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G.R. No. L-13032 August 31, 1959

PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN DRUG COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE and COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.

Jose F. Ochoa for petitioner.

Assistant Solicitor General Jose P. Alejandro and Attorney Alejandro B. Afurong for
respondents.

BARRERA, J.:

Based on a stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, Philippine American Drug Co.,
petitioner, and the Collector of Internal Revenue, respondent in CTA Case No. 265 the
pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:

2. That during the period from February 14, 1951 to December 31, 1954, petitioner
did not for purposes of computing the advance sales tax on its importations include
as part of the landed cost the difference (P.015) between the amounts actually paid
by it to the bank on said importations computed at the rate of P2.015 for every U. S.
dollar and the value of the imported goods computed at the legal rate of P2.00 for
every U. S. dollar;

3. That the difference of P0.015 represents the premium on the dollar charged by the
bank and paid by the petitioner in the purchase of foreign exchange;

4. That in November 4, 1955, respondent demanded from petitioner (Demand No.

13756) the payment of the sum of P10, 243.13 as deficiency advance sales tax, . .;

xxx xxx xxx

9. That the only question involved in this case is whether or not the difference of
P0.015, representing the premium on the dollar charged by the bank to the importer-
petitioner and paid by it in the purchase of foreign exchanged (U. S. dollar), should
from part of the landed cost of the imported articles for purposes of computing the
advance sales tax, assuming that respondent's ruling dated June 21, 1954, as
quoted in the 5th paragraph hereof, was issued in accordance with law and reflects
the correct interpretation thereof;

xxx xxx xxx

the Court of Tax Appeals rendered judgment in said case upholding the validity of the
decision of the Collector of Internal Revenue imposing sales tax on the bank premium of
P0.015 for every U. S. dollar purchased by the petitioner Philippine American Drug Co.
required for its importations from February 14, 1951, to December 31, 1954, which tax
together with the surcharges thereon, amounted to P10,243.13. Hence, this appeal by the
taxpayer.

In demanding collection of the disputed assessment, the respondent Collector of Internal

Revenue invokes Section 183-(B), as amended, of the National Internal Revenue Code
which provides:

SEC. 183. Payment of percentage taxes. —

xxx xxx xxx

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(B) Sales tax on imported articles. When the articles are imported, the percentage
taxes established in section one hundred eighty-four, one hundred eighty-five, and
one hundred eighty-six of this code shall be paid in advance by the importer, in
accordance with regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Finance and prior to the
release of such articles from custom's custody, based on the import invoice value
thereof, certified to as correct by the Philippine Consul at the port of origin if there is
any, including freight, postage, insurance, commission, customs duty and all similar
charges, plus one hundred per centum of such total value in the case of articles
enumerated in section one hundred and eighty-four; fifty per centum of such total
value in the case of articles enumerated in section one hundred and eighty-five; and
twenty-five per centum in the case of articles enumerated in section one hundred and
eighty-six . . . .

The questions presented herein actually revolve around the nature or characteristic of the
above-mentioned bank premium, that is whether said bank charge falls under the category
of the charges enumerated in Art. 183-(B) of the Tax Code as included in the taxable value
of imported goods and, therefore, must be declared for tax purposes. This case is not one of
first impression to this Court, because in our decision in the case of Genato Commercial
Corporation vs. The Court of Tax Appeals, et al., 104 Phil., 615; 55 Off. Gaz. (12), 2092 the
same issue was resolved, thus:

As may be seen, an importer is required to pay in advance the necessary percentage

tax on the articles imported "based on the import invoice value thereof, certified to as
correct by the Philippine Consul at the port of origin if there is any, including freight,
postage, insurance, commission, customs duty, and all similar charges." In other
words, the law requires that it be included in the assessment not only the import
invoice value of merchandise, which includes freight, postage, insurance,
commission, and customs duty, but all other similar charges which would necessarily
increase the landed cost of the merchandise imported, which, in our opinion, should
include the difference of P0.015 paid by petitioner to a local bank in the purchase of
foreign exchange to carry out the importation. Indeed, the intention of Congress in
enacting the above-quoted provision is to include in the assessment all charges,
whether specified or otherwise, which an importer has to pay to complete his
importation.

Invoking the rule of ejusdem generis which provides that "where, in a statute, general
words follow a designation of particular subjects or classes of persons, the meaning
of the general words will ordinarily be presumed to be restricted by the particular
designation, class or nature as those specifically enumerated," petitioner contends
that the difference of P0.015 which it paid to a local bank in the purchase of foreign
exchange to cover the importation in question cannot be included in the assessment
for the purpose of determining the advance sales tax because they are not similar to
the charges specifically enumerated in the law.

