Chapter 3 Cases Stat. Con.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33628 December 29, 1987
BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, SANTIAGO EISMA, MIRUFO CELERIAN, JOSE SAYSON,

CESAR TABILIRAN, and MAXIMO ADLAWAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE MELQUIADES B. SUCALDITO, RUFINO LABANG, MENELEO MESINA,
ARTURO GUILLERMO, IN THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPACITIES AS JUDGE OF THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR, CITY FISCAL OF PAGADIAN
CITY AND STATE PROSECUTOR, and ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., respondents.
No. L-34162 December 29, 1987
BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUDGE ASAALI S. ISNANI, RUFINO LABANG, ALBERTO S. LIM, JR., JESUS
ACEBES, IN THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPACITIES AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR, CITY FISCAL OF PAGADIAN CITY AND STATE
PROSECUTORS, ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., and ARTEMIO
ROMANILLOS, respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner, then provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur and a candidate for reelection
in the local elections of 1971, seeks injunctive relief in two separate petitions, to enjoin further
proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. CCC XVI-4-ZDS, CCC XVI-6-ZDS, and CCC XVI-8-ZDS
of the then Circuit Criminal Court sitting in Pagadian City, as well as I.S. Nos. 1-70, 2-71, 4-71,
5-71, 6-71, and 7-71 of the respondent Fiscal's office of the said city, all in the nature of
prosecutions for violation of certain provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(Republic Act No. 3019) and various provisions of the Revised Penal Code, commenced by
the respondent Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc.
On June 16, 1971 and October 8, 1971, respectively, we issued temporary restraining orders
directing the respondents (in both petitions) to desist from further proceedings in the cases in
question until further orders from the Court. At the same time, we gave due course to the
petitions and accordingly, required the respondents to answer.
The petitions raise pure question of law. The facts are hence, undisputed.
On September 26, 1970, the private respondent Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc., filed
a complaint with the respondent City Fiscal, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1-70 thereof, for
violation of the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law as well as Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
SPECIFICATION NO. I —
That on or about October 10, 1969, above-named respondents, conspiring and confabulating
together, allegedly conducted a bidding for the supply of gravel and sand for the Province of
Zamboanga del Sur: that it was made to appear that Tabiliran Trucking Company won the
bidding; that, thereafter, the award and contract pursuant to the said simulated bidding were
effected and executed in favor of Tabiliran Trucking Company; that, in truth and in fact, the
said bidding was really simulated and the papers on the same were falsified to favor Tabiliran
Trucking Company, represented by the private secretary of respondent Bienvenido Ebarle,
formerly confidential secretary of the latter; that said awardee was given wholly unwarranted
advantage and preference by means of manifest partiality; that respondent officials are hereby
also charged with interest for personal gain for approving said award which was manifestly
irregular and grossly unlawful because the same was facilitated and committed by means of
falsification of official documents.
SPECIFICATION NO. II
That after the aforecited award and contract, Tabiliran Trucking Company, represented by
respondent Cesar Tabiliran, attempted to collect advances under his trucking contract in the
under his trucking contract in the amount of P4,823.95 under PTA No. 3654; that the same
was not passed in audit by the Provincial Auditor in view of the then subsisting contract with
Tecson Trucking Company; which was to expire on November 2, 1969; that nevertheless the
said amount was paid and it was made to appear that it was collected by Tecson Trucking
Company, although there was nothing due from tile latter and the voucher was never indorsed
or signed by the operator of Tecson Trucking; and that in facilitating and consummating the
aforecited collection, respondent officials, hereinabove cited, conspired and connived to the
great prejudice and damage of the Provincial Government of Zamboanga del Sur. 1
xxx xxx xxx
On the same date, the private respondent commenced Criminal Case No. 2-71 of the
respondent City Fiscal, another proceeding for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 as well as
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. The complaint reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about April 8, 1970, a bidding was held for the construction of the right wing portion
of the Capitol Building of the Province of Zamboanga del Sur, by the Bidding Committee
composed of respondents cited hereinabove; that the said building was maliciously
manipulated so as to give wholly unwarranted advantage and preference in favor of the,
supposed winning bidder, Codeniera Construction, allegedly owned and managed by
Wenceslao Codeniera, brother-in-law of the wife of respondent Bienvenido Ebarle; that
respondent official is interested for personal gain because he is responsible for the approval
of the manifestly irregular and unlawful award and contract aforecited; and that, furthermore,
respondent, being a Member of the Bidding Committee, also violated Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code, by making it appear in the very abstract of bids that another interested bidder,
was not interested in the bidding, when in truth and in fact, it was not so.
2
xxx xxx xxx

On January 26, 1971, the private respondent instituted I.S. No. 4-71 of the respondent Fiscal,
a prosecution for violation of Articles 182, 183, and 318 of the Revised Penal Code, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about April 4, 1967, in Pagadian City, said respondent testified falsely under oath
in Cadastral Case No. N-17, LRC CAD REC. NO. N-468, for registration of title to Lot No. 2545
in particular;
That respondent BIENVENIDO EBARLE testified falsely under oath during the hearing and
reception of evidence that he acquired said lot by purchase from a certain Brigido Sanchez
and that he is the owner, when in truth and in fact Lot 2545 had been previously acquired and
is owned by the provincial Government of Zamboanga del Sur, where the provincial jail building
is now located.
2. That aforesaid deceit, false testimony and untruthful statement of respondent in said
Cadastral case were made knowingly to the great damage and prejudice of the Provincial
Government of Zamboanga del Sur in violation of aforecited provisions of the Revised Penal
Code. 3
On February 10, 1971, finally, the private respondent filed a complaint, docketed as I.S. No.
5-71 of the respondent Fiscal, an action for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 and Articles 171
and 213 of the Revised Penal Code, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
We hereby respectfully charge the above-named respondents for violation of Sec. 3, R.A. No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Articles 171 and 213,
Revised Penal Code and the rules and regulations of public bidding, committed as follows:
1. That on June 16, 1970, without publication, respondents conducted the so-called "bidding"
for the supply of gravel and sand for the province of Zamboanga del Sur; that said respondents,
without any valid or legal ground, did not include or even open the bid of one Jesus Teoson
that was seasonably submitted, despite the fact that he is a registered duly qualified operator
of "Teoson Trucking Service," and notwithstanding his compliance with all the rules and
requirements on public bidding; that, instead, aforecited respondents illegally and irregularly
awarded said contract to Cesar Tabiliran, an associate of respondent Governor Bienvenido
Ebarle; and
2. That in truth and in fact, aforesaid "bidding" was really simulated and papers were falsified
or otherwise "doctored" to favor respondent Cesar Tabiliran thereby giving him wholly
unwarranted advantage, preference and benefits by means of manifest partiality; and that
there is a statutory presumption of interest for personal gain because the transaction and
award were manifestly irregular and contrary to applicable law, rules and regulations. 4
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner initially moved to dismiss the aforesaid preliminary investigations, but the same
having been denied, he went to the respondent Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur,
the Honorable Melquiades Sucaldito presiding, on prohibition and mandamus (Special Case
No. 1000) praying at the same time, for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin further
proceedings therein. The court granted preliminary injunctive relief (restraining order) for which
the Anti-Graft League filed a motion to have the restraining order lifted and to have the petition
itself dismissed.
On May 14, 1971, the respondent, Judge Sucaldito, handed down the first of the two
challenged orders, granting Anti-Graft League's motion and dismissing Special Case No. 1000.
On June 11, 1971, the petitioner came to this Court on certiorari with prayer for a temporary
restraining order (G.R. No. 33628). As we said, we issued a temporary restraining order on
June 16, 1971.
Meanwhile, and in what would begin yet another series of criminal prosecutions, the private
respondent, on April 26, 1971, filed three complaints, subsequently docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. CCC XVI-4-ZDS, CCC XVI-6-ZDS, and CCC XVI-8-ZDS of the Circuit Criminal
Court of Pagadian City for violation of various provisions of the Anti-Graft Law as well as Article
171(4) of the Revised Penal Code, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx;
That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did
then and there unlawfully and feloniously extended and gave ELIZABETH EBARLE
MONTESCLAROS, daughter of his brother, his relative by consanguinity within the third
degree, and appointment as Private Secretary in the Office of the Provincial Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur, although he well know that the latter is related with him within the third
degree by consanguinity.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Honorable Court, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, then and there unlawfully and feloniously made
untruthful statements in a narration of facts by accomplishing and issuing a certificate, to wit: ,
c. That the provisions of law and rules on promotion, seniority and nepotism have been
observed.
required by law in such cases, in support of the appointment he extended to ELIZABETH

EBARLE-MONTESCLAROS as Private Secretary in the Office of the Provincial Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur, although he well know that the latter is related with him within the third
degree of consanguinity.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx

Honorable Court, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, then and there unlawfully and feloniously made
untruthful statements in a narration of facts by accomplishing and issuing a certificate, to wit:
observed.
required by law in such cases, in support of the appointment he extended to TERESITO

MONTESCLAROS, husband of his niece Elizabeth Ebarle, as Motor Pool Dispatcher, Office
of the Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur, although he well knew that the latter is
related with him within the third degree affinity.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 7
xxx xxx xxx
Subsequently, on August 23, 1971, the private respondent brought I.S. No. 6-71 of the
respondent Pagadian City Fiscal against the petitioner, still another proceeding for violation of
Republic Act No. 3019 and Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
First Count.
That on or about December 1, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Provincial

Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously extended and
gave MARIO EBARLE, son of his brother, his relative by consanguinity within the third degree,
an appointment as SECURITY GUARD in the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga
del Sur although he well knew that the latter is related with him in the third degree by
consanguinity and is not qualified under the Civil Service Law.
Second Count.
That in January, 1970, at Pagadian City, Gov. BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE replaced JOHNNY
ABABON who was then the incumbent Motor Pool Dispatcher in the Office of the Provincial
Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur with his nephew-in-law TERESITO MONTESCLAROS
relative by affinity within the third Civil degree, in violation of the Civil Service Law, this
knowingly causing undue injury in the discharge of his administrative function through manifest
partiality against said complaining employee.
Third Count:
That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Provincial
gave ELIZABETH EBARLE MONTESCLAROS, daughter of his brother, his relative by
consanguinity within the third degree, an appointment as Private Secretary in the Office of the
Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, although he well know that the latter is related with
him within the third degree of consanguinity, and said appointment is in violation of the Civil
Service Law.
Fourth Count.
That on or about January 22, 1970, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Provincial
gave ZACARIAS UGSOD, JR., son of the younger sister of Governor Ebarle, his relative by
consanguinity within the third degree, an appointment as Architectural Draftsman in the Office
of the Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur although he well know that the latter is related
with him in the third degree of consanguinity.
Fifth Count.
That on February 5, 1970, at Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Provincial Governor

of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously extended and gave
TERESITO MONTESCLAROS, husband of his niece ELIZABETH EBARLE, his relative by
affinity within the third degree, an appointment as Motor Pool Dispatcher, Office of the
Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur, although he wen knew then that the latter was not
qualified to such appointment as it was in violation of the Civil Service Law, thereby knowingly
granting and giving unwarranted advantage and preference in the discharge of his
administrative function through manifest partiality.
II. SPECIFICATION FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 4 (b), R.A. 3019
That on August 19, 1967, respondent BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Governor of Zamboanga del
Sur, taking advantage of his position caused, persuaded, induced, or influence the Presiding
Judge to perform irregular and felonious act in violation of applicable law or constituting an
offense into awarding and decreeing Lot 2645 of the Pagadian Public Lands subdivision to him
who, according to the records of the case, failed to establish his rights of ownership pursuant
to the provisions of the Land Registration law and the Public Land Act, it appearing that the
Provincial Government of Zamboanga del Sur as and is a claimant and in adverse possession
of Lot 2545 whereon the Provincial Jail Building thereon still stands.
III. SPECIFICATION FOR VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 171 (4), REVISED PENAL CODE
First Count.
That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, then and
there unlawfully and feloniously made untruthful statement in a narration of facts by
accomplishing and issuing a certificate, to wit:
observed.
required by law in such cases, in support of the appointment he extended to TERESITO

MONTESCLAROS, husband of his niece ELIZABETH EBARLE, as Motor Pool Dispatcher,
Office of the Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur, although he wen knew that the latter
is related with him within the third degree of affinity and is in violation of the Civil Service Law.
Second Count.
That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, then and
there unlawfully and feloniously made untruthful statements a certificate, to wit:
c. That the provisions of the law and rules on promotion, seniority and nepotism have been
observed.
required by law in such cases, in support of the appointment he extended to ELIZABETH

EBARLE-MONTESCLAROS as Private Secretary in the Office of the Provincial Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur, although he well knew that the latter is related with him within the third
degree of consanguinity, and is in violation of the Civil Service Law. CONTRARY to aforecited
laws.8
xxx xxx xxx
On September 21, 1971, the private respondent instituted I.S. No. 7-71 of the said City Fiscal,
again charging the petitioner with further violations of Republic Act No. 3019 thus:
xxx xxx xxx
First Count.
That on or about December 2, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO EBARLE, Provincial

Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously extend and give
unwarranted benefits and privileges BONINDA EBARLE, wife of his brother Bertuldo Ebarle,
the former being his relative by affinity within the second civil degree, an appointment as
LABORATORY TECHNICIAN in Pagadian City, although he well knew that the latter is related
to him in the second degree by affinity and is not qualified under the Civil Service Law.
Second Count.
That on or about January 1, 1970, at Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO EBARLE, Provincial

unwarranted benefits and privileges JESUS EBARLE, nephew of said respondent, an
appointment as DRIVER of the Provincial Engineer's Office, Pagadian City, although he well
knew that Jesus Ebarle is related to him within the third civil degree by consanguinity and is
not qualified under the Civil Service Law.
Third Count.
That on or about November 1, 1969, at Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO EBARLE, Provincial

unwarranted benefits and privileges PHENINA CODINERA, sister-in-law of said respondent,
an appointment as CONFIDENTIAL ASSISTANT in the Office of the Provincial Governor,
Pagadian City, although he well knew that Phenina Codinera is related to him in the second
civil degree of consanguinity and is not qualified under the Civil Service Law.
ALL CONTRARY TO AFORECITED LAW.
Please give due course to the above complaint and please set the case for immediate
preliminary investigation pursuant to the First Indorsement dated August 27, 1971 of the
Secretary of Justice, and in the paramount interest of good government. 9
xxx xxx xxx

The petitioner thereafter went to the respondent Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur,
the Honorable Asaali Isnani presiding, on a special civil action (Special Civil Case No. 1048)
for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction. The respondent Court issued a
restraining order. The respondent Anti-Graft League moved to have the same lifted and the
case itself dismissed.
On September 27, 1971, Judge Isnani issued an order, dismissing the case.
On October 6, 1971, the petitioner instituted G.R. No. 34162 of this Court, a special civil action
for certiorari with preliminary injunction. As earlier noted, we on October 8, 1971, stayed the
implementation of dismissal order.
Subsequently, we consolidated both petitions and considered the same submitted for decision.
Principally, the petitioner relies (in both petitions) on the failure of the respondents City Fiscal
and the Anti-Graft League to comply with the provisions of Executive Order No. 264,
"OUTLINING THE PROCEDUE BY WHICH COMPLAINANTS CHARGING GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITH COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE
GUIDED," 10 preliminary to their criminal recourses. At the same time, he assails the standing of the respondent Anti-Graft
League to commence the series of prosecutions below (G.R. No. 33628). He likewise contends that the respondent Fiscal (in G.R.
No. 34162), in giving due course to the complaints notwithstanding the restraining order we had issued (in G.R. No. 33628), which
he claims applies as well thereto, committed a grave abuse of discretion.
He likewise submits that the prosecutions in question are politically motivated, initiated by his
rivals, he being, as we said, a candidate for reelection as Governor of Zamboanga del Sur.
We dismiss these petitions.
The petitioner's reliance upon the provisions of Executive Order No. 264 has no merit. We
reproduce the Order in toto:
MALACAÑANG
RESIDENCE OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE PHILIPPINES
MANILA
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 264
OUTLINING THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH COMPLAINANTS CHARGING GOVERNMENT

OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITH COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE
GUIDED.
WHEREAS, it is necessary that the general public be duly informed or reminded of the
procedure provided by law and regulations by which complaints against public officials and
employees should be presented and prosecuted.
WHEREAS, actions on complaints are at times delayed because of the failure to observe the
form.91 requisites therefor, to indicate with sufficient clearness and particularity the charges
or offenses being aired or denounced, and to file the complaint with the proper office or
authority;
WHEREAS, without in any way curtailing the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression,
the Administration believes that many complaints or grievances could be resolved at the lower
levels of government if only the provisions of law and regulations on the matter are duly
observed by the parties concerned; and
WHEREAS, while all sorts of officials misconduct should be eliminated and punished, it is
equally compelling that public officials and employees be given opportunity afforded them by
the constitution and law to defend themselves in accordance with the procedure prescribed by
law and regulations;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of

the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:
1. Complaints against public officials and employees shall be in writing, subscribed and sworn
to by the complainants, describing in sufficient detail and particularity the acts or conduct
complained of, instead of generalizations.
2. Complaints against presidential appointees shag be filed with the Office of the President or
the Department Head having direct supervision or control over the official involved.
3. Those against subordinate officials and employees shall be lodged with the proper
department or agency head.
4. Those against elective local officials shall be filed with the Office of the President in case of
provincial and city officials, with the provincial governor or board secretary in case of municipal
officials, and with the municipal or city mayor or secretary in case of barrio officials.
5. Those against members of police forces shall be filed with the corresponding local board of
investigators headed by the city or municipal treasurer, except in the case of those appointed
by the President which should be filed with the Office of the President.
6. Complaints against public officials and employees shall be promptly acted upon and
disposed of by the officials or authorities concerned in accordance with pertinent laws and
regulations so that the erring officials or employees can be soonest removed or otherwise
disciplined and the innocent, exonerated or vindicated in like manner, and to the end also that
other remedies, including court action, may be pursued forthwith by the interested parties after
administrative remedies shall have been exhausted.
Done in the City of Manila, this 6th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and seventy.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President of the Philippines
By the President:
(Sgd.) ALEJANDRO MELCHOR
Executive Secretary 11
It is plain from the very wording of the Order that it has exclusive application to administrative, not criminal complaints. The Order
itself shows why.
The very title speaks of "COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES." There is no mention, not even
by implication, of criminal "offenses," that is to say, "crimes." While "crimes" amount to
"irregularities," the Executive Order could have very well referred to the more specific term had
it intended to make itself applicable thereto.
The first perambulatory clause states the necessity for informing the public "of the procedure
provided by law and regulations by which complaints against public officials and employees
should be presented and prosecuted. 12 To our mind, the "procedure provided by law and regulations" referred to
pertains to existing procedural rules with respect to the presentation of administrative charges against erring government officials.
And in fact, the aforequoted paragraphs are but restatements thereof. That presidential appointees are subject to the disciplinary
jurisdiction of the President, for instance, is a reecho of the long-standing doctrine that the President exercises the power of control
over his appointees. 13 Paragraph 3, on the other hand, regarding subordinate officials, is a mere reiteration of Section 33 of
Republic Act No. 2260, the Civil Service Act (of 1959) then in force, placing jurisdiction upon "the proper Head of Department, the
chief of a bureau or office" 14 to investigate and decide on matters involving disciplinary action.
Paragraph 4, which refers to complaints filed against elective local officials, reiterates, on the
other hand, the Decentralization Act of 1967, providing that "charges against any elective
provincial and city officials shall be preferred before the President of the Philippines; against
any elective municipal official before the provincial governor or the secretary of the provincial
board concerned; and against any elective barrio official before the municipal or secretary
concerned. 15
Paragraph 5, meanwhile, is a reproduction of the provisions of the Police Act of 1966, vesting
upon a "Board of Investigators" 16 the jurisdiction to try and decide complaints against members of the Philippine police.
Clearly, the Executive Order simply consolidates these existing rules and streamlines the
administrative apparatus in the matter of complaints against public officials. Furthermore, the
fact is that there is no reference therein to judicial or prejudicial (like a preliminary investigation
conducted by the fiscal) recourse, not because it makes such a resort a secondary measure,
but because it does not intend to serve as a condition precedent to, much less supplant, such
a court resort.
To be sure, there is mention therein of "court action[s] [being] pursued forthwith by the
interested parties, " 17 but that does not, so we hold, cover proceedings such as criminal actions, which do not require a
prior administrative course of action. It will indeed be noted that the term is closely shadowed by the qualification, "after administrative
remedies shall have been exhausted," 18 which suggests civil suits subject to previous administrative action.
It is moreover significant that the Executive Order in question makes specific reference to
"erring officials or employees ... removed or otherwise vindicated. 19 If it were intended to apply to criminal
prosecutions, it would have employed such technical terms as "accused", "convicted," or "acquitted." While this is not necessarily a
controlling parameter for all cases, it is here material in construing the intent of the measure.
What is even more compelling is the Constitutional implications if the petitioner's arguments
were accepted. For Executive Order No. 264 was promulgated under the 1935 Constitution in
which legislative power was vested exclusively in Congress. The regime of Presidential
lawmaking was to usher in yet some seven years later. If we were to consider the Executive
Order law, we would be forced to say that it is an amendment to Republic Act No. 5180, the
law on preliminary investigations then in effect, a situation that would give rise to a
Constitutional anomaly. We cannot accordingly countenace such a view.
The challenge the petitioner presents against the personality of the Anti-Graft League of the
Philippines to bring suit is equally without merit. That the Anti-Graft League is not an "offended
party" within the meaning of Section 2, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court (now Section 3 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure), cannot abate the complaints in question.
A complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal need not be filed by the
"offended party." The rule has been that, unless the offense subject thereof is one that cannot
be prosecuted de oficio, the same may be filed, for preliminary investigation purposes, by any
competent person. The "complaint" referred to in the Rule 110 contemplates one filed in court,
20
not with the fiscal, In that case, the proceeding must be started by the aggrieved party
himself. 21
For as a general rule, a criminal action is commenced by complaint or information, both of

which are filed in court. In case of a complaint, it must be filed by the offended party; with
respect to an information, it is the fiscal who files it. But a "complaint" filed with the fiscal prior
to a judicial action may be filed by any person.
The next question is whether or not the temporary restraining order we issued in G.R. No.
33628 embraced as well the complaint subject of G.R. No. 34162.
It is noteworthy that the charges levelled against the petitioner — whether in G.R. No. 33628
or 34162 — refer invariably to violations of the Anti-Graft Law or the Revised Penal Code. That
does not, however, make such charges Identical to one another.
The complaints involved in G.R. No. 34162 are, in general, nepotism under Sections 3(c) and
(j) of Republic Act No. 3019; exerting influence upon the presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga del Sur to award a certain parcel of land in his favor, over which the
provincial government itself lays claims, contrary to the provisions of Section 4(b) of Republic
Act No. 3019; and making untruthful statements in the certificates of appointment of certain
employees in his office. On the other hand, the complaints subject matter of G.R. No. 33628
involve charges of simulating bids for the supply of gravel and sand for certain public works
projects, in breach of Section 3 of the Anti-Graft statute; manipulating bids with respect to the
construction of the capitol building; testifying falsely in connection with Cadastral Case No. N-
17, LRC Cad. Rec. N-468, in which the petitioner alleged that he was the owner of a piece of
land, in violation of Articles 182, 183, and 318 of the Revised Penal Code; and simulating bids
for the supply of gravel and sand in connection with another public works project.
It is clear that the twin sets of complaints are characterized by major differences. When,
therefore, we restrained further proceedings in I.S. Nos. 1-71, 2-71, and 4-71, subject of G.R.
No. 33628. we did not consequently stay the proceedings in CCC-XVI-4-ZDS, CCC XVI-6-
ZDS, CCC XVI-8-ZDS, and I.S. Nos. 6-71 and 7-71, the same proceedings we did restrain in
G.R. No. 34162.
This brings us to the last issue: whether or not the complaints in question are tainted with a
political color.
It is not our business to resolve complaints the disposition of which belongs to another agency,
in this case, the respondent Fiscal. But more than that, and as a general rule, injunction does
not lie to enjoin criminal prosecutions. The rule is subject to exceptions, to wit: (1) for the
22
orderly administration of justice; (2) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an
oppressive and vindictive manner; (3) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (4) to afford adequate
protection to constitutional rights; and (5) because the statute relied on is constitutionally infirm
or otherwise void. We cannot perceive any of the exceptions applicable here. The petitioner
23
cries foul, in a manner of speaking, with respect to the deluge of complaints commenced by
the private respondent below, but whether or not they were filed for harassment purposes is a
question we are not in a position to decide. The proper venue, we believe, for the petitioner's
complaint is precisely in the preliminary investigations he wishes blocked here.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. The temporary restraining orders are LIFTED
and SET ASIDE. Costs against the petitioners.
It is so ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras, and Padilla, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-42050-66 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MANILA, BRANCH VII, and PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS, NESTOR BAES, ELIAS L.
GARCIA, SIMEON BUNDALIAN, JR., JOSEPH C. MAISO, EDUARDO A. LIBORDO,
ROMEO L. SUGAY, FEDERICO T. DIZON, GEORGE M. ALBINO, MARIANO COTIA, JR.,
ARMANDO L. DIZON, ROGELIO B. PARENO, RODRIGO V. ESTRADA, ALFREDO A.
REYES, JOSE A. BACARRA, REYNALDO BOGTONG, and EDGARDO M.
MENDOZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46229-32 November 20, 1978

vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH
XVIII, and REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO, ELPIDIO ARPON, VICTOR EUGENIO Y
ROQUE and ALFREDO VERSOZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46313-16 November 20, 1978

vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH
XVIII, and JUANITO DE LA CRUZ Y NUNEZ, SABINO BUENO Y CACAL, TIRSO ISAGAN
Y FRANCISCO and BEN CASTILLO Y UBALDO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46997 November 20, 1978

vs.
THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Samar, and PANCHITO REFUNCION, respondents.
Jose L. Gamboa, Fermin Martin, Jr. & Jose D. Cajucom, Office of the City of Fiscal of Manila
and the Office of Provincial Fiscal of Samar for petitioners.
Norberto Parto for respondents Candelosas, Baes and Garcia.
Amado C. de la Marced for respondents Simeon Bundalian Jr., et al.
Manuel F. de Jesus for all the respondents in L-46229-32 and L-46313-16.
Norberto L. Apostol for respondent Panchito Refuncion.

Hon. Amante P. Purisima for and in his own behalf.
MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:
These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented,
respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they
involve one basic question of law.
These Petitions or appeals involve three Courts of First Instance, namely: the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch VII, presided by Hon. Amante P. Purisima (17 Petitions), the Court
of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVIII, presided by Hon. Maximo A. Maceren (8 Petitions)
and, the Court of First Instance of Samar, with Hon. Wenceslao M. Polo, presiding, (1 Petition).
Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal
possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash
filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed
before them — the details of which will be recounted below — an Order quashing or dismissing
the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which
constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one
essential element of the crime.
Thus, are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute
the offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD
for short) No. 9? This is the central issue which we shall resolve and dispose of, all other
corollary matters not being indispensable for the moment.
A — The Information filed by the People —
1. In L-42050-66, one typical Information filed with the Court presided by Judge Purisima
follows:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN,

accused.
Crim. Case No. 19639
VIOLATION OF PAR. 3, PRES. DECREE No. 9 OF PROCLAMATION 1081
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN of a violation of paragraph 3,

Presidential Decree No. 9 of Proclamation 1081, committed as follows:
That on or about the 14 th day of December, 1974, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his
possession and under his custody and control one (1) carving knife with a blade of 6-½ inches
and a wooden handle of 5-1/4 inches, or an overall length of 11-¾ inches, which the said
accused carried outside of his residence, the said weapon not being used as a tool or
implement necessary to earn his livelihood nor being used in connection therewith.
Contrary to law. (p. 32, rollo of L-42050-66)
The other Informations are similarly worded except for the name of the accused, the date and
place of the commission of the crime, and the kind of weapon involved.
2. In L-46229-32 and L-46313-16, the Information filed with the Court presided by Judge
Maceren follows:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO,

accused.
CRIM. CASE NO. 29677
VIOL. OF PAR. 3,
PD 9 IN REL. TO LOI
No. 266 of the Chief
Executive dated April 1, 1975
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO of a VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH

3, PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9 in relation to Letter of Instruction No. 266 of the Chief
Executive dated April 1, 1975, committed as follows:
That on or about the 28 th day of January, 1977, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly carry outside of his residence a
bladed and pointed weapon, to wit: an ice pick with an overall length of about 8½ inches, the
same not being used as a necessary tool or implement to earn his livelihood nor being used
in connection therewith.
Contrary to law. (p. 14, rollo of L-46229-32)
The other Informations are likewise similarly worded except for the name of the accused, the
date and place of the commission of the crime, and the kind of weapon involved.
3. In L-46997, the Information before the Court of First Instance of Samar is quoted hereunder:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant, versus PANCHITO REFUNCION, accused.
CRIM. CASE NO. 933
For:
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
DEADLY WEAPON
(VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9)
INFORMATION
The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Samar, accuses PANCHITO REFUNCION
of the crime of ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DEADLY WEAPON or VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9
issued by the President of the Philippines on Oct. 2, 1972, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081
dated Sept. 21 and 23, 1972, committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of October, 1976, in the evening at Barangay Barruz, Municipality
of Matuginao, Province of Samar Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorabe Court,
the abovenamed accused, knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously carried with him
outside of his residence a deadly weapon called socyatan, an instrument which from its very
nature is no such as could be used as a necessary tool or instrument to earn a livelihood,
which act committed by the accused is a Violation of Presidential Decree No. 9.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 8, rollo of L-46997)
B. — The Orders of dismissal —
In dismissing or quashing the Informations the trial courts concurred with the submittal of the
defense that one essential element of the offense charged is missing from the Information, viz:
that the carrying outside of the accused's residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in
furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or
rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder.
1. Judge Purisima reasoned out, inter alia, in this manner:
... the Court is of the opinion that in order that possession of bladed weapon or the like outside
residence may be prosecuted and tried under P.D. No. 9, the information must specifically
allege that the possession of bladed weapon charged was for the purpose of abetting, or in
furtherance of the conditions of rampant criminality, organized lawlessness, public disorder,
etc. as are contemplated and recited in Proclamation No. 1081, as justification therefor. Devoid
of this specific allegation, not necessarily in the same words, the information is not complete,
as it does not allege sufficient facts to constitute the offense contemplated in P.D. No. 9. The
information in these cases under consideration suffer from this defect.
xxx xxx xxx
And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to believe the murmurings of
detained persons brought to Court upon a charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D.
No. 9, that more than ever before, policemen - of course not all can be so heartless — now
have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool for extortion, what with the terrifying
risk of being sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen knife or a pair
of scissors, which only God knows where it came from. Whereas before martial law an
extortion-minded peace officer had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and even that could
only convey the coercive message of one year in jail, now anything that has the semblance of
a sharp edge or pointed object, available even in trash cans, may already serve the same
purpose, and yet five to ten times more incriminating than the infamous paltik.
For sure, P.D. No. 9 was conceived with the best of intentions and wisely applied, its necessity
can never be assailed. But it seems it is back-firing, because it is too hot in the hands of
policemen who are inclined to backsliding.
The checkvalves against abuse of P.D. No. 9 are to be found in the heart of the Fiscal and the
conscience of the Court, and hence this resolution, let alone technical legal basis, is prompted
by the desire of this Court to apply said checkvalves. (pp. 55-57, rollo of L-42050-66)
2. Judge Maceren in turn gave his grounds for dismissing the charges as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
As earlier noted the "desired result" sought to be attained by Proclamation No. 1081 is the
maintenance of law and order throughout the Philippines and the prevention and suppression
of all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion. It is therefore
reasonable to conclude from the foregoing premises that the carrying of bladed, pointed or
blunt weapons outside of one's residence which is made unlawful and punishable by said par.
3 of P.D. No. 9 is one that abets subversion, insurrection or rebellion, lawless violence,
criminality, chaos and public disorder or is intended to bring about these conditions. This
conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that all previously existing laws that also made
the carrying of similar weapons punishable have not been repealed, whether expressly or
impliedly. It is noteworthy that Presidential Decree No. 9 does not contain any repealing clause
or provisions.
xxx xxx xxx
The mere carrying outside of one's residence of these deadly weapons if not concealed in
one's person and if not carried in any of the aforesaid specified places, would appear to be not
unlawful and punishable by law.
With the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 9, however, the prosecution, through
Assistant Fiscal Hilario H. Laqui, contends in his opposition to the motion to quash, that this
act is now made unlawful and punishable, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof, regardless of
the intention of the person carrying such weapon because the law makes it "mala prohibita". If
the contention of the prosecution is correct, then if a person happens to be caught while on his
way home by law enforcement officers carrying a kitchen knife that said person had just bought
from a store in order that the same may be used by one's cook for preparing the meals in one's
home, such person will be liable for punishment with such a severe penalty as imprisonment
from five to ten years under the decree. Such person cannot claim that said knife is going to
be used by him to earn a livelihood because he intended it merely for use by his cook in
preparing his meals.
This possibility cannot be discounted if Presidential Decree No. 9 were to be interpreted and
applied in the manner that that the prosecution wants it to be done. The good intentions of the
President in promulgating this decree may thus be perverted by some unscrupulous law
enforcement officers. It may be used as a tool of oppression and tyranny or of extortion.
xxx xxx xxx
It is therefore the considered and humble view of this Court that the act which the President
intended to make unlawful and punishable by Presidential Decree No. 9, particularly by
paragraph 3 thereof, is one that abets or is intended to abet subversion, rebellion, insurrection,
lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder. (pp. 28-30, rollo of L-46229-32)
3. Judge Polo of the Court of First Instance of Samar expounded his order dismissing the
Information filed before him, thus:
... We believe that to constitute an offense under the aforcited Presidential decree, the same
should be or there should be an allegation that a felony was committed in connection or in
furtherance of subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence and public disorder.
Precisely Proclamation No. 1081 declaring a state of martial law throughout the country was
issued because of wanton destruction to lives and properties widespread lawlessness and
anarchy. And in order to restore the tranquility and stability of the country and to secure the
people from violence anti loss of lives in the quickest possible manner and time, carrying
firearms, explosives and deadly weapons without a permit unless the same would fall under
the exception is prohibited. This conclusion becomes more compelling when we consider the
penalty imposable, which is from five years to ten years. A strict enforcement of the provision
of the said law would mean the imposition of the Draconian penalty upon the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
It is public knowledge that in rural areas, even before and during martial law, as a matter of
status symbol, carrying deadly weapons is very common, not necessarily for committing a
crime nor as their farm implement but for self-preservation or self-defense if necessity would
arise specially in going to and from their farm. (pp. 18-19, rollo of L-46997)
In most if not all of the cases, the orders of dismissal were given before arraignment of the
accused. In the criminal case before the Court of (First Instance of Samar the accused was
arraigned but at the same time moved to quash the Information. In all the cases where the
accused were under arrest, the three Judges ordered their immediate release unless held on
other charges.
C. — The law under which the Informations in question were filed by the People.
As seen from the Informations quoted above, the accused are charged with illegal possession
of deadly weapon in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9, Paragraph 3.
We quote in full Presidential Decree No. 9, to wit:
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9
DECLARING VIOLATIONS OF GENERAL ORDERS NO. 6 and NO. 7 DATED SEPTEMBER

22, 1972, AND SEPTEMBER 23, 1972, RESPECTIVELY, TO BE UNLAWFUL AND
PROVIDING PENALTIES THEREFORE.
WHEREAS, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, the Philippines
has been placed under a state of martial law;
WHEREAS, by virtue of said Proclamation No. 1081, General Order No. 6 dated September
22, 1972 and General Order No. 7 dated September 23, 1972, have been promulgated by me;
WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public
disorder mentioned in the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 are committed and abetted by the
use of firearms, explosives and other deadly weapons;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed

Forces of the Philippines, in older to attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No.
1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that:
1. Any violation of the aforesaid General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 is unlawful and the violator shall,
upon conviction suffer:
(a) The mandatory penalty of death by a firing squad or electrocution as a Military,

Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct, it the firearm involved in the violation is unlicensed and
is attended by assault upon, or resistance to persons in authority or their agents in the
performance of their official functions resulting in death to said persons in authority or their
agent; or if such unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of crimes against persons,
property or chastity causing the death of the victim used in violation of any other General
Orders and/or Letters of Instructions promulgated under said Proclamation No. 1081:
(b) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twenty years to life imprisonment as a Military
Court/Tribunal/commission may direct, when the violation is not attended by any of the
circumstances enumerated under the preceding paragraph;
(c) The penalty provided for in the preceding paragraphs shall be imposed upon the owner,
president, manager, members of the board of directors or other responsible officers of any
public or private firms, companies, corporations or entities who shall willfully or knowingly allow
any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity concerned to be used
in violation of said General Orders Nos. 6 and 7.
2. It is unlawful to posses deadly weapons, including hand grenades, rifle grenades and other
explosives, including, but not limited to, "pill box bombs," "molotov cocktail bombs," "fire
bombs," or other incendiary device consisting of any chemical, chemical compound, or
detonating agents containing combustible units or other ingredients in such proportion,
quantity, packing, or bottling that ignites by fire, by friction, by concussion, by percussion, or
by detonation of all or part of the compound or mixture which may cause such a sudden
generation of highly heated gases that the resultant gaseous pressures are capable of
producing destructive effects on continguous objects or of causing injury or death of a person;
and any person convicted thereof shall be punished by imprisonment ranging from ten to fifteen
years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.
3. It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or blunt weapon such as "fan
knife," "spear," "dagger," "bolo," "balisong," "barong," "kris," or club, except where such articles
are being used as necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood and while being used in
connection therewith; and any person found guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from five to ten years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may
direct.
4. When the violation penalized in the preceding paragraphs 2 and 3 is committed during the
commission of or for the purpose of committing, any other crime, the penalty shall be imposed
upon the offender in its maximum extent, in addition to the penalty provided for the particular
offenses committed or intended to be committed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of October in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and seventy-two.
(SGD) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
D. — The arguments of the People —
In the Comment filed in these cases by the Solicitor General who as stated earlier joins the
City Fiscal of Manila and the Provincial Fiscal of Samar in seeking the setting aside of the
questioned orders of dismissal, the main argument advanced on the issue now under
consideration is that a perusal of paragraph 3 of P.D. 9 'shows that the prohibited acts need
not be related to subversive activities; that the act proscribed is essentially a malum
prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy. 1
The City Fiscal of Manila in his brief adds further that in statutory offenses the intention of the
accused who commits the act is immaterial; that it is enough if the prohibited act is voluntarily
perpetuated; that P.D. 9 provides and condemns not only the carrying of said weapon in
connection with the commission of the crime of subversion or the like, but also that of criminality
in general, that is, to eradicate lawless violence which characterized pre-martial law days. It is
also argued that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or
preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have
been violated but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.2
E. — Our Ruling on the matter —
1. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be

informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 3
Pursuant to the above, Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly requires that for a
complaint or information to be sufficient it must, inter alia state the designation of the offense
by the statute, and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is
essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his
defense accordingly. 4
To comply with these fundamental requirements of the Constitution and the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, it is imperative for the specific statute violated to be designated or mentioned 4 in
the charge. In fact, another compelling reason exists why a specification of the statute violated
is essential in these cases. As stated in the order of respondent Judge Maceren the carrying
of so-called "deadly weapons" is the subject of another penal statute and a Manila city
ordinance. Thus, Section 26 of Act No. 1780 provides:
Section 26. It should be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his person any bowie
knife, dirk dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon: ... Any person violating the provisions of this
section shall, upon conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction, be punished by a fine not
exceeding five hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months, or
both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
Ordinance No. 3820 of the City of Manila as amended by Ordinance No. 3928 which took effect
on December 4, 1957, in turn penalizes with a fine of not more than P200.00 or imprisonment
for not more than one months, or both, at the discretion of the court, anyone who shall carry
concealed in his person in any manner that would disguise its deadly character any kind of
firearm, bowie knife, or other deadly weapon ... in any public place. Consequently, it is
necessary that the particular law violated be specified as there exists a substantial difference
between the statute and city ordinance on the one hand and P.D. 9 (3) on the other regarding
the circumstances of the commission of the crime and the penalty imposed for the offense.
We do not agree with petitioner that the above-mentioned statute and the city ordinance are
deemed repealed by P.D. 9 (3). P. D. 9(3) does not contain any repealing clause or provision,
5
and repeal by implication is not favored. This principle holds true with greater force with
6
regards to penal statutes which as a rule are to be construed strictly against the state and
liberally in favor of the accused. In fact, Article 7 of the New Civil Code provides that laws are
7
repealed only by subsequent ones and their violation or non- observance shall not be excused
by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
Thus we are faced with the situation where a particular act may be made to fall, at the discretion
of a police officer or a prosecuting fiscal, under the statute, or the city ordinance, or the
presidential decree. That being the case, the right becomes more compelling for an accused
to be confronted with the facts constituting the essential elements of the offense charged
against him, if he is not to become an easy pawn of oppression and harassment, or of negligent
or misguided official action — a fear understandably shared by respondent Judges who by the
nature of their judicial functions are daily exposed to such dangers.
2. In all the Informations filed by petitioner the accused are charged in the caption as well as
in the body of the Information with a violation of paragraph 3, P.D. 9. What then are the
elements of the offense treated in the presidential decree in question?
We hold that the offense carries two elements: first, the carrying outside one's residence of
any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a
livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to
abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality,
chaos, or public disorder.
It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon, if concealed,
outside of the scope of the statute or the city ordinance mentioned above. In other words, a
simple act of carrying any of the weapons described in the presidential decree is not a criminal
offense in itself. What makes the act criminal or punishable under the decree is the motivation
behind it. Without that motivation, the act falls within the purview of the city ordinance or some
statute when the circumstances so warrant.
Respondent Judges correctly ruled that this can be the only reasonably, logical, and valid
construction given to P.D. 9(3).
3. The position taken by petitioner that P.D. 9(3) covers one and all situations where a person
carries outside his residence any of the weapons mentioned or described in the decree
irrespective of motivation, intent, or purpose, converts these cases into one of "statutory
construction." That there is ambiguity in the presidential decree is manifest from the conflicting
views which arise from its implementation. When ambiguity exists, it becomes a judicial task to
construe and interpret the true meaning and scope of the measure, guided by the basic
principle that penal statutes are to be construed and applied liberally in favor of the accused
and strictly against the state.
4. In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure — a presidential decree in these

cases — the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the
law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor, for in the words of this Court in Hidalgo v.
Hidalgo, per Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within
the statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would result in absurdity,
injustice and contradictions. 8
There are certain aids available to Us to ascertain the intent or reason for P.D. 9(3).
First, the presence of events which led to or precipitated the enactment of P.D. 9. These events
are clearly spelled out in the "Whereas" clauses of the presidential decree, thus: (1) the state
of martial law in the country pursuant to Proclamation 1081 dated September 21, 1972; (2) the
desired result of Proclamation 1081 as well as General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are
particularly mentioned in P.D. 9; and (3) the alleged fact that subversion, rebellion, insurrection,
lawless violence, criminality, chaos, aid public disorder mentioned in Proclamation 1081 are
committed and abetted by the use of firearms and explosives and other deadly weapons.
The Solicitor General however contends that a preamble of a statute usually introduced by the
word "whereas", is not an essential part of an act and cannot enlarge or confer powers, or cure
inherent defects in the statute (p. 120, rollo of L-42050-66); that the explanatory note or
enacting clause of the decree, if it indeed limits the violation of the decree, cannot prevail over
the text itself inasmuch as such explanatory note merely states or explains the reason which
prompted the issuance of the decree. (pp. 114-115, rollo of 46997)
We disagree with these contentions. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall
within the purview of P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the
decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses which
enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff
sanctions stated therein.
A "preamble" is the key of the statute, to open the minds of the makers as to the mischiefs
which are to be remedied, and objects which are to be accomplished, by the provisions of the
statute." (West Norman Timber v. State, 224 P. 2d 635, 639, cited in Words and Phrases,
"Preamble"; emphasis supplied)
While the preamble of a statute is not strictly a part thereof, it may, when the statute is in itself
ambiguous and difficult of interpretation, be resorted to, but not to create a doubt or uncertainty
which otherwise does not exist." (James v. Du Bois, 16 N.J.L. (1 Har.) 285, 294, cited in Words
and Phrases, "Preamble")
In Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, et al. v. The City of Cebu, et al. this Court had occasion to
state that '(L)egislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a
whole, and not of an isolated part or a particular provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of
statutory construction. For taken in the abstract, a word or phrase might easily convey a
meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident when the word or phrase
is considered with those with which it is associated. Thus, an apparently general provision may
have a limited application if read together with other provisions. 9
Second, the result or effects of the presidential decree must be within its reason or intent.
In the paragraph immediately following the last "Whereas" clause, the presidential decree
states:
NOW, THEREFORE, I , FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of an the Armed

