Peirce and Logicism: Notes Towards an Exposition

Author(s): Susan Haack

Source: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Winter, 1993), pp. 33-56
Published by: Indiana University Press
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 Susan Haack

Peirce and Logicism:

Notes Towards an Exposition*

My damnedbrainhas a kink
in it thatpreventsmefrom
thinkingas otherpeoplethink.
[C.S. Peirce]1

1. Introduction:
Was Peirce a logicist?If one has to give a simpleanswer,cer-
tainly it must be "no;" but the issue is sufficiently far from
straightforward that a simple answer is not fullyadequate. How
far fromstraightforward the issue is mightbe illustratedby the
fact that Murphey opens chapter XII of The Developmentof
PeircefsPhilosophywith a discussionof Peirce's objections to the
logicistposition representedby Dedekind, but closes chapter
as
XIII with the observationthat "[i]n spirit.. . Peirce has more in
common with the logicisticschool than with intuition ism."2 He
makesno commentabout the apparenttension.
In fact,the evidenceseems to be that,thoughstaunchlyoppos-
ing one characteristic logicistthesis,Peirce sympathizedwith an-
other. Since the two theses appear to stand or fall together,as
Frege assumed they did, this raises some, intriguingquestions,
both exegeticaland philosophical.In hopes that here, as else-
where,theremay be somethingimportantto be learnedthanksto
the "kink"in Peirce's brain,I offerin thispaper my (preliminary,
and prettytentative)attemptto spell out somethingof his con-
ceptionof the relationof mathematics to logic.

2. Background:Peirce'sknowledge oflogicism:
There is no referenceto logicismin the indicesto the Collected
Papers? nor in the indicesto the firstfourvolumesof the Chron-
ologicalEditionf nor in the indicesto the New ElementsofMathe-

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34 Susan Haack

mattes.5Only in his discussionsof Dedekind, whom he mentions

at 4.239 (1902) as holdingthat "mathematics is a branchof log-
- -
ic" a thesisPeirce immediatelyrejects does he come even close
to an explicitdiscussionof logicism.
Frege recognized Dedekind as having anticipatedthe logicist
view,writingin the Grundgezetze that "Herr Dedekind, like my-
self,is of the opinion thatthe theoryof numbersis partof logic,"
but went on to say that Dedekind's work "hardlycontributesto
[this opinion's] confirmation"because it is insufficiently rigor-
ous.6 But thereis no reference to Frege in eitherthe CollectedPa-
persor the New Elements,and the few references in the Chrono-
logicalEditionare all to the editors'introductions, not to Peirce's
text. Peirce must have known something of Frege's work;
Schrodersent him a copy of his reviewof the Begriffsschrifft, and
ChristineLadd listed this reviewand the Begriffsschrijft itselfin
the bibliographyof her paper, "On the Algebraof Logic," in the
Studiesin Logicpublishedby membersof the JohnsHopkins Uni-
versityand edited by Peirce.7I conjecturethatSchroder'son the
whole hostile review,and especiallyhis claim that,apparentlyin
ignoranceof Boole's work,Frege was effectively just transcribing
his calculus of judgementsin a clumsynew notation,may have
disinclinedPeirce to takeany further interestin Frege's work.8
Peirce reviewedRussell's PrinciplesofMathematicsin 1903, but
the reviewamountsonly to a cursoryparagraph;Murpheyconjec-
turesthatPeirce may not actuallyhave read the book at the time
he wrotethe review.9Apartfromthis,all the references to Russell
in the CollectedPapersare supplied by the editors,as is the one
referencein the ChronologicalEdition. The severalreferencesin
the New Elementsare all dismissive,the most notable describing
Russell and Whiteheadas "blunderers,continuallyconfusingdif-
ferentquestions" (III/2, p. 785, 1906).
But in theirfootnoteto 3.43-4 (1876) Hartshome and Weiss
commenton the affinity betweenPeirce's definitionof cardinals,

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 Peirceand Logicism 35

and thatof Principia,Mathematica,. In the articleon Peircein the

Dictionaryof American Biography,P.W., referring to the same
1867 paper,writesthatPeirce "clearlyanticipatedthe methodfor
the derivationand definitionof numberemployedin the epochal
PrincipiaMathematica."™And the same point is made in Eisele's
Studiesin theScientificand,MathematicalPhilosophy ofC.S. Peirce;
Peirce, Eisele writes,anticipated"many of the ideas to be found
in ... PrincipiaMathematica."11
In the circumstances, the best strategyseems to be to begin by
consideringthe characteristic thesesof logicism,and investigating
Peirce'sattitudeto those theses.

3. Two Characteristic ThesesofLogicism:

Logicismcomes in two versions:a narrower,concerningthe re-
lation of arithmeticto logic, and a broader,concerningthe rela-
tion of mathematics to logic. Frege's logicismwas of the narrower
variety,Russell and Whitehead'sof the broader.12In eitherver-
sion, thereare two theses centralto logicism,one formal,the oth-
er epistemological.The formeris to the effectthatall the special
conceptsof mathematics[arithmetic]are definablein purelylogi-
cal terms,and all the theoremsof mathematics[arithmetic]are
thenderivablefrompurelylogical principles.For short,thisis the
thesisthat mathematics [arithmetic]is reducibleto logic,to which
I shall referas (LI). Closely associated are the theses that the
propositionsof mathematics[arithmetic]are analytic,and (in
Frege at least) that mathematical[arithmetical]objects are ab-
stract,neithermental nor physical.The epistemologicalthesisof
logicism is to the effectthat because of the certaintyor self-
evidence of the logical axioms, the reducibilityof mathematics
[arithmetic]to logic explains the peculiar security,the a priori
character,of mathematical[arithmetical]knowledge. For short,
thisis the thesisthattheepistemological foundationsofmathematics
[arithmetic]lie in logic,to whichI shall referas (L2).