With this we disagree, for it cannot be denied that the intention of the law is to
include all charges that may be paid by the importer to bring the importation into the
country. In other words, all items of expense that may be incurred by the importer in
bringing the importation into the country and which would necessarily increase the
landed cost must be deemed included in the phrase "all similar charges" mentioned
in the law. The doctrine of ejusdem generis is but a rule of construction adopted as
an aid to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent when that intent is
uncertain or ambiguous, but the same should not be given such wide application that
would operate to defeat the purpose of the law. In other words, the doctrine is not of
universal application. Its application must yield to the manifest intent of Congress
(State vs. Prather, 21 L.R.A. 23, 25)
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But it is contended that, even assuming that the difference of P0.015 paid by the
petitioner be considered as a proper charge to be included in the assessment of the
advance sales tax, still the same should be deemed as covered and absorbed by the
corresponding mark-up prescribed by law. This contention is erroneous as being
contrary to the clear import of the law. Thus, the law requires that the importer should
pay the advance sales tax based on the import invoice value of the merchandise,
including those charges therein enumerated, plus one hundred per centum of such
total value in the case of articles enumerated in section one hundred and eighty-four;
fifty per centum in case of articles enumerated in section one hundred and eighty-
five; and twenty-five per centum in the case of articles enumerated in section one
hundred and eighty-six." In other words, the mark-up prescribed by law is to be
considered in addition to the invoice value and all incidental expenses of importation.

There is no dispute that in the Parity Exchange Law (Republic Act No. 77) the legal
rate of exchange is P2.00 for every U. S. dollar and that this rate has always been
maintained by the government through various proclamations of the President of the
Philippines, but the existence of such legal rate does not preclude the government
from including in the landed cost the difference paid by the importer in the purchase
of foreign exchange if such difference has actually been paid in carrying out the
importation. The importer could have paid the legal rate in purchasing the foreign
exchange but if he chooses to pay a different rate he should declare the difference
for that goes to increase the cost in completing the importation.

As an additional argument not urged in the Genato case, appellant herein cites the change
in the wording of the law as an indication of the intention of Congress to limit the meaning of
the phrase "all similar charges." Before Section 183-(B) of the National Internal Revenue
Code was first amended by Republic Act 594 on February 16, 1951, it provided that the tax
was imposed on imported articles "based on the total value thereof at the time they are
received by the importer, including freight, postage, insurance, commission, customs duty,
and all similar charges." Republic Act No. 594 amended the section so that the tax on
imported articles shall be "based on the import invoice value thereof, certified to as correct
by the Philippine Consul at the port of origin if there is any, including freight, postage,
insurance, commission, customs duty, and all similar charges." Ascribing undue import to
this amendment, counsel for appellant argues:" Though we might concede that the term
'total value' in the provision just quoted could be interpreted to include the premiums that
banks charged the importers for opening letters of credit, we cannot subscribe to the
proposition suggested by the Court of Tax Appeals that the term 'import invoice value', which
Republic Act 594 introduced in lieu of the term 'total' value, can be so interpreted. For to
admit the correctness of said pro position is to entirely render meaningless the deletion of
the term 'total value' and the insertion in its stead of the term 'import invoice value'
accomplished by Republic Act 594."

The inference sought to be drawn by appellant from this change in the law is unjustified.
Whether we interpret the phrase "all similar charges" as component part of and therefore
already included in the "total value therefore", as appellant seems to accept, or we merely
add "all similar charges" as a separate item to "the import invoice value thereof", as the
present law provides, the result will be the same: the tax is to be based upon the total landed
cost of the imported articles, as pointed out in the Genato case.

Appellant herein further assails the legality of the assessment because, it is claimed,
retroactive effect is being given to the ruling of the Collector of June 21, 1954 which is void
for lack of approval by the Secretary of Finance, and is made to apply to transactions long
closed in the books of the taxpayer. We find no merit in this contention. As the Court of Tax
Appeals has rightly said "The validity or invalidity of the ruling of respondent of June 21,
1954 is not material to this case. What is material here is the correctness of respondent's
decision of November 4, 1955, which is the decision appealed from. (See par. 3, Petition for
Review.) Even if the ruling of June 21, 1954 is invalid for lack of approval of the Secretary of
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Finance, upon which we do not here express an opinion, it would not affect the correctness
of the decision of November 4, 1955, which we have found to be in accordance with Section
183-(B) of the Revenue Code."

As to the claim that transactions long closed in the books of the taxpayer can no longer be
examined for the purpose of making a reassessment, suffice it to say that the
underassessment of the total landed value of the imported merchandise was brought about
by the importer's failure to add to the aforesaid landed value the premium collected by the
bank on foreign exchange transactions. Hence, the same remained undetected until later
when, in connection with its claim for credit for overpaid sales tax, the taxpayer's record was
investigated. Moreover, even granting arguendo that the tax agent's inability to make the
correct assessment reflected against their efficiency or ability, such fact alone does not
preclude the Government from effecting a corrected assessment upon discovery of the error.
As this court has explicitly ruled:

If in assessing income tax (or other kinds of tax) upon the return of the taxpayer, an
error is made with the result that the tax is underassessed, the Collector has the
power to reassess and collect any additional tax upon the returns for said years,
even after the death of the taxpayer. The government is not estopped by error or
mistake on the part of its agents (Pineda vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, et
al., 52 Phil., 803).

