LTD, Original Registration Proceedings, Page 1
EN BANC Alejandro even before the Japanese occupation in 1941; and
[ GR No. 218345, Dec 07, 2016 ]
REPUBLIC v. ESTATE OF VIRGINIA SANTOS +
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to reverse
and set aside the May 22, 2015 Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100999, which affirmed the
April 5, 2013 Amended Order[2] of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 74, Taguig City (MeTC) in LRC Case No. 326,
a land registration case under Section 14 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1529.
The Antecedents
On October 9, 2006, the Application for Land
Registration[3] of a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 10839-
C (subject land) located at P. Burgos St., Sta. Ana, Taguig
City, with an area of 3,942 square meters and an assessed
value of P82,400.00, was filed by respondent Estate of
Virginia Santos (respondent estate), through its
administrator, Pacifico Santos (Pacifico). The subject land
was a subdivision of Lot No. 10839 described under survey
Plan Csd-00-000352 (Subdivision Plan of Lot No. 10839,
MCadm 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping).
Together with its application for registration, respondent
estate submitted the following documents: (1) Letters of
Administration[4]showing that Pacifico was appointed as the
administrator of the estate of Virginia Santos (Virginia); (2)
Oath of Office of Pacifico;[5] (3) Subdivision Plan[6] of Lot No.
10839, MCadm 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping (Csd-00-
000352) with the annotation that the survey was inside L.C.
Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B classified as
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development
on January 03, 1968; (4) Technical Description of Lot No.
10839-C, Csd-00-000352;[7] (5) Certification in Lieu of
Surveyor's/Geodetic Engineer's Certificate[8]issued by the
Land Survey Records Section, Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), National Capital Region; (6)
Tax Declaration (T.D.) No. FL-013-01057;[9] and (7)
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate by Sole Heir of the Late
Alejandro Santos,[10] dated March 27, 1975.
Respondent estate alleged that the late Virginia was the only
child and heir of Alejandro Santos (Alejandro), who was the
owner of the subject land during his lifetime. It further
asserted that on March 27, 1975, or after Alejandro's death,
Virginia executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate by
Sole Heir of the Late Alejandro Santos (Extrajudicial
Settlement) and appropriated the subject land for herself.
Respondent estate further alleged that Virginia, by her and
through her predecessor-in-interest, had been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and adverse possession of the
property in the concept of owner for more than thirty (30)
years.[11]
On October 9, 2006, the MeTC issued a notice of hearing
setting the case for initial hearing on February 7, 2007.[12]
On April 30, 2007, petitioner Republic of the Philippines
(Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed its Opposition[13] to the Application, raising the following
grounds: that neither the applicant nor the predecessors-in-
interest of Virginia had been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land
for a period of not less than thirty (30) years; that the tax
declarations and/or tax payment receipts attached to the
application did not constitute competent and sufficient
evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land applied for;
that the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of a
Spanish title or grant could no longer be availed of by the
applicant; and that the subject land was a portion of the
public domain belonging to the Republic and not subject to
private appropriation.
On July 12, 2007, the Land Registration Authority (LRA)
submitted its Report[14] stating that the subject property, as
plotted, did not appear to overlap with any previously plotted
decreed properties and that it was not in a position to verify
whether or not the aforesaid land was already covered by a
land patent and previously approved isolated surveys.
Thereafter, trial ensued.
To support its allegation of possession and occupation,
respondent estate presented Romualdo B. Flores
(Romualdo) who testified that Virginia owned the subject
land; that he had been tilling the land since 1970; that his
father, Sixto Cuevas Flores (Sixto), tilled the land for
that he knew this for a fact as he was already nine (9) years
old and attained the age of reason at that time. Respondent
estate also offered in evidence several tax declarations
covering Lot No. 10839, the earliest of which was T.D. No.
6532 issued on August 19, 1949.[15]
The MeTC Ruling
In its August 31, 2011 Decision[16] the MeTC denied
respondent estate's application for registration of the subject
land. It opined that respondent estate failed to present
sufficient evidence to establish its claim of possession and
ownership over the subject land. The MeTC reasoned that
mere casual cultivation of portions of the subject land did not
constitute sufficient basis for a claim of ownership. It did not
give much weight either to the tax declarations offered in
evidence as it stated that these documents were mere
indication of claim of ownership and not ownership itself. [17]
The MeTC added that respondent estate failed to prove the
alienable and disposable character of the subject land. It
opined that the certification at the dorsal portion of the
survey plan was not the kind of evidence contemplated in an
application for original registration of title to land. The
decretal portion of the decision, thus, reads:
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, the instant
application for registration of land filed by the Estate of
Virginia Santos represented by Pacifico S. Santos, is hereby
denied.
SO ORDERED.[18]
On September 16, 2011, respondent estate filed its Motion
for Reconsideration (With Alternative Motion for New
Trial).[19] On February 24, 2012, the MeTC granted the
motion and allowed respondent estate to present further
evidence in support of its application. In granting the motion,
the MeTC explained that respondent committed mistake or
excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not
have guarded against xxx."[20]
Respondent estate presented, among others, Felino Flores
(Felino), who, through his judicial affidavit,[21] testified that he
had been tilling the subject land for Virginia and her estate
since 1979; that before him, his father, Romualdo, tilled the
land from 1969 until he took over in 1979; that before his
father, his grandfather, Sixto, tilled the land even before the
Second World War; and that such claim was an accepted
fact in their family history.
On April 5, 2013, the MeTC issued the Order[22] granting the
subject application. In completely reversing itself, the trial
court stated that the tax declarations submitted by
respondent estate and the certification appearing at the
dorsal portion of the survey plan of Lot No. 10839, showing
that the land was disposable and alienable, were already
sufficient to establish respondent estate's claim over the
property as well as the alienable and disposable character of
the subject land.
On the same day, the MeTC issued the Amended
Order[23] correcting the dispositive portion of the earlier order
where the area of the subject property was omitted:
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, this Court hereby
confirms the title of applicant ESTATE OF VIRGINA M.
SANTOS, represented herein by the duly appointed
administrator, PACIFICO M. SANTOS, Filipino, of legal age,
married to Priscilla Santos and a resident of No. 93 P.
Mariano Street, Ususan, Taguig City over the subject parcel
of land designated as Lot 10839-C, as shown on subdivision
plan Csd-00-000352, being a portion of Lot 10839, MCadm-
590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping, situated at Barangay Sta.
Ana, Taguig City, Metro Manila consisting of Three
Thousand Nine Hundred Forty Two (3,942) Square
Meters, more or less and hereby order the registration
thereof in its name.
After finality of this Decision and upon payment of the
corresponding taxes due on the said lot, let an Order for the
issuance of decree of registration be issued.
SO ORDERED.[24] [Emphasis and underscoring in the
original]
Aggrieved, the Republic, through the OSG, elevated an
appeal to the CA.[25]
The CA Ruling
In its assailed Decision, dated May 22, 2015, the CA
dismissed the Republic's appeal and affirmed the Amended
Order, dated August 5, 2013 of the MeTC. The appellate
court noted that the cadastral survey in this case was the
LTD, Original Registration Proceedings, Page 2
same cadastral survey in the case of Natividad Sta. Ana
Victoria vs. Republic[26] (Sta. Ana Victoria), wherein the Court
granted the application for registration of property. The CA
concluded that it could not take a view contrary to the ruling
in the aforesaid case. It also concurred with the trial court
that the DENR certification at the dorsal portion of the
subdivision plan of Lot No. 10839 was sufficient evidence to
prove the character of Lot No. 10839-C as alienable and
disposable.
The appellate court further ratiocinated that the alleged
discrepancies in the area of the property applied for could be
explained by the fact that the subject land was a subdivision
of Lot No. 10839. It also found that respondent estate was
able to prove its open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession in the concept of owner. Relying again on Sta.
Ana Victoria, the CA held that a tax declaration issued in
1949 could be accepted as proof of open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in the
concept of an owner. The dispositive portion of the said
decision states:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Amended
Order dated April 5, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court (sic),
Branch 74, Taguig City in LRC Case No. 326, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[27]
Hence, this petition, anchored on the following
GROUNDS
I 1945, or prior thereto, as the earliest date of possession and
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN TAKING
"JUDICIAL NOTICE" OF A "CADASTRAL SURVEY''
SUBMITTED IN A DIFFERENT CASE ENTITLED "STA.
ANA VICTORIA VS. REPUBLIC" TO PROVE, DURING
THE APPEAL PROCEEDINGS, THE DATE WHEN THE
SUBJECT LAND WAS FIRST DECLARED ALIENABLE
AND DISPOSABLE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
GRANTING THE SUBJECT APPLICATION FOR LAND
REGISTRATION DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF DOUBT
IN THE TOTAL AREA OF THE PARCEL OF LAND BEING
APPLIED FOR REGISTRATION.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
RELYING ON THE STA. ANA VICTORIA CASE AND IN
UTTERLY DISREGARDING THAT THERE IS ABSENCE
OF EVIDENCE TO PROVE POSSESSION AND
OCCUPATION BY RESPONDENT OR ITS
PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST SINCE JUNE 12, 1945,
OR EARLIER.[28]
The Republic argues, first, that the CA gravely erred in its
over-reliance on Sta. Ana Victoria. It posits that although the
CA could take judicial notice of Sta. Ana Victoria, it could not
hastily rule that the subject land was also alienable and
disposable based merely on the allegation that the subject
property and the property registered in the said case
belonged to the same cadastral survey. Second, the
Republic asserts that respondent estate failed to establish its
open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession and
occupation under abona fide claim of ownership over the
subject land since June 12, 1945, or earlier. It contends that
the tax declarations submitted by respondent estate were
considered not proofs of ownership. Moreover, the earliest
tax declaration submitted by respondent estate was for the
year 1949, short of the required possession under the
law. Lastly, the Republic insists that respondent estate's
witnesses merely gave shady statements on the supposed
ownership of Virginia and Alejandro, without showing any
manifestation of acts of dominion over the property.
In its Comment,[29] respondent estate countered that judicial
decisions of this Court, including the findings of facts which
were integral parts thereof, formed part of the legal system
which all other courts were bound to follow and be familiar
with. It asserted that since the subject land emanated from
the same cadastral survey declared as alienable and
disposable in Sta. Ana Victoria, the subject property must
likewise be declared as alienable and disposable. It further
advanced that the contents of the certification at the dorsal
portion of the survey plan and the technical description of the
property enjoyed the presumption of their accuracy.
With regard to possession and occupation, respondent
estate averred that its witnesses testified on the identity of
the property, the crops planted thereon, and the three
generations of tenancy agreement involving the subject land.
It claimed that these testimonies were further supplemented
by the tax declarations it presented, which showed that
Virginia and her predecessor-in-interest were in possession
of the subject land for more than fifty (50) years.
In its Reply,[30] the Republic reiterated its position that
respondent estate failed to adduce sufficient evidence of
possession and occupation on or before June 12, 1945; and
that the appellate court erred in concluding that the subject
land was declared alienable and disposable based merely on
the facts sustained in Sta. Ana Victoria.
The Court's Ruling
Essentially, the Court is asked to resolve the issue of
whether the CA erred in granting respondent estate's
application for registration despite its failure to comply with
the requirements for original registration of title to/and under
Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529.
The petition is meritorious.
At the onset, the Court notes that there was some confusion
as to what law on which the application for registration of the
subject land was based. As per examination of respondent
estate's application, it would seem that the basis for their
application was Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 considering
its allegation of possession and occupation in the concept of
owner for more than thirty (30) years. The MeTC, and later
the appellate court, however, granted the application under
Section 14(1) of the same law making reference to June 12,
occupation. Thus, the Court deems it proper to discuss
respondent estate's application for registration of title to the
subject property vis-a-vis the provisions of Section 14(1) and
(2) of P.D. No. 1529.
Respondent Estate Failed to Comply with the
Requirements under Section 14(1) of
P.D. No. 1529
In Republic of the Philippines vs. Cortez,[31] the Court
explained that applicants for original registration of title to
land must first establish compliance with the provisions of
either Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529.
Section 14(1) provides that:
Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in
the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
(1)notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Under Section 14(1), applicants for registration of title must
sufficiently establish the following: first, that the land or
property forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of
the public domain; second, that the applicant and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
The first requisite of Section 14(1) only entails that the
property sought to be registered be alienable and disposable
at the time of the filing of the application for registration.[32]
In this case, to prove that the subject land formed part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
respondent estate relied on the annotation on the subdivision
plan of Lot No. 10839 and on the certification issued by
Rodelina M. De Villa, Forester II of the Forest Management
Services (FMS) of the DENR, which both stated that the
subject land was verified to be "within the alienable and
disposable land under Project No. 27-B, Taguig Cadastral
Mapping as per LC Map No. 2623."[33]
These pieces of evidence, however, would not suffice. The
present rule is that to prove the alienability and disposability
of the land sought to be registered, an application for original
registration must be accompanied by (1) a City Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO)
Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true
copy by the legal custodian of the official records.[34] Clearly,
the annotation on the subdivision plan and the certification
from the FMS fall short of these requirements.[35]
LTD, Original Registration Proceedings, Page 3
The judicial notice by the appellate court of the cadastral
survey submitted in Sta. Ana Victoria will not cure
respondent estate's shortcomings.
In Spouses Latip vs. Chua,[36] it was ruled that a court cannot
take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, was dependent
on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court
has no constructive knowledge.[37]
In this case, in concluding that the subject land formed part
of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
the CA, in effect, assumed and took judicial notice that it was
located within L.C. Map No. 2623. This is, however,
erroneous considering that the CA had no constructive
knowledge as to the location of the subject land and the
technical boundaries of L.C. Map No. 2623. Furthermore, the
CA erred in assuming the identity and location of the subject
land because such matter was still under dispute. In fact, the
Republic relentlessly raised this issue even during the trial
arguing that the identity of the land in question was doubtful.
This position was further reiterated by the Republic in its
Reply when it argued that respondent estate failed to prove
that the subject property was actually covered by the same
cadastral survey submitted in Sta. Ana Victoria.
Accordingly, the CA erred in taking judicial notice of the
identity and location of subject land. Its declaration that the
subject land was alienable and disposable based merely on
the declaration in Sta. Ana Victoria was erroneous.
Proof of Possession
Aside from the alienable and disposable character of the
land sought to be registered, the applicant must also prove
that he/she and/or his/her predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent,
notorious, and not clandestine. It is continuous when
uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional. It
is exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive
dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own
use and benefit. And it is notorious when it is so conspicuous
that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the
people in the neighborhood.[38] Respondent estate in this
case also failed to prove this requirement.
Respondent estate presented several tax declarations in the
name of Virginia and Alejandro. The earliest of these tax
declarations, however, dates back to 1949 only, short of the
requirement that possession and occupation under a bona
fide claim of ownership should be since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.
Respondent also offered the testimonies of Romualdo and
Felino to prove that Virginia's predecessor-in-interest had
been in possession and occupation under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945. Romualdo testified as
follows:
Atty. Valdez
At the time you started to farm the property, please
Q.
describe the condition thereof?
A. It was being farmed and planted to rice, sir.
Q.Who planted it with rice?
A. My father, Sixto Cuevas Flores, sir.
Q.Since when did your father start tilling the land?
He started tilling the land even before the Japanese time
A.
in 1942?
Q.How do you know?
I have already reached the age of reason at the time being
A.
nine (9) years old in 1941, sir.[39]
It needs to be pointed out, however, that in Republic vs.
Remman Enterprises, Inc.[40] (Remman), the Court held that
for purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of P.D.
No. 1529, proof of specific acts of ownership must be
presented to substantiate the claim of open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
land subject of the application. "Applicants for land
registration cannot just offer general statements which are
mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of
possession. Actual possession consists in the manifestation
of acts of dominion over it of such nature as a party would
actually exercise over his own property."[41]
In a plethora of cases, the Court has repeatedly held that
unsubstantiated claims of cultivation of land do not suffice to
prove open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the public land applied for in the concept
of an owner. In Remman, the Court denied the application
for original registration of title to land located in Taguig City
as the testimony of the applicant's witness lacked specifics
as to the nature of the alleged cultivation. It was observed
that:
Although Cerquena testified that the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest cultivated the subject properties, by
planting different crops thereon, his testimony is bereft of any
specificity as to the nature of such cultivation as to warrant
the conclusion that they have been indeed in possession and
occupation of the subject properties in the manner required
by law. There was no showing as to the number of crops that
are planted in the subject properties or to the volume of the
produce harvested from the crops supposedly planted
thereon.[42] (Underscoring supplied)
In Aranda vs. Republic of the Philippines,[43] the Court held
that mere statements regarding cultivation of land would not
establish possession in the concept of an owner, stating that:
X x x And even assuming that Lucio actually planted rice and
corn on the land, such statement is not sufficient to establish
possession in the concept of owner as contemplated by law.
Mere casual cultivation of the land does not amount to
exclusive and notorious possession that would give rise to
ownership. Specific acts of dominion must be clearly shown
by the applicant.[44] (Underscoring supplied)
In Republic vs. Candy Maker, Inc.,[45] the Court did not give
credit to the unsupported claim of the respondent-applicant's
predecessor-in-interest that he and his father cultivated the
property applied for since 1937 by planting palay during the
rainy season and vegetables during the dry season. The
Court emphasized the importance of showing specific acts of
dominion by the applicant or his predecessors-in-interest, to
wit:
Fourth. When he testified on October 5, 2001, Antonio Cruz
declared that he was "74 years old." He must have been
born in 1927, and was thus merely 10 years old in 1937. It is
incredible that, at that age, he was already cultivating the
property with his father. Moreover, no evidence was
presented to prove how many cavans of palay were planted
on the property, as well as the extent of such cultivation, in
order to support the claim of possession with a bona fide
claim of ownership. (Underscoring supplied)
Similarly in this case, assuming the veracity of the claim that
Alejandro and/or Virginia cultivated the subject land through
Romualdo and Sixto, the Court finds that the same could
only be considered as a mere casual cultivation because his
testimony was bereft of any specificity to warrant the
conclusion that Alejandro and/or Virginia had been indeed in
possession and occupation of the subject land. Romualdo's
statements failed to show the nature of the cultivation and
the volume of crops planted and harvested on the property.
Respondent estate, therefore, failed to satisfy the requisite
exclusivity and notoriety of the possession and occupation of
the property because exclusive dominion and conspicuous
possession over the subject land were not established.
Felino's testimony during the new trial of this case was
likewise insufficient to prove the required possession and
occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Felino's pertinent
testimony in his judicial affidavit was as follows:
Atty. Valdez
Q. Since when did you start tilling the property?
A. In 1979 at the age of 17.
Q. Before you, who cultivated the property, if any?
A. Romualdo Flores, my father then as tenant of the owner.
Q. Since when did Romualdo cultivate or till the property?
A. Since 1969.
Q. As tenant, up to when did your father till the property?
A. Up to 1979 when I took over.
In 1969 when Romualdo took over, who was cultivating or
Q.
tilling the property, if any?
A. Sixto Flores, his father and my grandfather.
Q. Since when did Sixto start to cultivate the property?
A. Before the Second World War.
Q. How do you know when you were born only in 1962?
It is an accepted fact in our family history. I heard my
parents and grandparents talk about it very, very often.
Everyone assumes it to be true. Besides during the days
A.
of my grandfather Sixto, there was not much source of
livelihood of the people but the farm. Many people worked
or derived their income from the farms.
Clearly, Felino failed to convincingly show that he had
personal knowledge of the ownership or possession over Lot
LTD, Original Registration Proceedings, Page 4
No. 10839-C on or before June 12, 1945 having been born
only in 1962. He also talked of how his father and
grandfather cultivated the land based on their family stories
which were not substantiated. Hence, the above testimony of
Felino does not deserve any credit for being hearsay.
From all the foregoing, the subject land cannot be registered
in the name of Virginia and/or her estate under Section 14(1)
of P.D. No. 1529 for respondent estates failure to prove its
alienable and disposable character, and its possession and
occupation from June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Respondent Failed to Comply with the
Requirements under Section 14(2) of
P.D. No. 1529
The subject land cannot also be registered under Section
14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, which states:
Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
(2)
prescription under the provision of existing laws.
In Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic[46] (Malabanan),
the Court explained that when Section 14(2) of P.D. No.
1529 stated that persons "who have acquired ownership
over private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws," it unmistakably referred to the Civil Code as a
valid basis for the registration of lands. The Civil Code is the
only existing law that specifically allows the acquisition of
private lands by prescription, including patrimonial property
belonging to the State.
Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the principles on
prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code. In this regard, the
Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the
State may be acquired by private persons through
prescription. This is brought about by Article 1113, which
provides that all things which are within the commerce of
man are susceptible to prescription, and that property of the
State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character
shall not be the object of prescription.[47]
This does not necessarily mean, however, that when a piece
of land is declared alienable and disposable, it can already
be acquired by prescription. In Malabanan, this Court ruled
that declaration of alienability and disposability was not
enough — there must be an express declaration that the
public dominion property was no longer intended for public
service or the development of the national wealth or that the
property had been converted into patrimonial, thus:
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code,
prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership
of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands
become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration
that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be
an express government manifestation that the property is
already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or
the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the
Civil Code. And only when the property has become
patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of
property of the public dominion begin to
run.[48] (Underscoring supplied)
In this case, and as already stated, respondent estate merely
relied on the annotation on the subdivision plan of Lot No.
10839 and on the certification issued by FMS-DENR which
certified the subject land to be "within the alienable and
disposable land under Project No. 27-B, Taguig Cadastral
Mapping as per LC Map No. 2623." No certification or any
competent evidence, however, was ever presented to the
effect that the subject land, or even the lands covered by
L.C. Map No. 2623, were no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth
pursuant to Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of
the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain does not change its status as property of the
public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus,
it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. Hence,
respondent estate failed to prove that acquisitive prescription
had begun to run against the State, much less that it had
acquired title to the subject property by virtue thereof.
In fine, respondent failed to satisfy all the requisites for
registration of title to land under either Sections 14(1) or (2)
of P.D. No. 1529. Respondent's application for original
registration of imperfect title over Lot No. 10839-C must be
denied.
Without Prejudice
This denial, however, is without prejudice. As the FMS-
DENR certified the subject land to be "within the alienable
and disposable land under Project No. 27-B, Taguig
Cadastral Mapping as per LC Map No. 2623," the
respondent must be given the opportunity to present the
required evidence. This is but fair and reasonable because a
property within an alienable and disposable land must be
deemed to be of the same status and condition. As earlier
stated, however, the respondent must prove that the subject
property was actually covered by the same cadastral survey
and that they and their predecessors in interest were in
possession and ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 22, 2015
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 100999
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Application for Registration of the Estate of Virginia
Santos in LRC Case No. 326 is DENIED, without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Leonen, JJ.,
concur.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 208350, November 14, 2016
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF
SPOUSES TOMASA ESTACIO AND EULALIO
OCOL, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA,***J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court which seeks the reversal of the
Decision2 dated February 20, 2013, and Resolution3 dated
July 26, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 96879. The CA affirmed the Order4 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in LRC Case No. N-11598 granting
respondents' application for registration and confirmation of
title over three (3) parcels of land located at Barangay
Calzada, Taguig City with a total area of 11,380 square
meters.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryOn September 19,
2008,5 respondents, Heirs of Spouses Tomasa Estacio and
Eulalio Ocol filed with the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 266 an
application for land registration under Presidential Decree
No. 1529 (PD 1529) otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree. The application covers three (3) parcels
of land described as follows: a) Lot 2 under approved survey
plan Ccs-00-000258 with an area of 3,731 square meters; b)
Lot 1672-A under approved subdivision plan Csd-00-001798
consisting of 1,583 square meters; c) a lot under approved
survey plan Cvn-00-000194 consisting of 6,066 square
meters.6The total assessed value of the parcels of land is
P288,970.007chanrobleslaw
On October 6, 2008, the RTC issued a Notice of Initial
Hearing, copy furnished the Land Registration Authority
(LRA). The notice was sent to the Official Gazette for
publication and was served on all the adjoining owners. It
was likewise posted conspicuously on each parcel of land
included in the application.8 During the initial hearing on
January 13, 2010, respondents, by counsel, presented the
jurisdictional requirements (Exhibits "A" to "I" and their sub-
markings). There being no private oppositor, an Order of
General Default was issued except against the Republic of
the Philippines.
At the ex-parte presentation of evidence on January 22,
2010, respondents Rosa Ocol, 72 years old, and Felipe
Ocol, 70 years old, testified that they are the children of the
late Tomasa Estacio and Eulalio Ocol (Exhibits "U" and "V").
They inherited the subject lots from their father and mother
who died on February 1, 1949 and March 22, 1999,
respectively. When Felipe Ocol was only about eight years
old and Rosa was still in grade school, their parents
developed and cultivated the subject lots as rice fields. In the
1940's, there were only a few houses around their house. At
present, one of the lots is residential while the two remaining
lots have become idle. Their parents and grandparents had
been in continuous, actual and physical possession of the
lots without any interruption for more than sixty five (65)
years. Felipe and Rosa have been in possession of the land
for more than fifty (50) years. There is n0 existing mortgage
or encumbrance over the said lots.9chanrobleslaw
Respondents presented witness Antonia Marcelo who was
LTD, Original Registration Proceedings, Page 5
85 years old at the time she testified. She is the neighbor of
Tomasa Estacio and Eulalio Ocol in Barangay Calzada
where she has been residing for more than fifty (50) years.
She testified that during her childhood days, she used to play
on the subject lots and had seen the spouses Ocol cultivate
the lots by planting vegetables, rice and
trees.10chanrobleslaw
In support of their application, respondents presented
documentary evidence which sought to establish the
following:
1. The first lot which is Lot 2 of the conv. Subd. plan
Ccs-00-000258 with an area of 3,731 square
meters was declared for taxation purposes in the
names of Tomasa Estacio and Eulalio Ocol in the
years 1966, 1974, 1979, 1985, 2000 and 2002
(Exhibits "T" to "T-7");
2. The second lot which is Lot 1672-A under
approved subdivision plan Csd-00-001798
consisting of 1,583 square meters was declared
for taxation purposes in the names of Tomasa
Estacio and Eulalio Ocol in the years 1942, 1949,
1966, 1974, 1979, 1985, 1994, 2000 and 2002
(Exhibits "R" to "R-10");
3. The third lot which is a lot under approved survey
plan CVN-00-000194 consisting of 6,066 square
meters, being a conversion of Lot 1889, MCadm,
590-D Taguig Cadastral Mapping, was declared
for taxation purposes in the names of Tomasa
Estacio and Eulalio Ocol in the years 1949, 1974,
1979, 1985, 2000 and 2002 (Exhibits "S" to "S-6");
4. The subject lots used to have larger areas but
certain portions were taken and designated as
legal easements. On December 17, 2009, the real
property tax on the subject lots, declared in the
names of Tomasa Estacio and Eulalio Ocol as
owners, were paid (Exhibits "Q", "Q-1" and "Q-2");
5. The subject lots were surveyed for Tomasa Vda.
de Ocol as evidenced by the Geodetic Engineers'
Certificates and Conversion Subdivision Plans
(Exhibits "J", "K", "L", "P", "P-1", and "P-2");
6. The subject lots are verified to be within alienable
and disposable land under Project No. 27-B
Taguig Cadastral Mapping as per LC Map No.
2623 approved on January 3, 1968 as evidenced
by Certifications dated January 28, 2010 issued by
the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources-National Capital Region (Exhibits "J-3,
"K-2" and "L-3").11
On February 11, 2010, respondents formally offered their
documentary evidence. The RTC set the case for
presentation of evidence of the government on April 16,
2010. On the date of the hearing, there was no appearance
from the government. Hence, the court, upon motion of
applicants, considered the case submitted for resolution.
On August 12, 2010, the RTC issued an Order granting the
respondents' application for registration of title to the subject
properties, viz.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered thus: the title of
the heirs of Tomasa Estacio and Eulalio Ocol, namely, Rosa
Ocol; and Felipe Ocol, to the three (3) parcels of land above-
described is hereby CONFIRMED.
Upon the finality of the judgment, let the proper Decree of
Registration and Certificates of Title be issued to the
applicants pursuant to Section 39 of P.D. 1529.
Let two (2) copies of this Order be furnished the Land
registration Authority Administrator Benedicta B. Ulep thru
Salvador L. Oriel, the Chief of the Docket Division of said
Office, East Avenue, Quezon City.
SO ORDERED.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The RTC found that respondents were able to prove that
their predecessors-in-interest possessed the subject lots
from 1966 until 2002 with respect to the first lot; from 1942 to
2002, with respect to the second lot; and from 1949 to 2002
with respect to the third lot, as shown in the tax declarations.
The court posited that even if the subject lots were declared
as alienable and disposable public land only on January 3,
1968, respondents had already "acquired title to the land
according to P.D. 1529" by virtue of the continued
possession of the respondents and their predecessors-in-
interest from January 3, 1968 to the present.13chanrobleslaw
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner
raising the following grounds:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) Respondents did not comply with the requirements
in acquiring ownership of the subject lots by
prescription because the few tax declarations of
respondents failed to substantiate the requirement
of open, continuous, notorious and exclusive
possession of the subject lots for the required
period as stated in the case of Wee vs. Republic;14
(b) The evidence is insufficient to establish the nature
of possession because the testimony of witness
Antonia Marcelo with regard to the cultivation of
the subject properties by spouses Ocol does not
convincingly prove possession and enjoyment of
the subject lots to the exclusion of other people;
(c) There was no declaration, either in the form of a
law or a presidential proclamation, showing that
the lots are no longer intended for public use or for
the development of national wealth, or that it has
been converted to patrimonial property as stated in
the case of Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic.15
The Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the RTC on
February 15, 2011.
The RTC opined that the case of Wee vs. Republic16 is not
applicable in the instant case because the parcels of land
involved in the said case are "unirrigated ricefields". In the
instant case, the first and third lots are ricefields while the
second lot is a residential one as shown in the tax
declarations. The RTC averred that, even prior to the dates
stated in the tax declarations specifically during the 1940s,
spouses Tomasa and Eulalio Ocol had started planting rice
on the first and third lots as testified to by respondents. The
testimony was corroborated by witness Antonia Marcelo,
who is 15 years older than the respondents, when she
testified that she played on the subject lots and had seen the
spouses Ocol cultivate the same by planting vegetables, rice
and trees in the 1930s. As to the second lot, the RTC gave
credence to the testimony of respondents that in the 1940s,
respondents' house was already erected on the said lot.
According to the court, such is proof that the lot has been
used for residential purposes even prior to 1942 which is the
earliest date of the tax declaration on the lot.
The RTC further held that the case of Heirs of Malabanan vs.
Republic17 does not apply in the case at bar because the
said case involved a 71,324-square-meter lot, while the
subject lots have a total area of 11,380 square meters only.
The court pointed out that respondents are not just entitled to
a grant of their application under Section 14(1) of PD 1529
but also under Section 14(2) of the same law because
respondents had proven that their predecessors-in-interest
were in possession of the subject lands earlier than 1945.
Thus, there is no need for an express government
manifestation that the property is patrimonial, or that such is
no longer intended for public service or for the development
of national wealth.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal before the CA. In a
Decision dated February 20, 2013, the CA affirmed the
Decision of the RTC. The fallo of the Decision
states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED, and the
Order dated August 12, 2010, of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 266, in L.R.C. Case No. N-11598 (LRA
Record No. N-79393) is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In affirming the RTC Order, the CA made the following
ratiocinations:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the case at bar, the applicants-appellees seek the
confirmation of their ownership to the subject lands not
based on prescription, but based on their claim that "they
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bonafide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier". (Section 14[1],
PD 1529). The requirement of prior declaration that the
property is patrimonial property of the State, therefore, does
not apply. As explained in Heirs of Malabanan, for
application based on Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, it is enough that the property is
alienable and disposable property of the State and the
LTD, Original Registration Proceedings, Page 6
applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land
under a bonafide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or
earlier. Both of these requirements are present in this
case.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner but
the same was denied by the CA on July 26, 2013.
Hence, this petition, raising the following
errors:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. THE RECORD IS BEREFT OF PROOF
THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES
HAD BEEN CLASSIFIED AS
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE;
2. THE RECORD IS BEREFT OF PROOF
THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN IN
OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE
AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION Of
THE SUBJECT LOTS UNDER A BONA
FIDE CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP SINCE
JUNE 12, 1945, OR EARLIER;
3. ALTERNATIVELY, RESPONDENTS
CANNOT INVOKE PRESCRIPTION
UNDER SECTION 14(2) OF
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1529.
THE SUBJECT LOTS HAVE NOT
BEEN CONVERTED INTO
PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY OF THE
STATE.20
On the first ground, petitioner states that respondents failed
to present a copy of the original certification, approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian, which would support respondents' claim that the
subject lands are alienable and disposable. The certification
of Senior Forest Management Specialist Corazon D.
Calamno and Chief of the Forest Utilization and Law
Enforcement Division of the DENR should not be treated as
sufficient compliance with the requirements of the law
because she was not presented during trial to testify on the
contents of the certification.
On the second ground, petitioner argues that there is
insufficient evidence of acts of dominion on the part of
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest for the
following reasons:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) Respondents did not explain how the properties
were acquired. The only explanation as to the
acquisition of Lot 1672-A was that it was first
acquired from a certain Gregorio, without even
mentioning the date of acquisition as well as any
document evidencing the same.21
(b) It was unusual for respondents' parents to possess
and occupy three (3) parcels of land that are not
contiguous to one another;
(c) Respondents were able to present a tax receipt
only for the year 2009;
(d) In terms of improvements, respondents did not go
to the extent of specifying whether fences were
erected on the lots. While they claim that crops
were planted, it did not appear that they
exclusively and continuously enjoyed the
possession of the lots;
(e) While respondents consistently affirm the
development of the lots as ricefields, they failed to
consider the fact that the second lot, Lot 1672-A, is
a residential land as stated on the tax declaration
of the land.
On the third ground, petitioner avers that respondents cannot
invoke prescription under Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529
because they failed to present the necessary documents
which would show that the subject properties are no longer
intended for public service or no longer used for the
development of the national wealth. They did not present a
declaration in the form of a law or a Presidential
Proclamation.
In their Comment,22 respondents counter that the
certifications issued by the DENR constitute substantial
compliance with the legal requirement, and that with their
continuous possession of the subject lots for more than thirty
(30) years, they had acquired ownership over the subject lots
through prescription under Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529.
In Reply,23 petitioner maintains that respondents failed to
establish their compliance with the requisites for original
registration either under Section 14 (1) or Section 14 (2) of
P.D. No. 1529. The certifications of Senior Forest
Management specialist Corazon C. Calamno and the Chief
of the Forest Utilization and Law Enforcement Division of the
DENR did not comply with the legal requirements for lack of
approval by the DENR Secretary and for lack of certification
by its legal custodian. Respondents failed to establish that
the State expressly declared, either through a law or a
presidential proclamation, that the parcels ofland are no
longer retained for public service or the development of
national wealth, or that they had been converted into
patrimonial properties. Without such, the subject lots remain
part of public dominion.
Petitioner further maintains that the tax declarations do not
represent regular assertion of ownership because of the
large gaps in the years between declarations. Such sporadic
assertion of alleged ownership does not prove open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation in the concept of an owner. And that, since the
parcels of land are not contiguous, alleged possession and
occupation over one parcel of land cannot prove possession
and occupation over the other parcels of
land.24chanrobleslaw
The petition is meritorious.
Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our
Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, which is the source of any asserted right to any
ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been
reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or
alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of the
inalienable public; domain. The burden of proof in
overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands
of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration, who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be presented to
establish that the land subject of the application is alienable
or disposable.25cralawredchanrobleslaw
Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in
the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(1) Those who by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provision of existing laws.
xxx
In the Order of the RTC granting the registration of the
subject lots, it was stated that respondents had "acquired
title to the land according to P.D. 1529" by virtue of the
continued possession of the respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest from January 3, 1968 to present.
On motion for reconsideration, however, the court added that
respondents are not just entitled to a grant of their
application under Section 14(2) of the P.D. 1529, but also
under Section 14(1) of the same law because respondents
had proven that their predecessors-in-interest were in
possession of the subject lots earlier than 1945. The CA
explained, however, that the confirmation of the ownership to
the subject lots is not based on prescription, but on Section
14 (1), since it was established that the lots are alienable
and disposable, and the applicants are in continuous
possession thereof since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
To distinguish between registration under Section 14(1) of
P.D. No. 1529 from the one filed under Section 14(2) of P.D.
No. 1529, this Court held in the case of Heirs of Mario
Malabanan v. Republic:26
Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis
of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the
basis of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is
LTD, Original Registration Proceedings, Page 7
extended under the aegis of the Property Registration
Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under
Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property
Registration Decree and the Civil
Code.27chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 is based
on possession and occupation of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain since June 12, 1945 or
earlier, without regard to whether the land was susceptible to
private ownership at that time. The applicant needs only to
show that the land had already been declared alienable and
disposable at any time prior to the filing of the application for
registration.28chanrobleslaw
On the other hand, registration under Section 14(2) of P.D.
No. 1529 is based on acquisitive prescription and must
comply with the law on prescription as provided by the Civil
Code. In that regard, only the patrimonial property of the
State may be acquired by prescription pursuant to the Civil
Code. For acquisitive prescription to set in, therefore, the
land being possessed and occupied must already be
classified or declared as patrimonial property of the State.
Otherwise, no length of possession would vest any right in
the possessor ifthe property has remained land of the public
dominion.29chanrobleslaw
Moreover, Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the
judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to public
land acquired under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No.
141, or the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No.
1073.30 Under Section 14(1), respondents need to prove
that: (1) the land forms part of the alienable and disposable
land of the public domain; and (2) they, by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of
ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier. These the
respondents must prove by no less than clear, positive and
convincing evidence.31chanrobleslaw
In the case at bar, the first requirement was not satisfied. To
prove that the subject property forms part of the alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, the respondents
presented three certifications - two are dated January 29,
2010 (Exhibits "J-3" and "K-2") and one is dated January 28,
2010 (Exhibits "L-3") - issued by Senior Forest Management
Specialist Corazon D. Calamno and Chief of the Forest
Utilization and Law Enforcement Division of the DENR-
National Capital Region.32 The certification attests that the
lots are verified to be within alienable and disposable land
under Project No. 27-B Taguig Cadastral Mapping as per LC
Map No. 2623 approved on January 3, 1968,
thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This is to certify that the tract of land as shown and
described at the reverse side hereof xxx as surveyed by
Geodetic Engineer Jose S. Agres, Jr. for Tomasa Vda de
Ocol is verified to be within the Alienable and Disposable
Land, under Project No. 27-B of Taguig City as per LC Map
2623, approved on January 3,
1968.33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
However, the certifications presented by the respondents are
insufficient to prove that the subject properties are alienable
and disposable. We reiterate the standing doctrine that land
of the public domain, to be the subject of appropriation, must
be declared alienable and disposable either by the President
or the Secretary of the DENR. Applicants must present a
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of
the records. In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc.,34 this Court explicitly
ruled:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO35 to
certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant
for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land
subject of the application for registration falls within the
approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO
or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration
must present a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true
copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These
facts must be established to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so
because the certifications presented by respondent do not,
by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In Republic v. Bantigue Point Development
Corporation,37 this Court deemed it appropriate to reiterate
the ruling in T.A.N. Properties,
viz.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Regalian doctrine dictates that all lands of the public
domain belong to the State. The applicant for land
registration has the burden of overcoming the presumption of
State ownership by establishing through incontrovertible
evidence that the land sought to be registered is alienable or
disposable based on a positive act of the government.
We held in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. that a CENRO
certification is insufficient to prove the alienable and
disposable character of the land sought to be registered. The
applicant must also show sufficient proof that the DENR
Secretary has approved the land classification and released
the land in question as alienable and disposable.
Thus, the present rule is that an application for original
registration must be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or
PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified
as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
Here, respondent Corporation only presented a CENRO
certification in support of its application. Clearly, this falls
short of the requirements for original
registration.38chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Similarly, in Republic v. Cortez,39 this Court declared
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
xxx. To prove that the subject property forms part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, Cortez
adduced in evidence a survey plan Csd-00-000633
(conversion-subdivision plan of Lot 2697, MCadm 594-D,
Pateros Cadastral Mapping) prepared by Geodetic Engineer
Oscar B. Fernandez and dertified by the Lands Management
Bureau of the DENR. The said survey plan contained the
following annotation:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Project No. 29,
classified as cuienable & disposable by the Bureau of Forest
Development on Jan. 3, 1968.
However, Cortez' reliance on the foregoing annotation in
the survey plan is amiss; it ciloes not constitute
incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption
that the subject property remains part of the inalienable
public domain. In Republic of the Philippines v. Tri-Plus
Corporation,40 the Court clarified that, the applicant must at
the very least submit a certification froi:n the proper
government agency stating that the parcel of land subject of
he application for registration is indeed alienable and
disposable, viz.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be
presented to establish that the land subject of the application
is alie table or disposable.
In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character
of the subject lands as required by law is the notation
appearinin the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said
properties are alienable and disposable. However, this is
hardly the kind of proof required by law. To prove that the
land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an
appficant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order, an administrative action, investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, andla legislative act
or statute. The applicant may also secure certification from
the Government that the lands applied: for are alienable and
disposable. In the case at bar, while the Advance Plan
bearing the notation was certified by the Lands
Management Services of the DENR, the cert fication
refers only to the technical correctness of the survey
plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do wh
tsoever with the nature and character of the property
surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a certification
fromithe proper government agency to prove that the lands
subject for registration are indeed alienable and
disposable.41chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Clearly, the aforestated doctrine unavoidably means that the
mere certification issued by the DENR does not suffice to
support the application for registration, because the applicant
must also submit a copy of the original classification of the
land as alienable and disposable as approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian
of the official records.42chanrobleslaw
Hence, in the instant case, the DENR certifications that were
presented by the respondents in support of their application
for registration are not sufficient to prove that the subject
properties are indeed classified by the DENR Secretary as
alienable and disposable. It is still imperative for the
respondents to present a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary, which must be certified by
the legal custodian thereof as a true copy. Accordingly, the
lower courts erred in granting the application for registration
in spite o£ the failure of the respondents to prove by well-
nigh incontrovertible evidence that the subject properties are
alienable and disposable.43chanrobleslaw
LTD, Original Registration Proceedings, Page 8
Anent the second requirement, the tax declarations do not
prove respondents' assertion. Although respondents claim
that they possessed the subject lots through their
predecessors-in-interest since the 1930s, their tax
declarations belie the same. The earliest tax declarations
presented for the first lot was issued only in 1966, while the
earliest tax declaration for the third lot was issued in 1949.
If it is true that the parents of respondents had been in
possession of the properties in the 1930s as testified to by
witness Antonia Marcelo, why was the first lot declared for
taxation purposes for the first time only in 1966, and the third
lot was declared only in 1949? While belated declaration of a
property for taxation purposes does not necessarily negate
the fact of possession, tax declarations or realty tax
payments of property are, nevertheless, good indicia of
possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right
mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his
actual or, at least, constructive possession.44chanrobleslaw
That the subject properties were first declared for taxation
purposes only in those mentioned years gives rise to the
presumption that the respondents claimed ownership or
possession of the subject properties starting in the year 1966
only with respect to the first lot; and year 1949, with respect
to the third lot.45The voluntary declaration of a piece of
property for taxation purposes not only manifests one's
sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property, but
also announces an adverse claim against the State and all
other interested parties with an intention to contribute
needed revenues to the government. Such an act
strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership.46chanrobleslaw
Likewise, this Court notes that the tax declarations on the
subject properties presented by the respondents were only
for the years 1966, 1974, 1979, 1985, 2000 and 2002 with
respect to the first lot (Lot 2 of the conv. Subd. plan Ccs-00-
000258 with an area of 3,731 square meters); for the years
1942, 1949, 1966, 1974, 1979, 1985, 1994, 2000 and 2002
with respect to the second lot (Lot 1672-A under approved
subdivision plan Csd-00-001798 consisting of 1,583 square
meters); for the years 1949, 1974, 1979, 1985,2000 and
2002 with respect to the third lot (a lot under approved
survey plan CVN-00-000194 consisting of 6,066 square
meters being a conversion of Lot 1889, MCadm, 590-D
Taguig Cadastral Mapping).
Thus, there are only six tax declarations for the first lot, nine
tax declarations for the second lot and five tax declarations
for the third lot within the alleged actual and physical
possession of the lands without any interruption for more
than sixty five (65) years. In Wee v. Republic of the
Philippines,47 this Court stated
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It bears stressing that petitioner presented only five tax
declarations (for the years 1957, 1961, 1967, 1980 and
1985) for a claimed possession and occupation of more
than 45 years (1945-1993). This type of intermittent and
sporadic assertion of alleged ownership does not prove
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation. In any event, in the absence of other
competent evidence, tax declarations do not conclusively
establish either possession or declarant's right to registration
of title.48chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Moreover, this Court emphasizes that respondents paid the
taxes due on the parcels of land subject of the application
only in 2009, a year after the filing of the application. There is
no showing of any tax payments before 2009. This Court
held in the case of Tan, et al. vs. Republic:49
Tax declarations per se do not qualify as competent
evidence of actual possession for purposes of prescription.
More so, if the payment of the taxes due on the property
is episodic, irregular and random such as in this case.
Indeed, how can the petitioners claim of possession for
the entire prescriptive period be ascribed any ounce of
credibility when taxes were paid only on eleven (11)
occasions within the 40-year period from 1961 to
2001?50chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
From the foregoing, this Court doubts the respondents' claim
that their predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous,
exclusive, and adverse possession and occupation thereof in
the concept of owners from June 12, 1945, or earlier. The
evidence presented by the respondents does not prove title
thru possession and occupation of public land under Section
14(1) of P.D. 1529.
Further, the RTC ruled that with the continuous possession
of the subject lots for more than 30 years, respondents had
acquired ownership over the subject lots through prescription
under Section 14(2) of P.D. 529. This view was adopted by
the respondents in their Comment,51 to the petition.
An application for original registration of land of the public
domain under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree (PD) No.
1529 must show not only that the land has previously been
declared alienable and disposable, but also that the land has
been declared patrimonial property of the State at the onset
of the 30-year or 10-year period of possession and
occupation required under the law on acquisitive
prescription.52chanrobleslaw
It was elucidated in Heirs of Malabanan53 that possession
and occupation of an alienable and disposable public land
for the periods provided under the Civil Code will not convert
it to patrimonial or private property. There must be an
express declaration that the property is no longer intended
for public service or the development of national wealth. In
the absence thereof, the property remains to be alienable
and disposable and may not be acquired by prescription
under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529.
This Court, therefore, stresses that there must be an official
declaration by the State that the public dominion property is
no longer intended for public use, public service, or for the
development of national wealth before it can be acquired by
prescription; that a mere declaration by government officials
that a land of the public domain is already alienable and
disposable would not suffice for purposes of registration
under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The period of
acquisitive prescription would only begin to run from the time
that the State officially declares that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public use, public service,
or for the development of national wealth54.
In Republic v. Rizalvo, Jr.,55 this Court reiterated the ruling
in Malabanan, viz.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for
application for registration because his claim of ownership
and possession over the subject property even exceeds
thirty (30) years. However, it is jurisprudentially clear that the
thirty (30)-year period of prescription for purposes of
acqmring ownership and registration of public land under
Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 only begins from the
moment the State expressly declares that the public
dominion property is no longer intended for public service or
the development of the national wealth or that the property
has been converted into patrimonial. xxx
In this case, there is no evidence showing that the parcels of
land in question were within an area expressly declared by
law either to be the patrimonial property of the State, or to be
no longer intended for public service or the development of
the national wealth.
Evidently, there being no compliance, with either the first or
second paragraph of Section 14 of PD 1529,
the Regalian presumption stands and must be enforced in
this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated February 20, 2013, in CA-G.R.
CV No. 96879, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 266, in LRC Case No. N-11598,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for
registration and confirmation of title filed by respondents
Heirs of Spouses Tomasa Estacio and Eulalio Ocol over
three parcels of land, with a total area of eleven thousand
three hundred eighty (11,380) square meters situated
at BarangayCalzada, Taguig City, Metro Manila, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.chan robles virtuallawlibrary
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally
A. Malabanan), Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
LTD, Original Registration Proceedings, Page 9

