Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 9115 September 17, 2014

REBECCA MARIE UY YUPANGCO-NAKPIL, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ROBERTO L. UY, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is an administrative case against respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy (respondent) for

unprofessional and unethical conduct, stemming from a complaint filed by private complainant
Rebecca Marie Uy Yupangco-Nakpil (Rebecca), represented by her attorney-in-fact, Bella Asuncion
Pollo (Bella).

The Facts

Rebecca is the natural niece and adopted daughter of the late Dra. Pacita Uy y Lim (Pacita).1 She
was adjudged as the sole and exclusive legal heir of Paci ta by virtue of an Order2 dated August 10,
1999 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 34 in SPEC. PROC. No. 95-7520 l (SP
95-75201). At the time of her death, Pacita was a stockholder in several corporations primarily
engaged in acquiring, developing, and leasing real properties, namely, Uy Realty Company, Inc.
(URCI), Jespajo Realty Corporation, Roberto L. Uy Realty and Development Corporation, Jesus Uy
Realty Corporation, Distelleria La Jarolina, Inc., and Pacita Lim Uy Realty, Inc.3

In her Complaint4 filed on May 9, 2005,5 Rebecca, through her attorney-in fact, Bella, averred that
respondent, her alleged illegitimate halfcousin,6 continuously failed and refused to comply with the
court order in SP 95-75201 declaring her as the successor-in-interest to all of Pacita’s properties, as
well as her requests for the accounting and delivery of the dividends and other proceeds or benefits
coming from Pacita’s stockholdings in the aforementioned corporations.7 She added that respondent
mortgaged a commercial property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-133606 (subject
property) in favor of Philippine Savings Bank in the total amount of 54,000,000.00,8 despite an
existing Trust Agreement9 executed on October 15, 1993 (subject Trust Agreement) wherein
respondent, in his capacity as President of URCI, already recognized her to be the true and
beneficial owner of the same.10Accordingly, she demanded that respondent return the said property
by executing the corresponding deed of conveyance in her favor together with an inventory and
accounting of all the proceeds therefrom, but to no avail.11 In this relation, Rebecca claimed that it
was only on September 2, 2005 or after she had already instituted various legal actions and
remedies that respondent and URCIagreed to transfer the subject property to her pursuant to a
compromise agreement.12

In his Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim,13 respondent denied Rebecca’s allegations and raised
the affirmative defenses of forum shopping and prescription. He pointed out that Rebecca had filed
several cases raising the single issue on the correct interpretation of the subject trust agreement. He
also contended that the parties’ transactions in this case were made way back in 1993 and 1995
without a complaint having been filed until Bella came into the picture and instituted various suits
covering the same issue.14 As such, he sought the dismissal of the complaint, and further prayed for
the payment of moral damages and attorney’s fees by way of counterclaim.15

On September 8, 2005, Rebecca filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint16 in CBD Case No. 05-1484
for the reason that "the facts surrounding the same arose out of a misunderstanding and
misapprehension of the real facts surrounding their dispute."17

However, on October 6, 2005, Bella filed a Manifestation with Leave of Court to File Motion for
Intervention,18praying that the investigation of the charges against respondent continue in order to
weed out erring members of the legal profession.19

The Report and Recommendation of the IBP

On October 8, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner
issuedhis Report and Recommendation,20 finding respondent guilty of serious misconduct in violation
of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), and, thus, recommended
the penalty of suspension for a period of six (6) months.21

On matters of procedure, the Investigating Commissioner opined that Rebecca’s motion to withdraw
did notserve as a bar for the further consideration and investigation ofthe administrative case against
respondent. As basis, he cites Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which provides that "[n]o
investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise,
restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same."
Separately, the Investigating Commissioner denied the claim of forum shopping, noting that
disciplinary cases are sui generis and may, therefore, proceed independently.22

On the merits of the charge, the Investigating Commissioner observed that respondent lacked the
good moral character required from members of the Bar when the latter failed to comply with the
demands of Rebecca under the subject trust agreement, not to mention his unworthy and deceitful
acts of mortgaging the subject property without the former’s consent. In fine, respondent was found
guilty of serious misconduct in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, for which the above-
stated penalty was recommended.23

In a Resolution24 dated November 10, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation.

The Issue Before the Court

The basic issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable.

The Court’s Ruling

Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, as itis applied to the members of the legal profession, engraves an
overriding prohibition against any form of misconduct, viz.:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
The gravity of the misconduct – determinative as it is of the errant lawyer’s penalty – depends on the
factual circumstances of each case.

Here, the Court observes that the squabble which gave rise to the present administrative case
largely constitutes an internal affair, which had already been laid to rest by the parties. This is clearly
exhibited by Rebecca’s motion to withdraw filed in this case as well as the compromise agreement
forged in Civil Case No. 04-108887 which involves the subject property’s alleged disposition in
violation of the subject trust agreement. As the Court sees it, his failure to complywith the demands
of Rebecca – which she takes as an invocation of her rights under the subject trust agreement – as
well as respondent’s acts of mortgaging the subject property without the former’s consent, sprung
from his own assertion of the rights he believed he had over the subject property. The propriety of
said courses of action eludes the Court’s determination,for that matter had never been resolved on
its merits in view of the aforementioned settlement. Rebecca even states in her motion to withdraw
that the allegations she had previously made arose out of a "misapprehension of the real facts
surrounding their dispute" and even adds that respondent "had fully explained to [her] the real nature
and extent of her inheritance x x x toher entire satisfaction," leading her to state that she is "now fully
convinced that [her] complaint has no basis in fact and in law."25 Accordingly, with the admitted
misstatement of facts, the observations of the Investigating Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP,
hardly hold water so as to support the finding of "serious misconduct" which would warrant its
recommended penalty. 1âw phi1

Be that as it may, the Court, nonetheless, finds that respondent committed some form of misconduct
by, as admitted, mortgaging the subject property, notwithstanding the apparent dispute over the
same. Regardless of the merits of his own claim, respondent should have exhibited prudent restraint
becoming of a legal exemplar. He should not have exposed himself even to the slightest risk of
committing a property violation nor any action which would endanger the Bar's reputation. Verily,
members of the Bar are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed
by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.26 By no insignificant
measure, respondent blemished not only his integrity as a member of the Bar, but also that of the
legal profession. In other words, his conduct fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a
guardian of law and justice. Although to a lesser extent as compared to what has been ascribed by
the IBP, the Court still holds respondent guilty of violating Rule 1. 01, Canon 1 of the Code.
Considering that this is his first offense as well as the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court
believes that a fine of ₱15,000.00 would suffice.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is ordered to pay a FINE of ₱15,000.00
within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution. Further, he is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent's record in this Court as attorney. Further, let
copies of this Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

A.C. No. 10579, December 10, 2014

 ERLINDA FOSTER, Complainant, v. ATTY. JAIME V. AGTANG, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This refers to the Resolution1 of the Board of Governors (BOG), Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), dated March 23,
2014, affirming with modification the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, who recommended the suspension of
respondent Atty. Jaime V. Agtang (respondent) from the practice of law for one (1) year for ethical impropriety and ordered
the payment of his unpaid obligations to complainant.

From the records, it appears that the IBP, thru its Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), received a complaint2, dated May
31, 2011, filed by Erlinda Foster (complainant) against respondent for “unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful” 3 acts as a
lawyer.

In its July 1, 2011 Order,4 the IBP-CBD directed respondent to file his Answer within 15 days from receipt of the order.
Respondent failed to do so and complainant sent a query as to the status of her complaint. On October 10, 2011, the
Investigating Commissioner issued the Order5 setting the case for mandatory conference/hearing on November 16, 2011. It
was only on November 11, 2011, or five (5) days before the scheduled conference when respondent filed his verified
Answer.6

During the conference, only the complainant together with her husband appeared. She submitted a set of documents
contained in a folder, copies of which were furnished the respondent. The Investigating Commissioner 7 indicated that the
said documents would be reviewed and the parties would be informed if there was a need for clarificatory questioning;
otherwise, the case would be submitted for resolution based on the documents on file. The Minutes 8 of the mandatory
conference showed that respondent arrived at 11:10 o’clock in the morning or after the proceeding was terminated.

On December 12, 2011, the complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Answer.