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36 Susan Haack

Frege took it for grantedthat (LI) and (L2) stand or fall to-
gether:
. . . arithmeticis a branchof logic and need not borrow
any ground of proof whateverfromexperienceor intui-
tion. . . . Everyaxiom which is needed must be discov-
ered ... it is just the hypotheseswhichare made without
clear consciousnessthat hinderour insightinto the epis-
temologicalnatureof a law.13
And so, it seems, until he feltthe need to hedge his bets about
the rationaleforthe Axiom of Infinity,did Russell:

The connectionof mathematicswithlogic ... is exceed-

inglyclose. The fact that all mathematicalconstantsare
logical constants,and thatall the premissesof mathemat-
ics are concernedwith these gives,I believe,the precise
statementof what philosophershave meant in asserting
thatmathematics is à priori.1*
But the textual evidence seems to indicate that Peirce sympa-
thized with somethinglike (LI) while resolutelyopposing any-
thinglike (L2).

4. Peirce's sympathy
withthefirstlogicistthesis:
In the second Lowell lectureof 1866 (CE 1, p. 386), Peirce
writesthat "mathematical demonstrationcan be reducedto syllo-
gism;" by 1867 he is claimingmuch more than this,opening a
paper entitled"Upon the Logic of Mathematics"thus:
The object of thispaper is to show thatthereare certain
generalpropositionsfromwhich the truthsof mathemat-
ics followsyllogistically,
and that these propositionsmay
be takenas definitionsof the objects underthe considera-
tion of the mathematician . . . (3.20; CE2, pp. 59-60)

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 Peirceand Logicism 37

What followsappears to be an attemptedreductionof arithmeti-

cal propositionsto Boolean logic. And in the course of the paper
Peirce presentsa discussionof cardinalnumberwhich,as Hart-
shorneand Weiss,P.W., and Eisele all remark,bearsa strikingaf-
finitywiththe definitionoffered,much later,in PrincipiaMathe-
matica:
... let the letters,in the particularapplicationof Boole's
calculus now supposed, be terms of second intention
which relate exclusivelyto the extensionof firstinten-
tions. Let the differences of the characteristics
of things
and eventsbe disregarded,and let the letterssignifyonly
the differences of classesas wideror narrower.. . . Thus
n in anothercase of Boole's calculusmight,forexample,
denote "New England States;" but in the case now sup-
posed, all the characterswhich make those States what
theyare being neglected,it would signifyonly what es-
sentiallybelongs to a class which has the same relations
to higherand lower classeswhichthe class of New Eng-
land Stateshas,- thatis, a collectionof six.
In this case, the sign of identitywill receive a special
meaning.For, if m denotes what essentiallybelongs to a
class of the rankof "sides of cube," then n = m will im-
ply,not thateveryNew England State is a side of a cube,
and conversely, but thatwhateveressentially belongsto a
class of the numerical rank of "New England States" es-
sentiallybelongs to a class of the numericalrank "sidesof
a cube," and conversely.Identityof this sort may be
termedequality.. . . (3.43-4; C£, 2, pp. 68-9)
Peirce's firstpaper on the logic of relativesappeared in 1870.
Subsequently,in a paper in which he returnsto the relationof
arithmetic to logic, and whichopens:

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38 Susan Haack

Nobody can doubt the elementarypropositionsconcern-

ing number. . . The object of thispaper is to show that
theyare strictlysyllogisticconsequences froma few pri-
marypropositions. . . which I here regard as defini-
tions . . . (3.252; C£, 4, p. 299, 1881)

he observes that these "syllogistic"derivationswill require the

logic of relatives.It was of course also crucialto Frege's program
that by developinga logic in which relationsare expressiblehe
overcame the difficulty which frustrated Leibniz's proto-logicist
project,thatarithmeticcannot be reducedto Aristotelian syllogis-
tic logic because of the inabilityof that logic to representrela-
tions.
At 4.88 (1893) Peirce points out how numericalpropositions
of the form"There are n Fs" maybe "syllogistic conclusionsfrom
particularpropositions;"for example, that from "Some A is B"
and "Some not-A is B" it followsthat thereare at least two Bs.
He continues(4.93) by remarking that "thereare variouswaysin
which arithmeticmay be conceived to connect itselfwith and
springout of logic"- the way just indicated,and the ways de-
scribedin the two earlierpapersdiscussedabove.
A discussionsomewhatmisleadingly entitled"Synthetical Prop-
ositionsA Priori"(NEM, IV, pp. 82fF.,1892) insiststhatmathe-
matical propositionseither "define an ideal hypothesis(in the
mathematicalsense)" or else are "deductionsfromthose defini-
tions" (p. 82). To illustratethis,Peirce continues,he will "prove
fromdefinitions that7 + 5 = 12." "Only an ignoranceof the log-
ic of relatives,"he continues,"has made anotheropinion possi-
ble."
It certainlylooks, in short,as if Peirce sympathizedwithsome-
thingmuch like (LI).
The position with respectto the thesis,which for Frege and
Russell is virtuallyidentifiedwith the logicistthesisI have called