For our consideration and resolution are the motions for
reconsideration of the parties who both assail the decision
promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling
of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application of the
petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land situated in
Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had
not established by sufficient evidence their right to the
registration in accordance with either Section 14(1) or
Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree).
Antecedents
The property subject of the application for registration is a
parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite,
more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with
an area of 71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998,
applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property
from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land
registration covering the property in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property
formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse
possession and occupation of the land for more than 30
years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his
title.1
To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, Malabanan presented during trial
a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
which reads:
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No.
9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Mr.
Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite
containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and
described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within
the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map
No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved
as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2
After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered
judgment granting Malabanan’s application for land
registration, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application
for registration and thus places under the operation of Act
141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property
Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-
0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy
One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square
Meters, as supported by its technical description now
forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other
proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is
of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting
Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in
the CA, his heirs elevated the CA’s decision of February 23,
2007 to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Corazon Naguit5 (Naguit) remains the
controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is
agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any
possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as
alienable and disposable could be counted in the reckoning
of the period of possession to perfect title under the Public
Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property
Registration Decree. They point out that the ruling in
Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land subject
of the application for registration as alienable and disposable
should also date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a
mere obiter dictum considering that the land registration
proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void ab
initio for lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc.6 to support their argument that the property
had been ipso jure converted into private property by reason
of the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
by their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land of the
public domain for more than 30 years. According to them,
what was essential was that the property had been
"converted" into private property through prescription at the
time of the application without regard to whether the property
sought to be registered was previously classified as
agricultural land of the public domain.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on
certiorari because Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient
evidence possession and occupation of the property on his
part and on the part of his predecessors-in interest since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that
the mere classification of the land as alienable or disposable
should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial
property of the State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses De
Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito v. Republic8 and Republic v.
T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the reclassification of
the land as alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive
prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had
purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco believing in
good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had
been the real owners of the land with the right to validly
transmit title and ownership thereof; that consequently, the
ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code,
in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed
the application for registration on February 20, 1998, he had
already been in possession of the land for almost 16 years
reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared
alienable and disposable by the State.