On April 18, 2012, complainant submitted copies of the January 24, 2012 Decisions 9 of the Municipal Trial Court in Small
Claims Case Nos. 2011-0077 and 2011-0079, ordering respondent [defendant therein] to pay complainant and her husband
the sum of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00, respectively, with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from December 8, 2011
until fully paid, plus cost of suit.10

Complainant’s Position

From the records, it appears that complainant was referred to respondent in connection with her legal problem regarding a
deed of absolute sale she entered into with Tierra Realty, which respondent had notarized. After their discussion,
complainant agreed to engage his legal services for the filing of the appropriate case in court, for which they signed a
contract. Complainant paid respondent P20,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental expenses. 11

On September 28, 2009, respondent wrote a letter12 to Tropical Villas Subdivision in relation to the legal problem referred by
complainant. He then visited the latter in her home and asked for a loan of P100,000.00, payable in sixty (60) days, for the
repair of his car. Complainant, having trust and confidence on respondent being her lawyer, agreed to lend the amount
without interest. A promissory note13 evidenced the loan.

In November 2009, complainant became aware that Tierra Realty was attempting to transfer to its name a lot she had
previously purchased. She referred the matter to respondent who recommended the immediate filing of a case for
reformation of contract with damages. On November 8, 2009, respondent requested and thereafter received from
complainant the amount of P150,000.00, as filing fee.14 When asked about the exorbitant amount, respondent cited the high
value of the land and the sheriffs’ travel expenses and accommodations in Manila, for the service of the summons to the
defendant corporation. Later, complainant confirmed that the fees paid for the filing of Civil Case No. 14791-65,
entitled Erlinda Foster v. Tierra Realty and Development Corporation, only amounted to P22,410.00 per trial court records. 15

During a conversation with the Registrar of Deeds, complainant also discovered that respondent was the one who notarized
the document being questioned in the civil case she filed. When asked about this, respondent merely replied that he would
take a collaborating counsel to handle complainant’s case. Upon reading a copy of the complaint filed by respondent with
the trial court, complainant noticed that: 1] the major differences in the documents issued by Tierra Realty were not alleged;
2] the contract to buy and sell and the deed of conditional sale were not attached thereto; 3] the complaint discussed the
method of payment which was not the point of contention in the case; and 4] the very anomalies she complained of were not
mentioned. Respondent, however, assured her that those matters could be brought up during the hearings.

On April 23, 2010, respondent wrote to complainant, requesting that the latter extend to him the amount of P70,000.00 or
P50,000.00 “in the moment of urgency or emergency.” 16 Complainant obliged the request and gave respondent the sum of
P22,000.00.
On August 31, 2010, respondent came to complainant’s house and demanded the sum of P50,000.00, purportedly to be
given to the judge in exchange for a favorable ruling. Complainant expressed her misgivings on this proposition but she
eventually gave the amount of P25,000.00 which was covered by a receipt, 17 stating that “it is understood that the balance of
P25,000.00 shall be paid later after favorable judgment for plaintiff Erlinda Foster.” On November 2, 2010, respondent
insisted that the remaining amount be given by complainant prior to the next hearing of the case, because the judge was
allegedly asking for the balance. Yet again, complainant handed to respondent the amount of P25,000.00. 18

On September 29, 2010, complainant’s case was dismissed. Not having been notified by respondent, complainant learned
of the dismissal on December 14, 2010, when she personally checked the status of the case with the court. She went to the
office of respondent, but he was not there. Instead, one of the office staff gave her a copy of the order of dismissal.

On December 15, 2010, respondent visited complainant and gave her a copy of the motion for reconsideration. On January
15, 2011, complainant went to see respondent and requested him to prepare a reply to the comment filed by Tierra Realty
on the motion for reconsideration; to include additional facts because the Land Registration Authority would not accept the
documents unless these were amended; and to make the additional averment that the defendant was using false
documents.

On January 18, 2011, respondent’s driver delivered to complainant a copy of the reply with a message from him that the
matters she requested to be included were mentioned therein. Upon reading the same, however, complainant discovered
that these matters were not so included. On the same occasion, the driver also asked for P2,500.00 on respondent’s
directive for the reimbursement of the value of a bottle of wine given to the judge as a present. Complainant was also told
that oral arguments on the case had been set the following month. 19

On February 2, 2011, complainant decided to terminate the services of respondent as her counsel and wrote him a letter of
termination,20 after her friend gave her copies of documents showing that respondent had been acquainted with Tierra
Realty since December 2007. Subsequently, complainant wrote to respondent, requesting him to pay her the amounts he
received from her less the contract fee and the actual cost of the filing fees. Respondent never replied.

Respondent’s Position

In his Answer,21 respondent alleged that he was 72 years old and had been engaged in the practice of law since March
1972, and was President of the IBP Ilocos Norte Chapter from 1998 to 1999. He admitted the fact that he notarized the
Deed of Absolute Sale subject of complainant’s case, but he qualified that he was not paid his notarial fees therefor. He
likewise admitted acting as counsel for complainant for which he claimed to have received P10,000.00 as acceptance fee
and P5,000.00 for incidental fees. Anent the loan of P100,000.00, respondent averred that it was complainant, at the behest
of her husband, who willingly offered the amount to him for his patience in visiting them at home and for his services. The
transaction was declared as “no loan” and he was told not to worry about its payment. As regards the amount of
P150,000.00 he received for filing fees, respondent claimed that the said amount was suggested by the complainant herself
who was persistent in covering the incidental expenses in the handling of the case. He denied having said that the sheriffs of
the court would need the money for their hotel accommodations. Complainant’s husband approved of the amount. In the
same vein, respondent denied having asked for a loan of P50,000.00 and having received P22,000.00 from complainant. He
also denied having told her that the case would be discussed with the judge who would rule in their favor at the very next
hearing. Instead, it was complainant who was bothered by the possibility that the other party would befriend the judge. He
never said that he would personally present a bottle of wine to the judge.

Further, respondent belied the Registrar’s comment as to his representation of Tierra Realty in the past. Respondent saw
nothing wrong in this situation since complainant was fully aware that another counsel was assisting him in the handling of
cases. Having been fully informed of the nature of her cause of action and the consequences of the suit, complainant was
aware of the applicable law on reformation of contracts. Finally, by way of counterclaim, respondent demanded just
compensation for the services he had rendered in other cases for the complainant.

Reply of Complainant

In her Reply,22 complainant mainly countered respondent’s defenses by making reference to the receipts in her possession,
all evidencing that respondent accepted the amounts mentioned in the complaint. Complainant also emphasized that
respondent and Tierra Realty had relations long before she met him. While respondent was employed as Provincial Legal
Officer of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte, he was involved in the preparation of several documents involving
Flying V, an oil company owned by Ernest Villavicencio, who likewise owned Tierra Realty. Complainant insisted that the
amount of P100,000.00 she extended to respondent was never considered as “no loan.”

On June 26, 2012, complainant furnished the Investigating Commissioner copies of the Resolution, dated June 20, 2012,
issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Laoag City, finding probable cause against respondent for estafa. 23

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

In its July 3, 2012 Report and Recommendation, 24 the Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of ethical
impropriety and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.

In its September 28, 2013 Resolution, the IBP-BOG adopted and approved with modification the recommendation of
suspension by the Investigating Commissioner and ordered respondent to return to complainant: 1) his loan of P122,000.00;
and 2) the balance of the filing fee amounting to P127,590.00.

Respondent received a copy of the said resolution on January 16, 2014 to which he filed a motion for
reconsideration.25 Complainant filed her opposition thereto, informing the IBP-BOG that an information charging respondent
for estafa had already been filed in court and that a corresponding order for his arrest had been issued. 26

In its March 23, 2014 Resolution, the IBP-BOG denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration but modified the penalty of
his suspension from the practice of law by reducing it from one (1) year to three (3) months. Respondent was likewise
ordered to return the balance of the filing fee received from complainant amounting to P127,590.00.

No petition for review was filed with the Court.

The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The Court’s Ruling

The Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with respect to respondent’s
violation of Rules 1 and 16 of the CPR. The Court, however, modifies the conclusion on his alleged violation of Rule 15, on
representing conflicting interests. The Court also differs on the penalty.

Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.” It is well-established that a lawyer’s conduct is “not confined to the performance of his professional duties. A
lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his
conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.”27

In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional and private
capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled complainant into believing that the filing fees for her case were worth more than the
prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned reasons such as the high value of the land involved and the extra expenses
to be incurred by court employees. In other words, he resorted to overpricing, an act customarily related to depravity and
dishonesty. He demanded the amount of P150,000.00 as filing fee, when in truth, the same amounted only to P22,410.00.
His defense that it was complainant who suggested that amount deserves no iota of credence. For one, it is highly
improbable that complainant, who was then plagued with the rigors of litigation, would propose such amount that would
further burden her financial resources. Assuming that the complainant was more than willing to shell out an exorbitant
amount just to initiate her complaint with the trial court, still, respondent should not have accepted the excessive amount. As
a lawyer, he is not only expected to be knowledgeable in the matter of filing fees, but he is likewise duty-bound to disclose to
his client the actual amount due, consistent with the values of honesty and good faith expected of all members of the legal
profession.

Moreover, the “fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to
account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client.” 28Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific
purpose but not used for the purpose should be immediately returned. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds
held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional
ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. 29

It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. As pointed out, he received various amounts from complainant but he
could not account for all of them. Worse, he could not deny the authenticity of the receipts presented by complainant. Upon
demand, he failed to return the excess money from the alleged filing fees and other expenses. His possession gives rise to
the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him
by, the client.30 When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an
accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if the lawyer does not
use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to the client. 31

Somewhat showing a propensity to demand excessive and unwarranted amounts from his client, respondent displayed a
reprehensible conduct when he asked for the amount of P50,000.00 as “representation expenses” allegedly for the benefit of
the judge handling the case, in exchange for a favorable decision. Respondent himself signed a receipt showing that he
initially took the amount of P 25,000.00 and, worse, he subsequently demanded and received the other half of the amount at
the time the case had already been dismissed. Undoubtedly, this act is tantamount to gross misconduct that necessarily
warrants the supreme penalty of disbarment. The act of demanding a sum of money from his client, purportedly to be used
as a bribe to ensure a positive outcome of a case, is not only an abuse of his client’s trust but an overt act of undermining
the trust and faith of the public in the legal profession and the entire Judiciary. This is the height of indecency. As officers of
the court, lawyers owe their utmost fidelity to public service and the administration of justice. In no way should a lawyer
indulge in any act that would damage the image of judges, lest the public’s perception of the dispensation of justice be
overshadowed by iniquitous doubts. The denial of respondent and his claim that the amount was given gratuitously would
not excuse him from any liability. The absence of proof that the said amount was indeed used as a bribe is of no moment.
To tolerate respondent’s actuations would seriously erode the public’s trust in the courts.

As it turned out, complainant’s case was dismissed as early as September 29, 2010. At this juncture, respondent proved
himself to be negligent in his duty as he failed to inform his client of the status of the case, and left the client to personally
inquire with the court. Surely, respondent was not only guilty of misconduct but was also remiss in his duty to his client.

Respondent’s unbecoming conduct towards complainant did not stop here. Records reveal that he likewise violated Rule
16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, which states that “[a] lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests
are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except,
when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.” In his
private capacity, he requested from his client, not just one, but two loans of considerable amounts. The first time, he visited
his client in her home and borrowed P100,000.00 for the repair of his car; and the next time, he implored her to extend to
him a loan of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of urgency or emergency” but was only given P22,000.00 by
complainant. These transactions were evidenced by promissory notes and receipts, the authenticity of which was never
questioned by respondent. These acts were committed by respondent in his private capacity, seemingly unrelated to his
relationship with complainant, but were indubitably acquiesced to by complainant because of the trust and confidence
reposed in him as a lawyer. Nowhere in the records, particularly in the defenses raised by respondent, was it implied that
these loans fell within the exceptions provided by the rules. The loans of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00 were surely not
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Respondent’s assertion that the amounts were given to him
out of the liberality of complainant and were, thus, considered as “no loan,” does not justify his inappropriate behavior. The
acts of requesting and receiving money as loans from his client and thereafter failing to pay the same are indicative of his
lack of integrity and sense of fair dealing. Up to the present, respondent has not yet paid his obligations to complainant.

Time and again, the Court has consistently held that deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross misconduct, for
which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration
of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high
standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is
ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and their clients, which
include prompt payment of financial obligations. 32

Verily, when the Code or the Rules speaks of “conduct” or “misconduct,” the reference is not confined to one’s behavior
exhibited in connection with the performance of the lawyer’s professional duties, but also covers any misconduct which,
albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privileges which his license and the law vest him with. Unfortunately, respondent must be found guilty of misconduct on both
scores.

With respect to respondent’s alleged representation of conflicting interests, the Court finds it proper to modify the findings of
the Investigating Commissioner who concluded that complainant presented insufficient evidence of respondent’s “lawyering”
for the opposing party, Tierra Realty.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.” The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally
be imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a
full disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information
between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation
from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and
loyalty in all dealings and transactions with the client. Part of the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to avoid representing
conflicting interests.”33 Thus, even if lucrative fees offered by prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must decline
professional employment if the same would trigger the violation of the prohibition against conflict of interest. The only
exception provided in the rules is a written consent from all the parties after full disclosure.

The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP. There is substantial evidence to hold respondent liable for representing
conflicting interests in handling the case of complainant against Tierra Realty, a corporation to which he had rendered
services in the past. The Court cannot ignore the fact that respondent admitted to having notarized the deed of sale, which
was the very document being questioned in complainant’s case. While the Investigating Commissioner found that the
complaint in Civil Case No. 14791-65 did not question the validity of the said contract, and that only the intentions of the
parties as to some provisions thereof were challenged, the Court still finds that the purpose for which the proscription was
made exists. The Court cannot brush aside the dissatisfied observations of the complainant as to the allegations lacking in
the complaint against Tierra Realty and the clear admission of respondent that he was the one who notarized the assailed
document. Regardless of whether it was the validity of the entire document or the intention of the parties as to some of its
provisions raised, respondent fell short of prudence in action when he accepted complainant’s case, knowing fully that he
was involved in the execution of the very transaction under question. Neither his unpaid notarial fees nor the participation of
a collaborating counsel would excuse him from such indiscretion. It is apparent that respondent was retained by clients who
had close dealings with each other. More significantly, there is no record of any written consent from any of the parties
involved.

The representation of conflicting interests is prohibited “not only because the relation of attorney and client is one of trust
and confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the principles of public policy and good taste. An attorney has the
duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client and represent him with undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is abused
or violated the entire profession suffers.”34

Penalties and Pecuniary Liabilities

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney, for violation of the
lawyer’s oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the CPR.35 For the practice of law is “a
profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good
moral character.”36 The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based
on the surrounding facts.37

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on any of
the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of
a superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer may be disbarred or
suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

Here, respondent demonstrated not just a negligent disregard of his duties as a lawyer but a wanton betrayal of the trust of
his client and, in general, the public. Accordingly, the Court finds that the suspension for three (3) months recommended by
the IBP-BOG is not sufficient punishment for the unacceptable acts and omissions of respondent. The acts of the
respondent constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney. His incompetence and appalling
indifference to his duty to his client, the courts and society render him unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in him
as a member of the Bar.

For taking advantage of the unfortunate situation of the complainant, for engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, for
maligning the judge and the Judiciary, for undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal profession and the entire
judiciary, and for representing conflicting interests, respondent deserves no less than the penalty of disbarment. 38

Notably, the Court cannot order respondent to return the money he borrowed from complainant in his private capacity.
In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,39 the Court held that it cannot order the lawyer to return money to complainant if he or she acted
in a private capacity because its findings in administrative cases have no bearing on liabilities which have no intrinsic link to
the lawyer’s professional engagement. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of
the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. The only concern of the Court is the determination of
respondent’s administrative liability. Its findings have no material bearing on other judicial actions which the parties may
choose against each other.