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 Peirceand Logicism 39

(LI), thatthe truthsof mathematics[arithmetic]are analytic,is a

bit more ambiguous. In the paper of 1893 mentionedearlier,
Peirceremarksthatthe wayarithmetic springsout of logic "is suf-
ficientto refuteKant's doctrinethat the propositionsof arithme-
tic are 'synthetical'"(4.91), and goes on to criticizeMill's con-
ceptionof arithmetical laws as verygeneralempiricalpropositions.
He is keen,however,to insistthat "thosewho [like myself]main-
tain that arithmeticaltruthsare logicallynecessary"are not "eo
ipsosayingthat theyare verbalin theirnature."Similarly,in the
paper of 1892 in which Peirce offershis proofof "7 + 5 = 12"
fromdefinitions, he concludesthat "the propositionin questionis
analytical explicatory,"but makesa point of adding, "but, no
or
doubt, Kant had a verynarrowconceptionof explicatory proposi-
tions, owing to his knowingnothing of the logic of relatives"
(NEM, IV, p. 84). A discussionof "essentialpredication"from
1901 makes it clear that Peirce is uneasy about the way Kant's
definitionsuggeststhatwhat is analytically true must be obvious:
an essentialpredicationis one wherethe predicateis containedin
the essence of the subject, hence, analyticin Kant's sense; but,
Peirce continues,neitherKant nor the scholasticsrealized that
"an indefinitely complicatedproposition,veryfar fromobvious,
may ... be deduced ... by the logic of relatives,froma defini-
tion of the utmostsimplicity ... ; and thismaycontainmanyno-
tions not implicitin the definition"(2.361, 1901). In view of
this,it is not so surprisingthat,by 1902, one findsPeirce denying
that mathematicaltruthsare analytic;of Kant's conception of
mathematicaltruthsas synthetica priori, he remarksthat it is
true,at any rate,that "theyare not, for the most part,what he
called analyticaljudgements; ... the predicateis not, in the
sense intended, contained in the definitionof the subject"
(4.232). I thinkthereis no real contradictionhere,only a verbal
shift;Peirce holds, on the one hand, that mathematicaltruthsare
deducible fromdefinitions,but insists,on the other, that this

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40 Susan Haack

does not mean thattheyare trivial,obvious,or merelyverbal.15

But it should alreadybe apparentthatPeirce should not be ex-
pected to take (LI) to have the epistemologicalconsequences
which Frege and Russell supposed; for he is chafingagainstthe
distinctionof analyticand synthetic.Mathematicaltruthsstraddle
the usual distinction:they are not empiricalgeneralizations,but
necessarytruths - necessarytruths,however,discoverableby ob-
servationof or experimentation on imagineddiagrams.
The positionwith respectto the other thesiscloselyassociated,
in Frege at least, with (LI), mathematicalPlatonism, is less
straightforward yet.16True, at 4.118 (1893) Peircespeaksof "the
Platonic world of pure formswith which mathematicsis always
dealing," and in the prospectusfor his 12-volume Principlesof
Philosophy (c.1893) he entitlesthe thirdvolume,Plato's World:an
Elucidation of the Ideas of Modern Mathematics.17 But at 4.161
(c.1897) we read: "[the systemof abstractnumbers]is a cluster
of ideas of individualthings,but it is not a clusterof real things.
It ... belongs to the world of ideas, or Inner World. But nor
does the mathematician, though he "createsthe idea for himself
create it absolutely." This is prettybafflinguntil one reads, at
6.455 (1908), "[o]f the three Universesof Experience... the
firstcomprisesall mere Ideas, those airy nothingsto which the
mind of poet [or] pure mathematician. . . mightgive local
habitation. . . "18The idea seems to be thatthe constructions of
the mathematician actualize what alreadyhad the statusof possi-
bility,of firstness.So while in the earlierpiece Peirce denied that
numbersare real,i.e., independentof thought,he now writesthat
"the fact that theirBeing consistsin mere capabilityof getting
thought,not in anybody'sActuallythinkingthem,saves theirRe-
ality." If this is Platonism,it is Platonismof a verydistinctively
Peirceanstripe.19

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 Peirceand Logicism 41

5. Puree's repudiationofthesecondlogicistthesis:
Peirce's repudiationof (L2) seems almostcompletelyunambig-
uous. I say "almost" because of the followingpassage, the only
one I have foundthateven appearsto suggestany sympathy with
(L2); it comes fromchapter7 of a ms "towarda logic book" of
1872-3, entitled"Of Logic as a Studyof Signs:"
The businessof Algebrain its most generalsignification is
to exhibitthe mannerof tracingthe consequencesof sup-
posing that certainsigns are subject to certainlaws. And
it is thereforeto be regardedas partof Logic. (CEy 3, p.
83)
What immediatelyfollows,however,is an argumentagainst "cer-
tain logiciansof some popular repute" (the editorsremark,"the
referenceis almost certainlyto W. StanleyJevons") who claim
thatalgebra is "inapplicableto logic." In view of this,and of the
factthat a littlelater(p. 92) Peirce is foundexplaininghow one
bit of algebraicnotation, "a- <b," may be interpreted as repres-
senting "a is smallerthan b" or "all a is b" or "b is a conse-
"
quence of a, the most plausibleexplanationof the passage quot-
ed seems to be as insistingon the usefulnessof algebraic
notationto logic, not as claimingthe epistemicdependenceof al-
gebra on logic.20
Everyother relevanttext I have come across seems to indicate
unambiguouslythat Peirce was strenuouslyopposed to the thesis
thatmathematicsis foundedepistemologically on logic.21
is
For Peirce,it Dedekind who representsthe idea that mathe-
maticsis a branchof logic. ApparentlyPeirce's fatherwas, at the
time he was writinghis Linear AssociativeAlgebra^attractedto
somethinglike thisview; Peirce reportsthathe did his best to dis-
suade him.22And the other evidence of Peirce's repudiationof
anythinglike (L2) is overwhelming."We homelythinkersbelieve
that . . . the safestway is to appeal forour logical principlesto

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42 Susan Haack

the science of mathematics"(3.427, 1896). "It does not seem to

me that mathematicsdepends in any way upon logic" (4.228,
1902). "[L]ogic depends on mathematics"(4.240, 1902). "Math-
ematicsis not subject to logic. Logic depends on mathematics"
(2.191, 1902). "Logic can be of no avail to mathematics;but
mathematicslays the foundationson which logic builds" (2.197,
1902). [Mathematics . . . has no need of any appeal to logic"
(4.242, 1902). "[T]rue mathematicalreasoningis so much more
evidentthan it is possible to renderany doctrineof logic proper
. . . thatan appeal in mathematicsto logic would only embroila
situation"(4.243, 1902). "[TJhereis no more satisfactory way of
assuringourselvesof anythingthanthe mathematical wayof assur-
ing ourselves of mathematicaltheorems.No aid from logic is
called forin thisfield"(2.192, 1902). "[Mjathematicsis almost,if
not quite, theonlysciencewhichstandsin no need of aid fromthe
scienceoflogic"(2.81, 1902). "[T]here are but fivetheoreticalsci-
ences which do not more or less depend on the science of logic
. . . the firstis mathematics. . . Mathematicshas no occasion to
inquireinto the theoryof validityof its own arguments;forthese
are more evidentthanany such theorycould be" (2.120, 1902).