The Republic’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration

Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the
corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to
3 obtain a clarification with reference to the application of the
SO ORDERED.
rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the

Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the
judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to
decision has enlarged, by implication, the interpretation of
prove that the property belonged to the alienable and
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree through
disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC erred
judicial legislation. It reiterates its view that an applicant is
in finding that he had been in possession of the property in
entitled to registration only when the land subject of the
the manner and for the length of time required by law for
application had been declared alienable and disposable
confirmation of imperfect title.
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision

Ruling
reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for
registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v.
Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the CA declared that under Section We deny the motions for reconsideration.
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of
possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable
In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be
and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded
imperative to discuss the different classifications of land in
from the computation of the period of possession. Noting that
relation to the existing applicable land registration laws of the
the CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had
Philippines.
been declared alienable and disposable only on March 15,
1982, Velazco’s possession prior to March 15, 1982 could
not be tacked for purposes of computing Malabanan’s period Classifications of land according to ownership
of possession.
Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified
as either of public dominion or of private ownership.11Land is
LTD, Original Registration Proceedings, Page 10
considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for
public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for
public use, and is intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.12 Land belonging to the
State that is not of such character, or although of such
character but no longer intended for public use or for public
service forms part of the patrimonial property of the
State.13 Land that is other than part of the patrimonial
property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is
of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal
concept first introduced into the country from the West by
Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal
Cedulas,14 all lands of the public domain belong to the
State.15This means that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.16
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands
remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain
unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated
them to private persons.17
Classifications of public lands
according to alienability
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and
disposable primarily rests on the classification of public lands
made under the Constitution. Under the 1935
Constitution,18 lands of the public domain were classified into
three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral.19 Section 10,
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the
public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial
or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or
forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law
might provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution
adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into
agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added national
parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by law
according to the uses to which they may be devoted.21 The
identification of lands according to their legal classification is
done exclusively by and through a positive act of the
Executive Department.22
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the
type of public land that may be alienated. Under Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of
the public domain may be alienated; all other natural
resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two
categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those
classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of
the Civil Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the public
domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution,
but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural.
Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral,
or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or
disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural.24 A
positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such
reclassification,25 and the exclusive prerogative to classify
public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive
Department, not in the courts.26 If, however, public land will
be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
or national park, or when public land is no longer intended
for public service or for the development of the national
wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit
of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be
made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a
Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is
duly authorized by law to that effect.27 Thus, until the
Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or
reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President declares
that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public
service or for the development of national wealth, the
Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
Disposition of alienable public lands
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the
manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to
wit:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes
can be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free
patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper
interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by
a Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
viz:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming
to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act,
to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications
for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the
words "lands of the public domain" or "alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that
lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or
national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private ownership,
are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the
law does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive
phrase "alienable and disposable" further limits the coverage
of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public
domain as set forth in Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under the
Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the following
requirements in order for his application to come under
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his
predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession
and occupation of the property subject of the
application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have
taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and
5. The property subject of the application must be
an agricultural land of the public domain.
Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is
vested with the authority to classify lands of the public
domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
presupposes that the land subject of the application for
registration must have been already classified as agricultural
land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply.
Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as
agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine
applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is
LTD, Original Registration Proceedings, Page 11
alienable and disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the
requirement that the classification required by Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act is classification or reclassification of a
public land as agricultural.
The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification
of the land as alienable and disposable agricultural land
should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier,
because any possession of the land prior to such
classification or reclassification produced no legal effects. It
observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be
minimized or glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or
by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the full
legislative intent be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the
reckoning point of the requisite possession and occupation
was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of
which should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers.
Except that said date qualified the period of possession and
occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be
associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945.
Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and
literal meaning of the law as written by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed no requirement
that the land subject of the registration should have been
classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As
such, the applicant’s imperfect or incomplete title is derived
only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945,
or earlier. This means that the character of the property
subject of the application as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain determines its eligibility
for land registration, not the ownership or title over it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally
or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously
and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is
converted to private property by the mere lapse or
completion of the period.29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine,
corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for
as long as the lands were already converted to private
ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying the
requisite period of possession prescribed by the Public Land
Act.30 It is for this reason that the property subject of the
application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable
and disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the
entire duration of the requisite period of possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have
been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land
at the time of the application for registration is necessary
only to dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also
serves to determine the point at which prescription may run
against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being
confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title
that is acquired by reason of the applicant’s possession and
occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural land
of the public domain. Where all the necessary requirements
for a grant by the Government are complied with through
actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public
possession of an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by
operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant by the
Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of
title be issued in order that such a grant be sanctioned by the
courts.31
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public
Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to unregistered lands
in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their
occupation and cultivation thereof for the number of years
prescribed by law32 will be defeated. Indeed, we should
always bear in mind that such objective still prevails, as a
fairly recent legislative development bears out, when
Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No. 10023)33in
order to liberalize stringent requirements and procedures in
the adjudication of alienable public land to qualified
applicants, particularly residential lands, subject to area
limitations.34
On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer
intended for public use or for the development of national
wealth by declaration of Congress or the President, thereby
converting such land into patrimonial or private land of the
State, the applicable provision concerning disposition and
registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
but the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree.35 As such, prescription can
now run against the State.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to
the disposition of public land or lands of the public domain,
namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian
Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to
the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not
clearly under private ownership are also presumed
to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be
alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general
rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public
domain are rendered alienable and
disposable through any of the exclusive
modes enumerated under Section 11 of
the Public Land Act. If the mode is
judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, the agricultural land subject of the
application needs only to be classified
as alienable and disposable as of the
time of the application, provided the
applicant’s possession and occupation
of the land dated back to June 12, 1945,
or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive
presumption that the applicant has
performed all the conditions essential to
a government grant arises,36 and the
applicant becomes the owner of the land
by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete
title. By legal fiction, the land has
already ceased to be part of the public
domain and has become private
property.37
(b) Lands of the public domain
subsequently classified or declared as
no longer intended for public use or for
the development of national wealth are
removed from the sphere of public
dominion and are considered converted
into patrimonial lands or lands of private
ownership that may be alienated or
disposed through any of the modes of
acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code. If the mode of acquisition is
prescription, whether ordinary or
extraordinary, proof that the land has
been already converted to private
ownership prior to the requisite
acquisitive prescriptive period is a
condition sine qua non in observance of
the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that
property of the State not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of
prescription.
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient
evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of the land since June 12,
1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period of
possession - possession and occupation that is open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or
earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to
private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it
as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run
against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible
for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be
ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law
or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as
no longer intended for public service or for the development
of the national wealth.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration and the respondent's Partial Motion for
Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
LTD, Original Registration Proceedings, Page 12

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Exhibit "H" - Notice of Appearance of the Solicitor G

Associate Justice
Thereafter, the case was called aloud in open court to
WE CONCUR: determine whether there were other oppositors aside from
the Republic. There being none, the court issued an Order of
Republic of the Philippines General Default on September 23, 1998.
SUPREME COURT
Manila Respondent corporation, to prove that it and its
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land
FIRST DIVISION applied for in the concept of an owner peacefully,
continuously, adversely and notoriously for a period required
under the law, presented six (6) witnesses. The six, who
G.R. No. 170724 January 29, 2007 were predecessors-in-interest of composite portions of the
subject parcel of land, provided testimonies to the effect that
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, they had been in possession of the land, and had
vs. subsequently sold their respective parcels thereof to the
SAN LORENZO DEVELOPMENT respondent. Their testimonies were supported by tax
CORPORATION, Respondent. declarations and deeds of sale.

DECISION On October 12, 2001, the trial court rendered its

GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, petitioner Republic of the Philippines seeks the
reversal and setting aside of the Decision1 dated May 23,
2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA)-Cebu City in CA-G.R. CV
No. 73996, as reiterated in its Resolution2 of December 7,
2005, dismissing the Republic's appeal from an earlier
decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Danao City, which ordered the registration of title in the
name of herein respondent San Lorenzo Development
Corporation over a 64,909-square meter parcel of land in
Barangay Maslog, City of Danao, Province of Cebu.
The facts:
On November 13, 1997, respondent San Lorenzo
Development Corporation filed with the MTCC of Danao City
an application for registration of title to a parcel of land,
described as Lot 1 of the Consolidation-Subdivision Plan,
Ccn-07-000094, being a portion of Lots 3151, 3152, 3158,
3159, 3160 and 3161, Cad. 681-D, Danao Cadastre, situated
in Barangay Maslog, City of Danao, Province of Cebu, with a
total area of 64,909 square meters, more or less. The
application was docketed in the MTCC as LRC No. 100.
On November 14, 1997, the MTCC issued an Order setting
the application for initial hearing on March 5, 1998. The
Order required that a copy thereof be furnished the
Commissioner, Land Registration Authority, for notice and
for the necessary publication to be made.
decision3 granting the respondent’s application for
registration of title, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is hereby
rendered ordering the issuance of title to Lot 1 of the
Consolidation-Subdivision of Plan Ccn-07-000094, being a
portion of Lot 3152, 3151, 3158, 3159, 3160 and 3161, Cad.
681-D, Danao Cadastre, situated in the Barangay of Maslog,
Danao City, Province of Cebu, Island of Cebu, containing an
area of SIXTY FOUR THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED NINE
(64,909) square meters, for and in the name of San Lorenzo
Development Corporation, with principal office address at
Ground Floor, Stanford Tower Condominium, 1870 M.H. Del
Pilar Street, Malate, Metro Manila.
Upon finality of this Decision, let a corresponding decree of
registration be issued in favor of applicant in accordance with
Sec. 39 of PD 1529.
SO ORDERED.
On November 7, 2001, petitioner Republic filed a Notice of
Appeal, therein making known that it was elevating the case
to the CA. In the CA, the Republic’s appellate recourse was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 73996.
In the herein assailed decision4 of May 23, 2005, the CA-
Cebu City dismissed the Republic’s appeal. Its motion for
reconsideration having been denied by the same court in its
equally assailed resolution5 of December 7, 2005, the
Republic is now before this Court via the instant petition
raising the following issues:

On December 11, 1997, the Solicitor General entered his
appearance as counsel for petitioner Republic and deputized
the City Prosecutor of Danao City to appear in the case. On
the same date, the Republic filed its opposition to the
application.
On February 24, 1998, another Order was issued by the
MTCC resetting the initial hearing of the application to June
15, 1998. This was followed by an Order of May 15, 1998,
resetting anew the initial hearing to September 23, 1998.
1. Whether or not the defective and/or want of
notice by publication of the initial hearing(s) of the
case a quo vested the trial court with jurisdiction to
take cognizance thereof; and
2. Whether or not deeds of sale and tax
declarations/clearances constitute the "well-nigh
incontrovertible" evidence necessary to acquire
title through adverse occupation under C.A. No.
141.