To rule otherwise would in effect deprive respondent of his right to appeal since administrative cases are filed directly with
the Court. Furthermore, the quantum of evidence required in civil cases is different from the quantum of evidence required in
administrative cases. In civil cases, preponderance of evidence is required. Preponderance of evidence is “a phrase which,
in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto.”40 In administrative cases, only substantial evidence is needed. Substantial
evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one administratively liable. 41Furthermore, the Court has to consider the
prescriptive period applicable to civil cases in contrast to administrative cases which are, as a rule, imprescriptible. 42

Thus, the IBP-BOG was correct in ordering respondent to return the amount of P127,590.00 representing the balance of the
filing fees he received from complainant, as this was intimately related to the lawyer-client relationship between them.
Similar to this is the amount of P50,000.00 which respondent received from complainant, as representation expenses for the
handling of the civil case and for the purported purchase of a bottle of wine for the judge. These were connected to his
professional relationship with the complainant. While respondent’s deplorable act of requesting the said amount for the
benefit of the judge is stained with mendacity, respondent should be ordered to return the same as it was borne out of their
professional relationship. As to his other obligations, respondent was already adjudged as liable for the personal loans he
contracted with complainant, per the small claims cases filed against him.

All told, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, “the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession.” 43 The Court
likewise aims to ensure the proper and honest administration of justice by “purging the profession of members who, by their
misconduct, have proven themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of an attorney.” 44
WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty. Jaime V. Agtang, GUILTY of gross misconduct in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Court hereby DISBARS him from the practice of law and ORDERS him to pay the
complainant, Erlinda Foster, the amounts of P127,590.00, P50,000.00 and P2,500.00.

Let a copy of this Decision be sent to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of
the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 10240 November 25, 2014

[Formerly CBD No. 11-3241]

ESTRELLA R. SANCHEZ, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. NICOLAS C. TORRES, M.D., Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Complaint1 dated November 24, 2011 for disciplinary action against respondent Atty.
Nicolas C. Torres (Atty. Torres) filed by Estrella R. Sanchez (Sanchez) with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBD Case No. 11-3241, now
A.C. No. 10240, for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22) and non-payment of debt.

In her complaint, Sanchez claimed that she is a friend and close acquaintance of Atty. Torres. That
in 2007, Atty. Torres asked Sanchez to lend him money in the amount of Two Million Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱2,200,000.00), and convinced her that he will pay the said amount within a
period of one (1) month, plus interest. On November 8, 2007, persuaded by Atty. Torres' promise
that he will pay immediately, Sanchez was convinced and handed him the cash amounting to Two
Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱2,200,000.00), which Sanchez withdrew from the bank in
Atty. Torres' presence. To bolster Sanchez's trust and confidence, Atty. Torres issued two (2) Allied
Bank checks with check nos. 0109386 and 0109387, under Account No. 001941-01285-8, both
dated November 8, 2007, amounting to ₱1,200,000.00 and ₱1,000,000.00, respectively, or in the
total amount of ₱2,200,000.002

However, after one (1) month,Atty. Torres failed to pay his obligation as promised. When Sanchez
called Atty. Torres over the phone, she was told that she could again deposit the check and assured
her that the checks will be honored upon presentment for payment.

On May 2, 2008, Sanchez deposited the said checks to her account, but the same were returned
due to "ACCOUNT CLOSED."

Despite repeated demands for the last three (3) years, Atty. Torres had yet to pay his obligation
since then, and thus, complainant sought legal assistance. As a consequence, formal demand
letters were sent by the complainant's lawyer which respondent received on August 14, 20083 and
November 17, 2008,4 respectively, and the same proved futile as Atty. Torres failed and refused to
pay his obligation. Nonetheless, Atty. Torres, in his letter dated May 9, 2009,5 promised to pay anew
the amount of ₱2,200,000.00 in cash on or before May 15, 2009 as replacement for the two checks
he previously issued. But no payment whatsoever was made. Hence, the instant complaint filed on
November 28, 2011.

On November 28, 2011, the IBP–Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required Atty. Torres to file
an answer.6

On December 29, 2011, Atty. Torres moved for extension of time to file an answer. He alleged that
his bookkeeper was on a holiday leave and that the receipts of payments and audit report were in
the custody of the bookkeeper which will be available only in the 1st week of January
2012.7 However, in an Order8 dated March 2, 2012, the IBP-CBD noted that Atty. Torres had yet to
file his Answer to the complaint even after the expiration of the extension period earlier granted;
thus, a final extension was given anew and the case was set for mandatory conference. Despite
sufficient time for respondent Atty. Torres tofile his answer, he failed to do so. Worse, he even failed
to appear in the scheduled mandatory conference despite due notice.

Thus, in its Report and Recommendation9 dated June 15, 2012, the IBP-CBD found Atty. Torres
guilty of willful dishonesty and unethical conduct for failure to pay just debt and for issuing checks
without sufficient funds. It recommended that Atty. Torres be sanctioned with suspension from the
practice of law for at least two (2) years.

On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Atty. Torres was ordered suspended from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years, and further ordered to return the amount of ₱2,200,000.00 to Sanchez, with
legal interest.10

On August 5, 2013, respondent, through counsel, filed a Manifestation with Motion for Extension of
Time to File Motion for Reconsideration.11 He claimed that he had proof of receipts to show that he
had already paid his obligation to Sanchez.12

However, despite the lapse of considerable time after the receipt of notice to comply with the said
Resolution, no motion for reconsideration was filed. Hence, in a Resolution dated January 21, 2014,
the Court resolved to note the Report dated December 13, 2013, stating that records of the OBC
showed that no motion for reconsideration or petition for review was filed by either party as of
November 22, 2013.

RULING

We sustain the findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD and the IBP-Board of Governors.

In the instant case, the existence of the loan obligation is undisputed. Sanchez was able to
discharge her burden of proving that she loaned ₱2,200,000.00 to Atty. Torres as evidenced by the
subject bank checks. Furthermore, backed by Atty. Torres' admission in his letter dated May 9, 2009,
his promise to pay the amount of ₱2,200,000.00 in cash, as replacement for the two checks he
previously issued, is more than sufficient to establish a valid obligation of Atty. Torres to Sanchez.
Atty. Torres’ admission of the loan he contracted and his failure to pay the same leave no room for
interpretation. Likewise, other than his belated and empty claims of payment, Atty. Torres failed to
discharge his burden of proving that he had indeed paid his obligation to Sanchez.
In Barrientos v. Atty. Libiran-Meteoro,13 we held that:

x x x [the] deliberate failure to pay justdebts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross
misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law.
Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They
are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured.
They must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their
clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in a
manner that reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 explicitly states: Canon 1— A lawyer shall upholdthe constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01—A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

We also note Atty. Torres' conduct in the course of the proceedings where he repeatedly asked for
extensions of time to file an answer and a motion for reconsideration, which he failed to submit, and
his failure to attend the disciplinary hearings set by the IBP do not speak well of his standing as a
lawyer. In Ngayan v. Tugade,14 we ruled that "[a lawyer’s] failure to answer the complaint against him
and his failure to appear at the investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful orders of
the court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138, Rules
of Court."

We come to the penalty imposable in this case.

In Lao v. Medel,15 we held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless
checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one-year
suspension from the practice of law. The same sanction was imposedon the respondent-lawyer in
Rangwani v. Atty. Dino,16 having been found guilty of gross misconduct for issuing bad checks in
payment of a piece of property, the title of which was only entrusted to him by the complainant.

Following the penalty imposed in a similar situation in A-1 Financial Services v. Valerio,17 we deem it
proper to adopt the penalty of two (2) years suspension in light of the amount involved and the
brazen disregard by Atty. Torres of the Orders of the IBP-CBDon the filing of an answer and
appearance in the hearing. We cannot sustain, however, the IBP’s recommendation ordering
respondent to return the amount of ₱2,200,000.00 to complainant. In disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue
as a member of the Bar. Our only concern isthe determination of respondent’s administrative liability.
Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial actions which the parties may choose to file
against each other.18

However, we note that in CF Sharp Crew management, Inc. v. Nicolas C. Torres,19 the Court had
already disbarred Torres from the practice of law for having been found guilty of violating Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 and Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In view of the foregoing, we can no longer impose the penalty of suspension or disbarment against
Atty. Torres, considering that he has already been previously disbarred. We do not have double or
multiple disbarments in our laws or jurisprudence.20 Nevertheless, considering that the issues and the
infraction committed are different from his previous infraction, we deem it proper to resolve the
instant case and give its corresponding penalty for purposes of recording it in respondent's personal
file in the Bar Confidant's Office.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XX-2013-202 dated March 20, 2013 of the IBP, which found
respondent Atty. Nicolas C. Torres guilty of gross misconduct and of violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, is AFFIRMED and respondent Atty. Nicolas C. Torres is hereby
SUSPENDED for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law. However, considering that
respondent has already been previously disbarred, this penalty can no longer be imposed.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the
personal r.ecord of Atty. Torres as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and
the Office of the Court Administrator, for circulation to all courts in the country, for their information
and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

