Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 69812 which
held that the Housing and Land Use Arbiter of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the motion of herein private respondent for a writ of
possession.

The controversy arose from the following antecedents:

In 1996, Teresa C. Aguilar entered into a contract to sell with Primetown Property Group, Inc. (PPGI) covering a condominium
unit which was under construction at Mary Cielo Leisure Resort Compound, Opon, Lapu-Lapu City. PPGI obligated itself to
deliver the unit by June 1998, as indicated in its promotional material. Thereafter, Aguilar paid by installment the purchase price
of the condominium unit in the total amount of P727,921.82.2

After the lapse of almost two years after the signing of the contract to sell, Aguilar saw that the construction of the building,
where her supposed condominium unit was to be located, had barely even started. Believing that PPGI would not be able to
deliver the unit to her by June 1998, she demanded in writing the rescission of her contract to sell with PPGI and the refund of
what she had paid. When PPGI refused, she filed a complaint 3 against PPGI for the rescission of the contract to sell and damages
with the HLURB. The case was docketed as HLURB Case No. REM-0207-0326198.

On August 26, 1999, the HLURB rendered its Decision4 in favor of Aguilar. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the complainant declaring the Contract to Sell
executed by the parties as having been Rescinded and ordering the Respondent to:

A. Pay the complainant the amount of P727,921.82 as refund of the payments made;

b. Pay the complainant 12% legal interest computed from the date of filing of this instant case until its final determination;

c. Pay the complainant the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages;

d. Pay the complainant the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages;

e. Pay the complainant the amount of P25,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses;

f. Pay the Board administrative fine of P10,000.00 for violating Section 20. Of (sic) Presidential Decree No. 957.

SO ORDERED.5

The respondent appealed the decision to the HLURB Board of Commissioners which, on December 21, 1999, affirmed the same
and declared it as final and executory. On motion of the complainant, the HLURB issued a writ of execution ordering the ex-
officio sheriff to execute its decision against PPGI with address at the Penthouse, Century Citadel, No. 5007 P. Burgos Street,
Bel-Air, Makati City.
Sheriff Cesar D. Raagas of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 138, levied several properties of PPGI, one of
which was a condominium unit identified as Condominium Unit No. 3301 in the Makati Prime Citadel located at P. Burgos
Street, Makati City, and covered by Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) No. 25156. The sale at public auction was set on
March 30, 2000. He issued a Sheriff's Notice of Sale dated February 17, 2000,6 posted a copy7 thereof to satisfy the writ of
execution, and sent a copy of the said notice to PPGI at Room 2807, Makati Prime Citadel Condominium, P. Burgos Street,
Makati City.8 The same notice was also published in the newspaper.9

Before the scheduled auction sale, or on March 21, 2000, Michael J. O Pallick served a copy of his affidavit of third-party
claim10 to Sheriff Raagas. O Pallick claimed that the condominium unit was the subject of a contract to sell executed by PPGI in
favor of Reynaldo Poblete and Tomas Villanueva who, in turn, had executed a deed for assignment in his favor. The latter
appended copies of the said deeds to his affidavit.11

The Sheriff proceeded with the sale at public auction on March 30, 2000. Aguilar was declared the highest bidder for the
condominium unit for P1,200,000.00. The Sheriff executed a certificate of sale over the property in her favor. 12

Following the failure of PPGI to redeem the property, the Sheriff executed, on April 20, 2001, a final deed of sale 13 in favor of
Aguilar, and in whose favor CCT No. 74777 was issued.14 She declared the condominium unit for taxation purposes under Tax
Declaration No. 10134.15

In the meantime, on November 6, 2001, the counsel of PPGI withdrew his appearance as its counsel. 16On November 28, 2001,
Aguilar filed a motion with the HLURB for the issuance of a writ of possession. 17A copy of the motion was served on PPGI at its
principal office as alleged in the complaint at No. 21/F Multinational BanCorporation Centre, 6805 Ayala Avenue, Makati City.
It appears that Ramon Reyes, Jr. received the said copy for PPGI on November 23, 2001. 18

