIL COMPLAINTS,
PETITIONS AND OTHER INITIATORY PLEADINGS FILED IN ALL
COURTS AND AGENCIES OTHER THAN THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE COURT OF APPEALS, TO PREVENT FORUM SHOPPING OR
MULTIPLE FILING OF SUCH PLEADINGS.
Revised Circular No. 28-91 dated February 8, 1994, applies to and governs
the filing of petitions in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and is
intended to prevent the multiple filing of petitions or complaints involving the
same issues in other tribunals or agencies as a form of forum
shopping.cralaw
Complementary thereto and for the same purpose, the following
requirements, in addition to those in pertinent provisions of the Rules of
Court and existing circulars, shall be strictly complied with in the filing of
complaints, petitions, applications or other initiatory pleadings in all courts
and agencies other than the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and
shall be subject to the sanctions provided hereunder.cralaw
[1] The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief in the
complaint, petition, application or other initiatory pleading shall certify under
oath in such original pleading, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto
and simultaneously filed therewith, to the truth of the following facts and
undertakings: (a) he has not raised the same issue in the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (b) to the best of his
knowledge, no such action or proceedings is pending in the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (c) if there is any such
action or proceeding which is either pending or may have been terminated,
he must state the status thereof; and (d) if he should thereafter learn that a
similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to
report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court or agency wherein
 the original pleading and sworn certification contemplated herein have been
filed.cralaw
The complaint and the initiatory pleadings referred to and the subject of this
Circular are the original civil complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third
[fourth, etc.[ party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention, petition, or
application wherein a party asserts his claim for relief.cralaw
[2] Any violation of this Circular shall be a cause for the dismissal of the
complaint, petition, application or other initiatory pleading, upon motion and
after hearing. However, any clearly willful and deliberate forum-shopping by
any party and his counsel through the filing of multiple complaints or other
initiatory pleadings to obtain favorable action shall be a ground for summary
dismissal thereof and shall cosntitute direct contempt of court. Furthermore,
the submission of false certification or non-compliance with the undertakings
therein, as provided in Paragraph 1 hereof, shall constitute indirect contempt
of court, without prejudice to disciplinary proceeding against the counsel and
the filing of a criminal action against the guilty party.cralaw
This Circular shall take effect on April 1, 1994.cralaw February 8, 1994.
(v) SC Circular No. 28-91, September 4, 1991 entitled “Additional
Requisites for Petitions filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals to prevent Forum Shopping or Multiple Filing of Petitions and
Complaints”
TO: THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, ALL OTHER
BAR ASSOCIATIONS, THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL REQUISITES FOR PETITIONS FILED
WITH THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS
TO PREVENT FORUM SHOPPING OR MULTIPLE FILING OF
PETITIONS AND COMPLAINTS
The attention of the Court has been called to the filing of multiple petitions and
complaints involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or
different Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, with the result that said
tribunals or agency have resolve the same issues.
To avoid the foregoing, every petition or complaint filed with the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or different Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, shall
comply with the following requirements, aside from pertinent provisions of the Rules
of Court and existing circulars:
1. Caption of petition or complaint. — The caption of the petition or
complaint must include the docket number of the case in the lower
court of quasi-judicial agency whose order or judgment is sought to
be reviewed.
2. Certification. — The party must certify under oath that he has not
commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same
issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different
Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, and that to the
best of his knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different Divisions
thereof, or any other tribunal or agency. If there is any other action
pending, he must state the status of the same. If he should learn
that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending
before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different
Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he should notify
the court, tribunal or agency within five (5) days from such notice.
3. Penalties. —
(a) Any violation of this Circular shall be a cause for the summary
dismissal of the, multiple petition or complaint;
(b) Any willful and deliberate forum shopping by any party and his
lawyer with the filing of multiple petitioners or complaints to ensure
favorable action shall constitute direct contempt of court.
(c) The submission of a false certification under Par. 2 of the
Circular shall likewise constitute contempt of Court, without
prejudice to the filing of criminal action against the guilty party. The
lawyer may also be subjected to disciplinary proceedings.
4. Effectivity Date. — This Circular shall take effect on January 1,
1992.
September 4, 1991.
g.) Proof of Personal Service
Section 13. Proof of Service. — Proof of personal service shall consist of a written
admission of the party served, or the official return of the server, or the affidavit of the
