FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-4026. March 7, 1908. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PASCUAL DULAY, Defendant-Appellant.

I. Javier, for Appellant.

Attorney-General Araneta, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. SEDUCTION UNDER PROMISE OF MARRIAGE. — A promise to marry a woman over 12 and under 23
years of age, abandoned voluntarily and without just cause, and given with the evil intention of
committing an unlawful act, such as to lie with the young woman of said age, constitutes the crime of
seduction with fraud under article 443 of the Penal Code.

DECISION

TORRES, J. :

In the month of May 1904, Pascual Dulay, of about 23 years of age, began courting Gregoria Pimentel a
girl of 16, residing in the pueblo of Aringay, San Fernando, La Union. Their relations became every day
more intimate, on account of the promises of marriage made by the accused Dulay, and the girl was
seduced. The defendant accomplished his desire for the first time on a certain night in the latter part of
December, 1905. The act was repeated on various occasions from that time until the 28th of April the
following year. On the 29th of the latter month, the accused, besides the promise previously given to the
injured girl, informed her parents of his intention to marry her, and following the advice of the parents the
marriage was postponed until the time when the accused was to complete his studies. However, in the
month of June following, in view of the fact that his fiancee was pregnant, the defendant disregarded his
promise of marriage, and denied being the author of the girl’s pregnancy. The latter positively asserted
that she never had sexual intercourse with any other man, and that during his courtship he sent to her
several letters, cards, photographs of himself, handkerchiefs, and a ring, all of which were exhibited at
the trial and recognized by him. He confessed that he had maintained friendly relations with her, but
denied that he had ever had any sexual intercourse with her, or that he was the father of the child born
on the 20th of October, 1906, which was produced at the trial.

Among the letters exhibited, written in the dialect of the province, one appears at folio 44 of the record,
the English translation of which taken from the Spanish translation is as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"GOYANG: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"I can not stand my heart’s grief because if I could help it I would not part from you; but, what can I do?
I must leave for important reasons; however, although I am going away, some one will make
arrangements for my return in the month of June; may Heaven grant this. Oh! my Gregoria, I feel uneasy;
I don’t know what to do; you do as I have told you to do; do it because I think it is more advisable that
you should tell the old man (grandfather) the sin we have committed in the eyes of God, for if somebody
else does it, or, if you wait until he notices the consequences thereof, it will be worse for you. Do it, do
not fail to comply with what I am asking of you so that the old man may not become too angry.

"Do go and hear mass tomorrow, and I will wait for you because I have a very important thing to ask you
to do; hear mass without fail so that you may know what you ought to do; I will do the same so that our
intentions may not have bad results.

"Your brother [among Ilocanos, this word is used when the parties are very intimate, or when they are
lovers],

"PASCUAL." cralaw virtua1aw library

The above facts are duly proven in this case, and constitute the crime of estupro (seduction), defined and
punished by article 443 paragraph 3 of the Penal Code, inasmuch as, by reason of the intimate relations
between the accused and the injured party, the latter was seduced by his repeated promises of marriage,
and she permitted him to lie with her on various occasions from the latter part of December, 1905, to the
last days of April, 1906; in consequence of these acts the girl became pregnant and gave birth to a child
on the 20th of October the following. Without any just reason the accused has refused to comply with the
promise of marriage made to Gregoria Pimentel; therefore, it is clear that he acted deceitfully when making
the promise solely with the unlawful purpose of inducing her to yield to his desire, and upon pretext of her
pregnancy he wrote to her parents stating that he declined to carry out his promise of marriage.

A promise of marriage given to a woman over 12 and under 23 years of age, with the evil intent of
committing an unlawful act and voluntarily abandoned without just cause, constitutes the deceit referred
to in article 458 of the Code of Spain, equivalent to article 443 of that of the Philippines, according to the
doctrine established by the supreme court of Spain, among other decisions in that of October 7, 1864.

The culpability of the accused as the only author of the crime can not be denied, inasmuch as he
acknowledged that he had maintained intimate relations with the aforenamed Gregoria Pimentel from May
1904 to the same month in 1906. No evidence is offered that would even indicate that the girl had
maintained any such relations with any man other than the accused, and in view of her affirmation that
Pascual Dulay was the only man who did lie with her on the several occasions, beginning with a certain
night in December, 1905, and that the accused was the father of the child to which she gave birth on the
20th of October 1906, it is unquestionable that the accused is responsible for the crime and that he has
incurred the penalty that the law imposes, because he managed to have intercourse with the injured girl
on several occasions by means of deceit and committed the seduction under promise of marriage.

The translation of the letter without date, hereinbefore inserted, shows that the accused addressed it to
the injured girl while he was still in the pueblo of Aringay, and before coming to this city; that he wrote
the same after he had sexual intercourse with the girl, and at a time when he was aware that she had
conceived and was pregnant; it was for this reason that he compelled her to inform her father of the
offense that they had committed.

The defendant alleges that from the latter part of December, 1905, to the 25th of April, 1906, he had not
returned to his pueblo where the injured girl resided, and that as her confinement only took place on the
20th of October of the latter year and the first carnal intercourse, according to her own statement, took
place upon one of the last days of December, 1905, it thereby appears that the pregnancy of the injured
party lasted about two hundred and ninety-eight days at least; that is , more than nine months. But by
such data it is not shown that the accused is not the author of the pregnancy of the girl, who states
positively that from December, 1905, to April, 1906, the accused repeatedly had sexual intercourse with
her.

If the ordinary average duration of the pregnancy of women is nine months and some days, a tardy birth
is not an impossibility or an unusual to have a delayed or retarded conception, one of the inexplicable
mysteries of nature, since the opinions of physicians upon the matter are conflicting; for this reason the
Penal Code, by article 476, imposes punishment upon a widow who marries before three hundred and one
days have elapsed from the death of her husband, a prohibition which is in accordance with other legal
provisions, and which is intended to prevent confusion in connection with filiation and paternity, inasmuch
as the widow might have conceived and become pregnant by her late husband. So that the law when
fixing the said three hundred and one days, admits the possibility that a woman may be in pregnancy for
more than nine months, and that the birth of a child taking place nine months after it was conceived is
not an impossibility.

In the commission of the crime in question no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance is present;
therefore, the judgment appealed from is in accordance with the law.

For the foregoing reasons, it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from, dated the 7th of March,
1907, sentencing Pascual Dulay to the penalty of four months of arresto mayor, to recognize and maintain
the offspring, to indemnify the injured party, Gregoria Pimentel, in the sum of P1,000 and, in case of
insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment which shall not exceed one-third of the principal penalty,
and to pay the costs, should be affirmed with the costs against the appellant; provided, however, that the
amount to be paid to the injured party for the subsistence of her child until the same shall reach his
majority, shall be P15 monthly. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson and Tracey, JJ., concur.

Willard and Carson, JJ., dissent.

 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 24084. November 3, 1926. ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PEDRO RAMIREZ, Defendant-

Appellant.

Vicente Llanes for Appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Reyes for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL. LAW; HOMICIDE; HOMICIDE THROUGH RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE. — Where it appears that
the accused killed the deceased while hunting at night by shooting him in the belief that he was a deer,
after having left the deceased, who was his companion, at another place, he cannot be convicted of the
crime of homicide, no proof having been introduced as to the existence of enmity between them, but of
homicide through reckless imprudence, since he has not exercised due diligence to avoid the accident.

DECISION

VILLAMOR, J. :

The appellant was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, for the crime of homicide, to
the penalty of fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the mother of
the deceased in the sum of P500 and to pay the costs. On the night of February 18, 1923, one Bartolome
Quiaoit invited Pedro Ramirez, the accused herein, Victoriano Ranga, the deceased, and Agustin Menor to
hunt in the mount Balitok of the municipality of Nueva Era, Province of Ilocos Norte. The three last named
proceeded to hunt, leaving Bartolome Quiaoit in a hut approximately 1 kilometer from the place where the
act complained of took place. Upon the hunters having arrived at a place in mount Balitok, Pedro Ramirez,
who was carrying the shotgun of Bartolome Quiaoit with a lantern, happened to hunt a deer, and then he
told his companions to stay there and watch over the prey while he entered the forest to get it. Thus
Victoriano Ranga and Agustin Menor were waiting when suddenly the report of the shotgun was heard
hitting Victoriano Ranga in the eye and the right temple, who thereafter died on that night as a result of
the wounds.

It does not appear that the matter was judicially investigated until the month of October, 1924, when the
complaint was filed which initiated this proceeding.

The only witness who could testify upon the act complained of is naturally Agustin Menor who was near
the deceased when the latter was shot. According to Agustin Menor, the defendant, after having gotten
the first prey, told his companions to stay there, while he (Pedro Ramirez) was leaving them to go on
hunting, and "when he was far away, he fired the shotgun," hitting the deceased Victoriano Ranga. It must
be noted that the witness Agustin Menor changed his first testimony that "when he was far away, he fired
the shotgun," by saying afterwards, "When Pedro Ramirez was a little away, he turned toward us and
fired." And to make it more specific, the defense moved that the translation of the testimony of the witness
be corrected and the interpreter of the court caused it to be stated in the record that the true testimony
of the witness was as follows: "Pedro Ramirez caused me and Victoriano Ranga to stay in the mount,
telling us: ’Brother you stay here and I am going up to hunt with the lamp’ and then after he has gone
away, he (Pedro Ramirez) turned toward us and fired."
cralaw virtua1aw library

On the other hand the defendant, testifying as witness in his behalf, admits being the author of the shot
which caused the death of Victoriano Ranga; that on that night after getting the first prey, he told his
companions to stay there, watching over the prey, while he was going away looking for another; and so
he did, because otherwise it would have been hard for them to find the prey, if no one would have been
left there; that being far away from his companions, he seemed to have seen with his lantern something
like the eyes of a deer about fifty meters from him and then he shot it; but much to his surprise, on
approaching what he thought was a deer, it proved to be his companion Victoriano Ranga. The same
witness says that he did not expect to find his companions in that spot, for he had warned them not to
leave, but they left, the place.