6. The explanationof Peirce'sapparentsympathy with (LI) and

repudiationof (L2) does not lie in the distinction
betweenbroad
and narrowlogicismi
On the assumptionthat (LI) and (L2) stand or fall together,
Peirce'spositionstandsin need of explanation.One diagnosisthat
suggestsitself,since the passages which indicatesympathywith
somethinglike (LI) seem to be concernedwiththe reducibility of
arithmeticto logic, while the passages repudiating(L2) seem to
be concernedwiththe epistemicpriority of mathematics over log-
ic, is that Peirce sympathizeswith (LI) in the narrowinterpreta-
tion ("arithmeticis reducibleto logic") but rejects(L2) in the
broad interpretation ("the epistemicfoundationsof mathematics

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 Peirceand Logicism 43

lie in logic"). There are a couple of complicatingfactors:Peirce

dislikesthe traditionaldivisionof mathematicsinto algebra and
geometry:(1.283, 4.247, both 1903), and he sometimesuses
"geometry,"simpliciter,to referto physicalgeometry(3.427,
1896); nevertheless, thisexplanationcan be decisivelyruledout.
Peirce'ssympathy with(LI) doesincludeits applicationto pure
geometry. This is indicated by his observationat 3.526 (1897)
that "forprojectivegeometry,Schuberthas developedan algebrai-
cal calculus which has a most remarkableaffinity to the Boolian
logic;" and cf. 4.131 (1893) whichdescribesSchubert'sCalculus
ofEnumerativeGeometry as "the mostextensiveapplicationof the
Boolian algebrawhich has ever been made . . . the classicaltrea-
tise upon geometryas viewed fromthe standpointof arithme-
tic."23But most decisive is this passage fromthe paper entitled
"SyntheticalPropositionsA Priori," alreadycited above; where,
afterhis proofof "7 + 5 = 12" fromdefinitions, and his comment
is
thatthisjudgement analytic(though not in quite Kant's narrow
sense), Peircecontinues:
Some have been of the opinion that while arithmetical
propositionsare analytic,geometricalones are synthetic.
But I am certain they are all of the same character.
(ITEM, IV, p. 84, 1892)

7. The explanationof Peirce'sapparentsympathy with (LI) and

repudiationof (L2) does notlie in a simplechangeofmind:
Anotherdiagnosis that suggestsitself,in part because the pas-
sages I have cited that seem to bespeak sympathywith (LI) are
generallyearlierthan those I have cited as indicatingPeirce's re-
pudiationof (L2), is thatPeirce may have shiftedfromearlylogi-
cist sympathiesto a later disenchantment with this kind of ap-
proach.
This conjecturemightbe thoughtto be supportedby the fact

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44 Susan Haack

thatPeirce manyyearslaterdescribedthe paper of 1867 in which

he claimed to show that arithmeticalpropositionsare derivable
fromdefinitionsas, he trusted,"by farthe worstI
syllogistically
have everwritten"(4.333, c.1905). But thisis not decisive:forhe
continuesby remarking thatthe paper was "foundedon an inter-
estingidea, worthyof a betterdevelopment."(The contextsug-
gests that he thoughthis account of cardinalsin that paper, the
one so close to PrincipiaMathematica,could be improved;but it
also indicatesthat by this time- 1905- Peirce was firmly of the
opinion that ordinals In
are primary,not cardinals.)24 any case,
for all his harshnessabout the 1867 paper, Peirce subsequently
describedthe paper of 1893 whichI have also cited as indicating
sympathy with(LI) as the strongesthe had everwritten.25
Anotherpassage which mightat firstblush be thoughtto sug-
gest a change of mind,wherePeirceremarksthatthe "nearestap-
proach to a logical analysis of mathematicalreasoning" was
Schroder'sstatementof Dedekind's analysisin a logical algebra
devisedby Peirce himself,but that "the soul of the reasoninghas
even here not been caught in the logical net" (4.426, c. 1903),
turnsout, a few paragraphslater,to be only paving the way for
the observationthat the systemof existentialgraphs,being dia-
grammatic,representsmathematicalreasoningbetterthan any al-
gebraicnotation(4.429). 26
Not only is there no decisive evidence of a change of mind;
there is also prettydecisive evidence against it. At 4.90 (1893)
Peirce expressesbothsympathywith somethinglike (LI) and in
the same sentence antipathyto anythinglike (L2): "... the
whole theoryof numbersbelongs to logic; or rather,it would do
so were it not, as mathematics, prelogical^that is, even more ab-
stractthan logic." And then thereis also Peirce's reminiscence of
to
trying persuade his father against "the opinion that Dedekind
long afterwardembraced" (that mathematicsis part of logic),
which must referto a time before the publicationof Benjamin

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 Peirceand Logicism 45

Peirce's Linear AssociativeAlgebra in 1870- which certainly

seems to rule out treatingPeirce's repudiationof (L2) as a late
development.

