G.R. No. 162155 August 28, 2007 RULING: Using Sec.
RULING: Using Sec. 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY
GROUP, INC.
On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property
Group, Inc., applied for the refund or credit of income tax respondent paid in
1997. According to Yap, because respondent suffered losses, it was not liable
for income taxes.7 Nevertheless, respondent paid its quarterly corporate
income tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from real estate sales to the
BIR in the total amount of ₱26,318,398.32.8 Therefore, respondent was
entitled to tax refund or tax credit.9
Respondent’s claim was not acted upon. Thus, on April 14, 2000, it filed a
petition for review11 in the CTA.
CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the two-year prescriptive
period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit.12 It invoked Section
229 of the NIRC.
The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998.
Thus, its right to claim a refund or credit commenced on that date.13
The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall be
understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of
thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours, and nights from sunset to sunrise. X X
X this reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative
Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under Section
229 of the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days.
Because the year 2000 was a leap year, respondent's petition, which was filed
731 days14 after respondent filed its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the
reglementary period.15
CA reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA.18 It ruled that Article 13 of
the Civil Code did not distinguish between a regular year and a leap year.
According to the CA.
Issue: How should the legal period provided by the NIRC be counted?
1987.
As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law
speaks of a year, it is understood to be equivalent to 365 days. x x x However,
in 1987, EO27 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section
31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides:
Sec. 31. Legal Periods. — "Year" shall be understood to be twelve
calendar months; x x x
A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without regard to the
number of days it may contain."28 It is the "period of time running from the
beginning of a certain numbered day up to, but not including, the
corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a sufficient
number of days in the next month, then up to and including the last day of that
month."
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject matter — the
computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365
days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative
Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless
to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is
irrelevant.
There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing
legal periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For
Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal
periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.
We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed
on the last day of the 24th calendar month from the day respondent filed its
final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the reglementary period.
G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO vs. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM
Petitioner and Respondent marriage in Holland. Unfortunately, their marriage bond
ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland.
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to
their son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent
to Php17,500.00 more or less).7 However, since the arrival of petitioner and her
son in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo.8
Petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from
respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.12
Petitioner filed a complaint affidavit against respondent for violation of Section 5,
paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor
child with petitioner.
RTC-Cebu dismissed the instant criminal case against respondent on the ground
that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect
to the respondent who is an alien x x x
Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s
obligation to support his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the
existence of a divorce decree issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family
Code,31 respondent is not excused from complying with his obligation to support
his minor child with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis
presented by petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial
support.32 Respondent also added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not
obligated topetitioner for any financial support.33
Issue: Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor
child under Philippine law.
Ruling: The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family
rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands,
we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to
Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as
the consequences of his failure to do so.37
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute
or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. 40 In the present case,
respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is
governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to
support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his
position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his
favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if
the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will
presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal
law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support
has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be
the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support
their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of
respondent states that parents have no obligation to support their children or that
such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still not find applicability, x
xx
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and
established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall
not be applied.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent
X X X. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would
work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is
the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is
obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. 48
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer
liable to support his former wife, X X X
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
G.R. No. 205487 November 12, 2014
ORION SAVINGS BANK vs. SHIGEKANE SUZUKI
In the first week of August 2003, respondent Suzuki, a Japanese national, inquireD
about a condominium unit and a parking slot allegedly owned by Kang a Korean
national and a Special Resident Retiree's Visa (SRRV) holder.
On August 5, 2003, Suzuki issued Kang a checks for payment amounting to 2.8M
Suzuki and Kang then executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 26,
20039covering Unit No. 536 and Parking Slot No. 42. Soon after, Suzuki took
possession of the condominium unit and parking lot, and commenced the
renovation of the interior of the condominium unit.
Suzuki later on learned that Kang had left the country, prompting Suzuki to verify
the status of the properties with the Mandaluyong City Registry of Deeds.
To protect his interests, Suzuki thenexecuted an Affidavit of Adverse Claim with
the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City, and demanded the delivery of the
titles.13 Orion, (through Perez), however, refused to surrender the titles x x x
Suzuki received a letter from Orion’s counsel stating that Kang obtained another
loan in the amount of ₱1,800,000.00. When Kang failed to pay, he executed a
Dacion en Pago dated February 2, 2003, in favour of Orion covering Unit No. 536.
Orion, however, did not register the Dacion en Pago, until October 15, 2003.
Suzuki filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Kang and
Orion. RTC found that Suzuki was an innocent purchaser for value whose rights
over the properties prevailed over Orion’s.
CA partially granted Orion’s appeal and sustained the RTC insofar as it upheld
Suzuki’s right over the properties. It deviated from the RTC ruling, however, by
deleting the award for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees,
expenses for litigation and cost of suit.
Orion then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with this Court.
Orion’s petition is based on the following grounds/arguments:15
1. The Deed of Sale executed by Kang in favor of Suzuki is null and void.
Under Korean law, any conveyance of a conjugal property should be made
with the consent of both spouses; X X X
ISSUE: Should the Deed of Sale follow Korean Law for it to be valid, considering
that one of the parties is Korean?
Ruling: NO. It is a universal principle that real or immovable property is exclusively
subject to the laws of the country or state where it is located. 21 The reason is found
in the very nature of immovable property — its immobility. Immovables are part of
the country and so closely connected to it that all rights over them have their
natural center of gravity there.22
Thus, all matters concerning the titleand disposition ofreal property are determined
by what is known as the lex loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by
which a title canpass from one person to another, or by which an interest therein
can be gained or lost.23 This general principle includes all rules governing the
descent, alienation and transfer of immovable property and the validity, effect and
construction of wills and other conveyances.24
This principle even governs the capacity of the person making a deed relating to
immovable property, no matter what its nature may be. Thus, an instrument will be
ineffective to transfer title to land if the person making it is incapacitated by the lex
loci rei sitae, even though under the law of his domicile and by the law of the place
where the instrument is actually made, his capacity is undoubted. 25
On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed principally by
the national law of the spouses.26 However, the party invoking the application of a
foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a question
of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge cannot take judicial notice
of a foreign law.27 He is presumed to know only domestic or the law of the forum.28
Accordingly, matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall be
governed by Philippine law while issues pertaining to the conjugal natureof the
property shall be governed by South Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact.