Forces of the Philippines, in order to attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No.
1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that:
xxx xxx xxx
From the above it is clear that the acts penalized in P.D. 9 are those related to the desired
result of Proclamation 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7. General Orders Nos. 6 and 7
refer to firearms and therefore have no relevance to P.D. 9(3) which refers to blunt or bladed
weapons. With respect to Proclamation 1081 some of the underlying reasons for its issuance
are quoted hereunder:
WHEREAS, these lawless elements having taken up arms against our duly constituted
government and against our people, and having committed and are still committing acts of
armed insurrection and rebellion consisting of armed raids, forays, sorties, ambushes, wanton
acts of murders, spoilage, plunder, looting, arsons, destruction of public and private buildings,
and attacks against innocent and defenseless civilian lives and property, all of which activities
have seriously endangered and continue to endanger public order and safety and the security
of the nation, ...
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, it is evident that there is throughout the land a state of anarchy and lawlessness,
chaos and disorder, turmoil and destruction of a magnitude equivalent to an actual war
between the forces of our duly constituted government and the New People's Army and their
satellite organizations because of the unmitigated forays, raids, ambuscades, assaults,
violence, murders, assassinations, acts of terror, deceits, coercions, threats, intimidations,
treachery, machinations, arsons, plunders and depredations committed and being committed
by the aforesaid lawless elements who have pledged to the whole nation that they will not stop
their dastardly effort and scheme until and unless they have fully attained their primary and
ultimate purpose of forcibly seizing political and state power in this country by overthrowing
our present duly constituted government, ... (See Book I, Vital Documents on the Declaration
of Martial Law in the Philippines by the Supreme Court of the Philippines, pp. 13-39)
It follows that it is only that act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon with a motivation connected
with or related to the afore-quoted desired result of Proclamation 1081 that is within the intent
of P.D. 9(3), and nothing else.
Statutes are to be construed in the light of purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be
remedied. (U.S. v. American Tracking Association, 310 U.S. 534, cited in LVN Pictures v.
Philippine Musicians Guild, 110 Phil. 725, 731; emphasis supplied)
When construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind, and the statute
should be construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose. (Statutory Construction
by E.T. Crawford, pp. 604-605, cited in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Filipinas
Compania de Seguros, 107 Phil. 1055, 1060; emphasis supplied)
5. In the construction of P.D. 9(3) it becomes relevant to inquire into the consequences of the
measure if a strict adherence to the letter of the paragraph is followed.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that
undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a
construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences. -a 9
It is to be presumed that when P.D. 9 was promulgated by the President of the Republic there
was no intent to work a hardship or an oppressive result, a possible abuse of authority or act
of oppression, arming one person with a weapon to impose hardship on another, and so on. 10
At this instance We quote from the order of Judge Purisima the following:
And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to believe the murmurings of
detained persons brought to Court upon a charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D.
No. 9, that more than ever before, policemen - of course not all can be so heartless — now
have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool for extortion, what with the terrifying
risk of being sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen knife or a pair
of scissors, which only God knows where it came from. Whereas before martial law an
extortion-minded peace officer had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and even that could
only convey the coercive message of one year in jail, now anything that has the semblance of
a sharp edge or pointed object, available even in trash cans, may already serve the same
purpose, and yet five to ten times more incriminating than the infamous paltik. (pp. 72-73, rollo
L-42050-66)
And as respondent Judge Maceren points out, the people's interpretation of P.D. 9(3) results
in absurdity at times. To his example We may add a situation where a law-abiding citizen, a
lawyer by profession, after gardening in his house remembers to return the bolo used by him
to his neighbor who lives about 30 meters or so away and while crossing the street meets a
policeman. The latter upon seeing the bolo being carried by that citizen places him under arrest
and books him for a violation of P.D. 9(3). Could the presidential decree have been conceived
to produce such absurd, unreasonable, and insensible results?
6. Penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of an
accused.
American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be "the tenderness of the law of
the rights of individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind
would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited." The purpose is not to enable a guilty
11
person to escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise definition of

forbidden acts.12
Our own decisions have set down the same guidelines in this manner, viz:
Criminal statutes are to be construed strictly. No person should be brought within their terms
who is not clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not made
clearly so by the statute. (U.S. v. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243, 246)
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the
interpretation of such laws, instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be
considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. (People v. Manantan, 5 SCRA
684, 692)
F. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective.
The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged in the Information in
order that the latter may constitute a sufficiently valid charged. The sufficiency of an
Information is determined solely by the facts alleged therein. Where the facts are incomplete
13
and do not convey the elements of the crime, the quashing of the accusation is in order.
Section 2(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the defendant may move to quash
the complaint or information when the facts charged do not constitute an offense.
In U.S.U. Gacutan, 1914, it was held that where an accused is charged with knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code, failure to allege in
the Information that the judgment was rendered knowing it to be unjust, is fatal. 14
In People v. Yadao, 1954, this Court through then Justice Cesar Bengzon who later became
Chief Justice of the Court affirmed an order of the trial court which quashed an Information
wherein the facts recited did not constitute a public offense as defined in Section 1, Republic
Act 145. 15
G. The filing of these Petitions was unnecessary because the People could have availed itself
of other available remedies below.
Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court follow:
Rule 117, Section 7. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. — If the motion to quash is
sustained the court may order that another information be filed. If such order is made the
defendant, if in custody, shall remain so unless he shall be admitted to bail. If such order is not
made or if having been made another information is not filed withuntime to be specified in the
order, or within such further time as the court may allow for good cause shown, the defendant,
if in custody, shall be discharged therefrom, unless he is in custody on some other charge.
Rule 110, Section 13. Amendment. — The information or complaint may be amended, in
substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the defendant pleads; and
thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the
court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant.
xxx xxx xxx
Two courses of action were open to Petitioner upon the quashing of the Informations in these
cases, viz:
First, if the evidence on hand so warranted, the People could have filed an amended
Information to include the second element of the offense as defined in the disputed orders of
respondent Judges. We have ruled that if the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute
a punishable offense, the case should not be dismissed but the prosecution should be given
an opportunity to amend the Information. 16
Second, if the facts so justified, the People could have filed a complaint either under Section
26 of Act No. 1780, quoted earlier, or Manila City Ordinance No. 3820, as amended by
Ordinance No. 3928, especially since in most if not all of the cases, the dismissal was made
prior to arraignment of the accused and on a motion to quash.
Section 8. Rule 117 states that:
An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in section 2, subsections (f)
and (h) of this rule.
Under the foregoing, the filing of another complaint or Information is barred only when the
criminal action or liability had been extinguished (Section 2[f]) or when the motion to quash
was granted for reasons of double jeopardy. (ibid., [h])
As to whether or not a plea of double jeopardy may be successfully invoked by the accused in
all these cases should new complaints be filed against them, is a matter We need not resolve
for the present.
H. — We conclude with high expectations that police authorities and the prosecuting arm of
the government true to the oath of office they have taken will exercise utmost circumspection
and good faith in evaluating the particular circumstances of a case so as to reach a fair and
just conclusion if a situation falls within the purview of P.D. 9(3) and the prosecution under said
decree is warranted and justified. This obligation becomes a sacred duty in the face of the
severe penalty imposed for the offense.
On this point, We commend the Chief State Prosecutor Rodolfo A. Nocon on his letter to the
City Fiscal of Manila on October 15, 1975, written for the Secretary, now Minister of Justice,
where he stated the following:
In any case, please study well each and every case of this nature so that persons accused of
carrying bladed weapons, specially those whose purpose is not to subvert the duly constituted
authorities, may not be unduly indicted for the serious offenses falling under P.D. No. 9. 17
Yes, while it is not within the power of courts of justice to inquire into the wisdom of a law, it is
however a judicial task and prerogative to determine if official action is within the spirit and
letter of the law and if basic fundamental rights of an individual guaranteed by the Constitution
are not violated in the process of its implementation. We have to face the fact that it is an
unwise and unjust application of a law, necessary and justified under prevailing circumstances,
which renders the measure an instrument of oppression and evil and leads the citizenry to lose
their faith in their government.
WHEREFORE, We DENY these 26 Petitions for Review and We AFFIRM the Orders of
respondent Judges dismissing or quashing the Information concerned, subject however to Our
observations made in the preceding pages 23 to 25 of this Decision regarding the right of the
State or Petitioner herein to file either an amended Information under Presidential Decree No.
9, paragraph 3, or a new one under other existing statute or city ordinance as the facts may
warrant.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, Teehankee, Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Castro, C.J. and Antonio, J, concur in the result.
Aquino, J, took no part.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring.
I concur with the qualification that under existing jurisprudence conviction is possible, without
the need of amending the information, for violation of other laws or ordinances on concealment
of deadly weapons.
Makasiar, J, concurs.
CONCEPCION, JR., J, concurring:
I concur with the additional observation that accused could properly be convicted of a violation
of Act 1780 of the Philippine Commission or of the ordinance.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring.
I concur with the qualification that under existing jurisprudence conviction is possible, without
the need of amending the information, for violation of other laws or ordinances on
concealment of deadly weapons.
Makasiar, J, concurs.
CONCEPCION, JR., J, concurring:
I concur with the additional observation that accused could properly be convicted of a
violation of Act 1780 of the Philippine Commission or of the ordinance.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24806 February 13, 1926
JULIO AGCAOILI, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ALBERTO SUGUITAN, defendant-appellee.
The appellant in his own behalf.

The appellee in his own behalf.
JOHNSON, J.:
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Ilocos Norte. Its
purpose was to obtain the extraordinary legal writ of quo warranto. The petition was denied by
the trial court and the plaintiff appealed. The question presented by the appeal are:
(a) Is the provision of Act No. 3107, in so far as it provides that "justices of the peace shall be
appointed to serve until they have reached the age of 65 years," valid and constitutional, when
applied to justices of the peace appointed under Act No. 2041, section 1, to serve "during good
behavior?" And,
(b) Is the present action barred by the statutes of limitations?
The facts involved in the decision of those questions are as follows:
(a) That the said Julio Agcaoili was appointed as justice of the peace of the municipality of
Laoag, of the Province of Ilocos Norte, by His Excellency, Francis Burton Harrison, on the 25th
day of March, 1916, with authority "to have and to hold the said office with all the powers,
privileges, and emoluments thereunto of right appertaining unto him, subject to the conditions
prescribed by law.
The conditions prescribed by law" to which the appointee was "subject" at the time of his
appointment, are found in section 1 of Act No. 2041 (vol. 8 Public Laws, 153). Said section is
amendment to section 67 of Act No. 136, and provides among other things for the "appointment
and term of the justices of the peace." It provides that one justice of the peace and one auxiliary
justice shall be appointed by the Governor-General, etc., for each municipality organized
according to the Municipal Code. Said section further provides that "All justices of the peace
and auxiliary justices shall hold office during good behavior . . . ." Said Act No. 2041 was
adopted, the Philippine Legislature was composed of the United States Commission and the
House of Representatives.
(b) That on the 17th day of March, 1923, the Philippine Legislature, composed of the Senate
and House of Representatives, adopted Act No. 3107, which was "an Act to amend and repeal
certain provisions of the Administrative Code relative to the judiciary in order to reorganize the
latter; increasing the number of judges for certain judicial districts; increasing the salaries of
judges of Courts of First Instance; vesting the Secretary of Justice with authority to detail a
district judge temporarily to a district or province other than his own; regulating the salaries of
justices of the peace; abolishing the municipal court and justice of the peace court of the City
of Manila and creating in lieu thereof a municipal court with three branches; regulating the
salaries of clerks of court and other subordinate employees of Courts of First Instance, and for
other purposes.
Notwithstanding the fact that the title of said Act No. (3107), so far as the same relates to
justice of the peace, provides only for "regulating the salaries of justices of the peace," said
Act in section 203 provides for "the appointment and distribution of justices of the peace" with
the proviso in said section ". . . That justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be
appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years." Attention is here called
to the fact again that there is nothing in the title of the Act, which, in the slightest degree,
indicates that said Act contains provisions for "appointment of justices of the of the peace" nor
as to the period during which they may serve after appointment. Attention is also invited to the
fact that the same section (203) contains provisions for the jurisdiction of justices of the peace
while section 207 contains provisions defining the "qualifications for justices of the
peace." Section 210 of said Act provides for the "filling of vacancies in the office of justices of
the peace." There is nothing in the title of the Act which in any way indicates that the Act
contains said provisions. Attention is here called to the provision of the Act of Congress of the
29th day of August, 1916, and to section 3 thereof, which provides "That no bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that the subject shall be expressed
in the title of the bill." The effect of a violation of said provision of said Act of Congress will be
discussed later.
(c) That on the 9th day of April, 1923, the Undersecretary of Justice sent the following letter to
the said Julio Agcaoili, through the Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Third Judicial
District, of the Province of Ilocos Sur. Said letter is in the words and figures following:
MANILA, April 9, 1923
SIR: In view of the provision of section 203 of the Administrative Code as

amended by section 1 of Act No. 3107, which, in part, provides that justices
and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have
reached the age of sixty-five years, and in view of the fact that the record shows
that you are over sixty-five years of age already, I have the honor to hereby
advise you that, upon receipt hereof, you cease to be a justice of the peace by
operation of said amendment of the Administrative Code.
Respectfully,
(Sgd.) LUIS P. TORRES

Undersecretary of Justice
Said letter was received by Julio Agcaoili, the justice of the peace, on the 26th day of April,
1923. It was handed to him by the clerk of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Ilocos
Norte.
(d) It will be noted that in the letter of April 9, 1923, the Secretary of Justice directed or ordered
Julio Agcaoili, then justice of the peace, "upon receipt of said letter, to cease to be a justice of
the peace." Against the order contained in said letter of April 9th, Julio Agcaoili entered a
protest dated April 28, 1923, in the following language:
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF COURT OF LAOAG, ILOCOS NORTE

P. I.
April 28, 1923

The Hon. LUIS TORRES
Undersecretary of Justice of
the Philippine Islands
SIR: The undersigned, Julio Agcaoili, justice of the peace of Laoag, capital of
the Province of Ilocos Norte, has the honor to state that on April 26, 1923, he
received, through the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, your
communication of April 9, 1923, informing the undersigned that, having
attained the age of 65 years, he ceased to be justice of the peace of Laoag
under the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 3107, amending section 203 of the
Administrative Code, which is Act No. 2711 enacted in the year 1919, and
which section 1 of said Act No. 3107 provides in part that the justices of the
peace and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they
attain the age of 65 years.
With all due respect, the undersigned has the honor to state that he believes
that the aforecited part of the provision of section 1 of Act No. 3107 does not
include those justices of the peace who had already been appointed justices
of the peace, like the undersigned, before the passage and enactment of said
Act No. 3107 and the amended Administrative Code, nor can this be the
intention of the legislator, for if it were so, it should have so stated in order that
the justices of the peace already appointed, who were discharging the
functions of the office and who had attained the age of 65 years when said Act
was passed and enacted, should cease from their office.
The undersigned was appointed of the peace of Laoag on March 25, 1916, and
therefore under Act No. 2041, enacted February 3, 1911. Section 1 of this Act,
which amended section 67 of Act No. 136, was not amended by any
subsequent Act and provides: All justices if the peace and auxiliary justices
shall hold office during good behavior and those now in office who have not
the qualifications required by this Act shall continue in office until their
successors are appointed.
Has section 203 of the Administrative Code amended or repealed section 1 of

Act No. 2041? The undersigned believes that it has not, judging from the
context of both laws, nor was it repealed because if this were the case the
Governor- General would have renewed the appointments of all the justices of
the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace under said section 203 of the
Administrative Code.
The undersigned was appointed justice of the peace of Laoag on March 25,
1916, under the said Act No. 2041 and continues in the discharge of the duties
of the office up to the present time, without the Governor-General having
renewed his appointment under said section 203 of the Administrative Code.
Then Act No. 3107 came, section 1 of which amends section 203 of the
Administrative Code.
Has this amendment retroactive effect? In the first place the legislature could
not give or have given this Act such a character, and if it had intended to do so,
it would have so stated; and in the second place, because not only is such
express declaration lacking in the law but Act No. 3107 very clearly provides
that the justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace to be appointed
shall hold office until they attain the age of 65 years.
Very respectfully,
(Sgd.) JULIO AGCAOILI

Justice of the Peace of Laoag, Ilocos Norte
A further protest against the said order of the Secretary of Justice was made by Julio Agcaoili
on the 7th day of July, 1923, and is couched in the following language:
I, Julio Agcaoili, Justice of the Peace of the Municipality of Laoag, Ilocos Norte,
do hereby state that on this day, July 7, 1923, Mr. Buenaventura Ocampo,
Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Norte, appeared at my office and thereupon showed
me the telegram of Undersecretary of Justice Torres, addressed to said
provincial fiscal. After reading said telegram I asked the provincial fiscal to
furnish me a copy thereof and he furnished me a copy of the telegram.
Said telegram of the Undersecretary of Justice in substance orders the

provincial fiscal; to cause me to deliver the office and all the documents and
records thereof to the auxiliary justice of the peace, because according to said
Undersecretary of Justice I must cease from the office under Act No. 3107,
and that I be prosecuted for violation of article 370 of the Penal Code should I
fail to comply with the telegram sent to me on the 2d instant by the same
Undersecretary of Justice.
I do also state that I have never had any malicious intention to disobey the
orders of the Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Torres, one given telegram and
the other by letter. I only desired to study the spirit of the law and this is the
reason why I did not leave the office until the present time, because I was from
the office of the justice of the peace under the provision of Act No. 2041 under
which I was appointed justice of the peace of the capital, and which Act was
not repealed by any subsequent one, nor by Act No. 3107, which Act No. 2041
provides that the justices of the peace to be appointed under it, should hold
office during good behavior. This Act does not say anything as to limitation of
age, and therefore I believe myself entitled to continue in, and retain the office.
I do also state that lest the Undersecretary of Justice should think that I do not
duly respect the constituted authorities, I now deliver under protest the office
of the justice of the peace of Laoag and all its documents and records, as well
as the furniture therein contained, to Mr. Alberto Suguitan, auxiliary justice of
the peace, in the presence of the provincial fiscal, in compliance with the
telegram of the Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Torres, received by me
through the provincial fiscal of Ilocos Norte. I make under protest the delivery
of the office and its documents and records because I think, as I have stated,
that I must not cease from the office of justice of the peace, and in order that
my right may be defined, I shall institute an action in the proper court of justice
to decide the case.
(Sgd.) JULIO AGCAOILI
I received the things of the office.

(Sgd.) ALBERTO SUGUITAN
In the presence of:
(Sgd.) BUENA V. OCAMPO Provincial Fiscal
Julio Agcaoili patiently waited in vain for a resolution by the Secretary of Justice of the protest
which he presented on the 28th day of April and on the 7th day of July, 1923; and not having
received any reply to his protest, filed a petition for a writ of quo warranto in the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Ilocos Norte on the 23d day of April, 1925, which petition was
amended by the filing of another petition in the same court on the 8th day of September, 1925.
A careful reading of the two protests (April 28, 1923, and July 7, 1923) shows that they contain
arguments in support thereof which, in all equity and justice, demanded a reply, but no reply
was forthcoming. The arguments in support of his protests find a counterpart and are fully
supported in the decision of this court in the case of Segovia vs. Noel, of March 4, 1925 (47
Phil., 543), wherein the Supreme Court held that the Act No. 3107 could not be applied to and
enforced against justices of the peace who had been appointed prior to the 17th day of March,
1923. Had the Secretary of Justice answered said protests, the great injustice which has been
done to Julio Agcaoili perhaps might have been avoided.
(e) That Julio Agcaoili being threatened with a criminal prosecution unless he turned his office
over to the auxiliary justice of the peace, and to avoid scandal, disgrace and humiliation which
might come to him by virtue of said prosecution, on the 7th day of July, 1923, still protesting,
delivered the possession of his office, as justice of the peace, to the auxiliary justice of the
peace of the municipality of Laoag. It is a matter of common knowledge that Julio Agcaoili had
been entrusted with the highest office in his province which the people could confer upon him.
The petitions presented by Julio Agcaoili in the Court of First Instance, the first on the 23d day
of July, 1925, and the second on the 8th day of September, 1925, contain, in resume, the
foregoing facts. To the petition the respondent Alberto Suguitan answered and set up the
defense of prescription. Upon the issue thus presented, the Honorable Fermin Mariano, judge,
sustained the defense of prescription and denied the petition for the extraordinary legal remedy
of quo warranto. From that judgment Julio Agcaoili appealed, and now contends in a vigorous
and logical argument that his remedy has not prescribed.
Considering the first question suggested above, attention is again called to one of the
provisions of section 3 of the Jones Law (Act of Congress, August 29, 1916, vol. 12, Public
Laws of the Philippine Islands). The "Jones Law" is the constitution of the Philippine Islands
providing a government therefor. Subparagraph 16 of section 3 of the Jones law provides "That
no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that
subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill." Under said provision, may the legislature
adopt a law which contains in the title of the Act? The effect of violating said provision of the
Jones Law has been brought before the courts many times. The effect of violating said
provision has already been passed upon by this court. (Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, 40 Phil.,
883, 889.)
In the case of Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, supra, it was decided that said provision of the Jones
Law was mandatory and not directory and its violation was fatal to any provision of the law to
which no reference was made in the title. In the decision of this court in the case of Central
Capiz vs. Ramirez, the decisions of the courts of many of the states of the Union were followed.
Many of the constitutions of the States of the Union contain similar provision to that quoted
above from the Jones Law. Among such states may be mentioned Alabama, California,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin and
Wyoming.
Mr. Justice Sutherland, now an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,
in his valuable work on "Statutory Construction," vol. 1, 2nd ed.) at section 111, states the
reason and the purpose of such a constitutional provision. He says:
In the construction and application of this constitutional restriction the courts have kept steadily
in view the correction of the mischief against which it was aimed. The object is to prevent the
practice, which was common in all legislative bodies where no such restriction existed, of
embracing in the same bill incongruous matters having no relation to each other, or to the
subject specified in the title, by which measures were often adopted without attracting attention.
Such distinct subjects represented diverse interests, and were combined in order to unite the
members of the legislature who favor either in support of all. These combinations were
corruptive of the legislature and dangerous to the state. Such omnibus bills sometimes
included more than a hundred sections on as many different subjects, with a title appropriate
to the first section, and for other purposes.
The failure to indicate in the title of the bill the object intended to be accomplished by the
legislation often resulted in members voting ignorantly for measures which they would not
knowingly have approved. And not only were legislators thus misled, but the public also; so
that legislative provisions were stealthily pushed through in the closing hours of a session,
which, having no merit to commend them, would have been made odious by popular
discussion and remonstrance if their pendency had been seasonably announced. The
constitutional clause under discussion is intended to correct these evils; to prevent such
corrupting aggregations of incongruous measures, by confining each act to one subject; to
prevent surprise and inadvertence by requiring that subject or object to be expressed in the
title.
The Supreme court of the State of Alabama, in discussing the effect of the violation of a similar
provision of the constitution of that state in the cases of Walker vs. State (49 Ala., 329) and
Lindsay vs. United States Savings and Loan Association (120 Ala., 156), had the following to
say, quoting with approval, what Mr. Justice Cooley in his Constitutional Limitations, at page
143, had said upon that question:
The object sought to be accomplished, and the mischief proposed to be remedied by this
provision, are well known. . . . Legislative assemblies for the dispatch of business often pass
bills by their titles only, without requiring them to be read. A specious title sometimes covered
a legislation which, if its real character had been disclosed, would not have commanded assent.
To prevent surprise and fraud on the legislature is one of the purposes this provision was
intended to accomplish. Before the adoption of this provision, the title of a statute was often
no indication of its subject or contents. . . .
An evil this constitutional requirement was intended to correct was the blending in one and the
same statute of such things as were diverse in their nature, and were connected only to
combine in favor of all the advocates of each, thus often securing the passage of several
measures, no one of which could have succeeded on its own merits. Mr. Cooley thus sums up
his review of the authorities, defining the objects of this provision: It may, therefore, be
assumed as settled, that the purpose of these provisions was: First, to prevent hodge-podge,
or log-rolling legislation; second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature, by means of
provisions in bills of which the titles gave no information, and which might therefore be
overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and, third, to fairly apprise the people,
through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of
legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard
thereon, by petition or otherwise if they shall so desire. (49 Ala., 330, 331.)
The purposes of constitutional requirement must be borne steadily in mind, when it becomes
necessary to determine whether there has been legislative observance of it. The exposition of
these purposes by Judge Cooley is accepted, we believe, in all the states in which a like
limitation prevails. . . . (120 Ala., 172.)
In the case of People vs. Parks (58 Cal., 624) the Supreme Court of the State of California had
occasion to discuss the question now before us and said:
At the least, then two heterogeneous subjects are embraced in the act, one of which is not
expressed in the title, and they cannot be segregated. The title does not express the objects
of legislation embodied in the provisions of the act. It is, therefore, narrower than the body of
the act, and fails to impart that notice of the measures enacted, which the Constitution requires.
To prohibit such legislation was the sole end and aim of the constitutional requirement. The
practice, says the Supreme Court of Missouri, of comprising in one bill subjects of a diverse
and antagonistic nature, in order to combine in its support members who were in favor of
particular measures, but neither of which could command the requisite majority on its own
merits, was found to be not a corruptive influence in the Legislature itself, but destructive of
the best interests of the State. But this was not more detrimental than that other pernicious
practice, by which, through dexterous and unscrupulous management, designing men inserted
clauses in the bodies of bills, of the true meaning of which the titles gave no indication, and by
skillful maneuvering urged them on to their passage. These things led to fraud and injury, and
it was found necessary to apply a corrective in the shape of a constitutional provision. (City of
St. Louis vs. Tiefel, 42 Mo., 590.) The provision has been framed in the constitutions of many
of the States of the Union; and the courts, whenever it has come before them, have liberally
construed it as the will of the people in the interests of honest legislation.
Decisions to the same effect are found in the following cases: City of St. Louis vs. Tiefel (42
Mo., 578); Cannon vs. Mathes (8 Heisk [Tenn.], 504); Ryerson vs. Utley (16 Mich., 269); Board
of Public Education for the City of Americus vs. Barlow (49 Ga., 232); Spier vs. Baker (120
Cal., 370).
Mr. Justice Sutherland, in a further discussion of the question, at section 112 of his work on
Statutory Construction, said:
The efficiency of this constitutional remedy to cure the evil and mischief which has been
pointed out depends on judicial enforcement; on this constitutional injunction being regarded
as mandatory, and compliance with it essential to the validity of legislation. The mischief
existed notwithstanding the sworn official obligation of legislators; it might be expected to
continue notwithstanding that the obligation is formulated and emphasized in this constitutional
injunction, if it be construed as addressed exclusively to them, and only directory. It would, in
a general sense, be a dangerous doctrine to announce that any of the provisions of the
constitution may be obeyed or disregarded at the mere will or pleasure of the legislature, unless
it is clear beyond all question that such was intention of the framers of that instrument. It would
seem to be a lowering of the proper dignity of the fundamental law to say that it descends to
prescribing rules of order in unessential matters which may be followed or disregarded at
pleasure. The fact is this: That whatever constitutional provision can be looked upon as
directory merely is very likely to be treated by the legislature as if it was devoid of moral
obligation, and to be therefore habitually disregarded.
In the case of Cannon vs. Mathes, supra, Mr. Chief Justice Nicholson, in discussing the effect
of the violation of a constitutional provision like the one before us, said:
* * * This is a direct, positive, and imperative limitation upon the power of the Legislature. It
matters not that a bill has passed through three readings in each house, on three different
days, and has received the approval of the Governor; still it is not a law of the State if it
embraces more than one subject. . . .
The Supreme Court of Alabama, in the case of Walker vs. State, supra, said:
It is settled law of this court, founded on reasoning which seems to us unanswerable, that this
provision of the Constitution is not a mere rule of legislative procedure, directory to the general
assembly, but that it is mandatory, and it is the duty of courts to declare void any statute not
conforming to it. . . .
Mr. Justice Cooley in his valuable work on Constitutional Limitations (pp. 179. 180) states that
our courts have held, without exception, that such constitutional provision is mandatory.
Considering that the great weight of authority is to the effect that the provision like the one
above quoted from the Jones Law is mandatory; and considering that there is nothing in the
title of Act No. 3107 which indicates in the slightest degree that said Act contains a provision
"that justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have
reached the age of sixty-five years," we are forced to the conclusions that, that provision is
illegal, void and contrary to the mandatory provision of the Jones Law, and that said law (3107)
cannot be applied to justices and auxiliary justices of the peace who were appointed prior to
the 17th day of March, 1923; and that when Julio Agcaoili was forcibly, by means of threats
and intimidation, ordered to leave his office as justice of the peace, he was forced to do so
illegally, without just cause, and should therefore be restored to his position as justice of the
peace of the municipality of Laoag, without delay.
With reference to the second question above suggested, in re prescription or limitation of the
action, it may be said that originally there was no limitation or prescription of action in an action
for quo warranto, neither could there be, for the reason that it was an action by the Government
and prescription could not be plead as a defense to an action by the Government. The ancient
writ of quo warranto was a high prerogative writ in the nature of a writ of right by the King
against any one who usurped or claimed any office, franchise or liberty of the crown, to inquire
by what authority the usurper supported his claim, in order to determine the right. Even at the
present time in many of the civilized countries of the world the action is still regarded as a
prerogative writ and no limitation or prescription is permitted to bar the action. As a general
principle it may be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or penal, have no application
to quo warranto proceeding brought to enforce a public right. (McPhail vs. People ex rel.
Lambert, 160 Ill., 77; 52 Am. St. Rep., 306; People ex rel. Moloney vs. Pullman's Palace Car
Co., 175 Ill., 125; 64 L. R. A., 366.)
In all public matters a writ of quo warranto is a writ of right at the suit of the state, and issues
as a matter of course upon demand of the proper officer (State ex rel. Washington County vs.
Stone, 25 Mo., 555; Commonwealth vs. Allen, 128 Mass., 308), and the court has no authority
to withhold leave to file a petition therefor.
If the statute of limitation or prescription cannot run against the state, it is difficult to understand
how in the same action they may be used as a defense against a public officer who has been
forcibly, with threats and intimidation, ousted from a public office by the Government itself as
was done in the present case. The principle that acts of limitation do not bind the King (the
State) or the people, applies to proceeding by quo warranto, the rule being that the
representative of the state may file an information on behalf of the people at any time; and the
lapse of time constitutes no bar to the proceeding, in conformity with the maxim Nullum tempus
occurrit regi. (Catlett vs. People ex rel. States's Attorney, 151 Ill., 16.) For the state to claim
that the statutes of limitation do not apply to it and yet insist that it may plead such statutes to
bar the action of quo warranto brought by one of its public officials whom it itself has ousted
from office, appears to us to be unjust, unfair, unreasonable, and not within the contemplation
of sound jurisprudence.
So much of the general rule concerning limitation of action in quo warranto proceedings. Is
there a statute in the Philippine Islands of limitation, limiting the action of a public official of the
Government who has been duly appointed and qualified, and who has, by force and
intimidation, been ousted from such office, to defeat his action of quo warranto?
On the 7th day of August, 1901, the United States Philippine Commission adopted Act No. 190
which had been considered privately and publicly for several months theretofore. Its provisions
were published throughout the Philippine Islands long prior to its adoption. While said Act was
adopted on the 7th day of August, 1901, it did not take effect, even though it had been
published, until the 1st day of October, 1901. (Act No. 212.) An examination of said Act (190)
shows that it provides remedies for the usurpation of office or franchise, etc. (secs. 197-216).
Said Act No. 190 was published in both English and Spanish. Section 216, in English, provided
that "Nothing herein contained shall authorize an action against a corporation for forfeiture of
charter, unless the same be commenced within five years after the act complained of was done
or committed; nor shall an action be brought against an officer to be ousted from his office
unless within one year after the cause of such ouster, or the right to hold the office, arose."
The same section (216), as published in Spanish, reads as follows: "Ninguna de estas
disposiciones facultara la iniciacion de un juicio contra una corporacion por la perdida de sus
derechos de concesion, a menos que el juicio se lleve a efecto dento de los cinco años
siguente a la comision u omision del hecho objeto de la accion. Tampocose podra iniciar un
juicio la persona que ejerza un cargo en una corporaciuon para desposeerla, a menos que se
lleve a efecto dentro del año siguente a la fecha de la comision del hecho que dio motivo a su
privacion, o que se puso en duda su derecho para ocupar el cargo."
Said section (216), as published in Spanish and translated into English, reads as follows:
"Nothing herein contained shall authorize an action against a corporation for forfeiture of its
corporate rights, unless the same be commenced within five years after the commission or
omission complained of took place. Neither may an action be brought against an officer to oust
him from office, unless the same is commenced within one year after the commission of the
act which caused the deprivation thereof, or after the right to hold the office arose."
Said section 216, as above quoted in Spanish, was published in vol. 1 of the Public Laws of
the Philippine Islands and distributed to the public officers throughout the Philippine Islands. It
is a fact of general information that even now, in 1926, the Spanish copy of the Public Laws
are consulted by the people in remote parts of the Philippine Islands for the purpose of knowing
what the law is. It is not strange, therefore, that the appellant did not believe that said section
216 applied to public officers; that it only applied to officers of corporations as it appeared in
the Spanish translation. Is it just and fair and reasonable for the Government of the Philippine
Islands to oust one of its officers from an office to which he had been legally appointed, by
force and intimidation and without just cause, and then to defeat his action in quo warranto by
invoking the provisions of a public statute, different from the one which the Government itself
had furnished its public officers? The appellant is familiar with the Spanish but not with the
English language. He naturally relied upon the Spanish version of the law for his information
as to what the law really was. Not only had the appellant the right to rely upon the provisions
of section 216 as they appeared in Spanish in the Public Laws of the Philippine Islands, but
the reading of the three or four sections immediately preceding section 216 will show that they
refer specifically to corporations only. The appellant, therefore, was justified in believing that
said section 216 as it appeared in Spanish was correct. At least the Government should give
him credit with having in good faith.
But, even granting that the appellant is bound by the provisions of section 216 as it appears in
English, is the same applicable to the appellant? By reference to said section above quoted in
English, it will be seen that after the word "committed" there is a semicolon. Does that which
follows the semicolon have reference to the same subject matter which precedes it? A
semicolon is a mark of grammatical punctuation, in the English language, to indicate a
separation in the relation of the thought, a degree greater than that expressed by a comma,
and what follows that semicolon must have relation to the same matter which precedes it. A
semicolon is not used for the purpose of introducing a new idea. A semicolon is used for the
purpose of continuing the expression of a thought, a degree greater than that expressed by a
mere comma. It is never used for the purpose of introducing a new idea. The comma and
semicolon are both used for the same purpose, namely, to divide sentences and parts of the
sentences, the only difference being that the semicolon makes the division a little more
pronounced than the comma. The punctuation used in a law may always be referred to for the
purpose of ascertaining the true meaning of a doubtful statute. It follows therefore that,
inasmuch as all of the provisions of said section 216 which precede the semicolon refer to
corporations only, that which follows the semicolon has reference to the same subject matter,
or to officers of a corporation.
But even granting, for the sake of the argument, that the word "officer" as used in the latter
part of said section applies to public officers who have been ousted from their position, and
not only to officers of corporations, then we have the question presented: Had the one year
mentioned in said section expired on the 23d day of April, 1925, when the first complaint, was
filed in the present action? When did the year begin to run if said section is applicable to the
appellant?
It will be remembered that on the 7th day of July, 1923, the appellant was ousted from his
office as justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag. Not only did he surrender his office
on that date under protest, but also on the 28th day of April, 1923, when he was notified by the
Secretary of Justice that he cease to be a justice of the peace of his municipality, he then
protested and gave a long and lucid argument in support of his protest. In all justice to him, did
he not have a right, without any legal action to protect his right, to await the solution of his
protest of the 28th day of April, 1923? He had a right to believe that the grounds upon which
his protest was based would be convincing to the Secretary of Justice and that he would not
be removed. Until this very hour the record contains no reply from the Secretary of Justice and
no answer whatever to the legal grounds presented by the appellant upon his right to continue
as justice of the peace and not to be ousted.
In our opinion even granting that section 216 is applicable to the appellant, the period of
prescription had not begun and run at the time of the commencement of the present action.
He was justified in delaying the commencement of his action until an answer to his protest had
been made. He had right to await the answer to his protest, in the confident belief that it would
be resolved in his favor and that action would unnecessary.
It is contended, however, that the question before us was answered and resolved against the
contention of the appellant in the case of Bautista vs. Fajardo (38 Phil., 624). In that case no
question was raised nor was it even suggested that said section 216 did not apply to a public
officer. That question was not discussed nor referred to by any of the parties interested in that
case. It has been frequently decided that the fact that a statute has been accepted as valid,
and invoked and applied for many years in cases where its validity was not raised or passed
on, does not prevent a court from later passing on its validity, where the question is squarely
and properly raised and presented, Where a question passes the court sub silentio, the case
in which the question was so passed is not binding on the Court (McGirr vs. Hamilton and
Abreu, 30 Phil., 563), nor should it be considered as a precedent. (U. S. vs. Noriega and Tobias,
31 Phil., 310; Chicote vs. Acasio, 31 Phil., 401; U. S. vs. More, 3 Cranch [U. S.], 159, 172; U.
S. vs. Sanges, 144 U. S., 310, 319; Cross vs. Burke, 146 U. S., 82.) For the reasons given in
the case of McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu, supra, the decision in the case of Bautista vs.
Fajardo, supra, can have no binding force in the interpretation of the question presented here.
The present case is anomalous under American sovereignty. An officer was appointed in
accordance with the law to the judiciary to serve "during good behavior." After he had faithfully
and honestly served the Government for a number of years the legislature adopted a new law
which arbitrarily, without giving any reason therefore, provided that said officer cease to be
such when he should reach the age of 65 years. Said law contained no express provision or
method for its enforcement. The Executive Department, through its Undersecretary of Justice,
without any authority given in said law, notified the said officer that he was no longer an officer
in the judicial department of the Government and must vacate his office and turn the same
over to another, who was designated by said Undersecretary. When the officer protested
against such arbitrary action, giving reasons therefor, and without answering said protest, he
was threatened with a criminal prosecution if he did not immediately vacate his office. The
history of this case reads more like a story of the Arabian Nights than like a procedure under
a well-organized Government. It seems impossible to believe, and we could not believe it, were
the facts not actually supported by the record.
Why the Undersecretary of Justice did not follow the orderly procedure marked out by Act No.
190 is not explained. The appellant was given no hearing. Even his protest, couched in most
humble and respectful language, fell upon deaf ears. Absolute indifference was shown to the
respectful protest and the able argument given in support thereof. The only answer to his
protest was a threat of a criminal prosecution if he did not vacate his office. His humility was
met with austereness. His humble petition was met with a threat. His patient waiting for a reply
to his protest was ended by a demand that he be prosecuted for refusing to comply with an
order by one who was not willing to follow the well-defined and well-beaten road of "due
process of law" by preferring charges and giving the appellant an opportunity to be heard and
to defend his right. Nothing of that character took place. The whole procedure, from beginning
to end, in ousting the appellant from an office to which he had been legally appointed and
against whom no complaint has been made, is anomalous in the jurisprudence under the
American flag.
Believing as I do, that the success of free institutions depends upon a rigid adherence to the
fundamentals of the law, I have never yielded, and I hope that I may never yield, to
considerations of expediency in expounding it. There is also some plausible reason for the
latitudinarian constructions which are resorted to for the purpose of acquiring power — some
evil to be avoided, or some good to be attained by pushing the powers of the Government
beyond their legitimate boundary. It is by yielding to such influences that the courts and
legislatures are gradually undermining and finally overthrowing constitutions. It is by yielding
to such influences that constitutions are gradually undermined and finally overthrown. It has
been, and is my purpose, so far as it is possible for me, to follow the fundamental law does not
work well the people or the legislature may amend it. If, however, the legislature or the courts
undertake to cure defects in the law by forced and unnatural constructions, they inflict a would
upon the constitution of the state which nothing can cure. One step taken by the legislature or
the judiciary in enlarging the powers of the Government, opens the door for another which will
be sure to follow; and so the process goes on until all respect for the fundamental law is lost
and the powers of the Government are just what those in authority are pleased to call them.
(Oakley vs. Aspinwall, 3 Comstock [N. Y.], 547, 568.) I cannot give my consent to a rule or
doctrine which will permit a Government to throw an honest and efficient official out of office
without reason and without authority of law, refuse to consider a protest, and then permit the
application of a law to prevent a recovery of that which he has lost illegally and without reason.
The judgment appealed from should be revoked, and a judgment should be entered ordering
the restoration of the appellant to the office from which he was illegally rejected. We should
follow the effect of the doctrine announced solemnly by this court in the case of Segovia vs.
Noel (47 Phil., 543). So ordered.
Villamor, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Johns, J., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
MALCOLM, J., concurring and dissenting:
(1) I concur in so much of the opinion of Mr. Justice Johnson as relates to the legal issue
presented in the lower court and here, pertaining to the question of whether or not the present
action was barred by the Statute of Limitations, and in entire accord with the reversal of the
judgment and the reinstatement of Julio Agcaoili, the appellant, in his office as justice of the
peace of Laoag, Ilocos Norte. My reasons are these:
(A) Act No. 3107, providing that justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed
to serve until they have reached the age of 65 years, should not be given retroactive effect.
That was expressly decided in the analogous case of Segovia vs. Noel ([1925], 47 Phil., 543).
(B) Plaintiff's action is not barred by the provisions of section 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
That section particularly confines itself to an action "against a corporation." Thereafter following
a semicolon, comes the clause "nor shall an action be brought against an officer," which plainly
relates back to "corporation." Otherwise, the new idea would neither have been expressed in
a separate section or in a separate sentence. That this is true is further borne out by the
Spanish transaction, making use of the phrase "la persona que ejerza un cargo en una
corporacion," which we are privileged to consult to explain an ambiguity in the English text.
(C) Even under the supposition the section 216 of the code of Civil Procedure applies, still it is
not clear that one year has elapse "after the cause of such ouster, . . . arose." In reality, no
cause for ouster has arisen since it was an erroneous interpretation of the law which met with
the disposal of the Supreme Court, which resulted in the attempt to force Mr. Agcaoili out of
the office and to place the auxiliary justice of the peace on office. The most that could be said
of the attempted ouster is that the auxiliary justice of the peace became a justice of the
peace de facto.
(2) I dissent from so much of the opinion of Mr. Justice Johnson, as discusses the question of
whether or not the provisions of act No. 3107 are costitutional, as unnecessary to a decision,
as not submitted for decision, and so as entirely uncancelled for.
The complaint for quo warranto presented in the court of first Instance contained the usual
allegations without, however, making any reference at all to the constitutionality of Act No. No.
3107. the answer set up presentation. The trial judge announcing the theories of the parties
said: "The defense of the defendant is that the action brought by the plaintiff has prescribed
because since July 7, 1923, when he left his office, no complaint was filed until April 23, 1925,
and, therefore, more than one year had elapsed. The plaintiff in turn alleges that there is no
such prescription," and then proceeded to deny the petition. On appeal this court, the errors
assigned by Mr. Agcaoili as appellant are these:
(1) The lower court erred in holding that the action of the petitioner had prescribed on account
of the same not having been brought within one year from July 7, 1923, when by an illegal
order of the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, the petitioner forcibly ceased to discharge the
duties of the office of justice of the peace of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, and respondent assumed
said office and began to act as such justice of the peace.
(2) The lower court erred in applying tot he instant case the provisions of section 216 of act
No. 190 (Code of Civil Procedure).
(3) The lower court erred in finding that the period of prescription must be counted from July 7,
1923, instead of March 4, 1925.
(4) The lower court finally erred in not granting the relief invoked by the petitioner; in not ousting
the respondent from the office of justice of the peace of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, in not reinstating
the petitioner in said office and in not sentencing the respondent to pay the costs and damages
caused to the petitioner in the sum of P5,000."
There is not one word either in appellant's brief or in appellee's brief on the subject of the
constitutionality of Act No. 3107.
Had not the constitutional question been discussed and decided without it being suggested
anywhere in the bill of executions, in the assignments of error, on in the briefs, it would hardly
be necessary to cite well known principles as these:
It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a legislative enactment void is one
which the judge, cconscious of the fallibility of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising
in any case where he can consciously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the
responsibility. . . .
. . . The task . . . is a delicate one, and only to be entered upon with reluctance and hesitation. . . .
Neither will a court, as a general rule pass a constitutional question, and decided a statute to
be invalid, unless a decision upon that very point becomes necessary to the determination of
the cause. "While courts cannot shun the discussion of constitutional questions when fairly
presented, they will not go out of their way to find such topics. They will not seek to draw in
such weighty matters collaterally, nor on trivial occasions. It is both more proper and more
respectful to a coordinate department to discuss constitutional questions only when that is the
very lis mota . . ." (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., pp. 227, 228, 231.)
STREET, J., dissenting:
This is an action of quo warranto instituted in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte by Julio
Agcaoili for the purpose of restoring his restoration to the office of justice of peace of Laoag
and to secure the removal of the defendant, Alfredo Saguitan, from the present employment
of the same office. Upon hearing the cause of the trial judge, while recognizing the theoritical
right of the plaintiff's right of section had been barred by the limitation prescribed in section 216
of the Code of Civil Procedure. He therefore denied the writ, with half costs, and the plaintiff
appealed.
It appears that on March 25, 1916, the plaintiff was appointed by the Governor-general to the
office of Justice of the peace of Laoag, in the Province of Ilocos Norte, effective from April 10,
1916, subject to the conditions prescribed by law. This appointment was approved by the
Philippine Senate, and the plaintiff entered upon the discharged of his duties in due course. At
that time there was no age limit upon the tenure of office of justices of the peace, but on March
17, 1923, act No. 3107 of the Philippine Legislature went into effect. By this Act, appointment
of justices of the peace, was amended by the addition of a proviso to the first auxiliary justices
of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years."
In the year 1923 the plaintiff herein had attained the age of 65; and the Secretary of Justice,
supposing that was applicable to the case, brought Administrative Code was applicable tot he
case, brought administrative pressure to bear upon the plaintiff, with the result that the plaintiff
ceased to exercise the functions of justice of the peace for Laoag and the Governor-General
to the same office. This appointment having been approved by the Senate, the said Suguitan
entered upon the discharge of the duties thereof.
On March 4, 1925, this court promulgated the decision in the case of segovia vs. Noel (47 Phil.,
543), wherein we decided that the amendment contained in Act No. 3107 to section 203 of the
Administrative Code should be given prospective application only, with the result that said
provisions is not applicable to a justice of the peace appointed prior to enactment of the
amendatory law. When this decision was promulgated it came to the attention of the plaintiff,
and the present action was stipulated by him shortly thereafter for the purpose of obtaining his
restoration to the office. Practically the only defense insisted upon in the court below was to
the effect that the action had prescribed under the one-year limitation; and the only question
made in this appeal arises upon the application of said section.
It appears from he record that the plaintiff was ousted from office on July 7, 1923, and that the
defendant, as auxiliary justice of the peace, then entered upon the discharge of the duties of
the office, by direction of Governor-General Wood, in the character of a temporary appointee
to the vacancy. Later, as already stated, Suguitan entered upon the discharged of the duties
of the office under commission from the Governor-General, approved by the Philippine Senate,
effective from December 13, 1923. It is therefore apparent that more than a full year had elapse
between the removal of the plaintiff from office and the date of the institution of the present
action; and more than a year had also elapsed later the defendant began the discharge of the
duties of the office as a regularly commissioned justice of the peace.
The section of the Code of civil Procedure, the application of which is here in question, reads,
in English, as follows:
SEC. 216. Limitations. — Nothing herein continued shall authorized an action against a
corporation for forfeiture of charter, unless the same be commenced within five years after the
act complained of was done or committed; nor shall an action be brought against an officer to
be ousted from his office unless within one year after the cause of such ouster, or the right to
hold the office arose.
The same section as it stands in a current version of the Spanish translation differ somewhat,
in the second member from the English version, a s will be seen by comparing the Spanish
version, which reads as follows:
ART. 216. De las limitaciones. — Ninguna de estates disposiciones facultara la perdida de

sus derechos de concesion, a menos que el jioco se lleve a efecto dentro de los cinco anos
sigientes a la comision u omision del hecho objecto de la accion. Tampoco se podra inciar un
juicio contra la persona que ejerza un cargo en una corporacion para desposeerla, a menos
que se lleve a fecto dentro del año siguinte la fecha de la comision del hecho que dio motivo
a su privacion, o que se puso en duda su derecho para ocupar el cargo.
Upon comparison of these version it will be seen that the word office (cargo) in the second
sentenced of the Spanish version is qualified by the expression "en una corporacion." The
plaintiff, relying upon the Spanish version, insist that the provision is not applicable to a public
office, like that of justice of the peace; and it is further insisted that the whole section deals
exclusively with the subject of the writ of quo warranto as used against a corporation or against
a person in possession of a corporate office.
I am unable to accede to this view of the law. Upon examination of section 197 to 216, inclusive,
of the Code of Civil Procedure, it will be found that two subjects are there threated, namely,
usurpation of franchise by corporation and usurpation of office; and the evident purpose of this
part of the Code is to define the conditions under which the writ of quo warranto may be final
section (sec. 216) dealing with the subject, a limitation is prescribe for both. The first member
of the section, down as far as the semicolon in the English version, prescribes a limitation of
five years upon any action instituted against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter. In the
matter following the semicolon is found the limitation appropriate to the case where instituted
to oust the incumbent and to secure the office for the person unlawfully kept from the
occupancy thereof. The prescription established for this case is one year.
A careful perusal of the section, in connection with related provisions of the Code, leaves no
room for doubt that have actions over public of the section was instituted to apply to actions
over public officer as well as corporate offices; and in this sense said provision has been
applied by this court. (Bautista vs. Fajardo, 38 Phil., 624.) The author, or authors, of the Code
of Civil Procedure could hardly have intended for this provision to be applied only to corporate
officers, since there is a public interest in public offices which requires there should be a
prescriptive provision applicable to actions over these offices no less than to actions over the
offices of corporations. The insertion "en una corporacion" after the word "cargo" was evidently
a mere mistake, resulting from a superficial attention to the context; and it will be found that in
the Spanish edition to the Code of civil Procedure edited by C. M. Recto this phrase has been
dropped. It goes without saying that the English version of the Code of civil Procedure is
controlling, and in case of conflict the courts must be governed by this version. The suggestion
contained in the opinion of the court of the Spanish language is novel and if followed by us in
the future will be the source of much uncertainty in the interpretation and application of our
statutes.
The opinion of the court contains a lengthy dissertion intended to demonstrate that the
amendment of section 203 of the Administrative Code contained in act No. 3107 is
unconstitutional, for defect in the title of the Act. With this provision I am also unable to agree.
The title to act No. 3107 begins with theses words: "An Act to amend and repeal certain
provisions of the Administrative Code in my opinion broad enough to include the amendment
of section 203 relating the analysis of Title IV of the Administrative Code it will be found that
justices of the peace are; and although the provisions of act No. 3107 are variously, they have
this in common, that they deal with different parts of the judiciary establishment and are
intended that a pronouncement as to the constitutionality of the amendment in question was
by no means called for in this case, not only because the point was not raised in the discussion
of the case but for the further reason that we the plaintiff.
RESOLUTION UPON PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION
February 26, 1926
The clerk having before it for consideration, (a) the motion of Alberto Suguitan for a
reconsideration of the decision of the court promulgated on February 13, 1926, and (b) the
motion of the Secretary of Justice, praying for leave to appear in the said decision in relation
with said motions, it is hereby ordered and decreed that said decision heretofore
announcement, be modified, to the end that the decision of all the questions involved ins aid
decision be limited tot he following alone:
(a) That said act No. 3107 can have no application to the petitioner herein, following the
doctrine heretofore announced in the case of Segovia vs. Noel (47 Phil., 543); and,
(b) That the defense of the limitation or prescription contended for by the respondent does not
apply to the petitioner under the particular facts of this cause. Modifying the decision heretofore
announced, as herein indicated, and basing the decision upon the two grounds above-
mentioned only the eliminating all remarks made about the action and conduct of the Acting
Secretary of Justice, said motions are hereby denied. Avanceña, C. J., Street and Ostrand,
JJ., adhering tot he dissenting opinion heretofore promulgated, concur nevertheless in this
resolution.
Avanceña, C.J. and Ostrand, J., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-9912 May 23, 1957
ROMULO CUYO, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
THE CITY MAYOR, BAGUIO CITY, ET. AL., respondents-appellants.
Pablo C. Sanidad and Herminegildo S. Cruz for appellee.