8. The explanation lies, at least in part, in an ambiguityin

Peirce'suse of "logic:"
When Peirce remarksin the paper of 1893 (4.85ff.) discussed
above that "there are severalways in which arithmeticmay be
conceived to springout of logic," "logic" evidentlymeans "for-
mal deductivelogic." But unlike Frege, who seems virtuallyal-
waysto mean "formaldeductivelogic" when he writesof "logic,"
Peirce uses "logic" in a whole rangeof ways,of whichthisis one
of the narrowest.My presentconcern is not with Peirce's shift
froman earlierconceptionof logic as a small part of semeiotic,
the partdealingwiththe truthand falsity of sentences,to his later
identification of logic and semeiotic.27It is ratherto point out
that "logic," for Peirce,oftenhas the broad sense of "theoryof
reasoning" (see e.g., 4.242, 1902); that deductivelogic is only
part of logic thus broadlyconceived- the branchconcernedwith
the theoryof necessaryreasoning;and that Peirce holds thatfor-
mal logic is a branchof mathematics. At 4.228 (1902), forexam-
ple, he writes that "all formal is
logic merelymathematicsapplied
to logic;" and at 4.240 (1902) that "[t]here is a mathematical
logic,just as thereis a mathematical optics . . . Mathematicallog-
ic is formallogic," but "[fjormallogicis byno meansthewholeof
logic,or eventheprincipalpart. It is hardlyto be reckoned a part of
logicproper"(my italics). And sure enough, in the "Outline Clas-
sificationof the Sciences" of 1903 (1.180ÍF.) Peirce definitely ex-
cludes "the mathematicsof logic" fromlogic proper;the latteris
classifiedas one of threenormativesciences,the formeras one of
the sciencesof discovery.
Let "LOGIC" mean "theoryof reasoning"and "logic" mean
"mathematicalformalizationof necessaryreasoning." The evi-

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46 Susan Haack

dence consideredthus farmightnow be reconstruedas indicating

thatPeirce holds thatmathematicsis reducibleto logic,but denies
that mathematicsis epistemically
subordinateto LOGIC. If logic
is conceivedas a branchof mathematicsratherthanas a branchof
LOGIC, the appearanceof tensioncan be banished.Certainlythe
distinctionseems helpfulwhen applied to a characteristic
passage
likethisone:
If there is any part of logic [LOGIC] of which mathe-
maticsstandsin need, it can onlybe thatverypartof log-
ic [logic]whichconsistsmerelyin an applicationof math-
ematics,so thatthe appeal will be, not of mathematics
to
a priorscience of logic [LOGIC], but of mathematicsto
mathematics[logic]. (1.247, 1902)
I conjecture,also, that the maturePeirce may tend increasingly
to preferto use "logic" in the broadestsense,and to regardfor-
mal deductivelogic at most as only a smallpartof it, and eventu-
ally as not part of it at all; and that he tends, understandably,
therefore, more and more to downplaythe importanceof the re-
ducibilityof mathematicsto logic,and more and more to stress
the importanceof the epistemicindependenceof mathematics
fromLOGIC. This would explainwhythe passagesI foundindi-
catingsympathy with,as I put it, "somethinglike(LI)" are most-
ly early,and those indicatingantipathyto "anythinglike (L2)"
mostlylater.
But we are not yet quite out of the woods. If my diagnosisis
correct,what Peirce denies when he denies that the epistemic
foundationsof mathematicslie in logic (which on my interpreta-
tion means, "in LOGIC") is not afterall what Frege or Russell
would mean by the thesisthatthe foundationsof mathematicslie
in logic- forno such distinctionas thatbetweenLOGIC and log-
ic is appropriatein their case. But this obviouslydoesn't mean
that there is no real disagreementhere;28what it means is that

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 Peirceand Logicism 47

the real disagreementwould be more perspicuously representedas

follows:Peirce, like the logicists,sympathizeswith the idea that
mathematicsis reducible to a formal deductive system,logic,
which, however,they regard as distinctfrom and epistemically
priorto mathematics, but which he does not; forPeirce'sview is
that mathematicsrequiresno foundation,that it is epistemically
more secure than anythingthatsupposedlygroundedit could be.
of logicas mathematicsratherthan LOGIC,
Peirce's classification
to put it anotherway,can be seen as an expressionof his convic-
tion of the epistemicautonomyof mathematics.An examination
of Peirce's reasonsforthat convictionsuppliesfurthermotivation
forthisway of lookingat it.

9. Peirce'sreasonsfor insistingon theepistemic autonomyofmath-

ematics-.
Afterreportinghow he argued with his fatheragainstthe idea
that mathematicsis a branchof logic [LOGIC], Peirce continues
by observingthat "no two thingscould be more directlyopposite
than the cast of mind of the mathematician and thatof the logi-
interestin reasoningis as a means
cian . . . [T]he mathematician's
of solvingproblems. . . [T]he logician ... is interestedin pick-
ing a method to pieces and findingout what its essentialingre-
dientsare," a thoughtechoed at 4.533 (1906). Shrewdas these
remarksare, however,they are insufficient to establishthe epis-
temic independence of mathematicsfrom LOGIC. Indeed,
Frege- who himself, though professionallya mathematician,
seems to have had the logician'stemperament - says
par excellence
much the same: "[mathematiciansgenerallyare indeed only con-
cernedwiththe contentof a propositionand the factthatit is to
be proved.What is new in thisbook is ... the way in whichthe
proof is carriedout and the foundationson which it rests . . .
[an] essentially viewpoint. . ."29
different
"The difference betweenthe two sciencesis farmore than that

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48 Susan Haack

betweentwo points of view," Peirce writesat 4.240 (1902); it is

a matterof the classification of the sciences(4.134, 1891). Actu-
ally,he says a "mere" matterof the classification of the sciences,
but the "mere" here seems excessivelyself-deprecatory in view of
the importancePeirce alwaysattachedto this classification. In all
the severalclassifications of the sciences that Peirce devised,re-
vised and re-revisedthroughouthis life,it seems, mathematicsis
at the head, and logic occupies a subordinateposition.30
The business of logic (i.e., LOGIC), according to Peirce, is
"analysisand theoryof reasoning,but not the practiceof it"
(4.134, 1891). The connection with the epistemicpriorityof
mathematicsover LOGIC is clear when Peirce observes,in the
contextof a discussionof Dedekind, that mathematicsis the sci-
ence which draws necessaryconclusions,LOGIC the science of
drawingnecessary conclusions(2.249, 1902). And "justas it is not
necessary,in orderto talk,to understandthe theoryof the forma-
tion of vowel sounds, so it is not necessary,in orderto reason,to
be in possessionof the theoryof reasoning" - indeed,Peirce con-
if
tinues, it were, "the scienceof logic could neverbe developed"
(4.242, 1902).
Peirce insistson the epistemicpriority of mathematics:"the saf-
est way is to appeal for our logical principlesto the science of
mathematics,where errorcan only go unexplodedon condition
of its not being suspected"(3.427, 1896); "mathematics performs
its reasoningsby a logica utensit develops foritself,and has no
need for any appeal to a logica Aocens"(1.417, c.1896); "if the
mathematician ever hesitatesor errsin his reasoning,logic cannot
come to his aid. He would be farmore liable to commitsimilaras
well as other errorsthere" (4.228, 1902); "mathematicsis the
one [sic] science to which . . . logic is not pertinent;fornothing
can be more evident than its own unaided reasonings"(7.524,
undated). Notice how Peirce uses "evident"as a matterof de-
gree; there is no suggestionthat the truthsof mathematicsare