In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean law on
the conjugal ownership ofproperty. It merely attached a "Certification from the
Embassy of the Republic of Korea"29 to prove the existence of Korean Law. This
certification, does not qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of the
property for there is no showing that it was properly authenticated bythe seal of his
office, as required under Section 24 of Rule 132.30
Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approachor
processual presumption comes into play, i.e., where a foreign law is not pleaded
or, evenif pleaded, is not proven, the presumption is that foreign law is the same
as Philippine Law.31
G.R. No. 195549 September 3, 2014
WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION vs. JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION
[Respondent] alleged that it had originated the use of plastic in place of rubber in
the manufacture of automotive under chassis parts x x x [Petitioner’s] manufacture
of the same automotive parts with plastic material was taken from [respondent’s]
idea of using plastic for automotive parts. Also, [petitioner] deliberately copied
[respondent’s] products all of which acts constitute unfair competition, is and are
contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy and have caused
[respondent] damages in terms oflost and unrealized profits in the amount of TWO
MILLION PESOS as of the date of [respondent’s] complaint.
As its Affirmative Defenses, [petitioner] claims that there can be no unfair
competition as the plastic-made automotive parts are mere reproductions of
original parts and their construction and composition merely conforms to the
specificationsof the original parts of motor vehicles they intend to replace. Thus,
[respondent] cannot claim that it "originated" the use of plastic for these automotive
parts. Even assuming for the sake of argument that [respondent] indeed originated
the use of these plastic automotive parts, it still has no exclusive right to use,
manufacture and sell these as it has no patent over these products. Furthermore,
[respondent] is not the only exclusive manufacturer of these plastic-made
automotive parts as there are other establishments which were already openly
selling them to the public.3
Conversely, respondent averred that copyright and patent registrations are
immaterial for an unfair competition case to prosper under Article 28 of the Civil
Code. It stresses that the characteristics of unfair competition are present in the
instant case as the parties are trade rivals and petitioner’s acts are contrary to
good conscience for deliberately copying its products and employing its former
employees.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner committed acts amounting to unfair competition
under Article 28 of the Civil Code.
Ruling: YES. Prefatorily, we would like to stress that the instant case falls under
Article 28 of the Civil Code on human relations, and not unfair competition under
Republic Act No. 8293,7 as the present suit is a damage suit and the products are
not covered by patent registration. A fortiori, the existence of patent registration is
immaterial in the present case.
The concept of "unfair competition" under Article 28 is very much broader than that
covered by intellectual property laws. Under the present article, which follows the
extended concept of "unfair competition" in American jurisdictions, the term covers
even cases of discovery of trade secrets of a competitor, bribery of his employees,
misrepresentation of all kinds, interference with the fulfillment of a competitor’s
contracts, or any malicious interference with the latter’s business. 8
Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in agricultural,
commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force,
intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed
method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers
damage."
From the foregoing, it is clear that what is being sought to be prevented is not
competition per se but the use of unjust, oppressive or high- handed methods
which may deprive others of a fair chance to engage in business or to earn a living.
Plainly, what the law prohibits is unfair competition and not competition where the
means used are fair and legitimate.
In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two characteristics: (1) it
must involve an injury to a competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must involve acts
which are characterized as "contrary to good conscience," or "shocking to judicial
sensibilities," or otherwise unlawful; in the language of our law, these include force,
intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed
method. The public injury or interest is a minor factor; the essence of the matter
appears to be a private wrong perpetrated by unconscionable means. 9
Here, both characteristics are present.
First, both parties are competitors or trade rivals, both being engaged in the
manufacture of plastic-made automotive parts. Second, the acts of the petitioner
were clearly "contrary to good conscience" as petitioner admitted having employed
respondent’s former employees, deliberately copied respondent’s products and
even went to the extent of selling these products to respondent’s customers. 10
Thus, it is evident that petitioner isengaged in unfair competition as shown by his
act of suddenly shifting his business from manufacturing kitchenware to plastic-
made automotive parts; his luring the employees of the respondent to transfer to
his employ and trying to discover the trade secrets of the respondent. 12
Moreover, when a person starts an opposing place of business, not for the sake of
profit to himself, but regardless of loss and for the sole purpose of driving his
competitor out of business so that later on he can take advantage of the effects of
his malevolent purpose, he is guilty of wanton wrong.13
G.R. No. 182836 October 13, 2009
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORP vs. HON. ACCREDITED
VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel and a member of
respondent a Union, filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and
Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union x x x
The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s wife,
Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in
the 38th week of pregnancy.5 Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s
claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other
death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance.7
The Union maintained that x x x the CBA did not specifically state that the
dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical
personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death
benefits.
On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA
did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality.
It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely:
(1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in
Hortillano’s case. Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 16 of the Civil
Code, contended that only one with civil personality could die. Hence, the unborn
child never died because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from
the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead
from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent
could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality. A fetus that
was delivered dead could not be considered a dependent, since it never needed
any support, nor did it ever acquire the right to be supported.
Issue: Is the acquisition of civil personality of a person required before it could be
considered dead?
Ruling: NO. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the
Civil Code for the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides
that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article
41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil
personality is extinguished by death.
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of
the Civil Code on natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the
same Code, the very first of the general provisions on civil personality, which
reads:
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is
inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act,
which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her
juridical capacity and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is not a
question before us whether the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any
obligations prior to his/her death that were passed on to or assumed by the child’s
parents.
The rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant case
pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latter’s death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition
of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality
may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have
acquired juridical personality could die.
And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life.24 Life is not synonymous
with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she
could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the
Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, 25 that the State
must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then
the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
G.R. No. 182894 April 22, 2014
FE FLORO VALINO vs. ROSARIO D. ADRIANO
Atty. Adriano married Rosario on November 15, 1955. The marriage of Atty.
Adriano and Rosario, however, turned sour and they were eventually separated-in-
fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano courted Valino, one of his clients, until they decided
to live together as husband and wife.
Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. At that time, Rosario was in the United
States spending Christmas with her children. As none of the family members was
around, Valino took it upon herself to shoulder the funeral and burial expenses for
Atty. Adriano. When Rosario learned about the death of her husband, she
immediately called Valino and requested that she delay the interment for a few
days but her request was not heeded. The remains of Atty. Adriano were then
interred at the mausoleum of the family of Valino at the Manila Memorial Park.
Respondents were not able to attend the interment.
Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view the remains of Atty.
Adriano before he was buried and that his burial at the Manila Memorial Park was
contrary to his wishes, respondents commenced suit against Valino praying that x
x x the remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed and transferred to the family plot at
the Holy Cross Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City.
In her defense, Valino claimed that throughout the time they were together, he had
introduced her to his friends and associates as his wife. Although they were living
together x x x She contended that, unlike Rosario, she took good care of Atty.
Adriano and paid for all his medical expenses when he got seriously ill. x x x
According to Valino, it was Atty. Adriano’s last wish that his remains be interred in
the Valino family mausoleum at the Manila Memorial Park.