party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place and manner of service. If
the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person
mailing of facts showing compliance with section 7 of this Rule. If service is made by
registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued
by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its
receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified
or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee. (10a)
h.) Proof of Service by Registered Mail (with explanation for failure to file
personally)
Section 7. Service by mail. — Service by registered mail shall be made by depositing
the copy in the post office in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the party or his
counsel at his office, if known, otherwise at his residence, if known, with postage fully
prepaid, and with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after
ten (10) days if undelivered. If no registry service is available in the locality of either
the senders or the addressee, service may be done by ordinary mail. (5a; Bar Matter
No. 803, 17 February 1998)
i.) Affidavit of Service (for Court of Appeals and Supreme Court)
Section 18. Proof of service. — The proof of service of a summons shall be made in
writing by the server and shall set forth the manner, place, and date of service; shall
specify any papers which have been served with the process and the name of the
person who received the same; and shall be sworn to when made by a person other
than a sheriff or his deputy. (20)
(i) RoC. Rule 13. Sec. 3, 5-7, 11, and 13
Section 3. Manner of filing. — The filing of pleadings, appearances, motions, notices,
orders, judgments and all other papers shall be made by presenting the original
copies thereof, plainly indicated as such, personally to the clerk of court or by sending
them by registered mail. In the first case, the clerk of court shall endorse on the
pleading the date and hour of filing. In the second case, the date of the mailing of
motions, pleadings, or any other papers or payments or deposits, as shown by the
post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt, shall be considered as the
date of their filing, payment, or deposit in court. The envelope shall be attached to the
record of the case. (1a)
Section 5. Modes of service. — Service of pleadings motions, notices, orders,
judgments and other papers shall be made either personally or by mail. (3a)
Section 6. Personal service. — Service of the papers may be made by delivering
personally a copy to the party or his counsel, or by leaving it in his office with his clerk
or with a person having charge thereof. If no person is found in his office, or his office
is not known, or he has no office, then by leaving the copy, between the hours of
eight in the morning and six in the evening, at the party's or counsel's residence, if
known, with a person of sufficient age and discretion then residing therein. (4a)
Section 7. Service by mail. — Service by registered mail shall be made by depositing
the copy in the post office in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the party or his
counsel at his office, if known, otherwise at his residence, if known, with postage fully
prepaid, and with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after
ten (10) days if undelivered. If no registry service is available in the locality of either
the senders or the addressee, service may be done by ordinary mail. (5a; Bar Matter
No. 803, 17 February 1998)
Section 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. — Whenever practicable, the
service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with
respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be
accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done
personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.
(n)
Section 13. Proof of Service. — Proof of personal service shall consist of a written
admission of the party served, or the official return of the server, or the affidavit of the
party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place and manner of service. If
the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person
mailing of facts showing compliance with section 7 of this Rule. If service is made by
registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued
by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its
receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified
or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee. (10a)
(ii) Spouses Ello v. CA, G.R. No. 141255, June 21, 2005
j.) Counsel’s Information.
(i) What is to be included? Rule 7, Sec. 3.
Section 3. Signature and address. — Every pleading must be signed by the
party or counsel representing him, stating in either case his address which
should not be a post office box.
The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.
An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court may, in its
discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it shall appear that the same
was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay. Counsel who
deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this
Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails promptly report to
the court a change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary
action. (5a)
(ii) Roll No. and IBP Payment – SC Circular No. 10 July 24, 1985
TO: INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, SANDIGAN-BAYAN,
COURT OF TAX APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS,
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRLAL COURTS
IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL
CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS
SUBJECT: INCLUSION OF NUMBER AND DATE OF OFFICIAL
RECEIPT OF PAYMENT OF ANNUAL MEMBERSHIP DUES TO
THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES IN ALL
PLEADINGS, MOTIONS AND PAPERS TO BE FILED IN COURT.
For the information and guidance of all concerned, quoted hereunder is the
Resolution En Banc of this Court, dated July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287, to wit:

Effective August 1, 1985, all lawyers shall indicate in all pleadings,

motions and papers signed and filed by them in any court in the
Philippines, the number and date of their official receipt indicating
payment of their annual membership dues to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for the current year; provided, however, that such
official receipt number and date for any year may be availed of and
indicated in all such pleadings, motions and papers filed by them in
court up to the end of the month of February of the next succeeding
year.

Strict compliance herewith is hereby enjoined. July 24, 1985.

(iii) PTR – RA 7160, Sec. 139. See also OCA Circular No. 58-2003

(iv) A.M. No. 07-6-5-SC July 10, 2007 re: statement of contact details (e.g.,
telephone number, fax number, cellular phone number or e-mail address)

(v) MCLE Compliance Number – OCA Circular No. 79-2014 regarding Bar
Matter No. 1922

OCA CIRCULAR NO. 79-2014 TO: THE COURT OF APPEALS,

SANDIGANBAYAN COURT OF TAX APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURTS, SHARI'A DISTRICT COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, SHARI'A CIRCUIT
COURTS, THE OFFICE OF THE STATE PROSECUTOR, PUBLIC
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE AND THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES SUBJECT: BAR MATTER NO. 1922 (RE:
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL
 EDUCATION [MCLE] BOARD TO INDICATE IN ALL PLEADINGS FILED
WITH THE COURTS THE COUNSEL'S MCLE CERTIFICATE OF
COMPLIANCE OR CERTIFICATE OF EXEMPTION)
In the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated January 14, 2014 in the above-
cited administrative matter, the Court RESOLVED, upon the
recommendation of the MCLE Governing Board, to: (a) AMEND the June 3,
2008 resolution by repealing the phrase “Failure to disclose the required
information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the
pleadings from the records” and replacing it with “Failure to disclose the
required information would subject the counsel to appropriate penalty and
disciplinary action”; and (b) PRESCRIBE the following rules for non-
disclosure of current MCLE compliance/exemption number in the pleadings:
(i) The lawyer shall be imposed a fine of P2,000.00 for the first offense,
P3,000.00 for the second offense and P4,000.00 for the third offense; (ii) In
addition to the fine, counsel may be listed as a delinquent member of the Bar
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 13 of Bar Matter No. 850 and its implementing
rules and regulations; and (iii) The non-compliant lawyer shall be discharged
from the case and the client/s shall be allowed to secure the services of a
new counsel with the concomitant right to demand the return of fees already
paid to the non-compliant lawyer. This revokes OCA Circular No. 66-2008
dated July 22, 2008, and any prior circular from the Office of the Court
Administrator on this matter which is contrary to the foregoing is hereby
superseded.
For your information, guidance and strict compliance. 26 May 2014
(vi) Compliance with A.M. 17-03-09-SC Rule on CLAS and 2018 CLAS
Rules Compliance – CLAS Compliance or CLAS Exemption Number (See
Section 8 of the 2018 IBP CLAS Rules) for attorneys who pass the 2017 Bar
Exams. Example: CLAS-OBC-EXMPT-PPLM(Home Chapter)-2018(Year of
Admission to the Bar)- 0001(Control Number).
(vii)Intestate Estate of Jose Uy v. Atty. Maghari III, A.C. No. 10525, Sept. 1, 2015
FACTS:
Lilia Hofileña was initially designated as administratrix of the estate of her
common-law partner, the deceased Jose Uy. However, a Motion for Reconsideration
of the Order designating Hofileña as administratix was filed by Wilson Uy, one of Jose
Uy's children, on behalf of Jose Uy's spouse and other children. Regional Trial Court
designated Wilson Uy as administrator of Uy’s estate. Subsequently, Hofileña's claims
in the settlement of Jose Uy's estate were granted. Hence, she filed a Motion for
Execution. In Spec. Proc No. 97-241 and in other proceedings arising from the
conflicting claims to Jose Uy's estate, Hofileña was represented by her counsel, Atty.
Mariano Natu-El. There appears to have been conflicts between Wilson Uy and the
other heirs of Jose Uy. In the course of the proceedings, Wilson Uy prayed that a
subpoena ad testificandum be issued to Magdalena Uy as she was alleged to have
been the treasurer of several businesses owned by Jose Uy. RTC granted the said
motion. Thereafter, Magdalena Uy, through Maghari, her counsel, filed a Motion to
Quash Subpoena ad Testificandum with Alternative Motion to Cite the Appearance of