During the hearing of the said motion, no representative of the PPGI appeared. On December 21, 2001, the HLURB issued its
Order19 granting Aguilar's motion for the issuance of a writ of possession, and directing the PPGI, its officers, incorporators,
stockholders and/or assignees/transferees to peacefully vacate the subject condominium. 20 It appears that the president of PPGI
was to be served with a copy of the order at Multinational BanCorporation Centre, 6809 Ayala Avenue, Makati City. 21

On January 18, 2002, PPGI filed its motion for reconsideration 22 of the December 21, 2001 Order of the HLURB, contending that
it was not served with a copy of Aguilar's motion for the issuance of a writ of possession. PPGI averred that it had transferred its
office from 21/F Multinational BanCorporation Centre, 6805 Ayala Avenue, Makati City to the Prime Citadel Condominium, No.
5007 P. Burgos Street, Makati City. PPGI further averred that despite its earnest efforts to secure copies of the aforementioned
motion of Aguilar, the HLURB Arbiter refused to furnish it with such copies. PPGI prayed that the HLURB Order dated
December 21, 2001 be recalled and set aside and, in the meantime, an order suspending the implementation thereof be issued.
PPGI set the hearing of its motion on January 21, 2002. Meanwhile, on January 22, 2002, the Sheriff placed Aguilar in physical
possession of the subject condominium.23

On February 27, 2002, the HLURB issued its Resolution 24 denying the said motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, and for
the added reason that the same had already been enforced and, as a consequence, the said motion was considered moot and
academic.25

Aggrieved, PPGI filed, on April 11, 2002, its Petition for Certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and sought
the reversal of the HLURB Order dated December 21, 2001 on the following issue:

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN GRANTING THE QUESTIONED ORDER DATED DECEMBER 21, 2000 (SIC) AND THE
RESOLUTION DATED FEBRUARY 27, 2002, WHICH DENIED THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. 26

PPGI asserted that in issuing the writ of execution, the HLURB Arbiter took judicial notice of its new address at the Prime
Citadel Condominium at No. 5007 P. Burgos Street, Bel-Air, Makati City. Despite this, the respondent caused the service of a
copy of her motion for the issuance of a writ of possession at its old office; hence, it behooved the HLURB to defer consideration
of the said motion until service had been made upon it at the said address. The petitioner asserted that the HLURB acted
arbitrarily when it allowed time to elapse before resolving the motion of the respondent herein, and enabled the Sheriff to place
her in possession of the property.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

In her comment on the petition, respondent Aguilar averred that (1) in view of the petitioner's failure to exhaust all administrative
remedies (including a Petition for Certiorari before the Board of Commissioners of the HLURB), the petition was premature; (2)
in view of the claim of O Pallick that he had acquired ownership over the property, the latter was the real party-in-interest to file
the petition; and (3) the HLURB acted in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the HLURB when it resolved the
respondent's motion for a writ of possession.

On November 12, 2002, the CA rendered its Decision 27 denying the petition of PPGI for lack of merit. The appellate court
declared that the records of the case reflected the address of PPGI as "No. 21/F Multinational BanCorporation Centre, 6805
Ayala Avenue, Makati City," and that it was never changed by PPGI; it remained as PPGI's address on record. Thus, when
Aguilar sent a copy of her motion at the said address, PPGI was deemed to have been notified. On its claim that its new address
was known to the HLURB as shown in the writ of execution it issued, the CA declared that the address "Rm. 2807, Makati Prime
Citadel Condominium, No. 5007 P. Burgos Street, Makati City," merely cropped-up because it was where the levied
condominium unit was located. The CA further ruled that the assailed order and resolution were legally issued. After all, the
respondent had already been issued CCT No. 74777 over the condominium unit; hence, she was entitled to the possession
thereof.