Issue: Who between Rosario and Valino is entitled to the remains of Atty. Adriano.
Ruling: Rosario is entitled to the remains. Article 305 of the Civil Code, in relation
to what is now Article 1996 of the Family Code, specifies the persons who have the
right and duty to make funeral arrangements for the deceased. x x x
Further, Article 308 of the Civil Code provides: No human remains shall be
retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without the consent of the persons
mentioned in Articles 294 and 305. [Emphases supplied]
In this connection, Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Section 1103. Persons charged with the duty of burial. – The immediate duty of burying the
body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall
devolve upon the persons herein below specified:
(a) If the deceased was a married man or woman, the duty of the burial shall devolve upon
the surviving spouse if he or she possesses sufficient means to pay the necessary
expenses; x x x x. [Emphases supplied]
From the aforecited provisions, it is undeniable that the law simply confines the
right and duty to make funeral arrangements to the members of the family to the
exclusion of one’s common law partner.
x x x Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man
and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife,
who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed
to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered
legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make
funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty.
Adriano. The fact that she was living separately from her husband and was in the
United States when he died has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario
had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to
make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless. The right
and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered
as having been waived or renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of
conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end.9 While there was
disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and their children when he was still
alive, the Court also recognizes that human compassion, more often than not,
opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once a family member joins his Creator.
Notably, it is an undisputed fact that the respondents wasted no time in making
frantic pleas to Valino for the delay of the interment for a few days so they could
attend the service and view the remains of the deceased.
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Atty. Adriano truly wished to be buried in
the Valino family plot at the Manila Memorial Park, the result remains the same.
Article 307 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the
deceased. In the absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation
shall determine the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of the funeral shall be
decided upon by the person obliged to make arrangements for the same, after
consulting the other members of the family.
From its terms, it is apparent that Article 307 simply seeks to prescribe the "form of
the funeral rites" that should govern in the burial of the deceased. As thoroughly
explained earlier, the right and duty to make funeral arrangements reside in the
persons specified in Article 305 in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code. Even
if Article 307 were to be interpreted to include the place of burial among those on
which the wishes of the deceased shall be followed, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino an
eminent authority on civil law, commented that it is generally recognized that any
inferences as to the wishes of the deceased should be established by some form
of testamentary disposition.10 As Article 307 itself provides, the wishes of the
deceased must be expressly provided. It cannot be inferred lightly, such as from
the circumstance that Atty. Adriano spent his last remaining days with Valino. It
bears stressing once more that other than Valino’s claim that Atty. Adriano wished
to be buried at the Valino family plot, no other evidence was presented to
corroborate it.
G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018
ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
On April 10, 2012, petitioner Estrellita Tadeo-Matias filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Tarlac City a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her
husband, Wilfredo N. Matias (Wilfredo).4The allegations of the petition read:
1. [Petitioner] is of legal age, married to [Wilfredo], Filipino and curr[e]ntly a
resident of 106 Molave street, Zone B, San Miguel, Tarlac City;
2. [Wilfredo] is of legal age, a member of the Philippine Constabulary and
was assigned in Arayat, Pampanga since August 24, 1967[;]
3. The [petitioner and [Wilfredo] entered into a lawful marriage on January 7,
1968 in Imbo, Anda, Pangasinan x x x;
4. After the solemnization of their marriage vows, the couple put up their
conjugal home at 106 Molave street, Zone B, San Miguel, Tarlac City;
5. [Wilfredo] continued to serve the Philippines and on September 15, 1979,
he set out from their conjugal home to again serve as a member of the
Philippine Constabulary;
6. [Wilfredo] never came back from his tour of duty in Arayat, Pampanga
since 1979 and he never made contact or communicated with the
[p]etitioner nor to his relatives;
7. That according to the service record of [Wilfredo] issued by the National
Police Commission, [Wilfredo] was already declared missing since 1979 x
x x;
8. Petitioner constantly pestered the then Philippine Constabulary for any
news regarding [her] beloved husband [Wilfredo], but the Philippine
Constabulary had no answer to his whereabouts, [neither] did they have
any news of him going AWOL, all they know was he was assigned to a
place frequented by the New People's Army;
9. [W]eeks became years and years became decades, but the [p]etitioner
never gave up hope, and after more than three (3) decades of waiting, the
[petitioner is still hopeful, but the times had been tough on her, specially
with a meager source of income coupled with her age, it is now necessary
for her to request for the benefits that rightfully belong to her in order to
survive;
10. [T]hat one of the requirements to attain the claim of benefits is for a proof
of death or at least a declaration of presumptive death by the Honorable
Court;
11. That this petition is being filed not for any other purpose but solely to claim
for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as amended.
The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 4850 and was raffled to Branch 65
of the Tarlac City RTC. A copy of the petition was then furnished to the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG).
Subsequently, the OSG filed its notice of appearance on behalf of herein
respondent Republic of the Philippines (Republic).5
On January 15, 2012, the RTC issued a Decision 6 in Spec. Proc. No. 4850
granting the petition. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:7
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby declared (sic)
WILFREDO N. MATIAS absent or presumptively dead under Article 41 of the
Family Code of the Philippines for purposes of claiming financial benefits due to
him as former military officer.
xxxx
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
The Republic questioned the decision of the RTC via a petition for certiorari.8
On November 28, 2012, the CA rendered a decision granting the certiorari petition
of the Republic and setting aside the decision of the RTC. It accordingly disposed:
WFIEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The
Decision dated January 15, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, branch 65, Tarlac
City, in Special Proceeding no. 4850 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the
petition is DISMISSED.
The CA premised its decision on the following ratiocinations:
1. The RTC erred when it declared Wilfredo presumptively dead on the basis
of Article 41 of the Family Code (FC). Article 41 of the FC does not apply
to the instant petition as it was clear that petitioner does not seek to
remarry. If anything, the petition was invoking the presumption of death
established under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code, and not that
provided for under Article 41 of the FC.
2. Be that as it may, the petition to declare Wilfredo presumptively dead
should have been dismissed by the RTC. The RTC is without authority to
take cognizance of a petition whose sole purpose is to have a person
declared presumptively dead under either Article 390 or Article 391 of the
Civil Code. As been held by jurisprudence, Articles 390 and 391 of the
 Civil Code merely express rules of evidence that allow a court or a tribunal
to presume that a person is dead—which presumption may be invoked in
any action or proceeding, but itself cannot be the subject of an
independent action or proceeding.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA remained steadfast. Hence, this
appeal.
Our Ruling
We deny the appeal.
