Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 1
proceed to a second marriage even before a competent
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127406. November 27, 2000]
OFELIA P. TY, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
and EDGARDO M. REYES, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This appeal seeks the reversal of the decision dated
July 24, 1996, of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV 37897,
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Branch 160, declaring the marriage contract between
private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes and petitioner Ofelia P.
Ty null and void ab initio. It also ordered private respondent to
pay P15,000.00 as monthly support for their children Faye
Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes.
As shown in the records of the case, private respondent
married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony on
March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had a church wedding
on August 27, 1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City
declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a
valid marriage license.The church wedding on August 27,
1977, was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of
consent of the parties.
Even before the decree was issued nullifying his
marriage to Anna Maria, private respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty,
herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated by
the judge of the City Court of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they
also had a church wedding in Makati, Metro Manila.
On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a Civil
Case 1853-J with the RTC of Pasig, Branch 160, praying that
his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void. He
alleged that they had no marriage license when they got
married. He also averred that at the time he married petitioner,
he was still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time
he married petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to
Anna Maria had not been issued. The decree of nullity of his
marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only on August 4, 1980,
while his civil marriage to petitioner took place on April 4,
1979.
Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private
respondent, pointed out that his claim that their marriage was
contracted without a valid license is untrue. She submitted
their Marriage License No. 5739990 issued at Rosario, Cavite
on April 3, 1979, as Exh. 11, 12 and 12-A. He did not question
this document when it was submitted in evidence. Petitioner
also submitted the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Quezon City dated August 4, 1980, which
declared null and void his civil marriage to Anna Maria Regina
Villanueva celebrated on March 29, 1977, and his church
marriage to said Anna Maria on August 27, 1977. These
documents were submitted as evidence during trial and,
according to petitioner, are therefore deemed sufficient proof
of the facts therein. The fact that the civil marriage of private
respondent and petitioner took place on April 4, 1979, before
the judgment declaring his prior marriage as null and void is
undisputed. It also appears indisputable that private
respondent and petitioner had a church wedding ceremony on
April 4, 1982.[1]
The Pasig RTC sustained private respondents civil suit
and declared his marriage to herein petitioner null and void ab
initio in its decision dated November 4, 1991. Both parties
appealed to respondent Court of Appeals. On July 24, 1996,
the appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision. It ruled
that a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage (to
Anna Maria) must first be secured before a subsequent
marriage could be validly contracted. Said the appellate court:
We can accept, without difficulty, the doctrine cited by
defendants counsel that no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of void marriages. It does not say,
however, that a second marriage may proceed even without
a judicial decree. While it is true that if a marriage is null and
void, ab initio, there is in fact no subsisting marriage, we are
unwilling to rule that the matter of whether a marriage is valid
or not is for each married spouse to determine for himself for
this would be the consequence of allowing a spouse to
court issues a judicial decree of nullity of his first
marriage. The results would be disquieting, to say the least,
and could not have been the intendment of even the now-
repealed provisions of the Civil Code on marriage.
xxx
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing ratiocination, We modify
the appealed Decision in this wise:
1. The marriage contracted by plaintiff-appellant
[herein private respondent] Eduardo M.
Reyes and defendant-appellant [herein
petitioner] Ofelia P. Ty is declared null and
void ab initio;
2. Plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes is
ordered to give monthly support in the
amount of P15,000.00 to his children Faye
Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes from
November 4, 1991; and
3. Cost against plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M.
Reyes.
SO ORDERED.[2]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was
denied. Hence, this instant petition asserting that the Court of
Appeals erred:
I.
BOTH IN THE DECISION AND THE RESOLUTION, IN
REQUIRING FOR THE VALIDITY OF PETITIONERS
MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT, A JUDICIAL DECREE NOT
REQUIRED BY LAW.
II
IN THE RESOLUTION, IN APPLYING THE RULING
IN DOMINGO VS. COURT OF APPEALS.
III
IN BOTH THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN NOT
CONSIDERING THE CIVIL EFFECTS OF THE RELIGIOUS
RATIFICATION WHICH USED THE SAME MARRIAGE
LICENSE.
IV
IN THE DECISION NOT GRANTING MORAL AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES TO THE DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT.
The principal issue in this case is whether the decree of
nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent
marriage can be entered into validly? To resolve this question,
we shall go over applicable laws and pertinent cases to shed
light on the assigned errors, particularly the first and the
second which we shall discuss jointly.
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals
declared the marriage of petitioner to private respondent null
and void for lack of a prior judicial decree of nullity of the
marriage between private respondent and Villanueva. The
appellate court rejected petitioners claim that People v.
Mendoza[3] and People v. Aragon[4] are applicable in this
case. For these cases held that where a marriage is void from
its performance, no judicial decree is necessary to establish
its invalidity. But the appellate court said these cases, decided
before the enactment of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209 as
amended by E.O No. 227), no longer control. A binding
decree is now needed and must be read into the provisions of
law previously obtaining.[5]
In refusing to consider petitioners appeal favorably, the
appellate court also said:
Terre v. Attorney Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, 3 July 1992 is
mandatory precedent for this case. Although decided by the
High Court in 1992, the facts situate it within the regime of
the now-repealed provisions of the Civil Code, as in the
instant case.
Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 2
xxx
For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free
to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the
first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. . . .[6]
At the outset, we must note that private respondents
first and second marriages contracted in 1977 and 1979,
respectively, are governed by the provisions of the Civil
Code. The present case differs significantly from the recent
cases of Bobis v. Bobis[7] and Mercado v. Tan,[8] both
involving a criminal case for bigamy where the bigamous
marriage was contracted during the effectivity of the Family
Code,[9] under which a judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage is clearly required.
Pertinent to the present controversy, Article 83 of the
Civil Code provides that:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any
person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person
with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal
and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven
years, is generally considered as dead and before any
person believed to be so by the spouse present at the time
of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee
is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The
marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three
cases until declared null and void by a competent court.
As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void
marriage is necessary, the Civil Code contains no express
provision to that effect. Jurisprudence on the matter, however,
appears to be conflicting.
Originally, in People v. Mendoza,[10] and People v.
Aragon,[11] this Court held that no judicial decree is necessary
to establish the nullity of a void marriage. Both cases involved
the same factual milieu. Accused contracted a second
marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. After the
death of his first wife, accused contracted a third marriage
during the subsistence of the second marriage. The second
wife initiated a complaint for bigamy. The Court acquitted
accused on the ground that the second marriage is void,
having been contracted during the existence of the first
marriage. There is no need for a judicial declaration that said
second marriage is void. Since the second marriage is void,
and the first one terminated by the death of his wife, there are
no two subsisting valid marriages. Hence, there can be no
bigamy. Justice Alex Reyes dissented in both cases, saying
that it is not for the spouses but the court to judge whether a
marriage is void or not.
In Gomez v. Lipana,[12] and Consuegra v.
Consuegra,[13] however, we recognized the right of the second
wife who entered into the marriage in good faith, to share in
their acquired estate and in proceeds of the retirement
insurance of the husband. The Court observed that although
the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as
it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting,
still there was a need for judicial declaration of such nullity (of
the second marriage). And since the death of the husband
supervened before such declaration, we upheld the right of
the second wife to share in the estate they acquired, on
grounds of justice and equity.[14]
But in Odayat v. Amante (1977),[15] the Court adverted
to Aragon and Mendoza as precedents. We exonerated a
clerk of court of the charge of immorality on the ground that
his marriage to Filomena Abella in October of 1948 was void,
since she was already previously married to one Eliseo
Portales in February of the same year. The Court held that no
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void
marriages. This ruling was affirmed in Tolentino v. Paras.[16]
Yet again in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986),[17] the Court
held that there is a need for a judicial declaration of nullity of
a void marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia married Maxion in 1972. In
1978, she married another man, Wiegel. Wiegel filed a
petition with the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court to declare
his marriage to Lilia as void on the ground of her previous valid
marriage.The Court, expressly relying on Consuegra,
concluded that:[18]
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about
the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they
married each other, for then such a marriage though void still
needs according to this Court a judicial declaration
(citing Consuegra) of such fact and for all legal intents and
purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at
the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl
Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and
respondent would be regarded VOID under the
law. (Emphasis supplied).
In Yap v. Court of Appeals,[19] however, the Court found
the second marriage void without need of judicial declaration,
thus reverting to the Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon rulings.
At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put
to rest under the Family Code. Our rulings in Gomez,
Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article
40 of the Family Code.[20] Article 40 of said Code expressly
required a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
In Terre v. Terre (1992)[21] the Court, applying Gomez,
Consuegra and Wiegel, categorically stated that a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary. Thus, we
disbarred a lawyer for contracting a bigamous marriage during
the subsistence of his first marriage. He claimed that his first
marriage in 1977 was void since his first wife was already
married in 1968. We held that Atty. Terre should have known
that the prevailing case law is that for purposes of determining
whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage,
a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and
void ab initio is essential.
The Court applied this ruling in subsequent
cases. In Domingo v. Court of Appeals (1993),[22] the Court
held:
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the
conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either
as a cause of action or a ground for defense. (Art. 39 of the
Family Code). Where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting
a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. (Family
Code, Art. 40; See also arts. 11, 13, 42, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54,
86, 99, 147, 148).[23]
However, a recent case applied the old rule because of
the peculiar circumstances of the case. In Apiag v. Cantero,
(1997)[24] the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of
immorality for entering into a second marriage. The judge
claimed that his first marriage was void since he was merely
forced into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On
the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we
applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since the
second marriage took place and all the children thereunder
were born before the promulgation of Wiegel and the
effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence at that time.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of
private respondent was entered into in 1979,
before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found
in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private
respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there
was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he
could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we
conclude that private respondents second marriage to
petitioner is valid.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family
Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for
to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of
her children. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals,[25] the
Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be
impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that
impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is
patent. Additionally, we are not quite prepared to give assent
to the appellate courts finding that despite private respondents
deceit and perfidy in contracting marriage with petitioner, he
could benefit from her silence on the issue. Thus, coming now
to the civil effects of the church ceremony wherein petitioner
married private respondent using the marriage license used
three years earlier in the civil ceremony, we find that petitioner
now has raised this matter properly. Earlier petitioner claimed
Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 3
as untruthful private respondents allegation that he wed
petitioner but they lacked a marriage license. Indeed we find
there was a marriage license, though it was the same license
issued on April 3, 1979 and used in both the civil and the
church rites. Obviously, the church ceremony was
confirmatory of their civil marriage. As petitioner contends, the
appellate court erred when it refused to recognize the validity
and salutary effects of said canonical marriage on a
technicality, i.e. that petitioner had failed to raise this matter
as affirmative defense during trial. She argues that such
failure does not prevent the appellate court
from giving her defense due consideration and weight. She
adds that the interest of the State in protecting the inviolability
of marriage, as a legal and social institution, outweighs such
technicality. In our view, petitioner and private respondent had
complied with all the essential and formal requisites for a valid
marriage, including the requirement of a valid license in the
first of the two ceremonies. That this license was used legally
in the celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from
the ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the same
parties to the marriage, for we hold that the latter rites served
not only to ratify but also to fortify the first. The appellate court
might have its reasons for brushing aside this possible
defense of the defendant below which undoubtedly could
have tendered a valid issue, but which was not timely
interposed by her before the trial court. But we are now
persuaded we cannot play blind to the absurdity, if not
inequity, of letting the wrongdoer profit from what the CA calls
his own deceit and perfidy.
On the matter of petitioners counterclaim for damages
and attorneys fees. Although the appellate court admitted that
they found private respondent acted duplicitously and craftily
in marrying petitioner, it did not award moral damages
because the latter did not adduce evidence to support her
claim.[26]
Like the lower courts, we are also of the view that no
damages should be awarded in the present case, but for
another reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to private
respondent held valid and subsisting. She is suing to maintain
her status as legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for
damages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for
annulment of their marriage which caused her mental
anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation
and alienation from her parents. Should we grant her prayer,
we would have a situation where the husband pays the wife
damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would
make the application of the law absurd. Logic, if not common
sense, militates against such incongruity.Moreover, our laws
do not comprehend an action for damages between husband
and wife merely because of breach of a marital
obligation.[27] There are other remedies.[28]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 24, 1996 and its
Resolution dated November 7, 1996, are reversed partially, so
that the marriage of petitioner Ofelia P. Ty and private
respondent Edgardo M. Reyes is hereby DECLARED VALID
AND SUBSISTING; and the award of the amount of
P15,000.00 is RATIFIED and MAINTAINED as monthly
support to their two children, Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel
Anne Reyes, for as long as they are of minor age or otherwise
legally entitled thereto. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in its Civil
Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant,
Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal separation and one million
pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the
defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,1 all
surnamed "Escaño," respectively.2
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the
following:
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in
the University of San Carlos, Cebu City, where she was then
enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta
Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially
prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a
"sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor
Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer
and of undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her
parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in
the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage
was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly
registered with the local civil register.
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the
marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply in love.
Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and
go-between, they had planned out their marital future
whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born;
they started saving money in a piggy bank. A few weeks
before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken;
Vicenta returned the engagement ring and accepted another
suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor beckoned; she
pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This time they
planned to get married and then elope. To facilitate the
elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to the
room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual
trysting place.
Although planned for the midnight following their marriage,
the elopement did not, however, materialize because when
Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage, her
mother, who got wind of the intended nuptials, was already
waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home where
she admitted that she had already married Pastor. Mamerto
and Mena Escaño were surprised, because Pastor never
asked for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because
of the great scandal that the clandestine marriage would
provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The following morning,
the Escaño spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes
suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be
an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due
to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish
priest for the officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage.
The recelebration did not take place, because on 26
February 1948 Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid,
whose name he claims he does not remember, a letter
purportedly coming from San Carlos college students and
disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor
Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to
her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage.
Vicenta and Pastor met that day in the house of Mrs. Pilar
Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her
parents while Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her letter
of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her
husband's welfare, was not as endearing as her previous
letters when their love was aflame.
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable
disposition, and Pastor knew it. She fondly accepted her
being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her
parents from communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escaño"),
but her letters became less frequent as the days passed. As
of June, 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged (Exh.
"2-Escaño"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis
Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage
stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a
petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul
her marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The
case was dismissed without prejudice because of her non-
appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she
applied for a passport, indicating in her application that she
was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was
domiciled in Cebu City, and that she intended to return after
two years. The application was approved, and she left for the
United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified
complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the
Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and
for the County of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty,
entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950, a decree
of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by
the said tribunal.
Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 4
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the
Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter's marriage to
Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought
papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American,
Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in
California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired
American citizenship on 8 August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the
proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against
Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño,
whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged
Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her
affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for
having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the
annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation
and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid
divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her
present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents
denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter's
acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation,
but freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife and to acquire
property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the
counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño for
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against
the plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and
plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the
following:
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding
defendant Vicenta F. Escaño liable for damages
and in dismissing the complaint;.
2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto
Escano and the heirs of Doña Mena Escaño liable
for damages;.
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him
to pay the damages to the defendant parents on
their counterclaims; and.
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the
relief sought by the plaintiff.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor
Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escaño,
were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our
civil law, is clearly established by the record before us. Both
parties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise
qualified; and both consented to the marriage, which was
performed by a Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in
the presence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown
that said priest was not duly authorized under civil law to
solemnize marriages.
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization
from the parish priest and the Ordinary, as required by
Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of
the separation of Church and State but also because Act
3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage
law in force at the time) expressly provided that —
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites
for marriage are the legal capacity of the
contracting parties and consent. (Emphasis
supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only
a formal requirement, and, therefore, not essential to give
the marriage civil effects,3 and this is emphasized by section
27 of said marriage act, which provided the following:
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal
requirements. No marriage shall be declared
invalid because of the absence of one or several
of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it
was performed, the spouses or one of them
believed in good faith that the person who
solemnized the marriage was actually empowered
to do so, and that the marriage was perfectly legal.
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence
the validity of their marriage) will be presumed until the
contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739,
745; Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note
here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the
solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage, when
Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes and the
archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in
abandoning her original action for annulment and
subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that her
marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding.
Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted
the marriage she was under the undue influence of Pacita
Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with
appellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for argument's sake,
the truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's
consent was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such
vices did not render her marriage ab initio void, but merely
voidable, and the marriage remained valid until annulled by a
competent civil court. This was never done, and admittedly,
Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court of First Instance of
Misamis was dismissed for non-prosecution.
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage
between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño remained
subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law,
notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife
sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second
Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada,
on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character."
At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño,
like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen.4 She was then
subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the
time, expressly provided:
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not
admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in
fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its
restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding
legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of
adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act
2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only
provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to
108), and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the
marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or
effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce betiveen
Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared
public policy of the state, specially in view of the third
paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the
following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have for their object
public order, policy and good customs, shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such
foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to an
irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy
citizens, to the detriment of those members of our polity
whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and
obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor
Tenchavez should have appeared in the Nevada divorce
court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be
nullified by acts of private parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam
quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance of a
non-resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the
court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as
a necessary consequence that in this jurisdiction Vicenta
Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to
recognition as valid; for her previous union to plaintiff
Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved.
It follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely
duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her
Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 5
husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault,
for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding
indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated
charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging
immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to her
claim, adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and
cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically
"intercourse with a person not her husband" from the
standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant
Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on
the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a
marriage after an invalid divorce are in accord with the
previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject,
particularly those that were rendered under our laws prior to
the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the
Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal history, our
statutes did not recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917,
when Act 2710 became effective; and the present Civil Code
of the Philippines, in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect
merely reverted to the policies on the subject prevailing
before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code
of 1889, prior to the Act above-mentioned, are now, fully
applicable. Of these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42
Phil. 855, is of particular interest. Said this Court in that case:
As the divorce granted by the French Court must
be ignored, it results that the marriage of Dr. Mory
and Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905,
could not legalize their relations; and the
circumstance that they afterwards passed for
husband and wife in Switzerland until her death is
wholly without legal significance. The claims of the
very children to participate in the estate of Samuel
Bishop must therefore be rejected. The right to
inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated and
acknowledged natural children. The children of
adulterous relations are wholly excluded. The word
"descendants" as used in Article 941 of the Civil
Code cannot be interpreted to include illegitimates
born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis supplied)
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the
children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage to Leo Moran
after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar,
the Gmur case is authority for the proposition that such union
is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an
action for legal separation on the part of the innocent consort
of the first marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine
law. In not so declaring, the trial court committed error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations
where the status of a person (whether divorced or not) would
depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies
of this kind are not new in the Philippines, and the answer to
them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:
The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the
Philippine Islands are well known to the members
of the Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to
enforce the laws of divorce as written by
Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts have
no right to say that such laws are too strict or too
liberal. (p. 72)
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore,
sustained.
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's
parents, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and his wife, the late Doña
Mena Escaño, alienated the affections of their daughter and
influenced her conduct toward her husband are not
supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor
Tenchavez about the Escaño's animosity toward him strikes
us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied
by Pastor's own letters written before this suit was begun
(Exh. "2-Escaño" and "Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp. 270-274).
In these letters he expressly apologized to the defendants for
"misjudging them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused
by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery and
audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escaño house to
visit and court Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to
prove that he would not have been accepted to marry
Vicente had he openly asked for her hand, as good manners
and breeding demanded. Even after learning of the
clandestine marriage, and despite their shock at such
unexpected event, the parents of Vicenta proposed and
arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in strict
conformity with the canons of their religion upon advice that
the previous one was canonically defective. If no
recelebration of the marriage ceremony was had it was not
due to defendants Mamerto Escaño and his wife, but to the
refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses
Escaño did not seek to compel or induce their daughter to
assent to the recelebration but respected her decision, or
that they abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law an
alienation of affections. Neither does the fact that Vicenta's
parents sent her money while she was in the United States;
for it was natural that they should not wish their daughter to
live in penury even if they did not concur in her decision to
divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of
improper motives, aided and abetted her original suit for
annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have
acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled to
judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be
respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be
charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice
or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith
being always presumed until the contrary is proved.
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin.
— The law distinguishes between the right of a
parent to interest himself in the marital affairs of
his child and the absence of rights in a stranger to
intermeddle in such affairs. However, such
distinction between the liability of parents and that
of strangers is only in regard to what will justify
interference. A parent isliable for alienation of
affections resulting from his own malicious
conduct, as where he wrongfully entices his son or
daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not
liable unless he acts maliciously, without
justification and from unworthy motives. He is not
liable where he acts and advises his child in good
faith with respect to his child's marital relations in
the interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage
of his child not terminating his right and liberty to
interest himself in, and be extremely solicitous for,
his child's welfare and happiness, even where his
conduct and advice suggest or result in the
separation of the spouses or the obtaining of a
divorce or annulment, or where he acts under
mistake or misinformation, or where his advice or
interference are indiscreet or unfortunate, although
it has been held that the parent is liable for
consequences resulting from recklessness. He
may in good faith take his child into his home and
afford him or her protection and support, so long
as he has not maliciously enticed his child away,
or does not maliciously entice or cause him or her
to stay away, from his or her spouse. This rule has
more frequently been applied in the case of advice
given to a married daughter, but it is equally
applicable in the case of advice given to a son.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged
parents with racial or social discrimination and with having
exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and
divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety,
entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not
have been impelled by actual malice, the charges were
certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and
circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties
to give vent to their prejudices or spleen.
In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by
appellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant Vicente Escaño,
it is proper to take into account, against his patently
unreasonable claim for a million pesos in damages, that (a)
the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not
characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's
part; (b) that the parties never lived together; and (c) that
there is evidence that appellant had originally agreed to the
annulment of the marriage, although such a promise was
legally invalid, being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ.
Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under our law,
this fact is a consequence of the indissoluble character of the
union that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open
eyes rather than of her divorce and her second marriage. All
told, we are of the opinion that appellant should recover
P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's fees.
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the
defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño, by the
court below, we opine that the same are excessive. While
the filing of this unfounded suit must have wounded said
defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the same
could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or
Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 6
otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a
common occurrence in present society. What is important,
and has been correctly established in the decision of the
court below, is that said defendants were not guilty of any
improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. This Court,
therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only.