Johnny K.H. Uy. Wilson Uy filed his Opposition to Magdalena Uy's Motion to Quash.
Magdalena Uy, through Maghari, filed her Reply to Wilson Uy's Opposition. The
Regional Trial Court subsequently denied Magdalena Uy's Motion to
Quash. Thereafter, Maghari filed for Magdalena Uy a Motion for Reconsideration. As
the Motion for Reconsideration was denied, Maghari filed for Magdalena Uy a Motion
to Recall Subpoena ad Testificandum.
At this point, Wilson Uy's counsel noticed that based on the details indicated
in the motion, Maghari appeared to have only recently passed the bar examinations.
This prompted Wilson Uy to check the records of Spec. Proc No. 97-241. Upon doing
so, he learned that since 2010, Maghari had been changing the professional details
indicated in the pleadings he has signed and has been copying the professional details
of Atty. Natu-El. Wilson Uy then filed a Motion to declare Magdalena Uy in indirect
contempt (as by then she had still not complied with the Subpoena ad Testificandum)
and to require Maghari to explain why he had been usurping the professional details of
another lawyer.
RTC declined from citing Magdalena Uy in contempt as no verified petition
asking that she be so cited had been filed. Wilson Uy filed before the Court a complaint
for disbarment. Pointing to Maghari's act of repeatedly a changing and using another
lawyer's professional details, Wilson Uy asserts that Maghari violated the Lawyer's
Oath and acted in a deceitful manner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Maghari engaged in unethical conduct and of what proper penalty
may be meted on him.
RULING: YES
Respondent does not deny the existence of the errant entries indicated by
complainant. However, he insists that he did not incur disciplinary liability. He claims
that these entries were mere overlooked errors. Respondent's avowals, protestations,
and ad hominem attacks on complainant fail to impress. He did not merely commit
errors in good faith. First, he violated clear legal requirements, and indicated patently
false information. Second, the way he did so demonstrates that he did so knowingly.
Third, he did so repeatedly. Fourth, the information he used was shown to have been
appropriated from another lawyer. Fifth, his act not only of usurping another lawyer's
details but also of his repeatedly changing information from one pleading to another
demonstrates the intent to mock and ridicule courts and legal processes.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court provides for deceit as a ground for
disbarment. The Lawyer's Oath entails commitment to, among others, obeying laws
and legal orders, doing no falsehood, conducting one's self as a lawyer to the best of
one's capacity, and acting with fidelity to both court and client. It is as clear as the
entries themselves that respondent acted in a manner that is woefully unworthy of an
officer of the court. He was not even a good citizen.
The requirement of a counsel's signature in pleadings, the significance of this
requirement, and the consequences of non-compliance are spelled out in Rule 7,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court. A counsel's signature on a pleading is neither an empty
formality nor even a mere means for identification. Through his or her signature, a
party's counsel makes a positive declaration. It constitutes an assurance by him that
he has read the pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge, information and belief,
there is a good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. The
preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving practice of law
which is reserved exclusively for the members of the legal profession. Counsel may
delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer but cannot do so in favor of one
who is not (in connection for Rule 9.01 of The Code of Professional Responsibility).
A counsel's signature is such an integral part of a pleading that failure to
comply with this requirement reduces a pleading to a mere scrap of paper totally bereft
of legal effect. Thus, faithful compliance with this requirement is not only a matter of
satisfying a duty to a court but is as much a matter of fidelity to one's client. A deficiency
in this respect can be fatal to a client's cause.
Apart from the signature itself, additional information is required to be
indicated as part of a counsel's signature:
(1) Per Rule 7, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, a counsel's address must be stated;
(2) In Bar Matter No. 1132,40 this court required all lawyers to indicate their Roll of