March 10, 2015

A.C. No. 5816

DR. ELMAR 0. PEREZ, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG and ATTY. KAREN E. BAYDO, Respondents.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by Dr. Elmar 0. Perez (Dr.
Perez) with the Office of the Bar Confidant on August 27, 2002 against Atty. Tristan A. Catindig
(Atty. Catindig) and Atty. Karen E. Baydo (Atty. Baydo) (respondents) for gross immorality and
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Facts

In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been friends since the mid-
1960’s when they were both students at the University of the Philippines, but they lost touch after
their graduation. Sometime in 1983, the paths of Atty. Catindig and Dr. Perez again crossed. It was
at that time that Atty. Catindig started to court Dr. Perez.2

Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez (Gomez),
having married the latter on May 18, 1968 at the Central Methodist Church in Ermita, Manila, which
was followed by a Catholic wedding at the Shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City.3 Atty.
Catindig however claimed that he only married Gomez because he got her pregnant; that he was
afraid that Gomez would make a scandal out of her pregnancy should he refuse to marry her, which
could have jeopardized his scholarship in the Harvard Law School.4

Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to
dissolve his marriage to Gomez, and that he would eventually marry her once the divorce had been
decreed. Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree
from the Dominican Republic. Dr. Perez claimed that Atty. Catindig assured her that the said divorce
decree was lawful and valid and that there was no longer any impediment to their marriage.5

Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States
of America (USA). Their union was blessed with a child whom they named Tristan Jegar Josef
Frederic.6

Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since the divorce
decree that was obtained from the Dominican Republic by the latter and Gomez is not recognized by
Philippine laws. When she confronted Atty. Catindig about it, the latter allegedly assured Dr. Perez
that he would legalize their union once he obtains a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gomez
under the laws of the Philippines. He also promised to legally adopt their son.7

Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to legalize their union by filing a
petition to nullify his marriage to Gomez. Atty. Catindig told her that he would still have to get the
consent of Gomez to the said petition.8

Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter9 in the mail informing
her of Atty. Catindig’s scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a
love letter10 written and signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said
letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once his "impediment
is removed." Apparently, five months into their relationship, Atty. Baydo requested Atty. Catindig to
put a halt to their affair until such time that he is able to obtain the annulment of his marriage. On
August 13, 2001, Atty. Catindig filed a petition to declare the nullity of his marriage to Gomez.11

On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved to an upscale
condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was frequently seen.12

In a Resolution13 dated October 9, 2002, the Court directed the respondents to file their respective
comments, which they separately did on November 25, 2002.14

Atty. Catindig, in his Comment,15 admitted that he married Gomez on May 18, 1968. He claimed,
however, that immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed signs that she was incapable of
complying with her marital obligations, as she had serious intimacy problems; and that while their
union was blessed with four children, their relationship simply deteriorated.

Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation in 1984. They then
consulted Atty. Wilhelmina Joven (Atty. Joven), a mutual friend, on how the agreement to separate
and live apart could be implemented. Atty. Joven suggested that the couple adopt a property regime
of complete separation of property. She likewise advised the couple to obtain a divorce decree from
the Dominican Republic for whatever value it may have and comfort it may provide them.16

Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez each executed a Special Power of Attorney
addressed to a Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an
attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action under its laws. Atty. Catindig likewise admitted that a
divorce by mutual consent was ratified by the Dominican Republic court on June 12, 1984. Further,
Atty. Catindig and Gomez filed a Joint Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133, which was granted on June 23, 1984.17

Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact that the divorce
decreed by the Dominican Republic court does not have any effect in the Philippines.
Notwithstanding that she knew that the marriage of Atty. Catindig and Gomez still subsisted, Dr.
Perez demanded that Atty. Catindig marry her. Thus, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in July 1984 in
the USA.18

Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage was not valid since his previous
marriage to Gomez was still subsisting, and that he only married Dr. Perez because he loved her
and that he was afraid of losing her if he did not. He merely desired to lend a modicum of legitimacy
to their relationship.19

Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour. Eventually, he left their home
in October 2001 to prevent any acrimony from developing.20

He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez, claiming that his relationship with
Dr. Perez started to fall apart as early as 1997. He asserted that Atty. Baydo joined his law firm only
in September 1999; and that while he was attracted to her, Atty. Baydo did not reciprocate and in
fact rejected him. He likewise pointed out that Atty. Baydo resigned from his firm in January 2001.21

For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig. She claimed that Atty.
Catindig began courting her while she was employed in his firm. She however rejected Atty.
Catindig’s romantic overtures; she told him that she could not reciprocate his feelings since he was
married and that he was too old for her. She said that despite being turned down, Atty. Catindig still
pursued her, which was the reason why she resigned from his law firm.22

On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from notice.23

On June 2, 2003, the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) issued an Order24 setting the
mandatory conference of the administrative case on July 4, 2003, which was later reset to August
29, 2003. During the conference, the parties manifested that they were already submitting the case
for resolution based on the pleadings already submitted. Thereupon, the IBP-CBD directed the
parties to submit their respective position papers within 10 days from notice. Respondents Atty.
Catindig and Atty. Baydo filed their position papers on October 17, 200325 and October 20,
2003,26 respectively. Dr. Perez filed her position paper27 on October 24, 2003.

Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

On May 6, 2011, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD issued a
Report and Recommendation,28 which recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig for gross
immorality, violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that Atty. Catindig’s act of marrying Dr. Perez despite
knowing fully well that his previous marriage to Gomez still subsisted was a grossly immoral and
illegal conduct, which warrants the ultimate penalty of disbarment. The Investigating Commissioner
further opined that:

In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Catindig
established a pattern of grossly immoral conduct that warrants fustigation and his disbarment. His
conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.

There is no dichotomy of morality. A lawyer and a professor of law, both in his official and personal
conduct, must display exemplary behavior. Respondent’s bigamous marriage and his proclivity for
extramarital adventurism have definitely caused damage to the legal and teaching professions. How
can he hold his head up high and expect his students, his peers and the community to look up to him
as a model worthy of emulation when he failed to follow the tenets of morality? In contracting a
second marriage notwithstanding knowing fully well that he has a prior valid subsisting marriage,
Atty. Catindig has made a mockery of an otherwise inviolable institution, a serious outrage to the
generally accepted moral standards of the community.29

On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charge against Atty.
Baydo be dismissed for dearth of evidence; Dr. Perez failed to present clear and preponderant
evidence in support of the alleged affair between the respondents.

Findings of the IBP Board of Governors

On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution,30 which adopted and
approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Atty. Catindig sought a reconsideration31 of the December 10, 2011 Resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors, claiming that the Investigating Commissioner erred in relying solely on Dr. Perez’s
uncorroborated allegations. He pointed out that, under Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,
a complaint for disbarment must be supported by affidavits of persons having knowledge of the facts
therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts. He said that despite the
absence of any corroborating testimony, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to Dr.
Perez’ testimony.

He also claimed that he had absolutely no intention of committing any felony; that he never
concealed the status of his marriage from anyone. In fact, Atty. Catindig asserted that he had always
been transparent with both Gomez and Dr. Perez.

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution32 dated December 29, 2012, denied Atty. Catindig’s
motion for reconsideration.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether the respondents committed gross immorality, which would warrant
their disbarment.

Ruling of the Court

After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the circumstances of this
case, the Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner
and the IBP Board of Governors.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.
In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit,33 the Court held:

[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is
concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Good moral character is not only a condition
precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain
one’s good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral character is more than just
the absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if
it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so because "vast
interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals
with his client’s property, reputation, his life, his all."34 (Citation omitted)

In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or
suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral conduct. Thus:

Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the
bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis ours)

"A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor."35 Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and
respectable members of the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of
decency. The Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from
conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.36

Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly immoral
conduct.

The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty. Catindig’s
own admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt
and unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.

Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice – a wedding in the Central Methodist Church in
1968, which was then followed by a Catholic wedding. In 1983, Atty. Catindig started pursuing Dr.
Perez when their paths crossed again. Curiously, 15 years into his first marriage and four children
after, Atty. Catindig claimed that his first marriage was then already falling apart due to Gomez’
serious intimacy problems.