The appellate court denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision for lack of merit. 28

The PPGI, now the petitioner, filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari alleging that:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD'S
ACTION IN ORDERING THE WRIT OF POSSESSION WHEN PETITIONER PRIMETOWN WAS NOT INFORMED NOR
DULY NOTIFIED OF THE HEARING ON THE MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF POSSESSION THEREBY
DEPRIVING PETITIONER PRIMETOWN OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. 29

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFERRING POSSESSION IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT AGUILAR OVER
THE SUBJECT CONDOMINIUM UNIT DESPITE THE FACT THAT TITLE OR OWNERSHIP THERETO HAD BEEN
WRONGLY TRANSFERRED IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT AGUILAR AS IT HAD BEEN SOLD ALREADY TO
ANOTHER BUYER PRIOR TO THE PUBLIC AUCTION HELD.30
On the first issue, the petitioner avers that under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, respondent Aguilar was
mandated to serve on it a copy of her motion for the issuance of a writ of possession at least three days before the date of its
scheduled hearing. However, the respondent failed to do so because she served a copy of the said motion at its old principal
office at No. 21/F Multinational BanCorporation Centre, No. 6805 Ayala Avenue, Makati City, and not at its new principal office
address. The petitioner avers that the HLURB and respondent Aguilar were aware of its new principal office address because the
writ of execution issued by the HLURB specifically stated that its principal office was located at the "Penthouse, Century Citadel
Inn, No. 5007 P. Burgos Street, Bel-Air, Makati City."

The petitioner posits that the HLURB acted with grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of and granting the respondent's motion for a writ of possession. As such, the petitioner posits, the motion of
respondent Aguilar was a mere scrap of paper. Worse, the HLURB dilly-dallied in resolving its motion for reconsideration, thus
allowing the Sheriff to place respondent Aguilar in possession of the unit and thereafter denying the said motion solely on the
ground that it had become moot and academic.
Patently, the petitioner argues, it was deprived of its property without due process of law.

On the second issue, the petitioner avers that respondent Aguilar bought the property at public auction in bad faith because,
before she secured CCT No. 74777, on October 30, 2001, she was already aware that the condominium unit had been sold by the
petitioner on March 20, 1995 in favor of Poblete and Villanueva, and that they assigned their right to O Pallick, who, in turn,
executed his affidavit of third-party claim on March 17, 2000 and filed the same with the office of the ex-officio Sheriff. Hence,
respondent Aguilar was not entitled to the possession of the condominium unit.

In her comment on the petition, respondent Aguilar avers that the petitioner failed to notify her and the HLURB of any change or
transfer of its principal office. Hence, she cannot be blamed for serving a copy of her motion on the petitioner at its original
principal office, and the HLURB for serving a copy of its order at the said address. On the second issue, the respondent avers that
she was entitled to the possession of the unit following the issuance of CCT No. 74777 in her favor. The respondent pointed out
that O Pallick had filed a complaint for quieting of title against her with the RTC of Makati City on April 2, 2001 with a plea for
injunctive relief, but that the RTC denied his plea for injunctive relief and his motion for reconsideration thereof. Besides, the
respondent argues, her title cannot be the subject of a collateral attack.
The petition is bereft of merit.

First. The petitioner was mandated to notify the HLURB and the respondent herein of the transfer of its principal office from the
Multinational BanCorporation Centre to the Prime Citadel Condominium at No. 5007 P. Burgos Street, Makati City. However,
the petitioner failed to do so. Based on the records of the HLURB and those of the respondent's, the principal office of the
petitioner remained at the Multinational BanCorporation Centre. While it may be true that in the writ of execution issued by the
HLURB and the Sheriff's notice of sale the address of the petitioner appears to be at the Prime Citadel Condominium at No. 5007
P. Burgos Street, Makati City, the said address had reference to the location of the condominium unit levied upon and sought to
be sold at public auction, not to the petitioner's principal office. That the petitioner retained its principal office at the
Multinational BanCorporation Centre is shown by the fact that its employee, Ramon Reyes, Jr., received a copy of the motion for
the issuance of a writ of possession filed by the respondent on November 23, 2001. The petitioner has not disputed the authority
of Reyes, Jr. to receive such copy of the respondent's motion.