Assistant City Attorney Santiago C. Gregorio for appellants.
CONCEPCION, J.:
On June 5, 1951, petitioner Romulo Cuyo, a regular member of the Baguio Police Department
since February 20, 1946, was suspended from office pending investigation, by councilor Luis
Lardizabal of the City of Baguio, of the administrative charges preferred against him (Cuyo) by
the then City Mayor, involving alleged irregularities in the performance of his duties and
violation of law and duty, said to have been committed as follows:
December 31, 1946, Administrative charge filed against him for Insubordination and
Reprehensible Conduct;
October 21, 1948, Conduct Unbecoming a Peace Officer, for which he was reprimanded and
warned; "April 16, 1951, Telling a Lie, for which he was severely reprimanded;
May 13, 1951, Abandoning his Post Without Proper Relief and Authority; and
May 16, 1951, Absent Without Leave (AWOL). (Folder of Exhibits, p. 5.)
In line with the report of the investigation conducted by said councilor, who found Cuyo guilty
of said charges, on July 20, 1951, the City Council of Baguio passed Resolution No. 204
ordering his dismissal effective, on June 5, 1951. On appeal taken therefrom the Civil Service
Commissioner, in a decision dated December 20, 1951, held — after considering that Cuyo
had already been punished for the individual offenses aforementioned, and that, being
responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in the City of Baguio, the City Council and
its Mayor should have some discretion in the choice of the members of its police forces — that
said officers of the City were not guilty of abuse of discretion and that there was "nothing
reversible" in said resolution of the City Council. The dispositive part of said decision, however,
reads:
Wherefore, and in line with the action taken by this Office in the case of Patrolman Quintin
Bugasto of the same organization, respondent-appellant Cuyo should be, as he is hereby
transferred to another branch of the Baguio City Government. The decision ordering his
dismissal from the service is thus modified. (Folder of Exhibits, p. 11.)
A reconsideration of this decision was denied by the Commissioner of Civil Service on March
13, 1952. On August 1, 1955, Cuyo instituted the present action, for mandamus and damages,
in the Court of First Instance of Baguio, against its Mayor, Council and Treasurer. In his petition
he prays:
(1) that the investigation had, and the decision made in the administrative charge against the
petitioner be declared, illegal, null and void ab initio;
(2) that the respondent City Mayor of Baguio be ordered to reinstate the petitioner as member
of the Baguio City Police Department;
(3) that the respondents be ordered to pay to the petitioner his salary from June 5, 1951, until
actually reinstated;
(4) that the respondents be condemned to pay to the petitioner the sum of P1,000.00 as
attorney's fees, plus the costs of this suit; and
(5) that the petitioner be granted all reliefs and remedies deemed just and equitable in the
premises.
In due course, said court rendered a decision, the dispositive part of which follows:
Judgment is, therefore, rendered against Respondents, ordering them to place Petitioner in
another branch of the City Government; Petitioner shall be entitled to his back pay as
policeman from June 5, 1951; No attorney's fees are awarded Petitioner as this is a case of
good faith on the part of Respondents; No special pronouncement as to costs.
The case is now before us on appeal taken by the respondents. Petitioner maintains that his
dismissal by the City Council of Baguio is null and void, the administrative charges preferred
against him having been investigated, not by said Council, but by one of its members, in
violation of Republic Act No. 557, as construed in Festejo vs. Municipal Mayor of Nabua (96
Phil., 286, 51. Off. Gaz., 121.). Indeed, we have repeatedly held that administrative charges
against members of the local police force must, pursuant to Republic Act No. 557, be
investigated by the Municipal or City Council, and that an investigation conducted by, either a
member, or a committee thereof, is null and void, even if the Council shall have approved the
action and recommendation of its investigating member or committee (see
Covacha vs. Amante, L-8358, May 25, 1956: Carmona vs. Amante, 99 Phil., 716:
Sennarillos vs. Hermosisima, 100 Phil., 501, 53 Off. Gaz., [4] 1043)
It is, also, settled, however, that the reinstatement of an officer illegally dismissed may not be
secured by mandamus, if the action therefor is filed over one (1) year after his dismissal. The
reason for this rule is that the right to a public office may be lost by abandonment thereof,
which may be deduced from his failure to seek reinstatement within said period of one (1) year
(Florentino Jose, Jr., vs. Arsenio H. Lacson, L-10477, May 17, 1957; Unabia vs. Hon. City
Mayor, 99 Phil., 253), and that "it is not proper that the title to public office should be subjected
to continued uncertainty, and people's interest requires that such right should be determined
as speedily as practicable" (Tumulak vs. Egay, 82 Phil., 828, 48 Off. Gaz., 3693, 3695)
In the case at bar, Cuyo's motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Commissioner of
Civil Service, substantially affirming the action taken by the City Council of Baguio, was denied
by said officer on March 13, 1952. Although the resolution of said Council, dismissing Cuyo,
was modified by the Commissioner of Civil Service, in the sense that petitioner "should be, as
he is hereby transferred to another branch of the Baguio City Government," the latter,
seemingly, understood the decision of said Commissioner as sustaining the removal of Cuyo
from the police force. What is more, said decision, as well as the attitude or inaction of the City
Government of Baguio, was similarly construed by the petitioner, for, in his petition herein,
Cuyo alleges that he "should not have been separated as member of the police force of the
City of Baguio, until and unless he is "transferred to another branch of the City Government of
Baguio" in accordance with the decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service" (paragraph VII),
and that "respondents failed and still fail, neglected and still neglect, refused and still refuse
to reinstate the petitioner to his position as member of the Baguio City Police Department"
(paragraph VIII). In other words, Cuyo understood the aforementioned decision as authorizing
his dismissal from said department, upon his transfer to another branch of the City
Government, and regarded the action taken by the latter as amounting to his removal from the
police force, prior to said transfer, and, yet, he did not bring this case until August 1, 1955, or
about three (3) years and five (5) months after the denial of his aforesaid motion for
reconsideration. Hence, regardless of the legality or illegality of the aforementioned resolution
of the City Council of Baguio, Cuyo's petition for mandamus is barred by the implied
abandonment of his office and, also, by laches. As a consequence, his claims for backpay and
damages must, also, fail.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from must be, as it is hereby reversed, and the petition
dismissed, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia
and Felix, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12767 November 16, 1918
In the matter of the estate of EMIL H. JOHNSON. EBBA INGEBORG

JOHNSON, applicant-appellant,
Hartigan & Welch for applicant and appellant.

Hartford Beaumont for Victor Johnson and others as appellees.
Chas. E. Tenney for Alejandra Ibañez de Johnson, personally and as guardian,
and for Simeona Ibañez, appellees.
STREET, J.:
On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the
United States, died in the city of Manila, leaving a will, dated September 9, 1915, by which he
disposed of an estate, the value of which, as estimated by him, was P231,800. This document
is an holographic instrument, being written in the testator's own handwriting, and is signed by
himself and two witnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by section 618 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. This will, therefore, was not executed in conformity with the provisions of
law generally applicable to wills executed by inhabitants of these Islands, and hence could not
have been proved under section 618.
On February 9, 1916, however, a petition was presented in the Court of First Instance of the
city of Manila for the probate of this will, on the ground that Johnson was at the time of his
death a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States of America; that the will was duly executed
in accordance with the laws of that State; and hence could properly be probated here pursuant
to section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This section reads as follows:
Will made here by alien. — A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of
another state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country
of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his
own state or country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall
have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands.
The hearing on said application was set for March 6, 1916, and three weeks publication of
notice was ordered in the "Manila Daily Bulletin." Due publication was made pursuant to this
order of the court. On March 6, 1916, witnesses were examined relative to the execution of
the will; and upon March 16th thereafter the document was declared to be legal and was
admitted to probate. At the same time an order was made nominating Victor Johnson and John
T. Pickett as administrators of the estate, with the sill annexed. Shortly thereafter Pickett
signified his desire not to serve, and Victor Johnson was appointed sole administrator.
By the will in question the testator gives to his brother Victor one hundred shares of the
corporate stock in the Johnson-Pickett Rope Company; to his father and mother in Sweden,
the sum of P20,000; to his daughter Ebba Ingeborg, the sum of P5,000; to his wife, Alejandra
Ibañez, the sum of P75 per month, if she remains single; to Simeona Ibañez, spinster, P65 per
month, if she remains single. The rest of the property is left to the testator's five children —
Mercedes, Encarnacion, Victor, Eleonor and Alberto.
The biographical facts relative to the deceased necessary to an understanding of the case are
these: Emil H. Johnson was born in Sweden, May 25, 1877, from which country he emigrated
to the United States and lived in Chicago, Illinois, from 1893 to 1898. On May 9, 1898, at
Chicago, he was married to Rosalie Ackeson, and immediately thereafter embarked for the
Philippine Islands as a soldier in the Army of the United States. As a result of relations between
Johnson and Rosalie Ackeson a daughter, named Ebba Ingeborg, was born a few months
after their marriage. This child was christened in Chicago by a pastor of the Swedish Lutheran
Church upon October 16, 1898.
After Johnson was discharged as a soldier from the service of the United States he continued
to live in the Philippine Islands, and on November 20, 1902, the wife, Rosalie Johnson, was
granted a decree of divorce from him in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, on the ground
of desertion. A little later Johnson appeared in the United States on a visit and on January 10,
1903, procured a certificate of naturalization at Chicago. From Chicago he appears to have
gone to Sweden, where a photograph, exhibited in evidence in this case, was taken in which
he appeared in a group with his father, mother, and the little daughter, Ebba Ingeborg, who
was then living with her grandparents in Sweden. When this visit was concluded, the deceased
returned to Manila, where he prospered in business and continued to live until his death.
In this city he appears to have entered into marital relations with Alejandra Ibañez, by whom
he had three children, to wit, Mercedes, baptized May 31, 1903; Encarnacion, baptized April
29, 1906; and Victor, baptized December 9, 1907. The other two children mentioned in the will
were borne to the deceased by Simeona Ibañez.
On June 12, 1916, or about three months after the will had been probated, the attorneys for
Ebba Ingeborg Johnson entered an appearance in her behalf and noted an exception to the
other admitting the will to probate. On October 31, 1916, the same attorneys moved the court
to vacate the order of March 16 and also various other orders in the case. On February 20,
1917, this motion was denied, and from this action of the trial court the present appeal has
been perfected.
As will be discerned, the purpose of the proceeding on behalf of the petitioner is to annul the
decree of probate and put the estate into intestate administration, thus preparing the way for
the establishment of the claim of the petitioner as the sole legitimate heir of her father.
The grounds upon which the petitioner seeks to avoid the probate are four in number and may
be stated, in the same sequence in which they are set forth in the petition, as follows:
(1) Emil H. Johnson was a resident of the city of Manila and not a resident of the State of Illinois
at the time the will in question was executed;
(2) The will is invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal property in the State of Illinois;
(3) The order admitting the will to probate was made without notice to the petitioner; and
(4) The order in question was beyond the jurisdiction of the court.
It cannot of course be maintained that a court of first instance lacks essential jurisdiction over
the probate of wills. The fourth proposition above stated must, accordingly, be interpreted in
relation with the third and must be considered as a corollary deduced from the latter. Moreover,
both the third and fourth grounds stated take precedence, by reason of their more fundamental
implications, over the first two; and a logical exposition of the contentions of the petitioner is
expressed in the two following propositions:
(I) The order admitting the will to probate was beyond the jurisdiction of the court and void
because made without notice to the petitioner;
(II) The judgment from which the petitioner seeks relief should be set aside because the
testator was not a resident of the State of Illinois and the will was not in conformity with the
laws of that State.
In the discussion which is to follow we shall consider the problems arising in this cae in the
order last above indicated. Upon the question, then, of the jurisdiction of the court, it is apparent
from an inspection of the record of the proceedings in the court below that all the steps
prescribed by law as prerequisites to the probate of a will were complied with in every respect
and that the probate was effected in external conformity with all legal requirements. This much
is unquestioned. It is, however, pointed out in the argument submitted in behalf of the petitioner,
that, at the time the court made the order of publication, it was apprised of the fact that the
petitioner lived in the United States and that as daughter and heir she was necessarily
interested in the probate of the will. It is, therefore, insisted that the court should have appointed
a date for the probate of the will sufficiently far in the future to permit the petitioner to be present
either in person or by representation; and it is said that the failure of the court thus to postpone
the probate of the will constitutes an infringement of that provision of the Philippine Bill which
declared that property shall not be taken without due process of law.
On this point we are of the opinion that the proceedings for the probate of the will were regular
and that the publication was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding
and to allow the will to be probated.
As was said in the case of In re Davis (136 Cal., 590, 596), "the proceeding as to the probate
of a will is essentially one in rem, and in the very nature of things the state is allowed a wide
latitude in determining the character of the constructive notice to be given to the world in a
proceeding where it has absolute possession of the res. It would be an exceptional case where
a court would declare a statute void, as depriving a party of his property without due process
of law, the proceeding being strictly in rem, and the res within the state, upon the ground that
the constructive notice prescribed by the statute was unreasonably short."
In that case the petitioner had been domiciled in the Hawaiian Islands at the time of the
testator's death; and it was impossible, in view of the distance and means of communication
then existing, for the petitioner to appear and oppose the probate on the day set for the hearing
in California. It was nevertheless held that publication in the manner prescribed by statute
constituted due process of law. (See Estate of Davis, 151 Cal., 318; Tracy vs. Muir, 151 Cal.,
363.)
In the Davis case (136 Cal., 590) the court commented upon the fact that, under the laws of
California, the petitioner had a full year within which she might have instituted a proceeding to
contest the will; and this was stated as one of the reasons for holding that publication in the
manner provided by statute was sufficient. The same circumstance was commented upon in
O'Callaghan vs. O'Brien (199 U. S., 89), decided in the Supreme Court of the United States.
This case arose under the laws of the State of Washington, and it was alleged that a will had
been there probated without the notice of application for probate having been given as required
by law. It was insisted that this was an infringement of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States. This contention was, however, rejected and it was held that
the statutory right to contest the will within a year was a complete refutation of the argument
founded on the idea of a violation of the due process provision.
The laws of these Islands, in contrast with the laws in force in perhaps all of the States of the
American Union, contain no special provision, other than that allowing an appeal in the probate
proceedings, under which relief of any sort can be obtained from an order of a court of first
instance improperly allowing or disallowing a will. We do, however, have a provision of a
general nature authorizing a court under certain circumstances to set aside any judgment,
order, or other proceeding whatever. This provision is found in section 113 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which reads as follows:
Upon such terms as may be just the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from
a judgment, order or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence,
surprise or excusable neglect; Provided, That application therefor be made within a reasonable
time, but in no case exceeding six months after such judgment, order, or proceeding was taken.
The use of the word "judgment, order or other proceeding" in this section indicates an intention
on the part of the Legislature to give a wide latitude to the remedy here provided, and in our
opinion its operation is not to be restricted to judgments or orders entered in ordinary
contentious litigation where a plaintiff impleads a defendant and brings him into court by
personal service of process. In other words the utility of the provision is not limited to actions
proper but extends to all sorts of judicial proceedings.
In the second section of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that the provisions of this
Code shall be liberally construed to promote its object and to assist the parties in obtaining
speedy justice. We think that the intention thus exhibited should be applied in the interpretation
of section 113; and we hold that the word "party," used in this section, means any person
having an interest in the subject matter of the proceeding who is in a position to be concluded
by the judgment, order, to other proceeding taken.
The petitioner, therefore, in this case could have applied, under the section cited, at any time
within six months for March 16, 1916, and upon showing that she had been precluded from
appearing in the probate proceedings by conditions over which she had no control and that
the order admitting the will to probate had been erroneously entered upon insufficient proof or
upon a supposed state of facts contrary to the truth, the court would have been authorized to
set the probate aside and grant a rehearing. It is no doubt true that six months was, under the
circumstances, a very short period of time within which to expect the petitioner to appear and
be prepared to contest the probate with the proof which she might have desired to collect from
remote countries. Nevertheless, although the time allowed for the making of such application
was inconveniently short, the remedy existed; and the possibility of its use is proved in this
case by the circumstance that on June 12, 1916, she in fact here appeared in court by her
attorneys and excepted to the order admitting the will to probate.
It results that, in conformity with the doctrine announced in the Davis case, above cited, the
proceedings in the court below were conducted in such manner as to constitute due process
of law. The law supplied a remedy by which the petitioner might have gotten a hearing and
have obtained relief from the order by which she is supposed to have been injured; and though
the period within which the application should have been made was short, the remedy was
both possible and practicable.
From what has been said it follows that the order of March 16, 1916, admitting the will of Emil
H. Johnson to probate cannot be declared null and void merely because the petitioner was
unavoidably prevented from appearing at the original hearing upon the matter of the probate
of the will in question. Whether the result would have been the same if our system of procedure
had contained no such provision as that expressed in section 113 is a matter which we need
not here consider.
Intimately connected with the question of the jurisdiction of the court, is another matter which
may be properly discussed at this juncture. This relates to the interpretation to be placed upon
section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The position is taken by the appellant that this
section is applicable only to wills of liens; and in this connection attention is directed to the fact
that the epigraph of this section speaks only of the will made here by an alien and to the further
fact that the word "state" in the body of the section is not capitalized. From this it is argued that
section 636 is not applicable to the will of a citizen of the United States residing in these
Islands.lawphil.net
We consider these suggestions of little weight and are of the opinion that, by the most
reasonable interpretation of the language used in the statute, the words "another state or
country" include the United States and the States of the American Union, and that the operation
of the statute is not limited to wills of aliens. It is a rule of hermeneutics that punctuation and
capitalization are aids of low degree in interpreting the language of a statute and can never
control against the intelligible meaning of the written words. Furthermore, the epigraph, or
heading,, of a section, being nothing more than a convenient index to the contents of the
provision, cannot have the effect of limiting the operative words contained in the body of the
text. It results that if Emil H. Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the United States
and of the State of Illinois, his will was provable under this section in the courts of the Philippine
Islands, provided the instrument was so executed as to be admissible to probate under the
laws of the State of Illinois.
We are thus brought to consider the second principal proposition stated at the outset of this
discussion, which raises the question whether the order f probate can be set aside in this
proceeding on the other ground stated in the petition, namely, that the testator was not a
resident of the State of Illinois and that the will was not made in conformity with the laws of that
State.
The order of the Court of First Instance admitting the will to probate recites, among other things:
That upon the date when the will in question was executed Emil H. Johnson was a citizen of
the United States, naturalized in the State of Illinois, County of Cook, and that the will in
question was executed in conformity with the dispositions of the law f the State of Illinois.
We consider this equivalent to a finding that upon the date of the execution of the will the
testator was a citizen of the State of Illinois and that the will was executed in conformity with
the laws of that State. Upon the last point the finding is express; and in our opinion the
statement that the testator was a citizen of the United States, naturalized in the State of Illinois,
should be taken to imply that he was a citizen of the State of Illinois, as well as of the United
States.
The naturalization laws of the United States require, as a condition precedent to the granting
of the certificate of naturalization, that the applicant should have resided at least five years in
the United States and for one year within the State or territory where the court granting the
naturalization papers is held; and in the absence of clear proof to the contrary it should be
presumed that a person naturalized in a court of a certain State thereby becomes a citizen of
that State as well as of the United States.
In this connection it should be remembered that the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States declares, in its opening words, that all persons naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside.
It is noteworthy that the petition by which it is sought to annul the probate of this will does not
assert that the testator was not a citizen of Illinois at the date when the will was executed. The
most that is said on this point is he was "never a resident of the State of Illinois after the year
1898, but became and was a resident of the city of Manila," etc. But residence in the Philippine
Islands is compatible with citizenship in Illinois; and it must be considered that the allegations
of the petition on this point are, considered in their bearing as an attempt to refute citizenship
in Illinois, wholly insufficient.
As the Court of First Instance found that the testator was a citizen of the State of Illinois and
that the will was executed in conformity with the laws of that State, the will was necessarily
and properly admitted to probate. And how is it possible to evade the effect of these findings?
In Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that "the allowance by the court of
a will of real or personal property shall be conclusive as to its due execution."
The due execution of a will involves conditions relating to a number of matters, such as the
age and mental capacity of the testator, the signing of the document by the testator, or by
someone in his behalf, and the acknowledgment of the instrument by him in the presence of
the required number of witnesses who affix their signatures to the will to attest the act. The
proof of all these requisites is involved in the probate; and as to each and all of them the
probate is conclusive. (Castañeda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil. Rep., 426; Pimentel vs. Palanca, 5 Phil.
Rep., 436; Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Vaño, 8 Phil. Rep., 119; Sanchez vs. Pascual, 11 Phil. Rep.,
395; Montañano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil. Rep., 676.)
Our reported cases do not contain the slightest intimation that a will which has been probated
according to law, and without fraud, can be annulled, in any other proceeding whatever, on
account of any supposed irregularity or defect in the execution of the will or on account of any
error in the action of the court upon the proof adduced before it. This court has never been
called upon to decide whether, in case the probate of a will should be procured by fraud, relief
could be granted in some other proceeding; and no such question is now presented. But it is
readily seen that if fraud were alleged, this would introduce an entirely different factor in the
cae. In Austrua vs. Ventenilla (21 Phil. Rep., 180, 184), it was suggested but not decided that
relief might be granted in case the probate of a will were procured by fraud.
The circumstance that the judgment of the trial court recites that the will was executed in
conformity with the law of Illinois and also, in effect, that the testator was a citizen of that State
places the judgment upon an unassailable basis so far as any supposed error apparent upon
the fact of the judgment is concerned. It is, however, probable that even if the judgment had
not contained these recitals, there would have been a presumption from the admission of the
will to probate as the will of a citizen of Illinois that the facts were as recited in the order of
probate.
As was said by this court in the case of Banco Español-Filipino vs. Palanca (37 Phil. Rep.,
921), "There is no principle of law better settled than that after jurisdiction has once been
acquired, every act of a court of general jurisdiction shall be presumed to have been rightly
done. This rule is applied to every judgment or decree rendered in the various stages of the
proceedings from their initiation to their completion (Voorhees vs. United States Bank, 10 Pet.,
314; 35 U. S., 449); and if the record is silent with respect to any fact which must have
established before the court could have rightly acted, it will be presumed that such fact was
properly brought to its knowledge."
The Court of First Instance is a court of original and general jurisdiction; and there is no
difference in its faculties in this respect whether exercised in matters of probate or exerted in
ordinary contentious litigation. The trial court therefore necessarily had the power to determine
the facts upon which the propriety of admitting the will to probate depended; and the recital of
those facts in the judgment was probably not essential to its validity. No express ruling is,
however, necessary on this point.
What has been said effectually disposes of the petition considered in its aspect as an attack
upon the order of probate for error apparent on the face of the record. But the petitioner seeks
to have the judgment reviewed, it being asserted that the findings of the trial court — especially
on the question of the citizenship of the testator — are not supported by the evidence. It needs
but a moment's reflection, however, to show that in such a proceeding as this it is not possible
to reverse the original order on the ground that the findings of the trial court are unsupported
by the proof adduced before that court. The only proceeding in which a review of the evidence
can be secured is by appeal, and the case is not before us upon appeal from the original order
admitting the will to probate. The present proceedings by petition to set aside the order of
probate, and the appeal herein is from the order denying this relief. It is obvious that on appeal
from an order refusing to vacate a judgment it is not possible to review the evidence upon
which the original judgment was based. To permit this would operate unduly to protract the
right of appeal.
However, for the purpose of arriving at a just conception of the case from the point of view of
the petitioner, we propose to examine the evidence submitted upon the original hearing, in
connection with the allegations of the petition, in order to see, first, whether the evidence
submitted to the trial court was sufficient to justify its findings, and, secondly, whether the
petition contains any matter which would justify the court in setting the judgment, aside. In this
connection we shall for a moment ignore the circumstance that the petition was filed after the
expiration of the six months allowed by section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The principal controversy is over the citizenship of the testator. The evidence adduced upon
this point in the trial court consists of the certificate of naturalization granted upon January 10,
1903, in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, in connection with certain biographical facts
contained in the oral evidence. The certificate of naturalization supplies incontrovertible proof
that upon the date stated the testator became a citizen of the United States, and inferentially
also a citizen of said State. In the testimony submitted to the trial court it appears that, when
Johnson first came to the United States as a boy, he took up his abode in the State of Illinois
and there remained until he came as a soldier in the United States Army to the Philippine
Islands. Although he remained in these Islands for sometime after receiving his discharge, no
evidence was adduced showing that at the time he returned to the United States, in the autumn
of 1902, he had then abandoned Illinois as the State of his permanent domicile, and on the
contrary the certificate of naturalization itself recites that at that time he claimed to be a resident
of Illinois.
Now, if upon January 10, 1903, the testator became a citizen of the United States and of the
State of Illinois, how has he lost the character of citizen with respect to either of these
jurisdictions? There is no law in force by virtue of which any person of foreign nativity can
become a naturalized citizen of the Philippine Islands; and it was, therefore, impossible for the
testator, even if he had so desired, to expatriate himself from the United States and change
his political status from a citizen of the United States to a citizen of these Islands. This being
true, it is to be presumed that he retained his citizenship in the State of Illinois along with his
status as a citizen of the United States. It would be novel doctrine to Americans living in the
Philippine Islands to be told that by living here they lose their citizenship in the State of their
naturalization or nativity.
We are not unmindful of the fact that when a citizen of one State leaves it and takes up his
abode in another State with no intention of returning, he immediately acquires citizenship in
the State of his new domicile. This is in accordance with that provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States which says that every citizen of the United
States is a citizen of the State where in he resides. The effect of this provision necessarily is
that a person transferring his domicile from one State to another loses his citizenship in the
State of his original above upon acquiring citizenship in the State of his new abode. The
acquisition of the new State citizenship extinguishes the old. That situation, in our opinion, has
no analogy to that which arises when a citizen of an American State comes to reside in the
Philippine Islands. Here he cannot acquire a new citizenship; nor by the mere change of
domicile does he lose that which he brought with him.
The proof adduced before the trial court must therefore be taken as showing that, at the time
the will was executed, the testator was, as stated in the order of probate, a citizen of the State
of Illinois. This, in connection with the circumstance that the petition does not even so much
as deny such citizenship but only asserts that the testator was a resident of the Philippine
Islands, demonstrates the impossibility of setting the probate aside for lack of the necessary
citizenship on the part of the testator. As already observed, the allegation of the petition on this
point is wholly insufficient to justify any relief whatever.
Upon the other point — as to whether the will was executed in conformity with the statutes of
the State of Illinois — we note that it does not affirmatively appear from the transaction of the
testimony adduced in the trial court that any witness was examined with reference to the law
of Illinois on the subject of the execution of will. The trial judge no doubt was satisfied that the
will was properly executed by examining section 1874 of the Revised Statutes of Illinois, as
exhibited in volume 3 of Starr & Curtis's Annotated Illinois Statutes, 2nd ed., p. 426; and he
may have assumed that he could take judicial notice of the laws of Illinois under section 275
of the Code of Civil Procedure. If so, he was in our opinion mistaken. that section authorizes
the courts here to take judicial notice, among other things, of the acts of the legislative
department of the United States. These words clearly have reference to Acts of the Congress
of the United States; and we would hesitate to hold that our courts can, under this provision,
take judicial notice of the multifarious laws of the various American States. Nor do we think
that any such authority can be derived from the broader language, used in the same action,
where it is said that our courts may take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge "similar"
to those therein enumerated. The proper rule we think is to require proof of the statutes of the
States of the American Union whenever their provisions are determinative of the issues in any
action litigated in the Philippine courts.
Nevertheless, even supposing that the trial court may have erred in taking judicial notice of the
law of Illinois on the point in question, such error is not now available to the petitioner, first,
because the petition does not state any fact from which it would appear that the law of Illinois
is different from what the court found, and, secondly, because the assignment of error and
argument for the appellant in this court raises no question based on such supposed error.
Though the trial court may have acted upon pure conjecture as to the law prevailing in the
State of Illinois, its judgment could not be set aside, even upon application made within six
months under section 113 of the Code of Civil procedure, unless it should be made to appear
affirmatively that the conjecture was wrong. The petitioner, it is true, states in general terms
that the will in question is invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal property in the
State of Illinois, but this is merely a conclusion of law. The affidavits by which the petition is
accompanied contain no reference to the subject, and we are cited to no authority in the
appellant's brief which might tent to raise a doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion of the
trial court. It is very clear, therefore, that this point cannot be urged as of serious moment.
But it is insisted in the brief for the appellant that the will in question was not properly admissible
to probate because it contains provisions which cannot be given effect consistently with the
laws of the Philippine Islands; and it is suggested that as the petitioner is a legitimate heir of
the testator she cannot be deprived of the legitime to which she is entitled under the law
governing testamentary successions in these Islands. Upon this point it is sufficient to say that
the probate of the will does not affect the intrinsic validity of its provisions, the decree of probate
being conclusive only as regards the due execution of the will. (Code of Civil Procedure, secs.
625, 614; Sahagun vs. De Gorostiza, 7 Phil. Rep., 347, 349; Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Vaño, 8 Phil.
Rep., 119, 121; Limjuco vs. Ganara, 11 Phil. Rep., 393, 395.)
If, therefore, upon the distribution of this estate, it should appear that any legacy given by the
will or other disposition made therein is contrary to the law applicable in such case, the will
must necessarily yield upon that point and the law must prevail. Nevertheless, it should not be
forgotten that the intrinsic validity of the provisions of this will must be determined by the law
of Illinois and not, as the appellant apparently assumes, by the general provisions here
applicable in such matters; for in the second paragraph of article 10 of the Civil Code it is
declared that "legal and testamentary successions, with regard to the order of succession, as
well as to the amount of the successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of their provisions,
shall be regulated by the laws of the nation of the person whose succession is in question,
whatever may be the nature of the property and the country where it may be situate."
From what has been said, it is, we think, manifest that the petition submitted to the court below
on October 31, 1916, was entirely insufficient to warrant the setting aside of the other probating
the will in question, whether said petition be considered as an attack on the validity of the
decree for error apparent, or whether it be considered as an application for a rehearing based
upon the new evidence submitted in the affidavits which accompany the petition. And in this
latter aspect the petition is subject to the further fatal defect that it was not presented within
the time allowed by law.
It follows that the trial court committed no error in denying the relief sought. The order appealed
from is accordingly affirmed with costs. So ordered.
Torres, Johnson, Malcolm, Avanceña and Fisher, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1960 November 26, 1948
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FLORENTINO ABILONG, defendant-appellant.
Carlos Perfecto for appellant.

Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Manuel Tomacruz for
appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Florentino Abilong was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with evasion of service
of sentence under the following information:
That on or about the 17th day of September, 1947, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, being then a convict sentenced and ordered to serve two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of destierro during which he should not enter any place within the radius of
100 kilometers from the City of Manila, by virtue of final judgment rendered by the municipal
court on April 5, 1946, in criminal case No. B-4795 for attempted robbery, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously evade the service of said sentence by going beyond the
limits made against him and commit vagrancy.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional, with the accessory penalties of the law and to pay the costs.
He is appealing from that decision with the following assignment of error:
1. The lower court erred in imposing a penalty on the accused under article 157 of the Revised
Penal Code, which does not cover evasion of service of "destierro."
Counsel for the appellant contends that a person like the accused evading a sentence
of destierro is not criminally liable under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly
article 157 of the said Code for the reason that said article 157 refers only to persons who are
imprisoned in a penal institution and completely deprived of their liberty. He bases his
contention on the word "imprisonment" used in the English text of said article which in part
reads as follows:
Evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence
by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment.
The Solicitor General in his brief says that had the original text of the Revised Penal Code
been in the English language, then the theory of the appellant could be uphold. However, it is
the Spanish text that is controlling in case of doubt. The Spanish text of article 157 in part
reads thus:
ART. 157. Quebrantamiento de sentencia. — Sera castigado con prision correccional en sus
grados medio y maximo el sentenciado que quebrantare su condena, fugandose mientras
estuviere sufriendo privacion de libertad por sentencia firme; . . . .
We agree with the Solicitor General that inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code was originally
approved and enacted in Spanish, the Spanish text governs (People vs. Manaba, 58 Phil., 665,
668). It is clear that the word "imprisonment" used in the English text is a wrong or erroneous
translation of the phrase "sufriendo privacion de libertad" used in the Spanish text. It is equally
clear that although the Solicitor General impliedly admits destierro as not constituting
imprisonment, it is a deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the sense that as in the present
case, the appellant by his sentence of destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City of
Manila. This view has been adopted in the case of People vs. Samonte, No. 36559 (July 26,
1932; 57 Phil., 968) wherein this Court held, as quoted in the brief of the Solicitor General that
"it is clear that a person under sentence of destierro is suffering deprivation of his liberty and
escapes from the restrictions of the penalty when he enters the prohibited area." Said ruling in
that case was ratified by this Court, though, indirectly in the case of People vs. Jose de Jesus,
(45 Off. Gaz. Supp. to No. 9, p. 370)1, where it was held that one evades the service of his
sentence of destierro when he enters the prohibited area specified in the judgment of
conviction, and he cannot invoke the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law which
provides that its provisions do not apply to those who shall have escaped from confinement or
evaded sentence.
In conclusion we find and hold that the appellant is guilty of evasion of service of sentence
under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code (Spanish text), in that during the period of his
sentence of destierro by virtue of final judgment wherein he was prohibited from entering the
City of Manila, he entered said City.
Finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed with
costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Moran, C. J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
The legal question raised in this case is whether or not appellant, for having violated his
judgment of destierro rendered by the Municipal Court of Manila, can be sentenced under
article 157 of the Revised Penal Code which reads as follows:
Evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence
by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment. However, if such
evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors,
windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit,
violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal
institution, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its maximum period.
Appellant invokes in his favor the negative opinion of author Guillermo Guevara (Revised
Penal Code, 1946, p. 322). This negative position is supported by another author, Ambrosio
Padilla (Revised Penal Code annotated, p. 474).
The prosecution invokes the decision of this Court in People vs. De Jesus, L-
1411,2promulgated April 16, 1948, but said decision has no application because in said case
the legal question involved in the case at bar was not raised. The Supreme Court did not
consider the question of interpretation of the wording of article 157. Undoubtedly, there was
occasion for considering the question, but the Court nevertheless failed to do so. This failure
to see the question, at the time, is only an evidence that the tribunal is composed of human
beings for whom infallibility is beyond reach.
The prosecution maintains that appellant's contention, supported by two authors who have
considered the question, although tenable under the English text of article 157, is not so under
the Spanish text, which is the one controlling because the Revised Penal Code was originally
enacted by the Legislature in Spanish.
There is no quarrel, therefore, that under the above quoted English text, the appellant is
entitled to acquittal. The question now is whether or not the Spanish text conveys a thing
different from that which can be read in the English text. The Spanish text reads as follows:
ART. 157. Quebrantamiento de sentencia. — Sera castigado con prision correccional en sus
grados medio y maximo el sentenciado que quebrantare su condena, fugandose mientras
estuviere sufriendo privacion de libertad por sentencia firme; pero si la evasion o fuga se
hubiere llevado a efecto con escalamiento, fractura de puertas, ventanas, verjas, paredes,
techos o suelos, o empleado ganzuas, llaves falsas, disfraz, engano, violencia o intimidacion,
o poniendose de acuerdo con otros sentenciados o dependientes del establecimiento donde
a hallare recluido la pena sera prision correccional en su grado maximo.
The question boils down to the words "fugandose mientras estuviere sufriendo privacion de
libertad por sentencia firme," which are translated into English "by escaping during the term of
his imprisonment by reason of final judgment." The prosecution contends that the words
"privacion de libertad" in the Spanish text is not the same as the word "imprisonment" in the
English text, and that while "imprisonment" cannot include destierro, "privacion de libertad"
may include it.
The reason is, however, the result of a partial point of view because it obliterates the
grammatical, logical, ideological function of the words "fugandose" and "by escaping" in the
Spanish and English texts, respectively. There should not be any question that, whatever
meaning we may want to give to the words "privacion de libertad," it has to be conditioned by
the verb "fugandose," (by escaping). "Privacion de libertad" cannot be considered
independently of "fugandose."
There seems to be no question that the Spanish "fugandose" is correctly translated into the
English "by escaping." Now, is there any sense in escaping from destierro or banishment,
where there is no enclosure binding the hypothetical fugitive? "Fugandose" is one of the forms
of the Spanish verb "fugar," to escape. The specific idea of "evasion" or "escape" is reiterated
by the use of said words after the semi-colon in the Spanish text and after the first period in
the English text. Either the verb "to escape" or the substantive noun "escape" essentially pre-
supposes some kind of imprisonment or confinement, except figuratively, and Article 157 does
not talk in metaphors or parables.
"To escape" means "to get away, as by flight or other conscious effort; to break away, get free,
or get clear, from or out of detention, danger, discomfort, or the like; as to escape from prison.
To issue from confinement or enclosure of any sort; as gas escapes from the mains."
(Webster's New International Dictionary.)
"Escape" means "act of escaping, or fact or having escaped; evasion of or deliverance from
injury or any evil; also the means of escape. The unlawful departure of a prisoner from the
limits of his custody. When the prisoner gets out of prison and unlawfully regains his liberty, it
is an actual escape." (Webster's New International Dictionary.)
"Evasion" means "escape." (Webster's New International Dictionary.) .
The "destierro" imposed on appellant banished him from Manila alone, and he was free to stay
in all the remaining parts of the country, and to go and stay in any part of the globe outside the
country. With freedom to move all over the world, it is farfetched to allege that he is in any
confinement from which he could escape.
The words "privacion de libertad" have been correctly translated into the English
"imprisonment," which gives the idea exactly conveyed by "privacion de libertad" in the
Spanish text. Undoubtedly, the drafters of the latter could have had used a more precise
Spanish word, but the literary error cannot be taken as a pretext to give to the less precise
words a broader meaning than is usually given to them.
"Privacion de libertad," literally meaning "deprivation of liberty or freedom," has always been
used by jurist using the Spanish language to mean "imprisonment." They have never given
them the unbounded philosophical scope that would lead to irretrievable absurdities.
Under that unlimited scope, no single individual in the more than two billion inhabitants of the
world can be considered free, as the freest citizen of the freest country is subject to many
limitations or deprivations of liberty. Under the prosecution's theory, should an accused,
sentenced to pay a fine of one peso, evade the payment of it, because the fine deprives him
of liberty to dispose of his one peso, he will be liable to be punished under article 157 of the
Revised Penal Code to imprisonment of from more that two years to six years. The iniquity
and cruelty of such situation are too glaring and violent to be entertained for a moment under
our constitutional framework.
There is no gainsaying the proposition that to allow the violation of a sentence

of destierro without punishment is undesirable, but even without applying article 157 of the
Revised Penal Code, the act of the appellant cannot remain unpunished, because his violation
of the sentence of destierro may be punished as contempt of court, for which imprisonment up
to six months is provided.
It is deplorable that article 157 should not provide for a situation presented in this case, but the
gap cannot be filled by this Court without encroaching upon the legislative powers of Congress.
Perhaps it is better that evasions of sentence be punished, as provided by the old Penal Code,
by an increased in the evaded penalty. This will be more reasonable that the penalties provided
by article 157, which appear to be disproportionate and arbitrary, because they place on equal
footing the evader of a sentence of one day of imprisonment and a life-termer, one who
commits an insignificant offense and one who perpetrates the most heinous crime. At any rate,
this is a problem for Congress to solve.
The appealed decision should be set aside.
BRIONES, J., concurring:
I concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion, because evidently the word "fugandose" in the
Spanish text refers to imprisonment, not to destierro.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of
the rights of the individual from the vast powers of the State and the inroads of societal
pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality
beyond which the State cannot tread - asserting that "individual spontaneity" must be allowed
to flourish with very little regard to social interference - he veritably acknowledges that the
exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation, which society is justified in
enforcing at all cost, against those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he says -
The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the
liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which power
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others.
Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-preservation.
With the end of maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the
State to formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance to its collective wisdom and
inflict punishment for non-observance.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought changes
in the social order, carrying with it a new formulation of fundamental rights and duties more
attuned to the imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the process, the web
of rights and State impositions became tangled and obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple
shades and colors, the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often outright collision,
between the law as the expression of the will of the State, and the zealous attempts by its
members to preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably followed. It is when individual
rights are pitted against State authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080
(An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659, wishes to
1 2
impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but
distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a
stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly
because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the
"reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens
rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly
clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed
constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or
material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by
him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business
associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on

the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or
any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public office
concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any
other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any
business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations

and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special
interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to

unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or
in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d)
hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00)
shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death.
Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the
imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the
court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes
and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or
investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be
necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of
the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being
sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8)
separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as
amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs.
3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713
(The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Crim.
Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No.
26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the
Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to specification "d" of the charges in the
Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses
under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits
and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds
raised were only lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses,
and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the charges and
the vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus
Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No.
26558 finding that "a probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance
of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the
ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on
which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended Information for
Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed
its Opposition to the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner
submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied
petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the
issues for resolution in the instant petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is
unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the
predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process;
and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it
is within the power of Congress to so classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is
predicated on the basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with
the Constitution. Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a
3
legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication.
This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden
for one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it
has been said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch accords to
its coordinate branch - the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must
assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers,
and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what
is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of
the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial
restraint and act with caution and forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged
by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In
construing therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an
interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon we held that as long as there is some basis
4
for the decision of the court, the constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched and
the case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force of the presumption is not
sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of
course, where the law clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic
law, it must be struck down on sight lest the positive commands of the fundamental law be
unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging
the validity of the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed
an infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be no finding of
unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice
Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain." And petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case to
5
discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters
which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is
sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden,
and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus -
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of
his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons;
2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series

of the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or
malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or
indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary
benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project
or by reason of the office or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent
conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of
stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future
employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural,
industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees
and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage
of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or
acquired is at least ₱50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are
subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained.
It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged
with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed
conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute
punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least
₱50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the
Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with
reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have
committed:
"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman,
hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDE,' together with Jose
'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro,
JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia
Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under
R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE
MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS
ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE
ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION,
OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and
acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount
or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (₱4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING
HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO
PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR
A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS,
described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN

THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS
(₱545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT,
SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy'
Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in
consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR

INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of
ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (₱130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a
portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (₱200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share
allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself and/or in connivance
with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or
Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (italic
supplied).
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF
STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES
OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF
MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY
FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
(₱1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX
HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (₱744,612,450.00),
RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN
PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (₱1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR
RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH
JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF
SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱189,700,000.00) MORE
OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT
IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES,
KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN
DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO
HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (₱3,233,104,173.17) AND
DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none -
that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions
clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate
contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions,
petitioner is completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare
for an intelligent defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the
terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions,
according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague
and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and
void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms
without defining them; much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is
6
no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and
every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and
its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the
vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be
gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be

interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident
7
that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words. The intention
8
of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use
statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate
Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition of the words "combination" and
"series:"
Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining.

To combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial
and temporal succession.
That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their popular
meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually
became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:
DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991

REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say THROUGH A
COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION
ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually mean to say, if there are two or
more means, we mean to say that number one and two or number one and something else
are included, how about a series of the same act? For example, through misappropriation,
conversion, misuse, will these be included also?
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.
REP. ISIDRO: Series.
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that -
REP. GARCIA: Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not
twice of one enumeration.
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, that’s it. When we say combination, we mean, two different
acts. It cannot be a repetition of the same act.
REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
REP. GARCIA: A series.
REP. ISIDRO: That’s not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or
series, we seem to say that two or more, di ba?
REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is
a very good suggestion because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we
have here a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. So x x x x
REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term "series?"

REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations....
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
SEN. TANADA: Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes "one" or maybe even "two"
acts may already result in such a big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting
the words "a series of overt or," to read, therefore: "or conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal
acts such as." Remove the idea of necessitating "a series." Anyway, the criminal acts are in
the plural.
SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned
in this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because "a series" implies several or many; two or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime.
But when we say "acts of plunder" there should be, at least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts
falling under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the
public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging
to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts
falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation,
malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar.
(1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination"
and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan that this term is
9
sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -
x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to
Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose
or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth.
And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said
common goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a
'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused and public officer and others
conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is
no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the
overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient
notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-
for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various
ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense
must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can
understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie
of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a
saving clause or by construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such
instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct
to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. But the doctrine does not apply as
10
against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless
specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet
fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction,
while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such
activities. With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is
11
clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the
language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured
by common understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness"
12
doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not
absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility,
rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute
are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more
explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of
the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
during the deliberations of the Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and
overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity -
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing
of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law." The
13
overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms." 14
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes
regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle
for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own
conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." The possible harm
15
to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the

possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left
to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in
terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this
reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful
conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech
cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put
it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine
outside the limited context of the First Amendment." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court
16 17
ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which,
by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are
sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial
challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its
18
face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct
that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct
of others."19
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in
American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is
involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to
whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the
ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in
which its application might be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out, "vagueness
20
challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial
invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated
[only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant." Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's
21
claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground
that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally
protected. It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of the
22
Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile
abstract contexts. But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris
23 24
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction
of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task
for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on
the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature
of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case
that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be
decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly
strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally
25
disfavored. In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which are
26
alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which
the defendant is charged. 27
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder
Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than real.
Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the statute
to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law. Every
provision of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other part. To
be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched presumption of
constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of
what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage,
petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its
appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his affirmative vote with full
knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan must be mentioned if only to illustrate and
28
emphasize the point that courts are loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the
law itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no reasonable
construction that will support and give it effect. In that case,
petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e),
of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners posited, among others,
that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no common law meaning or
settled definition by prior judicial or administrative precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3,
par. (e), violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or sufficient notice of what it
seeks to penalize. Petitioners further argued that the Information charged them with three (3)
distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality; (b)
giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith; and, (c) giving of "unwarranted"
benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in the discharge of their official function
and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was
violated because they were left to guess which of the three (3) offenses, if not all, they were
being charged and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act does not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases
"manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence" merely
describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute
may be committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same Information does not mean
that the indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses.
The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support;
unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without
justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of Justice, C.D.
Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978,
Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt practice
and make unlawful the act of the public officer in:
x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as amended).
It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions penalize is the
act of a public officer, in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions, in
giving any private party benefits, advantage or preference which is unjustified, unauthorized
or without justification or adequate reason, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence.
In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the
term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was
understood in its primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in that case, petitioners'
objection thereto was held inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder
Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a
pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy -
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be
necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to
establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal
prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the
presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State
succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused
is entitled to an acquittal. The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to
29
command the respect and confidence of the community in the application of criminal law. It is
critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves
people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free
society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his
government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper
factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such
exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process
Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. The following
30
exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score during the
deliberations in the floor of the House of Representatives are elucidating -
DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990
MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged
in the information must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and
find him guilty of the other acts enumerated in the information, does that not work against the
right of the accused especially so if the amount committed, say, by falsification is less than
₱100 million, but the totality of the crime committed is ₱100 million since there is malversation,
bribery, falsification of public document, coercion, theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every
element of the crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration of the things
taken by the robber in the information – three pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not
be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for
which he was charged just because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the
prosecution proved two. Now, what is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the
element of the offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder
the totality of the amount is very important, I feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has
to be taken singly. For instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to accumulate only ₱50,000
and in the crime of extortion, he was only able to accumulate ₱1 million. Now, when we add
the totality of the other acts as required under this bill through the interpretation on the rule of
evidence, it is just one single act, so how can we now convict him?
MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element of
the crime, there is a need to prove that element beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one
essential element of the crime is that the amount involved is ₱100 million. Now, in a series of
defalcations and other acts of corruption in the enumeration the total amount would be ₱110
or ₱120 million, but there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we will sum up the
amounts involved in those transactions which were proved. Now, if the amount involved in
these transactions, proved beyond reasonable doubt, is ₱100 million, then there is a crime of
plunder (underscoring supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the
standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the
prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute
the crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers
from a dismal misconception of the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to
prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or
series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least ₱50,000,000.00.
There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been
committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is
charged in an Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public
treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove
by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they
amounted to at least ₱50,000,000.00. 31
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that "pattern
of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the
very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise, such
pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate
acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate
acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason and common sense. There would be no other
explanation for a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts to stash ₱50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to make a
deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the establishment
of a series or combination of the predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that
"pattern" is "a very important element of the crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged,
(as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime," such that without it
the accused cannot be convicted of plunder -
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the Plunder
Law without applying Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable
doubt of the commission of the acts complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the
Revised Penal Code, but not plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond
reasonable doubt without applying Section 4, can you not have a conviction under the Plunder
Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an
accused charged for violation of the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive element
of the law x x x x
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof
beyond reasonable doubt on the acts charged constituting plunder?
ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of
evidence and it contains a substantive element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by
which we can avoid Section 4.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate
crimes charged are concerned that you do not have to go that far by applying Section 4?
ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important element
of the crime of plunder and that cannot be avoided by the prosecution. 32
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can
be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and
"pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and
unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder x x x x
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal
case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any
substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only
a means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a
conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient
evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that Sec.
4 is flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from
the rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the
existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080
provides for a separability clause -
Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to
any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the
application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as a
result of the nullity of some of its provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not
really so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated independently of each other,
especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can best be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in
se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion -
x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must
be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges
that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges
guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is
the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator
Tañada made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:
SENATOR TAÑADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be
evidence for each and every individual criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish the
conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder. 33
However, Senator Tañada was discussing §4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the
transcript quoted by petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section
4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the Gentleman's view, would provide for a speedier and faster
process of attending to this kind of cases?
SENATOR TAÑADA: Yes, Mr. President . . . 34
Senator Tañada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the
prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or
conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or ciminal
acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the
pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the
requisite mens rea must be shown.
Indeed, §2 provides that -
Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the
imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by
the court.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to
prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element
of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent.
It is true that §2 refers to "any person who participates with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe,
however, that it does not apply as well to the public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice
Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they
omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what
they obviously mean." 35
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have
been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the
heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are punished
with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these groups of heinous crimes,
this Court held in People v. Echegaray: 36
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature,
despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and
utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a
human being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or
subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death; and drug offenses
involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as
murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim
is detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or
threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional
mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are
clearly heinous by their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications
of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in
which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and
underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the
government and impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must muster the
political will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality
that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the populace.
[With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its
people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an
actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people
it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of
crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving
government officials, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to
cause further destruction and damage to society.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is
a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they
are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially
37
since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be
absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of
the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard
to the inherent wrongness of the acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080,
on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to
resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People v.
Echegaray to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that
38
RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by

necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in
high places which have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has
become more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive
more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical
measures are imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and
economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially
designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left
unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and
institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the
legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the avarice and
other venalities in public office.
These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of
national importance can equal the amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner's
ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal
statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may
linger for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above
factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder
Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare
the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr. C.J., Melo, Quisumbing, JJ., join concurring opinion of J. Mendoza.
Puno, Vitug, JJ., concurred and joins J. Mendoza's concurring opinion.
Kapunan, Pardo, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Ynares-Santiago, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Mendoza, J., please see concurring opinion.
Panganiban J., please see separate concurring opinion.
Carpio, J., no part. Was one of the complainants before Ombudsman.
Footnotes
1
Approved 12 July 1991 and took effect 8 October 1991.
2
Approved 13 December 1993 and took effect 31 December 1993.
3
Lim v. Pacquing, et al., G.R. No. 115044, 27 January 1995, 240 SCRA 644.
4
G.R. No. 87001, 4 December 1989, 179 SCRA 828.
5
Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 414 (1925).
6
82 C.J.S. 68, p. 113; People v. Ring, 70 P.2d 281, 26 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 768.
7
Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104988, 18 June 1996, 257 SCRA 430,
448.
8
PLDT v. Eastern Telecommunications Phil., Inc., G.R. No. 943774, 27 August 1992, 213
SCRA 16, 26.
9
Resolution of 9 July 2001.
10
See People v. Nazario, No. L-44143, 31 August 1988, 165 SCRA 186, 195-196.
11
Ibid.
12
State v. Hill, 189 Kan 403, 369 P2d 365, 91 ALR2d 750.
Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 70 L. Ed. 328 (1926) cited in Ermita-
13
Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Ass'n. v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849, 867 (1967).
NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307, 12, 2 L. Ed 325, 338 (1958); Shelton v. Tucker 364
14
U.S. 479, 5 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1960).

Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521, 31 L. Ed. 2d 408, 413 (1972) (internal quotation marks
15
omitted).
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 95 L. Ed 2d 697, 707 (1987); see also
16
People v. De la Piedra, G.R. No. 121777, 24 January 2001.
17
413 U.S. 601, 612-613, 37 L. Ed 2d 830, 840-841 (1973).
18
United States v. Salerno, supra.
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95, 71 L. Ed.
19
2d 362, 369 (1982).
20
United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21, 4 L. Ed. 2d 524, 529 (1960). The paradigmatic case
is Yazoo & Mississippi Valley RR. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 57 L. Ed. 193 (1912).
21
G. Gunther & K. Sullivan, Constitutional Law 1299 (2001).
22
Id. at 1328. See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As Applied and Facial Challenges, 113 Harv. L.
Rev. 1321 (2000) arguing that, in an important sense, as applied challenges are the basic
building blocks of constitutional adjudication and that determinations that statutes are facially
invalid properly occur only as logical outgrowths of ruling on whether statutes may be applied
to particular litigants on particular facts.
23
Constitution, Art. VIII, §1 and 5. Compare Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158
(1936); "[T]he power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be
exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to be
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could
only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities."
401 U.S. 37, 52-53, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669, 680 (1971). Accord, United States v. Raines, 362 U.S.
24
17, 4 L. Ed. 2d 524 (1960); Board of Trustees, State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 106 L.
Ed. 2d 388 (1989).
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. at 613, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 841; National Endowment for the
25
Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998).
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 223, 107 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1990); Cruz v. Secretary of
26
Environment and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 135385, 6 December 2000 (Mendoza, J.,
Separate Opinion).
27
United States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33, 9 L. Ed. 2d 561, 565-6 (1963).
28
G.R. No. 57841, 30 July 1982, 115 SCRA 793.
29
People v. Ganguso, G.R. No. 115430, 23 November 1995, 250 SCRA 268, 274-275.
30
People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 94187, 4 November 1992, 215 SCRA 349, 360.
31
Then Senate President Jovito R. Salonga construed in brief the provision, thuswise: "If
there are let’s say 150 crimes all in all, criminal acts, whether bribery, misappropriation,
malversation, extortion, you need not prove all those beyond reasonable doubt. If you can
prove by pattern, let’s say 10, but each must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, you do not
have to prove 150 crimes. That’s the meaning of this (Deliberations of Committee on
Constitutional Amendments and Revision of Laws, 15 November 1988, cited in the
Sandiganbayan Resolution of 9 July 2001).
32
TSN, 18 September 2001, pp. 115-121.
33
4 Record of the Senate 1316, 5 June 1989.
34
Ibid.
35
Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 339, 73 L.Ed. 722, 728 (1929).
36
267 SCRA 682, 721-2 (1997) (emphasis added).
37
Black's Law Dictionary 959 (1990); Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 324, 338 (1986).
38
G.R. No. 117472, 7 February 1997, 267 SCRA 682.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
DISSENTING OPINION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The primary duty of the Court is to render justice. The resolution of the issues brought before
it must be grounded on law, justice and the basic tenets of due process, unswayed by the
passions of the day or the clamor of the multitudes, guided only by its members’ honest
conscience, clean hearts and their unsullied conviction to do what is right under the law.
The issues posed by the instant petition are quite difficult. The task of the Court to resolve the
same is made more daunting because the case involves a former President of the Republic
who, in the eyes of certain sectors of society, deserves to be punished. But the mandate of the
Court is to decide these issues solely on the basis of law and due process, and regardless of
the personalities involved. For indeed, the rule of law and the right to due process are
immutable principles that should apply to all, even to those we hate. As Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas,
S.J., a noted constitutionalist, aptly puts it--
x x x the greater disaster would be if the Supreme Court should heed the clamor for conviction
and convict Estrada even under an unconstitutional law but of the belief that Estrada deserves
to be punished. That would be tantamount to a rule of men and not of law.1
The Basic Facts
The petition before us questions the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7080 (R.A. No. 7080
or Plunder Law), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,2 entitled "An Act Defining and
Penalizing the Crime of Plunder."3 This original petition for certiorari and prohibition against
Respondent Third Division of the Sandiganbayan filed by petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada
assails Respondent court’s Resolution, dated July 9, 2001, denying his Motion to Quash the
information against him in Criminal Case No. 26558 for Plunder. Petitioner likewise prays that
the Sandiganbayan be prohibited and enjoined from proceeding with his arraignment and trial
in Criminal Case No. 26558 due to the unconstitutionality of R. A. No. 7080.
On the heels of the finality of the joint decision of this Court in G.R. No. 146710 (Estrada vs.
Desierto, et al.) and in G.R. No. 146738 (Estrada vs. Macapagal-Arroyo), promulgated on April
3, 2001, upholding the constitutionality of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s assumption of
office as President of the Republic of the Philippines and declaring that the former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada no longer enjoyed immunity from suit, the Ombudsman filed eight (8)
Informations against Estrada. These cases were Criminal Case No. 26558 (for Plunder);
Criminal Case No. 26559 (for Violation of Sec. 3[a] of Republic Act No. 3019); Criminal Case
No. 26560 (for Violation of Sec. 3[a] of R.A. No. 3019); Criminal Case No. 26561 (for Violation
of Sec. 3[e] of R.A. 3019); Criminal Case No. 26562 (for Violation of Sec. 3[e] of R.A. No.
3019); Criminal Case No. 26563 (for Violation of Sec. 7[d] of R.A. No. 6713); Criminal Case
No. 26564 (for Perjury); and Criminal Case No. 26565 (for Illegal Use of Alias).
The aforementioned informations were raffled to the five divisions of the Sandiganbayan.
Criminal Case No. 26558 was raffled to the Third Division of said court. The amended
information against petitioner charging violations of Section 2, in relation to Section (d) (1) (2)
of the statute reads:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, by himself and in
conspiracy with his co-accused, business associates and persons heretofore named, by taking
advantage of his official position, authority, connection or influence as President of the
Republic of the Philippines, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass,
accumulate and acquire ill-gotten wealth, and unjustly enrich himself in the aggregate amount
of P4,097,804,173.17, more or less, through a combination and series of overt and criminal
acts, described as follows:
(a) by receiving, collecting, directly or indirectly, on many instances, so-called "jueteng money"
from gambling operators in connivance with co-accused Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte and Edward Serapio, as witnessed by Gov. Luis ‘Chavit’ Singson, among other
witnesses, in the aggregate amount of FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS
(P545,000.000.00), more or less, in consideration of their protection from arrest or interference
by law enforcers in their illegal "jueteng" activities; and
(b) by misappropriating, converting and misusing for his gain and benefit public fund in the
amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less,
representing a portion of One Hundred Seventy Million Pesos (P170,000,000.00) tobacco
excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, in conspiracy
with co-accused Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Alma Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan
or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, as witnessed by Gov. Luis ‘Chavit’ Singson, among
other witnesses; and
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
and the Social Security System (SSS) to purchase and buy a combined total of 681,733,000
shares of stock of the Belle Corporation in the aggregate gross value of One Billion Eight
Hundred Forty-Seven Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Pesos and Fifty
Centavos(P1,847,578,057.50), for the purpose of collecting for his personal gain and benefit,
as in fact he did collect and receive the sum of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION
SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS (P189,700,000.00) as commission
for said stock purchase; and
(d) by unjustly enriching himself in the amount of THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY
THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE
PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) comprising his unexplained
wealth acquired, accumulated and amassed by him under his account name "Jose Velarde"
with Equitable PCI Bank:
to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On April 16 and 17, 2001, the Ombudsman filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation to Withdraw
Information in Criminal Case Nos. 26559, 26560, 26561, 26562 and 26563. Petitioner
registered his objection to the Ombudsman’s motion to withdraw. The divisions of the
Sandiganbayan to which said cases were assigned granted the withdrawal of the informations,
save for that in Criminal Case No. 26561. At present, the Order of the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan denying the Ombudsman’s motion to withdraw in Criminal Case No. 26561 is
still under reconsideration.
In Criminal Case No. 26558, petitioner filed on April 11, 2001 an Omnibus Motion for the
remand of the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for: (1) the conduct of a preliminary
investigation as regards specification "d" of the accusations in the information in said case;
and (2) reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses in specifications "a," "b" and "c" to
enable petitioner to file his counter-affidavits as well as other necessary documents.
On April 25, 2001, the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding that:
(p)robable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify issuance of warrants of arrest
of accused former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Mayor Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie
"Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a Eleuterio
Tan or Eleuterio Ramon Tan or Mr. Uy and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas.
Subsequently, on May 31, 2001, the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution
denying petitioner’s Omnibus Motion.
On June 15, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said Resolution but the same
was denied in a Resolution of June 25, 2001.
Meanwhile, on June 14, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the information in Criminal
Case No. 26558, invoking the following grounds: (1) the facts charged do not constitute an
indictable offense as R.A. No. 7080, the statute on which it is based, is unconstitutional; and
(2) the information charges more than one offense.
The People of the Philippines filed an Opposition thereto on June 21, 2001. Petitioner filed his
Reply to the Opposition on June 28, 2001.
On July 9, 2001, the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution denying
petitioner’s motion to quash.
Petitioner thus filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition, claiming that the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to quash the
information in Criminal Case No. 26558. Petitioner argues that R.A. No. 7080 is
unconstitutional on the following grounds:
I. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE FOR ITS VAGUENESS
II. IT VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO KNOW THE

NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM
III. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE BY LOWERING THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE
NECESSARY FOR PROVING THE COMPONENT ELEMENTS OF PLUNDER
IV. IT IS BEYOND THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO DELIMIT

THE REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD AND TO ABOLISH THE ELEMENT OF MENS
REA IN MALA IN SE CRIMES BY CONVERTING THESE TO MALA PROHIBITA, IN
VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY.5
The provisions of law involved
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 provides:
Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in
the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be
guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person
who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the
crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the
degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as
provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare
any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the
properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor
of the State. (As amended by Sec. 12, RA No. 7659.)
Section 1(d) of the same law defines "ill-gotten wealth" as "any asset, property, business
enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2)" hereof,
acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates,
and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar
schemes:
1. Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds or raids on

2. By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any
other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer
concerned;
3. By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National

Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or
4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any
5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combination

interests; or
6. By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or

influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.6
On the other hand, Section 4 states:
Rule of Evidence - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary
to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish
beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy.
Petitioner’s theory
Petitioner asserts that R.A. No. 7080 is vague and overbroad on its face, and suffers from
structural deficiency and ambiguity.7 In sum, he maintains that the law does not afford an
ordinary person reasonable notice that his actuation will constitute a criminal offense. More
particularly, petitioner argues that the terms "combination" and "series" are not clearly defined,
citing that in a number of cases, the United States (U.S.) federal courts in deciding cases under
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO law), after which the Plunder
Law was patterned, have given different interpretations to "series of acts or transactions."8 In
addition, he terms "raid on the public treasury," "receiving or accepting a gift," "commission,"
"kickbacks," "illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets," "monopolies or other
combinations," "special interests," "taking undue advantage of official position," "unjustly
enrich" all suffer from overbreadth which is a form of vagueness.9
In arguing that the law on plunder is vague and impermissibly broad, petitioner points out that
the terms "combination" and ‘series" used in the phrase "any combination or series of the
following means or similar schemes" are not defined under the statute. The use of these terms
in the law allegedly raises several questions as to their meaning and import.
Petitioner posits the following queries: "Does it (referring to the term "series") mean two, three,
four, of the overt or criminal acts listed in Section 1(d)? Would it mean two or more related
enterprises falling under at least two of the means or ‘similar schemes’ listed in the law,
or just a joint criminal enterprise? Would it require substantial identity of facts and
participants, or merely a common pattern of action? Would it imply close connection between
acts, or a direct relationship between the charges? Does the term mean a factual
relationship between acts or merely a common plan among conspirators?"10
The term "combination" is allegedly equally equivocal. According to petitioner, it is not clear
from the law if said term covers time, place, manner of commission, or the principal characters.
Thus petitioner asks: "Does it (referring to the term "combination") include any two or more
acts, whether legal or illegal, or does the law require that the combination must include at least
two of the ‘means or similar schemes’ laid down in R.A. 7080? Does it cover transactions that
have occurred in the same place or area, or in different places, no matter how far apart?
Does ‘combination’ include any two or more overt acts, no matter how far apart in time, or
does it contemplate acts committed within a short period of time? Does the ‘combination’
cover the modus operandi of the crimes, or merely the evidence to be used at the trial?"11
It is also argued that the phrase "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
scheme or conspiracy" adds to the vagueness of the law because "pattern" is not defined
therein and is not included in the definition of the crime of plunder even though it is an essential
element of said crime.12
Petitioner also maintains that the Plunder Law violates the due process clause and the
constitutional presumption of innocence by lowering the quantum of evidence necessary for
proving the component elements of plunder because Section 4 does not require that each and
every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy be proved,
"it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy."13
Finally, petitioner alleges that it is beyond the power of Congress to delimit the reasonable
doubt standard and to abolish the element of mens rea in mala in se crimes by converting
these to mala prohibita, thereby making it easier for the prosecution to prove malversation,
bribery, estafa and other crimes committed by public officers since criminal intent need not be
established.14
Considering the infringement to the constitutionally-guaranteed right to due process of an

accused, petitioner contends that R.A. No. 7080 cannot be accorded any presumption of
constitutional validity.
Respondents’ theory
On the other hand, Respondents argue that the "particular elements constituting the crime of
plunder" are stated with "definiteness and certainty," as follows:
(1) There is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;
(2) There is an amassing, accumulating or acquiring of ill-gotten wealth;
(3) The total amount of ill-gotten wealth so amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least Fifty
Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00); and
(4) The ill-gotten wealth, which is defined as any asset, property, business enterprise or
material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) of R.A. No. 7080, was
acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates,
and/or business associates by any combination or series of the means or similar schemes
enumerated in Section 1(d).15
Moreover, Respondents maintain that assuming that there is some vagueness in the law, it
need not be declared unconstitutional but may be clarified by judicial
construction.16 Respondents further add that the ordinary import of the terms combination" and
"series" should prevail, as can be gleaned from the deliberations of the Congress in the course
of its passage of the law. According to respondents, "series of overt criminal acts" simply mean
a repetition of at least two of any of those enumerated acts found in Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080.
And "combination" means a product of combining of at least one of any of those enumerated
acts described in Section 1(d) with at least one of any of the other acts so enumerated.
Respondents score petitioner for arguing on the basis of federal courts’ decisions on the RICO
law, citing that the U.S. courts have consistently rejected the contention that said law is void
for being vague.17
Respondents deny that the Plunder Law dispenses with the requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt. While there may be no necessity to prove each and every other act done
by the accused in furtherance of the scheme to acquire ill-gotten wealth, it is still necessary for
the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy, as well as all the other elements of the offense
of plunder.18 Respondents also point out that conspiracy itself is not punishable under the
Plunder Law, which deals with conspiracy as a means of incurring criminal liability.19
Respondents likewise contend that it is within the inherent powers and wisdom of the
legislature to determine which acts are mala prohibita in the same way that it can declare
punishable an act which is inherently not criminal in nature.20
In conclusion, Respondents assert that petitioner has failed to overcome the presumption of
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080.
Petitioner’s Reply
Petitioner, in his Reply to Comment, draws attention to Section 4, arguing that the provision
states the "most important element, which is the common thread that ties the component acts
together: "a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy21 and raises the following questions:
(a) Reference is made to a "pattern of overt or criminal acts." The disjunctive "or" is used.
Will a pattern of acts, which are overt but not criminal in themselves, be indicative of an
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy?
(b) Under what specific facts or circumstances will a "pattern" be "indicative" of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy?
(c) Under what specific facts or circumstances will the required "pattern" or "scheme" even be
said to be present or to exist?
(d) When is there an "unlawful scheme or conspiracy?"22

Issues raised in the oral arguments
Oral arguments were heard on September 18, 2001. At said hearing, the Court defined the
issues for resolution as follows:
1.) WHETHER R.A. NO. 7080 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VAGUE;
2) WHETHER R.A. NO. 7080 REQUIRES LESS EVIDENCE FOR PROVING THE
PREDICATE CRIMES OF PLUNDER AND THEREFORE VIOLATES THE RIGHT OF THE
ACCUSED TO DUE PROCESS; and
3) WHETHER PLUNDER AS DEFINED IN R.A. NO. 7080 IS A MALUM PROHIBITUM AND

IF SO, WHETHER IT IS WITHIN THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO SO CLASSIFY THE
SAME.23
Thereafter, both parties filed their respective memoranda in which they discussed the points
which they raised in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.
I believe that there is merit in the petition.
A penal statute which violates constitutional

guarantees of individual rights is void.
Every law enacted by Congress enjoys a presumption of constitutionality,24 and the

presumption prevails in the absence of contrary evidence.25 A criminal statute is generally valid
if it does not violate constitutional guarantees of individual rights.26 Conversely, when a
constitutionally protected right of an individual is in danger of being trampled upon by
a criminal statute, such law must be struck down for being void.27
One of the fundamental requirements imposed by the Constitution upon criminal statutes is
that pertaining to clarity and definiteness. Statutes, particularly penal laws, that fall short of this
requirement have been declared unconstitutional for being vague. This "void-for-vagueness"
doctrine is rooted in the basic concept of fairness as well as the due process clause of the
Constitution.
The Constitution guarantees both substantive and procedural due process28 as well as the
right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.29 A
criminal statute should not be so vague and uncertain that "men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application.30
There are three distinct considerations for the vagueness doctrine. First, the doctrine is
designed to ensure that individuals are properly warned ex ante of the criminal consequences
of their conduct. This "fair notice" rationale was articulated in United States v. Harriss:31
The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give
a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the
statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct
which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.32
Second, and viewed as more important, the doctrine is intended to prevent arbitrary and
discriminatory law enforcement.33 Vague laws are invariably "standardless" and as such,
they afford too great an opportunity for criminal enforcement to be left to the unfettered
discretion of police officers and prosecutors.34 Third, vague laws fail to provide sufficient
guidance to judges who are charged with interpreting statutes. Where a statute is too vague
to provide sufficient guidance, the judiciary is arguably placed in the position of usurping the
proper function of the legislature by "making the law" rather than interpreting it.35
While the dictum that laws be clear and definite does not require Congress to spell out with
mathematical certainty the standards to which an individual must conform his conduct,36 it is
necessary that statutes provide reasonable standards to guide prospective conduct.37 And
where a statute imposes criminal sanctions, the standard of certainty is higher.38 The
penalty imposable on the person found guilty of violating R.A. No. 7080 is reclusion perpetua to
death.39 Given such penalty, the standard of clarity and definiteness required of R.A. No. 7080
is unarguably higher than that of other laws.40
Void-for-vagueness doctrine
applies to criminal laws.
A view has been proffered that "vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are not applicable to
penal laws."41 These two concepts, while related, are distinct from each other.42 On one hand,
the doctrine of overbreadth applies generally to statutes that infringe upon freedom of
speech.43 On the other hand, the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine applies to criminal laws, not
merely those that regulate speech or other fundamental constitutional rights.44 The fact that a
particular criminal statute does not infringe upon free speech does not mean that a facial
challenge to the statute on vagueness grounds cannot succeed.45
As earlier intimated, the "vagueness doctrine" is anchored on the constitutionally-enshrined

right to due process of law. Thus, as in this case that the "life, liberty and property" of petitioner
is involved, the Court should not hesitate to look into whether a criminal statute has sufficiently
complied with the elementary requirements of definiteness and clarity. It is an erroneous
argument that the Court cannot apply the vagueness doctrine to penal laws. Such stance is
tantamount to saying that no criminal law can be challenged however repugnant it is to
the constitutional right to due process.
While admittedly, penal statutes are worded in reasonably general terms to accomplish the
legislature’s objective of protecting the public from socially harmful conduct, this should not
prevent a vagueness challenge in cases where a penal statute is so indeterminate as to cause
the average person to guess at its meaning and application. For if a statute infringing upon
freedom of speech may be challenged for being vague because such right is considered as
fundamental, with more reason should a vagueness challenge with respect to a penal statute
be allowed since the latter involve deprivation of liberty, and even of life which, inarguably,
are rights as important as, if not more than, free speech.
It has been incorrectly suggested46 that petitioner cannot mount a "facial challenge" to the
Plunder Law, and that "facial" or "on its face" challenges seek the total invalidation of a
statute.47 Citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma,48 it is also opined that "claims of facial overbreadth
have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
spoken words" and that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when
invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For
this reason, it is argued further that "on its face invalidation of statutes has been described as
‘manifestly strong medicine,’ to be employed ‘sparingly and only as a last resort.’" A reading
of Broadrick, however, shows that the doctrine involved therein was the doctrine of
overbreadth. Its application to the present case is thus doubtful considering that the thrust at
hand is to determine whether the Plunder Law can survive the vagueness challenge mounted
by petitioner. A noted authority on constitutional law, Professor Lockhart, explained that "the
Court will resolve them (vagueness challenges) in ways different from the approaches it has
fashioned in the law of overbreadth."49 Thus, in at least two cases,50 the U.S. courts allowed
the facial challenges to vague criminal statutes even if these did not implicate free speech
In Kolender v. Lawson,51 petitioners assailed the constitutionality of a California criminal statute

which required persons who loiter or wander on the streets to provide a credible and
reasonable identification and to account for their presence when requested by a peace officer
under circumstances that would justify a valid stop. The U.S. Supreme Court held that said
statute was unconstitutionally vague on its face within the meaning of the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment because it encourages arbitrary enforcement by failing to clarify
what is contemplated by the requirement that a suspect provide a "credible and reasonable
identification." Springfield vs. Oklahoma52 on the other hand involved a challenge to a
Columbus city ordinance banning certain assault weapons. The court therein stated that a
criminal statute may be facially invalid even if it has some conceivable application. It went on
to rule that the assailed ordinance’s definition of "assault weapon" was unconstitutionally
vague, because it was "fundamentally irrational and impossible to apply consistently by the
buying public, the sportsman, the law enforcement officer, the prosecutor or the judge."53
It is incorrect to state that petitioner has made "little effort to show the alleged invalidity of the
statute as applied to him, as he allegedly "attacks ‘on their face’ not only §§ 1(d)(1) and (2) of
R.A. 7080 under which he is charged, but also its other provisions which deal with plunder
committed by illegal or fraudulent disposition of government assets (§1(d)(3)), acquisition of
interest in business (§1(d)(4)), and establishment of monopolies and combinations or
implementation of decrees intended to benefit particular persons or special interests (§
1(d)(5))."54 Notably, much of petitioner’s arguments dealt with the vagueness of the key
phrases "combination or series" and "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy" which go into the very nature of the crime for which he is
charged.
Taking into consideration that the Plunder Law is a penal statute that imposes the supreme
penalty of death, and that petitioner in this case clearly has standing to question its validity
inasmuch as he has been charged thereunder and that he has been for sometime now painfully
deprived of his liberty, it behooves this Court to address the challenge on the validity of R.A.
No. 7080.
Men steeped in law find

difficulty in understanding plunder.
The basic question that arises, therefore, is whether the clauses in Section 2--
combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof
and Section 1(d), which provides--
x x x by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on

xxx
6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or

prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
as qualified by Section 4 which also speaks of the "scheme or conspiracy to amass,

accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth" and of "a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of
the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy," are clear enough that a person "of common
intelligence" need not guess at their meaning and differ as to their application.
The above raise several difficult questions of meaning which go to the very essence of the
offense, such as:
a. How many acts would constitute a "combination or series?"
b. Must the acts alleged to constitute the "combination or series" be similar in nature? Note
that Section 1(d) speaks of "similar schemes" while Section 4 speaks of "the scheme" and of
"a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy."
c. Must the "combination or series" of "overt or criminal acts" involving the aggregate amount
of at least P50 million be conceived as such a scheme or a "pattern of overt or criminal acts"
from inception by the accused?
d. What would constitute a "pattern"? What linkage must there be between and among the
acts to constitute a "pattern"? Need there be a linkage as to the persons who conspire with
one another, and a linkage as to all the acts between and among them?
e. When Section 4 speaks of "indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy," would
this mean that the "scheme" or "conspiracy" should have been conceived or decided upon in
its entirety, and by all of the participants?
f. When committed in connivance "with members of his family, relatives by affinity or

consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons" or through "dummies,
nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates", would such fact be part of the
"pattern of overt or criminal acts" and of the "overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" such
that all of those who are alleged to have participated in the crime of plunder must have
participated in each and every act allegedly constituting the crime of plunder? And as in
conspiracy, conspired together from inception to commit the offense?
g. Within what time frame must the acts be committed so as to constitute a "combination or
series"?
I respectfully disagree with the majority that "ascertainable standards and well-defined
parameters" are provided in the law55 to resolve these basic questions.
Even men steeped in the knowledge of the law are in a quandary as to what constitutes plunder.
The Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, Justice Francis Garchitorena, admitted that the
justices of said court "have been quarrelling with each other in finding ways to determine
what [they] understand by plunder."56 Senator Neptali Gonzales also noted during the
deliberations of Senate Bill No. 733 that the definition of plunder under the law is vague.
He bluntly declared: "I am afraid that it might be faulted for being violative of the due process
clause and the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation of an
accused.57 Fr. Bernas, for his part, pointed to several problematical portions of the law that
were left unclarified. He posed the question: "How can you have a 'series' of criminal acts
if the elements that are supposed to constitute the series are not proved to be
criminal?"58
The meanings of "combination" and "series"

as used in R.A. No. 7080 are not clear.
Although the law has no statutory definition of "combination" or "series", the majority is of the
view that resort can be had to the ordinary meaning of these terms. Thus, Webster's Third New
International Dictionary gives the meaning of "combination": "the result or product or product
of combining: a union or aggregate made of combining one thing with another."59
In the context of R.A. No. 7080, "combination" as suggested by the Solicitor General means
that at least two of the enumerated acts found in Section 1(d), i.e., one of any of the
enumerated acts, combined with another act falling under any other of the enumerated means
may constitute the crime of plunder. With respect to the term "series," the majority states that
it has been understood as pertaining to "two or more overt or criminal acts falling under the
same category"60 as gleaned from the deliberations on the law in the House of Representatives
and the Senate.
Further, the import of "combination" or "series" can be ascertained, the majority insists,61 from
the following deliberations in the Bicameral Conference Committee on May 7, 1991:
REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say, THROUGH A
COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION
ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually mean to say, if there are two or
more means, we mean to say that number one and two or number one and something else
are included, how about a series of the same act? For example, through misappropriation,
conversion, misuse, will these be included also?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yeah, because we say series.
REP. ISIDRO: Series.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.
THE CHAIRMAN: (REP. GARCIA): Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that-
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not
twice of one enumeration.
THE CHAIRMAN: (REP. GARCIA): No, no, not twice.

REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yes. Combination is not twice—but combination, two
acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, that’s it. When we say combination, we mean two different
acts. It can not be a repetition of the same act.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): That be referred to series. Yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): A series.
REP. ISIDRO: That’s not series. It’s a combination. Because when we say combination or
series, we seem to say that two or more, ‘di ba?
THE CHAIRMAN: (REP. GARCIA): Yes, This distinguishes it, really, from the ordinary crimes.
That is why, I said, that is a very good suggestion because if it is only one act, it may fall under
ordinary crime but we have here a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. So…
HON. ISIDRO: I know what you are talking about. For example, through misappropriation,
conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds who raids the public treasury, now, for
example, misappropriation, if there are a series of misappropriations?
xxx
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Series. One after the other eh di…
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN TAÑADA): So that would fall under term "series"?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is combination, ano, two misappropriations…
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): It’s not… two misappropriations will not be combination.
Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say "combination", two different?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yes.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA): Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): For example, ha…
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition…62
The following deliberations in the Senate are pointed to by the majority63 to show that the words
"combination" and "series" are given their ordinary meaning:
Senator Maceda. In line of our interpellations that sometimes "one" or maybe even "two" acts
may already result in such a big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the
words "a series of overt or". To read, therefore: "or conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts
such as". Remove the idea of necessitating "a series". Anyway, the criminal acts are in the
plural.
Senator Tañada. That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.
The President. Probably, two or more would be….
Senator Maceda. Yes, because ‘a series’ implies several or many’ two or more.
Senator Tañada. Accepted, Mr. President.
xxx
The President. If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime.
But when we say ‘acts of plunder’ there should be, at least, two or more.
Senator Romulo. In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President.64
To my mind, resort to the dictionary meaning of the terms "combination" and "series" as well
as recourse to the deliberations of the lawmakers only serve to prove that R.A. No. 7080 failed
to satisfy the strict requirements of the Constitution on clarity and definiteness. Note that the
key element to the crime of plunder is that the public officer, by himself or in conspiracy with
others, amasses, accumulates, or acquires "ill-gotten wealth" through a "combination or series
of overt or criminal acts" as described in Section 1(d) of the law. Senator Gonzales, during the
deliberations in the Senate, already raised serious concern over the lack of a statutory
definition of what constitutes "combination" or "series", consequently, expressing his fears that
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 might be violative of due process:
Senator Gonzales. To commit the offense of plunder, as defined in this Act and while
constituting a single offense, it must consist of a series of overt or criminal acts, such as bribery,
extortion, malversation of public funds, swindling, illegal exaction, and graft or corrupt practices
act and like offenses. Now, Mr. President, I think, this provision, by itself will be vague. I am
afraid that it might be faulted for being violative of the due process clause and the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation of an accused. Because, what is meant by
"series of overt or criminal acts"? I mean, would 2, 3, 4 or 5 constitute a series? During the
period of amendments, can we establish a minimum of overt acts like, for example, robbery in
band? The law defines what is robbery in band by the number of participants therein. In this
particular case probably, we can statutorily provide for the definition of "series" so that two, for
example, would that be already a series? Or, three, what would be the basis for such
determination?65 (Emphasis supplied.)
The point raised by Senator Gonzales is crucial and well-taken. I share petitioner’s observation
that when penal laws enacted by Congress make reference to a term or concept requiring a
quantitative definition, these laws are so crafted as to specifically state the exact number or
percentage necessary to constitute the elements of a crime. To cite a few:
"Band" – "Whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in the
commission of an offense, it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band." (Article
14[6], Revised Penal Code)66
"Conspiracy" – "A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." (Article 8, Revised Penal
Code)67
"Illegal Recruitment by a Syndicate" – "Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate

if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one
another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme x x x." (Section
38, Labor Code)
"Large-scale Illegal Recruitment" – "Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if

committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group." (Section 38, Labor
Code)
"Organized/Syndicated Crime Group" – "[M]eans a group of two or more persons collaborating,

confederating or mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in the commission of any
crime." (Article 62 (1)(1a), Revised Penal Code)68
"Swindling by a Syndicate" – "x x x if the swindling (estafa) is committed by a syndicate

consisting of five or more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or
illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme x x x ." (Section 1, P.D. No. 1689)69
The deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee and of the Senate cited by the
majority, consisting mostly of unfinished sentences, offer very little help in clarifying the
nebulous concept of plunder. All that they indicate is that Congress seemingly intended to hold
liable for plunder a person who: (1) commits at least two counts of any one of the acts
mentioned in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080, in which case, such person commits plunder by a
series of overt criminal acts; or (2) commits at least one count of at least two of the acts
mentioned in Section 1(d), in which case, such person commits plunder by a combination of
overt criminal acts. Said discussions hardly provide a window as to the exact nature of this
crime.
A closer look at the exchange between Representatives Garcia and Isidro and Senator Tañada
would imply that initially, combination was intended to mean "two or more means,"70 i.e.,
"number one and two or number one and something else x x x,"71 "two of the enumerated
means not twice of one enumeration,"72 "two different acts."73 Series would refer to "a repetition
of the same act."74 However, the distinction was again lost as can be gleaned from the following:
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA) Yes. Combination is not twice – but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO. So in other words, that’s it. When we say combination, we mean, two different
acts. It can not be a repetition of the same act.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA). That be referred to series. Yeah.
REP. ISIDRO. No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA). A series.
REP. ISIDRO. That’s not series. It’s a combination. Because when we say combination or
series, we seem to say that two or more, ‘di ba?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA). Yes. This distinguishes it really the ordinary --- That’s why
I said, that’s a very good suggestion, because if its’ only one act, it may fall under ordinary
crime. But we have here a combination or series, of overt or criminal acts" (Emphasis
supplied).75
xxx
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) Series. One after the other eh di…
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA) So, that would fall under the term "series"?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P) Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO. Now, if it is combination, ano, two misappropriations…
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA) It’s not… two misappropriations will not be combination.
Series.
REP. ISIDRO. So, it is not a combination?
THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GARCIA P.) Yes.
REP. ISIDRO. When we say "combination", two different?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) Yes.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA) Two different.
REP. ISIDRO. Two different acts.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) For example, ha…
REP. ISIDRO. Now a series, meaning, repetition…
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA) Yes.
REP. ISIDRO. With that…
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA) So, it could be a series of any of the acts mentioned in
paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 of Section 2 (d), or… 1 (d) rather, or a combination of any of the acts
mentioned in paragraph 1 alone, or paragraph 2 alone or paragraph 3 or paragraph 4.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) I think combination maybe…which one? Series?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA) Series or combination.
REP. ISIDRO. Which one, combination or series or series or combination?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA) Okay. Ngayon doon sa definition, ano, Section 2, definition,
doon sa portion ng… Saan iyon? As mentioned, as described…
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) Described. I think that is…
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA) … better than "mentioned". Yes.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) Okay?
REP. ISIDRO. Very good.
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. TAÑADA) Oo, marami pong salamat.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) Maraming salamat po.
The meeting was adjourned at 1:33 p.m."76 (Emphasis supplied.)
The aforequoted deliberations, especially the latter part thereof, would show a dearth of focus
to render precise the definition of the terms. Phrases were uttered but were left unfinished.
The examples cited were not very definite. Unfortunately, the deliberations were apparently
adjourned without the Committee members themselves being clear on the concept of series
and combination.
Moreover, if "combination" as used in the law simply refers to the amassing, accumulation and
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least P50 Million through at least two of the
means enumerated in Section 1(d), and "series," to at least two counts of one of the modes
under said section, the accused could be meted out the death penalty for acts which, if taken
separately, i.e., not considered as part of the combination or series, would ordinarily result in
the imposition of correctional penalties only. If such interpretation would be adopted, the
Plunder law would be so oppressive and arbitrary as to violate due process and the
constitutional guarantees against cruel or inhuman punishment.77 The penalty would be
blatantly disproportionate to the offense. Petitioner’s examples illustrate this absurdity:
a. One act of indirect bribery (penalized under Art. 211 of the Revised Penal Code with prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods),
combined with -
one act of fraud against the public treasury (penalized under Art. 213 of the Revised Penal
Code with prision correccional in its medium period to prision mayor in its minimum period).
equals –
Plunder (punished by reclusion perpetua to death plus forfeiture of assets under R. A. 7080)
b. One act of prohibited transaction (penalized under Art. 215 of the Revised Penal Code with
prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from P200 to P1,000 or both).
combined with –
one act of establishing a commercial monopoly (penalized under Art. 186 of Revised Penal
Code with prision correccional in its minimum or a fine ranging from P200 to P6,00, or both.
equals –
Plunder (punished by reclusion perpetua to death, and forfeiture of assets under R.A. 7080).
c. One act of possession of prohibited interest by a public officer (penalized with prision
correccional in its minimum period or a fine of P200 to P1,000, or both under Art. 216 of the
Revised Penal Code).
combined with –
one act of combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade (penalized under Art. 186 of the
Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its minimum period, or a fine of P200 to P1,000,
or both),
equals –
plunder (punished by reclusion perpetua to death, and forfeiture of assets).78
The argument that higher penalties may be imposed where two or more distinct criminal acts
are combined and are regarded as special complex crimes, i.e., rape with homicide, does not
justify the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death in case plunder is committed.
Taken singly, rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua;79 and homicide, by reclusion
temporal.80 Hence, the increase in the penalty imposed when these two are considered
together as a special complex crime is not too far from the penalties imposed for each of the
single offenses. In contrast, as shown by the examples above, there are instances where the
component crimes of plunder, if taken separately, would result in the imposition of correctional
penalties only; but when considered as forming part of a series or combination of acts
constituting plunder, could be punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The disproportionate
increase in the penalty is certainly violative of substantive due process and constitute a cruel
and inhuman punishment.
It may also be pointed out that the definition of "ill-gotten wealth" in Section 1(d) has reference
to the acquisition of property (by the accused himself or in connivance with others) "by any
combination or series" of the "means" or "similar schemes" enumerated therein, which include
the following:
xxx
4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any
other forms of interest or participation including the promise of future employment or any
business enterprise or undertakings;
5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combination