I No. 1638 as amended."10
The CA was correct. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by
the petitioner is not an authorized suit and should have been dismissed by the
RTC. The RTC's decision must, therefore, be set aside.
RTC Erred in Declaring the Presumptive Death of Wilfredo under Article 41 of
the FC; Petitioner's Petition for the Declaration of Presumptive Death Is Not
Based on Article 41 of the FC, but on the Civil Code
A conspicuous error in the decision of the RTC must first be addressed.
It can be recalled that the RTC, in the fallo of its January 15, 2012 Decision,
granted the petitioner's petition by declaring Wilfredo presumptively dead "under
Article 41 of the FC." By doing so, the RTC gave the impression that the petition
for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner was likewise filed
pursuant to Article 41 of the FC.9 This is wrong.
The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner is not an
action that would have warranted the application of Article 41 of the FC because
petitioner was not seeking to remarry. A reading of Article 41 of the FC shows that
the presumption of death established therein is only applicable for the purpose
of contracting a valid subsequent marriage under the said law. Thus:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in
this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
Here, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the
presumptive death of Wilfredo as a prerequisite for remarriage. In her petition for
the declaration of presumptive death, petitioner categorically stated that the same
was filed "not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D.
Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was not filed for the
purpose of remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying on the presumption of
death under either Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code 11as the basis of
her petition. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code express the general rule
regarding presumptions of death for any civil purpose, to wit:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the
absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of
succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his
succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of
seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his
succession may be opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the
division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is
missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or
aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing
for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his
existence has not been known for four years.
Verily, the RTC's use of Article 41 of the FC as its basis in declaring the
presumptive death of Wilfredo was misleading and grossly improper. The petition
for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner was based on the
Civil Code, and not on Article 41 of the FC.
Petitioner's Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death Ought to Have
Been Dismissed; A Petition Whose Sole Objective is to Declare a Person
Presumptively Dead Under the Civil Code, Like that Filed by the Petitioner
Before the RTC, Is Not a Viable Suit in Our Jurisdiction
The true fault in the RTC's decision, however, goes beyond its misleading fallo.
The decision itself is objectionable.
Since the petition filed by the petitioner merely seeks the declaration of
presumptive death of Wilfredo under the Civil Code, the RTC should have
dismissed such petition outright. This is because, in our jurisdiction, a petition
whose sole objective is to have a person declared presumptively dead under the
Civil Code is not regarded as a valid suit and no court has any authority to take
cognizance of the same.
The above norm had its conceptual roots in the 1948 case of In re: Petition for the
Presumption of Death of Nicolai Szatraw.12 In the said case, we held that a rule
creating a presumption of death13 is merely one of evidence that—while may be
invoked in any action or proceeding—cannot be the lone subject of an independent
action or proceeding. Szatraw explained:
The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of evidence which permits the court to
presume that a person is dead after the fact that such person had been unheard
from in seven years had been established. This presumption may arise and be
invoked and made in a case, either in an action or in a special proceeding, which is
tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a competent court. Independently
of such an action or special proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be
invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or special proceeding. In
this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by
the petitioner against her absent husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final
determination of his right or status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact, for
the petition does not pray for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead,
but merely asks for a declaration that he be presumed dead because he had been
unheard from in seven years. If there is any pretense at securing a declaration that
the petitioner's husband is dead, such a pretension cannot be granted because it
is unauthorized. The petition is for a declaration that the petitioner's husband
is presumptively dead. But this declaration, even if judicially made, would
not improve the petitioner's situation, because such a presumption is
already established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if
final and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still
disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial
pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in
a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. The latter must decide
finally the controversy between the parties, or determine finally the right or status
of a party or establish finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights and
obligations arise or may arise; and once such controversy is decided by a final
judgement, or such right or status determined, or such particular fact established,
by a final decree, then the judgement on the subject of the controversy, or the
decree upon the right or status of a party or upon the existence of a particular fact,
becomes res judicata, subject to no collateral attack, except in a few rare instances
especially provided by law. It is, therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a
person is presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years,
being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the
stage of finality or become final. (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)
The above ruling in Szatraw has since been used by the subsequent cases
of Lukban v. Republic14 and Gue v. Republic15 in disallowing petitions for the
declaration of presumptive death based on Article 390 of the Civil Code (and,
implicitly, also those based on Article 391 of the Civil Code).
Dissecting the rulings of Szatraw, Gue and Lukban collectively, we are able to
ascertain the considerations why a petition for declaration of presumptive death
based on the Civil Code was disallowed in our jurisdiction, viz: 16
1. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence
that only allow a court or a. tribunal to presume that a person is dead upon
the establishment of certain facts.
2. Since Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of
evidence, an action brought exclusively to declare a person
presumptively dead under either of the said articles actually presents
no actual controversy that a court could decide. In such action, there
would be no actual rights to be enforced, no wrong to be remedied nor any
status to be established.
3. A judicial pronouncement declaring a person presumptively dead under
Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code, in an action exclusively based
thereon, would never really become "final" as the same only confirms the
existence of a prima facie or disputable presumption. The function of a
court to render decisions that is supposed to be final and binding between
litigants is thereby compromised.
 4. Moreover, a court action to declare a person presumptively dead under
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code would be unnecessary. The
presumption in the said articles is already established by law.
Verily, under prevailing case law, courts are without any authority to take
cognizance of a petition that—like the one filed by the petitioner in the case at
bench—only seeks to have a person declared presumptively dead under the Civil
Code. Such a petition is not authorized by law.17 Hence, by acting upon and
eventually granting the petitioner's petition for the declaration of presumptive
death, the RTC violated prevailing jurisprudence and thereby committed grave
abuse of discretion. The CA, therefore, was only correct in setting aside the RTC's
decision.
II
Before bringing this case to its logical conclusion, however, there are a few points
the Court is minded to make.
It is not lost on this Court that much of the present controversy stemmed from the
misconception that a court declaration is required in order to establish a person as
presumptively dead for purposes of claiming his death benefits as a military
serviceman under pertinent laws.18 This misconception is what moved petitioner to
file her misguided petition for the declaration of presumptive death of Wilfredo and
what ultimately exposed her to unnecessary difficulties in prosecuting an otherwise
simple claim for death benefits either before the Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office
(PVAO) or the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
What the Court finds deeply disconcerting, however, is the possibility that such
misconception may have been peddled by no less than the PVAO and the AFP
themselves; that such agencies, as a matter of practice, had been requiring
claimants, such as the petitioner, to first secure a court declaration of presumptive
death before processing the death benefits of a missing serviceman.