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 Peirceand Lo£ficism49

self-evident.The reasoningof mathematics is fallible,Peirceholds,

but "there is no more satisfactory way of assuringourselvesof
anything than the mathematical way ..." (2.192, 1902).
It is surprisingly difficultto figureout whether,when Peirce
saysthatmathematics is the sciencewhichdrawsnecessaryconclu-
sions, he means (1) conclusions which follow necessarilyfrom
theirpremisses,or (2) conclusionsthemselvesnecessary,or (3)
both. The symmetry of Peircefs remarksabout the business re-
spectivelyof mathematicsand of LOGIC seems to call for the
firstanswer,and so mighthis observationthatmathematical truth
is "hypothetical"- until one notices that he equates "hypotheti-
cal" with "non-factual"(4.232, 1902), which suggeststhe third
answer.This (the thirdinterpretation) would not requireone to
attributeto Peirce the idea that all deductivelyvalid reasoningis
mathematics,31 and it accomodates his observationthat, though
LOGIC is, mathematicsisn't a "positive"science (7.524, undat-
ed), and his claim that "[mathematical]necessitymust spring
fromsome truthso broad as to hold not onlyforthe universewe
know but forany worldthatpoet could create"(1.417, c.1896).
At any rate,it is clear that Peirce conceivesof mathematicsas
concernedwith abstractstructuralhypotheses,its truthsas apply-
ing to all possiblesituationswitha certainstructure. And here lies
an explanationof his beliefin the epistemicautonomyof mathe-
matics.The abstractstructuresabout which mathematicians rea-
son and on whichtheyexperimentare patternswhichtheythem-
selves construct,abstract,or, perhaps best, actualize; and this is
why Peirce holds that mathematicalreasoning,though fallible,is
as secureas any reasoningcould be. "[Mathematics does not re-
late to any matterof fact,but merelyto whetherone supposition
excludes another. Since we ... create the suppositions,we are
competentto answer. . ." (2.191, 1902); "[in mathematicalrea-
soning] all pertinentfactswould be withinthe beck and call of
the imagination;and . . . nothingbut the operationof thought

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50 SusanHaack

would be necessaryto render the true answer" (4.232, 1902).

Mathematiciansmay reason carelessly;but, though mathematics
fallible,(4.233, 1902), no appeal to LOGIC could
is, therefore,
its
improve security.

10. Envoi:
AfterRussell's paradox, Godel's incompletenesstheorem,the
proliferationof rivalset-theories,the claimthatset-theoryis "pure
logic" and "self-evident"is no longerplausible,and the epistemo-
logical promisesof the logicistprogramsound hollow. Here is
Quine's verdicton logicismi"... mathematics reducesonlyto set
theory and not to logic proper . . . the axioms of set theoryhave
less obviousnessand certaintyto recommendthem thando most
of the mathematicaltheoremswe would derivefromthem.More-
over, we know fromGòdel's work that no consistentaxiom sys-
tem can cover mathematicseven when we renounceself-evidence.
Reductionin the foundationsof mathematicsremainsmathemati-
callyand philosophicallyfascinating, but it does not do what the
epistemologistwould like of it; it does not revealthe ground of
mathematicalknowledge. . ,"32 This sounds remarkably, does it
not, like concedingthatsomethinglike (LI) is true,but denying
thatanythinglike (L2) is defensible?Here, as so often,one might
say,Peircesounds ahead of his time.
As historiansof logic remindus, Peirce belongs to anothertra-
dition than the Frege-Russell-Whitehead line that came to pre-
dominate.33What I have offeredhere,thoughveryfarfroma full
account of Peirce's understandingof the relationof mathematics
to logic, and furtheryet froma serious attemptto figureout
what mightbe defensiblein thataccount,is enough vividlyto il-
lustratehow Peirce's conceptionsrun obliquely to now-familiar
dichotomies.Are mathematicaltruthsanalyticor synthetic? Peirce
us by replying:
surprises theyare not descriptions
of empirical
fact,butneither
are theymerely
verbal,norobvious.Aremathe-
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 Peirceand Logicism 51

maticalobjects createdor discoveredby us? Peirce surprisesus by

replying:"the factthat theirBeing consistsin mere capabilityof
gettingthought,not in anybody'sActuallythinkingthem,saves
theirReality."Does mathematicalknowledgedepend on experi-
ence? Peirce surprisesus by replying:mathematicalknowledge,
likeall knowledge,is acquired by experience,but by innerexperi-
ence, by observationof and experimentation on imaginedicons.
Is mathematicalknowledgecertain?Peirce surprisesus by reply-
ing: it is fallible,because we mayblunderin our reasonings,but it
stands in no need of extra-mathematical warrant.Peirce's episte-
mology of mathematics,neitherlogicistnor intuitionist,34 resist-
ant to contemporary could
categories, prove to be a valuable re-
source.

of Miami
University

NOTES

*An abridgedversionof thispaper was read at the conferenceof the So-

cietyforthe Advancementof AmericanPhilosophy,University of Califor-
nia, Santa Cruz, March 1991. The paper had its originin a discussionat
the conferenceof the Societyat Buffaloin March 1990, where Sleeper
raisedthe questionwhetherPeircewas a logicist,and Houser repliedthat
he didn't see how anyonecould suppose thathe was; I went awayto re-
locate the passages which,I thought,would show that Houser was un-
ambiguouslyin the right,but what I found convincedme that matters
are, afterall, more complex than I originallysupposed. I wish to thank
the many correspondentswho made helpfulcommentson earlierdrafts
of this paper: Claudine Engel-Tiercelin,Luciano Floridi, Angus Kerr-
Lawson, Kenneth Laine Ketner,Mark Migotti, Sidney Ratner,Richard
Robin, Ralph Sleeperand, especially,StephenLevy and Nathan Houser.
1. Attributedto Peirce in Bell, E.T., The Developmentof

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52 Susan Haack

Mathematics,McGraw Hill, New York and London, firstedition,third

impression,1940, p. 519. I owe the referenceto Houser, "Peirceas Lo-
gician/ p. 7 of his typescript.
2. Murphey,MurrayG., The Development ofPeirce's Philoso-
phy^ Harvard UniversityPress, Cambridge, MA and London, 1961; see
pp. 229-30 and 287-8.
3. Peirce,C.S., CollectedPapers,eds. Hartshorne,C, Weiss,
P., and Burks,A., Harvard UniversityPress, Cambridge,MA, 1931-58
(referencesby volume and paragraphnumber).
4. Peirce, C.S., Writings:A ChronologicalEdition, eds.
Fisch, M., Kloesel, C.J.W., Moore, E.C., Roberts,D.D., Ziegler, LA.,
Atkinson,N.A., Indiana UniversityPress,Bloomington,IN, 1982- (ref-
erencesgivenas " CE" by volume and page number).
5. Peirce,C.S., The New ElementsofMathematics, ed. Eisele,
C, Mouton, the Hague and Paris/HumanitiesPress, AtlanticHighlands,
NJ, 1976 (references givenas "NEM" by volumeand page number).
6. Frege, G., Grundgezetzeder Arithmetik(1893); English
translationby MontgomeryFurth,The Basic Laws ofArithmetic, Univer-
sityof CaliforniaPress,Berkeleyand Los Angeles,1964, p. 4.
7. See Fisch, M., "Peirceand Leibniz" (1972), in Peirce,Se-
meioticand Pragmatism,eds. Ketner,K.L. and Kloesel, C.J.W.,Indiana
University Press,Bloomington,IN, 1986, pp. 251-2 and 259 n.8.
8. "Withregardto its major content,the 'conceptualnota-
tion' could be consideredactuallya transcription of the Boolean formula
language.Withregardto its form,though,the formeris different beyond
recognition- and not to its advantage.As I have said it was with-
already
out doubt developed independently - all too independently." - from
Schroder'sreview(1880) of Frege's Begriffsschrift, in Bynum,T. Ward,
ed., ConceptualNotationand Related Articles,ClarendonPress,Oxford,
1972, p. 221. Frege himself,of course,held his systemto be superiorto
Boole's, stressingespeciallythe ambiguityof Boole's symbolism;see his
"On the Aim of the 'Conceptual Notation'," (1882), in Bynum,pp. 90-
100, and "Boole's Logical Calculus and the Concept-Script" and

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 Peircetini Logicism 53

"Boole's Logical Formula-Language and my Concept-Script"in Posthu-

mous Writings,eds. Hermes, H., Kambartel,F., Klaubach, F., trans.
Long, P. and White, R., Universityof Chicago Press, Chicago/
Blackwell's,Oxford,1979, pp. 9-46 and 47-52.
9. 8.171; Murphey,The Developmentof Peirce's Philosophy,
p. 241. Houser informsme that Peirce returnedto the Principleslater,
but the paper he began on it in 1912 was neverfinished.
10. Dumas Malone, ed., DictionaryofAmericanBiography,
CharlesScribner'sSons, New York,1934, volume 14, p. 400.
11. Eisele, C, Studies in the Scientificand Mathematical
Philosophy of Charles S. Peirce,ed. Martin,R.M., Mouton, the Hague,
Paris,New York, 1979, p. 12.
12. "... the axioms of geometryare independentof ...
the primitivelaws of logic, and consequentlyare synthetic,"Frege, G.,
Die Grundlagender Arithmetik(1884), English translationby Austin,
J.L., Blackwell's,Oxford,second edition, 1974, p. 21e. "All traditional
pure mathematics,including analyticalgeometry,may be regarded as
consistingwholly of propositionsabout the naturalnumbers,"Russell,
B., Introductionto MathematicalPhilosophy, (1919), reprintedin Putnam,
H. and Benacerraf,P., eds, Philosophy of Mathematics:SelectedReadings,
PrenticeHall, Englewood Cliffs,NJ,firstedition,1964, p. 115.
13. Frege, Grundgezetze> trans.Furth,p. 29. Cf. the follow-
ing remarksfromthe Grundlagen,trans.Austin: "I hope I may claim in
the presentworkto have made it probablethatthe laws of arithmetic are
analyticjudgements and consequently a priori.Arithmetic thus becomes
simplya developmentof logic, and everypropositionof arithmetic a law
of logic, albeit a derivativeone" (p. 99e); ". . .it emerged as a very
probableconclusionthatthe truthsof arithmetic are analyticand a prio-
ri" (p. 118e). Dummett suggests{Frege:Philosophy of Language, Duck-
worth,London, 1973, p. xv) that Frege's work is of centralimportance
to contemporary philosophy because it shiftsthe focus fromepistemology
to logic and philosophyof language; this,in view of the epistemological
motivationforFrege's logicistprogram(whichDummetthimselfvirtually

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54 Susan Haack

acknowledgeson p. xix) is seriouslymisleading.

14. Russell, B., The Principlesof Mathematics,(1903), sec-
ond edition,W.W. Norton,New York, 1938, p. 8.
15. Cf. Levy, S., "Peirce's Theoremic/CollorarialDistinc-
tion and the Interconnections Between Mathematicsand Logic," forth-
coming,for an elegant conjectureconnectingthreesenses in which,ac-
cordingto Levy,Peirceuses "analytic,"withthe distinctionin his title.
16. Frege is a platonistall right,but Russell'spositionis not
so straightforward. While in the Principlesof Mathematics(1903) he
maintaineda realistaccount of classes, by the time of "Mathematical
Logic as Based on the Theoryof Types" ((1908), reprintedin Logicand
Knowledge,ed. Marsh, R.C., Allan and Unwin, London, 1956) he was
maintainingthe "no class" theoryaccordingto whichclasses are deemed
to be logical fictions.Cf. Quine, W.V., "Russell's Ontological Develop-
ment" (1966), reprintedin Theoriesand Things,Harvard University
Press,Cambridge,MA and London, 1981, 73-85.
17. Murphey, The Developmentof Parce's Philosophy, pp.
238-9.
18. Cf. NEM IV, p. 268, c. 1895, foranothercomparison
of the mathematician and the poet.
19. So I would prefernot to describePeirce's position,as
Kerr-Lawsondoes, as "weak Platonism,"though I agree with him that
Peircewould assignmathematicalobjectsto a different categorythanreg-
ular existents.See his "Benacerrafs Problemand Weak MathematicalPla-
tonism" and "Peirce's Pre-LogicisticAccount of Mathematics,"both
forthcoming.
20. It is worthyof note that Peirce primes,double primes
and tripleprimesthe "- < "; evidentlyhe is well aware of the difficulty
potentiallycaused by an ambiguous algebraic symbolism,a difficulty
Frege regardedas disastrousforthe Boolean approach.
21. But cf. Levy, "Peirce's Theoremic/CollorarialDistinc-
tion and the InterconnectionsBetween Mathematicsand Logic;" he
holds thatPeirce'spositionon the epistemologicalthesisremainedincon-

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 Peirceand Lojficism 55

sistent,since he was aware that the activitiesof the mathematicianin-

clude, e.g,. the devisingof hypotheses,whichcomes withinlogic [LOG-
IC] in Peirce'sconception.
22. Murphey, The Developmentof Peirce's Philosophy \ pp.
229-30.
23. The editors give a referenceto Schubert, Hermann,
Katkul derAbzahlendenGeometrie, Leibzig, 1897.
24. Peirce alludes to a definitionof ordinals "which was
substantially given by me in 1883;" the editorssuggestthat thismay be
a slip, that Peirce refersto 3.260ff.,1881. I wonder,however,whether
the referencemightnot be to the paper of 1893, 4.85ff..See also fh.25
below, and cf. Levy, S., "Peirce's Ordinal Conception of Number,"
Transactionsof the CharlesS. Peirce Society,XXII.6, 1986, 23-42, espe-
ciallyhis m. 10.
25. Editors' note to 4.85 (1893) refersto "vol. 9, lettersto
Judge Russell/ as the source of this claim. I have been unable to find
the remarkin the lettersto Russellpublishedin NEM, so cannot supply
a date. Can anybodyhelp here?
26. It may be asked whetherPeirce mightn'thave givenup
his sympathywith (LI) on learningof Russell's paradox. Accordingto
Murphey,however,thereis only one referenceto the paradox in all of
Peirce'swritings,and this is so late (1910) thata change of mind at this
pointwould not supplythe explanationwe are seeking.
27. This has been well documented by the editors of the
ChronologicalEdition: see CE, 1, pp. xxii-xxiv,xxxii-xxxv; see also, of
course,Fisch,Peirce} Semeioticand Pragmatism,pp. 306, 319, 320, 323-
4, 326, 338-41, 343, 350, 390-1, 396, 435-6. All I have to add is the
observationthat as earlyas 1873 thereis a trace of the broaderconcep-
tion in the titleof a piece alreadyreferred to, "On Logic as the Studyof
Signs," CE, 3, pp. 82-4.
28. This point is of more generalinterest,since it is often
taken forgrantedthat,if a termhas a different meaningin each of two
theoriesin whichit occurs,the theoriescannot be genuinerivals.Cf. the

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56 Susan Haack

section on "meaning- variance" in my "'Realism'," Synthese, 73, 1987,

272-99 (but please ignorethe discussionof realismvsnominalismearlier
in thispiece, whichis mistaken).
29. Frege, Grundgezetze, trans.Furth,p. 5.
30. I relyon Kent, B., CharlesS. Parce: Logicand theClas-
sificationof the Sciences,MeGill-Queen's UniversityPress,Kingstonand
Montreal,1987, chapterIV.
31. Cf. 7.524, n.d.: "Pure deductivelogic, insofaras it is re-
strictedto mathematicalhypotheses, is, indeed, mere mathematics"(my
italics).
"
32. Quine, W.V., EpistemologyNaturalized,"in Ontolqgi-
cal Relativityand OtherEssays,Columbia UniversityPress, New York,
1969, p. 70.
33. See, for example, Putnam, H., "Peirce as Logician,"
HistoriaMathemaùcae,9, 1982, 290-301; Grattan-Guiness, I., "Bertrand
Russell (1872-1970) AfterTwentyYears," NotesRee. R. Soc. Lond., 44,
1990, 2180-306, section8.
34. Intuitionists,of course,like Peirce,insistthatmathemat-
ics is not epistemically dependent on logic, but ratherthe reverse.But
Peirce does not, as theydo, pose any challengeto the legitimacyof the
non-constructive partsof classicalmathematics.And thoughPeirce envis-
aged the possibilityof a non-bivalentlogic, his reasonsare quite different
fromthe Intuitionist.See Fisch and Turquette,"Peirce'sTriadicLogic"
(1966), in Peirce,Semeioticand Pragmatism,171-83. Murpheywas, I
should note, quite correctin seeing Peirce's philosophyof mathematics
as havingsomeaffinities with logicismand otheraffinities withIntuition-
ism.

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