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Sambar vs. Levi Strauss & Co./, GR No.

132604, ( March 6, 2002), 378 SCRA 364


Did petitioner infringe on private respondents’ arcuate design?
We find no reason to disturb the findings of the Court of Appeals that Europress’ use of the arcuate design was an
infringement of the Levi’s design.
Must we hold petitioner solidarily liable with CVS Garments Industrial Corporation? Both the courts below found that petitioner had a
copyright over Europress’ arcuate design and that he consented to the use of said design by CVSGIC. We are bound by this
finding, especially in the absence of a showing that it was tainted with arbitrariness or palpable error.[7] It must be stressed that it
was immaterial whether or not petitioner was connected with CVSGIC. What is relevant is that petitioner had a copyright over the
design and that he allowed the use of the same by CVSGIC.

To be entitled to copyright, the thing being copyrighted must be original, created by the author through his own skill, labor and judgment,
without directly copying or evasively imitating the work of another. From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the matters raised
by petitioner in relation to the last issue are purely factual, except the matter of nominal and temperate damages. Petitioner claims
that damages are not due private respondents and his copyright should not be cancelled because he had not infringed on Levi’s
trademark. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found there was infringement. Thus, the award of damages and
cancellation of petitioner’s copyright are appropriate. Award of damages is clearly provided in Section 23 of the
Trademark law, while cancellation of petitioner’s copyright finds basis on the fact that the design was a mere copy of that
of private respondents’ trademark. To be entitled to copyright, the thing being copyrighted must be original, created by the
author through his own skill, labor and judgment, without directly copying or evasively imitating the work of another
However, we agree with petitioner that it was error for the Court of Appeals to affirm the award of nominal damages combined with
temperate damages by the Regional Trial Court of Makati. What respondents are entitled to is an award for temperate damages,
not nominal damages. For although the exact amount of damage or loss can not be determined with reasonable certainty, the fact
that there was infringement means they suffered losses for which they are entitled to moderate damages. We find that the award
of P50,000.00 as temperate damages fair and reasonable, considering the circumstances herein as well as the global coverage
and reputation of private respondents Levi Strauss & Company and Levi Strauss (Phil.), Inc.

Ching vs. Salinas, GR No. 161295, June 29, 2005, 462 SCRA 241
The RTC had jurisdiction to delve into and resolve the issue whether the petitioner ’s utility models are copyrightable and, if so, whether
he is the owner of a copyright over the said models.
For the RTC to determine whether the crime for infringement under R.A. No. 8293 as alleged in an application is committed, the petitioner-
applicant was burdened to prove that (a) respondents Jessie Ching and Joseph Yu were the owners of copyrighted material; and
(b) the copyrighted material was being copied and distributed by the respondents. Thus, the ownership of a valid copyright is
essential.
Ownership of copyrighted material is shown by proof of originality and copyrightability. By originality is meant that the material was not
copied, and evidence s at least minimal creativity; that it was independently created by the author and that it possesses at least
same minimal degree of creativity.
Copying is shown by proof of access to copyrighted material and substantial similarity between the two works.
It bears stressing that the focus of copyright is the usefulness of the artistic design, and not its marketability. The central inquiry is whether
the article is a work of art.] Works for applied art include all original pictorials, graphics, and sculptural works that are intended to
be or have been embodied in useful article regardless of factors such as mass production, commercial exploitation, and the
potential availability of design patent protection.
As gleaned from the description of the models and their objectives, these articles are useful articles which are defined as one having an
intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information. Indeed, while works
of applied art, original intellectual, literary and artistic works are copyrightable, useful articles and works of industrial design are
not. A useful article may be copyrightable only if and only to the extent that such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of the utilitarian aspects of the article.
In this case, the petitioner’s models are not works of applied art, nor artistic works. They are utility models, useful articles, albeit with no
artistic design or value.
A utility model is a technical solution to a problem in any field of human activity which is new and industrially applicable. It may be, or
may relate to, a product, or process, or an improvement of any of the aforesaid. Essentially, a utility model refers to an invention
in the mechanical field. This is the reason why its object is sometimes described as a device or useful object.
UTILITY MODEL v. INVENTION: first, the requisite of “inventive step” in a patent for invention is not required; second, the maximum term
of protection is only seven years compared to a patent which is twenty years, in a patent for both reckoned from the date of the
application; and third, the provisions on utility model dispense with its substantive examination and prefer for a less complicated
system.
No copyright granted by law can be said to arise in favor of the petitioner despite the issuance of the certificates of copyright registration
and the deposit of the Leaf Spring Eye Bushing and Vehicle Bearing Cushion.
That the works of the petitioner may be the proper subject of a patent does not entitle him to the issuance of a search warrant for violation
of copyright laws. In Kho v. Court of Appeals[49] and Pearl & Dean (Phil.), Incorporated v. Shoemart, Incorporated,[50] the Court
ruled that “these copyright and patent rights are completely distinct and separate from one another, and the protection afforded by
one cannot be used interchangeably to cover items or works that exclusively pertain to the others.
In this case, the bushing and cushion are not works of art. They are, as the petitioner himself admitted, utility models which may be the
subject of a patent.

ABS-CBN Corp., petitioner vs. GMA Pres. and CEO Atty. Felipe Gozon, GMA Vice

President and COO Gilberto Duavit Jr., Marissa L. Flores, Jessica A. Soho, GMA

Head of News Operations Grace Dela Peña-Reyes, GMA News Program Manager

John Oliver Manalastas, et. al., respondents.