Summing up, the Court rules:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought
and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code
(Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with
another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the
foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country;
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-
habitation with a person other than the lawful husband entitle
the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to
Philippine law;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce
decree by one consort entitles the other to recover damages;
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the
parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of
malice or unworthy motives on their part.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified
as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to
a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F.
Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay
plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for
damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the
appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the
deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and
attorneys' fees.
Neither party to recover costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Dizon, Regala,
Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY
MONTEJO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it
effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is
aimed.1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for
election to the House of Representatives be "a registered
voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a
resident thereof for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the election."2 The mischief which this
provision — reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution
— seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or
newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a
community and not identified with the latter, from an elective
office to serve that community."3
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on
March 8, 1995, providing the following information in item no.
8:4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY
WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE
ELECTION: __________ Years
and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo,
the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte
and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for
Cancellation and Disqualification"5 with the Commission on
Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition,
private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the
Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates
for the House of Representatives on the evidence of
declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-
No. 33497726 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed
that "an order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified
and canceling the certificate of candidacy."7
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months
to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended
certificate.8 On the same day, the Provincial Election
Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the
aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy
on the ground that it is filed out of time,
the deadline for the filing of the same
having already lapsed on March 20,
1995. The Corrected/Amended
Certificate of Candidacy should have
been filed on or before the March 20,
1995 deadline.9
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head Office in
Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition
in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the head office on
the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the
entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of
Candidacy was the result of an "honest
misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding
the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in filing the
petition seeking her disqualification, she noted that:
When respondent (petitioner herein)
announced that she was intending to
register as a voter in Tacloban City and
run for Congress in the First District of
Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed
her intended registration by writing a
letter stating that "she is not a resident
of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte. After respondent had registered
as a voter in Tolosa following completion
of her six month actual residence
therein, petitioner filed a petition with the
COMELEC to transfer the town of
Tolosa from the First District to the
Second District and pursued such a
move up to the Supreme Court, his
purpose being to remove respondent as
petitioner's opponent in the
congressional election in the First
District. He also filed a bill, along with
other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the
creation of another legislative district to
remove the town of Tolosa out of the
First District, to achieve his purpose.
However, such bill did not pass the
Senate. Having failed on such moves,
petitioner now filed the instant petition
for the same objective, as it is obvious
that he is afraid to submit along with
respondent for the judgment and verdict
of the electorate of the First District of
Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful,
free and clean elections on May 8,
1995. 12
Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 7
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up
with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for
Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off
petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of
March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of
Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the
validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy
after the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of
candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with the one year
residency requirement, the Second Division held:
Respondent raised the affirmative
defense in her Answer that the printed
word "Seven" (months) was a result of
an "honest misinterpretation or honest
mistake" on her part and, therefore, an
amendment should subsequently be
allowed. She averred that she thought
that what was asked was her "actual
and physical" presence in Tolosa and
not residence of origin or domicile in the
First Legislative District, to which she
could have responded "since childhood."
In an accompanying affidavit, she stated
that her domicile is Tacloban City, a
component of the First District, to which
she always intended to return whenever
absent and which she has never
abandoned. Furthermore, in her
memorandum, she tried to discredit
petitioner's theory of disqualification by
alleging that she has been a resident of
the First Legislative District of Leyte
since childhood, although she only
became a resident of the Municipality of
Tolosa for seven months. She asserts
that she has always been a resident of
Tacloban City, a component of the First
District, before coming to the
Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note
that prior to her registration in Tolosa,
respondent announced that she would
be registering in Tacloban City so that
she can be a candidate for the District.
However, this intention was rebuffed
when petitioner wrote the Election
Officer of Tacloban not to allow
respondent since she is a resident of
Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never
disputed this claim and instead implicitly
acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim
of "honest misinterpretation or honest
mistake." Besides, the Certificate of
Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE.
Since on the basis of her Answer, she
was quite aware of "residence of origin"
which she interprets to be Tacloban
City, it is curious why she did not cite
Tacloban City in her Certificate of
Candidacy. Her explanation that she
thought what was asked was her actual
and physical presence in Tolosa is not
easy to believe because there is none in
the question that insinuates about
Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the
Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly
of "Residency in the
CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be
elected immediately preceding the
election." Thus, the explanation of
respondent fails to be persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's
defense of an honest mistake or
misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of
merit.
To further buttress respondent's
contention that an amendment may be
made, she cited the case of Alialy
v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The
reliance of respondent on the case of
Alialy is misplaced. The case only
applies to the "inconsequential
deviations which cannot affect the result
of the election, or deviations from
provisions intended primarily to secure
timely and orderly conduct of elections."
The Supreme Court in that case
considered the amendment only as a
matter of form. But in the instant case,
the amendment cannot be considered
as a matter of form or an
inconsequential deviation. The change
in the number of years of residence in
the place where respondent seeks to be
elected is a substantial matter which
determines her qualification as a
candidacy, specially those intended to
suppress, accurate material
representation in the original certificate
which adversely affects the filer. To
admit the amended certificate is to
condone the evils brought by the shifting
minds of manipulating candidate, of the
detriment of the integrity of the election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to
change the seven (7) month period of
her residency in order to prolong it by
claiming it was "since childhood" is to
allow an untruthfulness to be committed
before this Commission. The
arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months
residency the respondent indicated in
her certificate of candidacy can be
gleaned from her entry in her Voter's
Registration Record accomplished on
January 28, 1995 which reflects that she
is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
for 6 months at the time of the said
registration (Annex A, Petition). Said
accuracy is further buttressed by her
letter to the election officer of San Juan,
Metro Manila, dated August 24, 1994,
requesting for the cancellation of her
registration in the Permanent List of
Voters thereat so that she can be re-
registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three
(3) different documents show the
respondent's consistent conviction that
she has transferred her residence to
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila
only for such limited period of time,
starting in the last week of August 1994
which on March 8, 1995 will only sum up
to 7 months. The Commission,
therefore, cannot be persuaded to
believe in the respondent's contention
that it was an error.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the
Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy cannot be admitted by this
Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on
the foregoing discussion, it is clear that
respondent has not complied with the
one year residency requirement of the
Constitution.
In election cases, the term "residence"
has always been considered as
synonymous with "domicile" which
imports not only the intention to reside in
a fixed place but also personal presence
in-that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. Domicile
denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which when absent for business or
pleasure, or for like reasons, one
intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs.
Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez
vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In
respondent's case, when she returned to
the Philippines in 1991, the residence
she chose was not Tacloban but San
Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus
revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila
and not Tacloban.
Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 8
This Division is aware that her claim that
she has been a resident of the First
District since childhood is nothing more
than to give her a color of qualification
where she is otherwise constitutionally
disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the
face of the facts admitted by the
respondent in her affidavit. Except for
the time that she studied and worked for
some years after graduation in Tacloban
City, she continuously lived in Manila. In
1959, after her husband was elected
Senator, she lived and resided in San
Juan, Metro Manila where she was a
registered voter. In 1965, she lived in
San Miguel, Manila where she was
again a registered voter. In 1978, she
served as member of the Batasang
Pambansa as the representative of the
City of Manila and later on served as the
Governor of Metro Manila. She could not
have served these positions if she had
not been a resident of the City of Manila.
Furthermore, when she filed her
certificate of candidacy for the office of
the President in 1992, she claimed to be
a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila.
As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994,
respondent wrote a letter with the
election officer of San Juan, Metro
Manila requesting for the cancellation of
her registration in the permanent list of
voters that she may be re-registered or
transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte. These facts manifest that she
could not have been a resident of
Tacloban City since childhood up to the
time she filed her certificate of
candidacy because she became a
resident of many places, including Metro
Manila. This debunks her claim that prior
to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she
was a resident of the First Legislative
District of Leyte since childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct
reveals her lack of intention to make
Tacloban her domicile. She registered
as a voter in different places and on
several occasions declared that she was
a resident of Manila. Although she spent
her school days in Tacloban, she is
considered to have abandoned such
place when she chose to stay and
reside in other different places. In the
case of Romualdez vs. RTC (226 SCRA
408) the Court explained how one
acquires a new domicile by choice.
There must concur: (1) residence or
bodily presence in the new locality; (2)
intention to remain there; and (3)
intention to abandon the old domicile. In
other words there must basically
be animus manendi with animus non
revertendi. When respondent chose to
stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila,
coupled with her intention to stay there
by registering as a voter there and
expressly declaring that she is a
resident of that place, she is deemed to
have abandoned Tacloban City, where
she spent her childhood and school
days, as her place of domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is
not sufficient, there must likewise be
conduct indicative of such intention.
Respondent's statements to the effect
that she has always intended to return to
Tacloban, without the accompanying
conduct to prove that intention, is not
conclusive of her choice of residence.
Respondent has not presented any
evidence to show that her conduct, one
year prior the election, showed intention
to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was
evident was that prior to her residence in
Tolosa, she had been a resident of
Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances
that she was not a resident of the First
District of Leyte "since childhood."
To further support the assertion that she
could have not been a resident of the
First District of Leyte for more than one
year, petitioner correctly pointed out that
on January 28, 1995 respondent
registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-
A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so,
she placed in her Voter Registration
Record that she resided in the
municipality of Tolosa for a period of six
months. This may be inconsequential as
argued by the respondent since it refers
only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte.
But her failure to prove that she was a
resident of the First District of Leyte prior
to her residence in Tolosa leaves
nothing but a convincing proof that she
had been a resident of the district for six
months only. 15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995
elections, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution
declaring her not qualified to run for the position of Member
of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative
District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for
Reconsideration, the Commission
RESOLVED to DENY it, no new
substantial matters having been raised
therein to warrant re-examination of the
resolution granting the petition for
disqualification. 18
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution
allowing petitioner's proclamation should the results of the
canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes
in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte.
On the same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself
and issued a second Resolution directing that the
proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that
she obtains the highest number of votes. 19
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner
averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the
elections for the congressional seat in the First District of
Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by
the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995.
Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained
a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes
received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate
of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from
running for the congressional seat of the First District of
Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending
her proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and
Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues may be
classified into two general areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident,
for election purposes, of the First District
of Leyte for a period of one year at the
time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly
exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying
petitioner outside the period mandated
by the Omnibus Election Code for
disqualification cases under Article 78 of
the said Code.
b) After the Elections
Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 9
Whether or not the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal
assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the
question of petitioner's qualifications
after the May 8, 1995 elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second
Division reveals a startling confusion in the application of
settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election
law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the
general proposition that for the purposes of election law,
residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution
reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of
domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for
the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for
election to the House of Representatives as required by the
1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of
meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a
settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of
civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile
of natural persons is their place of habitual residence."
In Ong vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile
to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to
which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one
intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in
the sense that they disclose intent." 21Based on the
foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of
residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus
manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual
relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the
physical presence of a person in a given area, community or
country. The essential distinction between residence and
domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave
when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his
abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as
pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to
remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as
soon as his purpose is established it is residence. 22 It is
thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different
residences in various places. However, a person can only
have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he
successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another
domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this
distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile
and residence. "Residence" is used to
indicate a place of abode, whether
permanent or temporary; "domicile"
denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which, when absent, one has the
intention of returning. A man may have a
residence in one place and a domicile in
another. Residence is not domicile, but
domicile is residence coupled with the
intention to remain for an unlimited time.
A man can have but one domicile for the
same purpose at any time, but he may
have numerous places of residence. His
place of residence is generally his place
of domicile, but it is not by any means
necessarily so since no length of
residence without intention of remaining
will constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and
domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws.
As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what
has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that
residence for election purposes is used synonymously with
domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term
residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which imports not
only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention." 25 Larena vs. Teves 26 reiterated the same
doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the
respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of
Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held
that the absence from residence to pursue studies or
practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in
the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of
residence. 28 So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our
election law that in these and other election law cases, this
Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from
his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it
does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence
qualification for certain elective positions have placed
beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks
of "residence" in election law, it actually means only
"domicile" to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I
remember that in the 1971
Constitutional Convention, there was an
attempt to require residence in the place
not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the elections. So
my question is: What is the Committee's
concept of residence of a candidate for
the legislature? Is it actual residence or
is it the concept of domicile or
constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar
as the regular members of the National
Assembly are concerned, the proposed
section merely provides, among others,
"and a resident thereof", that is, in the
district for a period of not less than one
year preceding the day of the election.
This was in effect lifted from the 1973
Constitution, the interpretation given to it
was domicile. 29
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is
on Section 7, page 2. I think
Commissioner Nolledo has raised the
same point that "resident" has been
interpreted at times as a matter of
intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the
gentleman consider at the proper time to
go back to actual residence rather than
mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might
encounter some difficulty especially
considering that a provision in the
Constitution in the Article on Suffrage
says that Filipinos living abroad may
vote as enacted by law. So, we have to
stick to the original concept that it should
be by domicile and not physical
residence. 30
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the framers of
the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition
given to the term residence in election law, regarding it as
having the same meaning as domicile. 32
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner
Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency
requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987
Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in
petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in
the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of
candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether
or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's
residency qualification requirement. The said statement
becomes material only when there is or appears to be a
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be
plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and
knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy
which would lead to his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely
committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in
the space provided for the residency qualification
Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 10
requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the
questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent
confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period
of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of
residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in
the space provided. These circumstances and events are
amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's
questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation.
For instance, when herein petitioner announced that she
would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to
run in the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed
the same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa,
not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of
actual residence in the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte,
a fact which she subsequently noted down in her Certificate
of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would reveal
the possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence
(Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for
residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks
election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete
Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR
ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE
CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING THE
ELECTION:_________ Years
and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her
place of actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioner's
claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down
her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The
juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 — the first
requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile
— coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's
registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing
down an unintended entry for which she could be
disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be
allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if
such fact were established by means more convincing than a
mere entry on a piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could
not possibly be in the First District of Leyte, the Second
Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April
24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner)
studied and worked for some years after graduation in
Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The
Resolution additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the
fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where
she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte.
First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided
in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered
voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of her husband to
the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila
where she as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as
a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of
Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if
she had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the
COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual
does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and
maintained residences in different places. Residence, it
bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given
place for various purposes. The absence from legal
residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to
do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature
does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by
the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of
Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her
certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of
many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in
which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual)
residence and domicile for election law purposes. In Larena
vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so
holds that a person who has his own
house wherein he lives with his family in
a municipality without having ever had
the intention of abandoning it, and
without having lived either alone or with
his family in another municipality, has
his residence in the former municipality,
notwithstanding his having registered as
an elector in the other municipality in
question and having been a candidate
for various insular and provincial
positions, stating every time that he is a
resident of the latter municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained
that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth
to look for "greener pastures," as the
saying goes, to improve his lot, and that,
of course includes study in other places,
practice of his avocation, or engaging in
business. When an election is to be
held, the citizen who left his birthplace to
improve his lot may desire to return to
his native town to cast his ballot but for
professional or business reasons, or for
any other reason, he may not absent
himself from his professional or
business activities; so there he registers
himself as voter as he has the
qualifications to be one and is not willing
to give up or lose the opportunity to
choose the officials who are to run the
government especially in national
elections. Despite such registration,
the animus revertendi to his home, to his
domicile or residence of origin has not
forsaken him. This may be the
explanation why the registration of a
voter in a place other than his residence
of origin has not been deemed sufficient
to constitute abandonment or loss of
such residence. It finds justification in
the natural desire and longing of every
person to return to his place of birth.
This strong feeling of attachment to the
place of one's birth must be overcome
by positive proof of abandonment for
another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-
cited statements supporting its proposition that petitioner
was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the
First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring
to petitioner's various places of (actual) residence, not her
domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled
jurisprudence on residence in election law and the
deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts
which establish the fact of petitioner's domicile, which we lift
verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed
Resolution: 36
In or about 1938 when respondent was
a little over 8 years old, she established
her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte
(Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy
Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938
to 1949 when she graduated from high
school. She pursued her college studies
in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word
University in Tacloban, where she
earned her degree in Education.
Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte
Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In
1952 she went to Manila to work with
her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z.
Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married
ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when
he was still a congressman of Ilocos
Norte and registered there as a voter.
When her husband was elected Senator
of the Republic in 1959, she and her
husband lived together in San Juan,
Rizal where she registered as a voter. In
1965, when her husband was elected
President of the Republic of the
Philippines, she lived with him in
Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 11
Malacanang Palace and registered as a
voter in San Miguel, Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that)
she and her family were abducted and
kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In
November 1991, she came home to
Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for
election as President of the Philippines
and filed her Certificate of Candidacy
wherein she indicated that she is a
resident and registered voter of San
Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by
COMELEC, what is inescapable is that petitioner held
various residences for different purposes during the last four
decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an
intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban,
Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a
minor she naturally followed the domicile of her parents. She
grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and
eventually established residence in different parts of the
country for various reasons. Even during her husband's
presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers,
petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by
establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her
birthdays and other important personal milestones in her
home province, instituting well-publicized projects for the
benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a
political power base where her siblings and close relatives
held positions of power either through the ballot or by
appointment, always with either her influence or consent.
These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of
the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in
our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the
COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC
did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the
fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban
was not petitioner's domicile of origin because she did not
live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after
leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency
(sic) therein for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish
her domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention
to live there again." We do not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile,
once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows
that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila,
Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of
law. This domicile was not established only when her father
brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private
respondent's averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully
effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual
change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning
the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the
purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these
criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to
continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all
three requirements can the presumption of continuity or
residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an
actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have
two legal residences at the same time. 38 In the case at
bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly
lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this
court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a
domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an
abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing
petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the
former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium
voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that
petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a
result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction
between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and
"residence." 39 The presumption that the wife automatically
gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon
marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term
"residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil
Code is one area where the two concepts are well
delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area
explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious
difference between domicile and
residence. Both terms imply relations
between a person and a place; but in
residence, the relation is one of fact
while in domicile it is legal or juridical,
independent of the necessity of physical
presence. 40
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the
residence of the family. But the court
may exempt the wife from living with the
husband if he should live abroad unless
in the service of the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the
concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the female
spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest
that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of
origin in favor of the husband's choice of residence upon
marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the
Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su
marido donde quiera que fije su
residencia. Los Tribunales, sin embargo,
podran con justa causa eximirla de esta
obligacion cuando el marido transende
su residencia a ultramar o' a pais
extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de
residencia" in the aforequoted article, which means wherever
(the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the
article clearly contemplates only actual residence because it
refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or residence.
Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by the
phrase "cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the
same provision which means, "when the husband shall
transfer his residence," referring to another positive act of
relocating the family to another home or place of actual
residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to
refer to domicile which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the
possibility of transferring from one place to another not only
once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his
family, a circumstance more consistent with the concept of
actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in
harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify
the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife
bring into the marriage different domiciles (of origin). This
difference could, for the sake of family unity, be reconciled
only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual
residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under
Title V under the heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding
Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife
to live together, thus:
Art. 109. — The husband and wife are
obligated to live together, observe
mutual respect and fidelity and render
mutual help and support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband
and wife are physically together. This takes into account the
situations where the couple has many residences (as in the
case of the petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or
transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should
necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together."
Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 12
Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to
"domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be
faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile
while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in
one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further
explains:
Residence and Domicile — Whether the
word "residence" as used with reference
to particular matters is synonymous with
"domicile" is a question of some
difficulty, and the ultimate decision must
be made from a consideration of the
purpose and intent with which the word
is used. Sometimes they are used
synonymously, at other times they are
distinguished from one another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material
fact, referring to the physical presence
of a person in a place. A person can
have two or more residences, such as a
country residence and a city residence.
Residence is acquired by living in place;
on the other hand, domicile can exist
without actually living in the place. The
important thing for domicile is that, once
residence has been established in one
place, there be an intention to stay there
permanently, even if residence is also
established in some other
place. 41
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the
husband and the wife during the marriage is not an iron-clad
principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of
a common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has
recognized certain situations 42 where the spouses could not
be compelled to live with each other such that the wife is
either allowed to maintain a residence different from that of
her husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert to her
original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new
one). In De la Vina vs.Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a]
married woman may acquire a residence or domicile
separate from that of her husband during the existence of
the marriage where the husband has given cause for
divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either to
obtain new residence or to choose a new domicile in such an
event. In instances where the wife actually opts, .under the
Civil Code, to live separately from her husband either by
taking new residence or reverting to her domicile of origin,
the Court has held that the wife could not be compelled to
live with her husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo
vs. Vasques de Arroyo 45 the Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we
are convinced that it is not within the
province of the courts of this country to
attempt to compel one of the spouses to
cohabit with, and render conjugal rights
to, the other. Of course where the
property rights of one of the pair are
invaded, an action for restitution of such
rights can be maintained. But we are
disinclined to sanction the doctrine that
an order, enforcible (sic) by process of
contempt, may be entered to compel the
restitution of the purely personal right of
consortium. At best such an order can
be effective for no other purpose than to
compel the spouses to live under the
same roof; and he experience of those
countries where the courts of justice
have assumed to compel the
cohabitation of married people shows
that the policy of the practice is
extremely questionable. Thus in
England, formerly the Ecclesiastical
Court entertained suits for the restitution
of conjugal rights at the instance of
either husband or wife; and if the facts
were found to warrant it, that court
would make a mandatory decree,
enforceable by process of contempt in
case of disobedience, requiring the
delinquent party to live with the other
and render conjugal rights. Yet this
practice was sometimes criticized even
by the judges who felt bound to enforce
such orders, and in Weldon
v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883,
Sir James Hannen, President in the
Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division
of the High Court of Justice, expressed
his regret that the English law on the
subject was not the same as that which
prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of
adherence, equivalent to the decree for
the restitution of conjugal rights in
England, could be obtained by the
injured spouse, but could not be
enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly,
in obedience to the growing sentiment
against the practice, the Matrimonial
Causes Act (1884) abolished the
remedy of imprisonment; though a
decree for the restitution of conjugal
rights can still be procured, and in case
of disobedience may serve in
appropriate cases as the basis of an
order for the periodical payment of a
stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the
United States, only one court, so far as
we can discover, has ever attempted to
make a preemptory order requiring one
of the spouses to live with the other; and
that was in a case where a wife was
ordered to follow and live with her
husband, who had changed his domicile
to the City of New Orleans. The decision
referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann.,
70) was based on a provision of the Civil
Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of
the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided
many years ago, and the doctrine
evidently has not been fruitful even in
the State of Louisiana. In other states of
the American Union the idea of
enforcing cohabitation by process of
contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the
Supreme Court of Spain appears to
have affirmed an order of the Audiencia
Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife
to return to the marital domicile, and in
the alternative, upon her failure to do so,
to make a particular disposition of
certain money and effects then in her
possession and to deliver to her
husband, as administrator of the
ganancial property, all income, rents,
and interest which might accrue to her
from the property which she had brought
to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11)
But it does not appear that this order for
the return of the wife to the marital
domicile was sanctioned by any other
penalty than the consequences that
would be visited upon her in respect to
the use and control of her property; and
it does not appear that her disobedience
to that order would necessarily have
been followed by imprisonment for
contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then
Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged — by
virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code — to follow her
husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The
problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several
places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and
Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these
places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But
assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as
the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon
marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile
of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial
domicile" appears to have been incorporated, as a result of
our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil
Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the
difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the
Family Code drafters, the term residence has been
supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision
(Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that
found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary
Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 13
changes in the concept of women's rights in the intervening
years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual
agreement between the spouses. 46
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence
may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and
quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that
insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights
and obligations of husband and wife — the term residence
should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The
inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil
law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the
former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and
merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner
gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only acquired
a right to choose a new one after her husband died,
petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly
indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her
domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of
law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally
expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when
petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate
(our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . .
to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in
our homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained her
residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living
in her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary
intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG
Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home in
San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been
previously looted by vandals. Her "homes" and "residences"
following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely
qualified as temporary or "actual residences," not domicile.