A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de facto separation from Gomez, dissolved
their conjugal partnership of gains, obtained a divorce decree from a court in the Dominican
Republic, and married Dr. Perez in the USA all in the same year. Atty. Catindig was so enchanted
with Dr. Perez at that time that he moved heaven and earth just so he could marry her right away – a
marriage that has at least a semblance of legality.
From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he obtained from the court in
the Dominican Republic was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both Filipino
citizens at that time. He knew that he was still validly married to Gomez; that he cannot marry anew
unless his previous marriage be properly declared a nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent marriage
would be void. This notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. The foregoing circumstances
seriously taint Atty. Catindig’s sense of social propriety and moral values. It is a blatant and
purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage.

It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the USA.
Considering that Atty. Catindig knew that his previous marriage remained valid, the logical
conclusion is that he wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the USA for the added security of avoiding any
charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction.

Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s claim is true, it matters not that Dr. Perez knew
that their marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted to various legal strategies in
order to render a façade of validity to his otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the
very least, so unprincipled that it is reprehensible to the highest degree. 1âwphi1

Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the various legal actions he resorted
to in order to give their union a semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig left her and their son. It was only
at that time that he finally decided to properly seek the nullity of his first marriage to Gomez.
Apparently, he was then already entranced with the much younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer
employed by his firm.

While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty. Baydo, in itself,
cannot be considered a grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms part of the pattern showing his
propensity towards immoral conduct. Lest it be misunderstood, the Court’s finding of gross immoral
conduct is hinged not on Atty. Catindig’s desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his contracting of a
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous marriage to Gomez.

"The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes
conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for
instance, which makes ‘a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage.’"37 In various cases,
the Court has held that disbarment is warranted when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and
maintains an illicit relationship with another woman who has borne him a child.38

Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one definitely manifests
a deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution
and affirmed by our laws. By his own admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution
of marriage, taking advantage of his legal skills in the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that
degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar, which thus warrant the penalty of
disbarment.

The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution,
and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer
as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary
suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed. Nevertheless,
in this case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar, as it
appears to be the most appropriate penalty.

Atty. Catindig’s claim that Dr. Perez’s allegations against him are not credible since they are
uncorroborated and not supported by affidavits contrary to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court, deserves scant consideration. Verily, Atty. Catindig himself admitted in his pleadings that he
indeed married Dr. Perez in 1984 while his previous marriage with Gomez still subsisted.
Indubitably, such admission provides ample basis for the Court to render disciplinary sanction
against him.

There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between the respondents.

The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating Commissioner that there is a dearth of evidence to
prove the claimed amorous relationship between the respondents. As it is, the evidence that was
presented by Dr. Perez to prove her claim was mere allegation, an anonymous letter informing her
that the respondents were indeed having an affair and the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that
was signed by Atty. Catindig.

The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the
lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to
prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required m suspens10n or disbarment
proceedings is preponderance of evidence.39

The presentation of the anonymous letter that was received by Dr. Perez only proves that the latter
indeed received a letter informing her of the alleged relations between the respondents; it does not
prove the veracity of the allegations therein. Similarly,. the supposed love letter, if at all, only
provesAtty.that Catindig wrote Atty. Baydo a letter professing his love for her. It does not prove that
Atty. Baydo is indeed in a relationship with Atty. Catindig.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court resolves to ADOPT the
recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty.
Tristan A. Catindig is found GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating the Lawyer's Oath and Rule
1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby DISBARRED
from the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Tristan A. Catindig in the Office of the
Bar Confidant and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, copies of
this Decision shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by the Court
Administrator to all appellate and trial courts.

The charge of gross immorality against Atty. Karen E. Baydo 1s hereby DISMISSED for lack of
evidence.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

A.C. No. 4697 November 25, 2014

FLORENCIO A. SALADAGA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ARTURO B. ASTORGA, Respondent.

x-----------------------x
A.C. No. 4728

FLORENCIO A. SALADAGA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ARTURO B. ASTORGA, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Membership in the legal profession is a high personal privilege burdened with conditions,1 including
continuing fidelity to the law and constant possession of moral fitness. Lawyers, as guardians of the
law, play a vital role in the preservation of society, and a consequent obligation of lawyers is to
maintain the highest standards of ethical conduct.2 Failure to live by the standards of the legal
profession and to discharge the burden of the privilege conferred on one as a member of the bar
warrant the suspension or revocation of that privilege.

The Factual Antecedents

Complainant Florencio A. Saladaga and respondent Atty. Arturo B. Astorga entered into a "Deed of
Sale with Right to Repurchase" on December 2, 1981 where respondent sold (with rightof
repurchase) to complainant a parcel of coconut land located at Barangay Bunga, Baybay, Leyte
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-662 for ₱15,000.00. Under the said deed,
respondent represented that he has "the perfect right to dispose as owner in fee simple" the subject
property and that the said property is "free from all liens and encumbrances."3 The deed also
provided that respondent, as vendor a retro, had two years within which to repurchase the property,
and if not repurchased within the said period, "the parties shall renew [the] instrument/agreement."4

Respondent failed to exercise his right of repurchase within the period provided in the deed, and no
renewal of the contract was made even after complainant sent respondent a final demand dated
May 10, 1984 for the latter to repurchase the property. Complainant remained in peaceful
possession of the property until December 1989 when he received letters from the Rural Bank of
Albuera (Leyte), Inc. (RBAI) informing him that the property was mortgaged by respondent to RBAI,
that the bank had subsequently foreclosed on the property, and that complainant should therefore
vacate the property.5

Complainant was alarmed and made aninvestigation. He learned the following:

(1) TCT No. T-662 was already cancelled by TCT No. T-3211 in the name of Philippine
National Bank (PNB) as early as November 17, 1972 after foreclosure proceedings;

(2) TCT No. T-3211 was cancelled by TCT No. T-7235 in the names of respondent and his
wife on January 4, 1982 pursuant to a deed of sale dated March 27,1979 between PNB and
respondent;

(3) Respondent mortgaged the subject property to RBAI on March 14, 1984, RBAI foreclosed
on the property, and subsequently obtained TCT No. TP-10635 on March 27,
1991.6 Complainant was subsequently dispossessed of the property by RBAI.7

Aggrieved, complainant instituted a criminal complaint for estafa against respondent with the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte, docketed as I.S. No. 95-144. The Provincial Prosecutor of
Leyte approved the Resolution8dated April 21, 1995 in I.S. No. 95-144 finding that "[t]he facts of [the]
case are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that Estafa x x x has been committed and that
respondent herein is probably guilty thereof."9 Accordingly, an Information10 dated January 8,1996
was filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Baybay, Leyte, formally charging respondent with
the crime of estafa under Article 316, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Revised Penal Code,11committed as
follows:

On March 14, 1984, accused representing himself as the owner of a parcel of land known as Lot No.
7661 of the Baybay Cadastre, mortgaged the same to the Rural Bank of Albuera, Albuera, Leyte,
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, knowing fully well that the possessor and owner at that
time was private complainant Florencio Saladaga by virtue of a Pacto de Retro Sale which accused
executed in favor of private complainant on 2nd December, 1981, without first
redeeming/repurchasing the same. [P]rivate complainant knowing of accused[’s] unlawful act only on
or about the last week of February, 1991 when the rural bank dispossessed him of the property, the
mortgage having been foreclosed, private complainant thereby suffered damages and was
prejudiced by accused[’s] unlawful transaction and misrepresentation.

The aforementioned estafa case against respondent was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3112-A.

Complainant likewise instituted the instant administrative cases against respondent by filing before
this Court an Affidavit-Complaint12 dated January 28, 1997 and Supplemental Complaint13 dated
February 27, 1997, which were docketed as A.C. No. 4697 and A.C. No. 4728, respectively. In both
complaints, complainant sought the disbarment of respondent.

The administrative cases were referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.14

In his Consolidated Answer15 dated August 16, 2003 filed before the IBP, respondent denied that his
agreement with complainant was a pacto de retrosale. He claimed that it was an equitable mortgage
and that, if only complainant rendered an accounting of his benefits from the produce of the land, the
total amount would have exceeded ₱15,000.00.