G.R. No. 195956, 1 March 2015

Ponente: Justice Marvic F. Leonen

FACTS

On August 13, 2004, petitioner ABS-CBN filed a criminal complaint against respondent GMA for (alleged) act of copyright
infringement under Sections 177 and 211 of the Intellectual Property Code (RA 8293, as amended), because the respondent
aired footage of the arrival and homecoming of OFW Angelo dela Cruz at NAIA from Iraq without the petitioner's consent. ABS-
CBN stated that it has an agreement with Reuter's that the petition will contribute news and content that it owns and makes to
Reuters in exchange of the latter's news and video material, and

Reuters will ensure that ABS-CBN's materials cannot be aired in the country.The respondent was a subscriber of Reuter's and
CNN live feeds. After it received the live feed of Angelo Dela Cruz's arrival and homecoming from Reuter's, it immediately aired
the video from that news feed. The respondent alleged that its news staff was not aware that there was (a news embargo)
agreement between ABSCBN and Reuters. Respondent alleged that it was not also aware that it aired petitioner's footage.

Assistant City Prosecutor Dindo Venturanza issued resolution on 3 December 2004which found probable cause to indict Dela
Peña-Reyes and Manalastas. The respondents appealed the Prosccutor's resolution before DOJ. DOJ Secretary Raul

M. Gonzalez ruled in favor of respondents in his resolution dated 1 August 2005 and held that good faith may be raised as a
defense in the case.

Meanwhile, DOJ Acting Secretary Alberto C. Agra issued a resolution on 29 June 2010 which reversed Sec. Gonzalez's
resolution and found probable cause to charge Dela Peña-Reyes, Manalastas, as well as to indict Gozon, Duavit, Jr., Flores, and
Soho for violation of the Intellectual Property Code (due to copyright infringement).

The Court of Appeals rendered a decision on 9 November 2010, which granted the Petition for Certiorari to reverse and set aside
DOJ Sec. Alberto Agra's resolution and a prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or Writ of

Preliminary Injunction.

The appellate court stated that the petitioner has copyright of its news coverage, but respondents’ act of airing five (5) seconds of
the homecoming footage without notice of the “No Access Philippines” restriction of the live Reuter's video feed, was

undeniably attended by good faith and thus, serves to exculpate from criminal liability under the Intellectual Property Code.

ISSUES

W/N there is probable cause to find respondents to be held liable criminally for the case of copyright infringement under the
Intellectual Property Law (RA 8293, as amended)?
HELD

The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED ABS-CBN’s petition and ordered RTC

Q.C. Branch 93 to continue with the criminal proceedings against Grace Dela PeñaReyes and John Oliver Manalastas due to
copyright infringement.

The other respondents, Atty. Felipe Gozon, Gilberto Duavit Jr., Marissa L. Flores, and Jessica A. Soho were held not liable for
the (criminal) act of copyright infringement. The Court held that their mere membership in GMA7's Board of

Directors does not mean that they have knowledge, approval, or participation in the criminal act of copyright infringement., as
there is a need for their direct/active participation in such act. Also, there was lack of proof that they actively participated or
exercised moral ascendancy over Manalastas and Dela Cruz-Pena.

Contrary to GMA’s contention, the Supreme Court deemed GMA's mere act of rebroadcast of ABS-CBN’s news footage (arrival
and homecoming of OFW Angelo dela Cruz at NAIA from Iraq last 22 July 2004) for 2 mins and 40 secs.without the latter's
authority creates probable cause to find GMA's news personnel Manalastas and Dela Peña-Reyes criminally liable for violating
provisions of Intellectual

Property Code (Section 216-217 of RA 8293, as amended) that imposes strict liability for copyright infringement, since
they have not been diligent in their functions to prevent that footage from being aired on television. They knew that there would
be consequences in carrying ABS-CBN’s footage in their broadcast – which is why they allegedly cut the feed from Reuters upon
seeing ABS-CBN’s logo and reporter.

The difference of an act mala in se and mala prohibita was stated in the present case. Acts mala in se requires presence of
criminal intent and the person's knowledge of the nature of his/her act, while in acts mala prohibita, presence of criminal intent
and the person's knowledge is not necessary. The Court also stated that Philippine laws on copyright infringement does not
require criminal intent (mens rea) and does not support good faith as a defense. Thus, the act of infringement and not the intent
is the one that causes the damage.

It held that ABS-CBN's video footage is copyrightable because it is under “audiovisual works and cinematographic works and
works produced by a process analogous to cinematography or any process for making audiovisual recordings.” It also stated that
news or the event itself is not copyrightable. The Court differentiated idea and expression – idea meant as “a form, the look or
appearance of a thing” while expression is its reality or the “external, perceptible world of articulate sounds and visible written
symbols that others can understand.” Thus, the Supreme Court stated that “only the expression of an idea is protected by
copyright, not the idea itself”, citing the US Supreme Court's decision in Baker vs

Selden (101 U.S. 99). In the present case, expression applies to the event captured and presented in a specific medium via
cinematography or processes analogous to it.

The Court also gave the four-fold test under the Fair Use Doctrine (stated in section 185 of RA 8293 or the Intellectual Property
Code, as amended) to determine fair use:

a. The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational
purposes;

b. The nature of the copyrighted work;

c. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and

d. The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.

Fair use, which is an exception to copyright owner’s monopoly of the work's usage, was defined by the Supreme Court as
privilege to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without the copyright owner's consent or by copying the
material's theme or idea rather than its expression.

It also said that determination of whether the Angelo dela Cruz footage is subject to fair use is better left to the trial court where
the proceedings are currently pending.

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