Moreover, and proceeding from our discussion pointing out
specific situations where the female spouse either reverts to
her domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the
subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical for us
to assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon
the death of her husband absent a positive act of selecting a
new one where situations exist within the subsistence of the
marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different from
her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and
domicile enunciated by this court up to this point, we are
persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh
heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim
of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had
already lapsed considering that the assailed resolutions were
rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the
election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC
which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the
House of Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec.
17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of
judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be
merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them does
not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute
had intended such result it would have clearly indicated
it." 50 The difference between a mandatory and a directory
provision is often made on grounds of necessity. Adopting
the same view held by several American authorities, this
court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51
The difference between a mandatory
and directory provision is often
determined on grounds of expediency,
the reason being that less injury results
to the general public by disregarding
than enforcing the letter of the law.
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling
for the interpretation of a statute
containing a limitation of thirty (30) days
within which a decree may be entered
without the consent of counsel, it was
held that "the statutory provisions which
may be thus departed from with
impunity, without affecting the validity of
statutory proceedings, are usually those
which relate to the mode or time of
doing that which is essential to effect the
aim and purpose of the Legislature or
some incident of the essential act."
Thus, in said case, the statute under
examination was construed merely to be
directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC
should have abstained from rendering a decision after the
period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it
lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other
quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments
merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision
within a given or prescribed period.
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A.
6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that
the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to
hear and decide a pending disqualification case under
Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's
supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of
petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections,
suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of
all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a
candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a member of the
House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this
point has no jurisdiction over the question.
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in
the 1987 Constitution for us to either to ignore or deliberately
make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality
of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made
on such a ground here. Surely, many established principles
of law, even of election laws were flouted for the sake
perpetuating power during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege
on these sacred ideals, including the meaning and spirit of
EDSA ourselves bending established principles of principles
of law to deny an individual what he or she justly deserves in
law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat
the mistakes of the past.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses
the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the
House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7,
May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the
Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the
duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 118305. February 12, 1998]
AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and
ABELARDO MAGSAJO, petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ALFREDO &
ENCARNACION CHING, respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, what debts and
obligations contracted by the husband alone are considered
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership which are
chargeable against the conjugal partnership? Is a surety
agreement or an accommodation contract entered into by the
husband in favor of his employer within the contemplation of
the said provision?
These are the issues which we will resolve in this
petition for review.
Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 14
The petitioner assails the decision dated April 14, 1994
of the respondent Court of Appeals in Spouses Alfredo and
Encarnacion Ching vs. Ayala Investment and Development
Corporation, et. al., docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
29632,[1] upholding the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Branch 168, which ruled that the conjugal partnership
of gains of respondents-spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion
Ching is not liable for the payment of the debts secured by
respondent-husband Alfredo Ching.
A chronology of the essential antecedent facts is
necessary for a clear understanding of the case at bar.
Philippine Blooming Mills (hereinafter referred to as
PBM) obtained a P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation (hereinafter
referred to as AIDC). As added security for the credit line
extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice
President of PBM, executed security agreements on
December 10, 1980 and on March 20, 1981 making himself
jointly and severally answerable with PBMs indebtedness to
AIDC.
PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, on July 30, 1981,
AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and
respondent-husband Alfredo Ching with the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch VIII, entitled Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation vs. Philippine
Blooming Mills and Alfredo Ching, docketed as Civil Case No.
42228.
After trial, the court rendered judgment ordering PBM
and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching to jointly and
severally pay AIDC the principal amount of P50,300,000.00
with interests.
Pending appeal of the judgment in Civil Case No.
42228, upon motion of AIDC, the lower court issued a writ of
execution pending appeal. Upon AIDCs putting up of
an P8,000,000.00 bond, a writ of execution dated May 12,
1982 was issued. Thereafter, petitioner Abelardo Magsajo,
Sr., Deputy Sheriff of Rizal and appointed sheriff in Civil Case
No. 42228, caused the issuance and service upon
respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale dated May 20,
1982 on three (3) of their conjugal properties. Petitioner
Magsajo then scheduled the auction sale of the properties
levied.
On June 9, 1982, private respondents filed a case of
injunction against petitioners with the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XIII, to enjoin the auction
sale alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment
against the conjugal partnership levied on the ground that,
among others, the subject loan did not redound to the benefit
of the said conjugal partnership.[2] Upon application of private
respondents, the lower court issued a temporary restraining
order to prevent petitioner Magsajo from proceeding with the
enforcement of the writ of execution and with the sale of the
said properties at public auction.
AIDC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals,[3] questioning the order of the lower court enjoining
the sale. Respondent Court of Appeals issued a Temporary
Restraining Order on June 25, 1982, enjoining the lower
court[4] from enforcing its Order of June 14, 1982, thus paving
the way for the scheduled auction sale of respondents-
spouses conjugal properties.
On June 25, 1982, the auction sale took place. AIDC
being the only bidder, was issued a Certificate of Sale by
petitioner Magsajo, which was registered on July 2, 1982.
Upon expiration of the redemption period, petitioner sheriff
issued the final deed of sale on August 4, 1982 which was
registered on August 9, 1983.
In the meantime, the respondent court, on August 4,
1982, decided CA-G.R. SP No. 14404, in this manner:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in this
case is granted and the challenged order of
the respondent Judge dated June 14, 1982 in
Civil Case No. 46309 is hereby set aside and
nullified. The same petition insofar as it seeks
to enjoin the respondent Judge from
proceeding with Civil Case No. 46309 is,
however, denied. No pronouncement is here
made as to costs. x x x x.[5]
On September 3, 1983, AIDC filed a motion to dismiss
the petition for injunction filed before Branch XIII of the CFI of
Rizal (Pasig) on the ground that the same had become moot
and academic with the consummation of the
sale. Respondents filed their opposition to the motion arguing,
among others, that where a third party who claims ownership
of the property attached or levied upon, a different legal
situation is presented; and that in this case, two (2) of the real
properties are actually in the name of Encarnacion Ching, a
non-party to Civil Case No. 42228.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss. Hence,
trial on the merits proceeded. Private respondents presented
several witnesses. On the other hand, petitioners did not
present any evidence.
On September 18, 1991, the trial court promulgated its
decision declaring the sale on execution null and
void. Petitioners appealed to the respondent court, which was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 29632.
On April 14, 1994, the respondent court promulgated
the assailed decision, affirming the decision of the regional
trial court. It held that:
The loan procured from respondent-appellant
AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of
Philippine Blooming Mills and not for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of
petitioners-appellees.
xxxxxxxxx
As to the applicable law, whether it is Article
161 of the New Civil Code or Article 1211 of
the Family Code-suffice it to say that the two
provisions are substantially the
same.Nevertheless, We agree with the trial
court that the Family Code is the applicable
law on the matter x x x x x x.
Article 121 of the Family Code provides that
The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: x
x x (2) All debts and obligations contracted
during the marriage by the designated
Administrator-Spouse for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of gains x x x. The
burden of proof that the debt was contracted
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of
gains, lies with the creditor-party litigant
claiming as such. In the case at bar,
respondent-appellant AIDC failed to prove that
the debt was contracted by appellee-husband,
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of
gains.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing,
judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the
appeal. The decision of the Regional Trial
Court is AFFIRMED in toto.[6]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied by the respondent court in a Resolution dated
November 28, 1994.[7]
Hence, this petition for review. Petitioner contends that
the respondent court erred in ruling that the conjugal
partnership of private respondents is not liable for the
obligation by the respondent-husband.
Specifically, the errors allegedly committed by the
respondent court are as follows:
I. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE OBLIGATION INCURRED BY
RESPONDENT HUSBAND DID NOT
REDOUND TO THE BENEFIT OF THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
II RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE ACT OF RESPONDENT
HUSBAND IN SECURING THE SUBJECT
LOAN IS NOT PART OF HIS INDUSTRY,
BUSINESS OR CAREER FROM WHICH HE
SUPPORTS HIS FAMILY.
Petitioners in their appeal point out that there is no need
to prove that actual benefit redounded to the benefit of the
partnership; all that is necessary, they say, is that the
transaction was entered into for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. Thus, petitioners aver that:
The wordings of Article 161 of the Civil Code
is very clear: for the partnership to be held
liable, the husband must have contracted the
debt for the benefit of the partnership, thus:
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable
for:
Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 15
1) all debts and
obligations
contracted
by the
husband for
the benefit
of the
conjugal
partnership
x x x.
There is a difference between the phrases:
redounded to the benefit of or benefited from
(on the one hand) and for the benefit of (on
the other). The former require that actual
benefit must have been realized; the latter
requires only that the transaction should be
one which normally would produce benefit to
the partnership, regardless of whether or not
actual benefit accrued.[8]
We do not agree with petitioners that there is a
difference between the terms redounded to the benefit of or
benefited from on the one hand; and for the benefit of on the
other. They mean one and the same thing. Article 161 (1) of
the Civil Code and Article 121 (2) of the Family Code are
similarly worded, i.e., both use the term for the benefit of. On
the other hand, Article 122 of the Family Code provides that
The payment of personal debts by the husband or the wife
before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the
conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the
benefit of the family. As can be seen, the terms are used
interchangeably.
Petitioners further contend that the ruling of the
respondent court runs counter to the pronouncement of this
Court in the case of Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin,[9] that the husband
as head of the family and as administrator of the conjugal
partnership is presumed to have contracted obligations for the
benefit of the family or the conjugal partnership.
Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, the case of
Cobb-Perez is not applicable in the case at bar. This Court
has, on several instances, interpreted the term for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership.
In the cases of Javier vs. Osmea,[10] Abella de Diaz vs.
Erlanger & Galinger, Inc.,[11] Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin[12] and G-
Tractors, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,[13] cited by the petitioners,
we held that:
The debts contracted by the husband during
the marriage relation, for and in the exercise
of the industry or profession by which he
contributes toward the support of his family,
are not his personal and private debts, and
the products or income from the wifes own
property, which, like those of her husbands,
are liable for the payment of the marriage
expenses, cannot be excepted from the
payment of such debts. (Javier)
The husband, as the manager of the
partnership (Article 1412, Civil Code), has a
right to embark the partnership in an ordinary
commercial enterprise for gain, and the fact
that the wife may not approve of a venture
does not make it a private and personal one
of the husband. (Abella de Diaz)
Debts contracted by the husband for and in
the exercise of the industry or profession by
which he contributes to the support of the
family, cannot be deemed to be his exclusive
and private debts. (Cobb-Perez)
x x x if he incurs an indebtedness in the
legitimate pursuit of his career or profession or
suffers losses in a legitimate business, the
conjugal partnership must equally bear the
indebtedness and the losses, unless he
deliberately acted to the prejudice of his
family. (G-Tractors)
However, in the cases of Ansaldo vs. Sheriff of Manila,
Fidelity Insurance & Luzon Insurance Co.,[14] Liberty
Insurance Corporation vs. Banuelos,[15] and Luzon Surety
Inc. vs. De Garcia,[16] cited by the respondents, we ruled that:
The fruits of the paraphernal property which
form part of the assets of the conjugal
partnership, are subject to the payment of the
debts and expenses of the spouses, but not to
the payment of the personal obligations
(guaranty agreements) of the husband, unless
it be proved that such obligations were
productive of some benefit to the family.
(Ansaldo; parenthetical phrase ours.)
When there is no showing that the execution
of an indemnity agreement by the husband
redounded to the benefit of his family, the
undertaking is not a conjugal debt but an
obligation personal to him. (Liberty Insurance)
In the most categorical language, a conjugal
partnership under Article 161 of the new Civil
Code is liable only for such debts and
obligations contracted by the husband for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. There
must be the requisite showing then of some
advantage which clearly accrued to the
welfare of the spouses. Certainly, to make a
conjugal partnership respond for a liability that
should appertain to the husband alone is to
defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of
the new Civil Code to show the utmost
concern for the solidarity and well-being of the
family as a unit. The husband, therefore, is
denied the power to assume unnecessary and
unwarranted risks to the financial stability of
the conjugal partnership. (Luzon Surety, Inc.)
From the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of this Court,
we can derive the following conclusions:
(A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the
contract, i.e., he directly received the money and services to
be used in or for his own business or his own profession,
that contract falls within the term x x x x obligations for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. Here, no actual benefit
may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is
apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. From the
very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family
stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be
rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is
immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or
does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband
contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the
law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will
redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
(B) On the other hand, if the money or services are given to
another person or entity, and the husband acted only as
a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be
categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. The contract of loan or
services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and
not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be
inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety
or accommodation agreement, it is for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.Proof must be presented to establish
benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.
Thus, the distinction between the Cobb-Perez case,
and we add, that of the three other companion cases, on the
one hand, and that of Ansaldo, Liberty Insurance and Luzon
Surety, is that in the former, the husband contracted the
obligation for his own business; while in the latter, the
husband merely acted as a surety for the loan contracted by
another for the latters business.
The evidence of petitioner indubitably show that co-
respondent Alfredo Ching signed as surety for the P50M loan
contracted on behalf of PBM. Petitioner should have adduced
evidence to prove that Alfredo Chings acting as surety
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The
reason for this is as lucidly explained by the respondent court:
The loan procured from respondent-
appellant AIDC was for the advancement
and benefit of Philippine Blooming Mills and
not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership
of petitioners-appellees. Philippine Blooming
Mills has a personality distinct and separate
from the family of petitioners-appellees - this
despite the fact that the members of the said
family happened to be stockholders of said
corporate entity.
xxxxxxxxx
x x x. The burden of proof that the debt was
contracted for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains, lies with the creditor-
party litigant claiming as such. In the case at
bar, respondent-appellant AIDC failed to
prove that the debt was contracted by
appellee-husband, for the benefit of the
Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 16
conjugal partnership of gains. What is
apparent from the facts of the case is that the
judgment debt was contracted by or in the
name of the Corporation Philippine Blooming
Mills and appellee-husband only signed as
surety thereof. The debt is clearly a corporate
debt and respondent-appellants right of
recourse against appellee-husband as surety
is only to the extent of his corporate
stockholdings. It does not extend to the
conjugal partnership of gains of the family of
petitioners-appellees. x x x x x x. [17]
Petitioners contend that no actual benefit need accrue
to the conjugal partnership. To support this contention, they
cite Justice J.B.L. Reyes authoritative opinion in the Luzon
Surety Company case:
I concur in the result, but would like to make of
record that, in my opinion, the words all debts
and obligations contracted by the husband for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership used in
Article 161 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
in describing the charges and obligations for
which the conjugal partnership is liable do not
require that actual profit or benefit must
accrue to the conjugal partnership from the
husbands transaction; but it suffices that the
transaction should be one that normally would
produce such benefit for the partnership. This
is the ratio behind our ruling in Javier vs.
Osmea, 34 Phil. 336, that obligations incurred
by the husband in the practice of his
profession are collectible from the conjugal
partnership.
The aforequoted concurring opinion agreed with the
majority decision that the conjugal partnership should not be
made liable for the surety agreement which was clearly for the
benefit of a third party. Such opinion merely registered an
exception to what may be construed as a sweeping statement
that in all cases actual profit or benefit must accrue to the
conjugal partnership. The opinion merely made it clear that no
actual benefits to the family need be proved in some cases
such as in the Javier case. There, the husband was the
principal obligor himself. Thus, said transaction was found to
be one that would normally produce x x x benefit for the
partnership. In the later case of G-Tractors, Inc., the husband
was also the principal obligor - not merely the surety. This
latter case, therefore, did not create any precedent. It did not
also supersede the Luzon Surety Company case, nor any of
the previous accommodation contract cases, where this Court
ruled that they were for the benefit of third parties.
But it could be argued, as the petitioner suggests, that
even in such kind of contract of accommodation, a benefit for
the family may also result, when the guarantee is in favor of
the husbands employer.
In the case at bar, petitioner claims that the benefits the
respondent family would reasonably anticipate were the
following:
(a) The employment of co-respondent Alfredo
Ching would be prolonged and he would be
entitled to his monthly salary of P20,000.00 for
an extended length of time because of the
loan he guaranteed;
(b) The shares of stock of the members of his
family would appreciate if the PBM could be
rehabilitated through the loan obtained;
(c) His prestige in the corporation would be
enhanced and his career would be boosted
should PBM survive because of the loan.
However, these are not the benefits contemplated by
Article 161 of the Civil Code. The benefits must be one directly
resulting from the loan. It cannot merely be a by-product or a
spin-off of the loan itself.
In all our decisions involving accommodation contracts
of the husband,[18] we underscored the requirement that: there
must be the requisite showing x x x of some advantage which
clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses or benefits to his
family or that such obligations are productive of some benefit
to the family. Unfortunately, the petition did not present any
proof to show: (a) Whether or not the corporate existence of
PBM was prolonged and for how many months or years;
and/or (b) Whether or not the PBM was saved by the loan and
its shares of stock appreciated, if so, how much and how
substantial was the holdings of the Ching family.
Such benefits (prospects of longer employment and
probable increase in the value of stocks) might have been
already apparent or could be anticipated at the time the
accommodation agreement was entered into. But would those
benefits qualify the transaction as one of the obligations x x x
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership? Are indirect and
remote probable benefits, the ones referred to in Article 161
of the Civil Code? The Court of Appeals in denying the motion
for reconsideration, disposed of these questions in the
following manner:
No matter how one looks at it, the debt/credit
extended by respondents-appellants is purely
a corporate debt granted to PBM, with
petitioner-appellee-husband merely signing as
surety. While such petitioner-appellee-
husband, as such surety, is solidarily liable
with the principal debtor AIDC, such liability
under the Civil Code provisions is specifically
restricted by Article 122 (par. 1) of the Family
Code, so that debts for which the husband is
liable may not be charged against conjugal
partnership properties. Article 122 of the
Family Code is explicit The payment of
personal debts contracted by the husband or
the wife before or during the marriage shall
not be charged to the conjugal partnership
except insofar as they redounded to the
benefit of the family.
Respondents-appellants insist that the
corporate debt in question falls under the
exception laid down in said Article 122 (par.
one). We do not agree. The loan procured
from respondent-appellant AIDC was for the
sole advancement and benefit of Philippine
Blooming Mills and not for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of petitioners-appellees.
x x x appellee-husband derives salaries,
dividends benefits from Philippine
Blooming Mills (the debtor corporation), only
because said husband is an employee of said
PBM.These salaries and benefits, are not the
benefits contemplated by Articles 121 and 122
of the Family Code. The benefits
contemplated by the exception in Article 122
(Family Code) is that benefit derived directly
from the use of the loan. In the case at bar,
the loan is a corporate loan extended to PBM
and used by PBM itself, not by petitioner-
appellee-husband or his family. The alleged
benefit, if any, continuously harped by
respondents-appellants, are not only
incidental but also speculative.[19]
We agree with the respondent court. Indeed,
considering the odds involved in guaranteeing a large amount
(P50,000,000.00) of loan, the probable prolongation of
employment in PBM and increase in value of its stocks, would
be too small to qualify the transaction as one for the benefit of
the suretys family. Verily, no one could say, with a degree of
certainty, that the said contract is even productive of some
benefits to the conjugal partnership.
We likewise agree with the respondent court (and this
view is not contested by the petitioners) that the provisions of
the Family Code is applicable in this case. These provisions
highlight the underlying concern of the law for the
conservation of the conjugal partnership; for the husbands
duty to protect and safeguard, if not augment, not to dissipate
it.
This is the underlying reason why the Family Code
clarifies that the obligations entered into by one of the spouses
must be those that redounded to the benefit of the family and
that the measure of the partnerships liability is to the extent
that the family is benefited.[20]
These are all in keeping with the spirit and intent of the
other provisions of the Civil Code which prohibits any of the
spouses to donate or convey gratuitously any part of the
conjugal property.[21] Thus, when co-respondent Alfredo
Ching entered into a surety agreement he, from then on,
definitely put in peril the conjugal property (in this case,
including the family home) and placed it in danger of being
taken gratuitously as in cases of donation.
In the second assignment of error, the petitioner
advances the view that acting as surety is part of the business
or profession of the respondent-husband.
This theory is new as it is novel.
The respondent court correctly observed that:
Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise
of an industry or profession, hence the cited
Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 17
cases of Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin; Abella de
Diaz vs. Erlanger & Galinger; G-Tractors, Inc.
vs. CA do not apply in the instant
case. Signing as a surety is not embarking in
a business.[22]
We are likewise of the view that no matter how often an
executive acted or was persuaded to act, as a surety for his
own employer, this should not be taken to mean that he had
thereby embarked in the business of suretyship or guaranty.