Attorneys number;
(3) In Bar Matter No. 287,41 this court required the inclusion of the "number and date
of their official receipt indicating payment of their annual membership dues to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the current year"; in lieu of this, a lawyer may
indicate his or her lifetime membership number;
(4) In accordance with Section 139 of the Local Government Code, 42 a lawyer must
indicate his professional tax receipt number;
(5) Bar Matter No. 192243 required the inclusion of a counsel's Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption; and
(6) This court's Resolution in A.M. No. 07-6-5-SC44 required the inclusion of a
counsel's contact details.
As with the signature itself, these requirements are not vain formalities.
The inclusion of a counsel's Roll of Attorneys number, professional tax receipt
number, and Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) receipt (or lifetime membership)
number is intended to preserve and protect the integrity of legal practice. With the Roll
of Attorneys number, parties can readily verify if a person purporting to be a lawyer has,
in fact, been admitted to the Philippine bar. With the professional tax receipt number,
they can verify if the same person is qualified to engage in a profession in the place
where he or she principally discharges his or her functions. With the IBP receipt
number, they can ascertain if the same person remains in good standing as a lawyer.
These pieces of information protect the public from bogus lawyers. Paying professional
taxes (and the receipt that proves this payment) is likewise compliance with a revenue
mechanism that has been statutorily devolved to local government units. The inclusion
of information regarding compliance with (or exemption from) Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education (MCLE) seeks to ensure that legal practice is reserved only for those
who have complied with the recognized mechanism for keeping abreast with law and
jurisprudence, maintaining the ethics of the profession and enhancing the standards of
the practice of law. Lastly, the inclusion of a counsel's address and contact details is
designed to facilitate the dispensation of justice.
Atty. Maghari acted in manifest bad faith, thereby exhibiting a pattern of
insubordination, dishonesty, deceit, and intent to make a mockery of courts and legal
processes. He acted deliberately. It is impossible that the erroneous details he
indicated on his pleadings are products of mere inadvertence. To begin with, details
were copied from a pleading submitted by another lawyer. Second, these details were
not merely copied, they were modified. "B.C." was added to the IBP official receipt and
professional tax receipt numbers copied from Atty. Natu-el. The facts of modification
and addition show active human intervention to make something more out of markings
that could otherwise have simply been reproduced. Third, in subsequent pleadings,
some details copied from Atty. Natu-el were discarded while some were retained. This
only reveals that the author of these markings must have engaged in a willful exercise
that filtered those that were to be discarded from those that were to be retained. In the
first place, it is doubtful that Atty. Maghari has complied with the requirements of paying
his dues to the IBP, paying his annual professional tax, and completing the necessary
units for MCLE in the periods concerned. There would be no need for him to use
incorrect information if he had complied with all pertinent regulations. In all, the totality
of respondent's actions demonstrates a degree of gravity that warrants suspension
from the practice of law for an extended period.
This case involves anything but trivial non-compliance. It is much graver. The
confluence of: (1) respondent's many violations; (2) the sheer multiplicity of rules
violated; (3) the frequency—nay, pattern—of falsity and deceit; and (4) his manifest
intent to bring courts, legal processes, and professional standards to disrepute brings
to light a degree of depravity that proves respondent worthy of being sanctioned.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility pronounces a lawyer's
foremost duty to uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law and legal processes Rule 1.01 of the same Code requires lawyers to not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Per Canon 10 of the CPR, a lawyer
owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. Rule 10.01 requires lawyers to not
