• Unless there be a particular provision in the penal code or special penal law that defines and

punishes the act, even if it be socially or morally wrong, no criminal liability is incurred by its
commission. (See U.S. vs. Taylor, 28 Phil. 599, 604)

• The State has the authority, under its police power, to define and punish crimes and to lay
down the rules of criminal procedure. States, as a part of their police power, have a large
measure of discretion in creating and denning criminal offenses. (People vs. Santiago, 43 Phil.
120, 124)

• The right of prosecution and punishment for a crime is one of the attributes that by a natural
law belongs to the sovereign power instinctively charged by the common will of the members
of society to look after, guard and defend the interests of the community, the individual and
social rights and the liberties of every citizen and the guaranty of the exercise of his rights.
(U.S. vs. Pablo, 35 Phil. 94, 100)

• deprives a person accused of a crime some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty. (In re: Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., 35 SCRA 429, 431)

• A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the
substitution of a legislative act for a judicial determination of guilt. (People vs. Ferrer, 48
SCRA 382, 395)

Example:

Congress passes a law which authorizes the arrest and imprisonment of communists without
the benefit of a judicial trial.

• The Philippines is a sovereign state with the obligation and the right of every government to uphold
its laws and maintain order within its domain, and with the general jurisdiction to punish persons for
offenses committed within its territory, regardless of the nationality of the offender. (Salonga and
Yap, Public International Law, p. 169)

No foreigner enjoys in this country extra-territorial right to be exempted from its laws and jurisdiction,
with the exception of heads of states and diplomatic representatives who, by virtue of the customary
law of nations, are not subject to the Philippine territorial jurisdiction." (People vs. Galacgac, C.A., 54

As a general rule, the jurisdiction of the civil courts is not affected by the military
character of the accused.

U.S. vs. Sweet (1 Phil. 18)

Facts: Sweet was an employee of the U.S. Army in the Philippines. He assaulted a prisoner of
war for which he was charged with the crime of physical injuries. Sweet interposed the defense
that the fact that he was an employee of the U.S. military authorities deprived the court of the
jurisdiction to try and punish him.

Held: The case is open to the application of the general principle that the jurisdiction of the civil
tribunals is unaffected by the military or other special character of the person brought before
them for trial, unless controlled by express legislation to the contrary.

Civil courts have concurrent jurisdiction with general courts-martial over soldiers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines

Civil courts have jurisdiction over the offense of malversation (Art. 217) committed by an army
finance officer. (People vs. Livara, G.R. No. L-6021, April 20, 1954)

Even in times of war, the civil courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the military courts or
general courts-martial over soldiers of the Philippine Army, provided that in the place of the
commission of the crime no hostilities are in progress and civil courts are functioning. (Valdez
vs. Lucero, 76 Phil. 356)

The Revised Penal Code or other penal law is not applicable when the military court
takes cognizance of the case.

"By their acceptance of appointments as officers in the Bolo Area from the General
Headquarters of the 6th Military District, the accused, who were civilians at the outbreak of the
war, became members of the Philippine Army amenable to the Articles of War." (Ruffy, et al. vs.
Chief of Staff, et al., 75 Phil. 875)

Jurisdiction of military courts

In view of the clear mandate of Rep. Act No. 7055, the Regional Trial Court cannot divest the
General Court-Martial of its jurisdiction over those charged with violations of Articles 63
(Disrespect Toward the President etc.), 64 (Disrespect Toward Superior Officer), 67 (Mutiny or
Sedition), 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and 97 (General Article) of the
Articles of War, as these are specifically included as " service-connected offenses or crimes"
under Section 1 thereof. Pursuant to the same provision of law, the military courts have
jurisdiction over these crimes or offenses. (Navales, et. al. vs. Abaya, et. al, G.R. Nos.
162318-162341, Oct. 25, 2004)

The prosecution of an accused before a court-martial is a bar to another prosecution of

the accused for the same offense.

A court-martial is a court, and the prosecution of an accused before it is a criminal, not an

administrative case, and therefore it would be, under certain conditions, a bar to another
prosecution of the accused for the same offense, because the latter would place the accused
in double jeopardy. (Marcos and Concordia vs. Chief of Staff, AFP, 89 Phil. 246)

Offenders accused of war crimes are triable by military commission

The petitioner is a Filipino citizen though of a Japanese father, and associating himself with
Japan in the war against the United States of America and the Philippines, committed
atrocities against unarmed and non-combatant Filipino civilians and looted Filipino property. He
is, indeed, a war criminal subject to the jurisdiction of the military commission. (Cantos vs.
Styer, 76 Phil. 748)

"War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After cessation of armed hostilities,
incidents of war may remain pending which should be disposed of as in time of war." A military
commission "has jurisdiction so long as a technical state of war continues." This includes the
period of an armistice, or military occupation, up to the effective date of a treaty of peace.
(Kuroda vs. Jalandoni, et al., 83 Phil. 171; Cowles, Trial of War Criminals by Military Tribunals,
American Bar Association, June, 1944)

A consul is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of an ambassador or minister

It is well-settled that a consul is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of an ambassador
or minister, but is subject to the laws and regulations of the country to which he is accredited.
(Schneckenburger vs. Moran, 63 Phil. 250)

Consuls, vice-consuls and other commercial representatives of foreign nations do not possess
the status of, and cannot claim the privileges and immunities accorded to ambassadors and
ministers. (Wheaton, International Law, Sec. 249)

Exceptions to the prospective application of criminal laws.

Whenever a new statute dealing with crime establishes conditions more lenient or favorable to
the accused, it can be given a retroactive effect.

But this exception has no application:

1. Where the new law is expressly made inapplicable to pending actions or existing causes of
action. (Tavera vs. Valdez, 1 Phil. 463, 470-471)

2. Where the offender is a habitual criminal under Rule 5, Article 62, Revised Penal Code. (Art.
22, RPC)

When the repeal is absolute the offense ceases to be criminal.

People vs. Tamayo (61 Phil. 225)

Facts: The accused was prosecuted for and convicted of a violation of an ordinance. While the
case was pending appeal, the ordinance was repealed by eliminating the section under which
the accused was being prosecuted.

Ruling: The repeal is absolute. Where the repeal is absolute, and not a reenactment or repeal
by implication, the offense ceases to be criminal. The accused must be acquitted.

But repeal of a penal law by its reenactment, even without a saving clause, would not destroy
criminal liability. (U.S. vs. Cuna, 12 Phil. 241)

When the new law and the old law penalize the same offense, the offender can be tried
under the old law.

U.S. vs. Cuna (12 Phil. 241)

Facts: The accused was charged with selling opium in violation of Act No. 1461 of the
Philippine Commission. During the pendency of the case, Act No. 1761 took effect repealing
the former law, but both Act No. 1461 and Act No. 1761 penalize offenses against the opium
laws.

Ruling: Where an Act of the Legislature which penalizes an offense repeals a former Act which
penalized the same offense, such repeal does not have the effect of thereafter depriving the
courts of jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence offenders charged with violations of the old
law prior to its repeal.

The penalty prescribed by Act No. 1761 is not more favorable to the accused than that
prescribed in Act No. 1461, the penalty in both Acts being the same.

When the repealing law fails to penalize the offense under the old law, the accused
cannot be convicted under the new law.

People vs. Sindiong and Pastor (77 Phil. 1000)

Facts: The accused was prosecuted for neglecting to make a return of the sales of newspapers
and magazines within the time prescribed by certain sections of the Revised Administrative
Code. Said sections of the Revised Administrative Code were repealed by the National Internal
Revenue Code which does not require the making of return of sales of newspapers and
magazines.

Ruling: The court loses jurisdiction where the repealing law wholly fails to penalize the act
denned and penalized as an offense in the old law. The accused, charged with violations of the
old law prior to the repeal, cannot be legally prosecuted after such repeal.

The provisions of said sections of the Revised Administrative Code were not reenacted, even
substantially, in the National Internal Revenue Code.

A person erroneously accused and convicted under a repealed statute may be punished
under the repealing statute.

The accused was charged with having failed to pay the salary of Cabasares whom he
employed as master fisherman in his motor launch from June 26 to October 12, 1952. He was
convicted under Com. Act No. 303, which was repealed by Rep. Act No. 602, approved on
April 16, 1951, and became effective 120 days thereafter. The subject-matter of Com. Act No.
303 is entirely covered by Rep. Act No. 602 with which its provisions are inconsistent. It was
held that the fact that the offender was erroneously accused and convicted under a statute
which had already been repealed and therefore no longer existed at the time the act
complained of was committed does not prevent conviction under the repealing statute which
punishes the same act, provided the accused had an opportunity to defend himself against the
charge brought against him. (People vs. Baesa, C.A., 56 O.G. 5466)

A new law which omits anything contained in the old law dealing on the same subject,
operates as a repeal of anything not so included in the amendatory act.

The A g r i c u l t u r a l Land Reform Code s u p e r s e d e d the Agricultural Tenancy Law

(except as qualified in Sections 4 and 35 of the Code). The Code instituted the leasehold
system and abolished share tenancy subject to certain conditions indicated in Section 4
thereof. It is significant that Section 39 is not reproduced in the Agricultural Land Reform Code
whose Section 172 repeals "all laws or part of any law inconsistent with" its provisions. Under
the leasehold system, the prohibition against pre-threshing has no more raison d' etre because
the lessee is obligated to pay a fixed rental as prescribed in Section 34 of the Agricultural Land
Reform Code, or the Code of Agrarian Reforms, as redesignated in R.A. No. 6389 which took
effect on September 10, 1971. Thus, the legal maxim, cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex (the
reason for the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases), applies to this case. (People vs. Almuete,
69 SCRA 410)

Self-repealing law.

The anomalous act attributed to Pedro de los Reyes as described in the information is
undoubtedly a violation of Republic Act No. 650 being a " material misrepresentation in any
document required" by said Act "or the rules and regulations issued thereunder" and was
committed while said Act was in force. It was punishable under Section 18 of said Act with fine
or imprisonment, or both, and with forfeiture of the goods or commodities imported in violation
thereof. (Sec. 18, R.A. No. 650) But since Rep. Act No. 650 expired by its own limitation on
June 30, 1953, the forfeiture therein provided could no longer be subsequently enforced. And,
as correctly stated by the Undersecretary of Justice in his Opinion No. 138, dated July
22,1953, "the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Customs to proceed with the forfeiture of
goods and commodities imported in violation of the Import Control Law was lost and that all
proceedings of forfeiture, as well as criminal actions pending on June 30, 1953, abated with
the expiration of Republic Act No. 650."

The falsification or misrepresentation allegedly committed on the import license could no

longer be a basis for the penalty of forfeiture at the time of the release of goods. Where an act
expires by its own limitation, the effect is the same as though it had been repealed at the time
of its expiration; and it is a recognized rule in this jurisdiction that the repeal of a law carries
with it the deprivation of the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence persons charged
with violation of the old law prior to the repeal. (People vs. Jacinto, C.A., 54 O.G. 7587)

Construction of penal laws.

1. Penal laws are strictly construed against the Government and liberally in favor of the
accused. (U.S. vs. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243; People vs. Yu Hai, 99 Phil. 728) The rule that
penal statutes should be strictly construed against the State may be invoked only where the
law is ambiguous and there is doubt as to its interpretation. Where the law is clear and
unambiguous, there is no room for the application of the rule. (People vs. Gatchalian, 104 Phil.
664)

2. In the construction or interpretation of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, the
Spanish text is controlling, because it was approved by the Philippine Legislature in its Spanish
text. (People vs. Manaba, 58 Phil. 665, 668)

People vs. Garcia

(94 Phil. 814, 815)

Facts: Accused Garcia was prosecuted for having sold tickets for "Have" races of the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes, in violation of Act 4130, as amended by Commonwealth Act
No. 301, which penalizes any person who, without being a duly authorized agent of the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes, sold tickets of said corporation. The tickets sold by the
accused were different from, and not, the tickets issued by said corporation. The law relied
upon does not include "Have" tickets for Sweepstakes races.

Held: The accused must be acquitted, the act imputed to him not being punished by Act 4130,
as amended.

No person should be brought within the terms of criminal statutes who is not clearly within
them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by the statute.
(U.S. vs. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243, 246)

People vs. Mangulabnan (99 Phil. 992, 998)

Facts: During the robbery in a dwelling house, one of the culprits fired his gun upward in the
ceiling, not knowing that there was a person in the ceiling of the house. The owner of the house
who was up in the ceiling was hit by the slug that passed through it and was killed.

Art. 294, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code provides, according to its English text, that the
crime is robbery with homicide "when by reason or on occasion of the robbery the crime of
homicide shall have been committed."

The Spanish text of the same provision reads, as follows: "Cuando con motivo o con ocasion
del robo resultare homicidio."

Held: In view of the Spanish text which must prevail, the crime committed is robbery with
homicide, even if the homicide supervened by mere accident.

While the English text of Art. 294, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code seems to convey the
meaning that the homicide should be intentionally committed, the Spanish text means that it is
sufficient that the homicide shall have resulted, even if by mere accident.