During the initial hearing, the respondent corporation, In the matter of jurisdiction, petitioner Republic maintains
through counsel, offered in evidence the following that the MCTC never acquired jurisdiction over the case on
documents to prove or establish the jurisdictional facts of the account of its failure to conduct the initial hearing thereof
case, to wit: within the period fixed in Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, which
mandates that the date and hour of initial hearing shall not
Exhibit "A" - The Petition for Registrationbe containing
earlier thanseven
45 days
(7) pages
nor later
and than
mandatory
90 days from the date
annexes designated as A-1 of to the
A-3;Order. In the Republic’s own words:6
Exhibit "A-1" - Lot Plan No. Ccn-07000094 of Lot 1 comprising Cad. Lot Nos. 3151,
3152, 3158, 3159, 3160 andAfter 3161; a series of postponements, the trial court finally set the
Exhibit "A-2" - Technical Description of Lotinitial
No. 1;hearing of the case on September 23, 1998 in an order
Exhibit "A-3" - Certification of Non-requirement
issued of on
Surveyor's
May 15, Certificate;
1998 xxx. The notice of initial hearing,
Exhibit "B" - Order resetting date of Initialhowever,
Hearing was issued only
to September 23,on1998;
June 6, 1998.
Exhibit "B-1" - Newspaper Clipping;
Exhibit "C" - Affidavit of Publication issued by Banat
Pursuant to News;
Section 23, P.D. 1529, the initial hearing of the
Exhibit "D" - caseby
Certificate of Publication issued must
the have
Land to be not earlier
Registration than forty-five (45) days and
Authority;
Exhibit "E" - Certificate of Posting issuednot laterCourt
by the than Sheriff;
ninety (90) days from the date of the order
Exhibit "F" - setting
Certificate of Publication issued the NPO;
by the date and hour of the initial hearing. The Order
having been issued on May 15, 1998, the initial hearing
Exhibit "F-1" - Copy of Notice of Initial Hearing;
should have been set not earlier than June 29, 1998 (45
Exhibit "G" - Copy of the Indorsement addressed
days from toMay
the Clerk of Court,
15, 1998 and notMTCC,
later Danao
than August 13, 1998
City, from Salvador Oriel, Chief, Docket
(90 days fromDivision,
May 15,Land Registration
1998). Unfortunately, the initial
Authority, dated July 7, 1998; and
LTD, Original Registration Proceedings, Page 13
hearing was scheduled and actually held on September 23,
1998, some forty-one (41) days later than the prescribed
period.
Even if counted from June 8, 1998 (date of notice of
hearing), still the hearing on September 23, 1998 is
seventeen (17) days late than the prescribed period of ninety
(90) days, the last day of which fell on September 6, 1998.
It is noteworthy that both parties invoke the decision of the
Court in Republic v. Manna Properties, Inc.,[7] decided
January 31, 2005, albeit each cites different portions thereof,
and for different purposes. The common reliance on said
case is well-placed as it is, indeed, of a similar factual
setting. Furthermore, that case tackles the same two (2)
issues presently raised: compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements for original registration, and proof of
possession for the requisite period.
A careful reading of Republic v. Manna Properties, Inc. will
support a finding in favor of the respondent but only as
regards the issue of jurisdiction. Speaking on that issue, the
Court in Manna Properties, Inc., wrote:
The duty and the power to set the hearing date lie with the
land registration court. After an applicant has filed his
application, the law requires the issuance of a court order
setting the initial hearing date. The notice of initial hearing is
a court document. The notice of initial hearing is signed by
the judge and copy of the notice is mailed by the clerk of
court to the LRA [Land Registration Authority]. This involves
a process to which the party applicant absolutely has no
participation.
Petitioner is correct that in land registration cases, the
applicant must strictly comply with the jurisdictional
requirements. In this case, the applicant complied with the
jurisdictional requirements.
The facts reveal that Manna Properties was not at fault why
the hearing date was set beyond the 90-day maximum
period. x x x.
We have held that "a party to an action has no control over
the Administrator or the Clerk of Court acting as a land court;
he has no right to meddle unduly with the business of such
official in the performance of his duties."8 A party cannot
intervene in matters within the exclusive power of the trial
court. No fault is attributable to such party if the trial court
errs on matters within its sole power. It is unfair to punish an
applicant for an act or omission over which the applicant has
neither responsibility nor control, especially if the applicant
has complied with all the requirements of the law.
Moreover, it is evident in Manner Properties, Inc. that what is
more important than the date on which the initial hearing is
set is the giving of sufficient notice of the registration
proceedings via publication. In fact, in its
memorandum,9 petitioner Republic "concedes (a) that
respondent should not be faulted if the initial hearing that
was conducted on September 23, 1995 was outside the 90-
day period set forth under Section 23 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529, and (b) that respondent might have substantially
complied with the requirement thereunder relating to the
registration of the subject land."10 Hence, on the issue of
jurisdiction, we find for the respondent, in that its application
for registration was rightfully given due course by the MTCC.
However, on the more important issue of lack of evidence of
possession on the part of the respondent for the period
required by law, the balance must tilt in favor of the
petitioner.
Very evident from Republic v. Manna Properties, Inc. is that
the reckoning date under the Public Land Act11 for the
acquisition of ownership of public lands is June 12, 1945 or
earlier, and that evidence of possession from that date or
earlier is essential for a grant of an application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, provides:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure. Those shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529 – the Property
Registration Decree – provides, inter alia, as follows:
Section 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file
in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
1. Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier;
(Emphasis supplied)
Here, in support of its application for registration, the
respondent corporation submitted a certification from the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) that the parcel of land sought to be registered
forms part of the general area classified as alienable and
disposable public land under Forestry Administrative Order
No. 4-467 dated June 7, 1938. It also submitted tax
declarations and/or clearances, the earliest of which is in the
year 1964 for Lots 3150 and 3160; 1963 for Lot 3151;
and 1948 for Lots 3152, 3159 and 3161.
The respondent's application was granted by the two (2)
courts below on the premise that, reckoned to date,
possession of the subject parcel of land since the declaration
of alienability and disposability on June 7, 1938 was more
than fifty (50) years already. Adverse possession for at least
thirty (30) years had long been completed. This reasoning
was fraught with errors.
First, the law, as mentioned earlier, requires that the
possession of lands of the public domain must be from at
least June 12, 1945 for the same to be acquired through
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. Through the years,
Section 48(b), supra, of the Public Land Act has been
amended several times. The case of Republic v.
Doldol[12] provides a summary of these amendments:
x x x. The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain
since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942,
which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of
occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. The same, however, has already been
amended by Presidential Decree 1073, approved on January
25, 1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by PD No.
1073, presently requires, for judicial confirmation of an
imperfect or incomplete title, the possession and occupation
of the piece of land by the applicants, by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest, since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. This provision is in total conformity with Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree heretofore cited.
As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession for
thirty years or more is not sufficient. It must be shown, too,
that possession and occupation had started on June 12,
1945 or earlier.
Second, the acceptance by the courts a quo of the CENRO
certificate of alienability and disposability as evidence
of possession since the date of said certificate is patently
erroneous. According to the CENRO certification, the subject
land was alienable and disposable public land since June 7,
1938. This certification does not in any way indicate that the
LTD, Original Registration Proceedings, Page 14
respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the property as far back as 1938.
The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove
two things, to wit:
1. That the land is alienable public land; and
2. That his open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same
must either be since time immemorial or for the
period prescribed in the Public Land Act.13
All that the CENRO certificate evidences is the alienability of
the land involved, not the open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation thereof by the
respondent or its predecessors-in-interest for the period
prescribed by law.
As in Manna Properties, Inc., while the Court acknowledges
tax declarations as sufficient basis for inferring possession,
the tax declarations presented by the respondent in this case
do not serve to prove their cause:
The 1945 tax declaration must be presented considering that
the date, 12 June 1945, is material to this case. CA 141
specifically fixes the date to 12 June 1945 or earlier. x x x
Unless the date and month of issuance in 1945 is stated,
compliance with the reckoning date in CA 141 cannot be
established.14
Here, the earliest of the tax declarations presented by the
respondent was in the year 1948 for Lots 3152, 3159 and
3161; 1963 for Lot 3151; and 1964 for Lots 3150 and 3160.
At best, the respondent corporation can only prove
possession since said dates. This does not constitute the
evidence necessary to acquire title through adverse
occupation under CA 141, as amended.
Lastly, while it is true that the issue of whether or not the
respondent corporation has presented sufficient proof or the
required possession raises a question of fact, which
ordinarily cannot be entertained in a petition under Rule 45,
one of the exceptions to that rule is when, as here, the
evidence on record does not support the conclusions of both
the trial and the appellate courts.
On the whole, we find merit in the petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the decision dated May 23, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals-Cebu City in CA-G.R. CV No. 73996, as reiterated
in its resolution of December 7, 2005,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the application for
registration filed by respondent San Lorenzo Development
Corporation is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 117734. February 22, 2001]
VICENTE G. DIVINA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and VILMA GAJO-SY, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision[1] dated
October 27, 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 03068
reversing and setting aside the judgment dated July 7, 1979 of the
Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, Branch II, in LRC Case No. N-
147.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Lot No. 1893 located at Gubat, Sorsogon, was originally
owned by Antonio Berosa. On July 22, 1960, he sold it to Teotimo
Berosa. The portion is particularly described as:
A parcel of land unirrigated situated in San Ignacio, Gubat,
Sorsogon, Philippines, with an area of TWENTY THOUSAND
(20,000) square meters and bounded on the North by Lot #1464 -
Fausto Ayson and Lot #1888 - Gloria Fajardo: on the East, by Lot
# 1446 - Silverio Garcia: on the South, by Lot #1891 - Antonio
Escobedo and on the West, by Lot #1880 - Federico Faronas and
Lot #1890 - Eugenia Espedido.Cadastral concrete posts are the
visible signs of boundary. It has no permanent improvement
thereon. Designated as Lot 1893 of Antonio Berosa. Declared
under Tax No. 13038, valued at P760.00 for the current year in the
name of ANTONIO BEROSA[2]
On March 23, 1961, the Berosa spouses sold the same Lot
1893 to Jose P. Gamos. In the deed of sale to Gamos, the lot was
more particularly described as:
A parcel of RICE land situated in San Ignacio, Gubat, Sorsogon,
Philippines, with an area of TWENTY THOUSAND (20,000)
square meters and bounded on the North, by Lot #1462 - Fausto
Ayson and Lot #1888 - Gloria F. Estonante: on the East, by Lot
#1464 Zacarias Espadilla; and Lot #1466 - Felix Arimado; on the
South, by Lot #1898 - Silverio Garcia; and on the West, by Lot
#1890 - Eugenia Espedido and Lot #1892 - Antonio
Escobedo. Concrete cements posts are the visible signs of
boundary. No permanent improvements thereon. Covered by Lot
#1893 of Teotimo E. Berosa, and declared under Tax No. 13039,
valued at P760.00 for the present year in the name of TEOTIMO
E. BEROSA.[3]
On April 26, 1960, Gamos acquired from the heirs of Felix
Arimado, a boundary owner of Lot 1893, a 20,687 sq. m. parcel of
land identified as Lot 1466, also in Gubat. It adjoins Lot 1893. On
March 28, 1961, Gamos had these two parcels of land under Tax
Declaration No. 13237 and declared it had a total area of 4.0867
hectares. He also had the property resurveyed by private land
surveyor Antonio Tiotangco. In 1967, Tax Declaration No. 13237
was cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 9032 in Gamos name.
The re-survey plan (AP-9021), of Lots 1466 and 1893
conducted on June 16, 1961 for Gamos, showed that the
consolidated properties contained a total area of 100,034 sq. m. This
plan was approved on July 12, 1961 by the Acting Director of Lands.
On November 23, 1968, Tax Declaration No. 12927 which
cancelled Tax Declaration No. 9032 was secured by Gamos and
declared therein that the area of the consolidated property was
10.0034 hectares with 2500 sq. m. planted to coconut, 3.8187
irrigated for rice planting and 5.9347 were thickets.
On January 19, 1967, Teotimo Berosa conveyed to Vicente
G. Divina, herein petitioner, a portion of Lot 1893 referred to as Lot
1893-B. It is described as follows:
A parcel of dry and thicket land situated in San Ignacio, Gubat,
Sorsogon, Philippines, having an area of 54,818 square meters and
bounded on the N., by Lot 1888 (Inocencio Eroe); Lot 1887 (Jaime
Enaje); and Lot 1462 (Heirs of Zacarias Espadilla); on the
(Illegible), by Lot 1466; on the SE, by Lot 1893-A; on the S., by
Lot 1898 (Heirs of Silverio Garcia); on the E., by Lot 1892
(Antonio Escobedo) and Lot 1890 (Eugenia Espedido); and on the
NE, by Lot 1889 (Pedro Fajardo); all of Gubat
Cadastre. NOTE: This lot is designed as Lot 1893-B, a portion of
Lot 1893, Cad 308-D.[4]
On November 28, 1968, two years from the date of said sale
and five (5) days after November 23, 1968, when Gamos secured
Tax Declaration No. 12927 declaring the consolidated property as
containing 100,034 sq. m., the deed of sale was registered. An
undated Subdivision PLAN of Lot 1893, was prepared for
petitioner. The plan, without Bureau of Lands approval, showed that
Lot 1893 was divided into two, Lot 1893-A and Lot 1893-B.
On July 24, 1970 Gamos sold the consolidated property to
private respondent Vilma Gajo-Sy, for P20,000.00. The land was
particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land located at San Ignacio, Gubat, Sorsogon, under
Tax Declaration No. 12927 in the name of Jose P. Gamos, covered
by Lots No. 1466 and 1893 of the Gubat Cadastre, with an area of
100,034 sq. m., more or less.[5]
On July 29, 1970, Tax Declaration No. 13768 secured by
private respondent, was cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 12509.
On August 28, 1972, she filed an application for registration
of title to the property at the then Court of First Instance of Sorsogon,
LTD, Original Registration Proceedings, Page 15
docketed as LRC Case No. N-147, GLRO Record No. 42920. The
application was amended on March 8, 1973, on order of Branch II
of the said court to include therein the postal address of Inocencio
Erpe, adjoining owner of Lot No. 1893 described in Plan AP-9021.
The land registration court, by Decision of July 29, 1975,
ordered the registration of private respondents title over Lots Nos.
1466 and 1893.
On July 13, 1977, pending issuance of the final decree of
registration petitioner filed before the same court a Petition for
Review of the July 29, 1975 judgment. He alleged that he is the
owner of a portion of Lot 1893 consisting of 54,818 sq. m. conveyed
to him by Teotimo Berosa on January 19, 1967; that he was unaware
of the registration proceedings on Lot 1893 due to private
respondents failure to give him notice and post any notice in the
subject lot; and that private respondent fraudulently misrepresented
herself as the owner of the disputed portion despite her knowledge
that another person had acquired the same.
Private respondent opposed the petition alleging that the
registration case had long become final and the court no longer had
any jurisdiction thereon; and that lack of personal notice to the
petitioner of the registration proceedings did not constitute actual
fraud.
The trial court, in its Decision[6] dated June 7, 1979, found
that the petition for review was timely filed. It also ruled that the
failure of private respondent to include a known claimant in her
application for registration constituted deliberate misrepresentation
that the lot subject of her application is not contested when in fact it
was. Private respondent, according to the trial court, should have
included in her application at least the person of petitioners cousin,
Elena Domalaon who had, before respondent filed her application
for registration, made known to the latters sister her apprehension of
their land being included in respondents application for
registration. This misrepresentation, according to the court,
amounted to fraud within the contemplation of Section 38 of Act
496.[7] The trial court in its decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Setting aside the Decision rendered in the land
registration case and revoking the order for the
issuance of a Decree;
(b) Declaring petitioner Vicente G. Divina the owner
of the portion of the land applied for containing an
area of 54,818 square meters which is described
in paragraph 3 of the Petition for Review of
Judgment; and
(c) Allowing this land registration case to proceed as
to the portion applied for which is outside the
limits of the portion herein awarded to the
petitioner Vicente G. Divina; and
(d) Ordering a subdivision survey of the lots applied
for, delimiting therein the area not contested and
which is registrable in favor of applicant Vilma
Gajo-Sy, and the area herein adjudicated to
petitioner Vicente G. Divina, as to whom the land
registration proceedings shall likewise be allowed
to proceed after he shall have adduced such other
evidence as are appropriate in land registration
cases.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Private respondent assailed the decision of the trial court
before the Court of Appeals. It averred that the trial court erred (1)
in declaring petitioner-appellee owner of a portion of Lot 1893, in
ordering a subdivision survey, and allowing petitioner-appellee to
proceed with registration after adducing evidence as are appropriate;
(2) in declaring respondent-appellant guilty of actual fraud in the
land registration case; (3) in taking cognizance of the petition for
review of judgment, setting aside the decision dated June 29, 1975,
and revoking the order of the issuance of the final decree in the land
registration case; and (4) in not dismissing the petition for review of
judgment with cost.[9]
The CA reversed the trial court and dismissed the petition. It
ruled:
In the case at bar, petitioner-appellee did not indeed appear in the
survey plan as an adjoining owner of the subject property. Neither
was he a known claimant or possessor of the questioned portion of
Lot 1893 which was found by the court a quo to be untouched and
thickly planted with bigaho. A fortiori, there was no need to
mention in the application for registration the apprehension or
claim of at least petitioner-appellees cousin Evelyn (sic) Domalaon
in the application for registration, nor to personally notify Elena
about registration proceeding.
There could, therefore, have been no misrepresentation in any form
on the part of respondent-appellee.
xxx
There being no extrinsic or collateral fraud attendant to the
registration of the property in the name of respondent-appellee, We
find it unnecessary to discuss the rest of the assigned
errors. Suffice it to state that Lot 1893 bought by Teotimo Berosa
which he sold to Jose P. Gamos who in turn sold it to respondent-
appellee in 1970 was designated by boundaries in such a manner as
to put its identity beyond doubt; that the total area of Lot 1893 lot
was determined after a resurvey/relocation was conducted for
Gamos in 1961 the result of which is reflected in the Plan approved
by the Bureau of Lands also in 1961; that what really defines a
piece of land is not the area but the boundaries therein laid down
(Pea, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1988 Edition, p. 213);
that the Lot 1893-B sold to petitioner-appellee made no mention of
any tax declaration covering it, unlike the different deeds of sale
covering Lot 1893, thereby raising the presumption that Lot 1893-
B was really part of the Lot 1893 sold by Gamos to respondent-
appellant; and that the subdivision of Lot 1893 into Lots A and B,
caused to be made by petitioner-appellee who claims Lot 1893-B
to have been the Lot 1893-B subject of the January 19, 1967 Deed
of Sale in his favor which was registered on November 28, 1968,
appears to have been made in 1977, ten years from the date of said
deed of sale, a confirmation that there was no such Lot 1893-B
subject of his purchase in 1967; and in any event, as the
subdivision survey prepared for petitioner-appellee was not
approved by the Bureau of Lands, it is not of much value (vide
Flores vs. Director of Lands, 17 Phil. 512 [1910]).
In fine, not all the basic elements for the allowance of the
reopening or review of the judgment rendered in the land
registration case in respondent-appellants favor are present. The
present appeal is thus meritorious.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby REVERSED and
set aside and another rendered DISMISSING petitioner-appellees
petition at the court a quo.[10]
Hence, the present petition. Petitioner now assails the
reversal of the Court of Appeals of the trial court decision. In
substance, he raises the primary issue of whether or not, there was
deliberate misrepresentation constituting actual fraud on private
respondents part when she failed to give or post notice to petitioner
of her application for registration of the contested land, such that it
was error for the trial court to declare private respondent owner of
the disputed land.
Prefatorily, on the timeliness of the petition for review of
judgment, we have repeatedly said that the adjudication in a
registration of a cadastral case does not become final and
incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the entry of
then final decree. As long as the final decree is not issued, and the
one year within which it may be revised had not elapsed, the
decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court
rendering the decree, which court after hearing may set aside the
decision or decree or adjudicate the land to another party. [11] In the
present case, a certification was issued by the Land Registration
Commission that no final decree of registration had yet been issued
and by the order of the trial court dated September 28, 1977, it
restrained the Commission from issuing such a decree.Clearly, the
tolling of the one year period has not even began. Thus, the trial
court did not err when it entertained the petition.
Now, we consider the crux of the petition. Both the trial and
appellate courts found that petitioners name did not appear in the
survey plan as an adjacent owner, nor claimant nor
possessor. However, the trial and appellate courts differed in their
conclusion on whether or not there was deliberate misrepresentation
constituting fraud in private respondents part when it failed to give
notice or post notice to potential claimant and include their names
in the application for registration. The trial court said there was, but
the appellate court disagreed.
Section 15 of P.D. 1529[12] is explicit in requiring that in the
application for registration of land titles, the application shall also
state the full names and addresses of all occupants of the land and
those of the adjoining owners if known, and if not known, it shall
state the extent of the search made to find them. As early
as Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, 97 SCRA 22 [1980] we
emphasized that a mere statement of the lack of knowledge of the
names of the occupants and adjoining owners is not sufficient but
what search has been made to find them is necessary. The trial court
was correct when it took notice that respondents sister Lydia Gajo-
Anonuevo admitted that she had a conversation with petitioners
cousin Elena Dumalaon about the latters apprehension that their land
may have been included in respondents application for registration
of the disputed land.[13] Respondents omission of this material
information prevented petitioner from having his day in court. The
LTD, Original Registration Proceedings, Page 16
trial court in its decision more than amply supported its conclusion
with jurisprudence to the effect that it is fraud to knowingly omit or
conceal a fact upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a
third person.[14] Such omission can not but be deliberate
misrepresentation constituting fraud, a basis for allowing a petition
for review of judgment under Section 38 of Act No. 496, The Land
Registration Act.
Additionally, it should be noted that petitioner acquired the
bigger portion of Lot 1893 long after the initial survey of Barrio San
Ignacio. Teotimo Berosa sold Lot 1893 to Jose P. Gamos who in
turn sold it to respondent in 1970. Clearly, going by the records,
petitioners name would not be found on the said survey plan
approved by the Bureau of Lands in 1961, years before his purchase
of the portion of Lot 1893. Petitioners claim is clearly meritorious.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 24, 1994 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment in LRC Case No. N-
147 of the then Court of First Instance, Branch II in Gubat, Sorsogon
is REINSTATED. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 139588 March 4, 2004
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
JOSEFINA B. VDA. DE NERI, SPS. GRACIANO B. NERI,
JR. and VICTORIA BABIERA, SPS. VICTORIA NERI and
MARIO FERNANDEZ, RAMON NERI, SPS. TERESA NERI
and ALBERTO YRASTORZA and the REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari filed
by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Director of the Bureau of Lands, seeking to reverse and set
aside the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 50139 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City,
which, in turn, dismissed the petitioner’s complaint for the
annulment of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0662 and
reversion. Likewise sought to be reversed and set aside is
the appellate court’s Resolution dated August 4, 1999,
denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are summarized as follows:
Lot 2821, Plan (LRC) SWO-150, approved by the Land
Registration Commission, is a parcel of land with an area of
105.568 hectares located along the Cagayan de Oro River in
Sitio Taguanao, Indahag, Cagayan de Oro City. On
September 3, 1973, the Bureau of Forest Development
certified that the property was alienable and disposable.2 On
July 24, 1974, the heirs of Graciano Neri, Sr.3 filed an
application with the then Court of First Instance of Misamis
Oriental for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
title, docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-531, LRC
Record No. 46236. They alleged, inter alia, thus:
1. That applicants GRACIANO B. NERI, JR. is of
legal age, married to VICTORIA BABIERA, Filipino
and residing at 833 Recto Avenue, Cagayan de
Oro City; JOSEFINA B. VDA. [DE] NERI is of legal
age, widow of GRACIANO A. NERI, Filipino and
residing at 833 Recto Avenue, Cagayan de Oro
City; VICTORIA N. FERNANDEZ is of legal age,
married to MARIO FERNANDEZ, Filipino and
residing at 832 Recto Avenue, Cagayan de Oro
City; RAMON B. NERI is of legal age, single,
Filipino and residing at 833 Recto Avenue,
Cagayan de Oro City; and MA. TERESA N.
YRASTORZA is of legal age, married to ALBERT
YRASTORZA, Filipino and residing at 833-Y Recto
Avenue, Cagayan de Oro City, hereby apply to
have the land hereinafter described brought under
the operation of the Land Registration Act, and to
have the title thereto registered and confirmed;
2. That the applicants are the owners in fee simple
of a certain parcel of land situated at Barrio
Indahag in the City of Cagayan de Oro, the said
land bounded and described on the plan and
technical description, attached hereto and made a
part hereof;
3. That said land at the last assessment for
taxation was assessed for ₱33,820.00;
4. That applicants do not know of any mortgage or
encumbrances affecting the said land, or that any
other person has any estate or interest therein
legal or equitable possession, remainder,
reversion or expectance;
5. That applicants obtained title on said property
by virtue of intestate succession from the late
GRACIANO A. NERI who died on December 20,
1971 in the City of Cagayan de Oro;
6. That applicants herein together with their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
public, peaceful, adverse, and continuous
possession in the concept of owners and have
been paying taxes thereon;
7. That the said land is legally occupied by the
following persons together with their families in the
concept of Tenants, namely:
a) PEDRO CABALUNA residing at
Indahag, Tibasak, Cagayan de Oro City
b) CERELO BADETAH residing at
Indahag, Tibasak, Cagayan de Oro City
8. That the names and addresses so far as known
to applicants of the owners of all land adjoining the
land above-mentioned are as follows:
a) JOSE F. MARFORI of Cagayan de
Oro City
b) INSULAR GOVERNMENT of the
PHILIPPINES
c) CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY (Cagayan
River)
9. This application is accompanied by the following
documents:
a) Tracing plan of the lot together with a
blue print copy thereof;
b) Technical description of the land;
c) Tax Declarations:
1. T.D. No. 1096
2. T.D. No. 22280
3. T.D. No. 10964
4. T.D. No. 81439
10. That by the application of Sections: 47, 48, 49,
50, and 51 of Com. Act 141 as amended by Rep.
Acts Nos. 107, 1942, 2061 and 2036, this
application is in order and the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court exist and can be exercised in
connection with this instant application.4
The applicants prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment
be rendered in their favor in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully
prayed that after due notice, the validity of the alleged title or
claim be inquired into and after due hearing an order be
issued directing the Land Registration Commission to issue
LTD, Original Registration Proceedings, Page 17
the corresponding decree over the said parcel of land so that
a Certificate of Title be issued in favor of the applicants
under the provisions of the Land Registration Act.
Prays for other relief in the premises.5
The applicants thereafter filed an amended application in the
same case on December 17, 1974. On January 27, 1975,
the Court, through the Land Registration Commission,
issued a notice of initial hearing addressed, among others, to
the Director of the Bureau of Lands, the Solicitor General,
and the Bureau of Forest Development.6 The notice was
published in the February 17 and 24, 1975 issues of the
Official Gazette. Copies thereof were sent by ordinary mail to
the persons named therein; the copies intended for the
Director of the Bureau of Lands and the Office of the Solicitor
General were sent by special messenger.7 The Solicitor
General and the Director of the Bureau of Lands failed to file
any opposition thereto.
On the designated time and date of the hearing, no
representative from the Office of the Solicitor General and
the Bureau of Lands appeared in court. The court granted
the motion of the applicants for an order of general default
"against the whole world," except those who filed their
opposition or appeared during the hearing. The court
thereafter issued an order allowing the applicants to adduce
evidence ex parte.
On February 5, 1976, the court rendered judgment granting
the application. The Office of the Solicitor General, as well as
the Director of the Bureau of Lands, failed to appeal the
same. Thus, the court issued Decree No. N-361749, on the
basis of which OCT No. 0662 was issued by the Register of
Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City on September 26, 1976.
On January 5, 1981, the Office of the Solicitor General, for
and in behalf of the petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
through the Director of the Bureau of Lands, filed with the
court a quo a complaint for annulment of OCT No. 0662 and
the reversion of the property covered by the said title against
herein respondents.8 The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 7514.
In its complaint, the petitioner alleged inter alia that it is the
true owner of a parcel of land of the public domain surveyed
as Lot No. 2821 (subject lot) containing an area of 1,055,684
square meters or 105.5684 hectares situated in Cagayan de
Oro City.9 The petitioner also alleged that the Bureau of
Forest and Development had classified the subject lot as
alienable and disposable; as such, it was under the direct
executive control, administration and disposition of the
Director of the Bureau of Lands. Despite the fact that the
Solicitor General and the Director of the Bureau of Lands
were not served copies of the respondents’ application for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title in LRC Case No. N-
531, in violation of Section 51 of Commonwealth Act No.
141, the said case was set for initial hearing on June 18,
1975. The petitioner also averred that although the survey
plan of the subject lot, Plan (LRC) SWO-150, was processed
and approved by the Land Registration Commission, it was
not submitted to the Director of the Bureau of Lands for re-
verification and approval as required by Sections 2 and 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 239. As such, according to the
petitioner, the court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the
property.
The petitioner prayed that after due proceedings, judgment
be rendered nullifying the proceedings in LRC No. N-531, as
well as the court’s decision therein, for lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the petitioner as well as the property
subject matter of the case. According to the petitioner, this is
in view of the court’s failure to comply with Section 51 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, which mandates that a copy of
an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
should be duly served on the Director of the Bureau of
Lands; and the private respondents’ failure to comply with
Sections 2 and 3 of P.D. No. 239, which requires the plan to
be re-verified and approved by the Director of the Bureau of
Lands, in this case, Plan (LRC) SWO-150. The petitioner
prayed OCT No. 0662 issued in favor of the private
respondents be declared null and void.
In their answer, the private respondents averred that the
subject lot had been theirs and their predecessors’ private
and exclusive property for more than fifty years, and that
OCT No. 0662 covering the same was issued in their favor
on September 20, 1976. The private respondents contended
that the duty to comply with the requirement under Section
51 of CA No. 141, that the Solicitor General through the
Director of the Bureau of Lands be served a copy of the
application for the judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title, devolved upon the clerk of court of the land
registration court. They also averred that a report on the pre-
verification and approval of Plan (LRC) SWO-150 had been
forwarded by the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands to
the Director of the Bureau of Lands. Moreover, Plan (LRC)
SWO-150 covering the subject lot had been duly processed
and approved by the Land Registration Commission.
According to the respondents, even if there were deficiencies
on the part of the administrative officials in complying with
the procedures relative to land registration, the same was
not jurisdictional, but merely a procedural flaw. As such, the
failure of the Bureau of Lands and the Land Registration
Commission to comply with the law did not result in nullifying
the proceedings in LRC Case No. N-531. Finally, the
respondents countered, the action of the petitioner had long
since prescribed.
In its reply, the petitioner alleged that Plan (LRC) SWO-150
was never submitted, much less approved, to the Director of
the Bureau of Lands. The report required by Section 2 of
P.D. No. 239 is one which the Director of the Bureau of
Lands actually submitted to the court. The petitioner alleged
that no such report was submitted in this case.
On October 16, 1976, the private respondents filed a motion
in LRC Case No. N-531 for the issuance of a writ of
possession and the demolition of the houses of the
occupants. The court granted the motion. The Director of the
Bureau of Lands, likewise, prayed for the suspension of the
enforcement of the writ pending final resolution of Civil Case
No. 7514. The court refused to suspend the enforcement of
its decision.
On November 19, 1981, the Republic of the Philippines,
through the Director of the Bureau of Lands, filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with this Court, docketed as
G.R. No. 58823, with the following prayer:
1. Declaring as null and void the decision rendered
by the court in Land Registration Case as plan
(LRC) Swo-150, Cagayan de Oro City, in favor of
the private defendants;
2. Declaring as null and void the corresponding
Decree No. N-361749 and Original Certificate of
Title No. 0662 issued by the same court in favor of
the private defendants;
3. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de
Oro City to cancel Original Certificate of Title No.
0662 issued in the name of the private defendants;
4. Ordering the reversion of the land covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 0662 to the State
and declaring the same as owned and belonging
to the latter; and
5. Awarding such further reliefs and remedies as
may be just and equitable in the premises.10
On March 18, 1985, this Court rendered a decision
dismissing the petition without prejudice to the outcome of
the petitioner’s action against the private respondents in Civil
Case No. 7514. The decision of the Court became final and
executory.
On July 17, 1985, Leonel Valdehuesa and 22 others filed a
motion for leave to intervene, and alleged, as follows: (a)
They were members of the Cagayan de Oro Green
Revolution Movement Association (COGREMA); (b) They
had been occupying the property even before 1969 and
commenced working extensive improvements thereon in
1969; (c) They filed a petition with the Presidential Action
Committee on Land Problems (PACLAP) in 1973, and
sought the subdivision of the property and the distribution of
the lots to the occupants thereof; and, (d) As occupants, they
were never informed of Graciano Neri’s application in LRC
Case No. N-531. The intervenors prayed that OCT No. 0662
be nullified.
In an Order dated September 6, 1985, the court a quo
dismissed the complaint and the complaint-in-intervention for
lack of jurisdiction to annul the judgment of the CFI in LRC
No. N-531, in view of the promulgation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129. However, on petition for certiorari filed by the
LTD, Original Registration Proceedings, Page 18
petitioner, docketed as G.R. No. 72218, this Court, in its
Resolution dated July 21, 1986, set aside the said order and
directed the court a quo to proceed with the hearing of the
case.11
In the meantime, the court issued an Order on April 6, 1988
denying the said motion for leave to intervene. The court
later denied the motion for the reconsideration of the said
order. Thereafter, Undersecretary and Officer-in-Charge of
the Bureau of Lands Rolleo Ignacio executed a Special
Power of Attorney authorizing Atty. Vicente Seriña of the
Office of the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands to
represent the petitioner during the pre-trial.12
During the hearing of March 27, 1989, the parties agreed to
forego a full-blown trial and to instead file their respective
"Memorandum of Authority" and to submit evidence in
support of their respective contentions. The court issued an
order on the said date, giving the parties thirty days to submit
their respective memoranda and evidence.
The petitioner submitted its memorandum, appending
thereto the documents marked respectively as follows:
1) Exhibit A – The Certification made by the
Officer-in-Charge of the Regional Director’s Office
for Forestry that the property had been certified on
September 3, 1973 as alienable and disposable.13
2) Exhibit B – The letter of the representatives of
the Philippine Constabulary Provincial
Commander and those of the Bureau of Lands,
Bureau of Forest Development, and Department of
Agrarian Reform to the Provincial Commander that
there were 73 bona fide tillers on the property
seeking to have the property subdivided and
distributed to them.14
3) Exhibit C – The Letter dated October 3, 1977
from the Chief, Regional Director of the Bureau of
Lands directing the District Land Officer of
Cagayan de Oro to submit a report within two days
from notice thereof on the letter of the occupants
requesting for the subdivision of the property, viz.:
Considering the urgency of the case, you are
hereby directed to submit the report within five (5)
days from receipt hereof. In your report you should
state whether the copy of the petition for
registration was received by that Office
considering that the case has come into your
knowledge and if so, the date of its receipt thereof,
and why the same has not been forwarded to us
immediately. You should also secure a certification
from the District Forest Office regarding the date of
release of the area from the forest zone, as it
appears that the land was only released on
September 13, 1973. This information is
necessary to determine whether the applicant has
acquired a registerable title to the land.15
4) Exhibit D – The Report dated July 15, 1975 of
the Chief Surveyor of the Land Registration
Commission and Acting Chief, Division of Original
Registration of the Land Registration Commission
to the Court in LRC Case No. N-531. Thus:
That a certain parcel of land described
on plan LRC Swo-1507, Lot 2821,
Cagayan Cadastre 237, Case 1, is
applied for registration of title in the
above-entitled land registration case;
That upon verification of our Record of
Cadastral Lots, Book No. 64, under Cad.
Court Case No. 17, LRC (GLRO)
Cadastral Record No. 1561, Cagayan
Cadastre, Province of Misamis Oriental,
it was found that said Lot 2821 is subject
of the following annotations, to quote:
"Lot 2821 (129-1) Pte. de Subd. Parte
Public Land."
That it is gleaned from the aforequoted
annotations that a decision has been
rendered for said Lot 2821 in cadastral
proceedings under Cad. Court Case No.
17, LRC (GLRO) Cadastral Record No.
1561, Cagayan Cadastre, Province of
Misamis Oriental, but no decree of
registration has been issued for said lot
pursuant to the decision rendered in the
aforementioned cadastral case. Copy,
however, of said decision is not among
our salvaged records. It likewise
appears in the above annotations that
Lot 2821 is pending subdivision and that
portion of the same was declared public
land;
That it is further informed that this
Commission is not in a position to verify
whether the land described on plan
Swo-1507, Lot 2821, Cagayan Cadastre
237, Case 1, subject of this application
for registration is already covered by a
patent previously issued or within the
forest zone.16
5) Exhibit E – The application in LRC Case No. N-
531.17
6) Exhibit F – Photographs showing the Taguanao
District Elementary School which stood on a
portion of the subject property, to prove that more
than 300 hundred families resided on the property
and that its occupants had made extensive
improvements thereon.
For their part, the private respondents appended to their
memorandum documentary evidence marked as follows:
Exhibit Brief Description
No.
1 Tax Declaration No. 10994 covering 1948 Lot 2821-C-1 with
101.5618
2 to 2- Tax receipts over lots from 193819
G
3 Letter of Commissioner of Land Registration to the Court da
October 31, 1974 acknowledging receipts of the duplicate re
the application and its answer in LRC Case No. N-53120
4 Notice of Initial Hearing in LRC Case No. N-531 dated Janu
197521
5 Certificate of Publication from Land Registration Commissio
March 24, 197522
6 Letter of Land Registration Commission to counsel of applic
March 12, 197523
7 Report of Land Registration Commission24
8 Letter of the Geodetic Engineer dated July 20, 1973, to the
respondents25
9 Letter of the Administrative Assistant of the District Lands O
Bureau of Lands through the District Land Office dated June
On January 31, 1995, the court rendered judgment
dismissing the complaint on the ground that the petitioner
failed to prove the factual averments therein. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the above, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the defendants and against the Republic
of the Philippines:
1. Dismissing the complaint in the above-entitled
case and no pronouncement will be made on the
civil aspect herein as the answer did not claim any
damages, etc.;
2. Declaring as valid and legal all the proceedings
taken by the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Oriental, Branch 1, regarding OCT No. 0662;
3. Upholding the validity and indefeasibility of
Original Certificate of Title No. 0662 issued on
September 20, 1976 involved herein;
LTD, Original Registration Proceedings, Page 19