interests;
xxx
The above-mentioned acts are not, by any stretch of the imagination, criminal or illegal acts.
They involve the exercise of the right to liberty and property guaranteed by Article III, Section
1 of the Constitution which provides that "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
Receiving or accepting any shares of stock is not per se objectionable. It is in pursuance of
civil liberty, which includes "the right of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful
ways; x x x to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any avocation, and/or that
purpose, to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his
carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion.81 Nor is there any impropriety,
immorality or illegality in establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combination and/or implementation of decrees and orders even if they are intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests. The phrases "particular persons" and "special interests"
may well refer to the poor,82 the indigenous cultural
communities, labor, farmers, fisherfolk, women,87 or those connected with education,
83 84 85 86
science and technology, arts, culture and sports.88
In contrast, the monopolies and combinations described in Article 186 of the Revised Penal
Code are punishable because, as specifically defined therein, they are "on restraint of trade or
commerce or to prevent by artificial means of free competition in the market, or the object is
"to alter the price" of any merchandise "by spreading false rumors," or to manipulate market
prices in restraint of trade. There are no similar elements of monopolies or combinations as
described in the Plunder Law to make the acts wrongful.
If, as interpreted by the Solicitor General, "series" means a "repetition" or pertains to "two or
more" acts, and "combination as defined in the Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
is "the result or product of combining one thing with another,"89 then, the commission of two or
more acts falling under paragraphs (4) and (5) of Section 1(d) would make innocent acts
protected by the Constitution as criminal, and punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
R.A. No. 7080 does not define "pattern,"

an essential element of the crime of plunder.
Granting arguendo that, as asserted by the majority, "combination" and "series" simplistically
mean the commission of two or more of the acts enumerated in Section 1(d),90 still, this
interpretation does not cure the vagueness of R.A. No. 7080. In construing the definition of
"plunder," Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 must not be read in isolation but rather, must be
interpreted in relation to the other provisions of said law. It is a basic rule of statutory
construction that to ascertain the meaning of a law, the same must be read in its
entirety.91 Section 1 taken in relation to Section 4 suggests that there is something to plunder
beyond simply the number of acts involved and that a grand scheme to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth is contemplated by R.A. No. 7080. Sections 1 and 2 pertain only to
the nature and quantitative means or acts by which a public officer, by himself or in connivance
with other persons, "amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth." Section 4, on the
other hand, requires the presence of elements other than those enumerated in Section 2 to
establish that the crime of plunder has been committed because it speaks of the necessity to
establish beyond reasonable doubt a "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy."
Clearly, it will not suffice that the "illegal wealth" amassed is at least Fifty Million Pesos and
that this was acquired by any two or more of the acts described in Section 1(d); it is necessary
that these acts constitute a "combination or series" of acts done in furtherance of "the scheme
or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth", and which constitute "a
pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy."
That pattern is an essential element of the crime of plunder is evident from a reading of the
assailed law in its entirety. It is that which would distinguish plunder from isolated criminal acts
punishable under the Revised Penal Code and other laws, for without the existence a "pattern
of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy" to acquire ill-gotten
wealth, a person committing several or even all of the acts enumerated in Section 1(d) cannot
be convicted for plunder, but may be convicted only for the specific crimes committed under
the pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code or other laws.
For this reason, I do not agree that Section 4 is merely a rule of evidence or a rule of procedure.
It does not become such simply because its caption states that it is, although its wording
indicates otherwise. On the contrary, it is of substantive character because it spells out a
distinctive element of the crime which has to be established, i.e., an overall unlawful "scheme
or conspiracy" indicated by a "pattern of overt or criminal acts" or means or similar schemes
"to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth."
The meaning of the phrase "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy," however, escapes me. As in "combination" and "series," R.A. No. 7080
does not provide a definition of "pattern" as well as "overall unlawful scheme." Reference to
the legislative history of R.A. No. 7080 for guidance as to the meanings of these concepts
would be unavailing, since the records of the deliberations in Congress are silent as to what
the lawmakers mean by these terms.
Resort to the dictionary meanings of "pattern" and "scheme" is, in this case, wholly inadequate.
These words are defined as:
pattern: an arrangement or order of things or activity.92
scheme: design; project; plot.93
At most, what the use of these terms signifies is that while multiplicity of the acts (at least two
or more) is necessary, this is not sufficient to constitute plunder. As stated earlier, without the
element of "pattern" indicative of an "overall unlawful scheme," the acts merely constitute
isolated or disconnected criminal offenses punishable by the Revised Penal Code or other
special laws.
The commission of two or more of the acts falling under Section 1(d) is no guarantee that they
fall into a "pattern" or "any arrangement or order." It is not the number of acts but the
relationship that they bear to each other or to some external organizing principle that renders
them "ordered" or "arranged":
A pattern is an arrangement or order of things, or activity, and the mere fact that there are a
number of predicates is no guarantee that they fall into an arrangement or order. It is not the
number of predicates but the relationship that they bear to each other or to some external
organizing principle that renders them ‘ordered’ or ‘arranged.’ 94
In any event, it is hardly possible that two predicate acts can form a pattern:
The implication is that while two acts are necessary, they may not be sufficient. Indeed, in
common parlance, two of anything will not generally form a ‘pattern.’95
In H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. et al.96 (hereinafter referred to

as Northwestern), the U.S. Court reiterated the foregoing doctrine:
xxx Nor can we agree with those courts that have suggested that a pattern is established
merely by proving two predicate acts.97
Respondents’ metaphorical illustration of "pattern" as a wheel with spokes (the overt or criminal
acts of the accused) meeting at a common center (the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth) and with
a rim (the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy) of the wheel enclosing the spokes, is off
tangent. Their position that two spokes suffice to make a wheel, even without regard to the
relationship the spokes bear to each other clearly demonstrates the absurdity of their view, for
how can a wheel with only two spokes which are disjointed function properly?
That "pattern" is an amorphous concept even in U.S. jurisprudence where the term is
reasonably defined is precisely the point of the incisive concurring opinion of Justice Antonin
Scalia in Northwestern where he invited a constitutional challenge to the RICO law on "void-
for-vagueness" ground.98 The RICO law is a federal statute in the United States that provides
for both civil and criminal penalties for violation therefor. It incorporates by reference twenty-
four separate federal crimes and eight types of state felonies.99 One of the key elements of a
RICO violation is that the offender is engaged in a "pattern of racketeering activity."100 The
RICO law defines the phrase "pattern of racketeering activity" as requiring "at least two acts of
racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of 18 USCS § 1961, and
within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of
racketeering activity."101 Incidentally, the Solicitor General claims that R.A. No. 7080 is an
entirely different law from the RICO law. The deliberations in Congress reveal otherwise. As
observed by Rep. Pablo Garcia, Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on
Justice, R.A. No. 7080 was patterned after the RICO law.102
In Northwestern, conceding that "[the U.S. Congress] has done nothing . . . further to illuminate
RICO’s key requirement of a pattern of racketeering," the U.S. Supreme Court, through Justice
William J. Brennan, Jr., undertook the task of developing a meaningful concept of "pattern"
within the existing statutory framework.103 Relying heavily on legislative history, the US
Supreme Court in that case construed "pattern" as requiring "continuity plus
relationship."104 The US Supreme Court formulated the "relationship requirement" in this wise:
"Criminal conduct forms a pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar
purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events."105 Continuity is
clarified as "both a closed and open-ended concept, referring either to a closed period of
repeated conduct, or to past conduct that by its nature projects into the future with a threat of
repetition."106
In his separate concurring opinion, Justice Scalia rejected the majority’s formulation. The
"talismanic phrase" of "continuity plus relationship" is, as put by Justice Scalia, about as helpful
as advising the courts that "life is a fountain." He writes:
x x x Thus, when §1961(5) says that a pattern "requires at least two acts of racketeering
activity" it is describing what is needful but not sufficient. (If that were not the case, the concept
of "pattern" would have been unnecessary, and the statute could simply have attached liability
to "multiple acts of racketeering activity"). But what that something more is, is beyond me. As
I have suggested, it is also beyond the Court. Today’s opinion has added nothing to improve
our prior guidance, which has created a kaleidoscope of Circuit positions, except to clarify that
RICO may in addition be violated when there is a "threat of continuity." It seems to me this
increases rather than removes the vagueness. There is no reason to believe that the Court of
Appeals will be any more unified in the future, than they have in the past, regarding the content
of this law.
That situation is bad enough with respect to any statute, but it is intolerable with respect to
RICO. For it is not only true, as Justice Marshall commented in Sedima, S.P.R.L. vs. Imrex
Co., 473 U.S. 479 x x x, that our interpretation of RICO has "quite simply revolutionize[d]
private litigation" and "validate[d] the federalization of broad areas of state common law of
frauds," x x x so that clarity and predictability in RICO’s civil applications are particularly
important; but it is also true that RICO, since it has criminal applications as well, must, even in
its civil applications, possess the degree of certainty required for criminal laws x x x. No
constitutional challenge to this law has been raised in the present case, and so that issue is
not before us. That the highest court in the land has been unable to derive from this statute
anything more than today’s meager guidance bodes ill for the day when that challenge is
presented.107
It bears noting that in Northwestern the constitutionality of the RICO law was not
challenged.108 After Northwestern, the U.S. Supreme Court has so far declined the opportunity
to hear cases in which the void-for-vagueness challenge to the pattern requirement was
raised.109
Admittedly, at the district courts level, the state statutes (referred to as Little RICOS)110 have
so far successfully survived constitutional challenge on void-for-vagueness ground. However,
it must be underscored that, unlike R.A. No. 7080, these state anti-racketeering laws have
invariably provided for a reasonably clear, comprehensive and understandable
definition of "pattern."111 For instance, in one state, the pattern requirement specifies that
the related predicate acts must have, among others, the same or similar purpose, result,
principal, victims or methods of commission and must be connected with "organized
crime.112 In four others, their pattern requirement provides that two or more predicate acts
should be related to the affairs of the enterprise, are not isolated, are not closely related to
each other and connected in point of time and place, and if they are too closely related, they
will be treated as a single act.113 In two other states, pattern requirements provide that if the
acts are not related to a common scheme, plan or purpose, a pattern may still exist if the
participants have the mental capacity required for the predicate acts and are associated with
the criminal enterprise.114
All the foregoing state statutes require that the predicate acts be related and that the acts
occur within a specified time frame.
Clearly, "pattern" has been statutorily defined and interpreted in countless ways by circuit
courts in the United States. Their divergent conclusions have functioned effectively to create
variant criminal offenses.115 This confusion has come about notwithstanding that almost all
these state laws have respectively statutorily defined "pattern". In sharp contrast, R.A. No.
7080, as earlier pointed out, lacks such crucial definition. As to what constitutes pattern
within the meaning of R.A. No. 7080 is left to the ad hoc interpretation of prosecutors and
judges. Neither the text of R.A. No. 7080 nor legislative history afford any guidance as to what
factors may be considered in order to prove beyond reasonable doubt "pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy."
Be that as it may, it is glaringly fallacious to argue that "series" simply means a "repetition" or
"pertaining to two or more" and "combination" is the "result or product or product of combining."
Whether two or more or at least three acts are involved, the majority would interpret the phrase
"combinations' or "series" only in terms of number of acts committed. They
entirely overlook or ignore Section 4 which requires "a pattern of overt of criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" to convict.
If the elements of the offense are as what the majority has suggested, the crime of plunder
could have been defined in the following manner:
Where a public official, by himself or in conspiracy with others, amasses or acquires money or
property by committing two or more acts in violation of Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (R.A. 3019), or Articles 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216 and 217 of the Revised
Penal Code, he shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death.
The above would be a straightforward and objective definition of the crime of plunder. However,
this would render meaningless the core phrases "a combination or series of" "overt or criminal
acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy," or the phrase "any combination
or series of the following means or similar schemes" or "a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy."
But that obviously is not the definition of the crime of plunder under R.A. 7080. There is
something more. A careful reading of the law would unavoidably compel a conclusion that
there should be a connecting link among the "means or schemes" comprising a "series or
combination" for the purpose of acquiring or amassing "ill-gotten wealth." The bond or link is
an "overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy mentioned in Section 4. The law contemplates a
combination or series of criminal acts in plunder done by the accused "in furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth." It does not
postulate acts committed randomly, separately or independently or
sporadically. Otherwise stated, if the legislature intended to define plunder as the acquisition
of ill-gotten wealth in the manner espoused by the majority, the use in R.A. 7080 of such words
and phrases as "combination" and "series of overt or criminal acts" xxx "in furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy" is absolutely pointless and meaningless.
R.A. No. 7080 makes it possible for a person

conspiring with the accused in committing
one of the acts constituting the charge
of plunder to be convicted for the same crime.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 states that "[a]ny person who participated with the said public officer
in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished
for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance
of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be
considered by the court." Both parties share the view that the law as it is worded makes it
possible for a person who participates in the commission of only one of the component crimes
constituting plunder to be liable as co-conspirator for plunder, not merely the component crime
in which he participated.116 While petitioner concedes that it is easy to ascertain the penalty for
an accomplice or accessory under R.A. No. 7080, such is not the case with respect to a co-
principal of the accused.117 In other words, a person who conspires with the accused in the
commission of only one of the component crimes may be prosecuted as co-principal for the
component crime, or as co-principal for the crime of plunder, depending on the interpretation
of the prosecutor. The unfettered discretion effectively bestowed on law enforcers by the
aforequoted clause in determining the liability of the participants in the commission of one or
more of the component crimes of a charge for plunder undeniably poses the danger of
arbitrary enforcement of the law.118
R.A. No. 7080 does not clearly state

the prescriptive period of the crime of plunder.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7080 provides that the crime punishable under said Act shall prescribe
in twenty (20) years. Considering that the law was designed to cover a "combination or series
of overt or criminal acts," or "a pattern of overt or criminal acts," from what time shall the period
of prescription be reckoned? From the first, second, third or last act of the series or pattern?
What shall be the time gap between two succeeding acts? If the last act of a series or
combination was committed twenty or more years after the next preceding one, would not the
crime have prescribed, thereby resulting in the total extinction of criminal liability under Article
89(b) of the Revised Penal Code? In antithesis, the RICO law affords more clarity and
definiteness in describing "pattern of racketeering activity" as "at least two acts of racketeering
activity, one of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after
the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity."119119 119 The U.S. state statutes similarly
provide specific time frames within which racketeering acts are committed.
The Solicitor General enjoins the Court to rectify the deficiencies in the law by judicial
construction. However, it certainly would not be feasible for the Court to interpret each and
every ambiguous provision without falling into the trap of judicial legislation. A statute
should be construed to avoid constitutional question only when an alternative interpretation is
possible from its language.120 Borrowing from the opinion of the court121 in Northwestern,122 the
law "may be a poorly drafted statute; but rewriting it is a job for Congress, if it so inclined,
and not for this Court." But where the law as the one in question is void on its face for its
patent ambiguity in that it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, the Court cannot breathe
life to it through the guise of construction.
R.A. No. 7080 effectively eliminates mens rea

or criminal intent as an element of the crime of plunder.
Section 4 provides that for the purpose of establishing the crime of plunder, "it shall not be
necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to
establish beyond reasonable a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy."
The majority would interpret this section to mean that the prosecution has the burden of
"showing a combination or series resulting in the crime of plunder." And, once the minimum
requirements for a combination or a series of acts are met, there is no necessity for the
prosecution to prove each and every other act done by the accused in furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten wealth.123
By its language, Section 4 eliminates proof of each and every component criminal act of
plunder by the accused and limits itself to establishing just the pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of unlawful scheme or conspiracy. The law, in effect, penalizes the accused on the
basis of a proven scheme or conspiracy to commit plunder without the necessity of establishing
beyond reasonable doubt each and every criminal act done by the accused in the crime of
plunder. To quote Fr. Bernas again: "How can you have a ‘series’ of criminal acts if the
elements that are supposed to constitute the series are not proved to be criminal?"124
Moreover, by doing away with proof beyond reasonable doubt of each and every criminal act
done by the accused in the furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to acquire ill-gotten wealth,
it being sufficient just to prove a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy, the Plunder Law effectively eliminated the mens rea or
criminal intent as an element of the crime. Because of this, it is easier to convict for plunder
and sentence the accused to death than to convict him for each of the component crimes
otherwise punishable under the Revised Penal Code and other laws which are bailable
offenses. The resultant absurdity strikes at the very heart if the constitutional guarantees of
due process and equal protection.
Plunder is a malum in se.
The acts enumerated in Section 1(d) are mostly defined and penalized by the Revised Penal
Code, e.g. malversation, estafa, bribery and other crimes committed by public officers. As such,
they are by nature mala in se crimes. Since intent is an essential element of these crimes, then,
with more reason that criminal intent be established in plunder which, under R.A. No. 7659, is
one of the heinous crimes125 as pronounced in one of its whereas clauses.126
The fact that the acts enumerated in Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080 were made criminal by special
law does not necessarily make the same mala prohibita where criminal intent is not essential,
although the term refers generally to acts made criminal by special laws. For there is a marked
difference between the two. According to a well-known author on criminal law:
There is a distinction between crimes which are mala in se, or wrongful from their nature, such
as theft, rape, homicide, etc., and those that are mala prohibita, or wrong merely because
prohibited by statute, such as illegal possession of firearms.
Crimes mala in se are those so serious in their effects on society as to call for almost
unanimous condemnation of its members; while crimes mala prohibita are violations of mere
rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society.
(Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Rawle’s 3rd Revision)
(1) In acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in those mala prohibit the only inquiry is, has the
law been violated? (People vs. Kibler, 106 N.Y., 321, cited in the case of U.S. vs. Go Chico,
14 Phil. 132)
Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy, as
in illegal possession of firearms. (People vs. Conosa, C.A., 45 O.G. 3953)
(2) The term mala in se refers generally to felonies defined and penalized by the Revised Penal
Code. When the acts are inherently immoral, they are mala in se, even if punished by special
laws. On the other hand, there are crimes in the Revised Penal Code which were originally
defined and penalized by special laws. Among them are possession and use of opium,
malversation, brigandage, and libel.127
The component acts constituting plunder, a heinous crime, being inherently wrongful and
immoral, are patently mala in se, even if punished by a special law and accordingly, criminal
intent must clearly be established together with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no
crime is committed. By eliminating mens rea, R.A. 7080 does not require the prosecution to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the component acts constituting plunder and imposes a lesser
burden of proof on the prosecution, thus paving the way for the imposition of the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death on the accused, in plain violation of the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution. Evidently, the authority of the legislature to omit the
element of scienter in the proof of a crime refers to regulatory measures in the exercise of
police power, where the emphasis of the law is to secure a more orderly regulations of the
offense of society, rather than the punishment of the crimes. So that in mala
prohibita prosecutions, the element of criminal intent is a requirement for conviction and must
be provided in the special law penalizing what are traditionally mala in se crimes. As correctly
pointed out by petitioner,128 citing U.S. Supreme Court decisions, the Smith Act was ruled to
require "intent" to advocate129 and held to require knowledge of illegal advocacy.130 And in
another case,131 and ordinance making illegal the possession of obscene books was declared
unconstitutional for lack of scienter requirement.
Mens rea is a substantive due process requirement under the Constitution, and this is a
limitation on police power. Additionally, lack of mens rea or a clarifying scienter requirement
aggravates the vagueness of a statute.
In Morisette v. U.S.132 the U.S. Supreme Court underscored the stultifying effect of
eliminating mens rea, thus:
The Government asks us by a feat of construction radically to change the weights and balances
in the scales of justice. The purpose and obvious effect of doing away with the requirement of
a guilty intent is to ease the prosecution’s party to conviction, to strip the defendant of such
benefit as he derived at common law from innocence of evil purpose, and to circumscribe the
freedom heretofore allowed juries. Such a manifest impairment of the immunities of the
individual should not be extended to common law crimes on judicial initiative.
In the same breath, Justice Florenz Regalado expreses serious doubts as to the authority of
the legislature to complex mala in se crimes with mala prohibita, saying:
x x x although there has been a tendency to penalize crimes under special laws with penalties
"borrowed" from the Code, there is still the question of legislative authority to consolidate
crimes punished under different statutes. Worse, where one is punished under the Code and
the other by the special law, both of these contingencies had not been contemplated when the
concept of a delito complejo was engrafted into the Code.133
Petitioner is not estopped from questioning

the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080.
The case at bar has been subject to controversy principally due to the personalities involved
herein. The fact that one of petitioner’s counsels134 was a co-sponsor of the Plunder Law135 and
petitioner himself voted for its passage when he was still a Senator would not in any put him
in estoppel to question its constitutionality. The rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact,
not of law.136 Moreover, estoppel should be resorted to only as a means of preventing
injustice.137 To hold that petitioner is estopped from questioning the validity of R.A. No. 7080
because he had earlier voted for its passage would result in injustice not only to him, but to all
others who may be held liable under this statute. In People vs. Vera,138 citing the U.S. case
of Attorney General v. Perkins, the Court held:
x x x The idea seems to be that the people are estopped from questioning the validity of a law
enacted by their representatives; that to an accusation by the people of Michigan of usurpation
upon their government, a statute enacted by the people of Michigan is an adequate statute
relied on in justification is unconstitutional, it is a statute only in form, and lacks the force of
law, and is of no more saving effect to justify action under it it had never been enacted. the
constitution is the supreme law, and to its behests the courts, the legislature, and the people
must bow. x x x139
The Court should not sanction the use of an equitable remedy to defeat the ends of justice by
permitting a person to be deprived of his life and liberty under an invalid law.
Undoubtedly, the reason behind the enactment of R.A. 7080 is commendable. It was a
response to the felt need at the time that existing laws were inadequate to penalize the nature
and magnitude of corruption that characterized a "previous regime."140 However, where the law,
such as R.A. 7080, is so indefinite that the line between innocent and condemned conduct
becomes a matter of guesswork, the indefiniteness runs afoul of due process concepts which
require that persons be given full notice of what to avoid, and that the discretion of law
enforcement officials, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement,
be limited by explicit legislative standards.141 It obfuscates the mind to ponder that such an
ambiguous law as R.A. No. 7080 would put on the balance the life and liberty of the accused
against whom all the resources of the State are arrayed. It could be used as a tool against
political enemies and a weapon of hate and revenge by whoever wields the levers of power.
I submit that the charge against petitioner in the Amended Information in Criminal Case No.
26558 does not constitute "plunder" under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. If at
all, the acts charged may constitute offenses punishable under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) or the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the information charging
petitioner with plunder must be quashed. Such quashal, however, should be without prejudice
to the filing of new informations for acts under R.A. No. 3019, of the Revised Penal Code and
other laws. Double jeopardy would not bar the filing of the same because the dismissal of the
case is made with the express consent of the petitioner-accused.142
In view of the foregoing, I vote to GRANT the petition.
Footnotes
1Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., Prejudging the Supreme Court, in his column "Sounding
Board", Today, September 26, 2001, p. 6.
2 An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, amending for that purpose
the Revised Penal Code and Other Special Penal Laws, namely: Dangerous Drugs Act, Crime
of Plunder, and Anti-Carnapping Act (1993).
3
87 O.G. 38, pp. 5488-5490 (1991).
4 Annex "C" of Petition.
5 Amended Petition, p. 8.
6 Section 1(d).
7 Memorandum for Petitioner, p.11.
8 Amended Petition., pp. 13-17; Memorandum for Petitioner, pp. 16-24.
According to petitioners:
a. While American federal courts in the First Circuit in the U.S. have defined "series of acts
or transactions" for purposes of Rule 8(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to refer
only to "joint criminal enterprise" [U.S. v. Turkette (1980, CA 1 Mass. 632 F 2d 896)] under
a common scheme [U.S. v. J. Tirocchi & Sons, Inc. (1960 DC RI) 187 F. Supp. 778], the
courts in the Second Circuit insist that "series of acts and transactions" should mean that
there should be "connection between the offenses" [U.S. v. Charney (1962, SD BY) 211 F.
Supp. 904] or "direct relationship between counts" [U.S. v. Haim (1963 SD NY), 218 F.
Supp. 922] or "substantial identity of facts and participants" [U.S. v. Olin Corp. (1979, WD
NY), 465 S. Supp. 1120].
b. Still on the U.S. Federal courts, the courts in the Third Circuit define "series of acts"
following the "direct relationship between acts" standard of the Second Circuit; for example,
U.S. v. Stafford (1974, ED Pa.), 382 F. Supp. 1401) using "factual relationship between
acts"; U.S. v. Slawik (1975, DC Del.) 408 F. Supp. 190, using "connection between charges";
U.S. v. Cohen (1978, ED Pa.) 444 F. Supp. 1314, using "direct relationship between
offenses"; and U.S. v. Serubo (1978, ED Pa.) 460 F. Supp. 689), using "direct relationship
between offenses", but the federal courts in the Fourth Circuit follow the "common scheme"
standard, as in Rakes v. U.S. (169 F2d 730).
c. The Sixth Circuit courts define "series" to mean "common scheme" (e.g. U.S. v. Russo
(480 F2d 1228) and so do the courts in the Seventh Circuit (e.g. U.S. v. Scott, (1969, CA 7
Ill.) (413 F2d 932), and Eighth Circuit Courts (e.g. Haggard v. U.S. (1966, CA 8 Mo.) 369
F2d 968), but the courts in the Fifth Circuit follow the "close connection between acts"
standard, (e.g. U.S. v. Laca (1974 CA 5 Tex) 593 F2d 615) or "substantial identity of facts
and participants" (e.g. U.S. v. Levine (1977 CA 5 Fla.) 546 F2d 658; U.S. v. Marionneaux
(1975 CA 5 La.) 514 F2d 1244) together with federal courts in the Ninth Circuit (e.g. U.S. v.
Ford (1980 CA 9 Cal..) 632 F2d 1354) and those in the District of Columbia Circuit (U.S. v.
Jackson (1977) 562 F2d 789; U.S. v. Bachman, (1958 DC Dist. Col.) 164 F. Suppl. 898).
[Amended Petition, pp. 14-16; Memorandum for Petitioner, pp. 20-22.]
9 Amended Petition, pp. 18-19; Memorandum for Petitioner, pp. 34-45.
10 Id., at 13-14; Id., at 19.
11 Id., at 16-17; Id., at 23.
12 Id., at 25-34.
13
Id., at 27-31;Id., at. 66-76.
14 Id., at 27-35; Id.,. at 76-83.
15 Comment, pp. 11-13; Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 30-32.
16 Ibid.; Id., at 49-50.
17 Id., at 13-25; Id., at 58-59.
18 Id., at 28-33; Id.., at 70-77.
19 Id., at 33-34.
20 Comment, pp. 37-42; Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 82-84.
21 Reply to Comment, p. 12.
22 Id., at 14-15.
23 TSN, Hearing on oral arguments, September 18, 2001, pp. 2-3.
24Tan vs. People, 290 SCRA 117 (1998); see also Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA
402 (1997).
25 Morfe vs. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1968).
26 State v. Vogel, 467 N.W.2d 86 (1991).
27 See Id.
28 ART. III, Sections 1, 12 and 14.
In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila (20
SCRA 849 [1967]), the Court expounded on the concept of due process as follows:
x x x What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a
substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that
matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness
to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness
is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to
paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression.
Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly
it has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea
of fair play. It exacts fealty 'to those strivings for justice' and judges the act of officialdom of
whatever branch 'in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect
[democratic] traditions of legal and political thought.' It is not a narrow or 'technical conception
with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances,' decisions based on such a
clause requiring a 'close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society."
Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or
phrases (at pp. 860-861).
29 ART. III, Section 14.
30 People v. Nazario, 165 SCRA 186 (1988).
31 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
32 Id., at 617.
33 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
34
Ibid.
35 See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
36 Ibid.
37 Kolender, supra.
38 Ibid.
39 Section 2.
40 See FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 US 284 (1954).
41 See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, pp. 10-12.
42RELATIONS BETWEEN VAGUENESS AND OVERBREADTH – THE VOID FOR VAGUE

DOCTRINE, American Constitutional Law (2nd) (1998), p. 1033 citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
306 U.S. 451 (1939). See also Springfield Armory, Inc. v City of Columbus, 29 F.3d 250, 1994
FED App 239P (6th Cir. 1994); Connally v. General Construction Company, 269 U.S. 385
(1926); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 1957); Kolender v. Lawson, supra.
43THE OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE, Treatise on Constitutional Law – Substance and

Procedure, Vol. IV (1992), pp. 25-31; 36-37.
44 See Note 42.
45 Springfield Armory, Inc. v City of Columbus, supra.
46 See Concurring Opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, pp. 10-12.
47RELATIONS BETWEEN VAGUENESS AND OVERBREADTH – THE VOID FOR VAGUE

DOCTRINE, American Constitutional Law (2nd) [1998], p. 1033 citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
306 U.S. 451 [1939]. See also Springfield Armory, Inc. v City of Columbus, 29 F.3d 250, 1994
FED App 239P [6th Cir. 1994]; Connally v. General Construction Company, 269 U.S. 385
[1926]; Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 [1957]; Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 [1953].
48
413 U.S. 601 [1973].
VAGUENESS AND OVERBREADTH, AN OVERVIEW, Lockhart et al. Constitutional Law,

49
Cases-Comments-Questions [6th Ed, 1986], p. 740.
50 Springfield v. Oklahoma, supra; Kolender v. Lawson, supra.
51 Supra.
52 Supra.
53 At p. 253.
54
See Concurring Opinion of Justice Mendoza, p. 5.
55 See Decision, p. 7.
56The transcript of Stenographic Notes of the Hearing in Criminal Case No. 26561 on June 13,
2001, p. 16 reads:
PJ Garchitorena:
xxx
But you see, I will provoke you. Forgive us for provoking you, but we ourselves have been
quarrelling with each other in finding ways to determine what we understand by plunder.
xxx
57 Infra.
58 In his column on the April 25, 2001 issue of Today, Fr. Bernas stated:
xxx
One question that has come up is whether a public official can commit more than one crime of
plunder during his or her incumbency. There are those who hold that the law describes only
one crime and that it cannot be split into several offenses. This would mean that the
prosecution must weave a web of offenses out of the six ways of illegally amassing wealth and
show how the various acts reveal a combination or series of means or schemes which reveal
a pattern of criminality. My understanding is that under such a reading the six ways of amassing
wealth should not be seen as separate from each other but must be shown to be parts of one
combination or scheme. The interrelationship of the separate acts must be shown.
An alternate reading of the law, which is perhaps easier to prove but harsher on the accused,
is that each one of the six ways of amassing wealth can constitute plunder if the total take adds
up to the required P75 million.
xxx
There is another provision in the law which I find intriguing. It says: "For purposes of
establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal
act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of
overt criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy." Is this an indication
that there is only one crime of plunder under the statute?
Fr. Bernas also discussed the vagueness of "combination" or "series" in the July 1, 2001
issue of Today:
Taken individually, the elements that are supposed to constitute the series can be well
understood. But now the Estrada lawyers are asking when precisely these elements constitute
a "combination or series". The question is important because of an intriguing provision in the
plunder law: "For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to
prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish
beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy." How can you have a "series of criminal acts if the elements that are
supposed to constitute the series are not proved to be criminal?
59 Decision, p. 12.
60 Id., at 14.
61 Decision, pp. 12-14.
62RECORD OF THE JOINT CONFERENCE MEETING COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE AND

COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS (S. No. 733 & H. No. 22752), May 7,
1991, pp. 39-40.
63 Decision, p. 14.
64 RECORDS OF THE SENATE, June 6, 1989, pp. 92-93.
65 RECORDS OF THE SENATE, June 5, 1989, pp. 34.
66 Reply to Comment, p. 33.
67 Ibid.
68
Id.
69 Id.
70RECORD OF THE JOINT CONFERENCE MEETING COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE AND

COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS (S. No. 733 & H. No. 22752), May 7,
1991, p. 40.
71 Ibid.
72 Id.
73
Id.
74 Id.
75 Id., at 40-41.
76 Id., at 42-43.
77 Article III of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
xxx
Sec. 19(1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed unless, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already
imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. (Emphasis supplied.)
78 Reply to Comment, pp.16-18; Memorandum for Petitioner, pp. 62-63.
79 Article 335, Revised Penal Code.
80 Article 249, Revised Penal Code.
81 Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil 660 (1919).
82 See Article XIII, Section 1 and 2, Constitution.
83 Id., at Section 6.
88 See Article XIV, Constitution..
89 Comment, p. 13.
91 Alpha Investigation and Security Agency, 272 SCRA 653 (1997).
92 11 Oxford English Dictionary 357 (2d ed 1989).

93
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, p. 2029 (1976).
94 H.J. Inc., et al. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., et al., 492 US 229 (1989)
95 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
96 Supra.
97 Id., at 236.
98 Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy.
99Atkinson, Jeff. "RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS," § §

1961-68: Broadest of the Federal Criminal Statutes, 69 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW AND
CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1978).
100 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1970):
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in
which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18,
United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the
proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of,
any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which effect, interstate or foreign
commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and
without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting
another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held
by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any
pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not
amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, an do
not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through
collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or
control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged
in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate,
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of
subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
101 Id., at § 1961(5).
102 See RECORDS JOINT CONFERENCE COMMITTEE MEETING, May 7, 1991, p. 12.
103 Northwestern, supra.

104
Id., at 239:
RICO’s legislative history reveals Congress’ intent that to prove a pattern of racketeering
activity a plaintiff or prosecutor must show that the racketeering predicates are
related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity. Citing 116 Cong
Rec 18940 (1970)
105 Id., at 240.
106 Id.,at 241.
107 Separate Concurring Opinion, pp. 255-256.
108The issue involved in this case was whether Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., Inc. was
liable under the RICO Law for bribing the members of the Minnesota Public Utilities
Commission to approve rates for the company in excess of a fair and reasonable amount. The
U.S. Supreme Court reversed the District Court of Minnesota and held that (1) to prove a
"pattern of racketeering activity" within the meaning of RICO, it must be shown that the
predicate acts of racketeering activity are related and that they amount to or pose a threat of
continued criminal activity; (2) it is not only by proof of multiple schemes that continuity of
criminal activity may be shown; (3) a pattern of racketeering activity may be shown regardless
of whether the racketeering activities are characteristic of "organized crime"; and (4) remand
was necessary because, under the facts alleged, it might be possible to prove that the
defendants' actions satisfied the requirements of relatedness and continuity and they thus
constituted a "pattern of racketeering activity".
109See United States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 11 S. Ct. 2019 (1991);
United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084 (3rd Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 11 S.Ct. 2009-11
(1991); United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 130 (1990).
All cases cited in Moran, Christopher, infra.
110Bauerschmidt, Joseph E., Mother of Mercy – Is this the End of RICO? – Justice Scalia
Invites Constitutional Void-for-Vagueness Challenge to RICO "Pattern", 65 NOTRE DAME
LAW REVIEW 1106 (1990).
111Moran, Christopher. Is the "Darling" in Danger? "Void for Vagueness" – The Constitutionality
of the RICO Pattern Requirement, 36 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW 1697 (1991) citing:
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-17-103(3): "Pattern of racketeering activity" means engaging in at

least two acts of racketeering activity which are related to the conduct of the enterprise, if at
least one of such acts occurred in this state after July 1, 1981, and if the last of such acts
occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after a prior act of
racketeering activity.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-394(e) (West 1985): "Pattern of racketeering activity" means
engaging in at least two incidents of racketeering activity that have the same or similar
purposes, results, participants, victims or methods of commission or otherwise are interrelated
by distinguishing characteristics, including a nexus to the same enterprise, and are not isolated
incidents, provided at least one of such incidents occurred after the effective date of this act
and that the last of such incidents occurred within five years after a prior incident of
racketeering conduct.
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-14-3(8) (Supp. 1991): "Pattern of racketeering activity" means engaging
in at least two incidents of racketeering activity that have the same or similar intents, results,
accomplices, victims, or methods of commission or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing
characteristics and are not isolated incidents, provided at least one of such incidents occurred
after July 1, 1980, and that the last of such incidents occurred within four years, excluding any
periods of imprisonment, after the commission of a prior incident of racketeering activity.
IDAHO CODE § 18-7803(d) (1987): "Pattern of racketeering activity" means engaging in at

least two (2) incidents of racketeering conduct that have the same or similar intents, results,
accomplices, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by
distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents, provided at least one (1) of such
incidents occurred after the effective date of this act and that the last of such incidents occurred
within five (5) years after a prior incident of racketeering conduct.
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-6-1 (West 1986): "Pattern of racketeering activity" means engaging
in at least two (2) incidents of racketeering activity that have the same or similar intent, result,
accomplice, victim, or method of commission, or that are otherwise interrelated by
distinguishing characteristics [sic] that are not isolated incidents. However, the incidents are a
pattern of racketeering activity only if at least one (1) of the incidents occurred after August 31,
1980, and if the last of the incidents occurred within five (5) years after a prior incident of
racketeering activity.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1352 (C) (West Supp. 1992): "Pattern of drug racketeering activity"
means engaging in at least two incidents of drug racketeering activity that have the same or
similar intents, results, principals, victims, or methods of commission or otherwise are
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents, provided at least
one of such occurs after a prior incident of drug racketeering activity.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-43-3(d) (Supp 1989): "Pattern of racketeering activity" means
engaging in at least two (2) incidents of racketeering conduct that have the same or similar
intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commission or otherwise are interrelated
by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents, provided at least one (1) of
such incidents occurred after the effective date of this chapter and that the last of such
incidents occurred within five (5) years after a prior incident of racketeering conduct.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-3(b) (1990): "Pattern of racketeering activity means engaging in at
least two incidents of racketeering activity that have the same or similar purposes, results,
accomplices, victims or methods of commission or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing
characteristics and are not isolated and unrelated incidents, provided at least one of such
incidents occurred after October 1, 1986, and that at least one other of such incidents occurred
within a four-year period of time of the other, excluding any periods of imprisonment, after the
commission of a prior incident of racketeering activity.
OR. REV. STAT. § 166.715(4) (1990): "Pattern of racketeering activity" means engaging in at
least two incidents of racketeering activity that have the same or similar intents, results,
accomplices, victims, or methods of commission or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing
characteristics, including a nexus to the same enterprise, and are not isolated incidents,
provided at least one of such incidents occurred after November 1, 1981, and that the last of
such incidents occurred within five years after a prior incident of racketeering activity.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-12-203(6) (1991): "Pattern of racketeering activity" means engaging
in at least two (2) incidents of racketeering activity that have the same or similar intents, results,
characteristics and are not isolated incidents; provided, that at least one (1) of such incidents
occurred after July 1, 1986, and that the last of such incidents occurred within two (2) years
after a prior incident of racketeering conduct.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.82.010(15) (1988): "Pattern of criminal profiteering activity"
means engaging in at least three acts of criminal profiteering, one of which occurred after July
1, 1985, and the last of which occurred within five years, excluding any period of imprisonment,
after the commission of the earliest act of criminal profiteering. In order to constitute a pattern,
the three acts must have the same or similar intent, results, accomplices, principals, victims or
methods of commission, or be otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics including
a nexus to the same enterprise, and must not be isolated events.
112 Id., citing:
CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.2(b) (West 1988): "Pattern of criminal profiteering activity" means
engaging in at least to incidents of criminal profiteering, as defined by this act, which meet the
following requirements: (1) Have the same or similar purpose, result, principals, victims or
methods of commission, or are otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics[;] (2)
Are not isolated events[; and] (3) Were committed as criminal activity of organized crime.
113 Id., citing:
DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 11. § 1502(5) (1987): "Pattern of racketeering activity" shall mean 2 or
more incidents of conduct: a. That: 1. Constitute racketeering activity; 2. Are related to the
affairs of the enterprise; 3. Are not so closely related to each other and connected in point of
time and place that they constitute a single event; and b. Where: 1. At least 1 of the incidents
of conduct occurred after July 9, 1986; 2. The last incident of conduct occurred within 10 years
after a prior occasion of conduct . . .
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2923.31(E) (Anderson Supp. 1991): "Pattern of corrupt activity"
means two or more incidents of corrupt activity, whether or not there has been a prior
conviction, that are related to the affairs of the same enterprise, are not isolated, and are not
so closely related to each other and connected in time and place that they constitute a single
event. At least one of the incidents forming the pattern shall occur on or after January 1, 1986.
Unless any incident was an aggravated murder or murder, the last incidents forming the pattern
shall occur within six years after the commission of any prior incident forming the pattern,
excluding any period of imprisonment served by any person engaging in the corrupt activity.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1402(5) (West Supp. 1992): Pattern of racketeering activity"
means two or more occasions of conduct: a. that include each of the following: (1) constitute
racketeering activity, (2) are related to the affairs of the enterprise, (3) are not isolated, (4) are
not so closely related to each other and connected in point of time and place that they
constitute a single event, and b. where each of the following is present: (1) at least one of the
occasions of conduct occurred after November 1, 1988, (2) the last of the occasions of conduct
occurred within three (3) years, excluding any period of imprisonment served by the person
engaging in the conduct, of a prior occasion of conduct . . .
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 946.82(3) (West Supp. 1991): "Pattern of racketeering activity" means
engaging in at least 3 incidents of racketeering activity that the same or similar intents, results,
characteristics, provided at least one of the incidents occurred after April 27, 1982 and that the
last of the incidents occurred within 7 years after the first incident of racketeering activity. Acts
occurring at the same time and place which may form the basis for crimes punishable under
more than one statutory provision may count for only one incident of racketeering activity.
114 Id., citing:
MINN. STAT. ANN. §609.902(6) (West Supp. 1992): "Pattern of criminal activity" means
conduct consisting constituting three or more criminal acts that: (1) were committed within ten
years of the commencement of the criminal proceedings; (2) are neither isolated incidents, nor
so closely related and connected in point of time or circumstance of commission as to
constitute a single criminal offense; and (3) were either: (i) related to one another through a
common scheme or plan or shared criminal purpose or (ii) committed, solicited, requested,
importuned, or intentionally aided by persons acting with the mental culpability required for the
commission of the criminal acts and associated with or in an enterprise involved in these
activities.
N.Y. PENAL LAW §460.10(4) (McKinney 1989): "Pattern of criminal activity" means conduct
engaged in by persons charged in an enterprise corruption count constituting three or more
criminal acts that: (a) were committed within ten years of the commencement of the criminal
action; (b) are neither isolated incidents, nor so closely related and connected in point in time
or circumstance of commission as to constitute a criminal offense or criminal transaction . . . ;
and (c) are either: (i) related to one another through a common scheme or plan or (ii) were
committed, solicited, requested, importuned or intentionally aided by persons acting with the
mental culpability required for the commission thereof and associated with or in the criminal
enterprise.
Luskin, Robert D. Behold, The Day of Judgment: Is the RICO Pattern Requirement Void for
115
Vagueness? 64 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW 779 (1990).
Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 47; TSN, Oral Arguments, September 18, 2001, see pp. 224-
116
233.
117 Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 47.
118 See Kolender v. Lawson, supra
119 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (5). .
120 See U.S. v. Batchelder, 442 US 114, 60 L Ed 2d 755, 99 S Ct 2198 (1979).
121 Through Justice Brennan.
122 Supra.
124 Today, July 1, 2001 issue.
125In People vs. Echegaray (267 SCRA 682) the word "heinous" was traced to the early
Spartans’ word "haineus" which means hateful and abominable. In turn, the word came from
the Greek prefix "haton" indicating acts so hateful or shockingly evil. (at 715)
126
WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being grievous,
odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards
and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.
127 Reyes, Luis B. The Revised Penal Code, Book One (13th ed.), p. 56.
128 Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 81.
129 Dennis v. U.S., 314 U.S. 494 (1951).
130 Scales v. U.S., 203 (1961).
131 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
132 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
133 Regalado, Florenz, Criminal Law Conspectus (2001 ed.), 161-162.
134 Atty. Rene A.V. Saguisag.
135 Senate Bill No. 733.
136 Tañada and Macapagal vs. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1093.
137 Commercial National Bank v. Rowe, 666 So. 2d 1312 (1996).
138 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
139 Id., at 90.
140 See Explanatory Note, Senate Bill No. 733, Records of the Senate, June 1, 1989, pp. 1-2.
141 See Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
142One of the reliefs sought in the Prayer contained in the Petition (at p. 37) and in Petitioner’s
Memorandum (at p. 84) is for the quashal of the Information in Criminal case No. 26558 for
being null and void.
Double jeopardy attaches only when all of the following circumstances are present: (1) upon a
valid indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has
been entered; and (5) when the accused was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused (Tecson vs.
Sandiganbayan, 318 SCRA 80, 89 [1999]).

SEPARATE DISSENTING OPINION
PARDO, J.:
With due respect, I vote to grant the petition on the second ground raised therein, that is,
multiplicity of offenses charged in the amended information.1 Consequently, the resolution of
the Sandiganbayan must be set aside, and the case remanded to the Ombudsman for the
amendment of the information to charge only a single offense.
In my view, it is unnecessary to rule on the unconstitutionality of the entire law,2 R. A. No. 7080,
as amended by R. A. No. 7659, although I share the opinion of the dissenting justices in the
case of People v. Echagaray,3 that the heinous crime law is unconstitutional. Hence, the
amendments to the plunder law prescribing the death penalty therefor are unconstitutional. I
am of the view that the plunder law penalizes acts that are mala in se, and consequently, the
charges must be the specific acts alleged to be in violation of the law, committed with malice
and criminal intent. At any rate, I venture the view that Section 4, R. A. No. 7080, must be
interpreted as requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt of all the elements of plunder as
prescribed in the law, including the elements of the component crimes, otherwise, the section
will be unconstitutional.
Footnotes
1 Petition, Annex "B", Motion to Quash, Ground II.
2‘The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the
record if the case can be disposed of on some other ground." (Laurel v. Garcia, 187 SCRA
797, 813 [1990], citing Siler v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 312 U.S. 175 [1909]; Railroad
Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 [1941]; Lalican v. Vergara, 342 Phil. 485, 498 [1997];
Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 128448, February 1, 2001.
3 335 Phil. 343 [1997].
DISSENTING OPINION
SANDOVAL–GUTIERREZ, J.:
At times when speaking against popular views can subject a member of this Court to all sorts
of unfair criticism and pressure from the media, the lure not to wield the judicial pen is at its
crest. Nevertheless, I cannot relent to such enticement. Silence under such circumstances
may mean not only weakness, but also insensibility to the legal consequence of a constitutional
adjudication bound to affect not only the litigants, but the citizenry as well. Indeed, the core
issue in this case is highly significant, the resolution of which is inevitably historical. Thus,
today, I prefer to take a stand and, therefore, dissent from the majority opinion.
It is beyond dispute that Republic Act No. 7080 (R.A. No. 7080),1 entitled "An Act Penalizing
the Crime of Plunder," is controversial and far-reaching. Nonetheless, it is my view that it is
also vague and fuzzy, inexact and sweeping. This brings us to the query - may R.A. No. 7080
be enforced as valid and its shortcomings supplied by judicial interpretation? My answer, to be
explained later, is "NO."
As a basic premise, we have to accept that even a person accused of a crime possesses
inviolable rights founded on the Constitution which even the welfare of the society as a whole
cannot override. The rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution are not subject to political
bargaining or to the calculus of social interest. Thus, no matter how socially-relevant the
purpose of a law is, it must be nullified if it tramples upon the basic rights of the accused.
Enshrined in our Constitution is the ultimate guaranty that "no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law."2 This provision in the Bill of Rights serves as a
protection of the Filipino people against any form of arbitrariness on the part of the government,
whether committed by the legislature, the executive or the judiciary. Any government act that
militates against the ordinary norms of justice and fair play is considered an infraction of the
due process; and this is true whether the denial involves violation merely of the procedure
prescribed by law or affects the very validity of the law itself.3
The same Due Process Clause protects an accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged. The reason for this was enunciated in In Re Winship:4 "[t]he accused during a criminal
prosecution has at stake interest of immense importance, both because of the possibility that
he may lose his liberty (or life) upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be
stigmatized by the conviction." In view thereof, any attempt on the part of the legislature to
diminish the requirement of proof in criminal cases should be discouraged.
R.A. No. 7080, as amended, is unconstitutional. Albeit the legislature did not directly lower the
degree of proof required in the crime of plunder from proof beyond reasonable doubt to mere
preponderance of or substantial evidence, it nevertheless lessened the burden of the
prosecution by dispensing with proof of the essential elements of plunder. Let me quote the
offending provision:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. – For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be
necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of
the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient
to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
In every criminal prosecution, the law recognizes certain elements as material or essential.
Calling a particular fact an "essential element" carries certain legal consequences. In this case,
the consequence that matters is that the Sandiganbayan cannot convict the accused unless it
unanimously5 finds that the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt each element of
the crime of plunder.
What factual elements must be proved beyond reasonable doubt to constitute the crime
of plunder?
Ordinarily, the factual elements that make up a crime are specified in the law that defines
it. Under R.A. No 7080, as amended, the essential elements of the crime of plunder are: a) that
the offender is a public officer; b) that he amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts described in Section 1 (d), to wit:

2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks, or

concerned;
3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National

Government or any of its subdivision, agencies or instrumentalities or government –owned or
4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly, or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any
5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations

and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular person or special
interests; or
6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection, or

prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
and c) that the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth is at least Fifty Million
Pesos (P50,000,000.00).6
Does the phrase "combination or series of overt or criminal acts described in Section 1 (d)"
mean that the "criminal acts" merely constitute the means to commit plunder? Or does it mean
that those "criminal acts," are essential elements of plunder?
When Section 4 of R.A. No. 7080 mandates that it shall not be necessary for the prosecution
to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused, the legislature, in effect, rendered
the enumerated "criminal acts" under Section 1 (d) merely as means and not as essential
elements of plunder. This is constitutionally infirmed and repugnant to the basic idea of justice
and fair play.7 As a matter of due process, the prosecution is required to prove beyond
reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the defendant
is charged. The State may not specify a lesser burden of proof for an element of a
crime.8 With more reason, it should not be allowed to go around the principle by characterizing
an essential element of plunder merely as a "means" of committing the crime. For the result is
the reduction of the burden of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
Let me elucidate on the vices that come with Section 4.

First, treating the specific "criminal acts" merely as means to commit the greater crime of
plunder, in effect, allows the imposition of the death penalty even if the Justices of the
Sandiganbayan did not "unanimously" find that the accused are guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of those "criminal acts." The three Justices need only agree that the accused
committed at least two of the criminal acts, even if not proved by evidence beyond
reasonable doubt. They do not have to agree unanimously on which two.
Let us consider the present case against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. The
accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No. 26558 charges Mr. Estrada and
others of willfully, unlawfully and criminally amassing, accumulating and acquiring ill-gotten
wealth in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17 more or less, through a combination
and series of overt and criminal acts described as follows:
"a) by receiving, collecting, directly or indirectly, on many instances, so called "jueteng money"
from gambling operators in connivance with co-accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, Yolanda
Ricaforte and Edward Serapio, as witnessed by Gov. Luis Chavit Singson, among other
witnesses, in the aggregate amount of FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION
PESOS (P545,000,000.00), more or less, in consideration of their protection from arrest or
interference by law enforcers in their illegal "jueteng" activities; and
b) by misappropriating, converting and misusing his gain and benefit public fund in the amount
of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing
a portion of the One Hundred Seventy Million Pesos (P170,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax
share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, in conspiracy with co-
accused Charlie "Atong" Ang, Alma Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan a.k.a Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr.
Uy., and Jane Doe a.k.a Delia Rajas as witnesses by Gov. Luis "Chavit" Singson, among other
witnesses; and
c) by directing, ordering and compelling the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
and the Social Security System (SSS) to purchase and buy a combined total of P681,733,000.
shares of stock of Belle Corporation in the aggregate value of One Billion Eight Hundred Forty
Seven Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P1,847,578,057.50), for the purpose of collecting for his
personal gain and benefit, as in fact he did collect and receive the sum of ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00), as
commission from said stock purchase; and
d) by unjustly enriching himself in the amount of THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY
THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE
PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) comprising his unexplained
wealth, acquired, accumulated and amassed by him under his account name "Jose Velarde"
with Equitable PCI Bank."
Since it is not necessary to prove each criminal act, the inevitable conclusion is that Mr. Estrada
may be convicted of the crime of plunder without the Justices of the Sandiganbayan
"unanimously" deciding which two of the four criminal acts have actually been committed. In
short, all that R.A. No. 7080 requires is that each Justice must be convinced of the existence
of a "combination or series." As to which criminal acts constitute a combination or series, the
Justices need not be in full agreement. Surely, this would cover-up a wide disagreement
among them about just what the accused actually did or did not do. Stated differently, even if
the Justices are not unified in their determination on what criminal acts were actually committed
by the accused, which need not be proved under the law, still, they could convict him of plunder.
Considering that what R.A. No. 7080 punishes is the plurality of criminal acts indicative of the
grand scheme or conspiracy to amass ill-gotten wealth, it is imperative to focus upon the
individual "criminal acts" in order to assure the guilt of the accused of plunder.
Second, R.A. No. 7080 lumps up into one new offense of plunder six (6) distinct crimes which
by themselves are currently punishable under separate statutes or provisions of law. The six
(6) separate crimes become mere "means or similar schemes" to commit the single offense of
plunder. It bears emphasis that each of the separate offenses is a crime mala in se. The
commission of any offense mala in se is inherently accompanied by a guilty mind or a criminal
intent.9 Unfortunately, R.A. No. 7080 converted the six mala in se offenses into one crime
which is mala prohibita wherein the intent becomes insignificant. Upon the commission of
the proscribed act, without proof of intent, the law is considered violated.10 Consequently, even
acts recklessly committed (i.e. without intent) can be punished by death.
Third, Section 4 mandates that it shall not be necessary for the prosecution to prove each
and every criminal act done by the accused x x x it being sufficient to prove beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts. By its own terminology, Section 4
requires that the "pattern" be proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt. Initially, we must
disassociate the specific "criminal acts" from the "pattern of criminal acts." These two phrases
do not refer to one and the same thing. Pattern, as defined in the dictionary, means an
established mode of behavior.11 In the crime of plunder, the existence of a "pattern" can only
be inferred from the specific "criminal acts" done by the accused. Several queries may be
raised to determine the existence of a "pattern." Are these criminal acts related or tied to one
another? Is the subsequent criminal act a mere continuation of the prior criminal act? Do these
criminal acts complement one another as to bring about a single result? Inevitably, one must
focus first on each criminal act to ascertain the relationship or connection it bears with the other
criminal acts, and from there determine whether a certain "pattern" exists. But how could
"pattern" be proved beyond reasonable doubt when in the first place the specific
"criminal acts" from which such pattern may be inferred are not even required to be
proved?
And fourth, plunder is a very serious offense. What is at stake under the law is not only the
liberty of the accused but his life and property as well. Thus, it will be extremely unjust to lessen
the prosecution’s burden of proof to such a degree not commensurate to what the accused
stands to suffer. If a person will lose his life, justice requires that every fact on which his guilt
may be inferred must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Providing a rule of evidence which does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt to establish
every fact necessary to constitute the crime is a clear infringement of due process. While the
principles of the law of evidence are the same whether applied on civil or criminal trials, they
are more strictly observed in criminal cases.12 Thus, while the legislature of a state has the
power to prescribe new or alter existing rules of evidence, or to prescribe methods of
proof, the same must not violate constitutional requirements or deprive any person of
his constitutional rights.13 Unfortunately, under R.A. No. 7080, the State did not only
specify a lesser burden of proof to sustain an element of the crime; it even dispensed
with proof by not considering the specific "criminal acts" as essential elements. That it
was the clear intention of the legislature is evident from the Senate deliberation, thus:
"Senator Guingona. Since it is a series or a scheme,what amount of evidence will, therefore,

be required? Must there be a pattern of the criminal acts? Must there be a series of briberies,
for example? Or, can there be only one?
Senator Tanada. Under Section 4 of the bill, Mr. President, it is provided that:
"For purposes of establishing the OFFENSE, of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove
each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy
to amass, accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten wealth… But, there must be enough evidence
"sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy."
So, that is the quantum of evidence that would be required under this proposal measure.
Senator Guingona. That is sufficient to establish the prima facie case.14
xxxxxx
Senator Romulo. That, perhaps, is a good provision of the bill. But, may I ask, Mr. President,
what is in this bill that would insure that there would be a speedier process by which this crime
of plunder would readily and immediately processed and convicted or acquitted than is now
existing in present laws?
Senator Tanada. Yes, x x x.
Now, on the second point, Mr. President, I believe that what could make faster and speedier
prosecutions of these grafters would be a change that will be authorized in this bill, at least, in
the filing of information against the perpetrators. Under the existing criminal procedure, as I
said earlier, there can only be one offense charged per information. So, if there is going to be
a series of overt or criminal acts committed by the grafter, then that would necessitate the filing
of so many informations against him. Now, if this bill becomes a law, then that means that
there can be only one information filed against the alleged grafter. And the evidence that will
be required to convict him would not be evidence for each and every individual criminal
act but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this
crime of plunder.15
xxxxxx
Senator Guingona. May I just be clarified Mr. President. In this Section 4, a pattern of the
criminal acts is all that is required. Would this pattern of criminal acts be also sufficient to
establish a prima facie case?
Senator Tanada. Mr. President, under Section 4, it would not only be sufficient to establish a
prima facie case. It would be sufficient to establish guilt as long as the evidence, necessary to
establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt is presented."16
In dispensing with proof of each criminal act, the clear objective of Congress is to render it less
difficult for the prosecution to prove the crime of plunder. While this presupposes a noble
intention, I do not think there is a sufficient justification. I, too, have the strong desire to
eliminate the sickness of corruption pervading in the Philippine government, but more than
anything else, I believe there are certain principles which must be maintained if we want to
preserve fairness in our criminal justice system. If the prosecution is not mandated to prove
the specific "criminal acts," then how can it establish the existence of the requisite "combination
or series" by proof beyond reasonable doubt?
II
Another valid constitutional objection to R.A. No. 7080 is the vagueness of the term "pattern."
As stated by Mr. Justice Kapunan, in his Dissent, the concept of "pattern of overt or criminal
acts" embodied in the law was derived by Congress from the RICO (Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations) statute.17 I am, therefore, constrained to refer to US law and
jurisprudence. "Pattern" as defined in the RICO statute means "as requiring at least two acts
of racketeering activity….the last of which occurred within ten years….after the commission of
the prior act of racketeering activity.18
Mr. Justice Kapunan observed that unlike the RICO law, the law on plunder does not
specify a) the number of criminal acts necessary before there could be a "pattern," as well
as b) the period within which the succeeding criminal acts should be committed. These failures
render the law void for its vagueness and broadness.
Indeed, Congress left much to be desired. I am at a quandary on how many delictual acts are
necessary to give rise to a "pattern of overt or criminal acts" in the crime of plunder. If there is
no numerical standard, then, how should the existence of "pattern" be ascertained? Should it
be by proximity of time or of relationship? May an act committed two decades after the prior
criminal act be linked with the latter for the purpose of establishing a pattern?
It must be remembered that plunder, being a continuous offense, the "pattern of overt or
criminal acts" can extend indefinitely, i.e., as long as the succeeding criminal acts may be
linked to the initial criminal act. This will expose the person concerned to criminal
prosecution ad infinitum. Surely, it will undermine the purpose of the statute of limitations, i.e.,
to discourage prosecution based on facts obscured by the passage of time, and to encourage
law enforcement officials to investigate suspected criminal activity promptly.19 All these
undesirable consequences arise from the fact that the plunder law fails to provide a
period within which the next criminal act must be committed for the purpose of
establishing a pattern. I believe R.A. No. 7080 should have provided a cut-off period after
which a succeeding act may no longer be attached to the prior act for the purpose of
establishing a pattern. In reiteration, the RICO law defines "pattern" as requiring at least two
acts of racketeering activity… the last of which occurred within ten years… after the
commission of the prior act of racketeering activity. Such limitation prevents a subsequent
racketeering activity, separated by more than a decade from the prior act of racketeering, from
being appended to the latter for the purpose of coming up with a pattern. We do not have the
same safeguard under our law.
Significantly, in Sedima, S.P.R.L v. Imrex Co.,20 the United States Supreme Court expressed
dismay that Congress has failed to properly define the term "pattern" at all but has simply
required that a "pattern" includes at least two acts of racketeering activity. The Court concluded
that "pattern" involves something more than two acts, and after examining RICO’s legislative
history, settled on "continuity plus relationship" as the additional requirement.
Years later, in H.C. Inc. v. The Northwestern Bell Tel.,21 the U.S. Supreme Court conceded
that "the continuity plus relationship" means different things to different circuits. Nevertheless,
it held firm to the Sedima requirement that "in order to establish a pattern, the government has
to show "that the racketeering predicates are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat
of continued criminal activity." Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion in which three other
justices joined, derided the "relationship" requirement as not "much more helpful [to the lower
courts] than telling them to look for a "pattern" - - which is what the statute already says." As
for the continuity requirement, Justice Scalia said: "Today’s opinion has added nothing to
improve our prior guidance, which has created a kaleidoscope of circuit positions, except to
clarify that RICO may in addition be violated when there is a 'threat of continuity'. It seems to
me this increases rather than removes the vagueness. There is no reason to believe that the
Court of Appeals will be any more unified in the future, than they have in the past, regarding
the content of this law."
Aware of the ambiguities present in the RICO law the drafters of the New York "Organized
Crime Control Act" (a progeny of RICO) now more specifically define "pattern of criminal
activity" as conduct engaged in by persons charged in an enterprise corruption count
constituting three or more criminal acts that (a) were committed within ten years from the
commencement of the criminal action; (b) are neither isolated incidents, nor so closely related
and connected in point of time or circumstance of commission as to constitute a criminal
offense or criminal transaction, as those terms are defined in section 40.10 of the criminal
procedure law; and (c) are either: (i) related to one another through a common scheme or plan
or (ii) were committed, solicited, requested, importuned or intentionally aided by persons
acting with the mental culpability required for the commission thereof and associated with or
in the criminal enterprise.22
If the term "pattern" as defined in the RICO law is continuously subjected to constitutional
attacks because of its alleged vagueness, how much more the term "pattern" in R.A. No. 7080
which does not carry with it any limiting definition and can only be read in context. Indeed,
there is no doubt that the invalidity of the law based on vagueness is not merely debatable - it
is manifest. Thus, this Court should declare R.A. No. 7080 unconstitutional.
III
Lastly, the terms "combination" and "series" are likewise vague. Hence, on the basis of the
law, a conviction of an accused cannot be sustained. A statute that does not provide adequate
standards for adjudication, by which guilt or innocence may be determined, should be struck
down.23 Crimes must be defined in a statute with appropriate certainty and definiteness.24 The
standards of certainty in a statute prescribing punishment for offenses are higher than in those
depending primarily on civil sanctions for their enforcement.25 A penal statute should therefore
be clear and unambiguous.26 It should explicitly establish the elements of the crime which it
creates27 and provide some reasonably ascertainable standards of guilt.28 It should not admit
of such a double meaning that a citizen may act on one conception of its requirements and the
courts on another.29
I agree with the observation of Mr. Justice Kapunan that "resort to the dictionary meaning of
the terms ‘combination’ and ‘series’ as well as recourse to the deliberations of the lawmakers
only serve to prove that R.A. No. 7080 failed to satisfy the requirement of the Constitution on
clarity and definiteness." The deliberations of our law-makers, as quoted verbatim in Justice
Kapunan's Dissent, indeed, failed to shed light on what constitute "combination" and "series."30
I believe this is fatal.
The essence of the law on plunder lies in the phrase "combination or series of overt or criminal
acts." As can be gleaned from the Record of the Senate, the determining factor of R.A. 7080
is the plurality of the overt acts or criminal acts under a grand scheme or conspiracy to
amass ill-gotten wealth. Thus, even if the amassed wealth equals or exceeds fifty million
pesos, a person cannot be prosecuted for the crime of plunder if there is only a single criminal
act.31
Considering that without plurality of overt or criminal acts, there can be no crime of plunder,
due process of law demands that the terms "combination" and "series" be defined with
exactitude in the law itself. Equating these terms with mere "plurality" or "two or more," is
inaccurate and speculative. For one, a "series" is a group of usually three or more things or
events standing or succeeding in order and having like relationship to each other.32 The Special
Prosecution Division Panel defines it as "at least three of the acts enumerated under Section
1(d) thereof."33 But it can very well be interpreted as only one act repeated at least three times.
And the Office of the Solicitor General, invoking the deliberations of the House of
Representatives, contends differently. It defines the term series as a "repetition" or pertaining
to "two or more."34 The disparity in the Prosecution and OSG’s positions clearly shows how
imprecise the term "series" is.
This should not be countenanced. Crimes are not to be created by inference.35 No one may be
required, at the peril of life, liberty or property to guess at, or speculate as to, the meaning of
a penal statute.36 An accused, regardless of who he is, is entitled to be tried only under a clear
and valid law.
Respondents argue that the vagueness of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, is cured when the
Information clearly specified the acts constituting the crime of plunder. I do not agree. It is the
statute and not the accusation under it that prescribes the rule to govern conduct and warns
against aggression.37 If on its face, a statute is repugnant to the due process clause on account
of vagueness, specification in the Information of the details of the offense intended to be
charged will not serve to validate it.38
On the argument that this Court may clarify the vague terms or explain the limits of the
overbroad provisions of R.A. No. 7080, I should emphasize that this Court has no power to
legislate.
Precision must be the characteristic of penal legislation. For the Court to define what is a crime
is to go beyond the so-called positive role in the protection of civil liberties or promotion of
public interests. As stated by Justice Frankfurter, the Court should be wary of judicial attempts
to impose justice on the community; to deprive it of the wisdom that comes from self-inflicted
wounds and the strengths that grow with the burden of responsibility.39
A statute which is so vague as to permit the infliction of capital punishment on acts already
punished with lesser penalties by clearly formulated law is unconstitutional. The vagueness
cannot be cured by judicial construction.
Also, not to be glossed over is the fact that R.A. 7080, as amended, is a novel law. Hence,
there is greater need for precision of terms. The requirement that law creating a crime must be
sufficiently explicit to inform those subject to it, what conduct on their part will render them
liable to its penalties, has particular force when applied to statutes creating new offenses.
For that reason, those statutes may not be generally understood, or may be subject of
generally accepted construction.40
Today, I recall what James Madison remarked in presenting the Bill of Rights to the United
States Congress in 1789: "if they (Bill of Rights) are incorporated into the Constitution,
independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians
of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the
legislative or executive; and they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights
expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration of rights."41 Time did not render
his foreboding stale. Indeed, in every constitutional democracy, the judiciary has become the
vanguard of these rights. Now, it behooves this Court to strike an unconstitutional law. The
result, I concede, may not be politically desirable and acceptable, nevertheless, I am fully
convinced that it is constitutionally correct.
To recapitulate, R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional because it violates the DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE of the Constitution. The vagueness of its terms and its incorporation of a rule of
evidence that reduces the burden of the prosecution in proving the crime of plunder tramples
upon the basic constitutional rights of the accused.
In fine, I can only stress that the one on trial here is not Mr. Estrada, but R.A. No. 7080. The
issue before this Court is not the guilt or innocence of the accused, but the constitutionality of
the law. I vote to grant the petition, not because I favor Mr. Estrada, but because I look beyond
today and I see that this law can pose a serious threat to the life, liberty and property of anyone
who may come under its unconstitutional provisions. As a member of this Court, my duty is to
see to it that the law conforms to the Constitution and no other. I simply cannot, in good
conscience, fortify a law that is patently unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, I vote to grant the petition.
Footnotes
1As amended by Republic Act No. 7659 - "An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain
Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Code, other Special Penal
Laws and for other Purpose (1993).
2 Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
3 Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1995 Ed. p. 95.
4 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2nd 368.
5 Section 1 (b) Rule XVIII, Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan
"The unanimous vote of three Justices in a division shall be necessary for the rendition of a
judgment or order. In the event that three Justices do not reach a unanimous vote, the
Presiding Justice shall designate by raffle two justices from among the other members of the
Sandiganbayan to sit temporarily with them forming a special division of five Justices, and the
vote of a majority of such special division shall be necessary for the rendition of a judgment or
order.
6 Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080.
7 It is an elementary principle of criminal jurisprudence, a principle firmly embedded in the

organic law of every free state and vindicated by statutory guarantee as well as by innumerable
judicial decisions, that every criminal, however hideous his alleged crime, or however,
debauched and fiendish his character, may require that the elements of that crime shall be
clearly and indisputably defined by law, and that his commission of and relationship to the
alleged offense shall be established by legal evidence delivered in his presence. (Rice, The
Law of Evidence on Evidence, Vol. 3, p. 421.
8
29 Am Jur 2d Section 168, p. 192. Re Winship, 397 US 358, 25 L Ed 2d 368; State v. Krantz,
498 US 938, 112 L Ed 2d 306.
9In U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488 (1910), it was held that the crime must be the product of
a free, intelligent, and intentional act.
10 U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 134 (1909-1910).
11 Webster, Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged, 1993, p. 1657.
12 Harris and Wilshere’s Criminal Law, Seventeenth Division, 1943, pp.513-514.
13 Burgett v. Texas, 389 US 109, 19 L Ed 2d 319, 88 Ct 258; 29 Am Jur 6.
14 Records of the Senate, June 5, 1989, Vol. IV, No. 140, p. 1314.
15 Records of the Senate, Vol. IV, No. 140, p. 1316.
16 Records of the Senate, June 16, 1989, Vol. IV, No. 141, p. 1403.
17See Records Joint Conference Committee Meeting, May 7, 1991, p. 12. Representative
Pablo Garcia, Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice, observed that
R.A. No. 7080 was patterned after the RICO law.
18 Rotella v. Wood, United States Supreme Court, February 23, 2000.
19 Toussie vs. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970).
20 473 U.S. 479, 105 S. Ct. 3275, 87 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1985).
21 492 U.S. 229, 109 S. Ct. 2893, 106 L Ed. 2d 195 (1989).
22 The People of the State of New York v. Capaldo et al., 151 Misc. 2d 114 (1991).
23 21 Am Jur §349, p.399.
24 22 C.J.S. §24 (2) p. 62; Pierce v. United States 314 US 306; 86 L. Ed 226.
"The constitutional vice in a vague or indefinite statute is the injustice to accused in placing
him on trial for an offense as to the nature of which he is given no fair notice. (American
Communications Associations C.I.O. v. Douds, N.Y. 70 S. Ct. 674, 339 U.S. 382, 94 L. Ed
1391) In determining whether a statute meets the requirement of certainty, the test is whether
the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribe conduct when measured
by a common understanding and practices. Penal statutes affecting public officers and
employees and public funds or property will be held invalid where the prohibited conduct is not
sufficiently defined. (Jordan v. De George III341 U.S. 223, 95 L. Ed. 886; Winters v. People of
State of New York. 333 U.S. 507; 92 L. Ed 840) The requirement of statutory specificity has
the dual purpose of giving adequate notice of acts which are forbidden and of informing
accused of the nature of offense charged so that he may defend himself. (Amsel v. Brooks,
106 A. 2d 152, 141 Conn. 288; 67 S. Ct. 125, 348 U.S. 880, 91 L. Ed. 693)".
25
"Winters v. People of State of Newyork 333 US 507; 92 L. Ed. 840 -- "A penal statute must
set up ascertainable standards so that men of common intelligence are not required to guess
at its meaning, either as to persons within the scope of the act or as to the apllicable test to
ascertain guilt."
26 Sullivan v. United States 332 U.S. 689; 92 L. Ed. 297.
27 United States v. Dettra Flag co. D.C. Pa., 86 F. Supp. 84.
28 Winters v. People of State of New York, supra.
29 State v. Tsutomu Ikeda, 143 P. 2d 880, followed in State v. Waller 143 P. 2d 884.
30"Senator Gonzales. To commit the offense of plunder, as defined in this Act and while
constituting a single offense, it must consist of a series of overt or criminal acts, such as bribery,
extortion, malversation, of public funds, swindling, falsification of public documents, coercion,
theft, fraud and illegal exaction, and graft or corrupt practices act and like offenses. Now, Mr.
President, I think, this provision, by itself, will be vague. I am afraid that it might be faulted for
being violative of the due process clause and the right to be informed of the nature and cause
of accusation of an accused. Because, what is meant by "series of overt or criminal acts"? I
mean, would 2, 3, 4 or 5 constitute a series? During the period of amendments, can we
establish a minimum of overt acts like, for example, robbery in band? The law defines what is
robbery in band by the number of participants therein. In this particular case, probably, we can
statutorily provide for the definition of "series" so that two, for example, would that already be
a series? Or, three, what would be the basis for such a determination?" (Record of the Senate,
June 5, 1989, Vol. IV, No. 140, p. 1310).
31
"Senator Paterno. Mr. President, not too clear yet on the reason for trying to define a crime
of plunder. Could I get some further clarification?
Senator Tanada. Yes, Mr. President.
Because of our experience in the former regime, we feel that there is a need for Congress to
pass the legislation which would cover a crime of this magnitude. While it is true, we already
have the Anti-Graft Law. But that does not directly deal with plunder. That covers only the
corrupt practices of public officials as well as their spouses and relatives within the civil degree,
and the Anti-Graft law as presently worded would not adequately or sufficiently address the
problems that we experienced during the past regime.
Senator Paterno. May I try to give the Gentleman, Mr. President, my understanding of the bill?
Senator Tanada. Yes.
Senator Paterno. I envision that this bill or this kind of plunder would cover a discovered
interconnection of certain acts, particularly, violations of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
when, after the different acts are looked at, a scheme of conspiracy can be detected, such
scheme or conspiracy consummated by the different criminal acts or violations of Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, such that the scheme or conspiracy becomes a sin, as a large
scheme to defraud the public or rob the public treasury. It is parang robo and banda. It is
considered as that. And, the bill seeks to define or says that P100 million is that level at which
ay talagang sobra na dapat nang parusahan ng husto. Would it be a correct interpretation or
assessment of the intent of the bill?
Senator Tanada. Yes, Mr. President. The fact that under existing law, there can be only one
offense charged in the information, that makes it very cumbersome and difficult to go after
these grafters if we would not come out with this bill. That is what is happening now; because
of that rule that there can be only one offense charged per information, then we are having
difficulty in charging all the public officials who would seem to have committed these corrupt
practices. With this bill, we could come out with just one information, and that would cover all
the series of criminal acts that may have been committed by him.
xxxxxx
Senator Romulo. To follow up the interpolations of Senator Paterno and Maceda, this crime of
plunder as envisioned here contemplates of a series or a scheme as responded by the
distinguished Sponsor.
Senator Tanada. That is correct, Mr. President. (Record of Senate, June 5, 1989, Vol. IV, No.
140, p. 1315)
xxxxxx
Senator Romulo. Mr. President, I was going to suggest prior to Senator Maceda that on line
24: "SHALL THROUGH ONE overt or criminal act OR…." I was just thinking of one which is
really not a "series.",
The President. If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime.
But when we say "acts of plunder" there should be, at least, two or more. (Record of the Senate,
June 6, 1989, Vol. IV, No. 141, p. 1399).
Tarsia v. Nick’s Laundry & Linen Supply Co., 399 P. 2d 28, 29, 239 Or. 562; Words and
32
Phrases, 38A p. 441.
For purposes of Rule permitting government to charge several defendants under one
indictment if they have participated in same "series" of acts or transactions, a "series" is
something more than mere "similar" acts.
33 Opposition to the Motion to Quash of Accused Joseph Estrada dated June 21, 2001, p. 9.
34 Comment to the Amended Petition dated July 16, 2001, p. 14.
35 United States v. Laub, 385 US 475, 17 L Ed 2d 526, 87 S Ct 574.
36 State v. Nelson, 95 N.W. 2d 678.
3722 C.J.S. §24 (2); People v. Bevilacqua, 170 N.Y. S. 2d 423; Lanzetta v. State of New Jersey,
306 U.S. 451, 59 S Ct 618, 83 L. Ed. 888; United States v. DeCadena, D.C. 105 F. Supp. 202.
38 21 Am Jur §17 p. 129.
39 Tresolini and Shapiro, American Constitutional Law, 3rd Edition, p. 23.

40
State v. Evans, 245 P. 2d 788, 73 Idaho 50.
41 Abraham, Perry, Freedom and the Court, 1998, p. 25.
DISSENTING OPINION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
It is an ancient maxim in law that in times of frenzy and excitement, when the desire to do
justice is tarnished by anger and vengeance, there is always the danger that vital protections
accorded an accused may be taken away.
The Plunder Law and its amendment were enacted to meet a national problem demanding
especially immediate and effective attention. By its very nature, the law deserved or required
legislative drafting of the highest order of clarity and precision.
Substantive due process dictates that there should be no arbitrariness, unreasonableness or

ambiguity in any law which deprives a person of his life or liberty. The trial and other procedures
leading to conviction may be fair and proper. But if the law itself is not reasonable legislation,
due process is violated. Thus, an accused may not be sentenced to suffer the lethal injection
or life imprisonment for an offense understood only after judicial construction takes over where
Congress left off, and interpretation supplies its meaning.
The Constitution guarantees both substantive and procedural due process1 as well as the right
of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.2 Substantive due process requires that a criminal statute should not be vague and
uncertain.3 More explicitly –
That the terms of a penal statute. . . must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject
to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to penalties, is a well–recognized
requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law. And
a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,
violates the first essential of due process.4
The doctrine of constitutional uncertainty is also based on the right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.5 Fundamental fairness dictates that a
person cannot be sent to jail for a crime that he cannot with reasonable certainty know he was
committing.6 Statutes defining crimes run afoul of the due process clause if they fail to give
adequate guidance to those who would be law-abiding, to advise defendants of the nature of
the offense with which they are charged or to guide courts trying those who are accused.7 In
short, laws which create crime ought to be so explicit that all men subject to their penalties
may know what acts it is their duty to avoid.8
A reading of the Plunder Law immediately shows that it is phrased in a manner not susceptible
to ready or clear understanding. In the desire to cover under one single offense of plunder
every conceivable criminal activity committed by a high government official in the course of his
duties, Congress has come out with a law unduly vague, uncertain and broad.
The doctrines of overbreadth and void-for-vagueness in Constitutional Law were developed in

the context of freedom of speech and of the press. However, they apply equally, if not more
so, to capital offenses. In the present case, what the law seeks to protect or regulate involves
the deprivation of life itself and not merely the regulation of expression.
In its early formulation, the overbreadth doctrine states that a governmental purpose to control
or prevent activities constitutionally subject to regulation may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.9
A statute, especially one involving criminal prosecution, must be definite to be valid. A statute
is vague or overbroad, in violation of the due process clause, where its language does not
convey sufficiently definite warning to the average person as to the prohibited conduct. A
statute is unconstitutionally vague if people of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning.10
It is not only prosecutors and judges who are concerned. The need for definiteness applies
with greater force to the accused and those in positions where opportunities for them to commit
the proscribed offense are present. They must understand exactly what prohibited activity will
be punished by capital punishment. Sadly, even the record of deliberations in Congress cited
in the motion to quash shows that even the members of the Senate who are illustrious lawyers
found the Plunder Law vague.
Under Section 1 of R.A. 7080 and Section 12 of R.A. 7659, the acquisition of at least
P50,000,000.00 of ill-gotten wealth is punished by reclusion perpetua to death, if committed
as follows:

2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or

concerned;
3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National

Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or
4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any
5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations

interests; or
6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or
prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.11
The crimes of malversation of public funds and bribery, which appear to be included among
the modes of committing plunder, have acquired well-defined meanings under our present
penal statutes. The accused immediately knows how to defend and justify his actions. The
prosecution understands the quantum and nature of the evidence he has to produce in court.
The Judge can apply the law with straight and positive judgment because there is no
vagueness about it.
The Sandiganbayan, however, has ruled that the Plunder Law does not make any reference
to any specific provision of laws other than R.A. 7080, as amended. It is an entirely new offense
where malversation or bribery become "generic terms" according to the court. And since
"generic" refers to an entire group or class of related matters, the discretion given to the
prosecutor and the judge figuratively runs riot.
Under the same paragraph of the Plunder Law, malversation is lumped with "misuse of public
funds." Misuse can be as innocuous as error or it can be as severe as corruption or
embezzlement. The terms "abuse," "distortion," "misapplication," "mismanagement," "poor
stewardship," "malpractice," "debasement," or "breach of trust," all conceivably fall under the
generic term "misuse." Exactly when does an administrative offense of misuse become the
capital crime of plunder? What degree of misuse is contemplated under the law?
A penal law violates due process where inherently vague statutory language permits selective
law enforcement.12 Under the Plunder Law, a crusading public officer who steps on too many
important toes in the course of his campaign could be prosecuted for a capital offense, while
for exactly the same acts, an official who tries to please everybody can be charged whether
administratively or for a much lighter offense.
For instance, direct bribery under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code is punished
with prision mayor in its medium or minimum periods, prision correccional in its medium period,
or prision mayor in its minimum period, depending on the manner of commission.13 Indirect
bribery under Article 211 is punished with prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods.14 Under the Plunder Law, the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. The void-for-
vagueness infirmity becomes all the more apparent if the proscribed activity is "misuse of public
funds." The prosecutor is given broad powers of selective law enforcement. For "misuse,"
exactly the same acts could be punished with death under the Plunder Law, or mere dismissal
with prejudice to future government employment under the Civil Service Law.
The provision in the Plunder Law on "implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests" also calls for more specific elucidation. If the only
person benefited is himself, does that fall under "particular person?" Decrees and orders
issued by a top government official may be intended to benefit certain segments of society
such as farmers, manufacturers, residents of a geographical area and the like. If in the process
a close relative acquires P50,000,000.00 because of development in that sector solely
because of the decree and without lifting a finger, is that plunder? The vagueness can be better
appreciated by referring to petitioner’s arguments that the element of mens rea in mala in
se crimes has been abolished and the offenses have been converted to mala prohibita. If the
guilty intent is eliminated, even innocent acts can be plunder. The law was not drafted for
petitioner alone. It applies to all public officers.
As petitioner has stated, what Congress did in enacting the Plunder Law was to take out the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on malversation, estafa, bribery, and other crimes
committed by public officers, mix these with special laws on graft and corruption and together
with a couple of non-criminal acts, combine them into a special law and call it "plunder."
Early in the history of this Court, it ruled that in acts mala in se, the criminal intent governs. But
in those acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is: has the law been violated?15 Acts constituting
malversation, estafa, and bribery are mala in se. The courts must inquire into the criminal intent,
the evil nature or wrongful disposition behind the criminal acts. In mala prohibita crimes, there
is a violation of a prohibitory law and the inquiry is, therefore, has the law been violated?
In the crime of plunder, it is enough that the acts defining malversation or bribery are described.
The court then proceeds to determine whether the acts fall under the prohibitory terms of the
law. Criminal intent no longer has to be proved. The criminal intent to commit the crime is not
required to be proved. The desire to benefit particular persons does not have to spring from
criminal intent under the special law creating the crime of plunder. In malversation or bribery
under the Revised Penal Code, the criminal intent is an important element of the criminal acts.
Under the Plunder Law, it is enough that the acts are committed.
Thus, even if the accused can prove lack of criminal intent with respect to crimes mala in
se, this will not exonerate him under the crime mala prohibita. This violates substantive due
process and the standards of fair play because mens rea is a constitutional guarantee under
the due process clause. Indeed, as stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Morisette v. U.S.:16
The Government asks us by a feat of construction radically to change the weights and balances
in the scales of justice. The purpose and obvious effect of doing away with the
requirement of a guilty intent is to ease the prosecution’s party to conviction, to strip
the defendant of such benefit as he derived at common law from innocence of evil
purpose, and to circumscribe the freedom heretofore allowed juries. Such a manifest
impairment of the immunities of the individual should not be extended to common law
crimes on judicial initiative. (Emphasis ours)
By grafting several felonies, some mala in se and some mala prohibita, to constitute the crime
of plunder and by doing away with the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt for the
component elements, the State would practically be given the judicial imprimatur to impose
the extreme penalty of death on the basis of proof only of the overall pattern of overt or criminal
acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy. This attempt of Congress to tip the scales of
criminal justice in favor of the state by doing away with the element of mens rea and to pave
the way for the accused to be convicted by depriving him of the defense of criminal intent as
to mala in se components of plunder will be anathema to substantive due process which
insures "respect for those personal immunities which are so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."17
Equally disagreeable is the provision of the Plunder Law which does away with the requirement
that each and every component of the criminal act of plunder be proved and instead limits itself
to proving only a pattern of overt acts indicative of the unlawful scheme or conspiracy.18 In
effect, the law seeks to penalize the accused only on the basis of a proven scheme or
conspiracy, and does away with the rights of the accused insofar as the component crimes are
concerned. In other words, R.A. No. 7080 circumvents the obligation of the prosecution to
prove beyond reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime of plunder,
because the law requires merely proof of a pattern of overt acts showing an unlawful scheme
or conspiracy. What aggravates matters on this point is that under controlling case law,
conspiracy to defraud is not punishable under the Revised Penal Code.19 Cutting corners on
the burden of proof is unconstitutional because the standard of reasonable doubt is part of the
due process safeguard accorded an accused. The due process clause protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged.20
Under R.A. 7659, plunder is a heinous crime punishable by death. It is described as grievous,
odious and hateful because of its inherent or magnified wickedness, viciousness, atrocity, and
perversity. There can be no quarrel with the legislative objective of reducing the upsurge of
such crimes which affect sustainable economic development and undermine the people’s faith
in Government and the latter’s ability to maintain peace and order. Nevertheless, due process
commands that even though the governmental purpose is legitimate and substantial, that
purpose cannot be pursued by means so vague and broad that they infringe on life or stifle
liberty when the end can be more narrowly achieved through existing penal statutes.
Where the statute has an overbroad sweep just as when it is vague, the hazard of loss or
impairment of life or liberty is critical.21
The problem of vagueness is reduced or eliminated if the different schemes mentioned in the
law as used in the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth are prosecuted under existing penal law. The
offenses are by their nature distinct and separate from each other and have acquired
established meanings.
Thus, the acts of misappropriation or malversation may be prosecuted as separate offenses.