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and Resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors

In a Report and Recommendation16 dated April 29, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner of the
IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline found that respondent was in bad faith when he dealt with
complainant and executed the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" but later on claimed that the
agreement was one of equitable mortgage. Respondent was also guilty of deceit or fraud when he
represented in the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" dated December 2, 1981 that the
property was covered by TCT No. T-662, even giving complainant the owner’s copy of the said
certificate of title, when the said TCT had already been cancelled on November 17, 1972 by TCT No.
T-3211 in the name of Philippine National Bank (PNB). Respondent made matters even worse,
when he had TCT No. T-3211 cancelled with the issuance of TCT No. T-7235 under his and his
wife’s name on January 4,1982 without informing complainant. This was compounded by
respondent’s subsequent mortgage of the property to RBAI, which led to the acquisition of the
property by RBAI and the dispossession thereof of complainant. Thus, the Investigating
Commissioner recommended that respondent be (1) suspended from the practice of law for one
year, with warning that a similar misdeed in the future shall be dealt with more severity, and (2)
ordered to return the sum of ₱15,000.00, the amount he received as consideration for the pacto de
retrosale, with interest at the legal rate.
Considering respondent’s "commission of unlawful acts, especially crimes involving moral turpitude,
actsof dishonesty, grossly immoral conduct and deceit," the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation with modification as
follows: respondent is(1) suspended from the practice of law for two years, with warning that a
similar misdeed in the future shall be dealt with more severity, and (2) ordered to return the sum of
₱15,000.00 received in consideration of the pacto de retrosale, with legal interest.17

The Court’s Ruling

The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to suspend respondent
from the practice of law for two years, but it refrains from ordering respondent to return the
₱15,000.00 consideration, plus interest.

Respondent does not deny executing the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" dated December
2, 1981 in favor of complainant. However, respondent insists that the deed is not one of sale with
pacto de retro, but one of equitable mortgage. Thus, respondent argues that he still had the legal
right to mortgage the subject property to other persons. Respondent additionally asserts that
complainant should render an accounting of the produce the latter had collected from the said
property, which would already exceed the ₱15,000.00 consideration stated in the deed.

There is no merit in respondent’s defense.

Regardless of whether the written contract between respondent and complainant is actually one of
sale with pacto de retroor of equitable mortgage, respondent’s actuations in his transaction with
complainant, as well as in the present administrative cases, clearly show a disregard for the highest
standards of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required from lawyers, for
which respondent should be held administratively liable.

When respondent was admitted to the legal profession, he took an oath where he undertook to
"obey the laws," "do no falsehood," and "conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to the best of [his]
knowledge and discretion."18 He gravely violated his oath.

The Investigating Commissioner correctly found, and the IBP Board of Governors rightly agreed, that
respondent caused the ambiguity or vagueness in the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" as
he was the one who prepared or drafted the said instrument. Respondent could have simply
denominated the instrument as a deed of mortgage and referred to himself and complainant as
"mortgagor" and "mortgagee," respectively, rather than as "vendor a retro" and "vendee a retro." If
only respondent had been more circumspect and careful in the drafting and preparation of the deed,
then the controversy between him and complainant could havebeen avoided or, at the very least,
easily resolved. His imprecise and misleading wording of the said deed on its face betrayed lack
oflegal competence on his part. He thereby fell short of his oath to "conduct [him]self as a lawyer
according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion."

More significantly, respondent transgressed the laws and the fundamental tenet of human relations
asembodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Respondent, as owner of the property, had the right to mortgage it to complainant but, as a lawyer,
he should have seen to it that his agreement with complainant is embodied in an instrument that
clearly expresses the intent of the contracting parties. A lawyer who drafts a contract must see to it
that the agreement faithfully and clearly reflects the intention of the contracting parties. Otherwise,
the respective rights and obligations of the contracting parties will be uncertain, which opens the
door to legal disputes between the said parties. Indeed, the uncertainty caused by respondent’s poor
formulation of the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" was a significant factor in the legal
controversy between respondent and complainant. Such poor formulation reflects at the very least
negatively on the legal competence of respondent.

Under Section 63 of the Land Registration Act,19 the law in effect at the time the PNB acquired the
subject property and obtained TCT No. T-3211 in its name in 1972, where a decree in favor of a
purchaser who acquires mortgaged property in foreclosure proceedings becomes final, such
purchaser becomes entitled to the issuance of a new certificate of title in his name and a
memorandum thereof shall be "indorsed upon the mortgagor’s original certificate."20 TCT No. T-662,
which respondent gave complainant when they entered into the "Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase" dated December 2, 1981, does not bearsuch memorandum but only a memorandum
on the mortgage of the property to PNB in 1963 and the subsequent amendment of the mortgage.

Respondent dealt with complainant with bad faith, falsehood, and deceit when he entered into the
"Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" dated December 2, 1981 with the latter. He made it appear
that the property was covered by TCT No. T-662 under his name, even giving complainant the
owner’s copy of the said certificate oftitle, when the truth is that the said TCT had already been
cancelled some nine years earlier by TCT No. T-3211 in the name of PNB. He did not evencare to
correct the wrong statement in the deed when he was subsequently issued a new copy of TCT No.
T-7235 on January 4, 1982,21 or barely a month after the execution of the said deed. All told,
respondent clearly committed an act of gross dishonesty and deceit against complainant.

Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Codeof Professional Responsibility provide:

CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Under
Canon 1, a lawyer is not only mandated to personally obey the laws and the legal processes, he is
moreover expected to inspire respect and obedience thereto. On the other hand, Rule 1.01 states
the norm of conduct that is expected of all lawyers.22

Any act or omission that is contrary to, prohibited or unauthorized by, in defiance of, disobedient to,
or disregards the law is "unlawful." "Unlawful" conduct does not necessarily imply the element of
criminality although the concept is broad enough to include such element.23

To be "dishonest" means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; be untrustworthy;
lacking inintegrity, honesty, probity, integrity in principle, fairness and straightforwardness. On the
other hand, conduct that is "deceitful" means as follows:

[Having] the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used
upon another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and damage of the party imposed
upon. In order to be deceitful, the person must either have knowledge of the falsity or acted in
reckless and conscious ignorance thereof, especially if the parties are not on equal terms, and was
done with the intent that the aggrieved party act thereon, and the latter indeed acted in reliance of
the false statement or deed in the manner contemplated to his injury.24 The actions of respondent in
connection with the execution of the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" clearly fall within the
concept of unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct. They violate Article 19 of the Civil Code. They
show a disregard for Section 63 of the Land Registration Act. They also reflect bad faith, dishonesty,
and deceit on respondent’s part. Thus, respondent deserves to be sanctioned.

Respondent’s breach of his oath, violation of the laws, lack of good faith, and dishonesty are
compounded by his gross disregard of this Court’s directives, as well as the orders of the IBP’s
Investigating Commissioner (who was acting as an agent of this Court pursuant to the Court’s
referral of these cases to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation), which caused delay
in the resolution of these administrative cases.

In particular, the Court required respondent to comment on complainant’s Affidavit-Complaint in A.C.

No. 4697 and Supplemental Complaint in A.C. No. 4728 on March 12, 1997 and June 25, 1997,
respectively.25 While he requested for several extensions of time within which to submit his comment,
no such comment was submitted prompting the Court to require him in a Resolution dated February
4,1998 to (1) show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such
failure, and (2) submit the consolidated comment.26 Respondent neither showed cause why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure, nor submitted the
consolidated comment.

When these cases were referred to the IBP and during the proceedings before the IBP’s
Investigating Commissioner, respondent was again required several times to submit his consolidated
answer. He only complied on August 28, 2003, or more than six years after this Court originally
required him to do so. The Investigating Commissioner also directed the parties to submit their
respective position papers. Despite having been given several opportunities to submit the same,
respondent did not file any position paper.27

Respondent’s disregard of the directives of this Court and of the Investigating Commissioner, which
caused undue delay in these administrative cases, contravenes the following provisions of the Code
of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 11 – A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

xxxx

CANON 12 – A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.

xxxx

Rule 12.03 – A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or
briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do
so.

Rule 12.04 – A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse
court processes.

Respondent’s infractions are aggravated by the fact that he has already been imposed a disciplinary
sanction before. In Nuñez v. Atty. Astorga,28 respondent was held liable for conduct unbecoming an
1âw phi 1

attorney for which he was fined ₱2,000.00.

Given the foregoing, the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for two years, as
recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, is proper.