This of course understood to be without prejudice to the defense of prescription

inappropriate cases.

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals being an accordance with the evidence
and the applicable law, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. It is so
ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion and Endencia,
JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 106724 February 9, 1994

THE NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, represented by its Acting Chairman, Cesar

Sarino, Teodolo C. Natividad, Vice-Chairman and Executive Officer, Brig. Gen. Virgilio
H. David, Edgar Dula Torre, Guillermo P. Enriquez, Commissioners, and Chief Supt.
Levy D. Macasiano Director for Personnel, petitioners,
vs.
Honorable Judge Salvador de Guzman, Jr., Chief Supt. Norberto M. Lina, Chief Supt.
Ricardo Trinidad, Jr., Sr. Supt. Manuel Suarez, Supt. Justito B. Tagum, Sr. Supt.
Tranquilino Aspiras, Sr., Supt. Ramon I. Navarro,
Sr. Supt. Ramon I. Navarro, Sr. Supt. Jose P. Suria, Sr. Supt. Agaton Abiera, Chief
Insp. Bienvenido Torres, and the National (ROTC) Alumni Association Inc. (NARRA),
represented by its President Col. Benjamin Gundran, and Director Hermogenes
Peralta, Jr., respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioners.

Renecio R. Espiritu for private respondents.

Diosdado P. Peralta for respondent-intervenor.

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BIDIN, J.:

The case at bar had its origin in the implementation of the compulsory retirement of PNP
officers as mandated in Sec. 39, RA 6975, otherwise known as "An Act Establishing the
Philippine National Police Under a Reorganized Department of the Interior and Local
Government", which took effect on
January 2, 1991. Among others, RA 6975 provides for a uniform retirement system for PNP
members. Section 39 thereof reads:

Sec. 39. Compulsory Retirement. — Compulsory retirement, for officer and

non-officer, shall be upon the attainment of age fifty-six (56); Provided, That,
in case of any officer with the rank of chief superintendent, director or deputy
director general, the Commission may allow his retention in the service for an
unextendible period of one (1) year.

Based on the above provision, petitioners sent notices of retirement to private respondents
who are all members of the defunct Philippine Constabulary and have reached the age of
fifty-six (56).

In response, private respondents filed a complaint on December 19, 1991 for declaratory
relief with prayer for the issuance of an ex parte restraining order and/or injunction (docketed
as Civil Case No. 91-3498) before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 142. In their
complaint, respondents aver that the age of retirement set at fifty-six (56) by Section 39 of
RA 6975 cannot be applied to them since they are also covered by Sec. 89 thereof which
provides:

Any provision hereof to the contrary notwithstanding, and within the transition
period of four (4) years following the effectivity of this Act, the following
members of the INP shall be considered compulsorily retired:

a) Those who shall attain the age of sixty (60) on the first year of the
effectivity of this Act.

b) Those who shall attain the age of fifty-nine (59) on the second year of the
effectivity of this Act.

c) Those who shall attain the age of fifty-eight (58) on the third year of the
effectivity of this Act.

d) Those who shall attain the age of fifty-seven (57) on the fourth year of the
effectivity of this Act.

It is the submission of respondents that the term "INP" includes both the former members of
the Philippine Constabulary and the local police force who were earlier constituted as the
Integrated National Police (INP) by virtue of
PD 765 in 1975.

On the other hand, it is the belief of petitioners that the 4-year transition period provided in
Section 89 applies only to the local police forces who previously retire, compulsorily, at age
sixty (60) for those in the ranks of Police/Fire Lieutenant or higher (Sec. 33, PD 1184); while
the retirement age for the PC had already been set at fifty-six (56) under the AFP law.

On December 23, 1991, respondent judge issued a restraining order followed by a writ of
injunction on January 8, 1992 upon posting of a P100,000.00 bond by private respondents.
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After the parties have submitted their respective pleadings, the case was submitted for
resolution and on August 14, 1992, the respondent judge rendered the assailed decision, the
decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the court hereby declares that the term "INP" in Section 89 of
the PNP Law includes all members of the present Philippine National Police,
irrespective of the original status of the present members of the Philippine
National Police before its creation and establishment, and that Section 39
thereof shall become operative after the lapse of the
four-year transition period.

The preliminary injunction issued is made permanent.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 29-30)

Petitioners filed the instant petition on October 8, 1992 seeking the reversal of the above
judgment. On January 12, 1993, the Court resolved to treat the respondents' Comment as
Answer and gave due course to the petition.

In ruling in favor of private respondents, respondent judge observed, among others, that:

It may have been the intention of Congress to refer to the local police forces
as the "INP" but the PNP Law failed to define who or what constituted the
INP. The natural recourse of the court is to trace the source of the "INP" as
courts are permitted to look to prior laws on the same subject and to
investigate the antecedents involved. There is nothing extant in the statute
books except that which was created and established under
PD 765 pursuant to the mandate of Article XV of the 1973 Constitution
providing that the "State shall establish and maintain an integrated national
police force whose organization, administration and operation shall be
provided by law." Heretofore, INP was unknown. And the said law
categorically declared the PC "as the principal component of the Integrated
National Police" (Sec. 5, PD 765).

The court was supplied by respondents (petitioners herein) with excerpts

taken from the discussion amongst the members of Congress concerning the
particular provision of Section 89. The court is not persuaded by said
discussion; it was a simple matter for the members of the legislature to state
precisely in clear and unequivocal terms their meaning, such as "integrated
police" as used in PD 765. Instead, they employed "INP", a generic term that
includes the PC as the principal component of the INP, supra. In failing to
categorically restrict the application of Section 89 as the members of
legislature are said to have intended, it gave rise to the presumption that it
has not limited nor intended to limit the meaning of the word when the bill was
finally passed into law. It is not difficult for the court to also presume that in
drafting the wording of the PNP Law, the legislators were aware of the
historical legislative origin of the "INP".

xxx xxx xxx

The court takes particular note of the fact that Section 89 is found in the
Transitory Provisions of the law which do not provide for any distinction
between the former PC officers and those belonging to the civilian police
forces. These provision are specifically enacted to regulate the period
covering the dissolution of the PC and the creation of the PNP, a period that
necessarily would be attended by imbalances and or confusion occasioned by
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the wholesale and mass integration. In fact, the retirement payment scheme
of the INP is still to be formulated, leaving the impression that nothing is really
settled until after the transition of four years has lapsed. Section 89 therefore
prevails over Section 39 up to the year 1995 when the retirement age for the
members of the PNP shall then be age 56; after the year 1995, Section 39
shall then be the applicable law on retirement of PNP members. (Rollo, pp.
27-28; emphasis supplied)

Petitioners disagree and claim that the use of the term INP in Sec. 89 does not imply the
same meaning contemplated under PD 765 wherein it is provided:

Sec. 1. Constitution of the Integrated National Police. — There is hereby

established and constituted the Integrated National Police (INP) which shall
be composed of the Philippine Constabulary as the nucleus, and the
integrated police forces as established by Presidential Decrees
Nos. 421, 482, 531, 585 and 641, as components, under the Department of
National Defense.

On the other hand, private respondents assert that being the nucleus of the Integrated
National Police (INP) under PD 765, former members of the Philippine Constabulary (PC)
should not be discriminated against from the coverage of the term "INP" in Sec. 89, RA
6975. Clearly, it is argued, the term "INP" found in Section 89 of RA 6975 refers to the INP in
PD 765. Thus, where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.

Does the law, RA 6975, distinguish INP from the PC? Petitioners submit that it does and cite
Sections 23 and 85 to stress the point, viz.:

Sec. 23. Composition. — Subject to the limitations provided for in this Act, the
Philippine National Police, hereinafter referred to as the PNP, is hereby
established, initially consisting of the members of the police forces who were
integrated into the Integrated National Police (INP) pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 765, and the officers and enlisted personnel of the Philippine
Constabulary (PC). . .

xxx xxx xxx

The permanent civilian employees of the present PC, INP, Narcotics

Command, CIS and the technical command of the AFP assigned with the PC,
including NAPOLCOM hearing officers holding regular items as such, shall be
absorbed by the Department as employees thereof, subject to existing laws
and regulations.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 85. Phase of Implementation. — The implementation of this Act shall be

undertaken in three (3) phases, to wit:

Phase I — Exercise of option by the uniformed members of the Philippine

Constabulary, the PC elements assigned with the Narcotics Command, CIS,
and the personnel of the technical services of the AFP assigned with the PC
to include the regular CIS investigating agents and the operatives and agents
of the NAPOLCOM Inspection, Investigation and Intelligence Branch, and the
personnel of the absorbed National Action Committee on Anti-Hijacking
(NACAH) of the Department of National Defense, to be completed within six
(6) months from the date of the effectivity of this Act. At the end of this phase,
all personnel from the INP, PC, technical Services, NACAH, and NAPOLCOM
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Inspection, Investigation and Intelligence Branch shall have been covered by
official orders assigning them to the PNP . . .

xxx xxx xxx

. . . Any PC-INP officer or enlisted personnel may, within the twelve-month

period from the effectivity of this Act, retire . . .

Phase III — . . . To accomplish the tasks of Phase III, the Commission shall
create a Board of Officers composed of the following: NAPOLCOM
Commissioner as Chairman and one (1) representative each from the PC,
INP, Civil Service Commission and the Department of Budget and
Management.

Section 86 of the same law further provides:

Sec. 86. Assumption by the PNP of Police Functions. — The PNP shall
absorb the functions of the PC, the INP and the Narcotics Command upon the
effectivity of this Act.

From a careful perusal of the above provisions, it appears therefore that the use of the term
INP is not synonymous with the PC. Had it been otherwise, the statute could have just made
a uniform reference to the members of the whole Philippine National Police (PNP) for
retirement purposes and not just the INP. The law itself distinguishes INP from the PC and it
cannot be construed that "INP" as used in Sec. 89 includes the members of the PC.

And contrary to the pronouncement of respondent judge that the law failed to define who
constitutes the INP, Sec. 90 of RA 6975 has in fact defined the same. Thus,

Sec. 90. Status of Present NAPOLCOM, PC-INP. — Upon the effectivity of

this Act, the present National Police Commission and the Philippine
Constabulary-Integrated National Police shall cease to exist. The Philippine
Constabulary, which is the nucleus of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated
National Police shall cease to be a major service of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. The Integrated National Police, which is the civilian component of
the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police, shall cease to be the
national police force and lieu thereof, a new police force shall be established
and constituted pursuant to this Act. (emphasis supplied)

It is not altogether correct to state, therefore, that the legislature failed to define who the
members of the INP are. In this regard, it is of no moment that the legislature failed to
categorically restrict the application of the transition period in Sec. 89 specifically in favor of
the local police forces for it would be a mere superfluity as the PC component of the INP was
already retirable at age fifty-six (56).

Having defined the meaning of INP, the trial court need not have belabored on the supposed
dubious meaning of the term. Nonetheless, if confronted with such a situation, courts are not
without recourse in determining the construction of the statute with doubtful meaning for they
may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative body. In case of doubt as to
what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative
deliberations may be adopted (De Villa v. Court of Appeals,
195 SCRA 722 [1991] citing Palanca v. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 125 [1920]; Arenas v. City of
San Carlos, 82 SCRA 318 [1978]).
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Courts should not give a literal interpretation to the letter of the law if it runs counter to the
legislative intent (Yellow Taxi and Pasay Transportation Workers' Association v. Manila
Yellow Taxi Cab. Co., 80 Phil. 83 [1948]).

Examining the records of the Bicameral Conference Committee, we find that the legislature
did intent to exclude the members of the PC from the coverage of Sec. 89 insofar as the
retirement age is concerned, thus:

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Well, it seems what people really want is
one common rule, so if it is fifty-six, fifty-six; of course, the PC wants sixty for
everybody. Of course, it is not acceptable to us in the sense that we tied this
up really to the question of: If you are lax in allowing their (the PC) entry into
the PNP, then tighten up the retirement. If we will be strict in, like requiring
examinations and other conditions for their original entry, then since we have
sifted out a certain amount of undesirables, then we can allow a longer
retirement age. That was the rationale, that was the tie-up. Since we are
relaxing the entry, we should speed up . . .

THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GUTANG). Exit.

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA) . . . the retirement, the exit.

THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GUTANG). So let me get it very clear, Mr. Chairman.
Fifty-six, let's say, that will not make any adjustment in the PC because there
(they) are (retirable at age) fifty-six.

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Kaya nga, wala na silang masasabi.

THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GUTANG). In the case of the Police, since they are
retireable now at sixty, for the officers, it will be
applicable to them on a one-year every year basis for a total period of four
years transition. (Bicameral Conference Committee on National Defense,
March 12, 1990)

REP. GUTANG. On the first year of effectivity, the police will retire at 60
years.

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Sixty.

REP. GUTANG. On the second year, 59.

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Oo.

REP. GUTANG. On the third year, 58.

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Fifty-eight. So 'yung 55, on the third

year, 58, doon siya re-retire.

REP. GUTANG. Oo.

SEN. SAGUISAG. So kung 55, when the law becomes effective . . .

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). He will retire at 58, doon siya aabot.

REP. UNICO. Pwede.

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SEN. SAGUISAG. Dahil 'yon, may time to . . .

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Walang problema dito sa transition ng

pulis, acceptable ito, eh.

THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. COJUANGCO). Sa PC?

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). PC, walang mawawala sa kanila, 56 ang

retirement age nilang talaga, eh. Kaya ayaw ko
ngang dagdagan 'yung 56 nila at 'yon din ang sa Armed Forces, 56. (Ibid.,
May 22, 1990)

In applying the provisions of Sec. 89 in favor of the local police force as established in PD
765, the Court does not, in any manner, give any
undue preferential treatment in favor of the other group. On the contrary, the Court is merely
giving life to the real intent of the legislators based on the deliberations of the Bicameral
Conference Committee that preceded the enactment of RA 6975.