In view of the foregoing circumstance, the Court deems it necessary to issue the
following guidelines—culled from relevant law and jurisprudential
pronouncements—to aid the public, PVAO and the AFP in making or dealing with
claims of death benefits which are similar to that of the petitioner:
1. The PVAO and the AFP can decide claims of death benefits of a
missing soldier without requiring the claimant to first produce a
court declaration of the presumptive death of such soldier. In such
claims, the PVAO and the AFP can make their own determination, on the
basis of evidence presented by the claimant, whether the presumption of
death under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code may be applied or not.
It must be stressed that the presumption of death under Articles 390 and
391 of the Civil Code arises by operation of law, without need of a court
declaration, once the factual conditions mentioned in the said articles are
established.19Hence, requiring the claimant to further secure a court
declaration in order to establish the presumptive death of a missing soldier
is not proper and contravenes established jurisprudence on the matter.20]
2. In order to avail of the presumption, therefore, the claimant need only
present before the PVAO or the appropriate office of the AFP, as the case
may be, any "evidence" which shows that the concerned soldier had been
missing for such number of years and/or under the circumstances
prescribed under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. Obviously, the
"evidence" referred to here excludes a court declaration of presumptive
death.
3. The PVAO or the AFP, as the case may be, may then weigh the evidence
submitted by the claimant and determine their sufficiency to establish the
requisite factual conditions specified under Article 390 or 391 of the Civil
Code in order for the presumption of death to arise. If the PVAO or the
AFP determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is
sufficient, they should not hesitate to apply the presumption of death
and pay the latter's claim. 4. If the PVAO or the AFP determines that the
evidence submitted by the claimant is not sufficient to invoke the
presumption of death under the Civil Code and denies the latter's claim by
reason thereof, the claimant may file an appeal with the Office of the
President (OP) pursuant to the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
If the OP denies the appeal, the claimant may next seek recourse via a petition for
review with the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of the Court. And finally, should
such recourse still fail, the claimant may file an appeal by certiorari with the
Supreme Court.
While we are constrained by case law to deny the instant petition, the Court is
hopeful that, by the foregoing guidelines, the unfortunate experience of the
petitioner would no longer be replicated in the future.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated November 28,
2016 and Resolution dated March 20, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 129467 are AFFIRMED. The Court declares that a judicial decision of a court
of law that a person is presumptively dead is not a requirement before the
Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office or the Armed Forces of the Philippines can grant
and pay the benefits under Presidential Decree No. 1638.
Let a copy of this decision be served to the Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office and
the Armed Forces of the Philippines for their consideration.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 165842 November 29, 2005]

EDUARDO P. MANUEL, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26877, affirming the Decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting Eduardo P. Manuel of
bigamy in Criminal Case No. 19562-R.
Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on November 7, 2001,
the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, being then previously and legally married to RUBYLUS
[GAÑA] and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with TINA
GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein complainant, who does not know the existence of
the first marriage of said EDUARDO P. MANUEL to Rubylus [Gaña].
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to
Rubylus Gaña before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati, which was then still a
municipality of the Province of Rizal.4 He met the private complainant Tina B.
Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. She stayed in Bonuan,
Dagupan City for two days looking for a friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a
Computer Secretarial student, while Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to
Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led to another, they went to a
motel where, despite Tina's resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with
her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was
single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina's parents,
and was assured by them that their son was still single.
Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996.
They were married on April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the
Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61.5 It appeared in their
marriage contract that Eduardo was "single."
The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through
their joint efforts, they were able to build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan,
Baguio City. However, starting 1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and
went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever
she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her.6 Sometime in January 2001,
Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving
financial support.
Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the
National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had
been previously married. She secured an NSO-certified copy of the marriage
contract.7 She was so embarrassed and humiliated when she learned that
Eduardo was in fact already married when they exchanged their own vows. 8
For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where
she worked as a Guest Relations Officer (GRO). He fell in love with her and
married her. He informed Tina of his previous marriage to Rubylus Gaña, but she
nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital relationship was in order until this
one time when he noticed that she had a "love-bite" on her neck. He then
abandoned her. Eduardo further testified that he declared he was "single" in his
marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith that his first
marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the
nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina.
Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she
threatened to commit suicide unless he did so. Rubylus was charged with estafa in
1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three months and never
saw her again. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first marriage
was no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20
years.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. He was sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of from six (6) years and ten (10) months, as minimum, to ten (10) years,
as maximum, and directed to indemnify the private complainant Tina Gandalera
the amount of P200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus costs of suit.9
The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable
doubt all the elements of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. It
declared that Eduardo's belief, that his first marriage had been dissolved because
of his first wife's 20-year absence, even if true, did not exculpate him from liability
for bigamy. Citing the ruling of this Court in People v. Bitdu,10 the trial court further
ruled that even if the private complainant had known that Eduardo had been
previously married, the latter would still be criminally liable for bigamy.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally
liable for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in
good faith and without any malicious intent. He maintained that at the time that he
married the private complainant, he was of the honest belief that his first marriage
no longer subsisted. He insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal
Code, there must be malice for one to be criminally liable for a felony. He was not
motivated by malice in marrying the private complainant because he did so only
out of his overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage. He posited that the trial
court should have taken into account Article 390 of the New Civil Code. To support
his view, the appellant cited the rulings of this Court in United States v.
Peñalosa11 and Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.12
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that Eduardo's defense of good
faith and reliance on the Court's ruling in United States v. Enriquez13 were
misplaced; what is applicable is Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended
Article 390 of the Civil Code. Citing the ruling of this Court in Republic v.
Nolasco,14 the OSG further posited that as provided in Article 41 of the Family
Code, there is a need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent
spouse to enable the present spouse to marry. Even assuming that the first
marriage was void, the parties thereto should not be permitted to judge for
themselves the nullity of the marriage;
the matter should be submitted to the proper court for resolution. Moreover, the
OSG maintained, the private complainant's knowledge of the first marriage would
not afford any relief since bigamy is an offense against the State and not just
against the private complainant.
However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty imposed by the trial
court was erroneous and sought the affirmance of the decision appealed from with
modification.