The Court, however, will not adopt the recommendation of the IBP to order respondent to return the
sum of ₱15,000.00 he received from complainant under the "Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase." This is a civil liability best determined and awarded in a civil case rather than the
present administrative cases.

In Roa v. Moreno,29 the Court pronounced that "[i]n disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only
issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar.
Our only concern is the determination of respondent’s administrative liability. Our findings have no
material bearing on other judicial action which the parties may choose to file against each
other."While the respondent lawyer’s wrongful actuations may give rise at the same time to criminal,
civil, and administrative liabilities, each must be determined in the appropriate case; and every case
must be resolved in accordance with the facts and the law applicable and the quantum of proof
required in each. Section 5,30 in relation to Sections 131 and 2,32 Rule 133 of the Rules of Court states
that in administrative cases, such as the ones atbar, only substantial evidence is required, not proof
beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or preponderance of evidence asin civil cases.
Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.33

The Court notes that based on the same factual antecedents as the present administrative cases,
complainant instituted a criminal case for estafa against respondent, docketed as Criminal Case No.
3112-A, before the MTC. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless
the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action.34 Unless the complainant waived the civil action, reserved the
right to institute it separately, or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action, then his civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the estafa committed by respondent is deemed
instituted with Criminal Case No. 3112-A. The civil liability that complainant may recover in Criminal
Case No. 3112-A includes restitution; reparation of the damage caused him; and/or indemnification
for consequential damages,35which may already cover the ₱15,000.00 consideration complainant
had paid for the subject property.

WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby found GUILTY of the following: breach of the Lawyer’s Oath;
unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct; and disrespect for the Court and causing undue delay of
these cases, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years,
reckoned from receipt of this Decision, with WARNING that a similar misconduct in the future shall
be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for their information and guidance. The Court Administrator is directed to circulate this
Decision to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

EN BANC
A.C. No. 8000 August 5, 2014

CHAMELYN A. AGOT, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LUIS P. RIVERA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court's resolution is a Complaint-Affidavit1 dated August 30, 2008 filed by complainant
Chamelyn A. Agot (complainant) against respondent Atty. Luis P. Rivera (respondent), charging him
of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and the lawyer's oath for
misrepresentation, deceit, and failure to account for and return her money despite several demands.

The Facts

In her Complaint-Affidavit, complainant alleged that she was invited as maid of honor in her best
friend’s wedding on December 9, 2007 at the United States of America. To facilitate the issuance of
her United States (US) visa, complainant sought the services of respondent who represented himself
as an immigration lawyer. Thus, on November 17, 2007, they entered into a Contract of Legal
Services (Contract),2 whereby respondent undertook to facilitate and secure the release of a US
immigrant visa in complainant’s favor prior to the scheduled wedding. In consideration therefor,
complainant paid respondent the amount of ₱350,000.00 as downpayment and undertook to pay the
balance of ₱350,000.00 after the issuance of the US visa.3 The parties likewise stipulated that should
complainant’s visa application be denied for any reason other than her absence on the day of the
interview and/or for records of criminal conviction and/or any court-issued hold departure order,
respondent is obligated to return the said downpayment.4 However, respondent failed to perform his
undertaking within the agreed period. Worse, complainant was not even scheduled for interview in
the US Embassy. As the demand for refund of the downpayment was not heeded, complainant filed
a criminal complaint for estafa and the instant administrative complaint against respondent.5

In his Comment6 dated December 5, 2008, respondent claimed that his failure to comply with his
obligation under the Contract was due to the false pretenses of a certain Rico Pineda (Pineda), who
he had believed to be a consul for the US Embassy and to whom he delivered the amount given by
the complainant. Respondent elaborated that he had a business relationship with Pineda on the
matter of facilitating the issuance of US visas to his friends and family, including himself. He
happened to disclose this to a certain Joseph Peralta, who in turn referred his friend, the
complainant, whose previous US visa application had been denied, resulting in the execution of the
Contract. Respondent claimed that Pineda reneged on his commitments and could no longer be
located but, nonetheless, assumed the responsibility to return the said amount to complainant.7 To
buttress his claims, respondent attached pictures supposedly of his friends and family with Pineda
as well as electronic mail messages (e-mails) purportedly coming from the latter.8

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation9 dated April 17, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively liable, and accordingly,
recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension for a period of four (4) months, with a
warning that a repetition of the same would invite a stiffer penalty.10
The Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of engaging in deceitful conduct for: (a)
misrepresenting himself as an immigration lawyer; (b) failing to deliver the services he contracted;
and (c) being remiss in returning complainant’s downpayment of ₱350,000.00. The Investigating
Commissioner did not lend credence to respondent’s defense anent his purported transactions with
Pineda considering that the latter’s identity was not proven and in light of respondent’s self-serving
evidence, i.e., photographs and e-mails, which were bereft of any probative value.11

In a Resolution dated December 14, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted and
approved the aforesaid report and recommendation with the modification increasing the period of
suspension to six (6) months and ordering respondent to return the amount of ₱350,000.0012 to
complainant within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice, with legal interest from the date of
demand.13

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable
for violating the CPR.

The Court’s Ruling

After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the IBP’s findings, subject to the
modification of the recommended penalty to be imposed upon respondent.

As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency,
but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.14 In this regard, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
CPR, provides:

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LANDAND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

In the instant case, respondent misrepresented himself as an immigration lawyer, which resulted to
complainant seeking his assistance to facilitate the issuance of her US visa and paying him the
amount of ₱350,000.00 as downpayment for his legal services. In truth, however, respondent has no
specialization in immigration law but merely had a contact allegedly with Pineda, a purported US
consul, who supposedly processes US visa applications for him. However, respondent failed to
prove Pineda’s identity considering that the photographs and e-mails he submitted were all self-
serving and thus, as correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, bereft of any probative
value and consequently cannot be given any credence. Undoubtedly, respondent’s deception is not
only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession; it reveals a basic moral
flaw that makes him unfit to practice law.15

Corollary to such deception, respondent likewise failed to perform his obligations under the Contract,
which is to facilitate and secure the issuance of a US visa in favor of complainant. This constitutes a
flagrant violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, to wit:

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglecta legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-
bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with diligence, care,
and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him.16 Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a
legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be
held administratively liable,17 as in this case.

Furthermore, respondent violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when he failed to
refund the amount of ₱350,000.00 that complainant paid him, viz.:

CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENTTHAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.

xxxx

Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. x
x x.

Verily, the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and prescribes on a lawyer
a great fidelity and good faith.18 The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon the
lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his
client.19 Thus, a lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client,
as in this case, gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as
well as of professional ethics.20

Anent the proper penalty for respondent’s acts, jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where
lawyers neglected their client’s affairs and, at the same time, failed to return the latter’s money
and/or property despite demand, the Court imposed upon them the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law. In Segovia-Ribaya v. Lawsin,21 the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of one
(1) year for his failure to perform his undertaking under his retainership agreement with his client and
to return the money given to him by the latter. Also, in Jinon v. Jiz,22the Court suspended the lawyer
for a period of two (2) years for his failure to return the amount his client gave him for his legal
services which he never performed. In this case, not only did respondent fail to facilitate the
issuance of complainant’s US visa and return her money, he likewise committed deceitful acts in
misrepresenting himself as an immigration lawyer, resulting in undue prejudice to his client. Under
these circumstances, a graver penalty should be imposed upon him. In view of the foregoing, the
Court deems it appropriate to increase the period of suspension from the practice of law of
respondent from six (6) months, as recommended by the IBP, to two (2) years.

Finally, the Court sustains the IBP's recommendation ordering respondent to return the amount of
₱350,000.00 he received from complainant as downpayment. It is well to note that "while the Court
has previously held that disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around the determination of the
respondent-lawyer's administrative and not his civil liability, it must be clarified that this rule remains
applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature - for instance, when the claim
involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct [from]
and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement."23 Hence, since respondent received the
aforesaid amount as part of his legal fees, the Court finds the return thereof to be in order.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis P. Rivera (respondent) is found guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1, Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years, effective upon the finality of this Decision, with a stem warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
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Furthermore, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Chamelyn A. Agot the legal fees he
received from the latter in the amount of ₱350,000.00 within ninety (90) days from the finality of this
Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of a more severe
penalty.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent's record in this Court as attorney. Further, let
copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice