Rule on prescription for violations of special laws and municipal ordinances

● Act No. 3326 as amended, the law which governs the period for prescription for violations penalized
by special acts and municipal ordinances, reads:

Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in
accordance with the following rules: (a) after a year for offenses punished only by a fine or by
imprisonment for not more than one month, or both; (b) after four years for those punished by
imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) after eight years for those punished
by imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; and (d) after twelve years for any other
offense punished by imprisonment for six years or more, except the crime of treason, which shall
prescribe after twenty years. Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two
months.

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if
the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding
for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall
begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

● In Zaldivia v. Reyes, G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992, the court held that the phrase "when proceedings
are instituted against the guilty person," (in Act No. 3326) refers to "judicial proceedings" and not
administrative proceedings. Hence, the filing of the complaint before the prosecutor in a case involving a
violation of municipal ordinance, which is covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure and which does
not require a preliminary investigation, does not interrupt the period of prescription of the offense.

● Act No. 3226 was approved on 4 December 1926 at a time when the function of conducting the
preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was vested in the justices of the peace. Thus, the prevailing
rule at the time is that the prescription of the offense is tolled once a complaint is filed with the justice
of the peace for preliminary investigation inasmuch as the filing of the complaint signifies the institution
of the criminal proceedings against the accused. (Panaguiton vs. CA, G.R. No. 167571, November 25,
2008)

● However, in the recent case of People vs. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012, it was held that
"there is no more distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws with
respect to the interruption of the period of prescription. The ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr. is not
controlling in special laws. In Llenes v. Dicdican, Ingco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, Brillante v. CA, and Sanrio
Company Limited v. Lim, cases involving special laws, this Court held that the institution of proceedings
for preliminary investigation against the accused interrupts the period of prescription."

● In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, which involved violations of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which
are both special laws, the Court ruled that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of
proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused. In the more recent case of Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, the Court ruled that the nature and purpose
of the investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised
Securities Act, another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in
criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.

The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case is instructive, thus:

While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before"
investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the
investigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the
executive branch, the term "proceedings" should now be understood either executive or judicial in
character: executive when it involves the investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and
judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty
person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.

The prevailing rule is, therefore, that irrespective of whether the offense charged is punishable by the
Revised Penal Code or by a special law, it is the filing of the complaint or information in the office of the
public prosecutor for purposes of the preliminary investigation that interrupts the period of prescription.
(Disini vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 169823-24, September 11, 2013)

● Read: Justado vs. People

Is the prescriptive period still tolled if the information or complaint is filed before a court which has no
jurisdiction over the offense charge?

Yes. The period of prescription for the crime was interrupted when the complaint was lodged with the
Office of the City Prosecutor and remained tolled pending the termination of the case. The mistake
should not operate to prejudice the interest of the state to prosecute criminal offenses and, more
importantly, the right of the offended party to obtain grievance. It is unjust to deprive the injured party
the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of
the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint. (Arambulo vs.
Lagui, G.R. No. 138596. October 12, 2000)