This is not to say, however, that we are unaware that
executives are often asked to stand as surety for their
companys loan obligations. This is especially true if the
corporate officials have sufficient property of their own;
otherwise, their spouses signatures are required in order to
bind the conjugal partnerships.
The fact that on several occasions the lending
institutions did not require the signature of the wife and the
husband signed alone does not mean that being a surety
became part of his profession. Neither could he be presumed
to have acted for the conjugal partnership.
Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Family Code is emphatic
that the payment of personal debts contracted by the husband
or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged
to the conjugal partnership except to the extent that they
redounded to the benefit of the family.
Here, the property in dispute also involves the family
home. The loan is a corporate loan not a personal
one. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an
industry or profession nor an act of administration for the
benefit of the family.
On the basis of the facts, the rules, the law and equity,
the assailed decision should be upheld as we now uphold
it. This is, of course, without prejudice to petitioners right to
enforce the obligation in its favor against the PBM receiver in
accordance with the rehabilitation program and payment
schedule approved or to be approved by the Securities &
Exchange Commission.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review should be, as it is
hereby, DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Melo, Puno, and Mendoza,
JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 116668. July 28, 1997]
ERLINDA A. AGAPAY, petitioner, vs. CARLINA
(CORNELIA) V. PALANG and HERMINIA P.
DELA CRUZ, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24199 entitled Erlinda
Agapay v. Carlina (Cornelia) Palang and Herminia P. Dela
Cruz dated June 22, 1994 involving the ownership of two
parcels of land acquired during the cohabitation of petitioner
and private respondents legitimate spouse.
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage on July 16,
1949 when he took private respondent Carlina (or Cornelia)
Vallesterol as a wife at the Pozorrubio Roman Catholic
Church in Pangasinan. A few months after the wedding, in
October 1949, he left to work in Hawaii. Miguel and Carlinas
only child, Herminia Palang, was born on May 12, 1950.
Miguel returned in 1954 for a year. His next visit to the
Philippines was in 1964 and during the entire duration of his
year-long sojourn he stayed in Zambales with his brother, not
in Pangasinan with his wife and child. The trial court found
evidence that as early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to
divorce Carlina in Hawaii.[1] When he returned for good in
1972, he refused to live with private respondents, but stayed
alone in a house in Pozorrubio, Pangasinan.
On July 15, 1973, the then sixty-three-year-old Miguel
contracted his second marriage with nineteen-year-old
Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner.[2] Two months earlier, on
May 17, 1973, Miguel and Erlinda, as evidenced by the Deed
of Sale, jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located
at San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan with an area of 10,080
square meters. Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
101736 covering said rice land was issued in their names.
A house and lot in Binalonan, Pangasinan was likewise
purchased on September 23, 1975, allegedly by Erlinda as the
sole vendee. TCT No. 143120 covering said property was
later issued in her name.
On October 30, 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang
executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise
agreement to settle and end a case filed by the latter. [3] The
parties therein agreed to donate their conjugal property
consisting of six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia
Palang.[4]
Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son,
Kristopher A. Palang, born on December 6, 1977. In 1979,
Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage upon
Carlinas complaint.[5] Two years later, on February 15, 1981,
Miguel died.
On July 11, 1981, Carlina Palang and her daughter
Herminia Palang de la Cruz, herein private respondents,
instituted the case at bar, an action for recovery of ownership
and possession with damages against petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court in Urdaneta, Pangasinan (Civil Case No.
U-4265). Private respondents sought to get back the riceland
and the house and lot both located at Binalonan, Pangasinan
allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with
petitioner.
Petitioner, as defendant below, contended that while
the riceland covered by TCT No. 101736 is registered in their
names (Miguel and Erlinda), she had already given her half of
the property to their son Kristopher Palang. She added that
the house and lot covered by TCT No. 143120 is her sole
property, having bought the same with her own
money. Erlinda added that Carlina is precluded from claiming
aforesaid properties since the latter had already donated their
conjugal estate to Herminia.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its
decision on June 30, 1989 dismissing the complaint after
declaring that there was little evidence to prove that the
subject properties pertained to the conjugal property of
Carlina and Miguel Palang. The lower court went on to provide
for the intestate shares of the parties, particularly of Kristopher
Palang, Miguels illegitimate son. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered-
1) Dismissing the complaint, with costs against plaintiffs;
2) Confirming the ownership of defendant Erlinda Agapay of the
residential lot located at Poblacion, Binalonan, Pangasinan, as
evidenced by TCT No. 143120, Lot 290-B including the old house
standing therein;
3) Confirming the ownership of one-half (1/2) portion of that piece
of agricultural land situated at Balisa, San Felipe, Binalonan,
Pangasinan, consisting of 10,080 square meters and as evidenced
by TCT No. 101736, Lot 1123-A to Erlinda Agapay;
4) Adjudicating to Kristopher Palang as his inheritance from his
deceased father, Miguel Palang, the one-half (1/2) of the
agricultural land situated at Balisa, San Felipe, Binalonan,
Pangasinan, under TCT No. 101736 in the name of Miguel Palang,
provided that the former (Kristopher) executes, within 15 days
after this decision becomes final and executory, a quit-claim
forever renouncing any claims to annul/reduce the donation to
Herminia Palang de la Cruz of all conjugal properties of her
parents, Miguel Palang and Carlina Vallesterol Palang, dated
October 30, 1975, otherwise, the estate of deceased Miguel Palang
will have to be settled in another separate action;
5) No pronouncement as to damages and attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.[6]
On appeal, respondent court reversed the trial courts
decision. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision on July
22, 1994 with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed
decision is hereby REVERSED and another one entered:
Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 18
1. Declaring plaintiffs-appellants the owners of the properties in
question;
2. Ordering defendant-appellee to vacate and deliver the properties
in question to herein plaintiffs-appellants;
3. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan to cancel Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. 143120 and 101736 and to issue in lieu
thereof another certificate of title in the name of plaintiffs-
appellants.
No pronouncement as to costs.[7]
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred in not
sustaining the validity of two deeds of absolute sale covering
the riceland and the house and lot, the first in favor of Miguel
Palang and Erlinda Agapay and the second, in favor of Erlinda
Agapay alone. Second, petitioner contends that respondent
appellate court erred in not declaring Kristopher A. Palang as
Miguel Palangs illegitimate son and thus entitled to inherit
from Miguels estate. Third, respondent court erred, according
to petitioner, in not finding that there is sufficient pleading and
evidence that Kristoffer A. Palang or Christopher A. Palang
should be considered as party-defendant in Civil Case No. U-
4625 before the trial court and in CA-G.R. No. 24199.[8]
After studying the merits of the instant case, as well as
the pertinent provisions of law and jurisprudence, the Court
denies the petition and affirms the questioned decision of the
Court of Appeals.
The first and principal issue is the ownership of the two
pieces of property subject of this action. Petitioner assails the
validity of the deeds of conveyance over the same parcels of
land.There is no dispute that the transfers of ownership from
the original owners of the riceland and the house and lot,
Corazon Ilomin and the spouses Cespedes, respectively,
were valid.
The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in
favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law applicable
here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of
cohabitation when a man and a woman who
are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda
contracted marriage on July 15, 1973, said union was patently
void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was
still susbsisting and unaffected by the latters de
facto separation.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both
of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must
be stressed that actual contribution is required by this
provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in
the care and maintenance of the family and household, are
regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common
property by one who has no salary or income or work or
industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved,
there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal
shares.[9]
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her
testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy and sell
and had a sari-sari store[10] but failed to persuade us that she
actually contributed money to buy the subject riceland. Worth
noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance, May 17,
1973, petitioner was only around twenty years of age and
Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner of the
U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is
unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed P3,750.00
as her share in the purchase price of subject property,[11] there
being no proof of the same.
Petitioner now claims that the riceland was bought two
months before Miguel and Erlinda actually cohabited. In the
nature of an afterthought, said added assertion was intended
to exclude their case from the operation of Article 148 of the
Family Code. Proof of the precise date when they
commenced their adulterous cohabitation not having been
adduced, we cannot state definitively that the riceland was
purchased even before they started living together. In any
case, even assuming that the subject property was bought
before cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would still apply
and proof of actual contribution would still be essential.
Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed
money to the purchase price of the riceland in Binalonan,
Pangasinan, we find no basis to justify her co-ownership with
Miguel over the same. Consequently, the riceland should, as
correctly held by the Court of Appeals, revert to the conjugal
partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private
respondent Carlina Palang.
Furthermore, it is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina
previously agreed to donate their conjugal property in favor of
their daughter Herminia in 1975. The trial court erred in
holding that the decision adopting their compromise
agreement in effect partakes the nature of judicial
confirmation of the separation of property between spouses
and the termination of the conjugal partnership.[12] Separation
of property between spouses during the marriage shall not
take place except by judicial order or without judicial
conferment when there is an express stipulation in the
marriage settlements.[13] The judgment which resulted from
the parties compromise was not specifically and expressly for
separation of property and should not be so inferred.
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly
bought the same for P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975
when she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary
public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property
reveals the falsehood of this claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun
testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for the
purchase price and directed that Erlindas name alone be
placed as the vendee.[14]
The transaction was properly a donation made by
Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and
inexistent by express provision of law because it was made
between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time
of the donation, under Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover,
Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the
prohibition against donations between spouses now applies
to donations between persons living together as husband and
wife without a valid marriage,[15] for otherwise, the condition of
those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those
in legal union.[16]
The second issue concerning Kristopher Palangs status
and claim as an illegitimate son and heir to Miguels estate is
here resolved in favor of respondent courts correct
assessment that the trial court erred in making
pronouncements regarding Kristophers heirship and filiation
inasmuch as questions as to who are the heirs of the
decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate children and the
determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto
should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special
proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot be
adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action which is for
recovery of ownership and possession.[17]
As regards the third issue, petitioner contends that
Kristopher Palang should be considered as party-defendant in
the case at bar following the trial courts decision which
expressly found that Kristopher had not been impleaded as
party defendant but theorized that he had submitted to the
courts jurisdiction through his mother/guardian ad
litem.[18] The trial court erred gravely. Kristopher, not having
been impleaded, was, therefore, not a party to the case at
bar. His mother, Erlinda, cannot be called his guardian ad
litem for he was not involved in the case at bar. Petitioner
adds that there is no need for Kristopher to file another action
to prove that he is the illegitimate son of Miguel, in order to
avoid multiplicity of suits.[19] Petitioners grave error has been
discussed in the preceeding paragraph where the need for
probate proceedings to resolve the settlement of Miguels
estate and Kristophers successional rights has been pointed
out.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Puno, and Mendoza,
JJ., concur.
Torres, Jr., J., on leave.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-28771. March 31, 1971.]
CORNELIA MATABUENA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
PETRONILA CERVANTES, Defendant-Appellee.
Alegre, Roces, Salazar & Sañez, for Plaintiff-
Appellant.
Fernando Gerona, Jr., for Defendant-Appellee.
SYLLABUS
Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 19
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN
HUSBAND AND WIFE; DONATIONS BY REASON OF
MARRIAGE; PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION
BETWEEN SPOUSES DURING MARRIAGE;
APPLICABLE TO COMMON LAW RELATIONSHIP. —
While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a
"donation between the spouses during the marriage",
policy considerations of the most exigent character
as well as the dictates of morality require that the
same prohibition should apply to a common-law
relationship. A 1954 Court of Appeals decision
Buenaventura v. Bautista, (50 O.G. 3679)
interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code
speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in
the language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L.
Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of
the other consort and his descendants because of
fear of undue and improper pressure and influence
upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our
ancient law; ‘porque no se engañen despojandose el
uno al otro por amor que han de consuno,’
[according to] the Partidas (Part. IV, Tit. Xl, LAW IV),
reiterating the rationale ‘Ne mutuato amore invicem
spoliarentur’ of the Pandects (Bk 24, Tit. I, De donat,
inter virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to
apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living
together as husband and wife without benefit of
nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to
such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks
greater influence of one party over the other, so that
the danger that the law seeks to avoid is
correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already
pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr.
1), it would not be just that such donations should
subsist lest the condition of those who incurred guilt
should turn out to be better. So long as marriage
remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason
and morality alike demand that the disabilities
attached to marriage should likewise attach to
concubinage.
2. ID.; SUCCESSION; INTESTATE SUCCESSION;
SURVIVING SPOUSE; RULE WHERE A SISTER
SURVIVES WITH THE WIDOW. — The lack of validity
of the donation made b~ the deceased to defendant
Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in
plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed
property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the
relationship between him and the defendant was
legitimated by their marriage on March 28. 1962.
She is therefore his widow. As provided in the Civil
Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance
and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister to the other
half.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J.:
A question of first impression is before this Court in
this litigation. We are called upon to decide whether
the ban on a donation between the spouses during a
marriage applies to a common-law relationship. 1
The plaintiff, now appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a
sister to the deceased Felix Matabuena, maintains
that a donation made while he was living maritally
without benefit of marriage to defendant, now
appellee Petronila Cervantes, was void. Defendant
would uphold its validity. The lower court, after
noting that it was made at a time before defendant
was married to the donor, sustained the latter’s
stand. Hence this appeal. The question, as noted, is
novel in character, this Court not having had as yet
the opportunity of ruling on it. A 1954 decision of the
Court of Appeals, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 2 by the
then Justice J. B. L. Reyes, who was appointed to
this Court later that year, is indicative of the
appropriate response that should be given. The
conclusion reached therein is that a donation
between common-law spouses falls within the
prohibition and is "null and void as contrary to public
policy." 3 Such a view merits fully the acceptance of
this Court. The decision must be reversed.
In the decision of November 23, 1965, the lower
court, after stating that in plaintiff’s complaint
alleging absolute ownership of the parcel of land in
question, she specifically raised the question that the
donation made by Felix Matabuena to defendant
Petronila Cervantes was null and void under the
aforesaid article of the Civil Code and that defendant
on the other hand did assert ownership precisely
because such a donation was made in 1956 and her
marriage to the deceased did not take place until
1962, noted that when the case was called for trial
on November 19, 1965, there was stipulation of facts
which it quoted. 4 Thus: "The plaintiff and the
defendant assisted by their respective counsels,
jointly agree and stipulate: (1) That the deceased
Felix Matabuena owned the property in question; (2)
That said Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of
Donation inter vivos in favor of Defendant, Petronila
Cervantes over the parcel of land in question on
February 20, 1956, which same donation was
accepted by defendant; (3) That the donation of the
land to the defendant which took effect immediately
was made during the common law relationship as
husband and wife between the defendant-done and
the now deceased donor and later said donor and
done were married on March 28, 1962; (4) That the
deceased Felix Matabuena died intestate on
September 13, 1962; (5) That the plaintiff claims the
property by reason of being the only sister and
nearest collateral relative of the deceased by virtue
of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in
1962 and had the land declared in her name and
paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon’" 5
The judgment of the lower court on the above facts
was adverse to plaintiff. It reasoned out thus: "A
donation under the terms of Article 133 of the Civil
Code is void if made between the spouses during the
marriage. When the donation was made by Felix
Matabuena in favor of the defendant on February 20,
1956, Petronila Cervantes and Felix Matabuena were
not yet married. At that time they were not spouses.
They became spouses only when they married on
March 28, 1962, six years after the deed of donation
had been executed." 6
We reach a different conclusion. While Art. 133 of
the Civil Code considers as void a "donation between
the spouses during the marriage," policy
considerations of the most exigent character as well
as the dictates of morality require that the same
prohibition should apply to a common-law
relationship. We reverse.
1. As announced at the outset of this opinion, a 1954
Court of Appeals decision, Buenaventura v. Bautista,
7 interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code
8 speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in
the language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L.
Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of
the other consort and his descendants because of
fear of undue and improper pressure and influence
upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our
ancient law; ‘porque no se engañen despojandose el
uno al otro por amor que han de consuno [according
to] the Partidas (Part IV, Tit. XI, LAW IV), reiterating
the rationale ‘Ne mutuato amore invicem
spoliarentur’ of the Pandects (Bk. 24, Tit. 1, De
donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every
reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to
persons living together as husband and wife without
the benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted
that assent to such irregular connection for thirty
years bespeaks greater influence of one party over
the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to
avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover, as
already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad
Sabinum, fr. 1), ‘it would not be just that such
donations should subsist, lest the condition of those
who incurred guilt should turn out to be better.’ So
long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our
family law, reason and morality alike demand that
the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise
attach to concubinage." 9
2. It is hardly necessary to add that even in the
absence of the above pronouncement, any other
conclusion cannot stand the test of scrutiny. It would
Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 20
be to indict the framers of the Civil Code for a failure
to apply a laudable rule to a situation which in its
essentials cannot be distinguished. Moreover, if it is
at all to be differentiated, the policy of the law which
embodies a deeply-rooted notion of what is just and
what is right would be nullified if such irregular
relationship instead of being visited with disabilities
would be attended with benefits. Certainly a legal
norm should not be susceptible to such a reproach. If
there is ever any occasion where the principle of
statutory construction that what is within the spirit of
the law is as much a part of it as what is written, this
is it. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such
codal provision would not be attained. Whatever
omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely
literal of the language used must be remedied by an
adherence to its avowed objective. In the language
of Justice Pablo: "El espiritu que informa la ley debe
ser la luz que ha de guiar a los tribunales en la
aplicación de sus disposiciones.’’ 10
3. The lack of validity of the donation made by the
deceased to defendant Petronila Cervantes does not
necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to
the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix
Matabuena, the relationship between him and the
defendant was legitimated by their marriage on
March 28, 1962. She is therefore his widow. As
provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-
half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the
surviving sister, to the other half. 11
WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November
23, 1965 dismissing the complaint with costs is
reversed. The questioned donation is declared void,
with the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro
indiviso heirs to the property in question recognized.
The case is remanded to the lower court for its
appropriate disposition in accordance with the above
opinion. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ.,
concur.
Teehankee, J, took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-61464 May 28, 1988
BA FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AUGUSTO
YULO, LILY YULO (doing business under the name and
style of A & L INDUSTRIES), respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review seeking to set aside the decision
of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the
then Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing the
complaint instituted by the petitioner and ordering it to pay
damages on the basis of the private respondent's
counterclaim.
On July 1, 1975, private respondent Augusto Yulo secured a
loan from the petitioner in the amount of P591,003.59 as
evidenced by a promissory note he signed in his own behalf
and as representative of the A & L Industries. Respondent
Yulo presented an alleged special power of attorney
executed by his wife, respondent Lily Yulo, who manages A
& L Industries and under whose name the said business is
registered, purportedly authorizing Augusto Yulo to procure
the loan and sign the promissory note. About two months
prior to the loan, however, Augusto Yulo had already left Lily
Yulo and their children and had abandoned their conjugal
home. When the obligation became due and demandable,
Augusto Yulo failed to pay the same.
On October 7, 1975, the petitioner filed its amended
complaint against the spouses Augusto and Lily Yulo on the
basis of the promissory note. It also prayed for the issuance
of a writ of attatchment alleging that the said spouses were
guilty of fraud in contracting the debt upon which the action
was brought and that the fraud consisted of the spouses'
inducing the petitioner to enter into a contract with them by
executing a Deed of Assignment in favor of the petitioner,
assigning all their rights, titles and interests over a
construction contract executed by and between the spouses
and A. Soriano Corporation on June 19, 1974 for a
consideration of P615,732.50 when, in truth, the spouses did
not have any intention of remitting the proceeds of the said
construction contract to the petitioner because despite the
provisions in the Deed of Assignment that the spouses shall,
without compensation or costs, collect and receive in trust for
the petitioner all payments made upon the construction
contract and shall remit to the petitioner all collections
therefrom, the said spouses failed and refuse to remit the
collections and instead, misappropriated the proceeds for
their own use and benefit, without the knowledge or consent
of the petitioner.
The trial court issued the writ of attachment prayed for
thereby enabling the petitioner to attach the properties of A &
L Industries. Apparently not contented with the order, the
petitioner filed another motion for the examination of
attachment debtor, alleging that the properties attached by
the sheriff were not sufficient to secure the satisfaction of
any judgment that may be recovered by it in the case. This
was likewise granted by the court.
Private respondent Lily Yulo filed her answer with
counterclaim, alleging that although Augusta Yulo and she
are husband and wife, the former had abandoned her and
their children five (5) months before the filing of the
complaint; that they were already separated when the
promissory note was executed; that her signature in the
special power of attorney was forged because she had never
authorized Augusto Yulo in any capacity to transact any
business for and in behalf of A & L Industries, which is
owned by her as a single proprietor, that she never got a
single centavo from the proceeds of the loan mentioned in
the promissory note; and that as a result of the illegal
attachment of her properties, which constituted the assets of
the A & L Industries, the latter closed its business and was
taken over by the new owner.
After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing
the petitioner's complaint against the private respondent Lily
Yulo and A & L Industries and ordering the petitioner to pay
the respondent Lily Yulo P660,000.00 as actual damages;
P500,000.00 as unrealized profits; P300,000.00 as
exemplary damages; P30,000.00 as and for attorney's fees;
and to pay the costs.
The petitioner appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's decision except for the exemplary damages
which it reduced from P300,000.00 to P150,000.00 and the
attorney's fees which were reduced from P30,000.00 to
P20,000.00.
In resolving the question of whether or not the trial court
erred in holding that the signature of respondent Lily Yulo in
the special power of attorney was forged, the Court of
Appeals said:
The crucial issue to be determined is
whether or not the signatures of the
appellee Lily Yulo in Exhibits B and B-1
are forged. Atty. Crispin Ordoña, the
Notary Public, admitted in open court
that the parties in the subject documents
did not sign their signatures in his
presence. The same were already
signed by the supposed parties and their
supposed witnesses at the time they
were brought to him for ratification. We
quote from the records the pertinent
testimony of Atty. Ordoña, thus:
Q. This document
marked as Exhibit
B-1, when this was
presented to you by
that common friend,
June Enriquez, it
was already
typewritten, it was
already
Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 21
accomplished, all
typewritten.?
A. Yes, sir.
Q And the parties
had already affixed
their signatures in
this document?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In this document
marked as Exhibit B
although it appears
here that this is an
acknowledgment,
you have not stated
here that the
principal actually
acknowledged this
document to be her
voluntary act and
deed?