The legislative intent to classify the INP in such manner that Section 89 of RA 6975 is
applicable only to the local police force is clear. The question now is whether the
classification is valid. The test for this is reasonableness such that it must conform to the
following requirements: (1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; (2) It must be
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; (4) It
must apply equally to all members of the same class (People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12 [1939]).

The classification is based upon substantial distinctions. The PC, before the effectivity of the
law (RA 6975), were already retirable at age 56 while the local police force were retirable at
60, and governed by different laws
(P.D. 1184, Sec. 33 and Sec. 50). The distinction is relevant for the purpose of the statute,
which is to enable the local police force to plan for their retirement which would be earlier
than usual because of the new law. Section 89 is merely transitory, remedial in nature, and
loses its force and effect once the four-year transitory period has elapsed. Finally, it applies
not only to some but to all local police officers.

It may be appropriate to state at this point that it seems absurd that a law will grant an
extension to PC officers' retirable age from 56 to 60 and then gradually lower it back to 56
without any cogent reason at all. Why should the retirement age of PC officers be increased
during the transitory period to the exclusion of other PC officers who would retire at age 56
after such period? Such absurdity was never contemplated by the law and would defeat its
purpose of providing a uniform retirement age for PNP members.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of injunction issued on January 8, 1992 is
hereby LIFTED and the assailed decision of respondent judge is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Nocon, J., is on leave.

Tañada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
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136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette,
petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or
cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case,
contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute
becomes valid and enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this
provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to
regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would
be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a
law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official
Gazette…. The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty.
That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter
of public concern is to be given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a

requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that
presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force
and effect.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985.
Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
“otherwise” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective
immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which
are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.
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HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any
other date, without its previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to
them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of
privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law
must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public
of the content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not
called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the
shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules
cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a
valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The
furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is
drawn.

G.R. No. L-36049 May 31, 1976

CITY OF NAGA, VICENTE P. SIBULO, as Mayor, and JOAQUIN C. CLEOPE, as

Treasurer of the City of Naga, petitioners,
vs.
CATALINO AGNA, FELIPE AGNA and SALUD VELASCO, respondents.

Ernesto A. Miguel for petitioners.

Bonot, Cledera & Associates for respondents.

MARTIN, J.:

Petition for review on certiorari, which We treat as special civil action, of the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur in Civil Case No. 7084, entitled Agna, et al. versus
City of Naga, et al., declaring Ordinance No. 360 of the City of Naga enforceable in 1971 the
year following its approval and requiring petitioners to pay to private respondents the
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amounts sought for in their complaint plus attorney's fees and costs. Included in the present
controversy as proper parties are Vicente P. Sibulo and Joaquin C. Cleope, the City Mayor
and City Treasurer of the City of Naga, respectively.

On June 15, 1970, the City of Naga enacted Ordinance No. 360 changing and amending the
graduated tax on quarterly gross sales of merchants prescribed in Section 3 of Ordinance
No. 4 of the City of Naga to percentage tax on gross sales provided for in Section 2 thereof.
Pursuant to said ordinance, private respondents paid to the City of Naga the following taxes
on their gross sales for the quarter from July 1, 1970 to September 30, 1970, as follows:

Catalino Agna paid P1,805.17 as per Official Receipt No. 1826591;

Felipe Agna paid P625.00 as per Official Receipt No. 1826594; and

Salud Velasco paid P129.81 as per Official Receipt No. 1820339.

On February 13, 1971, private respondents filed with the City Treasurer of the City of Naga a
claim for refund of the following amounts, together with interests thereon from the date of
payments: To Catalino Agna, P1,555.17; to Felipe Agna, P560.00; and to Salud Velasco,
P127.81, representing the difference between the amounts they paid under Section 3,
Ordinance No. 4 of the City of Naga, i.e., P250.00; P65.00 and P12.00 respectively. They
alleged that under existing law, Ordinance No. 360, which amended Section 3, Ordinance
No. 4 of the City of Naga, did not take effect in 1970, the year it was approved but in the next
succeeding year after the year of its approval, or in 1971, and that therefore, the taxes they
paid in 1970 on their gross sales for the quarter from July 1, 1970 to September 30, 1970
were illegal and should be refunded to them by the petitioners.

The City Treasurer denied the claim for refund of the amounts in question. So private
respondents filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Naga (Civil Case No. 7084),
seeking to have Ordinance No. 360 declared effective only in the year following the year of
its approval, that is, in 1971; to have Sections 4, 6 and 8 of Ordinance No. 360 declared
unjust, oppressive and arbitrary, and therefore, null and void; and to require petitioners to
refund the sums being claimed with interests thereon from the date the taxes complained of
were paid and to pay all legal costs and attorney's fees in the sum of P1,000.00. Private
respondents further prayed that the petitioners be enjoined from enforcing Ordinance No.
360.