On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC
with modification as to the penalty of the accused. It ruled that the prosecution was
able to prove all the elements of bigamy. Contrary to the contention of the
appellant, Article 41 of the Family Code should apply. Before Manuel could lawfully
marry the private complainant, there should have been a judicial declaration of
Gaña's presumptive death as the absent spouse. The appellate court cited the
rulings of this Court in Mercado v. Tan15 and Domingo v. Court of Appeals16 to
support its ruling. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision promulgated on July 31,
2002 is hereby MODIFIED to reflect, as it hereby reflects, that accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as
maximum. Said Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.17
Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari ,
insisting that:
I moral damages in favor of the private complainant. The private complainant was a
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN
IT RULED THAT PETITIONER'S FIRST WIFE CANNOT BE LEGALLY
PRESUMED DEAD UNDER ARTICLE 390 OF THE CIVIL CODE AS THERE
WAS NO JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH AS PROVIDED
FOR UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN
IT AFFIRMED THE AWARD OF PHP200,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES AS IT
HAS NO BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW.18
The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the second element of
the felony, i.e., that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his/her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead under the
Civil Code. He avers that when he married Gandalera in 1996, Gaña had been
"absent" for 21 years since 1975; under Article 390 of the Civil Code, she was
presumed dead as a matter of law. He points out that, under the first paragraph of
Article 390 of the Civil Code, one who has been absent for seven years, whether
or not he/she is still alive, shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for
succession, while the second paragraph refers to the rule on legal presumption of
death with respect to succession.
The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent spouse arises by
operation of law upon the satisfaction of two requirements: the
specified period and the present spouse's reasonable belief that the absentee is
dead. He insists that he was able to prove that he had not heard from his first wife
since 1975 and that he had no knowledge of her whereabouts or whether she was
still alive; hence, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the presumptive death of
Gaña had arisen by operation of law, as the two requirements of Article 390 of
the Civil Code are present. The petitioner concludes that he should thus be
acquitted of the crime of bigamy.
The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences provided for in Article
390 of the Civil Code, the rule therein on legal presumptions remains valid and
effective. Nowhere under Article 390 of the Civil Code does it require that there
must first be a judicial declaration of death before the rule on presumptive death
would apply. He further asserts that contrary to the rulings of the trial and appellate
courts, the requirement of a judicial declaration of presumptive death under Article
41 of the Family Code is only a requirement for the validity of the subsequent or
second marriage.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA erred in awarding
"GRO" before he married her, and even knew that he was already married. He
genuinely loved and took care of her and gave her financial support. He also
pointed out that she had an illicit relationship with a lover whom she brought to
their house.
In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the decision of the CA
affirming the petitioner's conviction is in accord with the law, jurisprudence and the
evidence on record. To bolster its claim, the OSG cited the ruling of this Court
in Republic v. Nolasco.19
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes bigamy,
reads:
Art. 349. Bigamy. 'The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person
who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage
has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Code, to wit:
El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse legÃtimamente
disuelto el anterior, será castigado con la pena de prision mayor. xxx
The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the
juridical tie of marriage established by law. 20 The phrase "or before the absent
spouse had been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings" was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because
the drafters of the law were of the impression that "in consonance with the civil law
which provides for the presumption of death after an absence of a number of
years, the judicial declaration of presumed death like annulment of
marriage should be a justification for bigamy."21
For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove
the felony: (a) he/she has been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a
subsequent marriage without the former marriage having been lawfully dissolved.
The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or
subsequent marriage.22 It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged
second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not
for the subsistence of the first marriage.23 Viada avers that a third element of the
crime is that the second marriage must be entered into with fraudulent
intent (intencion fraudulente) which is an essential element of a felony
by dolo.24 On the other hand, Cuello Calon is of the view that there are only two
elements of bigamy: (1) the existence of a marriage that has not been lawfully
dissolved; and (2) the celebration of a second marriage. It does not matter whether
the first marriage is void or voidable because such marriages have juridical effects
until lawfully dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction. 25 As the Court ruled
in Domingo v. Court of Appeals26 and Mercado v. Tan,27 under the Family Code of
the Philippines, the judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is a
defense.
In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the same view as
Viada and declared that there are three (3) elements of bigamy: (1) an undissolved
marriage; (2) a new marriage; and (3) fraudulent intention constituting the felony of
the act.28 He explained that:
'This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is undoubtedly
incorporated in the principle antedating all codes, and, constituting one of the
landmarks of our Penal Code, that, where there is no willfulness there is no crime.
There is no willfulness if the subject
believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and this must be supported
by very strong evidence, and if this be produced, the act shall be deemed not to
constitute a crime. Thus, a person who contracts a second marriage in the
reasonable and well-founded belief that his first wife is dead, because of the many
years that have elapsed since he has had any news of her whereabouts, in spite of
his endeavors to find her, cannot be deemed guilty of the crime of bigamy,
because there is no fraudulent intent which is one of the essential elements of the
crime.29
As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with bigamy,
a felony by dolo (deceit). Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that there is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent.
Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is classified as
an intentional felony, it is deemed voluntary.30 Although the words "with malice" do
not appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such phrase is included in the
word "voluntary."31
Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without
legal excuse or justification from which another suffers injury.32 When the act or
omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have been done or committed by
the accused, the law presumes it to have been intentional.33 Indeed, it is a legal
presumption of law that every man intends the natural or probable consequence of
his voluntary act in the absence of proof to the contrary, and such presumption
must prevail unless a reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of the whole
evidence.34
For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of
both an evil act and an evil intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.35
In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to
Gaña in 1975, and such marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the
marriage is presumed to subsist.36 The prosecution also proved that the petitioner
married the private complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of the Family
Code.
The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he
married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of
the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense
negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse
because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem
excusat.
It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the
private complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20
years since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent
court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial
declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and would
negate criminal intent on his part when he married the private complainant and, as
a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner,
however, failed to discharge his burden.
The phrase "or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead
by means of a judgment rendered on the proceedings" in Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code was not an aggroupment of empty or useless words. The
requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for
the benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the
consequences of a second marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged
and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based on mere testimony is
found incredible.
The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the "State shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution." Marriage is a social institution of
the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the interest of society
require that the marital relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its
severance only in the manner prescribed and the causes specified by law. 37 The
laws regulating civil marriages are necessary to serve the interest, safety, good
order, comfort or general welfare of the community and the parties can waive
nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an
ordered society by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones; it
enhances the welfare of the community.
In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses
and an approving State. On marriage, the parties assume new relations to each
other and the State touching nearly on every aspect of life and death. The
consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent parties and to
society, are so serious that the law may well take means calculated to ensure the
procurement of the most positive evidence of death of the first spouse or of the
presumptive death of the absent spouse38 after the lapse of the period provided for
under the law. One such means is the requirement of the declaration by a
competent court of the presumptive death of an absent spouse as proof that the
present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the
death of the first spouse. Indeed, "men readily believe what they wish to be true,"
is a maxim of the old jurists. To sustain a second marriage and to vacate a first
because one of the parties believed the other to be dead would make the
existence of the marital relation determinable, not by certain extrinsic facts, easily
capable of forensic ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective condition of
individuals.39 Only with such proof can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to
permit second marriages.40 Thus, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made
the dissolution of marriage dependent not only upon the personal belief of parties,
but upon certain objective facts easily capable of accurate judicial
cognizance,41 namely, a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse.
The petitioner's sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his
acquittal for bigamy is misplaced.
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide'
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not, the
absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of
succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his
succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of
seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his
succession may be opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the
division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is
missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or
aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing
for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his
existence has not been known for four years.
The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven years, it
being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, is created by law and arises
without any necessity of judicial declaration.42 However, Article 41 of the Family
Code, which amended the foregoing rules on presumptive death, reads:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided
in this Court for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.43
With the effectivity of the Family Code, 44 the period of seven years under the first
paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years.
Thus, before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she
must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of
the absentee spouse,45 without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the
absentee spouse. As explained by this Court in Armas v. Calisterio:46
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous
marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must
concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have been absent
for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under the
circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance;
(b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already
dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a
summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is
consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in
subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the
Family Code.
The Court rejects petitioner's contention that the requirement of instituting a
petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is
designed merely to enable the spouse present to contract a valid second marriage
and not for the acquittal of one charged with bigamy. Such provision was designed
to harmonize civil law and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and put to rest
the confusion spawned by the rulings of this Court and comments of eminent
authorities on Criminal Law.
As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v. Hortiguela47 that, for
purposes of the marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse
judicially declared an absentee before the spouse present may contract a
subsequent marriage. It held that the declaration of absence made in accordance
with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose the taking of the
necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the
celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse
had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage,
that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that
such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so
believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.48 In In Re Szatraw,49 the
Court declared that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead,
because he or she had been unheard from in seven years, being a
presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of
finality or become final; and that proof of actual death of the person presumed
dead being unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in another
proceeding to have such particular fact finally determined. The Court ruled that if a
judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead because he or she had not
been heard from in seven years cannot become final and executory even after the
lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such
presumption is still disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition
for such a declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the
petitioner. The Court stated that it should not waste its valuable time and be made
to perform a superfluous and meaningless act.50 The Court also took note that a
petition for a declaration of the presumptive death of an absent spouse may even
be made in collusion with the other spouse.
In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines,51 the Court declared that the words
"proper proceedings" in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code can only refer to
those authorized by law such as Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code which refer
to the administration or settlement of the estate of a deceased person. In Gue v.
Republic of the Philippines,52 the Court rejected the contention of the petitioner
therein that, under Article 390 of the Civil Code, the courts are authorized to
declare the presumptive death of a person after an absence of seven years. The
Court reiterated its rulings in Szatraw, Lukban and Jones.
Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that "the provision of
Article 349 or "before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment reached in the proper proceedings" is erroneous and should
be considered as not written. He opined that such provision presupposes that, if
the prior marriage has not been legally dissolved and the absent first spouse has
not been declared presumptively dead in a proper court proceedings, the
subsequent marriage is bigamous. He maintains that the supposition is not
true.53 A second marriage is bigamous only when the circumstances in paragraphs
1 and 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code are not present. 54 Former Senator Ambrosio
Padilla was, likewise, of the view that Article 349 seems to require judicial decree
of dissolution or judicial declaration of absence but even with such decree, a
second marriage in good faith will not constitute bigamy. He posits that a second
marriage, if not illegal, even if it be annullable, should not give rise to
bigamy.55 Former Justice Luis B. Reyes, on the other hand, was of the view that in
the case of an absent spouse who could not yet be presumed dead according to
the Civil Code, the spouse present cannot be charged and convicted of bigamy in
case he/she contracts a second marriage.56
The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the amendments of
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code to conform to Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, in that, in a case where a spouse is absent for the requisite period,
the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a
judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being
charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce
evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead.57 Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who
contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later
charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of
the crime. As explained by former Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy:
Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of authority is that the clause
"before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead x x x" should be
disregarded because of Article 83, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. With the new
law, there is a need to institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of the
presumptive death of the absentee, otherwise, there is bigamy.59
According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an eminent
authority on Criminal Law, in some cases where an absentee spouse is believed to
be dead, there must be a judicial declaration of presumptive death, which could
then be made only in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate. 60 Before
such declaration, it was held that the remarriage of the other spouse is bigamous
even if done in good faith.61 Justice Regalado opined that there were contrary
views because of the ruling in Jones and the provisions of Article 83(2) of the Civil
Code, which, however, appears to have been set to rest by Article 41 of the Family
Code, "which requires a summary hearing for the declaration of presumptive death
of the absent spouse before the other spouse can remarry."
Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a declaration of the
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code may
be filed under Articles 239 to 247 of the same Code.62

'Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code providing
that the present spouse must first ask for a declaration of presumptive death of the
absent spouse in order not to be guilty of bigamy in case he or she marries again.
The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for the purpose of
the present spouse contracting a second marriage, he or she must file a summary
proceeding as provided in the Code for the declaration of the presumptive death of
the absentee, without prejudice to the latter's reappearance. This provision is
intended to protect the present spouse from a criminal prosecution for bigamy
under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code because with the judicial declaration
that the missing spouses presumptively dead, the good faith of the present spouse
in contracting a second marriage is already established.58
Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now Undersecretary of
Justice) who wrote that things are now clarified. He says judicial declaration of
presumptive death is now authorized for purposes
remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary proceeding for
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, where the ordinary rules of
procedure in trial will not be followed. Affidavits will suffice, with possible
clarificatory examinations of affiants if the Judge finds it necessary for a full grasp
of the facts. The judgment declaring an absentee as presumptively dead is without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said absentee.
On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court and the CA for
awarding moral damages in favor of the private complainant. The petitioner
maintains that moral damages may be awarded only in any of the cases provided
in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, and bigamy is not one of them. The petitioner
asserts that the appellate court failed to apply its ruling in People v.
Bondoc,63 where an award of moral damages for bigamy was disallowed. In any
case, the petitioner maintains, the private complainant failed to adduce evidence to
prove moral damages.
The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private complainant on its
finding that she adduced evidence to prove the same. The appellate court ruled
that while bigamy is not included in those cases enumerated in Article 2219 of the
Civil Code, it is not proscribed from awarding moral damages against the
petitioner. The appellate court ruled that it is not bound by the following ruling
in People v. Bondoc:
of
... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daños, ello se debió
indedublamente porque el articulo 2219 del Código Civil de Filipinas autoriza la
adjudicación de daños morales en los delitos de estupro, rapto, violación,
adulterio o concubinato, y otros actos lascivos, sin incluir en esta enumeración el
delito de bigamia. No existe, por consiguiente, base legal para adjudicar aquà los
daños de P5,000.00 arriba mencionados.64
The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are based on the evidence
and the law. The OSG, likewise, avers that the CA was not bound by its ruling
in People v. Rodeo.