The testimony of the two witnesses as to the distance of the accused from them when he fired the gun for
the second time is contradictory. On the other hand, there is not in the record any circumstance as to
whether or not the deceased and the witness Agustin Menor were in the same place where they were left
by the defendant, when the latter fired. The night being dark like that when the event took place, the
hunter in the midst of a forest without paths is likely to get confused as to his relative situation; and after
walking around, he may think having gone very far, when in fact he has not, from the point of departure.
And so, judging the case from what the two witnesses Agustin Menor and Pedro Ramirez have testified to,
and taking into account that there existed no motive whatever for resentment on the part of the defendant
against the offended party, we are compelled to conclude that the act complained of constitutes homicide
through reckless imprudence. The defendant, who was carrying a firearm to hunt at nighttime with the
aid of a lantern, knowing that he had two companions, should have exercised all the necessary diligence
to avoid every undesirable accident, such as the one that unfortunately occurred on the person of
Victoriano Ranga.

While the fact that the defendant, a few days after the event, has offered to the mother of the deceased
a carabao and a horse by way of indemnity, indicates on the one hand that the defendant admitted the
commission of the crime, on the other it shows that he performed the act without criminal intent and only
through a real imprudence.

The defense alleges that the trial court must have solved the reasonable doubt in favor of the defendant.
After considering carefully the evidence and all the circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion and
so hold that the defendant is guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence, and must be
punished under paragraph 1 of article 568 of the Penal Code.

Wherefore the penalty of one year and one day of prision correcional, with the accessories prescribed by
the law, must be imposed upon him, and with this modification, the judgment appealed from is affirmed
in all other respects, with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

ROMUALDEZ, J., dissenting: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I believe that the guilt of the defendant is only under paragraph 2 of article 568 of the Penal Code.
 EN BANC

[G.R. AC-UNAV. April 30, 1957.]

In Re Charges of LILIAN F. VILLASANTA for Immorality, v. HILARION M. PERALTA, Respondent.

Ramon J. Diaz for Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; CONVICTION OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE; DISQUALIFICATION FOR

ADMISSION TO THE BAR. — Respondent made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding
respect and dignity and his conviction of violation of Art. 350 of the Revised Penal Code involves moral
turpitude. His act in contracting the second marriage even his act in making love to another woman while his
first wife is still alive and their marriage still valid and existing is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and
morality. Thus lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of Court, the respondent is disqualified
from being admitted to the bar.

DECISION

PARAS, C.J. :

G. R. No. L-9513 has a direct bearing on the present complaint. Said case originated from a criminal action
filed in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan by the complainant against the respondent for a violation of
Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code of which the respondent was found guilty. The verdict, when appealed to
the Court of Appeals, was affirmed. The appeal by certiorari taken to this Court by the respondent was
dismissed for lack of merit.

The complaint seeks to disqualify the respondent, a 1954 successful bar candidate, from being admitted to the
bar. The basic facts are the same as those found by the Court of Appeals, to wit: On April 16, 1939, the
respondent was married to Rizalina E. Valdez in Rizal, Nueva Ecija. On or before March 8, 1951, he courted the
complainant who fell in love with him. To have carnal knowledge of her, the respondent procured the
preparation of a fake marriage contract which was then a blank document. He made her sign it on March 8,
1951. A week after, the document was brought back by the respondent to the complainant, signed by the
Justice of the Peace and the Civil Registrar of San Manuel, Tarlac, and by two witnesses. Since then the
complainant and the respondent lived together as husband and wife. Sometime later, the complainant insisted
on a religious ratification of their marriage and on July 7, 1951, the corresponding ceremony was performed in
Aparri by the parish priest of said municipality. The priest no longer required the production of a marriage
license because of the civil marriage contract shown to him. After the ceremony in Aparri, the couple returned
to Manila as husband and wife and lived with some friends. The complainant then discovered that the
respondent was previously married to someone else; whereupon, she filed the criminal action for a violation of
Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan and the present complaint for
immorality in this court.

Upon consideration of the records of G. R. No. L-9513 and the complaint, this Court is of the opinion that the
respondent is immoral. He made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and
dignity. His conviction in the criminal case involves moral turpitude. The act of respondent in contracting the
second marriage (even his act in making love to another woman while his first wife is still alive and their
marriage still valid and existing) is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.

Thus lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of Court, the respondent is hereby declared
disqualified from being admitted to the bar. So ordered.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia and Felix, JJ.,
concur.