In their answer, the petitioners among other things, claimed that private respondents were
not "compelled" but voluntarily made the payments of their taxes under Ordinance No. 360;
that the said ordinance was published in accordance with law; that in accordance with
Republic Act No. 305 (Charter of the City of Naga) an ordinance takes effect after the tenth
day following its passage unless otherwise stated in said ordinance; that under existing law
the City of Naga is authorized to impose certain conditions to secure and accomplish the
collection of sales taxes in the most effective manner. As special and affirmative defenses,
the petitioners allege that the private respondents have no cause of action against them; that
granting that the collection of taxes can be enjoined. the complaint does not allege facts
sufficient to justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction; that the refund prayed for
by the private respondents is untenable; that petitioners Vicente P. Sibulo and Joaquin C.
Cleope, the City Mayor and Treasurer of the City of Naga, respectively are not proper parties
in interest; that the private respondents are estopped from questioning the validity and/or
constitutionality of the provisions of Ordinance No. 360. Petitioners counterclaimed for
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, for the alleged unlawful and malicious filing of the claim
against them, in such amount as the court may determine.

During the hearing of the petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and at
the pre-trial conference as well as at the trial on the merits of the case, the parties agreed on
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
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the following stipulation of facts: That on June 15, 1970, the City Board of the City of Naga
enacted Ordinance No. 360 entitled "An ordinance repealing Ordinance No. 4, as amended,
imposing a sales tax on the quarterly sales or receipts on all businesses in the City of Naga,"
which ordinance was transmitted to the City Mayor for approval or veto on June 25, 1970;
that the ordinance was duly posted in the designated places by the Secretary of the
Municipal Board; that private respondents voluntarily paid the gross sales tax, pursuant to
Ordinance No. 360, but that on February 15, 1971, they filed a claim for refund with the City
Treasurer who denied the same.

On October 9, 1971, the respondent Judge rendered judgment holding that Ordinance No.
360, series of 1970 of the City of Naga was enforceable in the year following the date of its
approval, that is, in 1971 and required the petitioners to reimburse the following sums, from
the date they paid their taxes to the City of Naga: to Catalino Agna, the sum of P1,555.17; to
Felipe Agna, P560.00; and to Salud Velasco, P127.81 and the corresponding interests from
the filing of the complaint up to the reimbursement of the amounts plus the sum of P500.00
as attorney's fees and the costs of the proceedings.

Petitioners' submit that Ordinance No. 360, series of 1970 of the City of Naga, took effect in
the quarter of the year of its approval, that is in July 1970, invoking Section 14 of Republic
Act No. 305, 1 as amended, otherwise known as the Charter of the City of Naga, which,
among others, provides that "Each approved ordinance ... shall take effect and be enforced
on and after the 10th day following its passage unless otherwise stated in said ordinance ...
". They contend that Ordinance No. 360 was enacted by the Municipal Board of the City of
Naga on June 15, 1970 2 and was transmitted to the City Mayor for his approval or veto on
June 25, 1970 3 but it was not acted upon by the City Mayor until August 4, 1970. Ordinarily,
pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 305, said ordinance should have taken effect
after the 10th day following its passage on June 15, 1970, or on June 25, 1970. But because
the ordinance itself provides that it shall take effect upon its approval, it becomes necessary
to determine when Ordinance No. 360 was deemed approved. According to the same
Section 14 of Republic Act No. 305, "if within 10 days after receipt of the ordinance the
Mayor does not return it with his veto or approval 4 the ordinance is deemed approved."
Since the ordinance in question was not returned by the City Mayor with his veto or approval
within 10 days after he received it on June 25, 1970, the same was deemed approved after
the lapse of ten (10) days from June 25, 1970 or on July 6, 1970. On this date, the
petitioners claim that Ordinance No. 360 became effective. They further contend that even
under Section 2, of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Acts) 5 which expressly
provides: "A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its passage unless
the ordinance shall provide otherwise', Ordinance No. 360 could have taken effect on June
30, 1970, which is the fifteenth day after its passage by the Municipal Board of the City of
Naga on June 15, 1970, or as earlier explained, it could have taken effect on July 6, 1970,
the date the ordinance was deemed approved because the ordinance itself provides that it
shall take effect upon its approval. Of the two provisions invoked by petitioners to support
their stand that the ordinance in question took effect in the year of its approval, it is Section 2
of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) that is more relevant because it is the
provision that specifically refers to effectivity of a tax ordinance and being a provision of
much later law it is deemed to have superseded Section 14 of Republic Act No. 305 (Charter
of the City of Naga) in so far as effectivity of a tax ordinance is concerned.