Second. The petitioner's reliance on Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, quoted, infra, is misplaced:

Sec. 4. Hearing of motion. - Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party,
every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.

Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its
receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on
shorter notice.

Sec. 5. Notice of hearing. - The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date
of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.

Sec. 6. Proof of service necessary. - No written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service
thereof.
This is so because the aforecited provisions apply only to a litigated motion and not to an ex partemotion.
The said rules do not apply to a motion which is merely a mode by which the respondent herein informed the Court that the writ
of execution had not been implemented, and that she had not been placed in possession of the property. There is no need for a
hearing of such motion because it is not a litigated motion, and the court may act thereon without prejudice to the rights of the
petitioner as the adverse party. The prejudice caused to the petitioner as the adverse party from the HLURB order directing it and
its officers and employees to vacate the condominium unit would not have been greater than that caused by the issuance of the
writ of execution itself. The writ of possession was but an implementation of the writ of execution.31

Third. The procedure in a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in nature. It is a proceeding
brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice by the court to any person adverse of interest. It is a proceeding
wherein relief is granted without an opportunity for the person against whom the relief is sought to be heard. 32 The issuance of a
writ of possession is not a judgment on the merits.33 Thus, the HLURB may grant the motion even in the absence of the judgment
obligor, herein petitioner.

Fourth. The buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed during the
period of one year after the registration of the sale.34 The issuance of the writ of possession had become ministerial duty on the
part of HLURB since the respondent had sufficiently shown her proof of title over the subject condominium. Being the registered
owner of the condominium unit, she is entitled to its possession. The case at bar is akin to foreclosure proceedings where the
issuance of a writ of possession becomes a ministerial act of the court after title on the property has been consolidated in the
mortgage.35

It must be stressed that the Register of Deeds had already cancelled CCT No. 25156 and issued CCT No. 74777 in the name of
the respondent. Thus, the argument of the petitioner that the title or ownership had been wrongfully vested with the respondent is
a collateral attack on the latter's title which is more appropriate in a direct proceeding. 36

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.SO
ORDERED.

PUNO, J., (Chairman),* AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,** TINGA, and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,

INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as
Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records
Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973
Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette
or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,
and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303,
312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503,
504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935,
961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772,
1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187,
188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261,
263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349,
357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527,
561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-
879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-
1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-
1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797,
1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-
1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933,
1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.

e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528,
531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647,
649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120,
122, 123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no
legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that
petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in
question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being
"aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled,
and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act
required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner
by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel
the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that
while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some
private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the
public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved
[Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus
is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose
instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to
show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec.
431].

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the mandamus
proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal president in the town
of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is a
proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule
in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is
always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule,
because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not
applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'

No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the respondent.
The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the
relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the
duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to
the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the
fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive
of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to
represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws
where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in
question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable
for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, 4 this
Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for
its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day
following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication.
Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does
not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions of
a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and
proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so
published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5]
such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time
to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to
regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of
the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that
at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the
people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones,
ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without
publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite
way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales
ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The
word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional
right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of
what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as
to what must be included or excluded from such publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously,
presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people,
such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or
class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned. 6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the land,
the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official
government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that
the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no
force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on
acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition,
have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented
prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and
realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and
hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1.
& L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the
effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a
statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling
as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and
official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have
finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its
previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have
engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-
inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law,
albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an
operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be
published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have
not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are
available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been
implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that
"publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the
persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the
manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws
until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws
provide that they shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances
which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED

Relova, J., concurs.

Aquino, J., took no part.

Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable,
however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for
unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.

I shall explain why.