4. Declaring the order for issuance of a decree to
issue Original Certificate of Title No. 0662 as valid
and lawful; and
5. Costs against plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.26
The trial court declared that the requisite copies of the notice
of initial hearing had been transmitted to the Office of the
Solicitor General and the Bureau of Lands as confirmed by
Josefina Bacarusso, the incumbent Branch Clerk of Court
when LRC Case No. N-531 was being heard. The court
further stated that the petitioner failed to adduce at least
prima facie evidence to prove the material allegations of the
complaint. The presumption, then, the trial court declared,
was that the personnel of Branch 1 of the CFI and the
officers of the Bureau of Lands performed their duties in
accordance with law, there being no evidence to the
contrary. The court even noted the fact that the petitioner,
through counsel, agreed to dispense with the trial and to
submit the case for decision after the submission of the
parties’ respective memoranda and documentary evidence.
The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals contending
that:
of Lands. They averred, however, that the same was merely
a procedural defect.29
On April 29, 1999, the CA rendered a decision affirming the
ruling of the CFI holding that: (a) the petitioner failed to prove
the material allegations of its complaint; and, (b) the
personnel of the CFI and the Land Registration Commission
are presumed to have performed their duties as the law
mandated.30 The CA denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of the said decision.
The petitioner filed its petition for review on certiorari praying
that the court resolve the following issues:
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS, IN AFFIRMING THE APPEALED
JUDGMENT DATED JANUARY 31, 1995,
COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL
OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER AND THE
PARTIES IN LAND REGISTRATION CASE NO.
531, COURT (SIC) ON THE BASIS OF THE
DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY
OF PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL ACTS
(SECTION 3[m], Rule 131 OF THE RULES OF
COURT).

I. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN

RELYING SOLELY ON PRESUMPTIONS AS THE
BASIS OF ITS DECISION.
II. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
RENDERING A DECISION WITHOUT HOLDING
A TRIAL AND GIVING AN OPPORTUNITY TO
APPELLANT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE.27
The Office of the Solicitor General alleged that the trial court
acted arbitrarily when it rendered judgment based on the
pleadings notwithstanding the following factual issues that
were raised by the parties:
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR WHEN
IT AFFIRMED THE APPEALED JUDGMENT
DATED JANUARY 31, 1995
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IT WAS RENDERED
WITHOUT A TRIAL.31
In their comment on the petition, the private respondents
assert that the issues raised by the petitioner pertain merely
to factual matters and not to questions of law. Furthermore,
as shown by the records of Branch 1 of the CFI in LRC Case
No. N-531, the petitioner received a copy of the application,
the amended application, as well as the notice of the initial
hearing of the case.

FACTUAL APPELLANT’S APPELLEES’ The threshold issues for resolution are as follows: (a)
ISSUES POSITION POSITION whether or not the Court may review the decision of the
appellate court on the issues raised herein; (b) whether the
1. Service of No compliance The Clerk of RTC erred in rendering the decision without a full-blown trial,
copy of Court based solely on the pleadings of the parties and the
application complied or is documents appended to their memorandum; and (c) whether
and its supposed to the decision of the trial court was made in accordance with
annexes to comply law.
the Director therewith
of Lands
On the first issue, the rule is that only questions of law may
2. Service of No compliance The Clerk of be reviewed in this Court on a petition for review on certiorari
copy of Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, it has also
application complied or is been held that the finding of facts of the appellate court may
and its supposed to be questioned in this Court, where as in this case, the latter’s
annexes to comply judgment is based on a misapprehension of the facts, or
the Solicitor therewith such findings are contrary to the admissions of the parties, or
General when certain relevant facts are overlooked, which, if property
considered, would justify a different conclusion.32
3. No compliance The survey
Submission plan has been
In this case, the petitioner avers that the trial court erred
of the survey duly
when it rendered a decision without conducting a full-blown
plan to the processed
trial, and based its ruling merely on the pleadings of the
Director of and approved
parties and the documents appended to their respective
Lands for by the Land
memoranda. The petitioner asserts that under Rule 34 of the
reverification Registration
Rules of Court, the court may render judgment on the
and approval Commission
pleadings only when the respondents’ answer fails to tender
an issue or otherwise admits the material allegations of the
4. No compliance A Report has
adverse party’s pleadings. Furthermore, it was not proper for
Submission been made to
the trial court to render summary judgment under Rule 35 of
of the report the Director of
the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that the private
by the Lands, Manila
respondents, in their answer, tendered genuine issues of fact
Director of by the
which called for the presentation of evidence.
Lands Regional
Office of the
Bureau of We do not agree with the petitioner. The trial court dispensed
Lands in with a full-blown trial because, precisely, the parties
Cagayan de themselves agreed thereto, on the claim that the issues
Oro28 raised may be resolved on the basis of the pleadings, the
memoranda and the appended documents, without need of
presenting witnesses thereon. A party may waive its right to
The Office of the Solicitor General contends that the trial present testimonial evidence and opt to adduce documentary
court should have conducted a full-blown trial instead of evidence and thereafter, submit the case for resolution
allowing the parties to forego with the same. The private based solely on their pleadings and documentary evidence.
respondents, for their part, admitted that the Land In this case, no less than the petitioner, represented by the
Registration Commission’s survey plan had not been re- Office of the Solicitor General through Special Attorney
evaluated much less approved, by the Director of the Bureau Vicente Seriña, agreed to dispense with a full-blown trial.
LTD, Original Registration Proceedings, Page 20
On the second issue, we agree with the petitioner that the
trial court erred in rendering judgment in favor of the private
respondents and that the CA committed a reversible error in
affirming the same.
The CA ruled that the petitioner was burdened to prove that
the issuance of OCT-0662 was marred by irregularities. It
further held that a title issued under the torrens system of
registration is presumed valid, and unless and until the
petitioner adduced competent and strong evidence to prove
otherwise, government officials such as the personnel of the
CFI and the Land Registration Commission and the Director
of the Bureau of Lands are presumed to have performed
their duties in accordance with law. According to the CA, the
petitioner failed to adduce such evidence. The appellate
court took note that the private respondents even appended
documentary evidence to their memorandum showing
compliance with the statutory requirement.
For its part, the petitioner contends that as defendants in the
trial court, it was the burden of the private respondents to
prove the existence of a fact – that the land registration court
had acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
petition and over the persons of the respondent therein;
conversely, the private respondents, as applicants therein,
were obliged to adduce in evidence the survey plan
approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands as required
by P.D. Nos. 239 and 1529. According to the petitioner, there
is no presumption in favor of the jurisdiction of a court of
limited jurisdiction, such as a land registration court. It
contends that where the jurisdiction of a court depends upon
the existence of facts, it has no right or power to proceed or
act upon a pleading which does not substantially set forth
such facts.
We find for the petitioner. As applicants in LRC Case No. N-
531, the private respondents had the burden of complying
with the statutory requirement of serving the Director of the
Bureau of Lands with a copy of their application and
amended application, and to show proof of their compliance
thereon. However, we also agree with the CA that it was the
burden of the petitioner in the trial court to prove the material
allegations of its complaint. This is provided in Section 1,
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court which reads:
Burden of proof. – Burden of proof is the duty of a party to
present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish
his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by
law.
Obviously, the burden of proof is, in the first instance, with
the plaintiff who initiated the action. But in the final analysis,
the party upon whom the ultimate burden lies is to be
determined by the pleadings, not by who is the plaintiff or the
defendant. The test for determining where the burden of
proof lies is to ask which party to an action or suit will fail if
he offers no evidence competent to show the facts averred
as the basis for the relief he seeks to obtain,33 and based on
the result of an inquiry, which party would be successful if he
offers no evidence.34
In ordinary civil cases, the plaintiff has the burden of proving
the material allegations of the complaint which are denied by
the defendant, and the defendant has the burden of proving
the material allegations in his case where he sets up a new
matter. All facts in issue and relevant facts must, as a
general rule, be proven by evidence except the following:
(1) Allegations contained in the complaint or
answer immaterial to the issues.
(2) Facts which are admitted or which are not
denied in the answer, provided they have been
sufficiently alleged.
(3) Those which are the subject of an agreed
statement of facts between the parties; as well as
those admitted by the party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case.
(4) Facts which are the subject of judicial notice.
(5) Facts which are legally presumed.
(6) Facts peculiarly within the knowledge of the
opposite party.35
The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to
create the need of presenting evidence to overcome the
prima facie case created thereby which if no proof to the
contrary is offered will prevail; it does not shift the burden of
proof.36 In this case, the personnel of the Land Registration
Commission and the CFI in LRC Case No. N-531 are
presumed to have performed their duty of serving a copy of
the application and its appendages to the petitioner. It was
thus the burden of the petitioner to prove that: (a) it was not
served with a copy of the application of the private
respondents and its annexes; (b) the private respondents
failed to append to their application the survey plan of Lot
No. 2821, duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of
Lands as required by P.D. Nos. 1529 and 239. Unless the
same were admitted by the respondents, the petitioner
should have adduced in evidence the relevant portions of the
records of LRC Case No. N-531, including the decision of
the trial court, to prove that the Director of the Bureau of
Lands was not served with a copy of the application and the
amended application.37
Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides as
follows:
SEC. 13. Proof of service. – Proof of personal service shall
consist of a written admission of the party served, or the
official return of the server, or the affidavit of the party
serving, containing a full statement of the date, place and
manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof
thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of
facts showing compliance with section 7 of this Rule. If
service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by
such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing
office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately
upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the
unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy of
the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee.
Such proof of service should be found in the records of the
case in which the application/amended application was filed,
in this case, LRC Case No. N-531. The same records will
also show whether or not the private respondents appended
the survey plan duly approved by the Director of the Bureau
of Lands to their application, as mandated by P.D. Nos. 1529
and 239, and whether the private respondents adduced the
said plan in evidence.
The petitioner should have moved for the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum for the Clerk of Court of Branch 1 of
the RTC to bring to the court the records of LRC Case No.
N-531 to prove the material allegations of its complaint. The
petitioner did not.
The question that comes to fore then is whether or not the
petitioner was burdened to prove its allegation that the
Director of the Bureau of Lands had approved Plan (LRC)
SWO-150. The answer to the question is dependent on the
resolution of the issue of whether or not the private
respondents admitted the same, impliedly or expressly, in
their answer to the complaint and in their pleadings.
A careful perusal of the records reveals that in paragraph 8
of its complaint, the petitioner alleged that the survey plan,
Plan (LRC) SWO-150 was not submitted to the Director of
the Bureau of Lands for re-verification and approval as
required by law, notwithstanding which the trial court
rendered judgment in favor of the applicants. Hence, the
petitioner concluded, the said plan is void:
8. That the survey plan of the land applied for in said
registration case, plan (LRC) SWO-150, is a plan processed
and approved by the Land Registration Commission, but the
same plan was not submitted to the Director of Lands for re-
verification and approval as required by the provision of
Section 2, Presidential Decree No. 239, series of 1973.
Hence, the plan (LRC) Swo-150 submitted with the
application should be considered as void and non-existing.
Furthermore, on February 5, 1976, the said land registration
court, after receiving the evidence of the applicants ex parte,
rendered its decision in the land registration case without
requiring the Director of Lands to submit his report as
required by the provision of Section 3 of the same
Presidential Decree No. 239;38
In paragraph 4 of their answer to the complaint, the private
respondents denied the foregoing allegation in paragraph 8,
but alleged as follows:
LTD, Original Registration Proceedings, Page 21

4. That defendants DENY the allegations in paragraph 8 of
the Complaint, the truth of the matter being that the survey
plan has been duly processed and approved by the Land
Registration Commission. As regards the Report required by
the provisions of Section 3 of PD 239, the records show that
a Report has been made to the Director of Lands, Manila, by
the Regional Office of the Bureau of Lands in Cagayan de
Oro City. Moreover, the deficiencies of the administrative
officials of the government in following procedures or rules
and implementing circulars relative to land registration
cases, if any, is not a ground for voiding the title already
issued since the defect, if any, is not jurisdictional but merely
procedural in nature. Besides, the fault or omission, if any, is
that of the Land Registration Commission and the Director of
Lands and not that of the defendants;39
The private respondents failed to specifically deny the
petitioner’s averment in its complaint that LRC Plan SWO-
150 had not been approved by the Director of the Bureau of
Lands. The private respondents thereby impliedly admitted
that the Director of the Bureau of Lands had not approved
any survey plan as required by Sections 2 and 3 of P.D. No.
239.40
In light of the private respondents’ admission, the petitioner
was relieved of its burden of still proving that the Director of
the Bureau of Lands had not approved any survey plan of
Lot 2821 before the trial court rendered its decision.
We reject the contention of the private respondents that the
reevaluation and approval of the Director of the Bureau of
Lands of the survey plan are not mandatory requirements
and that the lack thereof did not render Original Certificate of
Title No. 0662 void. Case law has it that it is not the function
of the Land Registration Commission to approve original
plans.41 The duty devolved upon the Director of the Bureau
of Lands, as mandated by Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529.
Applicants for land registration are required to append a
survey plan to their application, duly approved by the Bureau
of Lands, thus:
Sec. 17. What and where to file. – The application for land
registration shall be filed with the Court of First Instance of
the province or city where the land is situated. The applicant
shall file together with the application all original muniments
of titles or copies thereof and a survey plan approved by the
Bureau of Lands.
The submission of the plan approved by the Director of the
Bureau of Lands is a statutory requirement which is
mandatory in nature. The plan approved by the Land
Registration Commission is of no value.42 It behooved the
trial court not to take cognizance of any application for land
registration in the absence of a survey plan duly approved by
the Director of the Bureau of Lands appended thereto. The
private respondents admitted that the Director of the Bureau
of Lands had not approved any survey plan for Lot No. 2821.
Consequently, the title issued by the Register of Deeds in
favor of the private respondents is null and void. Such title
cannot ripen into private ownership. As we held in a recent
case:43
No plan or survey may be admitted in land registration
proceedings until approved by the Director of Lands. The
submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of
mandatory character. Unless a plan and its technical
description are duly approved by the Director of Lands, the
same are of no value.
Thus, the allegation that the signature approval for the
survey plan was nowhere to be found is an important
jurisdictional fact that must be ventilated before the trial
court. In Republic vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, this
Court stated that "void ab initio land titles issued cannot
ripen into private ownership." Thus, as OCT No. 17 is void
and Segundina traces her rights to OCT No. 17, her claim
would have no basis as a spring cannot rise higher than its
source.
approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands to their
application.44
The records show that on October 3, 1977, or after the CFI
had rendered judgment in LRC Case No. N-531, the
Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands directed the District
Land Officer to report if the applicants in LRC Case No. N-
531 had already furnished a copy to his office and, if so, to
explain why the same had not been forwarded to the
Regional Office.45 In fine, as of October 3, 1977, the copy of
the application of the private respondents in LRC No. N-531
had not been forwarded to the Regional Office of the Bureau
of Lands. Indeed, it appears, based on the evidence of the
parties, that the trial court even ignored the Report of the
Land Registration Commission dated July 15, 1975 in LRC
Case No. N-531 requiring the Directors of the Bureau of
Lands and Forestry to submit a status report of Lot No. 2821
before setting the case for hearing:
WHEREFORE, this matter is brought to the attention of this
Honorable Court for its information and guidance in the
disposition of the instant land registration case. Further, to
avoid duplication in the issuance of titles covering the same
parcel of land and the issuance of titles for lands within the
forest zone which have not been released and classified as
alienable, it is respectfully recommended that the Director of
Lands and the Director of Forestry, respectively, be required
to submit a report on the status of the land applied for,
before the hearing of the case, to determine whether said
land or any portion thereof is comprised in any patent or
forest zone.46
In recapitulation, then, the CFI committed a reversible error
in dismissing the petitioner’s complaint and in not rendering
judgment in favor of the petitioner. In turn, the Court of
Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the CFI.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming the Decision of the Court of First
Instance in Civil Case No. 7514 is SET ASIDE AND
REVERSED. The Decision of the Court of First Instance
appealed from is also SET ASIDE AND REVERSED. The
Court hereby nullifies Original Certificate of Title No. 6662
under the names of the private respondents and orders the
reversion of the property covered by the said title to the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, (Acting Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and
Tinga, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., (Chairman), on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus -
CARPIO,
LEONAR
PERALTA
ZENAIDA GUINTO-ALDANA, in her own behalf as Attorney-in- ABAD, an
fact of MA. AURORA GUINTO-COMISO, MA. LUISA MENDOZ
GUINTO-DIONISIO, ALFREDO GUINTO, JR., PACITA R.
GUINTO, ERNESTO R. GUINTO, NATIVIDAD R. GUINTO
and ALBERTO R. GUINTO,
Respondents.
Promulga
Augu

We also reject the private respondents’ submission that they

should not be faulted for the failure of the Director of the
Bureau of Lands to act on and resolve the recommendation
of its Regional Director. The private respondents were
mandated to comply with the requirements of P.D. No. 1529 x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
with fealty before they filed their application for judicial --------x
confirmation of imperfect title in the court a quo.

Parenthetically, the evidence of the petitioner shows that the DECISION

private respondents failed to append a survey plan duly
LTD, Original Registration Proceedings, Page 22

PERALTA, J.: involving the subject property which, however, had been dismissed

In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the without prejudice.[15]

Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor

General, assails the March 30, 2006 Decision [1]and the November The trial court found the application to be sufficient in

20, 2006 Resolution,[2] both of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV form and substance; hence, it gave due course thereto and ordered

No. 80500. The assailed decision reversed and set aside the July 10, compliance with the publication and notification requirements of the

2003 judgment[3]of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, law.[16]

Branch 199 in LRC Case No. 02-0036, one for original registration

of title, whereas the assailed Resolution denied reconsideration. Opposing the application, petitioner, through the Office

of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City, advanced that the lots sought

The facts follow. to be registered were inalienable lands of the public domain; that

neither respondents nor their predecessors-in-interest had been in

On April 3, 2002, respondents Zenaida Guinto-Aldana[4] (Zenaida), prior possession thereof; and that the muniment of title and the tax

Ma. Aurora Guinto-Comiso, Ma. Luisa Guinto-Dionisio, Alfredo declaration submitted to the court did not constitute competent and

Guinto, Jr., Pacita R. Guinto, Ernesto R. Guinto, Natividad R. sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition or of prior possession in

Guinto and Alberto R. Guinto, filed with the Regional Trial Court the concept of owner.[17]

(RTC) of Las Pias City, Branch 199 an Application for Registration

of Title[5] over two pieces of land in Talango, Pamplona Uno, Las At the hearing, Zenaida identified her herein co-

Pias City. These lands, identified as Lot No. 4 and Lot No. 5 in respondents to be her siblings, nephews and nieces. She likewise

Conversion Consolidation Subdivision Plan Ccs-007601-000040- identified the adjoining lot owners named in the application and the

D,[6] measure 1,509 square meters and 4,640 square meters, supporting documents attached to the application as well. She
[7]
respectively. Respondents professed themselves to be co-owners testified that the subject lots had been surveyed at the instance of her

of these lots, having acquired them by succession from their family sometime between 1994 and 1995, and that said survey was

predecessors Sergio Guinto (Sergio) and Lucia Rivera-Guinto documented in Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D and in the geodetic

(Lucia)Zenaidas parentswho, in turn, had acquired the property engineers technical description of the lots. She implied that they did

under a 1969 document denominated as Kasulatan sa Paghahati ng obtain the original tracing cloth plan of the property, but it was

Lupa na Labas sa Hukuman na may Pagpaparaya at Bilihan. Under forwarded to the Land Registration Authority (LRA) by the Las Pias

this document, Sergio and Lucia Guinto acquired for a consideration RTC in connection with the proceedings in LRC Case No. LP-

the respective shares on the property of Pastor Guinto, Dionisio 128. Notwithstanding this admission, and without objection from

Guinto, Potenciana Guinto and Marcelina Bernardo who, together the oppositor, the blueprint of Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D and the

with Luisa, had derived the same from Romulado technical description of the property were provisionally marked in
[8]
Guinto. Respondents also alleged that until the time of the evidence.[18]

application, they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in

actual, open, peaceful, adverse, exclusive and continuous possession Furthermore, Zenaida61 years old at the time of her

of these lots in the concept of owner and that they had consistently testimonydeclared that she has known that the subject lots were

declared the property in their name for purposes of real estate owned by her family since she was 5 years old and from her earliest

taxation.[9] recollection, she narrated that her grandparents had lived in the

subject lots until the death of her grandmother in 1961. She implied

In support of their application, respondents submitted to that aside from her predecessors there were other persons, caretakers
[10]
the court the blueprint of Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D, as well as supposedly, who had tilled the land and who had lived until

copies of the technical descriptions of each lot,[11] a certification sometime between 1980 and 1990. She remembered her
[12]
from the geodetic engineer and the pertinent tax grandmother having constructed a house on the property, but the

declarations,[13] together with the receipts of payment same had already been destroyed. Also, sometime in 1970, her
[14]
therefor. Expressly, they averred that the propertys original family built an adobe fence around the perimeter of the lots and later,

tracing cloth plan had previously been submitted to the RTC of Las in the 1990s, they reinforced it with hollow blocks and concrete after

Pias City, Branch 255 (Las Pias RTC) in connection with the an inundation caused by the flood.[19] She claimed that she and her

proceedings in LRC Case No. LP-128a previous registration case father, Sergio, had been religious in the payment of real estate taxes

as shown by the tax declarations and tax receipts which she

LTD, Original Registration Proceedings, Page 23

submitted to the court and which, following identification, were of the property sought to be registered is a mandatory requirement
[20]
forthwith marked in evidence. in registration proceedings in order to establish the exact identity of

the property. While respondents admitted that the original tracing

Zenaidas claim of prior, open, exclusive and continuous cloth plan of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 in this case was in the custody of the

possession of the land was corroborated by Josefina Luna (Josefina), LRA as a consequence of their first attempt to have the property

one of the adjoining lot owners. Josefina, then 73 years old, strongly registered, petitioner, invoking Del Rosario v. Republic of the

declared that the subject lots were owned by Zenaidas parents, Philippines,[27] believes that respondents, on that score alone, are not

Sergio Guinto and Lucia Rivera, since she reached the age of relieved of their procedural obligation to adduce in evidence the

understanding, and that she had not come to know of any instance original copy of the plan, because they could have easily retrieved it

where a third party had placed a claim on the property. When asked from the LRA and presented it in court.[28]

whether there was anyone residing in the property and whether there

were improvements made thereon, she said there was no one Furthermore, petitioner suggests that the blueprint of the

residing therein and that there was nothing standing thereon except subdivision plan submitted by respondents cannot approximate
[21]
for a nipa hut. substantial compliance with the requirement of Section 17 of P.D.

No. 1529. Again, relying on the aforementioned Del Rosario case,

At the close of Josefinas testimony, respondents formally offered petitioner observes that the blueprint in this case, allegedly illegible

their exhibits without the oppositor placing any objection and unreadable, does not even bear the certification of the Lands
[22]
thereto. After weighing the evidence, the trial court, on July 10, Management Bureau.[29] Lastly, petitioner attacks respondents claim

2003, rendered its Decision denying the application for of prior possession. It notes that there is no clear and convincing

registration. It found that respondents were unable to establish with evidence that respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have

certainty the identity of the lots applied for registration, because of been in open, continuous, adverse, public and exclusive possession

failure to submit to the court the original tracing cloth plan as of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 for 30 years.[30]

mandated by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. It likewise noted

Commenting on the petition, respondents observe that
that the fact of adverse, continuous, open, public and peaceful
petitioners arguments are mere reiterative theses on the issues that
possession in the concept of owner has not been proved by the
have already been addressed by the Court of Appeals in the assailed
evidence as Zenaidas and Josefinas respective testimonies did not
Decision and Resolution, and that there are no new matters raised
establish the nature of the possession of respondents
which have not yet been previously passed upon. Accordingly, they
predecessors.[23] The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
prayed that the petition be denied.[31]

WHEREFORE, for failure of the

applicants to comply with the requirements of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, the We find the petition to be unmeritorious.
Application for Original Registration of Title
is hereby DENIED.

ORDERED.[24] Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as The

Property Registration Decree of 1978, materially provides:

Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals Section 17. What and where to
file.The application for land registration shall
which, on March 30, 2006, issued the assailed Decision reversing be filed with the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where the land is situated.
the trial court as follows: The applicant shall file, together with the
WHEREFORE, premises application, all original muniments of titles or
considered, the assailed decision is hereby copies thereof and a survey plan of the land
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, approved by the Bureau of Lands.
the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED.
The clerk of court shall not accept
SO ORDERED.[25] any application unless it is shown that the
applicant has furnished the Director of Lands
with a copy of the application and all
annexes.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was

denied.[26] Hence, it filed the instant petition which attributes error

The provision denotes that it is imperative in an
to the Court of Appeals in reversing the trial courts July 10, 2003
application for original registration that the applicant submit to the
decision.
court, aside from the original or duplicate copies of the muniments

of title, a copy of a duly approved survey plan of the land sought to

Petitioner principally posits that under Section 17 of P.D.
be registered. The survey plan is indispensable as it provides a
No. 1529, the submission in court of the original tracing cloth plan
LTD, Original Registration Proceedings, Page 24

reference on the exact identity of the property. This begs the Lands (now the Lands Management Services of the Department of

question in the instant case: Does the blueprint copy of the survey Environment and Natural Resources [DENR]), blueprint copies and

plan suffice for compliance with the requirement? In not so many other evidence could also provide sufficient
[32]
cases, it was held that the non-submission, for any reason, of the identification. Pertinently, the Court

original tracing cloth plan is fatal to the registration application, in Hubilla, citing Recto, pronounced:

since the same is mandatory in original registration of title. For

While the petitioner correctly
instance, in the Del Rosario case relied on by petitioner, the Court asserts that the submission in evidence of the
original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by
ruled that the submission of the original copy of the duly approved the Bureau of Lands, is a mandatory
requirement, this Court has recognized
tracing cloth plan is a mandatory condition for land registration as it instances of substantial compliance with this
rule. In previous cases, this Court ruled that
supplies the means by which to determine the exact metes and blueprint copies of the original tracing cloth
plan from the Bureau of Lands and other
bounds of the property. The applicant in that case was unable to evidence could also provide sufficient
identification to identify a piece of land for
submit the original tracing cloth plan of the land he was claiming registration purposes. x x x[37]
because apparently, as in the present case, it was previously

transmitted by the clerk of court to the LRA. Yet the Court, deeming
In the case at bar, we find that the submission of the
it the applicants obligation to retrieve the plan himself and present it
blueprint of Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D, together with the technical
in evidence, denied the application, to wit:
description of the property, operates as substantial compliance with
The submission in evidence of the
original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the legal requirement of ascertaining the identity of Lot Nos. 4 and
the Bureau of Lands, in cases for application
of original registration of land is a mandatory 5 applied for registration. The blueprint, which is shown to have
requirement.The reason for this rule is to
establish the true identity of the land to ensure been duly executed by Geodetic Engineer Rolando Roxas (Roxas),
that it does not overlap a parcel of land or a
portion thereof already covered by a previous attached to the application and subsequently identified, marked, and
land registration, and to forestall the
possibility that it will be overlapped by a offered in evidence, shows that it proceeded officially from the
subsequent registration of any adjoining
land. The failure to comply with this Lands Management Services and, in fact, bears the approval of
requirement is fatal to petitioners application
for registration. Surveys Division Chief Ernesto Erive. It also shows on its face that

Petitioner contends, however, that the survey of the property was endorsed by the Community
he had submitted the original tracing cloth
plan to the branch clerk of court, but the latter Environment and Natural Resources Office of the DENR. [38] This,
submitted the same to the LRA. This claim
has no merit. Petitioner is duty bound to compounded by the accompanying technical description of Lot Nos.
retrieve the tracing cloth plan from the LRA
and to present it in evidence in the trial 4 and 5 duly executed and verified also by Roxas,[39] should
court. x x x[33]
substantially supply as it did the means by which the identity of Lot

Nos. 4 and 5 may be ascertained.

Yet if the reason for requiring an applicant to adduce in

evidence the original tracing cloth plan is merely to provide a Verily, no error can be attributed to the Court of Appeals

convenient and necessary means to afford certainty as to the exact when it ruled that respondents were able to approximate compliance

identity of the property applied for registration and to ensure that the with Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529. Also telling is the observation

same does not overlap with the boundaries of the adjoining lots, made by the Court of Appeals that there was no objection raised by

there stands to be no reason why a registration application must be the oppositor or by the LRA to the admission of the blueprint of Plan

denied for failure to present the original tracing cloth plan, Ccs-007601-000040-D despite the fact that they were well-informed

especially where it is accompanied by pieces of evidencesuch as a of the present proceedings, to wit:

duly executed blueprint of the survey plan and a duly executed

In the instant case, the plaintiffs-
technical description of the propertywhich may likewise appellants do not deny that only the blueprint
copy of the plan of the subject lands (Exh. J)
substantially and with as much certainty prove the limits and extent and not the original tracing cloth plan thereof
was submitted to the court a quo since they
of the property sought to be registered. had previously submitted the original tracing
cloth plan to the Land Registration
Thus, sound is the doctrinal precept laid down Authority. However, despite the failure of the
plaintiffs-appellants to present the original
in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[34] and in the later tracing cloth plan, neither the Land
Registration Authority nor the oppositor-
cases of Spouses Recto v. Republic of the appellee question[ed] this
[35] [36]
deficiency. Likewise, when the blueprint
Philippines and Republic of the Philippines v. Hubilla, that copy of the plan (Exh. J) was offered in
evidence, the oppositor-apellee did not raise
while the best evidence to identify a piece of land for registration any objection thereto. Such silence on the
part of the Land Registration [Authority] and
purposes is the original tracing cloth plan issued by the Bureau of
the oppositor-appellee can be deemed as an
LTD, Original Registration Proceedings, Page 25
implied admission that the original tracing
cloth plan and the blueprint copy thereof
(Exh. J) are one and the same, free from all
defects and clearly identify the lands sought
to be registered. In this regard x x x, the
blueprint copy of the plan (Exh. J), together
with its technical descriptions (Exhs. K and
L), is deemed tantamount to substantial
compliance with the requirements of law.[40]
We now proceed to the issue of possession. Petitioner theorizes that
not only were respondents unable to identify the lots applied for
registration; it also claims that they have no credible evidence
tending to establish that for at least 30 years they and their
predecessors-in-interest have occupied and possessed the property
openly, continuously, exclusively and notoriously under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.[41] We do not
agree.
In an original registration of title under Section 14(1)[42] P.D. No.
1529, the applicant for registration must be able to establish by
evidence that he and his predecessor-in-interest have exercised acts
of dominion over the lot under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.[43] He must prove that for at least 30 years,
he and his predecessor have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land. Republic v.
Alconaba[44] well explains possession and occupation of this
character, thus:
The law speaks of possession and
occupation. Since these words are separated
by the conjunction and, the clear intention of
the law is not to make one synonymous with
the other. Possession is broader than
occupation because it includes constructive
possession. When, therefore, the law adds the
word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-
encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Taken together with the words
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious,
the word occupation serves to highlight the
fact that for an applicant to qualify, his
possession must not be a mere fiction.
Actual possession of a land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of
such a nature as a party would naturally
exercise over his own property.[45]
Proceeding from this fundamental principle, we find that indeed
respondents have been in possession and occupation of Lot Nos. 4
and 5 under a bona fide claim of ownership for the duration required
by law. This conclusion is primarily factual.
From the records, it is clear that respondents possession through
their predecessor-in-interest dates back to as early as 1937. In that
year, the subject property had already been declared for taxation by
Zenaidas father, Sergio, jointly with a certain Toribia Miranda
[46]
(Toribia). Yet, it also can be safely inferred that Sergio and
Toribia had declared the land for taxation even earlier because the
1937 tax declaration shows that it offsets a previous tax
number.[47] The property was again declared in 1979,[48] 1985[49] and
1994[50] by Sergio, Toribia and by Romualdo.
Certainly, respondents could have produced more proof of this kind
had it not been for the fact that, as certified by the Office of the Rizal
Provincial Assessor, the relevant portions of the tax records on file
with it had been burned when the assessors office was razed by fire
in 1997.[51] Of equal relevance is the fact that with these tax
assessments, there came next tax payments. Respondents receipts
for tax expenditures on Lot Nos. 4 and 5 between 1977 and 2001 are
likewise fleshed out in the records and in these documents, Sergio,
Toribia and Romualdo are the named owners of the property with
Zenaida being identified as the one who delivered the payment in
the 1994 receipts.[52]
The foregoing evidentiary matters and muniments clearly show that
Zenaidas testimony in this respect is no less believable. And the
unbroken chain of positive acts exercised by respondents
predecessors, as demonstrated by these pieces of evidence, yields no
other conclusion than that as early as 1937, they had already
demonstrated an unmistakable claim to the property. Not only do
they show that they had excluded all others in their claim but also,
that such claim is in all good faith.
Land registration proceedings are governed by the rule
that while tax declarations and realty tax payment are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are a good indication of
possession in the concept of owner. These documents constitute at
least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property, for
no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is
not in his actual or at least constructive possession. The voluntary
declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests
not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the
property. It also announces his adverse claim against the state and
all other parties who may be in conflict with his interest. More
importantly, it signifies an unfeigned intention to contribute to
government revenuesan act that strengthens ones bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership.[53]
Indeed, that respondents herein have been in possession of
the land in the concept of owneropen, continuous, peaceful and
without interference and opposition from the government or from
any private individualitself makes their right thereto unquestionably
settled and, hence, deserving of protection under the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 30, 2006
Decision and the November 20, 2006 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 80500, are AFFIRMED.
LTD, Original Registration Proceedings, Page 26

(
signed)
A
SO ORDERED. LFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ
A
FIRST DIVISION DMINISTRATOR
N
ational Land Titles and
Deeds
R
[G.R. No. 146262. January 21, 2005] egistration Administration

Entered in the
Registration Book for
HEIRS OF EUGENIO LOPEZ, SR., petitioners, vs. HON. Marikina, pursuant to the
ALFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as provisions of section 39 of
Administrator of the Land Registration PD No. 1529, on the 18th day
Authority and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF of August nineteen
MARIKINA CITY, respondents. hundred and ninety-
eight, at 1:16 p.m.
DECISION
(
CARPIO, J.: signed)
E
DGAR D. SANTOS
R
The Case egister of Deeds
(Emphasis added)

Petitioners filed another motion on 25 November 1998

This is a petition for review[1] to reverse the
to declare void Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 and
Decision[2] dated 29 November 2000 of the Court of Appeals
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) Nos. O-1603 and O-1604.
(appellate court) in CA-G.R. SP No. 55993. The appellate
Petitioners pointed out that the OCTs show that incumbent
court affirmed the Resolution[3] dated 21 May 1999 issued by
Administrator Alfredo R. Enriquez signed the Decrees on 20
the Land Registration Authority (LRA) in Consulta No. 2879.
October 1997, before he assumed office on 8 July 1998 and
The LRA ruled that a notice of lis pendens based on a motion
even before Hon. Briccio C. Ygaa issued the Order of 3 July
is not registrable.
1998.[12]

Petitioners questioned the inconsistencies in the dates

and requested the LRA to recall the decrees. The LRA
The Facts Administrator denied the request and explained the
inconsistencies in the dates in a letter[13] dated 1 December
1998. The entire letter states:
Alfonso Sandoval (Sandoval) and Roman Ozaeta, Jr.
Republic of the
(Ozaeta) filed an application for registration of title before the
Philippines
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 152 (land
Department of Justice
registration court), docketed as Case No. 2858, Land
LAND REGISTRATION
Registration Case No. N-18887 (LRC No. N-18887). The land
AUTHORITY
registration court issued an order of general default and
Quezon City
hearings on the application followed. On 31 May 1966, the
land registration court granted the application. The decision
became final and executory, and the land registration court 1 December 1998
issued a certificate of finality dated 8 March 1991.[4]

The National Land Titles and Deeds Administration
(now LRA) issued on 20 October 1977 Decree Nos. N-217643
and N-217644 in the names of Sandoval and his wife Rosa
Ruiz, and Ozaeta and his wife Ma. Salome Lao.[5]
On 16 July 1997, petitioners Eugenio Lopez, Jr.,
Manolo Lopez, Oscar Lopez, and Presentacion L. Psinakis
(petitioners), heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr., filed a motion[6] in
LRC No. N-18887. The motion alleged that Sandoval and
Ozaeta sold the lots subject of the application to the late
Eugenio Lopez, Sr. on 23 September 1970. Petitioners prayed
that the court consider in the land registration case the Deed
of Absolute Sale[7] over the lots executed by Sandoval and
Ozaeta and their respective spouses in favor of Eugenio
Lopez, Sr. Invoking Section 22 of Presidential Decree No.
1529 (PD 1529),[8] petitioners also prayed that the court issue
the decree of registration in their names as the successors-in-
interest of Eugenio Lopez, Sr.
The land registration court gave due course to the
motion and conducted hearings.[9]
The Register of Deeds of Marikina City issued the
corresponding OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 in favor of
Sandoval and Ozaeta and their spouses only on 18 August
1998.[10] The pertinent entries[11] in the Decrees read:
This Decree is issued pursuant to the Decision dated 31 st day
of May, 1966 of the Hon. Pedro C. Navarro, Judge of [Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Rizal], and the Honorable
Briccio C. Ygaa, this 3rd day of July, 1998.
Atty. Crisostomo A. Quizon
Quiason Makalintal Barot Torres & Ibarra Law
Offices
2nd Floor Benpres Building
Exchange Road corner Meralco Ave.
Ortigas Center, Pasig City
Sir:
This concerns your letter requesting the recall of Decree Nos. N-
217643 and N-217644 issued in Land Registration Case No. N-
2858, LRC Record No. N-18887, both in the names of Alfonso
Sandoval and his wife, Rosa Ruiz, and Roman Ozaeta, Jr., and his
wife, Ma. Salome Lao.
Records of this Authority show that aforesaid decrees of
registration were prepared on October 20, 1977 pursuant to the
decision of the court dated May 31, 1966 and the order for issuance
of decree dated August 24, 1993. Said decrees were forwarded to
the Office of the Administrator on August 8, 1998 and was [sic]
released therefrom on August 13, 1998. Consequently, said decrees
were signed sometime between August 8 and 13 1998 and
definitely not on October 20, 1997 as what is reflected thereon
because the undersigned Administrator assumed office only on
July 8, 1998. Apparently, at the time the decrees were signed it was
not noticed, through oversight, that they were dated October 20,
1977. It is therefore hereby clarified that Decree Nos. N-217643
and N-217644 were actually issued sometime between August 8
and 13 1998 and not on October 20, 1997.

Regarding the claim that these decrees were prematurely issued as

Issued at the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
the motion for the issuance of the decrees in favor of the Heirs of
Administration, Quezon City, this 20th day of October, in the
Eugenio Lopez, the properties involved having been sold to him by
year of Our Lord nineteen hundred and ninety-seven at 8:01
the applicants, is still pending with the court, it is informed that no
a.m.
copy of said motion nor of the order directing this Office to
comment thereon appears on file in the records of the case. Hence,
these matters could not have been taken into consideration in the
LTD, Original Registration Proceedings, Page 27
issuance of the decrees. Had the Administration been apprised of
these incidents, perhaps the issuance of the decrees could have
been held in abeyance until the court has resolved the same.
As to the recall of the decrees of registration, we regret to inform
you that since the certificates of title transcribed pursuant to said
decrees have already been issued and released by the Registrar of
Deeds concerned, it is now beyond our authority to recall them
unless duly authorized by the court.
We hope that we have satisfactorily disposed of the concerns
raised in your letter.
ery truly yours,
signed)
LFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ
dministrator
On 25 November 1998, petitioners filed with the
Register of Deeds of Marikina City an application to annotate
the notice of lis pendens at the back of OCT Nos. O-1603 and
O-1604 on the ground that petitioners have filed with the land
registration court a motion to declare OCT Nos. O-1603 and
O-1604 void.[14] Petitioners attached to the application a copy
of the 25 November 1998 motion and the pertinent OCTs.
In a letter[15] dated 15 December 1998, the Register of
Deeds of Marikina City denied the application to annotate the
notice of lis pendens. The entire letter states:
Republic of the Philippines
Department of Justice
LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY
Registry of Deeds, Marikina City
15 December 1998
Atty. Crisostomo A. Quizon
2nd Floor, Benpres Bldg.
Exchange Road cor. Meralco Avenue
Pasig City
Sir:
This is in connection to [sic] your application to have a Notice of
Lis Pendens [annotated] at the back of OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-
1604 issued in the name of ALFONSO SANDOVAL AND
SPOUSE.
Pursuant to Sec. 76, PD No. 1529[,] the contents of the notice are
the name[s] of the parties, the court where the action is pending,
the date the action was instituted and a copy of the compalint [sic]
in order to determine if the person named in the title is impleaded.
We regret to inform you that the application, bereft of the original
petition or compaint [sic] upon which this office will base its
action, is DENIED.
If you do not agree with our findings, you can, without
withdrawing the documents you submitted, elevate the matter en
consulta five (5) days from receipt hereof to the Office of the
Administrator, Land Registration Authority, East Avenue cor. NIA
Road, Quezon City.
ery truly yours,
signed)
DGAR D. SANTOS
egister of Deeds
On 14 January 1999, three days after receipt of the
letter, petitioners elevated the denial in consulta to the LRA.
The case was docketed as Consulta No. 2879.
The Ruling of the Land Registration Authority
In its resolution[16] dated 21 May 1999, the LRA stated
that the sole question for resolution is whether a notice of lis
pendens is registrable based on a motion to declare void the
decrees and titles. The LRA agreed with the Register of
Deeds that a notice of lis pendens based on a motion is not
registrable. Relying on Section 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court, the LRA ruled that only a party to a case has the legal
personality to file a notice of lis pendens relative to the
pending case.
The LRA focused on petitioners standing in LRC No. N-
18887. The LRA declared that petitioners are not parties in
LRC No. N-18887. Since a land registration case is a
proceeding in rem, an order of general default binds the whole
world as a party in the case. Petitioners are mere movants
whose V personality the court has not admitted. Based on
Section 26 of PD 1529, the LRA ruled that petitioners should
(
have filed a motion to lift the order of general default. Pertinent
portions of the LRA decision read:
A
Until and after
A the Order of General Default in LRC Case No.
18887 is lifted, petitioners cannot be clothed with personality as
oppositors in said land registration case by merely filing a motion
after a judgement has been rendered. Such being the case, a notice
of lis pendens on the basis of the motion filed by petitioners cannot
be admitted for registration. To rule otherwise would preempt the
judgment of the Court in so far as the personalities of the movants
as oppositors in the land registration case is concerned.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Authority is of the
opinion and so holds that the notice of lis pendens is not
registrable.
SO ORDERED.[17]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Undaunted, petitioners filed before the appellate court a
petition for review of the LRAs decision. Petitioners filed the
petition on the ground of manifest error and grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the LRA Administrator when he ruled
in Consulta No. 2879 that the notice of lis pendens is not
registrable.
The appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of
merit. The appellate court reiterated the LRAs ruling that only
a party to a case has the legal personality to file a notice of lis
pendens. Petitioners have no legal personality because they
failed to file a motion to lift the order of general default in the
land registration case.
Issues
Petitioners present the following issues for resolution of
this Court:
1. WHETHER PETITIONERS MOTION TO
DECLARE VOID THE DECREES ISSUED
BY THE LAND REGISTRATION
AUTHORITY IS A PROPER BASIS FOR
FILING THE NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS,
and
2. WHETHER PETITIONERS CAN FILE THE
MOTION TO DECLARE VOID THE
V DECREES ISSUED BY THE LAND
REGISTRATION COURT IN LRC CASE NO.
N-18887 DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
COURT HAS NOT LIFTED THE GENERAL
(
ORDER OF DEFAULT.[18]
E
R The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
We agree with the observation of the appellate court
that the pleadings filed by petitioners, public respondents and
the Office of the Solicitor General cite more or less the same
provisions of the laws as applicable in support of their
respective contentions but differ x x x only with respect to their
interpretation thereof.[19] With this observation in mind, we
quote the pertinent provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure and of PD 1529.
LTD, Original Registration Proceedings, Page 28
Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
SECTION 14. Notice of lis pendens. In an action affecting the title
or the right of possession of real property, the plaintiff and the
defendant, when affirmative relief is claimed in his answer, may
record in the office of the registry of deeds of the province in
which the property is situated a notice of the pendency of the
action. Said notice shall contain the names of the parties and the
object of the action or defense, and a description of the property in
that province affected thereby. Only from the time of filing such
notice for record shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of the
property affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of
the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency against the
parties designated by their real names.
The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled
only upon order of the court, after proper showing that the notice is
for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not
necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be
recorded.
Section 76 of PD 1529 states:
SECTION 76. Notice of lis pendens. No action to recover
possession of real estate, or to quiet title thereto, or to remove
clouds upon the title thereof, or for partition or other proceedings
of any kind in court directly affecting the title to land or the use or
occupation thereof or the buildings thereon, and no judgment, and
no proceeding to vacate or reverse any judgment, shall have any
effect upon registered land as against persons other than the parties
thereto, unless a memorandum or notice stating the institution of
such action or proceeding and the court wherein the same is
pending, as well as the date of the institution thereof, together with
a reference to the number of the certificate of title, and an adequate
description of the land affected and the registered owner thereof,
shall have been filed and registered.
Notice of Lis Pendens
Lis pendens literally means a pending suit. The doctrine
of lis pendens refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which
a court acquires over property involved in a suit, pending the
continuance of the action, and until final judgment.[20]
The purposes of lis pendens are (1) to protect the rights
of the party causing the registration of the lis pendens, and (2)
to advise third persons who purchase or contract on the
subject property that they do so at their peril and subject to
the result of the pending litigation.[21]
The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect.
First, it keeps the subject matter of the litigation within the
power of the court until the entry of the final judgment to
prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive
alienations. Second, it binds a purchaser, bona fide or not, of
the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that
the court will promulgate subsequently. However, the filing of
a notice of lis pendens does not create a right or lien that
previously did not exist.[22]
Without a notice of lis pendens, a third party who
acquires the property after relying only on the certificate of title
is a purchaser in good faith. Against such third party, the
supposed rights of a litigant cannot prevail, because the
former is not bound by the property owners undertakings not
annotated in the transfer certificate of title.[23] Thus, we have
consistently held that
The notice of lis pendens x x x is ordinarily recorded without the
intervention of the court where the action is pending. The notice is
but an incident in an action, an extrajudicial one, to be sure. It does
not affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to constructively
advise, or warn, all people who deal with the property that they so
deal with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire
in the property in any voluntary transaction are subject to the
results of the action, and may well be inferior and subordinate to
those which may be finally determined and laid down therein. The
cancellation of such a precautionary notice is therefore also a mere
incident in the action, and may be ordered by the Court having
jurisdiction of it at any given time. And its continuance or removal
x x x is not contingent on the existence of a final judgment in the
action, and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof.[24]
A notice of lis pendens may involve actions that deal not
only with title or possession of a property, but also with the
use or occupation of a property.[25] The litigation must directly
involve a specific property which is necessarily affected by the
judgment. Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals[26] enumerated the cases where a notice
of lis pendens is appropriate:
[A] notice of lis pendens is proper in the following cases, viz:
a) An action to recover possession of real estate;
b) An action to quiet title thereto;
c) An action to remove clouds thereon;
d) An action for partition; and
e) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court
directly affecting the title to the land or the use or
occupation thereof or the buildings thereon.
On the other hand, the doctrine of lis pendens has no
application in the following cases:
a) Preliminary attachments;
b) Proceedings for the probate of wills;
c) Levies on execution;
d) Proceedings for administration of estate of deceased persons;
and
e) Proceedings in which the only object is the
recovery of a money judgment.[27]
As decreed by Section 76 of PD 1529, a notice of lis
pendens should contain a statement of the institution of an
action or proceeding, the court where the same is pending,
and the date of its institution. A notice of lis pendens should
also contain a reference to the number of the certificate of title
of the land, an adequate description of the land affected and
its registered owner.
The Register of Deeds denied registration of the notice
of lis pendens because the application was bereft of the
original petition or complaint upon which this office will base
its action.[28] In consulta to the LRA, petitioners pointed out
that they have complied with the requirements for the
registration of the notice of lis pendens, as follows:
7.2.1 The Notice of Lis Pendens contains a statement of the filing
by the Heirs of Eugenio Lopez of a motion to declare Original
Certificates of Title Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 null and void;
7.2.2 It contains the name of the court wherein the motion is
pending which is the registration court, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 152, Pasig City. The date of the filing of the motion is
shown on the motion itself wherein the receipt of said motion by
the land registration court on November 25, 1998 is duly stamped;
7.2.3 The numbers of the Original Certificates of Title Nos. O-
1603 and O-1604 are clearly indicated in the notice;
7.2.4 There is adequate description of the land affected in the
Notice of Lis Pendens;
7.2.5 The names of the registered owners are indicated in
Paragraph 4 of the Motion attached to the Notice;
7.2.6 A copy of the motion to declare OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-
1604 null and void, dated November 25, 1998 upon which the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal will base its action is
attached as Annex A of the Notice of Lis Pendens. (Emphasis in
the original)[29]
Petitioners enumeration readily reveals that they have
not complied with the requisites. Both the LRA and the
appellate court denied the application for a notice of lis
pendens because petitioners are mere movants, and not
original parties, in LRC No. N-18887. As petitioners are not
parties to an action as contemplated in Section 76 of PD 1529,
they failed to present the requisite pleading to the Register of
Deeds of Marikina City. We hold that the Register of Deeds
correctly denied the application for a notice of lis pendens.
LTD, Original Registration Proceedings, Page 29
Reconveyance
Petitioners committed a fatal procedural error when
they filed a motion in LRC No. N-18887 on 16 July 1997. The
remedy of petitioners is an action for reconveyance against
Sandoval, Ozaeta and their spouses. Reconveyance is based
on Section 55 of Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 3322,
which states that xxx in all cases of registration procured by
fraud the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable
remedies against the parties to such fraud, without prejudice,
however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a
certificate of title xxx.
An action for reconveyance is an action in
personam available to a person whose property has been
wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in anothers
name. Although the decree is recognized as incontrovertible
and no longer open to review, the registered owner is not
necessarily held free from liens. As a remedy, an action for
reconveyance is filed as an ordinary action in the ordinary
courts of justice and not with the land registration
court.[30] Reconveyance is always available as long as the
property has not passed to an innocent third person for value.
A notice of lis pendens may thus be annotated on the
certificate of title immediately upon the institution of the action
in court. The notice of lis pendens will avoid transfer to an
innocent third person for value and preserve the claim of the
real owner.[31]
Necessity of a Motion to Lift the Order of General Default
[32]
In its comment, the LRA states that under Section 26
of PD 1529 the order of default includes petitioners.
Therefore, petitioners failure to move to lift the default order
did not give them standing in the case. As long as the court
does not lift the order of general default, petitioners have no
legal standing to file the motion to declare void the decrees of
registration issued to the applicant. Section 26 of PD 1529
provides thus:
Sec. 26. Order of default; effect. If no person appears and answers
within the time allowed, the court shall, upon motion of the
applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a default to be
recorded and require the applicant to present evidence. By the
description in the notice To All Whom It May Concern, all the
world are made parties defendant and shall be concluded by the
default order.
Where an appearance has been entered and an answer filed, a
default order shall be entered against persons who did not appear
and answer.
Petitioners justification for filing a motion to annul the
decrees and titles, as opposed to filing a motion to lift the order
of general default, rests on two related assumptions. First,
with the filing of the 16 July 1997 motion and giving of due
course to the motion by the land registration court, petitioners
assert that they acquired legal standing in the registration
proceedings. Second, buyer Eugenio Lopez, Sr. stepped into
the shoes of the sellers-applicants Sandoval and Ozaeta
when applicants sold the property to him. As successors-in-
interest of the buyer, petitioners contend that they are not
strangers to the proceedings.
To justify their two assumptions, petitioners traced the
antecedent of Section 22 of PD 1529 to Section 29 of Act
496[33] and its judicial interpretation in Mendoza v. Court of
Appeals.[34]
Section 22 of PD 1529 provides:
SECTION 22. Dealings with land pending original
registration.After the filing of the application and before the
issuance of the decree of registration, the land therein described
may still be the subject of dealings in whole or in part, in which
case the interested party shall present to the court the pertinent
instruments together with the subdivision plan approved by the
Director of Lands in case of transfer of portions thereof, and the
court, after notice to the parties, shall order such land registered
subject to the conveyance or encumbrance created by said
instruments, or order that the decree of registration be issued in the
name of the person to whom the property has been conveyed by
said instruments.
The pertinent portion of Section 29 of Act 496 provides:
SECTION 29. After the filing of the application and before the
issuance of the decree of title by the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office, the land therein described may be dealt with
and instruments relating thereto shall be recorded in the office of
the register of deeds at any time before issuance of the decree of
title, in the same manner as if no application had been made. The
interested party may, however, present such instruments to the
Court of First Instance instead of presenting them to the office of
the Register of Deeds, together with a motion that the same be
considered in relation with the application, and the court, after
notice to the parties shall order such land registered subject to the
encumbrance created by said instruments, or order the decree of
registration issued in the name of the buyer or of the person to
whom the property has been conveyed by said instruments. x x x
Mendoza v. Court of Appeals[35] explains the
procedure in cases of conveyance of the land subject of a
registration proceeding by an instrument executed between
the time of filing of the application for registration and the
issuance of the decree of title.
The law does not require that the application for registration be
amended by substituting the buyer or the person to whom the
property has been conveyed for the applicant. Neither does it
require that the buyer or the person to whom the property has been
conveyed be a party to the case. He may thus be a total stranger to
the land registration proceedings. The only requirements of the law
are: (1) that the instrument be presented to the court by the
interested party together with a motion that the same be considered
in relation with the application; and (2) that prior notice be given to
the parties to the case xxx.[36]
Petitioners also assert that they do not dispute the
judgment of the land registration court. However, this position
is in conflict with their 25 November 1998 motion to have the
decree and the titles declared void. Petitioners now assume
the roles of both successors-in-interest and oppositors. This
confusion of roles brought about petitioners grave error in
procedure.
The land registration court granted the application in
LRC No. N-18887 on 31 May 1966 and issued a certificate of
finality dated 8 March 1991. Petitioners filed their motion to
consider the deed of sale in the registration on 16 July 1997.
Petitioners filed their motion to have the decrees and the
corresponding certificates of title declared void on 25
November 1998. Petitioners filed both motions long after the
decision in LRC No. N-18887 became final and executory.
Neither petitioners nor even the applicants from whom they
base their claim presented the Deed of Sale before the land
registration court while the action was pending.
Considering the facts and arguments as presented
above, we hold that the motion filed by petitioners is
insufficient to give them standing in the land registration
proceedings for purposes of filing an application of a notice
of lis pendens. However, we disagree with the LRA and the
appellate courts observation that petitioners need to file a
motion to lift the order of general default. A motion to lift the
order of general default should be filed before entry of final
judgment. The land registration court granted the application
for registration of title on 31 May 1966 and issued a certificate
of finality on 8 March 1991. Petitioners filed their motion on 16
July 1997. Thus, even if petitioners filed a motion to lift the
order of general default, the order of default could not be set
aside because the motion was filed out of time.
In Lim Toco v. Go Fay,[37] this Court explained the
effect of an order of default to the party defaulted. A party
declared in default loses his standing in court. As a result of
his loss of standing, a party in default cannot appear in court,
adduce evidence, be heard, or be entitled to notice. A party in
default cannot even appeal from the judgment rendered by the
court, unless he files a motion to set aside the order of default
under the grounds provided in what is now Section 3, Rule 9
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Indeed, in its comment before this Court, the LRA stated
thus:
Under Section 26, PD 1429, petitioners are deemed to have been
included by the default order. Those who did not file an answer
should be considered as having lost their standing in court from
that stage (Republic v. Dela Rosa, 173 SCRA 12) except when
they file a motion to set aside the order [of] default on the grounds
mentioned in Section 3, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court (Toco v.
Fay, 80 Phil. 166).
In land registration cases (as in the said LRC No. N-18887), an
order of general default was deemed to have been issued based on
the presumption of regularity in judicial proceedings (Pascual, et
al. v. Ortega, et al., 58 O.G. 12 March 1962 C.A.). Petitioners
LTD, Original Registration Proceedings, Page 30
failed to adduce any evidence showing that the order of general
default was lifted. Records disclosed that without first filing a
motion to lift the order of general default, petitioners filed a motion
to declare as null and void the decrees and titles. Until the order of
general default is lifted by the court, petitioner could not be
considered as a party to the action. They are deemed movants
whose personality as far as the case is concerned is not yet
admitted by the court considering that the order of default has not
been lifted.[38]
One should be careful, however, to distinguish between
movants as mere interested parties prescribed under Section
22 of PD 1529 and movants as intervenors-oppositors to the
land registration proceedings. It is only in the latter case that
a motion to lift the order of general default is required. It is only
in the latter case that the doctrine pronounced in Serrano v.
Palacio,[39] as repeatedly invoked by the LRA and OSG, is
applicable:
x x x [P]etitioners committed an error of procedure when they filed
a motion to intervene in the x x x land registration case for the
proper procedure would have been for them to ask first for the
lifting of the order of general default, and then, if lifted, to file an
opposition to the application of the applicants. This is so because
proceedings in land registration are in rem, and not in personam,
the sole object being the registration applied for, and not the
determination of any right not connected with the registration
(Estila vs. Alvero, 37 Phil. 498).
Petitioners are not mere interested parties in this case. By
filing their motion to have the decrees and the corresponding
certificates of title declared void, they took the role of
oppositors to the application for land registration.
The appellate court stated that in as much as it would
want to oblige to the plea of petitioners to hasten or expedite
the proceedings and to avoid further expenses on the part of
the petitioners, however[,] (it) could not.[40] Indeed, it requires
a delicate balancing act between the objective of the Rules of
Court to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding[41] and the strict requirements for
a notice of lis pendens. The facts in this case show that
petitioners have not complied with the requirements.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55993
dated 29 November 2000.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, (Acting Chairman), Ynares-
Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), on leave.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 125154. September 28, 2001]
DIGNA VERGEL, EDUARDO SALVACRUZ, BEATRIZ
MANACOP, FELICISIMA FLORES, GENEROSO
SALVACRUZ, BLANDINO SALVACRUZ,
MILAGROS SALVACRUZ and THE HEIRS OF
CORAZON SANTIAGO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and DOROTEA TAMISIN
GONZALES, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision of the
Court of Appeals[1] setting aside the orders[2] of the trial court that
denied petitioners motion to set aside the order of general
default[3] in an application for registration of a parcel of land,
consisting of one thousand, one hundred seventy six (1,176),
situated in barrio Batong Malake, municipality of Los Baos,
province of Laguna.[4]
The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals,[5] are as follows:
On May 26, 1994, Digna Vergel, Eduardo Salvacruz, Beatriz
Maacop, Felicisima Flores, Generoso and Blandino Salvacruz,
Milagros Evangelista and the heirs of Corazon Santiago, namely:
Leocadio, Jr. and Concepcion Santiago (petitioners herein) filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Calamba, Laguna an application for
registration of a parcel of land (for titling purposes).
On July 20, 1994, the Republic of the Philippines represented by
the Director of Lands filed an opposition to the application for
registration.
On December 15, 1994, the trial court issued an order of general
default against the whole world with the exception of Republic of
the Philippines x x x.
On October 3, 1995, respondent Dorotea Tamisin Gonzales filed
with the trial court an Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Order of
General Default alleging, inter alia, in her affidavit that she is
claiming the land in question subject of this petition as an owner x
x x which motion was opposed by the petitioners herein.
On October 12, 1995, respondent filed with the trial court a reply
to the opposition interposed by the petitioners and, at the same
time, filed an Urgent Motion praying for the suspension of the
proceedings.
On October 18, 1995, the trial court issued the first assailed order,
the dispositive portion of which is quoted, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the motion to set aside the Order of default as well
as the motion to suspend the proceedings filed by the movant
through counsel is hereby denied for lack of merit.
On October 20, 1995, petitioners filed with the trial court a Motion
to Strike Out Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceeding.
On November 21, 1995, respondent filed with the trial court a
motion for reconsideration of the order denying the motion to set
aside the order of general default, which motion petitioners
opposed.
On November 28, 1995, the trial court issued its second questioned
order, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for
reconsideration, dated November 16, 1995, is hereby denied for
lack of merit.
On December 13, 1995, respondent filed with the Court of
Appeals[6] a petition for certiorari alleging that the trial court judge
acted capriciously and without or in excess of his jurisdiction and
gravely abused the exercise of his discretion in issuing the two
aforementioned orders.[7]
On April 02, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated a
decision annulling the trial courts orders dated October 18, 1995 and
November 28, 1995, and consequently, setting aside the trial courts
order of general default dated December 15, 1994, in Land
Registration Case No. 88-94-C with respect to respondent.[8]
Hence, this appeal.[9]
The Issue
The issue presented is whether the Court of Appeals erred in
setting aside the trial courts order of general default in the land
registration case involved without making a specific finding of
fraud, negligence, accident or excusable mistake but relying on its
view that substantial justice and speedy determination of the
controversy would be better attained in lifting the order of general
default, to enable a claimant to oppose and to establish a case of
ownership in herself.
The Courts Ruling
We grant the petition. The Court of Appeals arbitrarily set
aside the trial courts order of general default without factual basis
save for its own gut feeling, ipse dixit.[10] Respondents failure to file
LTD, Original Registration Proceedings, Page 31
timely opposition to the application for land registration because she
missed reading the publication of the notice in the Official
Gazette[11] or in the newspaper Malaya issue of August 8, 1994,[12] in
itself may not be considered excusable negligence.
In respondents motion to set aside order of general default,
she alleged that petitioners were aware of her claim of ownership
over the subject property, but did not give her personal notice of the
filing of the application. She learned about the application by
accident. In the petition for certiorari she filed with the Court of
Appeals, respondent alleged that petitioners filed the application in
bad faith, surreptitiously and without notice to her. [13] The Court of
Appeals did not make a finding on this.
Hence, we find that the appellate court erred in setting aside
the order of general default in the Land Registration Case No. 88-
94-C, without making a specific finding of fraud, accident or
excusable neglect that prevented respondent from timely opposing
the application.
We are not a trier of facts. Consequently, we have to remand
the case to the Court of Appeals for it to make findings of fact
constituting fraud, accident or excusable neglect sufficient for the
court to lift the order of general default in the land registration case
involved.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 39239.
Let the case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings with instructions to determine whether there exists facts
warranting the lifting of the order of general default in LRC Case
No. 88-94-C of the trial court.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 77770 December 15, 1988
ATTY. JOSE S. GOMEZ, DELFINA GOMEZ ESTRADA,
ENRIQUITA GOMEZ OXCIANO, BENITA GOMEZ
GARLITOS, REYNALDO GOMEZ ESPEJO, ARMANDO
GOMEZ, ERLINDA GOMEZ GUICO, EUGENIA GOMEZ
CALICDAN, AZUCENA GOMEZ ORENCIA, TEODORO S.
GOMEZ, JR., and ALEJO S. GOMEZ (now deceased)
represented by his wife, LETICIA Y. GOMEZ, and
children, namely, MARGIE GOMEZ GOB, JACINTO Y.
GOMEZ, ALEJO Y. GOMEZ, JR., and MARY ANN Y.
GOMEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PEDRO G.
ADUCAYEN Judge Regional Trial Court, San Carlos City
(Pangasinan) Branch LVI, HON. CHIEF, LAND
REGISTRATION COMMISSION, Quezon City, Metro
Manila, and SILVERIO G. PEREZ, Chief, Division of
Original Registration, Land Registration Commission,
Quezon City, Metro Manila, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
The present case originated with the filing by petitioners on
30 August 1968 in the Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, of an application
for registration of several lots situated in Bayambang,
Pangasinan.
The lots applied for were Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 1
0, 11 and 12 of Plan Psu-54792 Amd.-2. The lots were
among those involved in the case of Government of the
Philippine Islands vs. Abran,1 wherein this Court declared
Consolacion M. Gomez owner of certain lots in Sitio Poponto
Bayambang, Pangasinan. Petitioners are the heirs of
Teodoro Y. Gomez (father of Consolacion) who, together
with Consolacion's son, Luis Lopez, inherited from her
parcels of land when Consolacion Gomez died intestate.
Petitioners alleged that after the death of Teodoro Y. Gomez,
they became the absolute owners of the subject lots by
virtue of a Quitclaim executed in their favor by Luis Lopez.
The lots (formerly portions of Lots 15,16, 34 and 41 covered
by Plan Ipd-92) were subdivided into twelve lots—Lots Nos.
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12. The subdivision plan
was duly approved by the Bureau of Lands on 30 November
1963. Petitioners agreed to allocate the lots among
themselves.
After notice and publication, and there being no opposition to
the application, the trial court issued an order of general
default. On 5 August 1981, the court rendered its decision
adjudicating the subject lots in petitioners' favor. 2
On 6 October 1981, the trial court issued an
order 3 expressly stating that the decision of 5 August 1981
had become final and directed the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office to issue the corresponding decrees of
registration over the lots adjudicated in the decision of 5
August 1981.
On 11 July 1984, respondent Silverio G. Perez, Chief of the
Division of Original Registration, Land Registration
Commission (now known as the National Land Titles and
Deeds Registration Administration), submitted a report to the
court a quo stating that Lots 15, 16, 34 and 41 of Ipd-92
were already covered by homestead patents issued in 1928
and 1929 and registered under the Land Registration Act. He
recommended that the decision of 5 August 1981, and the
order of 6 October 1981 be set aside. Petitioners opposed
the report, pointing out that no opposition was raised by the
Bureau of Lands during the registration proceedings and that
the decision of 5 August 1981 should be implemented
because it had long become final and executory.
After hearing, the lower court rendered a second decision on
25 March 1985 setting aside the decision dated 5 August
1981 and the order dated 6 October 1981 for the issuance of
decrees.4 Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the
motion was denied by respondent judge on 6 August 1985
for lack of merit. 5
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
this Court which in turn referred the petition to the Court of
Appeals. 6
On 17 September 1986, the appellate court rendered
judgment, 7 dismissing the petition and stating, among
others, thus—
In resumé, prior to the issuance of the
decree of registration, the respondent
Judge has still the power and control
over the decision he rendered. The
finality of an adjudication of land in a
registration or cadastral case takes
place only after the expiration of the
one-year period after entry of the final
decree of registration (Afalla vs.
Rosauro, 60 Phil. 622; Valmonte vs.
Nable, 85 Phil. 256; Capio vs. Capio, 94
Phil. 113). When the respondent Judge
amended his decision after the report of
the respondent officials of the Land
Registration office had shown that
homestead patents had already been
issued on some of the lots, respondents
cannot be faulted because land already
granted by homestead patent can no
longer be the subject of another
registration (Manalo vs. Lukban, et al.,
48 Phil. 973).
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
We resolve to DISMISS the petition for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the
appellate court in its Resolution dated 10 March
1987.8Hence, this recourse.
Several issues are raised by petitioners in this petition. The
more important issues before the Court are: (a) whether or
not respondent Judge had jurisdiction to issue the decision
of 25 March 1985 which set aside the lower court's earlier
decision of 5 August 1981 and the order of 6 October 1981;
LTD, Original Registration Proceedings, Page 32
(b) whether or not the respondents Acting Land Registration
Commissioner and Engr. Silverio Perez, Chief, Division of
Original Registration, Land Registration Commission, have
no alternative but to issue the decrees of registration
pursuant to the decision of 5 August 1981 and the order for
issuance of decrees, dated 6 October 1981, their duty to do
so being purely ministerial; (c) whether or not "the law of the
case" is the decision in Government of the Philippine Islands
v. Abran, supra, which held that the lands adjudicated to
Consolacion Gomez were not public lands, and therefore
they could not have been acquired by holders of homestead
titles as against petitioners herein.
It is not disputed that the decision dated 5 August 1981 had
become final and executory. Petitioners vigorously maintain
that said decision having become final, it may no longer be
reopened, reviewed, much less, set aside. They anchor this
claim on section 30 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration
Decree) which provides that, after judgment has become
final and executory, the court shall forthwith issue an order to
the Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of
the decree of registration and certificate of title. Petitioners
contend that section 30 should be read in relation to section
32 of P.D. 1529 in that, once the judgment becomes final
and executory under section 30, the decree of registration
must issue as a matter of course. This being the law,
petitioners assert, when respondent Judge set aside in his
decision, dated 25 March 1985, the decision of 5 August
1981 and the order of 6 October 1981, he clearly acted
without jurisdiction.
Petitioners' contention is not correct. Unlike ordinary civil
actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land
registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense
of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year
after the entry of the final decree of registration.9 This Court,
in several decisions, has held that as long as a final decree
has not been entered by the Land Registration Commission
(now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not
elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the title is not
finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration
proceeding continues to be under the control and sound
discretion of the court rendering it.10
Petitioners contend that the report of respondent Silverio
Perez should have been submitted to the court a quobefore
its decision became final. But were we to sustain this
argument, we would be pressuring respondent land
registration officials to submit a report or study even if
haphazardly prepared just to beat the reglementary deadline
for the finality of the court decision. As said by this Court
in De los Reyes vs. de Villa: 11
Examining section 40, we find that the
decrees of registration must be stated in
convenient form for transcription upon
the certificate of title and must contain
an accurate technical description of the
land. This requires technical men.
Moreover, it frequently occurs that only
portions of a parcel of land included in
an application are ordered registered
and that the limits of such portions can
only be roughly indicated in the decision
of the court. In such cases amendments
of the plans and sometimes additional
surveys become necessary before the
final decree can be entered. That can
hardly be done by the court itself; the
law very wisely charges the Chief
Surveyor of the General Land
Registration Office with such duties
(Administrative Code, section 177).
Thus, the duty of respondent land registration officials to
render reports is not limited to the period before the court's
decision becomes final, but may extend even after its finality
but not beyond the lapse of one (1) year from the entry of the
decree.
Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land
registration officials to issue the decree is purely ministerial.
It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of
the court and the decree must be in conformity with the
decision of the court and with the data found in the record,
and they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they
are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and
issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to
the court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the court
and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of
the court. 12 They are specifically called upon to "extend
assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land
registration proceedings ." 13
The foregoing observations resolve the first two (2) issues
raised by petitioners.
Petitioners next contend that "the law of the case" is found
in Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abran, et al.,
supra, where it was decided by this Court that the lands of
Consolacion M. Gomez, from whom petitioners derive their
ownership over the lots in question, were not public lands. A
reading of the pertinent and dispositive portions of the
aforesaid decision will show, however, that the lots earlier
covered by homestead patents were not included among the
lands adjudicated to Consolacion M. Gomez. The decision
states:
With respect to the portions of land
covered by homestead certificates of
title, we are of opinion that such
certificates are sufficient to prevent the
title to such portion from going to
appellants aforesaid, for they carry with
them preponderating evidence that the
respective homesteaders held adverse
possession of such portions, dating back
to 1919 or 1920, accordingly to the
evidence, and the said appellants failed
to object to that possession in time.
(Emphasis supplied)
Wherefore modifying the judgment
appealed from, it is hereby ordered that
the lots respectively claimed by Agustin
V. Gomez, Consolacion M. Gomez, and
Julian Macaraeg, be registered in their
name, with the exclusion of the portions
covered by the homestead certificates ...
. (Emphasis supplied.) 14
The report of respondent land registration officials states that
the holders of the homestead patents registered the lots in
question in the years 1928 and 1929. The decision
in Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abran was
promulgated on 31 December 1931. Hence, the subject lots
are specifically excluded from those adjudicated by the
aforesaid decision to Consolacion M. Gomez.
It is a settled rule that a homestead patent, once registered
under the Land Registration Act, becomes indefeasible and
incontrovertible as a Torrens title, and may no longer be the
subject of an investigation for determination or judgment in
cadastral proceeding. 15
The aforecited case of Government vs. Abran, therefore, is
not "the law of the case", for the lots in question were not
private lands of Consolacion M. Gomez when homestead
patents were issued over them in 1928-1929. There is
sufficient proof to show that Lots 15, 16, 34 and 41 of Ipd-92
were already titled lands way back in 1928 and 1929 as
shown by Annexes "A", "B", "C", and "D" of respondents'
Memorandum. 16
Lastly, petitioners claim that if the decision of 5 August 1981
of the lower court is sustained, the homestead title holders
may still vindicate their rights by filing a separate civil action
for cancellation of titles and for reconveyance in a court of
ordinary civil jurisdiction. Conversely, the same recourse
may be resorted to by petitioners. "(T)he true owner may
bring an action to have the ownership or title to land judicially
settled, and if the allegations of the plaintiff that he is the true
owner of the parcel of land granted as free patent and
described in the Torrens title and that the defendant and his
predecessor-in-interest were never in possession of the
parcel of land and knew that the plaintiff and his
predecessor-in-interest have been in possession thereof be
established, then the court in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction, without ordering the cancellation of the Torrens
title issued upon the patent, may direct the defendant, the
registered owner, to reconvey the parcel of land to the
plaintiff who has been found to be the true owner thereof." 17
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioners-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
LTD, Original Registration Proceedings, Page 33
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 168913 March 14, 2007
ROLANDO TING, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRIO, namely: FLORA A. LIRIO,
AMELIA L. ROSKA, AURORA L. ABEJO, ALICIA L.
DUNQUE, ADELAIDA L. DAVID, EFREN A. LIRIO and
JOCELYN ANABELLE L. ALCOVER, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
In a Decision of December 10, 1976 in Land Registration
Case (LRC) No. N-983, then Judge Alfredo Marigomen of
the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 7, granted
the application filed by the Spouses Diego Lirio and Flora
Atienza for registration of title to Lot No. 18281 (the lot) of
the Cebu Cadastral 12 Extension, Plan Rs-07-000787.
The decision in LRC No. N-983 became final and executory
on January 29, 1977. Judge Marigomen thereafter issued an
order of November 10, 1982 directing the Land Registration
Commission to issue the corresponding decree of
registration and the certificate of title in favor of the spouses
Lirio.
On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting (petitioner) filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu an application for
registration of title to the same lot. The application was
docketed as LRC No. 1437-N.1
The herein respondents, heirs of Diego Lirio, namely: Flora
A. Lirio, Amelia L. Roska, Aurora L. Abejo, Alicia L. Dunque,
Adelaida L. David, Efren A. Lirio and Jocelyn Anabelle L.
Alcover, who were afforded the opportunity to file an
opposition to petitioner’s application by Branch 21 of the
Cebu RTC, filed their Answer2 calling attention to the
December 10, 1976 decision in LRC No. N-983 which had
become final and executory on January 29, 1977 and which,
they argued, barred the filing of petitioner’s application on
the ground of res judicata.
After hearing the respective sides of the parties, Branch 21
of the Cebu RTC, on motion of respondents, dismissed
petitioner’s application on the ground of res
judicata. 31ªvvphi1.nét
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari which
raises the sole issue of whether the decision in LRC No. N-
983 constitutes res judicata in LRC No. 1437-N.
Petitioner argues that although the decision in LRC No. N-
983 had become final and executory on January 29, 1977,
no decree of registration has been issued by the Land
Registration Authority (LRA);4 it was only on July 26, 2003
that the "extinct" decision belatedly surfaced as basis of
respondents’ motion to dismiss LRC No. 1437-N;5and as no
action for revival of the said decision was filed by
respondents after the lapse of the ten-year prescriptive
period, "the cause of action in the dormant judgment
passé[d] into extinction."6
Petitioner thus concludes that an "extinct" judgment cannot
be the basis of res judicata.7
The petition fails.
Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property
Registration Decree provides:
SEC. 30. When judgment becomes final; duty to cause
issuance of decree. – The judgment rendered in a land
registration proceeding becomes final upon the expiration
of thirty days8 to be counted from the date of receipt of notice
of the judgment. An appeal may be taken from the judgment
of the court as in ordinary civil cases.
After judgment has become final and executory, it shall
devolve upon the court to forthwith issue an order in
accordance with Section 39 of this Decree to the
Commissioner for the issuance of the decree of registration
and the corresponding certificate of title in favor of the
person adjudged entitled to registration. (Emphasis supplied)
In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a
private land, with or without opposition, the judgment of the
court confirming the title of the applicant or oppositor, as the
case may be, and ordering its registration in his name
constitutes, when final, res judicata against the whole
world.9 It becomes final when no appeal within the
reglementary period is taken from a judgment of confirmation
and registration.10
The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land
registration court’s approval in LRC No. N-983 of spouses
Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza’s application for registration of
the lot settled its ownership, and is binding on the whole
world including petitioner.
Explaining his position that the December 10, 1976 Decision
in LRC No. N-983 had become "extinct," petitioner advances
that the LRA has not issued the decree of registration, a
certain Engr. Rafaela Belleza, Chief of the Survey
Assistance Section, Land Management Services,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
Region 7, Cebu City having claimed that the survey of the
Cebu Cadastral Extension is erroneous and all resurvey
within the Cebu Cadastral extension must first be approved
by the Land Management Services of
the DENR, Region 7, Cebu City before said resurvey may be
used in court; and that the spouses Lirio did not comply with
the said requirement for they instead submitted to the court a
mere special work order.11
There is, however, no showing that the LRA credited the
alleged claim of Engineer Belleza and that it reported such
claim to the land registration court for appropriate action or
reconsideration of the decision which was its duty.
Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land
registration officials to issue the decree is purely ministerial.
It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of
the court and the decree must be in conformity with the
decision of the court and with the data found in the record,
and they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they
are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation
and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the
matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials
of the court and not as administrative officials, and their
act is the act of the court. They are specifically called
upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and
cadastral land registration proceedings."12 (Emphasis
supplied)
As for petitioner’s claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court reading:
SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A
final and executory judgment or order may be executed on
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After
the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute
of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The
revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five
(5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action
before it is barred by the statute of limitations[,]
the December 10, 1976 decision became "extinct" in light of
the failure of respondents and/or of their predecessors-in-
interest to execute the same within the prescriptive period,
the same does not lie.
Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al.13 enunciates the raison d’etre why
Section 6, Rule 39 does not apply in land registration
proceedings, viz:
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT
THE DECISION RENDERED IN THIS LAND
REGISTRATION CASE ON NOVEMBER 28, 1931 OR
LTD, Original Registration Proceedings, Page 34

TWENTY SIX YEARS AGO, HAS NOT YET BECOME

FINAL AND UNENFORCEABLE.

We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in

support of the above assignment, except in so far as it
supports his theory that after a decision in a land registration
case has become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse
of a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to
enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for this theory is
the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment
may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five
years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule
39.) This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions
and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a
land registration case. This is so because a party in a
civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is
secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to
act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as
provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable
against the losing party. In special proceedings the
purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in
land registration proceedings, the

ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to

be established. After the ownership has been proved
and confirmed

by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce

said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse
or losing party had been in possession of the land and
the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.

Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration

Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a
judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place
the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession.
The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse
or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any
further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting
an appeal.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing

discussions, DENIED.

Costs against petitioner, Rolando Ting.

SO ORDERED.