The Court rules against the petitioner.
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or
omission.65 An award for moral damages requires the confluence of the following
conditions: first, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological,
clearly sustained by the claimant; second, there must be culpable act or omission
factually established; third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the
proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and fourth, the award of
damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 or Article 2220 of
the Civil Code.66
Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only in criminal
cases enumerated in Article 2219, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Code
and analogous cases, viz.:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases.
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No.
3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the
action mentioned in No. 9 of this article in the order named.
Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be awarded in all cases
where the aggrieved party has suffered mental anguish, fright, moral anxieties,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and
similar injury arising out of an act or omission of another, otherwise, there would
not have been any reason for the inclusion of specific acts in Article 2219 67 and
analogous cases (which refer to those cases bearing analogy or resemblance,
corresponds to some others or resembling, in other respects, as in form,
proportion, relation, etc.)68
Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the
Civil Code in which the offender may be ordered to pay moral damages to the
private complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the petitioner is liable to the
private complainant for moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19,
20 and 21 of the Civil Code.
According to Article 19, "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith." This provision contains what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, and sets certain standards which must be observed not
only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. The
standards are the following: act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe
honesty and good faith. The elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal
right or duty; (b) exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another.69
Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do
not especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner
which does not conform to the standards set forth in the said provision and results
in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer
must be responsible.70 If the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation,
an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would
be proper. Article 20 provides that "every person who, contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same." On
the other hand, Article 21 provides that "any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for damages." The latter provision is adopted to
remedy "the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral
wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury
should vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs
which it is impossible for human foresight to prove for specifically in the statutes."
Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in
damages under Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code or other applicable
provisions of law depends upon the circumstances of each case.71
In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant and proposed to
marry her. He assured her that he was single. He even brought his parents to the
house of the private complainant where he and his parents made the same
assurance - that he was single. Thus, the private complainant agreed to marry the
petitioner, who even stated in the certificate of marriage that he was single. She
lived with the petitioner and dutifully performed her duties as his wife, believing all
the while that he was her lawful husband. For two years or so until the petitioner
heartlessly abandoned her, the private complainant had no inkling that he was
already married to another before they were married.
Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner's chicanery
and heartless deception, the fraud consisting not of a single act alone, but a
continuous series of acts. Day by day, he maintained the appearance of being a
lawful husband to the private complainant, who changed her status from a single
woman to a married woman, lost the consortium, attributes and support of a single
man she could have married lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation,
being bound to a man who it turned out was not her lawful husband. 72
The Court rules that the petitioner's collective acts of fraud and deceit before,
during and after his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate
and with malice and caused injury to the latter. That she did not sustain any
physical injuries is not a bar to an award for moral damages. Indeed, in Morris v.
Macnab,73 the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled:
xxx The defendant cites authorities which indicate that, absent physical injuries,
damages for shame, humiliation, and mental anguish are not recoverable where
the actor is simply negligent. See Prosser, supra, at p. 180; 2 Harper & James,
Torts, 1031 (1956). But the authorities all recognize that where the wrong is willful
rather than negligent, recovery may be had for the ordinary, natural, and proximate
consequences though they consist of shame, humiliation, and mental anguish. See
Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 NJL 90, 94, 186 A 585 (Sup. Ct. 1936);
Kuzma v. Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, 27 N.J. Super, 579, 591, 99 A.2d 833
(App. Div. 1953); Prosser, supra, at p. 38. Here the defendant's conduct was not
merely negligent, but was willfully and maliciously wrongful. It was bound to result
in shame, humiliation, and mental anguish for the plaintiff, and when such result
did ensue the plaintiff became entitled not only to compensatory but also to
punitive damages. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., supra; Kuzma v.
Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, supra. CF. Note, "Exemplary Damages in the
Law of Torts," 70 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1957). The plaintiff testified that because of
the defendant's bigamous marriage to her and the attendant publicity she not only
was embarrassed and "ashamed to go out" but "couldn't sleep" but "couldn't eat,"
had terrific headaches" and "lost quite a lot of weight." No just basis appears for
judicial interference with the jury's reasonable allowance of $1,000 punitive
damages on the first count. See Cabakov v. Thatcher, 37 N.J. Super 249, 117
A.2d 298 (App. Div.741955).
The Court thus declares that the petitioner's acts are against public policy as they
undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the
interest and general welfare of society.
Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner's perfidy,
she is not barred from claiming moral damages. Besides, even considerations of
public policy would not prevent her from recovery. As held in Jekshewitz v.
Groswald:75
Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of another to do an act
which, in consequence of such misrepresentation, he believes to be neither illegal
nor immoral, but which is in fact a criminal offense, he has a right of action against
the person so inducing him for damages sustained by him in consequence of his
having done such act. Burrows v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 816. In Cooper v. Cooper,
147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E. 892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the court said that a false
representation by the defendant that he was divorced from his former wife,
whereby the plaintiff was induced to marry him, gave her a remedy in tort for
deceit. It seems to have been assumed that the fact that she had unintentionally
violated the law or innocently committed a crime by cohabiting with him would be
no bar to the action, but rather that it might be a ground for enhancing her
damages. The injury to the plaintiff was said to be in her being led by the promise
to give the fellowship and assistance of a wife to one who was not her husband
and to assume and act in a relation and condition that proved to be false and
ignominious. Damages for such an injury were held to be recoverable in Sherman
v. Rawson, 102 Mass. 395 and Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am. Rep.
336.
Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her cause of action upon
any transgression of the law by herself but upon the defendant's
misrepresentation. The criminal relations which followed, innocently on her part,
were but one of the incidental results of the defendant's fraud for which damages
may be assessed.
[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to enter into the marriage
relation have been maintained in other jurisdictions. Sears v. Wegner, 150 Mich.
388, 114 N.W. 224, 17 L.R. A. (N.S.) 819; Larson v. McMillan, 99 Wash. 626, 170
P. 324; Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434, 97 Am. Dec. 747; Morril v. Palmer, 68 Vt.
1, 33 A. 829, 33 L.R.A. 411. Considerations of public policy would not prevent
recovery where the circumstances are such that the plaintiff was conscious of no
moral turpitude, that her illegal action was induced solely by the defendant's
misrepresentation, and that she does not base her cause of action upon any
transgression of the law by herself. Such considerations
distinguish this case from cases in which the court has refused to lend its aid to the
enforcement of a contract illegal on its face or to one who has consciously and
voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is
founded. Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 520, 154 N.E. 251, 49 A. L. R.
958.76

Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award
of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed

decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.