1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply adversely to a
party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is
that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage
to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases
and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of
any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself
to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the
Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is
decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any
possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.

2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is
the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a
prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process
requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in
the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I
concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound
by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by
publication in the Official Gazette. 2

3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be ascertainable in some
form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo,
"if it is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine
that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact
date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or
executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted
themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official
Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to
question. Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our
decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post
facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There
must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the
police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be that
process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there
could arise then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes.

4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential to the
effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication
must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect
after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is
otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and
cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of
law can legally provide for a different rule.

5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and executive
acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion,
to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to
such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion.

Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law
connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not
subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule
of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey
before they can be punished for its violation,1 citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that
"before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published
and the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.

Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised Administrative
Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice
that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that
"Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to their
effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and
meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso
perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best
example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15
days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity
and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render
nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple
expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of 15 days
following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be published. What I
would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree
becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have
retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will
run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some
Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected parties
before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause
is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not
apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide
not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it
shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be published in
the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official
Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its
sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be
published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of
the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It
is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a
public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of
laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general
application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a
provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.

In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should
be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall
be by publication in the Official Gazette.

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in the Official
Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general applicability
ineffective, until due publication thereof.
Footnotes

1 Section 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shag be recognized, access to
official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shag be
afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by law.
2 Anti-Chinese League vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012; Costas vs. Aidanese, 45 Phil. 345; Almario vs. City Mayor,
16 SCRA 151;Parting vs. San Jose Petroleum, 18 SCRA 924; Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392.
3 16 Phil. 366, 378.
4 Camacho vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 80 Phil 848; Mejia vs. Balolong, 81 Phil. 486; Republic of the
Philippines vs. Encamacion, 87 Phil. 843; Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. vs. Social Security System, 17
SCRA 1077; Askay vs. Cosalan, 46 Phil. 179.
5 1 Manresa, Codigo Civil 7th Ed., p. 146.
6 People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Balbuena et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 110 Phil. 150.
7 82 SCRA 30, dissenting opinion.
8 308 U.S. 371, 374.
9 93 Phil.. 68,.
10 The report was prepared by the Clerk of Court after Acting Director Florendo S. Pablo Jr. of the
Government Printing Office, failed to respond to her letter-request regarding the respective dates of
publication in the Official Gazette of the presidential issuances listed therein. No report has been submitted
by the Clerk of Court as to the publication or non-publication of other presidential issuances.
11 129 SCRA 174.

Fernando, CJ.:

1 Separate Opinion of Justice Plana, first paragraph. He mentioned in tills connection Article 7, Sec. 21 of the
Wisconsin Constitution and State ex rel. White v. Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing the Constitution
of Indiana, U.S.A

2 Ibid, closing paragraph.

3 Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty 104 (1960).

4 Cardozo, The Growth of the Law, 3 (1924).

5 Cf. Nunez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 50581-50617, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 433.

6 Cf. Alalayan v. National Power Corporation, L-24396, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 172.

Teehankee, J.:

1 People vs. de Dios, G.R. No. 11003, Aug. 3l, 1959, per the late Chief Justice Paras.

2 Notes in brackets supplied.

3 Respondents: comment, pp. 14-15.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986

LORENZO M. TAÑ;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR

BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his
capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.

RESOLUTION

CRUZ, J.:

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which they claimed
had not been published as required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so
when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon
their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these
decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that decision. 1Specifically, they
ask the following questions:

1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?

2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?

3. What is meant by "publication"?

4. Where is the publication to be made?

5. When is the publication to be made?

Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and
those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official
Gazette. 2

In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion
and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil
Code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative; that publication, when necessary, did not have to be
made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and consequently
not binding. This elicited a Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came next the February Revolution and the Court required the new
Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court.
Responding, he submitted that issuances intended only for the internal administration of a government agency or for particular
persons did not have to be 'Published; that publication when necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and that,
however, the decision under reconsideration was not binding because it was not supported by eight members of this Court. 5

The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:

ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on the instant motion,
we have come to the conclusion and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and
not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature
may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall
be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original
decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one
year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided. "

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason. is that such
omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the
legislature could validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or
after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result
and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply because they did not know of its existence, Significantly,
this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on
prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.