A This in one of
those things that
escaped my
attention. Actually I
have not gone over
the second page. I
believed it was in
order I signed it.
(TSN pp. 13-14,
Hearing of Nov. 26,
1976).
The glaring admission by the Notary
Public that he failed to state in the
acknowledgment portion of Exhibit B-1
that the appellee Lily Yulo
acknowledged the said document to be
her own voluntary act and deed, is a
very strong and commanding
circumstance to show that she did not
appear personally before the said
Notary Public and did not sign the
document.
Additionally, the Notary Public admitted
that, while June Enriquez is admittedly a
mutual friend of his and the defendant
Augusta Yulo, and who is also an
instrumental witness in said Exhibit B-1.,
he could not recognize or tell which of
the two signatures appearing therein,
was the signature of this June Enriquez.
Furthermore, as the issue is one of
credibility of a witness, the findings and
conclusions of the trial court before
whom said witness, Atty. Crispin
Ordoña, the Notary Public before whom
the questioned document was
supposedly ratified and acknowledged,
deserve great respect and are seldom
disturbed on appeal by appellate
tribunals, since it is in the best and
peculiar advantage of determining and
observing the conduct, demeanor and
deportment of a particular witness while
he is testifying in court, an opportunity
not enjoyed by the appellate courts who
merely have to rely on the recorded
proceedings which transpired in the
court below, and the records are bare of
any circumstance of weight, which the
trial court had overlooked and which if
duly considered, may radically affect the
outcome of the case.
On the other hand, the appellee Lily
Yulo, to back up her claim of forgery of
her signature in Exhibit B-1, presented
in court a handwriting expert witness in
the person of Police Captain Yakal
Giron of the Integrated National Police
Training Command, and who is also a
Document Examiner of the same
Command's Crime Laboratory at Fort
Bonifacio, Metro Manila. His experience
as an examiner of questioned and
disputed documents, in our mind, is
quite impressive. To qualify him as a
handwriting expert, he declared that he
underwent extensive and actual studies
and examination of disputed or
questioned document, both at the
National Bureau of Investigation
Academy and National Bureau of
Investigation Questioned Document
Laboratory, respectively, from July 1964,
up to his appointment as Document
Examiner in June, 1975, and, to further
his experience along this line, he
attended the 297th Annual Conference
of the American Society of Questioned
Docurnent Examiners held at Seattle,
Washington, in August 1971, as a
representative of the Philippines, and
likewise conducted an observation of the
present and modern trends of crime
laboratories in the West Coast, U.S.A.,
in 1971; that he likewise had conducted
actual tests and examination of about
100,000 documents, as requested by
the different courts, administrative, and
governmental agencies of the
Government, substantial portions of
which relate to actual court cases.
In concluding that the signatures of the
appellee Lily Yulo, in the disputed
document in question (Exh. B-1), were
all forgeries, and not her genuine
signature, the expert witness
categorically recited and specified in
open court what he observed to be
about twelve (12) glaring and material
significant differences, in his comparison
of the signatures appearing in the
genuine specimen signatures of the said
appellee and with those appearing in the
questioned document (Exhibit B-1).
Indeed, we have likewise seen the
supposed notable differences, found in
the standard or genuine signatures of
the appellee which were lifted and
obtained in the official files of the
government, such as the Bureau of
Internal Revenue on her income tax
returns, as compared to the pretended
signature of the appellee appearing in
Exhibits B, B-1. It is also noteworthy to
mention that the appellant did not even
bother to conduct a cross-examination
of the handwriting expert witness, Capt.
Giron, neither did the appellant present
another handwriting expert, at least to
counter-act or balance the appellee's
handwriting expert.
Prescinding from the foregoing facts, we
subscribe fully to the lower court's
observations that the signatures of the
appellee Lily Yulo in the questioned
document (Exh. B-1) were forged.
Hence, we find no factual basis to
disagree. (pp. 28-30, Rollo)
As to the petitioner's contention that even if the signature of
Lily Yulo was forged or even if the attached properties were
her exclusive property, the same can be made answerable to
the obligation because the said properties form part of the
conjugal partnership of the spouses Yulo, the appellate court
held that these contentions are without merit because there
is strong preponderant evidence to show that A & L
Industries belongs exclusively to respondent Lily Yulo,
namely: a) The Certificate of Registration of A & L Industries,
issued by the Bureau of Commerce, showing that said
business is a single proprietorship, and that the registered
owner thereof is only Lily Yulo; b) The Mayor's Permit issued
in favor of A & L Industries, by the Caloocan City Mayor's
Office showing compliance by said single proprietorship
company with the City Ordinance governing business
establishments; and c) The Special Power of Attorney itself,
assuming but without admitting its due execution, is tangible
proof that Augusto Yulo has no interest whatsoever in the A
& L Industries, otherwise, there would have been no
necessity for the Special Power of Attorney if he is a part
owner of said single proprietorship.
Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 22

With regard to the award of damages, the Court of Appeals the very basis of the
affirmed the findings of the trial court that there was bad faith plaintiff in filing this
on the part of the petitioner as to entitle the private complaint,
respondent to damages as shown not only by the fact that immediately after
the petitioner did not present the Deed of Assignment or the the day it filed a
construction agreement or any evidence whatsoever to Motion for the
support its claim of fraud on the part of the private Issuance of an Alias
respondent and to justify the issuance of a preliminary Writ of Preliminary
attachment, but also by the following findings: Attachment . . .Yet,
inspite of the
knowledge and the
Continuing and elaborating further on
filing of this Motion
the appellant's mala fide actuations in
to Suspend
securing the writ of attachment, the
Proceedings, the
lower court stated as follows:
Plaintiff still filed a
Motion for the
Plaintiff not satisfied Issuance of a Writ
with the instant of Attachment dated
case where an February 6, 1976
order for attachment before this court. To
has already been add insult to injury,
issued and plaintiff even filed a
enforced, on the Motion for
strength of the Examination of the
same Promissory Attachment Debtor,
Note (Exhibit"A"), although aware that
utilizing the Deed of Lily Yulo had
Chattel Mortgage already denied
(Exhibit "4"), filed a participation in the
foreclosure execution of
proceedings before Exhibits "A" and "B".
the Office of the These incidents and
Sheriff of Caloocan actions taken by
(Exhibit"6") plaintiff, to the
foreclosing the thinking of the court,
remaining are sufficient to
properties found prove and establish
inside the premises the element of bad
formerly occupied faith and malice on
by the A & L the part of plaintiff
Industries. A minute which may warrant
examination of the award of
Exhibit "4" will show damages in favor of
that the contracting defendant Lily Yulo.
parties thereto, as (Ibid., pp. 102-
appearing in par. 1 103).<äre||anº•1àw
thereof, are >
Augusto Yulo, doing
business under the
Indeed, the
style of A & L
existence of evident
Industries (should
bad faith on the
be A & L Glass
appellant's part in
Industries
proceeding against
Corporation), as
the appellee Lily
mortgagor and BA
Yulo in the present
Finance
case, may likewise
Corporation as
be distressed on the
mortgagee, thus the
fact that its officer
enforcement of the
Mr. Abraham Co,
Chattel Mortgage
did not even bother
against the property
to demand the
of A & L Industries
production of at
exclusively owned
least the duplicate
by Lily T. Yulo
original of the
appears to be
Special Power of
without any factual
Attorney (Exhibit B)
or legal basis
and merely
whatsoever. The
contended himself
chattel mortgage,
with a mere xerox
Exhibit "4" and the
copy thereof,
Promissory Note,
neither did he
Exhibit A, are based
require a more
on one and the
specific authority
same obligation.
from the A & L
Plaintiff tried to
Industries to
enforce as it did
contract the loan in
enforce its claim
question, since from
into two different
the very content
modes a single
and recitals of the
obligation.
disputed document,
no authority,
Aware that express or implied,
defendant Lily Yulo, has been delegated
filed a Motion to or granted to
Suspend August Yulo to
Proceedings by contract a loan,
virtue of a complaint especially with the
she filed with the appellant. (pp. 33-
Court of First 34, Rollo)
Instance of
Caloocan, seeking
Concerning the actual damages, the appellate court ruled
annulment of the
that the petitioner should have presented evidence to
Promissory Note,
Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 23
disprove or rebut the private respondent's claim but it
remained quiet and chose not to disturb the testimony and
the evidence presented by the private respondent to prove
her claim.
In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner raises three issues.
The first issue deals with the appellate court's affirmance of
the trial court's findings that the signature of the private
respondent on the Special Power of Attorney was forged.
According to the petitioner, the Court of Appeals disregarded
the direct mandate of Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court which states in part that evidence of handwriting by
comparison may be made "with writings admitted or treated
as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is
offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the
judge," and that there is no evidence on record which proves
or tends to prove the genuineness of the standards used.
There is no merit in this contention.
The records show that the signatures which were used as
"standards" for comparison with the alleged signature of the
private respondent in the Special Power of Attorney were
those from the latter's residence certificates in the years
1973, 1974 and 1975, her income tax returns for the years
1973 and 1975 and from a document on long bond paper
dated May 18, 1977. Not only were the signatures in the
foregoing documents admitted by the private respondent as
hers but most of the said documents were used by the
private respondent in her transactions with the government.
As was held in the case of Plymouth Saving & Loan Assn.
No. 2 v. Kassing (125 NE 488, 494):
We believe the true rule deduced from
the authorities to be that the
genuineness of a "standard" writing may
be established (1) by the admission of
the person sought to be charged with
the disputed writing made at or for the
purposes of the trial or by his testimony;
(2) by witnesses who saw the standards
written or to whom or in whose hearing
the person sought to be charged
acknowledged the writing thereof; (3) by
evidence showing that the reputed writer
of the standard has acquiesced in or
recognized the same, or that it has been
adopted and acted upon by him his
business transactions or other
concerns....
Furthermore, the judge found such signatures to be sufficient
as standards. In the case of Taylor-Wharton Iron & Steel Co.
v. Earnshaw (156 N.E. 855, 856), it was held:
When a writing is offered as a standard
of comparison it is for the presiding
judge to decide whether it is the
handwriting of the party to be charged.
Unless his finding is founded upon error
of law, or upon evidence which is, as
matter of law, insufficient to justify the
finding, this court will not revise it upon
exceptions." (Costelo v. Crowell, 139
Mass. 588, 590, 2 N.E. 648; Nuñez v.
Perry, 113 Mass, 274, 276.)
We cannot find any error on the part of the trial judge in
using the above documents as standards and also in giving
credence to the expert witness presented by the private
respondent whose testimony the petitioner failed to rebut
and whose credibility it likewise failed to impeach. But more
important is the fact that the unrebutted handwriting expert's
testimony noted twelve (12) glaring and material differences
in the alleged signature of the private respondent in the
Special Power of Attorney as compared with the specimen
signatures, something which the appellate court also took
into account. In Cesar v. Sandiganbayan (134 SCRA 105,
132), we ruled:
Mr. Maniwang pointed to other
significant divergences and distinctive
characteristics between the sample
signatures and the signatures on the
questioned checks in his report which
the court's Presiding Justice kept
mentioning during Maniwang's
testimony.
In the course of his cross-examination,
NBI expert Tabayoyong admitted that he
saw the differences between the
exemplars used and the questioned
signatures but he dismissed the
differences because he did not consider
them fundamental. We rule that
significant differences are more
fundamental than a few similarities. A
forger always strives to master some
similarities.
The second issue raised by the petitioner is that while it is
true that A & L Industries is a single proprietorship and the
registered owner thereof is private respondent Lily Yulo, the
said proprietorship was established during the marriage and
its assets were also acquired during the same. Therefore, it
is presumed that this property forms part of the conjugal
partnership of the spouses Augusto and Lily Yulo and thus,
could be held liable for the obligations contracted by Augusto
Yulo, as administrator of the partnership.
There is no dispute that A & L Industries was established
during the marriage of Augusta and Lily Yulo and therefore
the same is presumed conjugal and the fact that it was
registered in the name of only one of the spouses does not
destroy its conjugal nature (See Mendoza v. Reyes, 124
SCRA 161, 165). However, for the said property to be held
liable, the obligation contracted by the husband must have
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership under
Article 161 of the Civil Code. In the present case, the
obligation which the petitioner is seeking to enforce against
the conjugal property managed by the private respondent
Lily Yulo was undoubtedly contracted by Augusto Yulo for
his own benefit because at the time he incurred the
obligation he had already abandoned his family and had left
their conjugal home. Worse, he made it appear that he was
duly authorized by his wife in behalf of A & L Industries, to
procure such loan from the petitioner. Clearly, to make A & L
Industries liable now for the said loan would be unjust and
contrary to the express provision of the Civil Code. As we
have ruled in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. De Gracia (30 SCRA
111, 115-117):
As explained in the decision now under
review: "It is true that the husband is the
administrator of the conjugal property
pursuant to the provisions of Art. 163 of
the new Civil Code. However, as such
administrator the only obligations
incurred by the husband that are
chargeable against the conjugal
property are those incurred in the
legitimate pursuit of his career,
profession or business with the honest
belief that he is doing right for the
benefit of the family. This is not true in
the case at bar for we believe that the
husband in acting as guarantor or surety
for another in an indemnity agreement
as that involved in this case did not act
for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. Such inference is more
emphatic in this case, when no proof is
presented that Vicente Garcia in acting
as surety or guarantor received
consideration therefore, which may
redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.(Ibid, pp. 46-47).
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
In the most categorical language, a
conjugal partnership under that
provision is liable only for such "debts
and obligations contracted by the
husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." There must be the
requisite showing then of some
advantage which clearly accrued to the
welfare of the spouses. There is none in
this case.
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, it would negate the plain
object of the additional requirement in
Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 24
the present Civil Code that a debt
contracted by the husband to bind a
conjugal partnership must redound to its
benefit. That is still another provision
indicative of the solicitude and tender
regard that the law manifests for the
family as a unit. Its interest is
paramount; its welfare uppermost in the
minds of the codifiers and legislators.
We, therefore, rule that the petitioner cannot enforce the
obligation contracted by Augusto Yulo against his conjugal
properties with respondent Lily Yulo. Thus, it follows that the
writ of attachment cannot issue against the said properties.
Finally, the third issue assails the award of actual damages
according to the petitioner, both the lower court and the
appellate court overlooked the fact that the properties
referred to are still subject to a levy on attachment. They are,
therefore, still under custodia legis and thus, the assailed
decision should have included a declaration as to who is
entitled to the attached properties and that assuming
arguendo that the attachment was erroneous, the lower court
should have ordered the sheriff to return to the private
respondent the attached properties instead of condemning
the petitioner to pay the value thereof by way of actual
damages.
In the case of Lazatin v. Twaño (2 SCRA 842, 847), we
ruled:
xxx xxx xxx
... It should be observed that Sec. 4 of
Rule 59, does not prescribed the
remedies available to the attachment
defendant in case of a wrongful
attachment, but merely provides an
action for recovery upon the bond,
based on the undertaking therein made
and not upon the liability arising from a
tortuous act, like the malicious suing out
of an attachment. Under the first, where
malice is not essential, the attachment
defendant, is entitled to recover only the
actual damages sustained by him by
reason of the attachment. Under the
second, where the attachment is
maliciously sued out, the damages
recoverable may include a
compensation for every injury to his
credit, business or feed (Tyler v.
Mahoney, 168 NC 237, 84 SE 362;
Pittsburg etc. 5 Wakefield, etc., 135 NC
73, 47 SE 234). ...
The question before us, therefore, is whether the attachment
of the properties of A & L Industries was wrongful so as to
entitle the petitioner to actual damages only or whether the
said attachment was made in bad faith and with malice to
warrant the award of other kinds of damages. Moreover, if
the private respondent is entitled only to actual damages,
was the court justified in ordering the petitioner to pay for the
value of the attached properties instead of ordering the
return of the said properties to the private respondent Yulo ?
Both the trial and appellate courts found that there was bad
faith on the part of the petitioner in securing the writ of
attachment. We do not think so. "An attachment may be said
to be wrongful when, for instance, the plaintiff has no cause
of action, or that there is no true ground therefore, or that the
plaintiff has a sufficient security other than the property
attached, which is tantamout to saying that the plaintiff is not
entitled to attachment because the requirements of entitling
him to the writ are wanting. (7 C.J.S., 664)" (p. 48, Section 4,
Rule 57, Francisco, Revised Rules of Court).
Although the petitioner failed to prove the ground relied upon
for the issuance of the writ of attachment, this failure cannot
be equated with bad faith or malicious intent. The steps
which were taken by the petitioner to ensure the security of
its claim were premised, on the firm belief that the properties
involved could be made answerable for the unpaid obligation
due it. There is no question that a loan in the amount of
P591,003.59 was borrowed from the bank.
We, thus, find that the petitioner is liable only for actual
damages and not for exemplary damages and attorney's
fees. Respondent Lily Yulo has manifested before this Court
that she no longer desires the return of the attached
properties since the said attachment caused her to close
down the business. From that time she has become a mere
employee of the new owner of the premises. She has grave
doubts as to the running condition of the attached
machineries and equipments considering that the attachment
was effected way back in 1975. She states as a matter of
fact that the petitioner has already caused the sale of the
machineries for fear that they might be destroyed due to
prolonged litigation. We, therefore, deem it just and equitable
to allow private respondent Lily Yulo to recover actual
damages based on the value of the attached properties as
proven in the trial court, in the amount of P660,000.00. In
turn, if there are any remaining attached properties, they
should be permanently released to herein petitioner.
We cannot, however, sustain the award of P500,000.00
representing unrealized profits because this amount was not
proved or justified before the trial court. The basis of the
alleged unearned profits is too speculative and conjectural to
show actual damages for a future period. The private
respondent failed to present reports on the average actual
profits earned by her business and other evidence of
profitability which are necessary to prove her claim for the
said amount (See G. A. Machineries, Inc. v. Yaptinchay, 126
SCRA 78, 88).
The judgment is therefore set aside insofar as it holds the
petitioner liable for P500,000.00 actual damages
representing unrealized profits, P150,000.00 for exemplary
damages and P20,000.00 for attorney's fees. As stated
earlier, the attached properties, should be released in favor
of the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby SET ASIDE and the petitioner is ordered to pay the
private respondent Lily Yulo the amount of SIX HUNDRED
SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P660,000.00) as actual
damages. The remaining properties subject of the
attachment are ordered released in favor of the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 79734 December 8, 1988
MARMONT RESORT HOTEL ENTERPRISES, petitioner,
vs.
FEDERICO GUIANG, AURORA GUIANG, and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Isagani M. Jungco for petitioner.
FELICIANO, J.:
The present Petition for Review seeks to set aside the
Decision dated 9 December 1986 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV 03299. The appellate court affirmed a Decision
dated 31 May 1983 of Branch 83 of the Regional Trial Court
of Olongapo City dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No.
2896-C filed by petitioner company against private
respondent spouses.
On 2 May 1975, a Memorandum of Agreement was
executed between Maris Trading and petitioner Marmont
Resort Hotel Enterprises, Inc. ("Marmont"), a corporation
engaged in the hotel and resort business with office and
establishment at Olongapo City. Under the agreement, Maris
Trading undertook to drill for water and to provide all
equipment necessary to install and complete a water supply
facility to service the Marmont Resort Hotel in Olongapo, for
a stipulated fee of P40,000.00. In fulfillment of its contract,
Maris Trading drilled a well and installed a water pump on a
portion of a parcel of land situated in Olongapo City, then
occupied by respondent spouses Federico and Aurora
Guiang.
Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 25

Five (5) months later, a second Memorandum of Agreement 2. The contract

was executed between Maris Trading and Aurora Guiang, referred to in
with Federico Guiang signing as witness. This second paragraph 2 of the
agreement in essential part read: 1 complaint between
the plaintiff and
Maris Trading is
That the First Party [Maris Trading] has
contained in a
dug, drilled and tapped water source for
document captioned
Marmont Resort, located at Bo. Barretto,
Memorandum
Olongapo City in accordance with their
Agreement
agreement executed on May 2, 1975
executed on May 2,
and notarized before Isagani M. Jungco,
1975, a xerox copy
Notary Public and entered as Doc. No.
of which is Annex
166; Page No. 135; Book No. XV; Series
'A' of plaintiffs
of 1975.
complaint;

That the First Party has erected, built

3. On October 7,
and drilled for the water source of
1975, the Maris
Marmont Resort on the land owned by
Trading represented
the Second Party [Aurora Guiang] at the
by Ceferino Cabral
corner of J. Montelibano Street and
and defendant
Maquinaya Drive (Provincial Road) with
Aurora Guiang
the latter's permission.
entered into a
memorandum
That for and in consideration of the sum agreement;
of P1,500.00 the Second Party hereby
Sell, Transfer and Cede all possessory
4. The portion sold
rights, interest and claims over that
under Annex 'A' is
portion of the lot wherein the water
still a part of the
source of Marmont Resort is located
public domain.
unto and in favor of Maris Trading.

IV
After some time, the water supply of the Marmont Resort
Hotel became inadequate to meet the hotel's water
requirements. Petitioner Marmont secured the services of The plaintiff marked the following
another contractor (the name of which was not disclosed), exhibits in evidence:
which suggested that in addition to the existing water pump,
a submersible pump be installed to increase the pressure
Exhibit 'A'-
and improve the flow of water to the hotel. Accordingly, Juan
Memorandum
Montelibano, Jr., manager of the Marmont Resort Hotel,
Agreement dated
sought permission from the Guiang spouses to inspect the
May 2, 1975
water pump which had been installed on the portion of the
land previously occupied by the spouses and to make the
necessary additional installations thereon. No such Exhibit 'B-
permission, however, was granted. Memorandum
Agreement dated
October 7, 1975
On 13 May 1980, petitioner Marmont filed a
Complaint 2 against the Guiang spouses for damages
resulting from their refusal to allow representatives of V
petitioner and the second contractor firm entry into the water
facility site. The claimed damages were broken down as
follows: (a) P10,000.00 representing the amount advanced in The issues left to be ventilated during
the trial are the following:
payment to the second contractor; (b) P40,000.00
representing the total project cost of the installation made by
Maris Trading: (c) P50,000.00 representing additional 1. Whether
expenses incurred and incidental losses resulting from defendants has
failure of the original pump to cope with the water actually prohibited
requirements of the Marmont Resort Hotel; and (d) the plaintiff [from)
P10,000.00 for Attorney's fees. making repairs, [on]
the pump
In their Answer, 3 the Guiang spouses (defendants below) constructed by
Maris Trading for
denied having had any previous knowledge of the first
Memorandum of Agreement and asserted that the second the plaintiff under
Memorandum of Agreement was invalid for not having been the agreement
Exhibit 'A,' if so;
executed in accordance with law. The spouses added a
counterclaim for damages in the amount of P200,000.00.
2. Whether
defendants [have]
On 2 October 1980, at the pre-trial conference, the parties
agreed on the following stipulation of facts and issues the right to prohibit
embodied in a Pre-Trial Order:4 the Maris Trading
from performing the
repairs and if not
III
3. Whether
In addition to the admission made defendants are
elsewhere in their respective pleadings, liable for damages
the parties entered into the following under the human
stipulation of facts: relations provision
of the Civil Code.
1. Plaintiff is a
corporation duly On I January 1980, the Guiang spouses moved to dismiss
organized and the Complaint.5 The spouses there assailed the validity of
existing under the the second Memorandum of Agreement, alleging that the
laws of the subject matter thereof involved conjugal property alienated
Philippines with by Aurora Guiang without the marital consent of her
office at husband, Federico Guiang. Further, it was alleged that the
Montelibano Street, land upon which the hotel's water supply facility was
Barrio Barretto, installed-and which the Guiang spouses occupied-formed
Olongapo City; part of the public domain and was then still the subject of a
Miscellaneous Sales Application submitted by Federico
Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 26

Guiang. The Motion to Dismiss, however, was denied by the stipulation of facts is incontrovertible, 9 and may be relied
trial court. upon by the courts. 10 Respondent spouses are estopped
from raising as an issue in this case the existence and
admissibility in evidence of both the first and second
No evidence having been adduced by the Guiang spouses
Memoranda of Agreement which, having been marked as
on their behalf, the case was submitted for derision. On 31
exhibits during pre-trial, properly form part of the record of
May 1983, the trial court rendered a decision, 6 dismissing
this case, even though not formally offered in evidence after
the complaint. The trial court found that Aurora Guiang had
trial. 11
validly alienated her rights over the disputed portion of land
to Maris Trading, but held that the evidence failed to show
that Maris Trading, in turn, had transferred such rights to We consider briefly respondent spouses' argument that the
petitioner Marmont. second Memorandum of Agreement was invalid for having
been executed by Aurora Guiang without the marital consent
of Federico, contrary to Articles 165 and 172 of the Civil
Petitioner Marmont appealed to the Court of Appeals which
Code.
affirmed the decision of the trial court and dismissed the
appeal for lack of merit. 7 The appellate court, citing Section
55, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, held that the first Article 165 and 172 state the general principle under our civil
and second Memoranda of Agreement could not legally be law, that the wife may not validly bind the conjugal
considered by the court as included in the body of evidence partnership without the consent of the husband, who is
of the case, as neither document had been formally offered legally the administrator of the conjugal partnership. In this
in evidence by either party. It also held that, in any event, particular case, however, as noted earlier, the second
neither document showed that Marmont had in fact acquired Memorandum of Agreement, although ostensibly contracted
from Maris Trading whatever rights the latter had over the solely by Aurora Guiang with Maris Trading, was also signed
land in dispute. by her husband Federico, as one of the witnesses thereto.
This circumstance indicates not only that Federico was
present during the execution of the agreement but also that
In the instant Petition for Review, petitioner assigns the
he had, in fact, given his consent to the execution thereof by
following errors:8
his wife Aurora. Otherwise, he should not have appended his
signature to the document as witness. Respondent spouses
1. The Court of cannot now disown the second Memorandum of Agreement
Appeals erred in not as their effective consent thereto is sufficiently manifested in
considering the the document itself.
Memorandum of
Agreement of May
That the land in dispute was, at the time of execution of the
2, 1975 and 7
second Memorandum of Agreement, public land, is of no
October 1975 as
consequence here. Pending approval of Federico's
the same were
Miscellaneous Sales Application over said land, respondent
already admitted in
spouses enjoyed possessory and other rights over the same
the pre-trial order;
which could validly be assigned or transferred in favor of
and
third persons. In this case, respondent spouses chose to
transfer such rights (over the portion upon which the water
2. The Court of pump was installed) to Maris Trading, as evidenced by the
Appeals erred in fourth paragraph of the second Memorandum of Agreement,
deciding that quoted earlier. Furthermore, assuming (though only for the
ownership belongs sake of argument) that the alienation to Maris Trading was
to Maris Trading legally objectionable, respondent spouses are not the proper
hence, private parties to raise the issue of invalidity, they and Maris Trading
respondent Guiang being in pari delicto. Only the government may raise that
can prohibit issue.
Marmont Resort
from entering the
Finally, respondent spouses allege that dismissal of the
land.
complaint by the trial court was not improper as petitioner
Marmont was not privy to the second Memorandum of
We find for the petitioner. Agreement, and that accordingly, petitioner had no valid
cause of action against respondents.
Both the trial and appellate courts held that the first and
second Memoranda of Agreement are not properly A closer scrutiny of the second and third paragraphs of the
considered as forming part of the record of this case, second Memorandum of Agreement discloses that the first
because neither had been formally presented and offered in Memorandum of Agreement, including the obligations
evidence at the trial of Civil Case No. 2896-C. The record imposed thereunder upon Maris Trading, had been
shows, however, as noted earlier, that at the pre-trial acknowledged therein:
conference held on 2 October 1980, both petitioner Marmont
and respondent spouses had agreed upon a stipulation of
That the First Party (i.e., Maris
facts and issues recognizing the existence of those same
Trading) has dug, drilled and tapped
two (2) agreements. Such stipulation of facts constitutes a
water source for Marmont Resort,
judicial admission, the veracity of which requires no further
located at Bo. Barretto, Olongapo City in
proof and which may be controverted only upon a clear
accordance with their agreement
showing that such stipulation had been entered into through
executed on May 2, 1975and notarized
"palpable mistake." On this point, Section 2, Rule 129 of the
before Isagani M. Jungco, Notary Public
Revised Rules of Court provides:
and entered as Doc. No. 166; Page No.
135; Book No. XV; Series of 1975.
Section 2. Judicial
Admissions.--
That the First Party has erected, built
Admission made by
and drilled for the water source of
the parties in the
Marmont Resort on the land owned by
pleadings, or in the
the Second Party [respondent spouses]
course of the trial or
at the corner of J. Montelibano Street
other proceedings
and Maquinaya Drive (Provincial Road)
do not require proof
with the latter's permission;... (Emphasis
and cannot be
supplied)
contradicted unless
previously shown to
have been made The above paragraphs establish, among other things, that
through palpable construction work had been performed by Maris Trading on
mistake. (emphasis the land occupied by respondent spouses; that such
supplied) construction work had been performed in accordance with
terms and conditions stipulated in the first Memorandum of
Agreement and that the purpose of the work was to build a
There has been no showing and respondent spouses do not
water supply facility for petitioner Marmont. The same
claim that "palpable mistake" had intervened here, in respect
excerpts also show that the work so performed was with the
of the formulation of the facts stipulated by the parties at the
pre-trial conference. Absent any such showing, that
Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 27
knowledge and consent of the Guiang spouses, who were
then occupying the land.
It is clear from the foregoing stipulations that petitioner
Marmont was to benefit from the second Memorandum of
Agreement. In fact, said stipulations appear to have been
designed precisely to benefit petitioner and, thus, partake of
the nature of stipulations pour autrui, contemplated in Article
1311 of the Civil Code.
A stipulation pour autrui is a stipulation in favor of a third
person conferring a clear and deliberate favor upon him,
which stipulation is found in a contract entered into by parties
neither of whom acted as agent of the beneficiary. 12We
believe and so hold that the purpose and intent of the
stipulating parties (Maris Trading and respondent spouses)
to benefit the third person (petitioner Marmont) is sufficiently
clear in the second Memorandum of Agreement. Marmont
was not of course a party to that second Agreement but, as
correctly pointed out by the trial court and the appellate
court, the respondent spouses could not have prevented
Maris Trading from entering the property possessory rights
over which had thus been acquired by Maris Trading. That
respondent t spouses remained in physical possession of
that particular bit of land, is of no moment; they did so simply
upon the sufferance of Maris Trading. Had Maris Trading,
and not the respondent spouses, been in physical
possession, we believe that Marmont would have been
similarly entitled to compel Maris Trading to give it (Marmont)
access to the site involved. The two (2) courts below failed to
take adequate account of the fact that the sole purpose of
Maris Trading in acquiring possessory rights over that
specific portion of the land where well and pump and piping
had been installed, was to supply the water requirements of
petitioner's hotel. That said purpose was known by
respondent spouses, is made explicit by the second
Memorandum of Agreement. Maris Trading itself had no
need for a water supply facility; neither did the respondent
spouses. The water facility was intended solely for Marmont
Resort Hotel. The interest of Marmont cannot therefore be
regarded as merely "incidental ." 13 Finally, even if it be
assumed (for purposes of argument merely) that the second
Memorandum of Agreement did not constitute a
stipulation pour autrui, still respondent spouses, in the
circumstances of this case, must be regarded as having
acted contrary to the principles of honesty, good faith and
fair dealing embodied in Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code
when they refused petitioner Marmont access to the water
facility to inspect and repair the same and to increase its
capacity and thereby to benefit from it. In so doing,
respondent spouses forced petitioner Marmont to locate an
alternative source of water for its hotel which of course
involved expenditure of money and perhaps loss of hotel
revenues. We believe they should respond in damages.
The evidence on record, however, appears insufficient for
determination of the amount of damages for which
respondent spouses should be liable. For this reason, the
Court is compelled to remand this case to the trial court for
determination of such damages in appropriate further
proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on certiorari is hereby
GRANTED. The Decision dated 9 December 1986 of the
Court of Appeals in C.A. — G.R. CV No. 03299, as well as
the Decision dated 31 May 1983 of the Regional Trial Court
of Olongapo City in Civil Case No. 2896-C, are REVERSED.
This case is REMANDED to the trial court for determination,
in further proceedings consistent with this decision, of the
amount of petitioner is entitled to receive from respondent
spouses.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 109557. November 29, 2000]
JOSE UY and his Spouse GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L.
JARDELEZA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and TEODORO L.
JARDELEZA, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the
decision[1] of the Court of Appeals and its resolution denying
reconsideration[2] reversing that of the Regional Trial Court,
Iloilo, Branch 32[3]and declaring void the special
proceedings instituted therein by petitioners to authorize
petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza, in view of the comatose
condition of her husband, Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., with the
approval of the court, to dispose of their conjugal property in
favor of co-petitioners, their daughter and son in law, for the
ostensible purpose of financial need in the personal, business
and medical expenses of her incapacitated husband.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as
follows:
This case is a dispute between Teodoro L. Jardeleza (herein
respondent) on the one hand, against his mother Gilda L.
Jardeleza, and sister and brother-in-law, the spouses Jose
Uy and Glenda Jardeleza (herein petitioners) on the other
hand. The controversy came about as a result of Dr. Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr.s suffering of a stroke on March 25, 1991,
which left him comatose and bereft of any motor or mental
faculties. Said Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. is the father of herein
respondent Teodoro Jardeleza and husband of herein
private respondent Gilda Jardeleza.
Upon learning that one piece of real property belonging to
the senior Jardeleza spouses was about to be sold,
petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza, on June 6, 1991, filed a
petition (Annex A) before the R.T.C. of Iloilo City, Branch 25,
where it was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 4689, in
the matter of the guardianship of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza,
Sr. The petitioner averred therein that the present physical
and mental incapacity of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. prevent
him from competently administering his properties, and in
order to prevent the loss and dissipation of the Jardelezas
real and personal assets, there was a need for a court-
appointed guardian to administer said properties. It was
prayed therein that Letters of Guardianship be issued in
favor of herein private respondent Gilda Ledesma Jardeleza,
wife of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. It was further prayed that
in the meantime, no property of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. be
negotiated, mortgaged or otherwise alienated to third
persons, particularly Lot No. 4291 and all the improvements
thereon, located along Bonifacio Drive, Iloilo City, and
covered by T.C.T. No. 47337.
A few days later, or on June 13, 1991, respondent Gilda L.
Jardeleza herself filed a petition docketed as Special
Proceeding NO. 4691, before Branch 32 of the R.T.C. of
Iloilo City, regarding the declaration of incapacity of Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr., assumption of sole powers of administration
of conjugal properties, and authorization to sell the same
(Annex B). Therein, the petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza averred
the physical and mental incapacity of her husband, who was
then confined for intensive medical care and treatment at the
Iloilo Doctors Hospital.She signified to the court her desire to
assume sole powers of administration of their conjugal
properties. She also alleged that her husbands medical
treatment and hospitalization expenses were piling up,
accumulating to several hundred thousands of pesos
already. For this, she urgently needed to sell one piece of
real property, specifically Lot No. 4291 and its
improvements. Thus, she prayed for authorization from the
court to sell said property.
The following day, June 14, 1991, Branch 32 of the R.T.C. of
Iloilo City issued an Order (Annex C) finding the petition in
Spec. Proc. No. 4691 to be sufficient in form and substance,
and setting the hearing thereof for June 20, 1991. The
scheduled hearing of the petition proceeded, attended by
therein petitioner Gilda Jardeleza, her counsel, her two
children, namely Ernesto Jardeleza, Jr., and Glenda
Jardeleza Uy, and Dr. Rolando Padilla, one of Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr.s attending physicians.
On that same day, June 20, 1991, Branch 32 of the RTC of
Iloilo City rendered its Decision (Annex D), finding that it was
convinced that Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. was truly incapacitated
to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties,
and that the sale of Lot No. 4291 and the improvements
Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 28
thereon was necessary to defray the mounting expenses for
treatment and Hospitalization. The said court also made the
pronouncement that the petition filed by Gilda L. Jardeleza
was pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code, and that the
proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on summary
proceedings sanctioned under Article 253 of the same Code
x x x.
The said court then disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, there being factual and legal bases to the
petition dated June 13, 1991, the Court hereby renders
judgment as follows:
1) declaring Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., petitioners husband, to
be incapacitated and unable to participate in the
administration of conjugal properties;
2) authorizing petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza to assume sole
powers of administration of their conjugal properties; and
3) authorizing aforesaid petitioner to sell Lot No. 4291 of the
Cadastral Survey of Iloilo, situated in Iloilo City and covered
by TCT No. 47337 issued in the names of Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr. and Gilda L. Jardeleza and the buildings
standing thereof.
SO ORDERED.
On June 24, 1991, herein petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza filed
his Opposition to the proceedings before Branch 32 in Spec.
Proc. Case No. 4691, said petitioner being unaware and not
knowing that a decision has already been rendered on the
case by public respondent.
On July 3, 1991, herein petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza filed a
motion for reconsideration of the judgment in Spec. Proc.
No. 4691 and a motion for consolidation of the two cases
(Annex F).He propounded the argument that the petition for
declaration of incapacity, assumption of sole powers of
administration, and authority to sell the conjugal properties
was essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and
properties of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. As such, it cannot be
prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on summary
proceedings set out in Article 253 of the Family Code. It
should follow the rules governing special proceedings in the
Revised Rules of Court which require procedural due
process, particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the
merits. On the other hand, even if Gilda Jardelezas petition
can be prosecuted by summary proceedings, there was still
a failure to comply with the basic requirements thereof,
making the decision in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 a defective
one. He further alleged that under the New Civil Code,
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. had acquired vested rights as a
conjugal partner, and that these rights cannot be impaired or
prejudiced without his consent. Neither can he be deprived
of his share in the conjugal properties through mere
summary proceedings.He then restated his position that
Spec. Proc. No. 4691 should be consolidated with Spec.
Proc. No. 4689 which was filed earlier and pending before
Branch 25.
Teodoro Jardeleza also questioned the propriety of the sale
of Lot No. 4291 and the improvements thereon supposedly
to pay the accumulated financial obligations arising from
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.s hospitalization. He alleged that the
market value of the property would be around Twelve to
Fifteen Million Pesos, but that he had been informed that it
would be sold for much less. He also pointed out that the
building thereon which houses the Jardeleza Clinic is a
monument to Ernesto Jardeleza Sr.s industry, labor and
service to his fellowmen. Hence, the said property has a lot
of sentimental value to his family. Besides, argued Teodoro
Jardeleza, then conjugal partnership had other liquid assets
to pay off all financial obligations. He mentioned that apart
from sufficient cash, Jardeleza, Sr. owned stocks of Iloilo
Doctors Hospital which can be off-set against the cost of
medical and hospital bills. Furthermore, Ernesto Jardeleza,
Sr. enjoys certain privileges at the said hospital which allows
him to pay on installment basis. Moreover, two of Ernesto
Jardeleza Sr.s attending physicians are his own sons who do
not charge anything for their professional services.
On July 4, 1991, Teodoro Jardeleza filed in Spec. Proc. No.
4691 a supplement to his motion for reconsideration (Annex
G). He reiterated his contention that summary proceedings
was irregularly applied. He also noted that the provisions on
summary proceedings found in Chapter 2 of the Family Code
comes under the heading on Separation in Fact Between
Husband and Wife which contemplates of a situation where
both spouses are of disposing mind. Thus, he argued that
were one spouse is comatose without motor and mental
faculties, the said provisions cannot be made to apply.
While the motion for reconsideration was pending, Gilda
Jardeleza disposed by absolute sale Lot No. 4291 and all its
improvements to her daughter, Ma. Glenda Jardeleza Uy, for
Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000.00), as evidenced by a
Deed Absolute Sale dated July 8, 1991 executed between
them (p. 111, Rollo). Under date of July 23, 1991, Gilda
Jardeleza filed an urgent ex-parte motion for approval of the
deed of absolute sale.
On August 12, 1991 Teodoro Jardeleza filed his Opposition
to the motion for approval of the deed of sale on the grounds
that: (1) the motion was prematurely filed and should be held
in abeyance until the final resolution of the petition; (2) the
motion does not allege nor prove the justifications for the
sale; and (3) the motion does not allege that had Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr. been competent, he would have given his
consent to the sale.
Judge Amelita K. del Rosario-Benedicto of Branch 32 of the
respondent Court, who had penned the decision in Spec.
Proc. No. 4691 had in the meantime formally inhibited
herself from further acting in this case (Annex I). The case
was then reraffled to Branch 28 of the said court.
On December 19, 1991, the said court issued an Order
(Annex M) denying herein petitioners motion for
reconsideration and approving respondent Jardelezas
motion for approval of the deed of absolute sale. The said
court ruled that:
After a careful and thorough perusal of the decision, dated
June 20, 1991, the Motion for Reconsideration, as well as its
supplements filed by oppositor, Teodoro L. Jardeleza,
through counsel, and the opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration, including its supplements, filed by
petitioner, through counsel, this Court is of the opinion and
so holds, that her Honor, Amelita K. del Rosario-Benedicto,
Presiding Judge of Branch 32, of this Court, has properly
observed the procedure embodied under Article 253, in
relation to Article 124, of the Family Code, in rendering her
decision dated June 20, 1991.
Also, as correctly stated by petitioner, through counsel, that
oppositor Teodor L. Jardeleza does not have the personality
to oppose the instant petition considering that the property or
properties, subject of the petition, belongs to the conjugal
partnership of the spouses Ernesto and Gilda Jardeleza,
who are both still alive.
In view thereof, the Motion for Reconsideration of oppositor
Teodoro L. Jardeleza, is hereby denied for lack of merit.
Considering the validity of the decision dated June 20, 1991,
which among others, authorized Gilda L. Jardeleza to sell
Lot No. 4291 of the Cadastral Survey of Iloilo, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47337 issued in the names of
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., and Gilda L. Jardeleza and the
building standing thereon, the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Approval of Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 23, 1991, filed
by petitioner, through counsel, is hereby granted and the
deed of absolute sale, executed and notarized on July 8,
1991, by and between Gilda L. Jardeleza, as vendor, and
Ma. Glenda Jardeleza, as vendee, is hereby approved, and
the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City, is directed to register the
sale and issue the corresponding transfer certificate of title to
the vendee.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On December 9, 1992, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision reversing the appealed decision and
ordering the trial court to dismiss the special proceedings to
approve the deed of sale, which was also declared void.[5]
On December 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration,[6] however, on March 29, 1993, the Court of
Appeals denied the motion, finding no cogent and compelling
reason to disturb the decision.[7]
Hence, this appeal.[8]
The issue raised is whether petitioner Gilda L.
Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. who suffered
Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 29
a stroke, a cerebrovascular accident, rendering him
comatose, without motor and mental faculties, and could not
manage their conjugal partnership property may assume sole
powers of administration of the conjugal property under Article
124 of the Family Code and dispose of a parcel of land with
its improvements, worth more than twelve million pesos, with
the approval of the court in a summary proceedings, to her co-
petitioners, her own daughter and son-in-law, for the amount
of eight million pesos.
The Court of Appeals ruled that in the condition of Dr.
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., the procedural rules on summary
proceedings in relation to Article 124 of the Family Code are
notapplicable. Because Dr. Jardeleza, Sr. was unable to take
care of himself and manage the conjugal property due to
illness that had rendered him comatose, the proper remedy
was the appointment of a judicial guardian of the person or
estate or both of such incompetent, under Rule 93, Section 1,
1964 Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, petitioner earlier had
filed such a petition for judicial guardianship.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In
case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail,
subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper
remedy which must be availed of within five years from the
date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration.These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of
the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall
be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a).
In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial
proceedings under the Family Code govern the proceedings
under Article 124 of the Family Code. The situation
contemplated is one where the spouse is absent, or separated
in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or
cannot be obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases where
the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to
give consent. In this case, the trial court found that the subject
spouse "is an incompetent" who was in comatose or semi-
comatose condition, a victim of stroke, cerebrovascular
accident, without motor and mental faculties, and with a
diagnosis of brain stem infarct.[9] In such case, the proper
remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93
of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.
Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial
proceedings under the Family Code may apply to the wife's
administration of the conjugal property, the law provides that
the wife who assumes sole powers of administration has the
same powers and duties as a guardian under the Rules of
Court.[10]
Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real
property as such administrator of the conjugal property must
observe the procedure for the sale of the wards estate
required of judicial guardians under Rule 95, 1964 Revised
Rules of Court, not the summary judicial proceedings under
the Family Code.
In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the
procedure under the Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, the trial
court did not even observe the requirements of the summary
judicial proceedings under the Family Code. Thus, the trial
court did not serve notice of the petition to the incapacitated
spouse; it did not require him to show cause why the petition
should not be granted.
Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that absent
an opportunity to be heard, the decision rendered by the trial
court is void for lack of due process. The doctrine consistently
adhered to by this Court is that a denial of due process
suffices to cast on the official act taken by whatever branch of
the government the impress of nullity.[11] A decision rendered
without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked
directly or collaterally.[12] A decision is void for lack of due
process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity of
being heard.[13] A void decision may be assailed or impugned
at any time either directly or collaterally, by means of a
separate action, or by resisting such decision in any action or
proceeding where it is invoked.[14]
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 26936, in toto.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno,
Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19565 January 30, 1968
ESTRELLA DE LA CRUZ, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SEVERINO DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
Estacion and Paltriguera for plaintiff-appellee.
Manuel O. Soriano and Pio G. Villoso for defendant-
appellant.
CASTRO, J.:
The plaintiff Estrella de la Cruz filed a complaint on July 22,
1958 with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
alleging in essence that her husband, the defendant
Severino de la Cruz, had not only abandoned her but as well
was mismanaging their conjugal partnership properties, and
praying for (1) separation of property, (2) monthly support of
P2,500 during the pendency of the action, and (3) payment
of P20,000 as attorney's fees, and costs.
The court a quo forthwith issued an order allowing the
plaintiff the amount prayed for as alimony pendente lite,
which however, upon defendant's motion, was reduced to
P2,000.
On June 1, 1961 the trial court rendered judgment ordering
separation and division of the conjugal assets, and directing
the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P20,000 as
attorney's fees, with legal interest from the date of the
original complaint, that is, from July 22, 1958, until fully paid,
plus costs. From this judgment the defendant appealed to
the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to us, "it
appearing that the total value of the conjugal assets is over
P500,000".
The basic facts are not controverted. The plaintiff and the
defendant were married in Bacolod City on February 1,
1938. Six children were born to them, namely, Zenia (1939),
Ronnie (1942), Victoria (1944), Jessie 1945), Bella (1946),
and Felipe (1948). During their coverture they acquired
seven parcels of land of the Bacolod Cadastre, all assessed
at P45,429, and three parcels of the Silay Cadastre, all
assessed at P43,580. All these parcels are registered in their
names. The hacienda in Silay yielded for the year 1957 a net
profit of P3,390.49.
They are also engaged in varied business ventures with
fixed assets valued as of December 31, 1956 at
P496,006.92, from which they obtained for that year a net
profit of P75,655.78. The net gain of the Philippine Texboard
Factory, the principal business of the spouses, was
P90,454.48 for the year 1957. As of December 31, 1959, the
total assets of the various enterprises of the conjugal
partnership were valued at P1,021,407.68, not including
those of the Top Service Inc., of which firm the defendant
has been the president since its organization in 1959 in
Manila with a paid-up capital of P50,000, P10,000 of which
was contributed by him. This corporation was the Beverly
Hills Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, the Golden Acres
Subdivision and the Green Valley Subdivision in Las Piñas,
Rizal, and a lot and building located at M. H. del Pilar, Manila
purchased for P285,000, an amount borrowed from the
Manufacturer's Bank and Trust Company.
The spouses are indebted to the Philippine National Bank
and the Development Bank of the Philippines for loans
obtained, to secure which they mortgaged the Philippine
Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 30
Texboard Factory, the Silay hacienda, their conjugal house,
and all their parcels of land located in Bacolod City.
The essential issues of fact may be gleaned from the nine
errors the defendant imputes to the court a quo, namely,
1. In finding that the only visit, from May 15, 1955
to the rendition of the decision, made by the
defendant to the conjugal abode to see his wife
was on June 15, 1955;
2. In finding that the letter exh. 3 was written by
one Nenita Hernandez and that she and the
defendant are living as husband and wife;
3. In finding that since 1951 the relations between
the plaintiff and the defendant were far from
cordial, and that it was from 1948 that the former
has been receiving an allowance from the latter;
4. In finding that the defendant has abandoned the
plaintiff;
5. In finding that the defendant since 1956 has not
discussed with his wife the business activities of
the partnership, and that this silence constituted
"abuse of administration of the conjugal
partnerships";
6. In declaring that the defendant mortgaged the
conjugal assets without the knowledge of the
plaintiff and thru false pretences to which the latter
was prey;
7. In allowing the plaintiff, on the one hand, to
testify on facts not actually known by her, and, on
the other hand, in not allowing the defendant to
establish his special defenses;
8. In ordering separation of the conjugal
partnership properties; and
9. In sentencing the defendant to pay to the
plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000,
with interest at the legal rate.1äwphï1.ñët
Two issues of law as well emerge, requiring resolution
petition: (1) Did the separation of the defendant from the
plaintiff constitute abandonment in law that would justify a
separation of the conjugal partnership properties? (2) Was
the defendant's failure and/or refusal to inform the plaintiff of
the state of their business enterprises such an abuse of his
powers of administration of the conjugal partnership as to
warrant a division of the matrimonial assets?
The plaintiff's evidence may be summarized briefly. The
defendant started living in Manila in 1955, although he
occasionally returned to Bacolod City, sleeping in his office
at the Philippine Texboard Factory in Mandalagan, instead of
in the conjugal home at 2nd Street, Bacolod City. Since 1955
the defendant had not slept in the conjugal dwelling,
although in the said year he paid short visits during which
they engaged in brief conversations. After 1955 up to the
time of the trial, the defendant had never visited the conjugal
abode, and when he was in Bacolod, she was denied
communication with him. He has abandoned her and their
children, to live in Manila with his concubine, Nenita
Hernandez. In 1949 she began to suspect the existence of
illicit relations between her husband and Nenita. This
suspicion was confirmed in 1951 when she found an
unsigned note in a pocket of one of her husband's polo shirt
which was written by Nenita and in which she asked "Bering"
to meet her near the church. She confronted her husband
who forthwith tore the note even as he admitted his amorous
liaison with Nenita. He then allayed her fears by vowing to
forsake his mistress. Subsequently, in November 1951, she
found in the iron safe of her husband a letter, exh. C, also
written by Nenita. In this letter the sender (who signed as
"D") apologized for her conduct, and expressed the hope
that the addressee ("Darling") could join her in Baguio as she
was alone in the Patria Inn and lonely in "a place for
honeymooners". Immediately after her husband departed for
Manila the following morning, the plaintiff enplaned for
Baguio, where she learned that Nenita had actually stayed at
the Patria Inn, but had already left for Manila before her
arrival. Later she met her husband in the house of a relative
in Manila from whence they proceeded to the Avenue Hotel
where she again confronted him about Nenita. He denied
having further relations with this woman.
Celia Bañez, testifying for the plaintiff, declared that she was
employed as a cook in the home of the spouses from May
15, 1955 to August 15, 1958, and that during the entire
period of her employment she saw the defendant in the
place only once. This declaration is contradicted, however,
by the plaintiff herself who testified that in 1955 the
defendant "used to have a short visit there," which statement
implies more than one visit.
The defendant, for his part, denied having abandoned his
wife and children, but admitted that in 1957, or a year before
the filing of the action, he started to live separately from his
wife. When he transferred his living quarters to his office in
Mandalagan, Bacolod City, his intention was not, as it never
has been, to abandon his wife and children, but only to teach
her a lesson as she was quarrelsome and extremely jealous
of every woman. He decided to live apart from his wife
temporarily because at home he could not concentrate on
his work as she always quarreled with him, while in
Mandalagan he could pass the nights in peace. Since 1953
he stayed in Manila for some duration of time to manage
their expanding business and look for market outlets for their
texboard products. Even the plaintiff admitted in both her
original and amended complaints that "sometime in 1953,
because of the expanding business of the herein parties, the
defendant established an office in the City of Manila, wherein
some of the goods, effects and merchandise manufactured
or produced in the business enterprises of the parties were
sold or disposed of". From the time he started living
separately in Mandalagan up to the filing of the complaint,
the plaintiff herself furnished him food and took care of his
laundry. This latter declaration was not rebutted by the
plaintiff.
The defendant, with vehemence, denied that he has
abandoned his wife and family, averring that he has never
failed, even for a single month, to give them financial
support, as witnessed by the plaintiff's admission in her
original and amended complaints as well as in open court
that during the entire period of their estrangement, he was
giving her around P500 a month for support. In point of fact,
his wife and children continued to draw allowances from his
office of a total ranging from P1,200 to P1,500 a month. He
financed the education of their children, two of whom were
studying in Manila at the time of the trial and were not living
with the plaintiff. While in Bacolod City, he never failed to
visit his family, particularly the children. His wife was always
in bad need of money because she played mahjong, an
accusation which she did not traverse, explaining that she
played mahjong to entertain herself and forget the infidelities
of her husband.
Marcos V. Ganaban, the manager of the Philippine Texboard
Factory, corroborated the testimony of the defendant on the
matter of the support the latter gave to his family, by
declaring in court that since the start of his employment in
1950 as assistant general manager, the plaintiff has been
drawing an allowance of P1,000 to P1,500 monthly, which
amount was given personally by the defendant or, in his
absence, by the witness himself.
The defendant denied that he ever maintained a mistress in
Manila. He came to know Nenita Hernandez when she was
barely 12 years old, but had lost track of her thereafter. His
constant presence in Manila was required by the pressing
demands of an expanding business. He denied having
destroyed the alleged note which the plaintiff claimed to have
come from Nenita, nor having seen, previous to the trial, the
letter exh. C. The allegation of his wife that he had a
concubine is based on mere suspicion. He had always been
faithful to his wife, and not for a single instance had he been
caught or surprised by her with another woman.
On the matter of the alleged abuse by the defendant of his
powers of administration of the conjugal partnership, the
plaintiff declared that the defendant refused and failed to
inform her of the progress of their various business
concerns. Although she did not allege, much less prove, that
her husband had dissipated the conjugal properties, she
averred nevertheless that her husband might squander and
dispose of the conjugal assets in favor of his concubine.
Hence, the urgency of separation of property.
The defendant's answer to the charge of mismanagement is
that he has applied his industry, channeled his ingenuity, and
devoted his time, to the management, maintenance and
expansion of their business concerns, even as his wife threw
Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 31
money away at the mahjong tables. Tangible proof of his
endeavors is that from a single cargo truck which he himself
drove at the time of their marriage, he had built up one
business after another, the Speedway Trucking Service, the
Negros Shipping Service, the Bacolod Press, the Philippine
Texboard Factory, and miscellaneous other business
enterprises worth over a million pesos; that all that the
spouses now own have been acquired through his diligence,
intelligence and industry; that he has steadily expanded the
income and assets of said business enterprises from year to
year, contrary to the allegations of the complainant, as
proved by his balance sheet and profit and loss statements
for the year 1958 and 1959 (exhibits 1 and 2); and that out of
the income of their enterprises he had purchased additional
equipment and machineries and has partially paid their
indebtedness to the Philippine National Bank and the
Development Bank of the Philippines.
It will be noted that the plaintiff does not ask for legal
separation. The evidence presented by her to prove
concubinage on the part of the defendant, while pertinent
and material in the determination of the merits of a petition
for legal separation, must in this case be regarded merely as
an attempt to bolster her claim that the defendant had
abandoned her, which abandonment, if it constitutes
abandonment in law, would justify separation of the conjugal
assets under the applicable provisions of article 178 of the
new Civil Code which read: "The separation in fact between
husband and wife without judicial approval, shall not affect
the conjugal partnership, except that . . . if the husband has
abandoned the wife without just cause for at least one year,
she may petition the court for a receivership, or
administration by her of the conjugal partnership property, or
separation of property". In addition to abandonment as a
ground, the plaintiff also invokes article 167 of the new Civil
Code in support of her prayer for division of the matrimonial
assets. This article provides that "In case of abuse of powers
of administration of the conjugal partnership property by the
husband, the courts, on the petition of the wife, may provide
for a receivership, or administration by the wife, or
separation of property". It behooves us, therefore, to inquire,
in the case at bar, whether there has been abandonment, in
the legal sense, by the defendant of the plaintiff, and/or
whether the defendant has abused his powers of
administration of the conjugal partnership property, so as to
justify the plaintiff's plea for separation of property.
We have made a searching scrutiny of the record, and it is
our considered view that the defendant is not guilty of
abandonment of his wife, nor of such abuse of his powers of
administration of the conjugal partnership, as to warrant
division of the conjugal assets.
The extraordinary remedies afforded to the wife by article
178 when she has been abandoned by the husband for at
least one year are the same as those granted to her by
article 167 in case of abuse of the powers of administration
by the husband. To entitle her to any of these remedies,
under article 178, there must be real abandonment, and not
mere separation. 1 The abandonment must not only be
physical estrangement but also amount to financial and
moral desertion.
Although an all-embracing definition of the term
"abandonment " is yet to be spelled out in explicit words, we
nevertheless can determine its meaning from the context of
the Law as well as from its ordinary usage. The concept of
abandonment in article 178 may be established in relation to
the alternative remedies granted to the wife when she has
been abandoned by the husband, namely, receivership,
administration by her, or separation of property, all of which
are designed to protect the conjugal assets from waste and
dissipation rendered imminent by the husband's continued
absence from the conjugal abode, and to assure the wife of
a ready and steady source of support. Therefore, physical
separation alone is not the full meaning of the term
"abandonment", if the husband, despite his voluntary
departure from the society of his spouse, neither neglects
the management of the conjugal partnership nor ceases to
give support to his wife.
The word "abandon", in its ordinary sense, means to forsake
entirely; to forsake or renounce utterly. 2 The dictionaries
trace this word to the root idea of "putting under a bar". The
emphasis is on the finality and the publicity with which some
thing or body is thus put in the control of another, and hence
the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never again
to resume or claim one's rights or interests. 3 When referring
to desertion of a wife by a husband, the word has been
defined as "the act of a husband in voluntarily leaving his
wife with intention to forsake her entirely, never to return to
her, and never to resume his marital duties towards her, or to
claim his marital rights; such neglect as either leaves the
wife destitute of the common necessaries of life, or would
leave her destitute but for the charity of others." 4 The word
"abandonment", when referring to the act of one consort of
leaving the other, is "the act of the husband or the wife who
leaves his or her consort wilfully, and with an intention of
causing per perpetual separation." 5 Giving to the word
"abandoned", as used in article 178, the meaning drawn
from the definitions above reproduced, it seems rather clear
that to constitute abandonment of the wife by the husband,
there must be absolute cessation of marital relations and
duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation.
Coming back to the case at bar, we believe that the
defendant did not intend to leave his wife and children
permanently. The record conclusively shows that he
continued to give support to his family despite his absence
from the conjugal home. This fact is admitted by the
complainant, although she minimized the amount of support
given, saying that it was only P500 monthly. There is good
reason to believe, however, that she and the children
received more than this amount, as the defendant's claim
that his wife and children continued to draw from his office
more than P500 monthly was substantially corroborated by
Marcos Ganaban, whose declarations were not rebutted by
the plaintiff. And then there is at all no showing that the
plaintiff and the children were living in want. On the contrary,
the plaintiff admitted, albeit reluctantly, that she frequently
played mahjong, from which we can infer that she had
money; to spare.
The fact that the defendant never ceased to give support to
his wife and children negatives any intent on his part not to
return to the conjugal abode and resume his marital duties
and rights. In People v. Schelske, 6 it was held that where a
husband, after leaving his wife, continued to make small
contributions at intervals to her support and that of their
minor child, he was not guilty of their "abandonment", which
is an act of separation with intent that it shall be perpetual,
since contributing to their support negatived such intent. In re
Hoss' Estate, supra, it was ruled that a father did not
abandon his family where the evidence disclosed that he
almost always did give his wife part of his earnings during
the period of their separation and that he gradually paid
some old rental and grocery bills.
With respect to the allegation that the defendant maintained
a concubine, we believe, contrary to the findings of the
court a quo, that the evidence on record fails to
preponderate in favor of the plaintiff's thesis. The proof that
Nenita Hernandez was the concubine of the defendant and
that they were living as husband and wife in Manila, is
altogether too indefinite. Aside from the uncorroborated
statement of the plaintiff that she knew that Nenita
Hernandez was her husband's concubine, without
demonstrating by credible evidence the existence of illicit
relations between Nenita and the defendant, the only
evidence on record offered to link the defendant to his
alleged mistress is exh. C. The plaintiff however failed to
connect authorship of the said letter with Nenita, on the face
whereof the sender merely signed as "D" and the addressee
was one unidentified "Darling". The plaintiff's testimony on
cross-examination, hereunder quoted, underscores such
failure:
Q. You personally never received any letter from
Nenita?
A. No.
Q. Neither have you received on any time until
today from 1949 from Nenita?
A. No.
Q. Neither have you written to her any letter
yourself until now?
A. Why should I write a letter to her.
Q. In that case, Mrs. De la Cruz, you are not
familiar with the handwriting of Nenita. Is that
right?
A. I can say that Nenita writes very well.
Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 32
Q. I am not asking you whether she writes very
well or not but, my question is this: In view of the
fact that you have never received a letter from
Nenita, you have ot sent any letter to her, you are
not familiar with her handwriting?
A. Yes.
Q. You have not seen her writing anybody?
A. Yes.
Anent the allegation that the defendant had mismanaged the
conjugal partnership property, the record presents a different
picture. There is absolutely no evidence to show that he has
squandered the conjugal assets. Upon the contrary, he
proved that through his industry and zeal, the conjugal
assets at the time of the trial had increased to a value of over
a million pesos.
The lower court likewise erred in holding that mere refusal or
failure of the husband as administrator of the conjugal
partnership to inform the wife of the progress of the family
businesses constitutes abuse of administration. For "abuse"
to exist, it is not enough that the husband perform an act or
acts prejudicial to the wife. Nor is it sufficient that he commits
acts injurious to the partnership, for these may be the result
of mere inefficient or negligent administration. Abuse
connotes willful and utter disregard of the interests of the
partnership, evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts
and/or omissions prejudicial to the latter. 7
If there is only physical separation between the spouses
(and nothing more), engendered by the husband's leaving
the conjugal abode, but the husband continues to manage
the conjugal properties with the same zeal, industry, and
efficiency as he did prior to the separation, and religiously
gives support to his wife and children, as in the case at bar,
we are not disposed to grant the wife's petition for separation
of property. This decision may appear to condone the
husband's separation from his wife; however, the remedies
granted to the wife by articles 167 and 178 are not to be
construed as condonation of the husband's act but are
designed to protect the conjugal partnership from waste and
shield the wife from want. Therefore, a denial of the wife's
prayer does not imply a condonation of the husband's act but
merely points up the insufficiency or absence of a cause of
action.1äwphï1.ñët
Courts must need exercise judicial restraint and reasoned
hesitance in ordering a separation of conjugal properties
because the basic policy of the law is homiletic, to promote
healthy family life and to preserve the union of the spouses,
in person, in spirit and in property.
Consistent with its policy of discouraging a regime
of separation as not in harmony with the unity of
the family and the mutual affection and help
expected of the spouses, the Civil Code (both old
and new) requires that separation of property shall
not prevail unless expressly stipulated in marriage
settlements before the union is solemnized or by
formal judicial decree during the existence of the
marriage (Article 190, new Civil Code, Article
1432, old Civil Code): and in the latter case, it may
only be ordered by the court for causes specified
in Article 191 of the new Civil Code. 8
Furthermore, a judgment ordering the division of conjugal
assets where there has been no real abandonment, the
separation not being wanton and absolute, may altogether
slam shut the door for possible reconciliation. The estranged
spouses may drift irreversibly further apart; the already
broken family solidarity may be irretrievably shattered; and
any flickering hope for a new life together may be completely
and finally extinguished.
The monthly alimony in the sum of P2,000 which was
allowed to the wife in 1958, long before the devaluation of
the Philippine peso in 1962, should be increased to P3,000.
On the matter of attorney's fees, it is our view that because
the defendant, by leaving the conjugal abode, has given
cause for the plaintiff to seek redress in the courts, and ask
for adequate support, an award of attorney's fees to the
plaintiff must be made. Ample authority for such award is
found in paragraphs 6 and 11 of article 2208 of the new Civil
Code which empower courts to grant counsel's fees "in
actions for legal support" and in cases "where the court
deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees . . . should be
recovered." However, an award of P10,000, in our opinion,
is, under the environmental circumstances, sufficient.
This Court would be remiss if it did not, firstly, remind the
plaintiff and the defendant that the law enjoins husband and
wife to live together, and, secondly, exhort them to avail of —
mutually, earnestly and steadfastly — all opportunities for
reconciliation to the end that their marital differences may be
happily resolved, and conjugal harmony may return and, on
the basis of mutual respect and understanding, endure.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo, insofar as it decrees
separation of the conjugal properties, is reversed and set
aside. Conformably to our observations, however, the
defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff, in the concept of
support, the amount of P3,000 per month, until he shall have
rejoined her in the conjugal home, which amount may, in the
meantime, be reduced or increased in the discretion of the
court a quo as circumstances warrant. The award of
attorney's fees to the plaintiff is reduced to P10,000, without
interest. No pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal,
Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles and Fernando,
JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 108522. January 29, 1996]
GERARDO A. DEL MUNDO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. TEODORO P.
REGINO, Presiding Judge of Branch 84,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Metro
Manila, DIONISIO PASCUAL, JR., Deputy
Sheriff, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, and
Spouses CARLOS NAVA and ALEJANDRA
NAVA, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
This petition for review seeks a reversal of the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 33251
entitled Gerardo A. Del Mundo vs. Spouses Carlos and
Alejandra Nava,[1] and a declaration that the Writ of Execution
by respondent Regional Trial Court Judge in Civil Case No.
Q-92-12438[2] is null and void.