do any falsehood or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. Rule 10.03 imposes
upon lawyers the duty of faithfully observing the rules of procedure and not misusing
them to defeat the ends of justice. Canon 11 exhorts lawyers to observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts. Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
requires a lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues. In appropriating information pertaining to his opposing
counsel, respondent did not only fail to observe common courtesy. He encroached
upon matters that, ultimately, are personal to another. Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility imposes upon a lawyer fidelity to the cause of his client,
while Canon 18 requires a lawyer to serve his client with competence and diligence.
In using false information in his pleadings, Atty. Maghari unnecessarily put his own
client at risk.
4. Parts of a Pleading according to the Supreme Court
a.) Spouses Munsalud v. NHA, G.R. 167181, Dec 23, 2008
FACTS: Petitioner Winnie Munsalud is the daughter and one of thecompulsory heirs of
the late Lourdes Bulado who died in 1985. During the lifetime of Bulado, respondent
National Housing Authority (NHA) awarded her a lot pursuant to the "Land for the
Landless" program of respondent. She resided at the said property until her death.
Winnie assumed the obligation to pay the monthly amortizations. Respondent NHA
recognized petitioner spouses' assumption of obligations as their names were reflected
in the receipts and they were allowed to occupy the lot. In 1989, petitioners completed
the amortization payments evidenced by the annotation “full payment” reflected on the
left side portion of the official receipt. Consequently, petitioners demanded that NHA
issue in their favor a deed of sale and a title over the property. However, respondent
refused. In 2003, petitioners by counsel, sent respondent a letter to issue a deed of
sale and title. Respondent did not issue the requested documents but informed
petitioners that Winnie's name does not appear as beneficiary. Petitioners replied that
Winnie was representing her mother, the late Lourdes Bulado. Respondent did not
respond to the reply. Left with no recourse, petitioners instituted a complaint for
mandamus with the RTC which dismissed the complaint for the petition is insufficient
in form and substance and that there being no reference to any law which respondent
by reason of its office, trust or station is especially enjoined as a duty to perform.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the dismissal. Hence, this instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for mandamus is sufficient in form and substance
RULING: Yes. The petition for mandamus was sufficient in form and substance. The
complaint designated by petitioners as mandamus reveals that it is sufficient in form. It
has the caption with the name of the court, the name of the parties, and the docket
number. The complaint contains allegations of petitioners' claims. It has a prayer and
the date when it was prepared. The signature page shows the signature and name of
petitioners' counsel, the counsel's IBP, PTR and Roll of Attorney's Numbers. The
complaint was also verified and accompanied by a certificate of non-forum shopping
and signed by petitioners as plaintiffs. It was filed personally with the office of the clerk
of court.
Substance is one which relates to the material allegations and the character
of the relief sought for in the pleading. It is determinative of whether or not a cause of
action exists and is the embodiment of the essential facts necessary to confer
jurisdiction upon the court. The action commenced by petitioners before the trial court,
although designated as mandamus, is in reality an action to perform a specific act. The
averments of the complaint are clear. The essential facts are sufficiently alleged as to
appraise the court of the nature of the case. The relief sought to be obtained aims to
compel respondent to issue a deed of sale and the corresponding title over the property
awarded to Bulado. Thus, the Court finds the complaint sufficient in substance. The
designation or caption is not controlling, more than the allegations in the
complaint, for it is not even an indispensable part of the complaint. There is no
need to make reference to any law which respondent by reason of its office is enjoined
as a duty to perform. Respondent's duty arose from its contractual obligation under the
"Land for the Landless Program."

Usual Documents and Practical Exercises

 Complaint for Ejectment

 Complaint for Damages