We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course presupposes that the law has
been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the
Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to,
among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government.

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the
people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular
individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law
does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter
of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in
the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might
be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and t to the public as a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative
powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.
administrative rules and regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant
also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency
and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory
and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those
naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued
by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank
Act which that body is supposed to enforce.

However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be
made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his
personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local
Government Code.

We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of
the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such
decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official
Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in
which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was
"published" by the Marcos administration. 7 The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital
law.

Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for publication in the Official
Gazette 8 and that six others felt that publication could be made elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed. 9 One
reserved his vote 10 and another merely acknowledged the need for due publication without indicating where it should be
made. 11 It is therefore necessary for the present membership of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay
down a binding decision supported by the necessary vote.

There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic releases
and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating, the
laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly. The trouble,
though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no amendment
has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we have no information
that it exists. If it does, it obviously has not yet been published.

At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That
is not our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and
approved by the political departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no
choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazett and
not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provided by
the legislature.

We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the
said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered
unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a matter,
however, that we do not need to examine at this time.

Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an advisory opinion is untenable, to say
the least, and deserves no further comment.

The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open society, with all the acts of the
government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain
democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority emanating from them.

Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the work of their delegates and to ratify
or reject it according to their lights, through their freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts
of the legislature are concealed.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets.
Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed
by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded
saber that cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as
possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on
another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., and Paras, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

FERNAN, J., concurring:

While concurring in the Court's opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, I would like to add a
few observations. Even as a Member of the defunct Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong stand against the insidious manner by
which the previous dispensation had promulgated and made effective thousands of decrees, executive orders, letters of
instructions, etc. Never has the law-making power which traditionally belongs to the legislature been used and abused to satisfy
the whims and caprices of a one-man legislative mill as it happened in the past regime. Thus, in those days, it was not surprising
to witness the sad spectacle of two presidential decrees bearing the same number, although covering two different subject
matters. In point is the case of two presidential decrees bearing number 1686 issued on March 19, 1980, one granting Philippine
citizenship to Michael M. Keon the then President's nephew and the other imposing a tax on every motor vehicle equipped with
airconditioner. This was further exacerbated by the issuance of PD No. 1686-A also on March 19, 1980 granting Philippine
citizenship to basketball players Jeffrey Moore and Dennis George Still

The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law may be made effective seeks prevent abuses
on the part of the lawmakers and, at the same time, ensures to the people their constitutional right to due process and to
information on matters of public concern.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz. At the same time, I wish to add
a few statements to reflect my understanding of what the Court is saying.

A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon approval thereof, is properly interpreted as
coming into effect immediately upon publication thereof in the Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Such
statute, in other words, should not be regarded as purporting literally to come into effect immediately upon its approval or
enactment and without need of publication. For so to interpret such statute would be to collide with the constitutional obstacle
posed by the due process clause. The enforcement of prescriptions which are both unknown to and unknowable by those
subjected to the statute, has been throughout history a common tool of tyrannical governments. Such application and enforcement
constitutes at bottom a negation of the fundamental principle of legality in the relations between a government and its people.

At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official Gazette, as distinguished from any
other medium such as a newspaper of general circulation, is embodied in a statutory norm and is not a constitutional command.
The statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil Code and is supported and reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act
No. 638 and Section 35 of the Revised Administrative Code. A specification of the Official Gazette as the prescribed medium of
publication may therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code could, without creating a constitutional problem, be amended
by a subsequent statute providing, for instance, for publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the country. Until such an amendatory statute is in fact enacted, Article 2 of the Civil Code must be obeyed and
publication effected in the Official Gazette and not in any other medium.