The antecedent facts from which this case arose are as
follows:
Private respondent Alejandra Nava was a former client
of petitioner Gerardo A. del Mundo. The spouses Carlos and
Alejandra Nava owned a house and lot located in Project
6, Quezon City covered by TCT No. 256140 which was
mortgaged to the Philippine Veterans Bank. In 1981, before
the spouses Nava migrated to the United States, this
residential property was leased by petitioner. In a lease
contract denominated as Agreement of Lease with Option to
Purchase, private respondent spouses agreed to lease the
property to petitioner for one year, with a monthly rental of
P2,500.00. The del Mundo family moved into the house upon
execution of the lease contract. Petitioner was given
until October 16, 1982 to exercise his option to buy the
property.
Petitioner was unable to exercise his option to purchase
because he had no money. While respondent spouses were
in the United States, petitioner sent them a Deed of Sale with
Assignment of Mortgage.[3] He asked the spouses Nava to
sign the said Deed ostensibly to enable him to borrow part of
the purchase price in the sum of P470,000.00 from the
bank.Petitioner also sent them an Addendum to the Deed of
Sale which states that he will also assume her obligations to
Mrs. Ligaya Gonzales and to Pablo Nava. After several
letters,[4]petitioner succeeded in persuading the spouses
Nava to trust him and to sign the Deed of Sale with
Assignment of Mortgage and the Addendum even without
receiving consideration for the property.
Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 33
Private respondent Alejandra Nava lost faith in
petitioner because he did not comply with his promise to pay
the P174,000.00 obligation to the Philippine Veterans Bank,
the P166,000.00 indebtedness to Mrs. Ligaya Gonzales and
her P40,000.00 obligation to Pablo Nava. On March 16, 1983,
private respondent spouses Nava executed a Revocation of
Deed of Sale with Assignment of Mortgage which was duly
notarized by a County Clerk of the Superior Court of California
and certified by Vice Consul Danilo Bacalzo of the Philippine
Consulate General in California, U.S.A. The Deed of Sale
with Assignment of Mortgage in favor of petitioner and his wife
was revoked and canceled by private respondent spouses
because the former had not yet paid the private respondent
spouses and Mrs. Ligaya Gonzales.[5]
On August 11, 1983, private respondent spouses
through their attorney-in-fact Bayani Sy, filed a complaint for
Unlawful Detainer (Civil Case No. 44181) against petitioner
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 43.
Petitioner was ordered to vacate the premises, pay rent and
attorneys fees in a decision dated March 26, 1992. Petitioner
appealed to the Regional Trial Court and the unlawful detainer
suit was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-92-12438.[6] Upon
motion by private respondent spouses, Judge Teodoro P.
Regino ordered the issuance of a writ of execution pending
appeal on January 14, 1993.[7] In the instant petition for
certiorari, petitioner assails the issuance of the writ on the
ground that the Metropolitan Trial Court did not have
jurisdiction over the ejectment case.
On June 30, 1993, the Regional Trial Court rendered its
decision on the ejectment case on appeal. The judgment of
the Metropolitan Trial Court was merely modified by
increasing the attorneys fees and costs to be paid by
petitioner.[8]
A disbarment case was also filed by private respondent
Alejandra Nava against petitioner before this Court
(Administrative Case No. 2607) on November 22, 1983. This
administrative case was dismissed on May 16, 1984.
On November 5, 1985, a Petition for Declaratory Relief
to Quiet Title was filed by herein petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 79 (hereinafter referred to
as Special Civil Action No. Q-46386).[9] The trial court
rendered a decision on May 31, 1991 in favor of private
respondents.[10] The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, a decision is hereby rendered in this case as
follows:
1. The instant petition for declaratory relief with damages and
injunction is dismissed for lack of merit.
2. The writ of preliminary injunction issued in this case on June 2,
1986 against respondents is hereby cancelled.
3. The damages claimed by petitioner (moral, exemplary, attorneys
fees, and penalty charged) are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
4. On the counterclaim of the respondents, the Court orders
petitioner to pay respondents spouses Carlos and Alejandra Nava a
sum of P30,000.00 by way of moral damages, and to pay Bayani
Sy P10,000.00 by way of moral damages.
5. The Deed of Sale with Assignment of Mortgage (Exhs. B, B-1,
to B-13) is hereby declared null and void.
6. The Revocation of Deed of Sale with Assignment of Mortgage
(Exh. 27) is hereby declared valid and binding to both parties.
7. The claim for attorneys fees on the counterclaim is dismissed for
failure to establish the claim with sufficient evidence.
With costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Petitioner appealed this decision on the declaratory
relief suit (Special Civil Action No. Q-46386) to the Court of
Appeals.[12] It is petitioners contention that the notarized Deed
of Sale with Assignment of Mortgage signed by the spouses
Nava conclusively shows that there was consideration for the
contract of sale. He likewise questioned the validity of the
private respondents formal offer of documentary exhibits
below.
On August 24, 1992 respondent Court of Appeals
dismissed petitioners appeal (CA-G.R. CV No. 33251) and
affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto.[13] On January
14, 1993, respondent appellate court denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.[14]
Petitioners latest recourse is through the instant petition
for certiorari[15] where he maintains that the Court of Appeals
erred in affirming the dismissal of the declaratory relief case
(Special Civil Action No. Q-46386). More particularly,
petitioner contends that respondent court erred in not
upholding the validity of the Deed of Sale with Assignment of
Mortgage; in giving credence to parol evidence over the
written instrument; in holding that the documentary evidence
of private respondents have been formally offered and in
giving full weight to private respondents evidence which is
based on deposition upon written interrogatories. In addition,
petitioner maintains that the respondent RTC judge committed
grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance of the writ
of execution in the unlawful detainer case (Civil Case No. 92-
12438).
The Court notes that there is a misjoinder of causes of
action in the instant petition.[16] Petitioner sought a review of
the decision of the Court of Appeals in the declaratory relief
case he filed and a declaration of nullity of the writ of
execution issued in the ejectment case filed by private
respondents against him. By doing so, petitioner, a lawyer
who represented himself in the case at bench, revealed a lack
of understanding of the legal remedies provided by Rule 45
and Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The writ of certiorari is granted when any tribunal acts
without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.[17] Errors in judgment are not proper in a petition for
certiorari. These are raised in a petition for review.[18]
The petition deals with two separate and distinct cases
having different causes of action: Special Civil Action No. Q-
46386 for declaratory relief under Rule 64 and Civil Case No.
Q-92-12438[19] for unlawful detainer under Rule 70. The
former results in the determination of the legal rights of the
parties under a contract, such as the disputed Deed of Sale
with Assignment of Mortgage,[20] while ejectment involves the
issue of possession only.[21] The ejectment case was for
deprivation of possession while an action to quiet title is based
on ownership.[22]
It is significant to note that while the instant petition is
denominated as one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, the errors are more properly addressed in a petition
for review under Rule 45. We, therefore, treat this as a petition
for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in the
declaratory relief case (Special Civil Action No. Q-46386) filed
by petitioner del Mundo.
Petitioner in the main contends that the Deed of Sale
with Assignment of Mortgage executed by the parties is valid,
thus making him the owner of the property. However, the
Regional Trial Court and respondent Court of Appeals ruled
against him and held that the Deed was simulated and was
made without consideration.
The errors raised by petitioner are clearly factual in
nature. There is no justification to depart from the well-settled
principle laid down in a long line of cases that the findings of
fact of the lower courts, the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, are, as a general rule, binding and conclusive upon
this Court.[23] There is likewise no basis to review the factual
conclusions of the Regional Trial Court, particularly since
respondent Court of Appeals adopted them as its own and
found them to be in order.
Moreover, we agree with respondent appellate court in
sustaining the trial courts findings:
a) Appellants allegation that he paid the amount of P476,000.00 to
Mrs. Nava in his law office was not corroborated by any of the
office personnel allegedly present at that time;
b) There was no receipt of payment signed by the Navas presented
in evidence;
c) Appellants allegation that he paid the consideration in his office
is in conflict with his statement in his affidavit-complaint (Exh. 32-
a-1) that he paid the said amount at the City Hall of Manila.
d) His payment of the rentals on the premises in question for the
months of December 1981 and January 1982; and his failure to
declare the property in question in his name and his non-payment
of the realty taxes due thereon, are clear indications that at the time
of the alleged sale, he still recognized the Navas as the owners of
the premises in question.
Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 34
e) The series of letters he sent to the Navas who were in the United
States (Exhs. 16 to 24) from March to June 1982 would show that
he has not paid the consideration as he was then requesting the
Navas to sign the prepared documents and return them to him, so
that he may use them in applying for a bank loan the proceeds of
which will be used in paying the loans of the Navas and the
consideration for the sale of the property. [24]
As regards the formal offer of documentary exhibits,
petitioner argues that since the testimony of private
respondents witness was not seasonably offered, the
documentary exhibits identified by the witness were likewise
not properly offered. Petitioners contention, made through
indirection, is without merit. This Court is of the same
conclusion as respondent Court of Appeals, that the
documentary exhibits were formally offered and properly
admitted by the trial court.[25]
The next question raised by petitioner, regarding the
validity of the writ of execution in the ejectment case,[26] should
have been raised in a separate petition for certiorari. To end
the protracted legal battle between the parties, the Court has
decided to resolve this issue and lay it to rest.
Petitioner fails to make his case. He contends that the
Metropolitan Trial Court which ruled against his favor was
bereft of jurisdiction because the issue of possession cannot
be decided without deciding the issue of ownership and
because respondent judge deprived him of his right to be
heard. The records elevated to the Court are those of the
declaratory relief suit (Special Civil Action No. Q-46386
and CA- G.R. CV No. 33251).
First, petitioner submitted only copies of the Order and
writ of execution issued by the respondent Judge Teodoro P.
Regino. He did not attach a copy of the decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court against him. Petitioner offers nothing
substantial to justify his allegations.
Second, the issue of possession can be resolved in an
ejectment proceeding without deciding the issue of
ownership. A judgment rendered in the summary action of
forcible entry or unlawful detainer is conclusive only on the
question of possession and not of ownership. When the issue
of ownership is indispensable to the resolution of the issue of
possession, the Metropolitan Trial Court is empowered to
decide it as well.[27] In any case, its decision does not bind the
title or affect the ownership of the land or building.[28]
Lastly, his allegations are now moot and academic. The writ
of execution issued by Judge Regino was served and effected
on March 1, 1993. A decision in favor of private respondents
was rendered by respondent RTC Judge on June 30, 1993, in
effect confirming the propriety of the writ.[29]
The Court could not agree more with the trial court in
the ejectment case, Civil Case No. Q-92-12438, when it held:
x x x (T)his Court finds the defendants appeal to be wholly without
merit, evidently interposed only for purpose of delay or prolong
litigation unnecessarily. This case had been pending since
September 1, 1983, when then complaint for ejectment was filed. It
stemmed (sic) when the lease expired on October 31, 1982, and
defendant failed to exercise his option to purchase as well as to pay
rentals. The summary nature of proceedings for this unlawful
detainer case has all been lost because of the delaying tactics
employed or resorted to in the lower court as recited in its
decision. The statement of the case narrated by the court below
leads this Court to believe that all along there was a clear pattern of
conduct on the part of defendant with a view to frustrating
relief. Plaintiffs-spouses, it bears stressing, have been deprived
possession of the premises since October 31, 1982 to March 1,
1993, when execution pending appeal was implemented, or a
period of more than ten (10) years. These facts amply convince this
Court that the prime objective of defendant in all of his moves was
to stave off the inevitable day when he must have to surrender
possession of the premises to plaintiffs. This is an attitude this
Court unsympathetically rejects. As if the delays were not enough,
defendant also instituted a declaratory relief case with injunction,
known as Sp. Civil Case No. Q-46386 of Branch 79 of this Court,
which was dismissed on May 31, 1991, and for which, on the
counterclaim of plaintiffs, defendant del Mundo was sentenced to
pay sums of money by way of damages. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals, in CA-G.R. No. 33251, prom. August 24, 1992,
defendant again lost. Not only that. Defendant also took to the task
the MTC Judge in a certiorari case, CA-G.R. SP No. 27793,
prom. October 9, 1992, but the same also proved futile. This is not
to mention a certiorari and prohibition case known as Civil Case
No. Q-92-13869 of Branch 98 of this Court, as well as G.R. No.
108522 of the Supreme Court. x x x[30]
Petitioners employment of his legal knowledge to
unnecessarily and unjustly delay this case is deplorable and
merits reprimand by the Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 33251 entitled Gerardo
A. del Mundo v. Sps. Carlos and Alejandra Nava, et al. is
AFFIRMED. Petitioner Gerardo A. del Mundo is hereby
reprimanded and given a stern warning that a repetition of
delaying tactics or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely. Let copies of this decision be furnished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar
Confidant. Treble costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 74577 : December 4, 1990.]
192 SCRA 21
CONSOLACION VILLANUEVA, Petitioner,
vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
JESUS BERNAS and REMEDIOS Q. BERNAS,
Respondents.
DECISION
NARVASA, J.:
The spouses Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa
were the owners in fee simple of a parcel of land
identified as Lot 13, their ownership being evidenced
by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3239 issued by
the Register of Deeds of Capiz on June 19, 1924. After
they died, their surviving children, Modesto Aranas
and Federico Aranas, adjudicated the land to
themselves under a deed of extrajudicial partition
executed on May 2, 1952. The southern portion,
described as Lot 13-C, was thereby assigned to
Modesto; the northern, to Federico. 1
On March 21, 1953, Modesto Aranas obtained a
Torrens title in his name from the Capiz Registry of
Property, numbered T-1346. He died on April 20,
1973, at the age of 81 years. His wife, Victoria
Comorro, predeceased him dying at age 70 on July 16,
1971. They had no children. 2
Now, it appears that Modesto was survived by two (2)
illegitimate children named Dorothea Aranas Ado and
Teodoro C. Aranas. These two borrowed P18,000.00
from Jesus Bernas. As security therefor they
mortgaged to Bernas their father's property, Lot 13-
C. In the "Loan Agreement with Real Estate Mortgage"
executed between them and Bernas on October 30,
1975, they described themselves as the absolute co-
owners of Lot 13-C. A relative, Raymundo Aranas,
signed the agreement as a witness. 3
Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay their loan. As a
result, Bernas caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of
the mortgage over Lot 13-C on June 29, 1977 and
acquired the land at the auction sale as the highest
bidder. 4 After the foreclosure sale, Dorothea and
Teodoro executed a deed of Extrajudicial Partition
dated June 21, 1978, in which they adjudicated the
same Lot 13-C unto themselves in equal shares pro-
indiviso.: nad
On October 25, 1978 Bernas consolidated his
ownership over Lot 13-C, the mortgagors having
failed to redeem the same within the reglementary
period, and had the latter's title (No. T-1346 in the
name of Modesto Aranas) cancelled and another
issued in his name, TCT No. T-15121. 5
About a month later, or on November 24, 1978,
Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas — who,
as aforestated, was an instrumental witness in the
deed of mortgage executed by Dorothea and Teodoro
Aranas on October 30, 1975 — filed a complaint with
the Regional Trial Court at Roxas City against Jesus
Bernas and his spouse, Remedios Bernas. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. V-4188, and assigned
to Branch 14. In their complaint, the plaintiffs prayed
that the latter's title over Lot 13-C, TCT No. T-15121,
Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 35
be cancelled and they be declared co-owners of the
land. They grounded their cause of action upon their
alleged discovery on or about November 20, 1978 of
two (2) wills, one executed on February 11, 1958 by
Modesto Aranas, and the other, executed on October
29, 1957 by his wife, Victoria Comorro. Victoria
Comorro's will allegedly bequeathed to Consolacion
and Raymundo, and to Dorothea and Teodoro Aranas,
in equal shares pro indiviso, all of said Victoria
Comorro's "interests, rights and properties, real and
personal . . . as her net share from (the) conjugal
partnership property with her husband, Modesto
Aranas . . ." Modesto Aranas' will, on the other hand,
bequeathed to Dorothea and Teodoro Aranas (his
illegitimate children) all his interests in his conjugal
partnership with Victoria "as well as his own capital
property brought by him to (his) marriage with his
said wife." 6
At the pre-trial, the parties stipulated on certain facts,
including the following:
1) that the property in question was
registered before the mortgage in the name
of the late Modesto Aranas, married to
Victoria Comorro, (covered by) TCT No.
1346, issued on March 21, 1953;
2) that the wills above described were
probated only after the filing of the case (No.
V-4188);
3) that Consolacion Villanueva and
Raymundo Aranas are not children of either
Modesto Aranas or Victoria Comorro;
4) that the lot in question is not expressly
mentioned in the will; and
5) that TCT No. 15121 exists, and was issued
in favor of defendant spouses Jesus Bernas
and Remedios Bernas.:-cralaw
Trial ensued after which judgment was rendered
adversely to the plaintiffs, Consolacion Villanueva and
Raymundo Aranas. 7 The dispositive part of the
judgment reads as follows: 8
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
defendants and against the plaintiffs as
follows:
The plaintiffs' complaint is hereby
dismissed and ordering the
plaintiffs, jointly and severally, to
pay the defendants the following:
1) THREE THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS
(P3,500.00) as
attorney's fees;
2) FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(P500.00) as actual
damages;
3) TEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P10,000.00) as moral
damages;
4) Declaring the
defendants spouses
Jesus Bernas and
Remedios O. Bernas
as legal owners of Lot
No. 13-C and including
all the improvements
thereon;
5) Declaring the loan
agreement with real
estate mortgage (Exh.
'2') entered into by
Dorothea Aranas Ado
married to Reynaldo F.
Ado and Teodoro C.
Aranas and Jesus
Bernas married to
Remedios O. Bernas,
over the lot in
question executed on
October 30, 1975
before Notary Public
Roland D. Abalajon
and the corresponding
Certificate of Title No.
T-15121 registered in
the name of Jesus
Bernas (defendants
spouses) as having
been executed and
issued in accordance
with law, are declared
legal and valid;
6) For failure to prove all
other counter-claim
and damages, the
same are hereby
dismissed.
7) To pay costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED."
The plaintiffs appealed to the Intermediate Appellate
Court, where they succeeded only in having the award
of actual and moral damages deleted, the judgment
of the Regional Trial Court having been otherwise
affirmed in toto.
From this judgment of the Appellate Court, 9
Consolacion Villanueva appealed to this Court. Her co-
plaintiff, Raymundo Aranas, did not.
The only question is, what right was acquired by
Consolacion Villanueva over Lot 13-C and the
improvements thereon standing by virtue of Victoria
Camorro's last will and testament giving to her all of
said Victoria's "interests, rights and properties, real
and personal . . . as her net share from (the) conjugal
partnership property with her husband, Modesto
Aranas . . ." She is admittedly, not named an heiress
in Modesto Aranas' will.: nad
Certain it is that the land itself, Lot 13-C, was not
"conjugal partnership property" of Victoria Comorro
and her husband, Modesto Aranas. It was the latter's
exclusive, private property, which he had inherited
from his parents — Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa
Bunsa, the original owners of the property —
registered solely in his name, under TCT T-1346.
Whether Modesto succeeded to the property prior or
subsequent to his marriage to Victoria Comorro — the
record being unfortunately none too clear on the point
— is inconsequential. The property should be regarded
as his own exclusively, as a matter of law. This is what
Article 148 of the Civil Code clearly decrees: that to
be considered as "the exclusive property of each
spouse" is inter alia, "that which is brought to the
marriage as his or her own," or "that which each
acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title."
Thus, even if it be assumed that Modesto's acquisition
by succession of Lot 13-C took place during his
marriage to Victoria Comorro, the lot would
nonetheless be his "exclusive property" because
acquired by him, "during the marriage, by lucrative
title."
Moreover, Victoria Comorro died on July 16, 1971,
about two (2) years ahead of her husband, Modesto
Aranas, exclusive owner of Lot 13-C, who passed
away on April 20, 1973. Victoria never therefore
inherited any part of Lot 13-C and hence, had nothing
of Lot 13-C to bequeath by will or otherwise to
Consolacion Villanueva or anybody else.
It would seem, however, that there are improvements
standing on Lot 13-C, and it is to these improvements
that Consolacion Villanueva's claims are directed. The
question then is, whether or not the improvements are
conjugal property, so that Victoria Comorro may be
said to have acquired a right over them by succession,
as voluntary heir of Victoria Comorro.
The Civil Code says that improvements, "whether for
utility or adornment, made on the separate property
of the spouses through advancements from the
partnership or through the industry of either the
husband or the wife, belong to the conjugal
partnership," and buildings "constructed, at the
expense of the partnership, during the marriage on
land belonging to one of the spouses, also pertain to
the partnership, but the value of the land shall be
reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same." 10
Persons, Fam Code 69 onwards, Property, Page 36

Proof, therefore, is needful of the time of the making

or construction of the improvements and the source
of the funds used therefor, in order to determine the
character of the improvements as belonging to the
conjugal partnership or to one spouse separately. No
such proof was presented or proferred by Consolacion
Villanueva or any one else. What is certain is that the
land on which the improvements stand was the
exclusive property of Modesto Aranas and that where,
as here, property is registered in the name of one
spouse only and there is no showing of when precisely
the property was acquired, the presumption is that it
belongs exclusively to said spouse. 11 It is not
therefore possible to declare the improvements to be
conjugal in character.
Yet another consideration precludes relief to
Consolacion Villanueva and that is, that when Lot 13-
C was mortgaged to Jesus Bernas, the title was free
of any lien, encumbrance or adverse claim presented
by or for Consolacion Villanueva or anybody else, and
that when Bernas subsequently consolidated his
ownership over Lot 13-C and obtained title in his
name, the Registry of Deeds contained no record of
any lien, encumbrance or adverse claim affecting the
property. Furthermore, Bernas' mode of acquisition of
ownership over the property, i.e., by a mortgage sale,
appears in all respects to be regular, untainted by any
defect whatsoever. Bernas must therefore be deemed
to have acquired indefeasible and clear title to Lot 13-
C which cannot be defeated or negated by claims
subsequently arising and of which he had no
knowledge or means of knowing prior to their
assertion and ventilation.:-cralaw
Finally, it bears stressing that the conclusion of the
Intermediate Appellate Court that the evidence
establishes that the property in question was the
exclusive property of one spouse, not conjugal, is a
factual one which, absent any satisfactory showing of
palpable error or grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the Appellate Court in reaching it, is not reviewable
by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Intermediate
Appellate Court subject of this appeal, being in accord
with the evidence and applicable law and
jurisprudence, is AFFIRMED, with costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea,
JJ., concur.