On the other hand, private respondents contend that Ordinance No. 360 became effective
and enforceable in 1971, the year following the year of its approval, invoking Section 2309 of
the Revised Administrative Code which provides:

Section 2309. Imposition of tax and duration of license.—A municipal license

tax already in existence shall be subject to change only by ordinance enacted
prior to the 15th day of December of any year after the next succeeding year,
but an entirely new tax may be created by any ordinance enacted during the
quarter year effective at the beginning of any subsequent quarter.
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
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They submit that since Ordinance No. 360, series of 1970 of the City of Naga, is one which
changes the existing graduated sales tax on gross sales or receipts of dealers of
merchandise and sari-sari merchants provided for in Ordinance No. 4 of the City of Naga to
a percentage tax on their gross sales prescribed in the questioned ordinance, the same
should take effect in the next succeeding year after the year of its approval or in 1971.

Evidently, the divergence of opinion as to when Ordinance No. 360 took effect and became
enforceable is mainly due to the seemingly apparent conflict between Section 2309 of the
Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act).
Is there really such a conflict in the above-mentioned provisions? It will be easily noted that
Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code contemplates of two types of municipal
ordinances, namely: (1) a municipal ordinance which changes a municipal license tax
already in existence and (2) an ordinance which creates an entirely new tax. Under the first
type, a municipal license tax already in existence shall be subject to change only by an
ordinance enacted prior to the 15th day of December of any year after the next succeeding
year. This means that the ordinance enacted prior to the 15th day of December changing or
repealing a municipal license tax already in existence will have to take effect in next
succeeding year. The evident purpose of the provision is to enable the taxpayers to adjust
themselves to the new charge or burden brought about by the new ordinance. This is
different from the second type of a municipal ordinance where an entirely new tax may be
created by any ordinance enacted during the quarter year to be effective at the beginning of
any subsequent quarter. We do not find any such distinction between an ordinance which
changes a municipal license tax already in existence and an ordinance creating an entirely
new tax in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) which merely refers to a
"tax ordinance" without any qualification whatsoever.

Now to the meat of the problem in this petition. Is not Section 2309 of the Revised
Administrative Code deemed repealed or abrogated by Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264
(Local Autonomy Act) in so far as effectivity of a tax ordinance is concerned? An
examination of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) fails to show any provision
expressly repealing Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code. All that is mentioned
therein is Section 9 which reads:

Section 9 — All acts, executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations

or parts thereof, inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed and modified accordingly.

The foregoing provision does not amount to an express repeal of Section 2309 of the
Revised Administrative Code. It is a well established principle in statutory construction that a
statute will not be construed as repealing prior acts on the same subject in the absence of
words to that effect unless there is an irreconcilable repugnancy between them, or unless
the new law is evidently intended to supersede all prior acts on the matter in hand and to
comprise itself the sole and complete system of legislation on that subject. Every new statute
should be construed in connection with those already existing in relation to the same subject
matter and all should be made to harmonize and stand together, if they can be done by any
fair and reasonable interpretation ... . 6 It will also be noted that Section 2309 of the Revised
Administrative Code and Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) refer to
the same subject matter-enactment and effectivity of a tax ordinance. In this respect they
can be considered in pari materia. Statutes are said to be in pari materia when they relate to
the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or things, or have the same
purpose or object. 7 When statutes are in pari materia, the rule of statutory construction
dictates that they should be construed together. This is because enactments of the same
legislature on the same subject matter are supposed to form part of one uniform system; that
later statutes are supplementary or complimentary to the earlier enactments and in the
passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the existing legislation on the
same subject and to have enacted its new act with reference thereto. 8 Having thus in mind
the previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, whenever the legislature enacts a
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new law, it is deemed to have enacted the new provision in accordance with the legislative
policy embodied in those prior statutes unless there is an express repeal of the old and they
all should be construed together. 9 In construing them the old statutes relating to the same
subject matter should be compared with the new provisions and if possible by reasonable
construction, both should be so construed that effect may be given to every provision of
each. However, when the new provision and the old relating to the same subject cannot be
reconciled the former shall prevail as it is the latter expression of the legislative
will. 10 Actually we do not see any conflict between Section 2309 of the Revised
Administrative Code and Section 2 of the Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act). The
conflict, if any, is more apparent than real. It is one that is not incapable of reconciliation.
And the two provisions can be reconciled by applying the first clause of Section 2309 of the
Revised Administrative Code when the problem refers to the effectivity of an ordinance
changing or repealing a municipal license tax already in existence. But where the problem
refers to effectivity of an ordinance creating an entirely new tax, let Section 2 of Republic Act
No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) govern.

In the case before Us, the ordinance in question is one which changes the graduated sales
tax on gross sales or receipts of dealers of merchandise and sari-sari merchants prescribed
in Section 3 of Ordinance No. 4 of the City of Naga to percentage tax on their gross sale-an
ordinance which definitely falls within the clause of Section 2309 of the Revised
Administrative Code. Accordingly it should be effective and enforceable in the next
succeeding year after the year of its approval or in 1971 and private respondents should be
refunded of the taxes they have paid to the petitioners on their gross sales for the quarter
from July 1, 1970 to September 30, 1970 plus the corresponding interests from the filing of
the complaint until reimbursement of the amount.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby dismissed.