So may the receipt of commissions, gifts, or kickbacks by higher officials in connection with
government contracts. The four other methods or schemes mentioned in the law may be the
objects of separate penal statutes.
When the law creates a new crime of plunder through a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts, the courts have to supply missing elements if conviction is to be achieved.
Bribery is punished as plunder under the law only when there is a combination or series of
criminal acts. But when do certain acts constitute a combination or series? Does the Plunder
law provide that two or three acts of one crime of bribery constitute a combination or series
which qualify bribery into plunder? Or does bribery have to be conjoined with the separate
offense of malversation to become a combination? Or with malversation and fraudulent
conveyance or disposition of public assets or one of the other means or schemes before it
becomes a series?
I find it difficult to accept the wide discretion given to the prosecution by the Plunder Law. An
elective official who is a political threat may be charged for plunder as one single offense
punishable by death while one in the good graces of the powers-that-be is charged only under
the Revised Penal Code.
The confusion generated by a vague law is exemplified in the informations filed against
petitioner in this case. Petitioner was charged with eight crimes, namely: [1] plunder; [2]
violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019; [3] violation of Section 3 (a) of R.A. 3019; [4] another
violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019; [5] violation of Section 3 (c) of R.A. 3019; [6] violation
of Section 7 (d) of R.A. 6713; [7] perjury; [8] illegal use of alias.
Only twelve days later, the prosecution withdrew five (5) of the informations which it
consolidated into only one offense of plunder. The prosecution was not clear about the steps
to take in instances where the words "combination" or "series" may or may not apply. It could
not understand the coverage of the law as acts repetitive of the same offense or acts
constituting one crime lumped up with other crimes or both criminal and non-criminal acts
punished as one new offense of plunder.
In the following exchange during the deliberations on Senate Bill No. 733, Senators Neptali
Gonzales and Wigberto Tanada voiced serious doubts on the constitutionality of the definition
of plunder, thus:
Senator Gonzales:
To commit the offense of plunder, as defined in this act, and while constituting a single offense,
it must consist of a series of overt or criminal acts, such as bribery, extortion, malversation of
public funds, swindling, falsification of public documents, coercion, theft, fraud, and illegal
exaction and graft or corrupt practices and like offenses. Now, Mr. President, I think this
provision, by itself will be vague. I am afraid that it may be faulted for being violative of
the due process clause and the right to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation of an accused. Because what is meant by "series of overt or criminal acts?"
I mean, would 2, 4, or 5 constitute a series? During the period of amendments, can we
establish a minimum of overt acts like, for example, robbery in band? The law defines what is
robbery in band by the number of participants therein. In this particular case, probably, we can
statutorily provide for the definition of "series" so that two, for example, would that
already be a series? Or, three, what would be the basis for such determination?
Senator Tanada:
I think, Mr. President, that would be called for, this being a penal legislation, we should be
very clear as to what it encompasses; otherwise, we may contravene the constitutional
provision on the right of accused to due process. (Emphasis ours)22
The foregoing concerns to statutorily provide for the definition of "series" or "combination" have,
however, not been addressed and the terms were left undefined. The law, as presently crafted,
does not specify whether a "series" means two, three, four or even more of the overt or criminal
acts listed in Section 1 (d) of R.A. 7080.
Even more difficult to accept is when the trial court has to supply the missing elements, in
effect taking over corrective or punitive legislation from Congress. The attempts of the
Sandiganbayan in the questioned Resolution do not clarify. They instead serve to confuse and
increase the ambiguity even more.
The Sandiganbayan interprets the words "combination" and "series" of overt or criminal acts
through terms found in American decisions like "pattern," "conspiracy," "over-all unlawful
scheme," or "general plan of action or method."
The above definitions are not found in the Plunder Law. The use of such phrases as "over-all
scheme" or "general plan" indicates that the Sandiganbayan is expanding the coverage of the
law through the use of ambiguous phrases capable of dual or multiple applications. When do
two or three acts of the same offense of malversation constitute a "pattern," "a general plan of
action," or an "over-all scheme?" Would one malversation in the first week of a public officer’s
tenure and another similar act six (6) years later become a "combination," a "pattern," or a
"general plan of action?"
I agree with petitioner’s concern over the danger that the trial court may allow the specifications
of details in an information to validate a statute inherently void for vagueness. An information
cannot rise higher than the statute upon which it is based. Not even the construction by the
Sandiganbayan of a vague or ambiguous provision can supply the missing ingredients of the
Plunder Law.
The right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
is most often exemplified in the care with which a complaint or information should be drafted.
However, the clarity and particularity required of an information should also be present in the
law upon which the charges are based. If the penal law is vague, any particularity in the
information will come from the prosecutor. The prosecution takes over the role of Congress.
The fact that the details of the charges are specified in the Information will not cure the statute
of its constitutional infirmity. If on its face the challenged provision is repugnant to the due
process clause, specification of details of the offense intended to be charged would not serve
to validate it.23 In other words, it is the statute, not the accusation under it, that prescribes the
rule to govern conduct and warns against transgression. No one may be required at peril of
life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be
informed as to what the State commands or forbids.24
Definiteness is a due process requirement. It is especially important in its application to penal

statutes. Vagueness and unintelligibility will invariably lead to arbitrary government action. The
purpose of the due process clause is to exclude everything that is arbitrary and capricious
affecting the rights of the citizen.25 Congress, in exercising its power to declare what acts
constitute a crime, must inform the citizen with reasonable precision what acts it intends to
prohibit so that he may have a certain understandable rule of conduct and know what acts it is
his duty to avoid.26
The questioned statutes were enacted purportedly in the interest of justice, public peace and
order, and the rule of law. These purposes are not served by R.A. Nos. 7080 and 7659. These
statutes allow the prosecutors and the courts arbitrary and too broad discretionary powers in
their enforcement. Fair, equal and impartial justice would be denied.
For all the foregoing reasons, I vote to grant the petition and nullify the Plunder Law for being
unconstitutional.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 169080 December 19, 2007
CELESTIAL NICKEL MINING EXPLORATION CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
MACROASIA CORPORATION (formerly INFANTA MINERAL AND INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION), BLUE RIDGE MINERAL CORPORATION, and LEBACH MINING
CORPORATION, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 172936
BLUE RIDGE MINERAL CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. ANGELO REYES in his capacity as SECRETARY of the DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, HON. GUILLERMO ESTABILLO in his
capacity as REGIONAL DIRECTOR of the MINES AND GEOSCIENCES BUREAU,
REGION IV-B of the DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
and MACROASIA CORPORATION (formerly INFANTA MINERAL AND INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION), Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 176226
CELESTIAL NICKEL MINING EXPLORATION CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
BLUE RIDGE MINERAL CORPORATION and MACROASIA CORPORATION (formerly
INFANTA MINERAL AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION), Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 176319
MACROASIA CORPORATION (formerly INFANTA MINERAL AND INDUSTRIAL

CORPORATION), Petitioner,
vs.
BLUE RIDGE MINERAL CORPORATION and CELESTIAL NICKEL MINING
EXPLORATION CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before us are four (4) petitions. The first is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45
docketed as G.R. No. 169080, wherein petitioner Celestial Nickel Mining Exploration
Corporation (Celestial) seeks to set aside the April 15, 2005 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87931. The CA affirmed the November 26, 2004 Resolution of the
Mines Adjudication Board (MAB) in MAB Case Nos. 056-97 and 057-97 (DENR Case Nos. 97-
01 and 97-02), upholding the authority of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Secretary to grant and cancel mineral agreements. Also assailed is the
August 3, 2005 Resolution3 of the CA denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed
Decision.
The second is a Petition for Certiorari4 under Rule 65 docketed as G.R. No. 172936, wherein
petitioner Blue Ridge Mineral Corporation (Blue Ridge) seeks to annul and set aside the action
of then Secretary Michael T. Defensor, in his capacity as DENR Secretary, approving and
signing two Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSAs) in favor of Macroasia
Corporation (Macroasia) denominated as MPSA Nos. 220-2005-IVB and 221-2005-IVB.
And the third and fourth are petitions for review on certiorari5 under Rule 45 docketed as G.R.
No. 176226 and G.R. No. 176319, wherein petitioners Celestial and Macroasia, respectively,
seek to set aside the May 18, 2006 Decision6 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 90828. The CA
reversed and set aside the November 26, 2004 and July 12, 2005 Resolutions of the MAB,
and reinstated the October 24, 2000 Decision in MAB Case Nos. 056-97 and 057-97, granting
Blue Ridge the prior and preferential right to file its application over the mining claims of
Macroasia. These petitions likewise seek to set aside the January 19, 2007 Resolution7 of the
CA denying petitioners’ motions for reconsideration of the assailed Decision.
Through our July 5, 2006 Resolution,8 we consolidated the first two cases. While in our
subsequent April 23, 20079 and July 11, 200710 Resolutions, we consolidated the four cases
as they arose from the same facts.
The undisputed facts as found by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 87931 are as follows:
On September 24, 1973, the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Infanta
Mineral and Industrial Corporation (Infanta) entered into a Mining Lease Contract (V-1050) for
a term of 25 years up to September 23, 1998 for mining lode claims covering an area of 216
hectares at Sitio Linao, Ipilan, Brooke’s Point, Palawan. The mining claims of Infanta covered
by lode/lease contracts were as follows:
Contract No. Area Date of Issuance

LLC-V-941 18 hectares January 17, 1972
LC-V-1050 216 hectares September 24, 1973
LLC-V-1060 16 hectares October 30, 1973

LLC-V-1061 144 hectares October 30, 1973
LLC-V-1073 144 hectares April 18, 1973
MLC-MRD-52 306 hectares April 26, 1978

MLC-MRC-53 72 hectares April 26, 1978
Infanta’s corporate name was changed to Cobertson Holdings Corporation on January 26,
1994 and subsequently to its present name, Macroasia Corporation, on November 6, 1995.
Sometime in 1997, Celestial filed a Petition to Cancel the subject mining lease contracts and
other mining claims of Macroasia including those covered by Mining Lease Contract No. V-
1050, before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB) of
the DENR. The petition was docketed as DENR Case No. 97-01.
Blue Ridge, in an earlier letter-petition, also wrote the Director of Mines to seek cancellation of
mining lease contracts and other mining rights of Macroasia and another entity, Lebach Mining
Corporation (Lebach), in mining areas in Brooke’s Point. The petition was eventually docketed
as DENR Case No. 97-02.
Celestial is the assignee of 144 mining claims covering such areas contiguous to Infanta’s
(now Macroasia) mining lode claims. Said area was involved in protracted administrative
disputes with Infanta (now Macroasia), Lecar & Sons, Inc., and Palawan Nickel Mining
Corporation. Celestial also holds an MPSA with the government which covers 2,835 hectares
located at Ipilan/Maasin, Brooke’s Point, Palawan and two pending applications covering
another 4,040 hectares in Barangay Mainit also in Brooke’s Point.
Celestial sought the cancellation of Macroasia’s lease contracts on the following grounds: (1)
the nonpayment of Macroasia of required occupational fees and municipal taxes; (2) the non-
filing of Macroasia of Affidavits of Annual Work Obligations; (3) the failure of Macroasia to
provide improvements on subject mining claims; (4) the concentration of Macroasia on logging;
(5) the encroachment, mining, and extraction by Macroasia of nickel ore from Celestial’s
property; (6) the ability of Celestial to subject the mining areas to commercial production; and
(7) the willingness of Celestial to pay fees and back taxes of Macroasia.
In the later part of the proceedings, Macroasia intervened in the case and submitted its position
paper refuting the grounds for cancellation invoked by Celestial.11
The Ruling of the Panel of Arbitrators in

DENR Case Nos. 97-01 and 97-02
Based on the records of the Bureau of Mines and findings of the field investigations, the POA
found that Macroasia and Lebach not only automatically abandoned their areas/mining claims
but likewise had lost all their rights to the mining claims. The POA granted the petition of
Celestial to cancel the following Mining Lease Contracts of Macroasia: LLC-V-941, LLC-V-
1050, LLC-V-1060, LLC-V-1061, LLC-V-1073, MLC-MRD-52, and MLC-MRC-53; and found
the claims of the others indubitably meritorious. It gave Celestial the preferential right to
Macroasia’s mining areas.12 It upheld Blue Ridge’s petition regarding DENR Case No. 97-02,
but only as against the Mining Lease Contract areas of Lebach (LLC-V-1153, LLC-V-1154,
and LLC-V-1155), and the said leased areas were declared automatically abandoned. It gave
Blue Ridge priority right to the aforesaid Lebach’s areas/mining claims.13
Blue Ridge and Macroasia appealed before the MAB, and the cases were docketed as MAB
Case Nos. 056-97 and 057-97, respectively.
Lebach did not file any notice of appeal with the required memorandum of appeal; thus, with
respect to Lebach, the above resolution became final and executory.
The Rulings of the Mines Adjudication Board in
MAB Case Nos. 056-97 and 057-97 (DENR Case Nos. 97-01 and 97-02)
The MAB resolved the issues of timeliness and perfection of Macroasia’s appeal; Macroasia’s
abandonment of its mining claims; and the preferential right over the abandoned mining claims
of Macroasia.
Conformably with Section 51 of Consolidated Mines Administrative Order

(CMAO)14 implementing Presidential Decree No. (PD) 46315 and our ruling in Medrana v. Office
of the President (OP),16 the MAB affirmed the POA findings that Macroasia abandoned its
mining claims. The MAB found that Macroasia did not comply with its work obligations from
1986 to 1991. It based its conclusion on the field verifications conducted by the MGB, Region
IV and validated by the Special Team tasked by the MAB.17 However, contrary to the findings
of the POA, the MAB found that it was Blue Ridge that had prior and preferential rights over
the mining claims of Macroasia, and not Celestial.
Thus, on October 24, 2000, the MAB promulgated its Decision upholding the Decision of the
POA to cancel the Mining Lode/Lease Contracts of Macroasia; declaring abandoned the
subject mining claims; and opening the mining area with prior and preferential rights to Blue
Ridge for mining applications, subject to strict compliance with the procedure and requirements
provided by law. In case Blue Ridge defaults, Celestial could exercise the secondary priority
and preferential rights, and subsequently, in case Celestial also defaults, other qualified
applicants could file.18
Both Celestial and Macroasia moved for reconsideration.19 Celestial asserted that it had better
rights than Blue Ridge over the mining claims of Macroasia as it had correctly filed its petition,
and filed its MPSA application after Macroasia’s lease contract expired on January 17, 1997
and after the POA’s resolution was issued on September 1, 1997. Moreover, it argued that
priority was not an issue when the contested area had not yet been declared abandoned. Thus,
Blue Ridge’s MPSA application filed on June 17, 1996 had no effect and should not be
considered superior since Macroasia’s lease contracts were still valid and subsisting and could
not have been canceled by Macroasia’s mere failure to perform annual work obligations and
pay corresponding royalties/taxes to the government.
Macroasia, in its Motion for Reconsideration, reiterated that it did not abandon its mining claims,
and even if mining was not listed among its purposes in its amended Articles of Incorporation,
its mining activities were acts that were only ultra vires but were ratified as a secondary
purpose by its stockholders in subsequent amendments of its Articles of Incorporation.
Before the MAB could resolve the motions for reconsideration, on March 16, 2001, Macroasia
filed its Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration20 questioning the jurisdiction of the POA in
canceling mining lease contracts and mining claims. Macroasia averred that the power and
authority to grant, cancel, and revoke mineral agreements is exclusively lodged with the DENR
Secretary. Macroasia further pointed out that in arrogating upon itself such power, the POA
whimsically and capriciously discarded the procedure on conferment of mining rights laid down
in Republic Act No. (RA) 7942, The Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and DENR Administrative
Order No. (AO) 96-40,21 and perfunctorily and improperly awarded its mining rights to Blue
Ridge and Celestial.
Subsequently, on November 26, 2004, the MAB issued a Resolution22 vacating its October 24,
2000 Decision, holding that neither the POA nor the MAB had the power to revoke a mineral
agreement duly entered into by the DENR Secretary, ratiocinating that there was no provision
giving the POA and MAB the concurrent power to manage or develop mineral resources. The
MAB further held that the power to cancel or revoke a mineral agreement was exclusively
lodged with the DENR Secretary; that a petition for cancellation is not a mining dispute under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the POA pursuant to Sec. 77 of RA 7942; and that the POA could
only adjudicate claims or contests during the MPSA application and not when the claims and
leases were already granted and subsisting.
Moreover, the MAB held that there was no abandonment by Macroasia because the DENR
Secretary had not decided to release Macroasia from its obligations. The Secretary may
choose not to release a contractor from its obligations on grounds of public interest. Thus,
through its said resolution, the MAB rendered its disposition, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of October 24, 2000 is hereby
VACATED. The seven (7) mining lease contracts of Macroasia Corporation (formerly Infanta
Mineral & Industrial Corporation) are DECLARED SUBSISTING prior to their expirations
without prejudice to any Decision or Order that the Secretary may render on the same. NO
PREFERENTIAL RIGHT over the same mining claims is accorded to Blue Ridge Mineral
Corporation or Celestial Nickel Mining Exploration Corporation also without prejudice to the
determination by the Secretary over the matter at the proper time.23
After the issuance of the MAB Resolution, Celestial and Blue Ridge went through divergent
paths in their quest to protect their individual interests.
On January 10, 2005, Celestial assailed the November 26, 2004 MAB Resolution before the
CA in a petition for review24 under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The petition entitled Celestial
Nickel Mining Exploration Corporation v. Macroasia Corporation, et al. was docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 87931.
On the other hand, Blue Ridge first filed a Motion for Reconsideration25 which was denied.26 On
August 26, 2005, Blue Ridge questioned the MAB’s November 26, 2004 and July 12, 2005
Resolutions before the CA in a petition for review27 entitled Blue Ridge Mineral Corporation v.
Mines Adjudication Board, et al. docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90828.
CA-G.R. SP No. 87931 filed by Celestial was heard by the 12th Division of the CA; while Blue
Ridge’s CA-G.R. SP No. 90828 was heard by the Special 10th Division. Ironically, the two
divisions rendered two (2) diametrically opposing decisions.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals Twelfth Division
On April 15, 2005, in CA-G.R. SP No. 87931, the CA 12th Division affirmed the November 26,
2004 MAB Resolution which declared Macroasia’s seven mining lease contracts as subsisting;
rejected Blue Ridge’s claim for preferential right over said mining claims; and upheld the
exclusive authority of the DENR Secretary to approve, cancel, and revoke mineral agreements.
The CA also denied Celestial’s Motion for Reconsideration28 of the assailed August 3, 2005
Resolution.29
Hence, Celestial filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari 30 docketed as G.R. No.
169080, before this Court.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals Special Tenth Division

On May 18, 2006, the CA Special 10th Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 90828 granted Blue Ridge’s
petition; reversed and set aside the November 26, 2004 and July 12, 2005 Resolutions of the
MAB; and reinstated the October 24, 2000 Decision in MAB Case Nos. 056-97 and 057-97.
The Special Tenth Division canceled Macroasia’s lease contracts; granted Blue Ridge prior
and preferential rights; and treated the cancellation of a mining lease agreement as a mining
dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the POA under Sec. 77 of RA 7942, explaining that
the power to resolve mining disputes, which is the greater power, necessarily includes the
lesser power to cancel mining agreements.
On February 20, 2006, Celestial filed a Most Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order/Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction/Mandatory Injunction31 to defer and
preclude the issuance of MPSA to Macroasia by the MGB and the DENR Secretary. We denied
this motion in our February 22, 2006 Resolution.32
Upon inquiry with the DENR, Blue Ridge discovered that sometime in December 2005 two
MPSAs, duly approved and signed by the DENR Secretary, had been issued in favor of
Macroasia. Thus, we have the instant Petition for Certiorari33 filed by Blue Ridge docketed
as G.R. No. 172936 under Rule 65, seeking to invalidate the two MPSAs issued to Macroasia.
In the meantime, on June 7, 2006, Celestial filed its Motion for Partial Reconsideration34 of the
May 18, 2006 CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 90828, while Macroasia filed its motion for
reconsideration of the same CA decision on July 7, 2006. The motions were denied in the
assailed January 19, 2007 CA Resolution. Hence, on March 8, 2007, Celestial filed the third
petition35 docketed as G.R. No. 176226, assailing the CA’s May 18, 2006 Decision and
January 19, 2007 Resolution, insofar as these granted Blue Ridge’s prior and preferential
rights. While on March 9, 2007, Macroasia filed the fourth petition36 docketed as G.R. No.
176319, also assailing the CA’s May 18, 2006 Decision and January 19, 2007 Resolution.
The Issues
In G.R. No. 169080, petitioner Celestial raises the following issues for our consideration:
(1) Whether or not Macroasia, for reasons of public policy is estopped from assailing the
alleged lack of jurisdiction of the Panel of Arbitrators and the Mines Adjudication Board only
after receiving an adverse judgment therefrom? [sic]
(2) Whether or not it is only the Secretary of the DENR who has the jurisdiction to cancel mining
contracts and privileges? [sic]
(3) Whether or not a petition for the cancellation of a mining lease contract or privilege is a
mining dispute within the meaning of the law? [sic]
(4) Whether or not Infanta’s (Macroasia) mining lease contract areas were deemed abandoned
warranting the cancellation of the lease contracts and the opening of the areas to other
qualified applicants? [sic]
(5) Whether or not Macroasia/Infanta had lost its right to participate in this case after it failed
to seasonably file its appeal and after its lease contracts had been declared abandoned and
expired without having been renewed by the government? [sic]
(6) Whether or not Celestial has the preferential right to apply for the 23 DE LARA claims which
were included in Infanta’s (Macroasia) expired lease contract (LLC-V-941) and the other areas
declared as lapsed or abandoned by MGB-Region 4 and the Panel of Arbitrators?37 [sic]
In G.R. No. 172936, petitioner Blue Ridge raises the following grounds for the allowance of
the petition:
At the outset, the instant petition must be given due course and taken cognizance of by the
Honorable Court considering that exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the
availment of the instant petition and the call for the exercise of the Honorable Court’s primary
jurisdiction.
A. The exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils
are imbued with public interest. The action of then Secretary Defensor, maintained and
continued by public respondent Secretary Reyes, was tainted with grave abuse of discretion,
has far-reaching consequences because of the magnitude of the effect created thereby.
B. The issues in the instant petition have already been put to fore by Celestial with the First
Division of the Honorable Court, and hence, this circumstance justifies the cognizance by the
Honorable Court of the instant petition.1âwphi1
II
It was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction for then
Secretary Defensor to have issued the subject MPSAs in favor of private respondent
Macroasia, considering that:
A. Non-compliance of the mandatory requirements by private respondent Macroasia prior to

approval of the subject MPSAs should have precluded then Secretary Defensor from
approving subject MPSAs.
B. Petitioner Blue Ridge has the prior and preferential right to file its mining application over
the mining claims covered by the subject MPSAs, pursuant to the Decision dated 24 October
2000 of the Board and as affirmed by the Decision dated 18 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 90828.38
In G.R. No. 176226, petitioner Celestial ascribes the following errors to the CA for our
consideration:
(1) That in reinstating and adopting as its own the Decision of the Mine Adjudication Board
affirming the abandonment and cancellation of the mining areas/claims of Macroasia (Infanta)
but awarding the prior or preferential rights to Blue Ridge, the Hon. Court of Appeals had
decided a question of substance in a way not in accord with the Law (RA 7942) or with the
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court; in other words, errors of law had been committed
by the Hon. Court of Appeals in granting preferential rights to Blue Ridge;
(2) That the Hon. Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings or so far sanctioned such departure by the Mines Adjudication Board in
its Decision of May 18, 2006 and Resolution of January 19, 2007 because:
(A) The findings of fact of the Hon. Court of Appeals are contradictory or inconsistent with the
findings of the Panel of Arbitrators;
(B) There is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Hon. Court of Appeals in its
appreciation of the facts, the evidence and the law thereby leading it to make the erroneous
conclusion that Blue Ridge, not Celestial, is entitled to the Award of prior/preferential rights
over the mining areas declared as abandoned by Macroasia;
(C) There is likewise, a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Hon. Court of Appeals in
that the said Court did not even consider some of the issues raised by Celestial;
(D) That the findings of the Hon. Court of Appeals are mere conclusions not supported by
substantial evidence and without citation of the specific evidence upon which they are based;
they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of contradiction of the evidence on record and
findings of the Panel of Arbitrators in the Resolution of September 1, 1997;
(E) That the findings of the Hon. Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence
but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record and are violative of the provisions
of RA 7942 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.39
In G.R. No. 176319, petitioner Macroasia raises the following grounds for the allowance of the
petition:
I.
The Court of Appeals (Special Tenth Division) should have dismissed the Petition of Blue
Ridge outright since the issues, facts and matters involved in the said Petition are identical to
those which had already been painstakingly passed upon, reviewed and resolved by the Court
of Appeal’s Twelfth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 87931
II.
The Court of Appeals (Special Tenth Division) gravely erred in denying Macroasia’s Motion to
Inhibit Associate Justice Rosmari Carandang from hearing and deciding the Petition
III.
There were no factual nor legal bases for the Court of Appeals to rule that Macroasia had
waived its right to question the jurisdiction of the Mines Adjudication Board
IV.
Republic Act No. 7942 contains provisions which unequivocally indicate that only the Secretary
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources has the power and authority to
cancel mining lease agreements
V.
The Court of Appeals (Special Tenth Division) gravely erred in perfunctorily transferring
Macroasia’s mining lease agreements to Blue Ridge without observing the required procedure
nor providing any basis therefor40
The Court’s Ruling
The petitions under G.R. Nos. 169080, 172936, and 176226 are bereft of merit, while the
petition under G.R. No. 176319 is meritorious.
The pith of the controversy, upon which the other issues are hinged is, who has authority and
jurisdiction to cancel existing mineral agreements under RA 7942 in relation to PD 463 and
pertinent rules and regulations.
G.R. Nos. 169080, 176226 and 176319
We will jointly tackle G.R. Nos. 169080, 176266, and 176319 as the issues and arguments of
these three are inextricably intertwined.
Core Issue: Jurisdiction over Cancellation of Mineral Agreements
Petitioner Celestial maintains that while the jurisdiction to approve mining lease contracts or
mineral agreements is conferred on the DENR Secretary, Sec. 77(a) of RA 7942 by implication
granted to the POA and MAB the authority to cancel existing mining lease contracts or mineral
agreements.
On the other hand, respondent Macroasia strongly asserts that it is the DENR Secretary who
has the exclusive and primary jurisdiction to grant and cancel existing mining lease contracts;
thus, the POA and MAB have no jurisdiction to cancel much less to grant any preferential rights
to other mining firms.
Before we resolve this core issue of jurisdiction over cancellation of mining lease contracts, we
first need to look back at previous mining laws pertinent to this issue.
Under PD 463, The Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974, which took effect on
May 17, 1974, applications for lease of mining claims were required to be filed with the Director
of the Bureau of Mines, within two (2) days from the date of their recording.41 Sec. 40 of PD
463 provided that if no adverse claim was filed within (15) days after the first date of publication,
it was conclusively presumed that no adverse claim existed and thereafter no objection from
third parties to the grant of the lease could be heard, except protests pending at the time of
publication. The Secretary would then approve and issue the corresponding mining lease
contract. In case of any protest or adverse claim relating to any mining claim and lease
application, Secs. 48 and 50 of PD 463 prescribed the procedure. Under Sec. 48, the protest
should be filed with the Bureau of Mines. Under Sec. 50, any party not satisfied with the
decision or order of the Director could, within five (5) days from receipt of the decision or order,
appeal to the Secretary. The decisions of the Secretary were likewise appealable within five
(5) days from receipts by the affected party to the President of the Philippines whose decision
shall be final and executory. PD 463 was, however, silent as to who was authorized to cancel
the mineral agreements.
On July 10, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. (EO) 211. Under
Sec. 2 of EO 211, the processing, evaluation, and approval of all mining applications,
declarations of locations, operating agreements, and service contracts were governed by PD
463, as amended. EO 211 likewise did not contain any provision on the authority to cancel
operating agreements and service contracts.
On July 25, 1987, EO 279 was issued by President Aquino. It authorized the DENR Secretary
to negotiate and enter into, for and in behalf of the Government, joint venture, co-production,
or production-sharing agreements for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral
resources with any Filipino citizen, corporation, or association, at least 60% of whose capital
was owned by Filipino citizens.42 The contract or agreement was subject to the approval of the
President.43 With respect to contracts of foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors
involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, the DENR Secretary could recommend approval of said contracts to the
President.44 EO 279 provided that PD 463 and its implementing rules and regulations, which
were not inconsistent with EO 279, continued in force and effect.45 Again, EO 279 was silent
on the authority to cancel mineral agreements.
RA 7942, The Philippine Mining Act of 1995 enacted on March 3, 1995, repealed the
provisions of PD 463 inconsistent with RA 7942. Unlike PD 463, where the application was
filed with the Bureau of Mines Director, the applications for mineral agreements are now
required to be filed with the Regional Director as provided by Sec. 29 of RA 7942. The proper
filing gave the proponent the prior right to be approved by the Secretary and thereafter to be
submitted to the President. The President shall provide a list to Congress of every approved
mineral agreement within 30 days from its approval by the Secretary. Again, RA 7942 is silent
on who has authority to cancel the agreement.
Compared to PD 463 where disputes were decided by the Bureau of Mines Director whose
decisions were appealable to the DENR Secretary and then to the President, RA 7942 now
provides for the creation of quasi-judicial bodies (POA and MAB) that would have jurisdiction
over conflicts arising from the applications and mineral agreements. Secs. 77, 78, and 79 lay
down the procedure, thus:
SEC. 77. Panel of Arbitrators.––There shall be a panel of arbitrators in the regional office of
the Department composed of three (3) members, two (2) of whom must be members of the
Philippine Bar in good standing and one [1] licensed mining engineer or a professional in a
related field, and duly designated by the Secretary as recommended by the Mines and
Geosciences Bureau Director. Those designated as members of the panel shall serve as such
in addition to their work in the Department without receiving any additional compensation. As
much as practicable, said members shall come from the different bureaus of the Department
in the region. The presiding officer thereof shall be selected by the drawing of lots. His tenure
as presiding officer shall be on a yearly basis. The members of the panel shall perform their
duties and obligations in hearing and deciding cases until their designation is withdrawn or
revoked by the Secretary. Within thirty (30) working days, after the submission of the case by
the parties for decision, the panel shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and
decide on the following:
(a) Disputes involving rights to mining areas;
(b) Disputes involving mineral agreements or permits;
(c) Disputes involving surface owners, occupants and claimholders/concessionaires; and
(d) Disputes pending before the Bureau and the Department at the date of the effectivity of
this Act.
SEC. 78. Appellate Jurisdiction.—The decision or order of the panel of arbitrators may be
appealed by the party not satisfied thereto to the Mines Adjudication Board within fifteen (15)
days from receipt thereof which must decide the case within thirty (30) days from submission
thereof for decision.
SEC. 79. Mines Adjudication Board.—The Mines Adjudication Board shall be composed of
three (3) members. The Secretary shall be the chairman with the Director of the Mines and
Geosciences Bureau and the Undersecretary for Operations of the Department as members
thereof.
xxxx
A petition for review by certiorari and question of law may be filed by the aggrieved party with
the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or decision of the Board.
RA 7942 is also silent as to who is empowered to cancel existing lease contracts and mineral
agreements.
Meanwhile, in Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp. v. MAB, we explained that the decision
of the MAB can first be appealed, via a petition for review, to the CA before elevating the case
to this Court.46
After a scrutiny of the provisions of PD 463, EO 211, EO 279, RA 7942 and its implementing
rules and regulations, executive issuances, and case law, we rule that the DENR Secretary,
not the POA, has the jurisdiction to cancel existing mineral lease contracts or mineral
agreements based on the following reasons:
1. The power of the DENR Secretary to cancel mineral agreements emanates from his
administrative authority, supervision, management, and control over mineral resources under
Chapter I, Title XIV of Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, viz:
Chapter 1—General Provisions
Section 1. Declaration of Policy.—(1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino
people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources x x x
Sec. 2. Mandate.—(1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be

primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy. (2) It shall, subject to law
and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to
control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the
country’s natural resources.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Powers and Functions.—The Department shall:
xxxx
(2) Formulate, implement and supervise the implementation of the government’s policies,
plans, and programs pertaining to the management, conservation, development, use and
replenishment of the country’s natural resources;
xxxx
(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and disposable public lands,
mineral resources x x x
xxxx
(12) Regulate the development, disposition, extraction, exploration and use of the country’s
forest, land, water and mineral resources;
(13) Assume responsibility for the assessment, development, protection, licensing and
regulation as provided for by law, where applicable, of all energy and natural resources; the
regulation and monitoring of service contractors, licensees, lessees, and permit for the
extraction, exploration, development and use of natural resources products; x x x
xxxx
(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public
domain x x x
Chapter 2—The Department Proper
xxxx
Sec. 8. The Secretary.—The Secretary shall:
xxxx
(3) Promulgate rules, regulations and other issuances necessary in carrying out the
Department’s mandate, objectives, policies, plans, programs and projects.
(4) Exercise supervision and control over all functions and activities of the Department;
(5) Delegate authority for the performance of any administrative or substantive function to
subordinate officials of the Department x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
It is the DENR, through the Secretary, that manages, supervises, and regulates the use and
development of all mineral resources of the country. It has exclusive jurisdiction over the
management of all lands of public domain, which covers mineral resources and deposits from
said lands. It has the power to oversee, supervise, and police our natural resources which
include mineral resources. Derived from the broad and explicit powers of the DENR and its
Secretary under the Administrative Code of 1987 is the power to approve mineral agreements
and necessarily to cancel or cause to cancel said agreements.
2. RA 7942 confers to the DENR Secretary specific authority over mineral resources.
Secs. 8 and 29 of RA 7942 pertinently provide:
SEC. 8. Authority of the Department.––The Department shall be the primary government

agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the
States mineral resources including those in reservations, watershed areas, and lands of the
public domain. The Secretary shall have the authority to enter into mineral agreements
on behalf of the Government upon the recommendation of the Director, promulgate such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to implement the intent and provisions of this Act.
SEC. 29. Filing and approval of Mineral Agreements.––x x x.
The filing of a proposal for a mineral agreement shall give the proponent the prior right to areas
covered by the same. The proposed mineral agreement will be approved by the
Secretary and copies thereof shall be submitted to the President. Thereafter, the President
shall provide a list to Congress of every approved mineral agreement within thirty (30) days
from its approval by the Secretary. (Emphasis supplied.)
Sec. 29 is a carry over of Sec. 40 of PD 463 which granted jurisdiction to the DENR Secretary
to approve mining lease contracts on behalf of the government, thus:
SEC. 40. Issuance of Mining Lease Contract.––If no adverse claim is filed within fifteen (15)
days after the first date of publication, it shall be conclusively presumed that no such adverse
claim exists and thereafter no objection from third parties to the grant of the lease shall be
heard, except protest pending at the time of publication, and the Secretary shall approve and
issue the corresponding mining lease x x x.
To enforce PD 463, the CMAO containing the rules and regulations implementing PD 463 was
issued. Sec. 44 of the CMAO provides:
SEC. 44. Procedure for Cancellation.––Before any mining lease contract is cancelled for any
cause enumerated in Section 43 above, the mining lessee shall first be notified in writing of
such cause or causes, and shall be given an opportunity to be heard, and to show cause why
the lease shall not be cancelled.
If, upon investigation, the Secretary shall find the lessee to be in default, the former may
warn the lessee, suspend his operations or cancel the lease contract (emphasis
supplied).
Sec. 4 of EO 279 provided that the provisions of PD 463 and its implementing rules and
regulations, not inconsistent with the executive order, continue in force and effect.
When RA 7942 took effect on March 3, 1995, there was no provision on who could cancel
mineral agreements. However, since the aforequoted Sec. 44 of the CMAO implementing PD
463 was not repealed by RA 7942 and DENR AO 96-40, not being contrary to any of the
provisions in them, then it follows that Sec. 44 serves as basis for the DENR Secretary’s
authority to cancel mineral agreements.
Since the DENR Secretary had the power to approve and cancel mineral agreements under
PD 463, and the power to cancel them under the CMAO implementing PD 463, EO 211, and
EO 279, then there was no recall of the power of the DENR Secretary under RA 7942.
Historically, the DENR Secretary has the express power to approve mineral agreements or
contracts and the implied power to cancel said agreements.
It is a well-established principle that in the interpretation of an ambiguous provision of law, the

history of the enactment of the law may be used as an extrinsic aid to determine the import of
the legal provision or the law.47 History of the enactment of the statute constitutes prior laws
on the same subject matter. Legislative history necessitates review of "the origin, antecedents
and derivation" of the law in question to discover the legislative purpose or intent.48 It can be
assumed "that the new legislation has been enacted as continuation of the existing legislative
policy or as a new effort to perpetuate it or further advance it."49
We rule, therefore, that based on the grant of implied power to terminate mining or mineral
contracts under previous laws or executive issuances like PD 463, EO 211, and EO 279, RA
7942 should be construed as a continuation of the legislative intent to authorize the DENR
Secretary to cancel mineral agreements on account of violations of the terms and conditions
thereof.
3. Under RA 7942, the power of control and supervision of the DENR Secretary over the MGB
to cancel or recommend cancellation of mineral rights clearly demonstrates the authority of the
DENR Secretary to cancel or approve the cancellation of mineral agreements.
Under Sec. 9 of RA 7942, the MGB was given the power of direct supervision of mineral lands
and resources, thus:
Sec. 9. Authority of the Bureau.—The Bureau shall have direct charge in the administration
and disposition of mineral lands and mineral resources and shall undertake geological, mining,
metallurgical, chemical, and other researches as well as geological and mineral exploration
surveys. The Director shall recommend to the Secretary the granting of mineral agreements
to duly qualified persons and shall monitor the compliance by the contractor of the terms and
conditions of the mineral agreements. The Bureau may confiscate surety, performance and
guaranty bonds posted through an order to be promulgated by the Director. The Director may
deputize, when necessary, any member or unit of the Philippine National Police, barangay,
duly registered nongovernmental organization (NGO) or any qualified person to police all
mining activities. (Emphasis supplied.)
Corollary to the power of the MGB Director to recommend approval of mineral agreements is
his power to cancel or recommend cancellation of mining rights covered by said agreements
under Sec. 7 of DENR AO 96-40, containing the revised Implementing Rules and Regulations
of RA 7942. Sec. 7 reads:
Sec. 7. Organization and Authority of the Bureau.
xxxx
The Bureau shall have the following authority, among others:
a. To have direct charge in the administration and disposition of mineral land and mineral
resources;
xxxx
d. To recommend to the Secretary the granting of mineral agreements or to endorse to the

Secretary for action by the President the grant of FTAAs [Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreements], in favor of qualified persons and to monitor compliance by the Contractor with
the terms and conditions of the mineral agreements and FTAAs.
e. To cancel or to recommend cancellation after due process, mining rights, mining
applications and mining claims for non-compliance with pertinent laws, rules and regulations.
It is explicit from the foregoing provision that the DENR Secretary has the authority to cancel
mineral agreements based on the recommendation of the MGB Director. As a matter of fact,
the power to cancel mining rights can even be delegated by the DENR Secretary to the MGB
Director. Clearly, it is the Secretary, not the POA, that has authority and jurisdiction over
cancellation of existing mining contracts or mineral agreements.
4. The DENR Secretary’s power to cancel mining rights or agreements through the MGB can
be inferred from Sec. 230, Chapter XXIV of DENR AO 96-40 on cancellation, revocation, and
termination of a permit/mineral agreement/FTAA. Sec. 230 provides:
Section 230. Grounds
The following grounds for cancellation revocation and termination of a Mining Permit Mineral
Agreement/FTAA.
a. Violation of any of the terms and conditions of the Permits or Agreements;
b. Nonpayment of taxes and fees due the government for two (2) consecutive years; and
c. Falsehood or omission of facts in the application for exploration [or Mining] Permit Mineral
Agreement/FTAA or other permits which may later, change or affect substantially the facts set
forth in said statements.
Though Sec. 230 is silent as to who can order the cancellation, revocation, and termination of
a permit/mineral agreement/FTAA, it has to be correlated with the power of the MGB under
Sec. 7 of AO 96-40 "to cancel or to recommend cancellation, after due process, mining rights,
mining applications and mining claims for noncompliance with pertinent laws, rules and
regulations." As the MGB is under the supervision of the DENR Secretary, then the logical
conclusion is that it is the DENR Secretary who can cancel the mineral agreements and not
the POA nor the MAB.
5. Celestial and Blue Ridge are not unaware of the stipulations in the Mining Lease Contract
Nos. V-1050 and MRD-52,50 the cancellation of which they sought from the POA. It is clear
from said lease contracts that the parties are the Republic of the Philippines represented by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now DENR Secretary) as lessor, and
Infanta (Macroasia) as lessee. Paragraph 18 of said lease contracts provides:
Whenever the LESSEE fails to comply with any provision of [PD 463, and] Commonwealth
Acts Nos. 137, 466 and 470, [both as amended,] and/or the rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder, or any of the covenants therein, the LESSOR may declare this lease
cancelled and, after having given thirty (30) days’ notice in writing to the LESSEE, may enter
and take possession of the said premises, and said lessee shall be liable for all unpaid rentals,
royalties and taxes due the Government on the lease up to the time of the forfeiture or
cancellation, in which event, the LESSEE hereby covenants and agrees to give up the
possession of the property leased. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the government represented by the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
(now the DENR Secretary) has the power to cancel the lease contracts for violations of existing
laws, rules and regulations and the terms and conditions of the contracts. Celestial and Blue
Ridge are now estopped from challenging the power and authority of the DENR Secretary to
cancel mineral agreements.
However, Celestial and Blue Ridge insist that the power to cancel mineral agreements is also
lodged with the POA under the explicit provisions of Sec. 77 of RA 7942.
This postulation is incorrect.
Sec. 77 of RA 7942 lays down the jurisdiction of POA, to wit:
Within thirty (30) days, after the submission of the case by the parties for the decision, the
panel shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following:
(a) Disputes involving rights to mining areas
(b) Disputes involving mineral agreements or permits
The phrase "disputes involving rights to mining areas" refers to any adverse claim, protest, or
opposition to an application for mineral agreement. The POA therefore has the jurisdiction to
resolve any adverse claim, protest, or opposition to a pending application for a mineral
agreement filed with the concerned Regional Office of the MGB. This is clear from Secs. 38
and 41 of DENR AO 96-40, which provide:
Sec. 38.
xxxx
Within thirty (30) calendar days from the last date of publication/posting/radio announcements,
the authorized officer(s) of the concerned office(s) shall issue a certification(s) that the
publication/posting/radio announcement have been complied with. Any adverse claim, protest
or opposition shall be filed directly, within thirty (30) calendar days from the last date of
publication/posting/radio announcement, with the concerned Regional Office or through any
concerned PENRO or CENRO for filing in the concerned Regional Office for purposes of its
resolution by the Panel of Arbitrators pursuant to the provisions of this Act and these
implementing rules and regulations. Upon final resolution of any adverse claim, protest or
opposition, the Panel of Arbitrators shall likewise issue a certification to that effect within five
(5) working days from the date of finality of resolution thereof. Where there is no adverse claim,
protest or opposition, the Panel of Arbitrators shall likewise issue a Certification to that effect
within five working days therefrom.
xxxx
No Mineral Agreement shall be approved unless the requirements under this Section are fully
complied with and any adverse claim/protest/opposition is finally resolved by the Panel of
Arbitrators.
Sec. 41.
xxxx
Within fifteen (15) working days from the receipt of the Certification issued by the Panel
of Arbitrators as provided in Section 38 hereof, the concerned Regional Director shall
initially evaluate the Mineral Agreement applications in areas outside Mineral
reservations. He/She shall thereafter endorse his/her findings to the Bureau for further
evaluation by the Director within fifteen (15) working days from receipt of forwarded
documents. Thereafter, the Director shall endorse the same to the secretary for
consideration/approval within fifteen working days from receipt of such endorsement.
In case of Mineral Agreement applications in areas with Mineral Reservations, within fifteen
(15) working days from receipt of the Certification issued by the Panel of Arbitrators as
provided for in Section 38 hereof, the same shall be evaluated and endorsed by the
Director to the Secretary for consideration/approval within fifteen days from receipt of
such endorsement. (Emphasis supplied.)
It has been made clear from the aforecited provisions that the "disputes involving rights to
mining areas" under Sec. 77(a) specifically refer only to those disputes relative to
the applications for a mineral agreement or conferment of mining rights.
The jurisdiction of the POA over adverse claims, protest, or oppositions to a mining right
application is further elucidated by Secs. 219 and 43 of DENR AO 95-936, which read:
Sec. 219. Filing of Adverse Claims/Conflicts/Oppositions.—Notwithstanding the provisions of

Sections 28, 43 and 57 above, any adverse claim, protest or opposition specified in said
sections may also be filed directly with the Panel of Arbitrators within the concerned
periods for filing such claim, protest or opposition as specified in said Sections.
Sec. 43. Publication/Posting of Mineral Agreement Application.—
xxxx
The Regional Director or concerned Regional Director shall also cause the posting of the
application on the bulletin boards of the Bureau, concerned Regional office(s) and in the
concerned province(s) and municipality(ies), copy furnished the barangays where the
proposed contract area is located once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks in a language
generally understood in the locality. After forty-five (45) days from the last date of
publication/posting has been made and no adverse claim, protest or opposition was filed within
the said forty-five (45) days, the concerned offices shall issue a certification that
publication/posting has been made and that no adverse claim, protest or opposition of
whatever nature has been filed. On the other hand, if there be any adverse claim, protest
or opposition, the same shall be filed within forty-five (45) days from the last date of
publication/posting, with the Regional Offices concerned, or through the Department’s
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officers (CENRO) or Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Officers (PENRO), to be filed at the Regional Office
for resolution of the Panel of Arbitrators. However previously published valid and subsisting
mining claims are exempted from posted/posting required under this Section.
No mineral agreement shall be approved unless the requirements under this section are
fully complied with and any opposition/adverse claim is dealt with in writing by the
Director and resolved by the Panel of Arbitrators. (Emphasis supplied.)
These provisions lead us to conclude that the power of the POA to resolve any adverse claim,
opposition, or protest relative to mining rights under Sec. 77(a) of RA 7942 is confined only to
adverse claims, conflicts and oppositions relating to applications for the grant of mineral rights.
POA’s jurisdiction is confined only to resolutions of such adverse claims, conflicts and
oppositions and it has no authority to approve or reject said applications. Such power is vested
in the DENR Secretary upon recommendation of the MGB Director. Clearly, POA’s jurisdiction
over "disputes involving rights to mining areas" has nothing to do with the cancellation of
existing mineral agreements.
On the other hand, Celestial and Blue Ridge contend that POA has jurisdiction over their
petitions for the cancellation of Macroasia’s lease agreements banking on POA’s jurisdiction
over "disputes involving mineral agreements or permits" under Sec. 77 (b) of RA 7942.
Such position is bereft of merit.
As earlier discussed, the DENR Secretary, by virtue of his powers as administrative head of
his department in charge of the management and supervision of the natural resources of the
country under the 1987 Administrative Code, RA 7942, and other laws, rules, and regulations,
can cancel a mineral agreement for violation of its terms, even without a petition or request
filed for its cancellation, provided there is compliance with due process. Since the cancellation
of the mineral agreement is approved by the DENR Secretary, then the recourse of the
contractor is to elevate the matter to the OP pursuant to AO 18, Series of 1987 but not with
the POA.
Matched with the legal provisions empowering the DENR Secretary to cancel a mineral
agreement is Sec. 77 (b) of RA 7942 which grants POA jurisdiction over disputes involving
mineral agreements.
A dispute is defined as "a conflict or controversy; a conflict of claims or rights; an assertion of

a right, claim or demand on one side; met by contrary claims or allegations on the other."51 It
is synonymous to a cause of action which is "an act or omission by which a party violates a
right of another."52
A petition or complaint originating from a dispute can be filed or initiated only by a real party-
in-interest. The rules of court define a real party-in-interest as "the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit."53 Every action, therefore, can only be prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-
interest.54 It has been explained that "a real party-in-interest plaintiff is one who has a legal
right, while a real party-in-interest-defendant is one who has a correlative legal obligation
whose act or omission violates the legal right of the former."55
On the other hand, interest "means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by
the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest." It is settled in this jurisdiction that "one having no right or interest to protect cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party-plaintiff in an action."56 Real interest is defined as
"a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future,
contingent, subordinate or consequential interest."57
From the foregoing, a petition for the cancellation of an existing mineral agreement covering
an area applied for by an applicant based on the alleged violation of any of the terms thereof,
is not a "dispute" involving a mineral agreement under Sec. 77 (b) of RA 7942. It does not
pertain to a violation by a party of the right of another. The applicant is not a real party-in-
interest as he does not have a material or substantial interest in the mineral agreement but
only a prospective or expectant right or interest in the mining area. He has no legal right to
such mining claim and hence no dispute can arise between the applicant and the parties to
the mineral agreement. The court rules therefore that a petition for cancellation of a mineral
agreement anchored on the breach thereof even if filed by an applicant to a mining claim, like
Celestial and Blue Ridge, falls within the jurisdiction of the DENR Secretary and not POA. Such
petition is excluded from the coverage of the POA’s jurisdiction over disputes involving mineral
agreements under Sec. 77 (b) of RA 7942.
Macroasia not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction on appeal
On the related issue of estoppel, petitioner Celestial argues that Macroasia is estopped from
raising and questioning the issue of the jurisdiction of the POA and MAB over the petition for
cancellation of its mining lease contracts, when Macroasia raised it only in its Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration.
We rule that the principle of estoppel does not apply.
Indeed, Macroasia was not the one that initiated the instant case before the POA, and thus
was not the one that invoked the jurisdiction of the POA. Hence, on appeal, Macroasia is not
precluded from raising the issue of jurisdiction as it may be invoked even on appeal. 58 As a
matter of fact, a party can raise the issue of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceedings.
Petitioner Celestial’s reliance on Villela v. Gozun59 to support the contention that the POA has
jurisdiction to hear and decide a petition to cancel existing mining lease contracts, is misplaced.
In said case, we dismissed the petition on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies and disregarded judicial hierarchy as no compelling reason was shown to warrant
otherwise. While we pointed out the authority of the POA, there was no categorical
pronouncement on the jurisdictional issue.
No valid pronouncement of abandonment due to lack of jurisdiction over petition to

cancel
As we are not a trier of facts, we need not make any finding on the various investigations done
by the MGB and MAB on the issue of Macroasia’s non-compliance with its work obligations
and nonpayment of taxes and fees. Verily, the law does not impose automatic cancellation of
an existing mining lease contract, as it is a question of fact which must be determined by the
MGB which can recommend the cancellation of the mineral or lease agreements to the DENR
Secretary. Be that as it may, since the POA and MAB have no jurisdiction over the petition for
cancellation of existing mining lease contracts of Macroasia, they could not have made any
binding pronouncement that Macroasia had indeed abandoned the subject mining claims.
Besides, it is the DENR Secretary who has the authority to cancel Macroasia’s existing mining
lease contracts whether on grounds of abandonment or any valid grounds for cancellation.
Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 90828 not in accord with the law
With our resolution of the issue on the lack of jurisdiction of the POA and the MAB over petitions
to cancel existing mining lease contracts or mineral agreements, it is thus clear that the May
18, 2006 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 90828 must be nullified for being not in accord with the
law and the April 15, 2005 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 87931 must be upheld.
Notwithstanding the nullification of the May 18, 2006 Decision of the Special Tenth Division in
CA-G.R. SP No. 90828, the rendition of two conflicting decisions of the two CA Divisions over
the same challenged resolutions of the MAB should be avoided in the future as this is
anathema to stability of judicial decisions and orderly administration of justice.
The chronology of events reveals the following:
1. January 10, 2005 – petitioner Celestial filed its petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 87931
with the CA.
2. April 15, 2005 – the CA through its Twelfth Division rendered its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
87931 affirming the November 26, 2004 MAB Resolution.
3. July 12, 2005 – respondent Blue Ridge filed its petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90828
with the CA. It is clear that the Blue Ridge petition was filed with the CA three months after the
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 87931 was promulgated.
4. May 18, 2006 – the CA through its Special Tenth Division rendered its Decision setting aside
the November 26, 2004 and July 12, 2005 Resolutions of the MAB and reinstating the October
24, 2000 MAB Decision.
From these facts, the CA Special Tenth Division should have ordered the consolidation of the
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90828 by CA-G.R. SP No. 87931 pursuant to the Internal Rules of
the CA, the latter having the earlier docket number. Had it done so, then the occurrence of the
conflicting decisions could have been prevented. The CA Special Tenth Division should have
abided by our ruling in Nacuray v. NLRC, where we held, "Consequently, a division cannot and
should not review a case already passed upon by another Division of this Court. It is only
proper, to allow the case to take its rest after having attained finality."60
The CA should take the appropriate steps, including the adoption or amendment of the rules,
to see to it that cases or petitions arising from the same questioned decision, order, or
resolution are consolidated to steer clear of contrary or opposing decisions of the different CA
Divisions and ensure that incidents of similar nature will not be replicated.
G.R. No. 172936
No showing that the DENR Secretary gravely abused his discretion
Now, going to the substance of the petition in G.R. No. 172936. A scrutiny of the records shows
that the DENR Secretary did not gravely abuse his discretion in approving and signing MPSA
Nos. 220-2005-IVB and 221-2005-IVB in favor of Macroasia.
Petitioner Blue Ridge anchors its rights on the May 18, 2006 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
90828, which we have unfortunately struck down. Blue Ridge’s argument in assailing the
approval and issuance of the subject MPSAs that it has been accorded preferential right by
the CA has no leg to stand on.
The October 24, 2000 MAB Decision, nullified by the subsequent November 26, 2004
Resolution, is unequivocal that Blue Ridge was granted only "prior and preferential rights to
FILE its mining application over the same mining claims."61 What was accorded Blue Ridge
was only the right to file the mining application but with no assurance that the application will
be recommended for approval by the MGB and finally approved by the DENR Secretary.
Moreover, a preferential right would at most be an inchoate right to be given priority in the grant
of a mining agreement. It has not yet been transformed into a legal and vested right unless
approved by the MGB or DENR Secretary. Even if Blue Ridge has a preferential right over the
subject mining claims, it is still within the competence and discretion of the DENR Secretary to
grant mineral agreements to whomever he deems best to pursue the mining claims over and
above the preferential status given to Blue Ridge. Besides, being simply a preferential right, it
is ineffective to dissolve the pre-existing or subsisting mining lease contracts of Macroasia.
The DENR Secretary has full discretion in the grant of mineral agreements
Blue Ridge also argues that the Secretary gravely abused his discretion in approving the
subject MPSAs without Macroasia complying with the mandatory requirements for mineral
agreement applications under Sec. 35 of DENR AO 96-40. Petitioner specifically cited Sec. 36
of DENR AO 96-40 to the effect that "no Mineral Agreement shall be approved unless the
requirements under this section are fully complied with and any adverse
claim/protest/opposition thereto is finally resolved by the Panel of Arbitrators." Moreover, Blue
Ridge contends that the MPSAs were approved even prior to the issuance of the Compliance
Certificate62 by the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples under the OP, which is a
requisite pre-condition for the issuance of an MPSA.
We are not persuaded.
Blue Ridge cites Sec. 38 (not Sec. 36) of DENR AO 96-40 as basis for claiming that then
DENR Secretary Defensor committed grave abuse of discretion in granting MPSA Nos. 220-
2005-IVB and 221-2005-IVB to Macroasia. Petitioner’s postulation cannot be entertained for
the reason that the issuance of the mining agreements was not raised before the MGB Director
and DENR Secretary, nor was it amply presented before the CA. There is even a counter-
charge that Blue Ridge has not complied with the legal requirements for a mining application.
The rule is established that questions raised for the first time on appeal before this Court are
not proper and have to be rejected. Furthermore, the resolution of these factual issues would
relegate the Court to a trier of facts. The Blue Ridge plea is hindered by the factual issue bar
rule where factual questions are proscribed under Rule 65. Lastly, there was no exhaustion of
administrative remedies before the MGB and DENR. Thus, Blue Ridge’s petition must fail.
Primary jurisdiction of the DENR Secretary in determining whether to grant or not a mineral
agreement
Verily, RA 7942, similar to PD 463, confers exclusive and primary jurisdiction on the DENR
Secretary to approve mineral agreements, which is purely an administrative function within the
scope of his powers and authority. In exercising such exclusive primary jurisdiction, the DENR
Secretary, through the MGB, has the best competence to determine to whom mineral
agreements are granted. Settled is the rule that the courts will defer to the decisions of the
administrative offices and agencies by reason of their expertise and experience in the matters
assigned to them pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Administrative decisions on
matter within the jurisdiction of administrative bodies are to be respected and can only be set
aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law.63 Unless it is shown that the
then DENR Secretary has acted in a wanton, whimsical, or oppressive manner, giving undue
advantage to a party or for an illegal consideration and similar reasons, this Court cannot look
into or review the wisdom of the exercise of such discretion. Blue Ridge failed in this regard.
Delineation of powers and functions is accorded the three branches of government for the
smooth functioning of the different governmental services. We will not disturb nor interfere in
the exercise of purely administrative functions of the executive branch absent a clear showing
of grave abuse of discretion.
Without a restraining order or injunction, litigation will not deter the DENR from exercising its
functions
While it is true that the subject mining claims are under litigation, this does not preclude the
DENR and its Secretary from carrying out their functions and duties without a restraining order
or an injunctive writ. Otherwise, public interest and public service would unduly suffer by mere
litigation of particular issues where government interests would be unduly affected. In the
instant case, it must be borne in mind that the government has a stake in the subject mining
claims. Also, Macroasia had various valid existing mining lease contracts over the subject
mining lode claims issued by the DENR. Thus, Macroasia has an advantage over Blue Ridge
and Celestial insofar as the administrative aspect of pursuing the mineral agreements is
concerned.
WHEREFORE, the petitions under G.R. Nos. 169080, 172936, and 176229
are DISMISSED for lack of merit, while the petition under G.R. No. 176319 is
hereby GRANTED. The assailed April 15, 2005 Decision and August 3, 2005 Resolution of
the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 87931 are hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO. And the May 18, 2006
Decision and January 19, 2007 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 90828 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In view of the foregoing considerations, we find no grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the then DENR Secretary in the approval and issuance of MPSA
Nos. 220-2005-IVB and 221-2005-IVB. Costs against Celestial Nickel Mining Exploration
Corporation and Blue Ridge Mineral Corporation.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-36828 February 2, 1932

ARTURO V. ESCALANTE, petitioner,
vs.
PAULINO SANTOS, Director of Prisons, respondent.
Engracio F. Clemena for petitioner.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for respondent.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The present habeas corpus proceeding was instituted by Arturo V. Escalante, who is in Bilibid
Prison. On November 14, 1928, he was convicted of estafa and sentenced to two years,
eleven months, and eleven days of presidio correccional, to indemnify the offended party in
the sum of P4,836.53, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
This penalty is the minimum of the maximum degree of the penalty provided in article 534,
paragraph No. 3, of the Penal Code then in force, that is, presidio correctional in the minimum
and medium degrees, i.e., six months and one day to four years and two months of presidio
correctional, because the amount abstracted exceeds 6,250 pesetas.
Estafa in that amount (P4,836.53) not exceeding P6,000 is punished in the Revised Penal
Code, in force since the first of this year (article 315, paragraph 3), with a penalty ranging
from arresto mayor in the maximum degree to prision correctional in the minimum degree, i.
e., four months and one day to two years and four months of imprisonment.
The Attorney-General, recommending that the petition be granted and the petitioner set at
liberty, submits the following computations:
4. If the minimum of the maximum degree were to be imposed under the new Penal Code (it
being the grade imposed in the original decision of the Supreme Court), the computation of
the total term which petitioner has to serve is as follows:
Year Month Day

Minimum of the maximum 1 8 1
Subsidiary imprisonment ......... 6 20
2 2 21
The petitioner was also sentenced to 2

months and 16 days' imprisonment for a ......... 2 16
violation of conditional pardon
Total term to be
served . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 7
This total term does not include allowances for good conduct.
5. Petitioner entered Bilibid on January 17, 1929, and hence has already served more than
three years of imprisonment, which is more than the total term above computed.
6. If, on the other hand, the maximum of the maximum were to be imposed under the new
Penal Code (section 315, paragraph 3), the petitioner would be still be entitled to his discharge
because of allowances for good conduct which he can invoke in his favor, in accordance with
the records of the Bureau of Prisons. The computation of the penalty will then be as follows:
Year Month Day

Minimum of the maximum 2 4 ........
Subsidiary imprisonment ......... 9 10
Sentence for violation of conditional pardon ......... 2 16
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3 26
Good-conduct allowances to which entitled on

5 26
3 years, 1 month, 10 days
NET TERM to be served . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 10 .........
So that petitioner should have been released at all events on November 16, 1931.
7. In both cases, therefore, petitioner, having already served more than three years, is entitled
to be now discharged under the provisions of article 22 of the new Penal Code. (Pages 1, 2
and 3, Answer of the Attorney-General, Rollo.)
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, to which the Attorney-General refers, reads as follows:
ART. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect in so
far as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is
defined in rule 5 of article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws
a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. With referrence to
the application of prior laws, the Code provides the following:
ART. 366. Application of laws enacted prior to this Code. — Without prejudice to the provisions
contained in article 22 of this Code, felonies and misdemeanors, committed prior to the date
of effectiveness of this Code shall be punished in accordance with the Code or Acts in force at
the time of their commission.
Inasmuch as the law in this case is more favorable to the accused, and the latter has not been
shown to be an habitual criminal, article 315, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code now in
force must be applied to the estafa of which the petitioner was convicted; and inasmuch as he
has already served that penalty, he must be set at liberty immediately.
Some light is thrown on the intentioned of the new law with referrence to its being retroactive
when favorable to the accused, by the interpretation of its provisions by the chairman and a
member of the committee created to draft the present Revised Penal Code. Judge Anacleto
Diaz, the chairman of the committee, says the following in a communication addressed to
Justice George A. Malcolm of this court:
I was present when the proposed bill referred to was discussed in the Joint Committee as I
had been assigned to assist it in any way possible. I was present when the bill as amended by
the Joint Committee was finally submitted and approved by the two Houses, and I can
positively say that the two articles were accepted and passed without any discussion
whatsoever. In view of this, I believe that the two articles referred to must be construed, taking
into consideration not only their literal meaning but the purpose in view of the law-making body
that first approved art. 22 (art. 23, P.C. of Spain) as understood by the courts and the
authorities called upon to construe the same.
There seems to be no doubt that the purpose of art. 366 is to give the benefit of the retroactivity
of a penal law as expressly and unmistakably stated in art. 22 to any person that may be found
under the circumstances therein provided.
Representative Quintin Paredes, member of the committee in charge of drafting the new Code,
and also of the Committee for the Revision of Codes of the Eighteen Legislature, expresses
himself as follows upon the point in a communication likewise addressed to Justice Malcolm:
In reply to your letter of the 26th instant, just received yesterday, I wish to inform you that I
believe the members of the House Committee on Revision of Codes which introduced and
recommended the bill that was later enacted as the "Revised Penal Code" intended to give
said code retroactive effect in so far as it favor a person guilty of a felony, although at the time
of its enactment a final sentence has already been pronounced and the convict is serving the
same, provided that he is not an habitual criminal. To emphasize this intention, section 366
providing that "felonies and misdemeanors committed prior to the date of this code shall be
punished in accordance with the codes or acts in force at the time of their commission" was
preceded by the saving clause "without prejudice to the provisions contained in article 22 of
this Code," which to my mind means that while felonies and misdemeanors committed prior to
the date of effectiveness of the Revised Penal Code shall be punished in accordance with the
Code or Acts in force at the time of their commission, the same should not be the case if such
Code or Acts are unfavorable to the guilty party, for the general principle on the retroactivity of
favorable penal laws, recognized in article 22, should then apply.
And least it be doubted that article 22 of the Revised Penal Code applies to said Code,
Representative Quintin Paredes adds the following:
The use of the words "penal laws" in general, instead of "this Revised Penal Code and any
other penal laws" in article 22, may give room for a doubt as to whether said article meant to
include in the phrase "penal laws" the same Revised Penal Code that was establishing the
provision. But this doubt, I think, should not be entertained inasmuch as the Revised Penal
Code is itself a penal law and the phrase "penal laws" is broad enough to include all laws that
are penal in character.
As we have just held in the case of Laceste vs. Santos (page 472, ante), it is evident that the
principle that penal laws are retroactive so far as they favor the accused, is sanctioned by the
present as well as the former Penal Code.
The petition for habeas corpus being justified, it is hereby granted, and let the petitioner be at
once set at liberty, with cost de oficio. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Villa-Real and Imperial, JJ.,
concur.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 14129 July 31, 1962

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GUILLERMO MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.

Padilla Law Office for defendant-appellee.
REGALA, J.:
This is an appeal of the Solicitor General from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan dismissing the information against the defendant.
The records show that the statement of the case and the facts, as recited in the brief of plaintiff-
appellant, is complete and accurate. The same is, consequently, here adopted, to wit:
In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First Instance of
that Province, defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code. A preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted in the
finding a probable cause that the crime charged as committed by defendant. Thereafter, the
trial started upon defendant's plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information
on the ground that as justice of the peace the defendant is one of the officers enumerated in
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss holding
that a justice of the peace is within the purview Section 54. A second motion was filed by
defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in People
vs. Macaraeg, (CA-G.R. No. 15613-R, 54 Off. Gaz., pp. 1873-76) where it was held that a
justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
Acting on this second motion to dismiss, the answer of the prosecution, the reply of the defense,
and the opposition of the prosecution, the lower court dismissed the information against the
accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense.
Both parties are submitting this case upon the determination of this single question of law: Is
a justice the peace included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code?
Section 54 of the said Code reads:
No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the
Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no
classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any
manner in a election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public
peace, if he is a peace officer.
Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the peace is not comprehended among the officers
enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. He submits the aforecited section
was taken from Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, which provided the following:
SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. — No judge of the First Instance,
justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or employee
of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall
aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise
than exercising the right to vote.
When, therefore, section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the words "justice of the
peace," the omission revealed the intention of the Legislature to exclude justices of the peace
from its operation.
The above argument overlooks one fundamental fact. It is to be noted that under Section 449
of the Revised Administrative Code, the word "judge" was modified or qualified by the phrase
"of First instance", while under Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, no such modification
exists. In other words, justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the
Revised Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of
the First Instance and justice of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity
therefore to include justices of the peace in the enumeration because the legislature had
availed itself of the more generic and broader term, "judge." It was a term not modified by any
word or phrase and was intended to comprehend all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts
of First Instance, Judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial
Relations, and justices of the peace.
It is a well known fact that a justice of the peace is sometimes addressed as "judge" in this
jurisdiction. It is because a justice of the peace is indeed a judge. A "judge" is a public officer,
who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority (U.S. v. Clark, 25 Fed. Cas. 441,
422). According to Bouvier Law Dictionary, "a judge is a public officer lawfully appointed to
decide litigated questions according to law. In its most extensive sense the term includes all
officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justices
of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts."
A review of the history of the Revised Election Code will help to justify and clarify the above
conclusion.
The first election law in the Philippines was Act 1582 enacted by the Philippine Commission in
1907, and which was later amended by Act. Nos. 1669, 1709, 1726 and 1768. (Of these 4
amendments, however, only Act No. 1709 has a relation to the discussion of the instant case
as shall be shown later.) Act No. 1582, with its subsequent 4 amendments were later on
incorporated Chapter 18 of the Administrative Code. Under the Philippine Legislature, several
amendments were made through the passage of Acts Nos. 2310, 3336 and 3387. (Again, of
these last 3 amendments, only Act No. 3587 has pertinent to the case at bar as shall be seen
later.) During the time of the Commonwealth, the National Assembly passed Commonwealth
Act No. 23 and later on enacted Commonwealth Act No. 357, which was the law enforced until
June 1947, when the Revised Election Code was approved. Included as its basic provisions
are the provisions of Commonwealth Acts Nos. 233, 357, 605, 666, 657. The present Code
was further amended by Republic Acts Nos. 599, 867, 2242 and again, during the session of
Congress in 1960, amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 3036 and 3038. In the history of our election
law, the following should be noted:
Under Act 1582, Section 29, it was provided:
No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for elections, nor shall he be eligible during
the time that he holds said public office to election at any municipal, provincial or Assembly
election, except for reelection to the position which he may be holding, and no judge of the
First Instance, justice of the peace, provincial fiscal, or officer or employee of the Philippine
Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate or influence in any manner
or take part in any municipal, provincial, or Assembly election under the penalty of being
deprived of his office and being disqualified to hold any public office whatsoever for a term of
5 year: Provide, however, That the foregoing provisions shall not be construe to deprive any
person otherwise qualified of the right to vote it any election." (Enacted January 9, 1907; Took
effect on January 15, 1907.)
Then, in Act 1709, Sec. 6, it was likewise provided:
. . . No judge of the First Instance, Justice of the peace provincial fiscal or officer or employee
of the Bureau of Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate or
influence in any manner to take part in any municipal provincial or Assembly election. Any
person violating the provisions of this section shall be deprived of his office or employment and
shall be disqualified to hold any public office or employment whatever for a term of 5 years,
Provided, however, that the foregoing provisions shall not be construed to deprive any person
otherwise qualified of the right to vote at any election. (Enacted on August 31, 1907; Took
effect on September 15, 1907.)
Again, when the existing election laws were incorporated in the Administrative Code on March
10, 1917, the provisions in question read:
SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. — No judge of the First Instance,
justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or employee
of the Philippine Constabulary or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall
aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise
than exercising the right to vote. (Emphasis supplied)
After the Administrative Code, the next pertinent legislation was Act No. 3387. This Act reads:
SEC. 2636. Officers and employees meddling with the election. — Any judge of the First
Instance, justice of the peace, treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province, any officer or
employee of the Philippine Constabulary or of the police of any municipality, or any officer or
employee of any Bureau of the classified civil service, who aids any candidate or violated in
any manner the provisions of this section or takes part in any election otherwise by exercising
the right to vote, shall be punished by a fine of not less than P100.00 nor more than P2,000.00,
or by imprisonment for not less than 2 months nor more than 2 years, and in all cases by
disqualification from public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage for a period of 5 years.
(Approved December 3, 1927.) (Emphasis supplied.)
Subsequently, however, Commonwealth Act No. 357 was enacted on August 22, 1938. This
law provided in Section 48:
SEC. 48. Active Interventation of Public Officers and Employees. — No justice, judge, fiscal,
treasurer or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, the Constabulary of
the national, provincial, municipal or rural police, and no classified civil service officer or
employee shall aid any candidate, nor exert influence in any manner in any election nor take
part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace
officer.
This last law was the legislation from which Section 54 of the Revised Election Code was taken.
It will thus be observed from the foregoing narration of the legislative development or history
of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code that the first omission of the word "justice of the
peace" was effected in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code
as averred by defendant-appellee. Note carefully, however, that in the two instances when the
words "justice of the peace" were omitted (in Com. Act No. 357 and Rep. Act No. 180), the
word "judge" which preceded in the enumeration did not carry the qualification "of the First
Instance." In other words, whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First
Instance", the words "justice of the peace" would follow; however, if the law simply said "judge,"
the words "justice of the peace" were omitted.
The above-mentioned pattern of congressional phraseology would seem to justify the

conclusion that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in Rep. Act No.
180, it did not intend to exempt the said officer from its operation. Rather, it had considered
the said officer as already comprehended in the broader term "judge".
It is unfortunate and regrettable that the last World War had destroyed congressional records
which might have offered some explanation of the discussion of Com. Act No. 357 which
legislation, as indicated above, has eliminated for the first time the words "justice of the peace."
Having been completely destroyed, all efforts to seek deeper and additional clarifications from
these records proved futile. Nevertheless, the conclusions drawn from the historical
background of Rep. Act No. 180 is sufficiently borne out by reason hid equity.
Defendant further argues that he cannot possibly be among the officers enumerated in Section
54 inasmuch as under that said section, the word "judge" is modified or qualified by the phrase
"of any province." The last mentioned phrase, defendant submits, cannot then refer to a justice
of the peace since the latter is not an officer of a province but of a municipality.
Defendant's argument in that respect is too strained. If it is true that the phrase "of any
province" necessarily removes justices of the peace from the enumeration for the reason that
they are municipal and not provincial officials, then the same thing may be said of the Justices
of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals. They are national officials. Yet, can there
be any doubt that Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals are not included
in the prohibition? The more sensible and logical interpretation of the said phrase is that it
qualifies fiscals, treasurers and assessors who are generally known as provincial officers.
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-
appellee. Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be
held to have been omitted intentionally. If that rule is applicable to the present, then indeed,
justices of the peace must be held to have been intentionally and deliberately exempted from
the operation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim "casus omisus" can operate and
apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. In the case under
consideration, it has already been shown that the legislature did not exclude or omit justices
of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political
activities. Rather, they were merely called by another term. In the new law, or Section 54 of
the Revised Election Code, justices of the peace were just called "judges."
In insisting on the application of the rule of "casus omisus" to this case, defendant-appellee
cites authorities to the effect that the said rule, being restrictive in nature, has more particular
application to statutes that should be strictly construed. It is pointed out that Section 54 must
be strictly construed against the government since proceedings under it are criminal in nature
and the jurisprudence is settled that penal statutes should be strictly interpreted against the
state.
Amplifying on the above argument regarding strict interpretation of penal statutes, defendant
asserts that the spirit of fair play and due process demand such strict construction in order to
give "fair warning of what the law intends to do, if a certain line is passed, in language that the
common world will understand." (Justice Holmes, in McBoyle v. U.S., 283 U.S. 25, L. Ed. 816).
The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed from the mere fact that a case
is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or
thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons
already mentioned, there has been no such omission. There has only been a substitution of
terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the
interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be
considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. This has been recognized time
and again by decisions of various courts. (3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 56.) Thus,
cases will frequently be found enunciating the principle that the intent of the legislature will
govern (U.S. vs. Corbet, 215 U.S. 233). It is to be noted that a strict construction should not
be permitted to defeat the policy and purposes of the statute (Ash Sheep Co. v. U.S., 252 U.S.
159). The court may consider the spirit and reason of a statute, as in this particular instance,
where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the
clear purpose of the law makers (Crawford, Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294). A Federal
District court in the U.S. has well said:
The strict construction of a criminal statute does not mean such construction of it as to deprive
it of the meaning intended. Penal statutes must be construed in the sense which best
harmonizes with their intent and purpose. (U.S. v. Betteridge 43 F. Supp. 53, 56, cited in 3
Sutherland Statutory Construction 56.)
As well stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, the language of criminal statutes,
frequently, has been narrowed where the letter includes situations inconsistent with the
legislative plan (U.S. v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354; See also Ernest Brunchen, Interpretation of the
Written Law (1915) 25 Yale L.J. 129.)
Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the purpose of the
statute is to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, and various judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of
the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included in the prohibition under the old
statute, are now within its encompass. If such were the evident purpose, can the legislature
intend to eliminate the justice of the peace within its orbit? Certainly not. This point is fully
explained in the brief of the Solicitor General, to wit:
On the other hand, when the legislature eliminated the phrases "Judge of First Instance" and
justice of the peace", found in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, and used
"judge" in lieu thereof, the obvious intention was to include in the scope of the term not just
one class of judges but all judges, whether of first Instance justices of the peace or special
courts, such as judges of the Court of Industrial Relations. . . . .
The weakest link in our judicial system is the justice of the peace court, and to so construe the
law as to allow a judge thereof to engage in partisan political activities would weaken rather
than strengthen the judiciary. On the other hand, there are cogent reasons found in the
Revised Election Code itself why justices of the peace should be prohibited from electioneering.
Along with Justices of the appellate courts and judges of the Court of First Instance, they are
given authority and jurisdiction over certain election cases (See Secs. 103, 104, 117-123).
Justices of the peace are authorized to hear and decided inclusion and exclusion cases, and
if they are permitted to campaign for candidates for an elective office the impartiality of their
decisions in election cases would be open to serious doubt. We do not believe that the
legislature had, in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, intended to create such an
unfortunate situation. (pp. 708, Appellant's Brief.)
Another factor which fortifies the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the administrative
or executive department has regarded justices of the peace within the purview of Section 54
of the Revised Election Code.
In Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. v. The Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Justice, etc. (G.R. No.
L-12601), this Court did not give due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction against the respondents, for not setting aside, among others,
Administrative Order No. 237, dated March 31, 1957, of the President of the Philippines,
dismissing the petitioner as justice of the peace of Carmen, Agusan. It is worthy of note that
one of the causes of the separation of the petitioner was the fact that he was found guilty in
engaging in electioneering, contrary to the provisions of the Election Code.
Defendant-appellee calls the attention of this Court to House Bill No. 2676, which was filed on
January 25, 1955. In that proposed legislation, under Section 56, justices of the peace are
already expressly included among the officers enjoined from active political participation. The
argument is that with the filing of the said House Bill, Congress impliedly acknowledged that
existing laws do not prohibit justices of the peace from partisan political activities.
The argument is unacceptable. To begin with, House Bill No. 2676 was a proposed
amendment to Rep. Act No. 180 as a whole and not merely to section 54 of said Rep. Act No.
180. In other words, House Bill No. 2676 was a proposed re-codification of the existing election
laws at the time that it was filed. Besides, the proposed amendment, until it has become a law,
cannot be considered to contain or manifest any legislative intent. If the motives, opinions, and
the reasons expressed by the individual members of the legislature even in debates, cannot
be properly taken into consideration in ascertaining the meaning of a statute (Crawford,
Statutory Construction, Sec. 213, pp. 375-376), a fortiori what weight can We give to a mere
draft of a bill.
On law reason and public policy, defendant-appellee's contention that justices of the peace
are not covered by the injunction of Section 54 must be rejected. To accept it is to render
ineffective a policy so clearly and emphatically laid down by the legislature.
Our law-making body has consistently prohibited justices of the peace from participating in
partisan politics. They were prohibited under the old Election Law since 1907 (Act No. 1582
and Act No. 1709). Likewise, they were so enjoined by the Revised Administrative Code.
Another which expressed the prohibition to them was Act No. 3387, and later, Com. Act No.
357.
Lastly, it is observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the rule of
"expressio unius, est exclusion alterius" in arriving at the conclusion that justices of the peace
are not covered by Section 54. Said the Court of Appeals: "Anyway, guided by the rule of
exclusion, otherwise known as expressio unius est exclusion alterius, it would not be beyond
reason to infer that there was an intention of omitting the term "justice of the peace from Section
54 of the Revised Election Code. . . ."
The rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to exclude a justice of the peace
from the purview of Section 54, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals has given the
reason for the exclusion. Indeed, there appears no reason for the alleged change. Hence, the
rule of expressio unius est exclusion alterius has been erroneously applied. (Appellant's Brief,
p. 6.)
Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions to particular persons
or things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why other persons or things not so
enumerated should not have been included, and manifest injustice will follow by not so
including them, the maxim expressio unius est exclusion alterius, should not be invoked.
(Blevins v. Mullally 135 p. 307, 22 Cal. App. 519.) .
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set
aside and this case is remanded for trial on the merits.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Padilla and Dizon, JJ., took no part.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., is on leave.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-62636 April 27, 1984

ACTING COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF TAX APPEALS and CHARLES ANDRULIS, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Alentajan & Associates for respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: ñé +.£ ªw ph! 1
A proceeding for review on certiorari of the Decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals in
CTA Case No. 3201, which reversed the Decision of petitioner, the Acting Commissioner of
Customs, decreeing the forfeiture of various foreign currencies found in the possession of
private respondent (Charles Joseph Andrulis) for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 534, in
relation to section 2530(f) of the Revised Tariff and Customs Code.
On 20 February 1980, Andrulis representing himself as an American businessman "on joint

ventures with his Filipino counterparts", arrived in Manila and checked in at the Century Park
Sheraton Hotel. Two days later, or on 22 February 1980, he left the hotel surreptitiously without
paying for his bills in the amount of P2,000.00. Col. Felix Zerrudo, Chief Security Officer of the
Hotel, timely discovered the scheduled departure of Andrulis on that same day, and
immediately tipped-off the Customs authorities on Andrulis' intention to abscond. At the Manila
International Airport (MIA), the Customs authorities looked for Andrulis from among the
passengers who were already on board Philippine Airlines Flight No. 501 bound for Singapore.
Apprehensive, Andrulis locked himself inside the airplane's comfort room. In the course of
negotiations for him to come out, he slipped through an opening bills worth US$300.00.
Andrulis finally yielded to the authorities and surrendered the luggage he was carrying which,
when opened by the authorities, contained various foreign currencies consisting of
US$59,639.00; 53,100 Indonesian Rupiah, and Singapore $308.00.
A criminal charge was filed before the Office of the City Fiscal, Pasay City, for violation of CB
Circular No. 534 in relation to RA 265, the Central Bank Charter. On 10 March 1980, the
Assistant City Fiscal dismissed the charge on the rationalization that the Government had
failed to present evidence that the currencies were not brought in by Andrulis.
Proceedings for the seizure of the foreign currencies were also commenced at the Customs
Office of the MIA in Pasay City, docketed as Seizure Identification No. 416280.
During the hearing, Andrulis submitted the case for resolution on the basis of the following
documentary evidence: têñ.£î hqwâ£
1. Sworn Affidavit of Charles Joseph Andrulis, stating that the foreign exchange in question
are owned by claimant;
2. Resolution of the City Fiscal of Pasay City in I.S. No. 80-94112, entitled MIA Customhouse
vs. Charles Joseph Andrulis, dismissing the alleged charge of violation of Central Bank Circular
No. 534, in relation to Central Bank Circular No. 265, to show that there was no violation as
charged. 1
For its part, the prosecution submitted the case on the basis of the following: têñ.£îhqwâ £
A. Affidavit of Col. Felix A. Zerrudo (Ret.) Chief Security Officer of the Century Park Sheraton-
Manila Hotel, executed on February 29, 1980;
B. Certification issued by Col. Felix A. Zerrudo (Ret.) dated February 29, 1980;
C. Certification of Mr. Domingo J. Galicia, Acting Credit Manager of the Manila Hotel dated
February 28, 1980;
D. Letter of Demand dated July 9, 1979 issued by Robert L. Maniquiz, Credit and Collection
Manager of the Resort Hotels Corporation addressed to Mr. Charles Andrulis;
E. Sworn statement dated February 22, 1980 of Mr. Ramonchito Liongson, a Customs Officer,
who apprehended the various foreign currencies herein subject to seizure." 2
Items "C" and "D" above-listed tended to show that Andrulis had, on previous occasions, also
tried to abscond without payment of his bills from the Manila Hotel and the Pines Hotel in
Baguio.
On 3 June 1980, the Acting District Collector of Customs rendered a Decision, which found
Andrulis to have violated Central Bank Circular No. 534 in relation to section 2530(f) of the
Tariff and Customs Code, and decreed: têñ.£îhqwâ £
WHEREFORE, by authority of law vested in this Office, it is ordered and decreed that the
various foreign currencies confiscated from herein claimant, covered by SID No. 4162-80 be,
as they are hereby declared forfeited in favor of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, the same to be turned over to the Central Bank of the Philippines and exchanged
with their equivalent in Philippine pesos which shall be deposited with the National Treasury
and accounted for as Customs receipts.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all offices and parties concerned for their information
and guidance.
The Chief, Auction and Cargo Disposal Division, this Customhouse, shall inform this Office of
the action taken thereon.
SO ORDERED. 3
Andrulis appealed to the Acting Commissioner of Customs, who affirmed the same.
On 23 January 1981, Andrulis filed a Notice of Appeal and on 16 February 1981, a Petition for
Review with the Court of Tax Appeals, docketed as CTA Case No. 3201. On 30 June 1982,
respondent Court reversed the appealed Decision on the theory that the legal presumption of
ownership has to be accorded the possessor of the res, who need not be obliged to show or
prove it pursuant to Section 5(j) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court and Article 541 of the Civil
Code. The dispositive portion of the CTA Decision decreed: têñ.£îhqwâ £
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed and respondent ordered to effect the
restitution of the forfeited currencies to petitioner. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 4
On 10 September 1982, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the principal ground
that respondent Court had failed to consider that claimant Andrulis had the burden of proof to
show that the foreign currencies seized from him were brought into the Philippines by him. The
motion was denied on 2 December 1982. Hence, the instant Petition for Review on certiorari
by the Acting Commissioner of Customs represented by the Solicitor General.
The pertinent legal provisions provide: têñ.£îh qwâ£
Section 3. Unless specifically authorized by the Central Bank or allowed under existing
international agreements or Central Bank regulations, no person shall take or attempt to take
or transmit foreign exchanges, in any form, out of the Philippines, directly, through other
persons, through mails, or through international carriers;
The provisions of this section shall not apply to tourists and non-resident temporary visitors
who are taking or sending out of the Philippines their own foreign exchange brought in by them.
(CB Circular No. 534)
Section 2530. Property Subject to Forfeiture Under Tariff and Customs Law. — Any vehicle,
vessel or aircraft, cargo, article and other objects shall, under the following condition be subject
to forfeiture;
xxx xxx xxx têñ.£îhqw â£
(f) Any article the importation or exportation of which is effected or attempted contrary to law, or
any article of prohibited importation or exportation, and au other articles which, in the opinion
of the Collector, have been used, are or were entered to be used as instruments in the
importation or exportation of the former. (Emphais supplied)
5
In his defense, private respondent seeks refuge behind the exception in the aforequoted CB
Circular No. 534 giving tourists the right to take out of the Philippines their own foreign
exchange brought in by them. Private respondent also relies heavily on his acquittal in the
criminal charge filed against him for violation of CB Circular No. 534.
The core issue is who has the burden of proof in seizure or forfeiture proceedings? The
applicable law, Section 2535 of the Tariff and Customs Code, is explicit in this regard. têñ.£îh qwâ£
SEC. 2535. Burden of Proof in Seizure and/or Forfeiture. — In all proceedings taken for the
seizure and/or forfeiture of any vehicle, vessel, aircraft, beast or articles under the provisions
of the tariff and customs laws, the burden of proof shall lie upon the claimant: Provided, That
probable cause shall be first shown for the institution of such proceedings and that seizure
and/or forfeiture was made under the circumstances and in the manner described in the
preceding sections of this Code (Emphais ours).
6
Upon the facts of the case, the requirement of the law that the existence of probable cause
should first be shown before firing of the forfeiture proceedings, had been fully met. When
Andrulis was apprehended at the MIA and was found to have in his possession the various
foreign currencies, he could not produce the required Central Bank authorization allowing him
to bring them out of the country. This constituted prima facie evidence of infringement of the
provisions of CB Circular No. 534 and provided sufficient basis for the seizure 'of the said
foreign exchange. Probable cause having been shown, the burden of proof was upon Andrulis
to establish that he fell within the purview of the exception prescribed in the second paragraph
of the aforequoted Section 3 of CB Circular No. 534 in that he actually brought into the country
the foreign currencies and was just taking them out. This burden, Andrulis had failed to
7
satisfactorily discharge. The legal presumption in Section 5(j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court
and Article 541 of the Civil Code, relied upon by respondent Court, are of a general character
and cannot prevail over the specific provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code.
Aside from Andrulis' suspicious actuations when about to be apprehended on board the plane,
which cast doubt on his alleged bona fide possession of the foreign currencies, his bare
assertion in his Affidavit, claiming that "he came into the country with the intention of investing
here and of going into joint ventures with local counterparts" 8, has not been corroborated by
other convincing evidence. The observations of the Solicitor General on this point finds
relevance: têñ.£îh qwâ£
If it was really his intention to invest, he could have presented documents to support his
assertion. He could have produced papers required by the Government of foreigners intending
to invest in the Philippines. He could have presented as witnesses Filipino businessmen with
whom he entered into joint ventures or at least discussed the prospects thereof. He could at
the least have revealed the nature of the business he intended to engage in, the capital
requirements thereof, the situs of the business, the form of the entity he intended to form to
carry on the business, etc. He had done none of these.
Private respondent implies that the foreign currencies seized from him were intended to be
invested in business ventures in the Philippines. If this is so, why was it necessary for him to
have three kinds of currencies: US dollars, Indonesian Rupiah and Singapore dollars. Besides,
businessmen usually do not personally carry the cash which they intend to invest. They remit
them through the banks. 9
Andrulis' acquittal in the criminal charge before the City Fiscal's Office does not operate as res
judicata in a seizure or forfeiture proceeding. A distinction exists between the proceedings
before the Fiscal which are in personam since they are directed against the owner or holder of
the thing, whereas, a forfeiture proceeding is one in rem directed against the thing itself. têñ.£îhqwâ £
There is a split of authority as to whether a former conviction of a criminal offense based upon
the same facts amounts to a bar. ... The authorities are by no means agreed, however, that a
prior conviction for a Criminal charge bars an action for a forfeiture of property. Thus, it has
been held that since the forfeiture proceedings is one in rem under which the offense is
attached primarily to the thing rather than the offender, the forfeiture proceedings stands
independent of, and wholly unaffected by, any criminal proceeding in personam and is not
barred by a conviction of the individual under a criminal charge. 10
In a similar vein, it was also held in C.F. Sharp & Co., Inc. vs. Commissioner of Customs, 22 SCRA 765 (1968) that the result of
criminal proceedings in a separate case before a different tribunal, being dependent upon the evidence adduced therein, would not
necessarily influence the judgment in a forfeiture proceeding.
Finally, Andrulis contends that no foreign currency declaration is required of any incoming or
outgoing passenger and that it is not the intention of the Government to entrap unwary
foreigners. True, Resolution No. 594, dated 14 April 1969, of the Monetary Board, provides: têñ.£îhqw â£
Henceforth, no currency declaration of any kind shall be required either from outgoing or
incoming passengers. 11
However, tourists are not precluded from submitting proof, other than a currency declaration, to show the legitimate source of the
currency in their possession. Besides, Resolution No. 594 must be deemed superseded by Resolution No. 1412, dated 16 July 1976,
which requires that persons taking or transmitting or attempting to take or transmit foreign exchange out of the Philippines must
have authorization from the Central Bank allowing them to do so.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals, promulgated on 30 June

1982, is hereby reversed and set aside, and the Decision of the Acting Commissioner of
Customs, dated 15 December 1980, hereby ordered reinstated. No costs.
SO ORDERED. 1äwphï1 .ñët
Teehankee, (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 106719 September 21, 1993

DRA. BRIGIDA S. BUENASEDA, Lt. Col. ISABELO BANEZ, JR., ENGR. CONRADO REY
MATIAS, Ms. CORA S. SOLIS and Ms. ENYA N. LOPEZ, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY JUAN FLAVIER, Ombudsman CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, and NCMH
NURSES ASSOCIATION, represented by RAOULITO GAYUTIN, respondents.
Renato J. Dilag and Benjamin C. Santos for petitioners.
Danilo C. Cunanan for respondent Ombudsman.
Crispin T. Reyes and Florencio T. Domingo for private respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Principally, the petition seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman dated January 7, 1992,
directing the preventive suspension of petitioners,
Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda, Chief of Hospital III; Isabelo C. Banez, Jr., Administrative Officer III;
Conrado Rey Matias, Technical Assistant to the Chief of Hospital; Cora C. Solis, Accountant
III; and Enya N. Lopez, Supply Officer III, all of the National Center for Mental Health. The
petition also asks for an order directing the Ombudsman to disqualify Director Raul Arnaw and
Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero, of the Office of the Ombudsman, from participation in the
preliminary investigation of the charges against petitioner (Rollo, pp. 2-17; Annexes to
Petition, Rollo, pp. 19-21).
The questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative complaint filed with the
Ombudsman (OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) by the private respondents against the petitioners for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
According to the petition, the said order was issued upon the recommendation of Director Raul
Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero, without affording petitioners the opportunity to
controvert the charges filed against them. Petitioners had sought to disqualify Director Arnaw
and Investigator Villa-Rosero for manifest partiality and bias (Rollo, pp. 4-15).
On September 10, 1992, this Court required respondents' Comment on the petition.
On September 14 and September 22, 1992, petitioners filed a "Supplemental Petition (Rollo,
pp. 124-130); Annexes to Supplemental Petition; Rollo pp. 140-163) and an "Urgent
Supplemental Manifestation" (Rollo,
pp. 164-172; Annexes to Urgent Supplemental Manifestation; Rollo, pp. 173-176), respectively,
averring developments that transpired after the filing of the petition and stressing the urgency
for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.
On September 22, 1992, this Court ". . . Resolved to REQUIRE the respondents to MAINTAIN
in the meantime, the STATUS QUO pending filing of comments by said respondents on the
original supplemental manifestation" (Rollo, p. 177).
On September 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion to direct respondent Secretary of Health to
comply with the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 (Rollo, pp. 182-192, Annexes, pp. 192-
203). In a Resolution dated October 1, 1992, this Court required respondent Secretary of
Health to comment on the said motion.
On September 29, 1992, in a pleading entitled "Omnibus Submission," respondent NCMH

Nurses Association submitted its Comment to the Petition, Supplemental Petition and Urgent
Supplemental Manifestation. Included in said pleadings were the motions to hold the lawyers
of petitioners in contempt and to disbar them (Rollo, pp. 210-267). Attached to the "Omnibus
Submission" as annexes were the orders and pleadings filed in Administrative Case No. OBM-
ADM-0-91-1051 against petitioners (Rollo, pp. 268-480).
The Motion for Disbarment charges the lawyers of petitioners with:

(1) unlawfully advising or otherwise causing or inducing their clients — petitioners Buenaseda,
et al., to openly defy, ignore, disregard, disobey or otherwise violate, maliciously evade their
preventive suspension by Order of July 7, 1992 of the Ombudsman . . ."; (2) "unlawfully
interfering with and obstructing the implementation of the said order (Omnibus Submission, pp.
50-52; Rollo, pp. 259-260); and (3) violation of the Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and of unprofessional and unethical conduct "by foisting blatant lies, malicious
falsehood and outrageous deception" and by committing subornation of perjury, falsification
and fabrication in their pleadings (Omnibus Submission, pp. 52-54; Rollo, pp. 261-263).
On November 11, 1992, petitioners filed a "Manifestation and Supplement to 'Motion to Direct
Respondent Secretary of Health to Comply with 22 September 1992 Resolution'"
(Manifestation attached to Rollo without pagination between pp. 613 and 614 thereof).
On November 13, 1992, the Solicitor General submitted its Comment dated November 10,
1992, alleging that: (a) "despite the issuance of the September 22, 1992 Resolution directing
respondents to maintain the status quo, respondent Secretary refuses to hold in abeyance the
implementation of petitioners' preventive suspension; (b) the clear intent and spirit of the
Resolution dated September 22, 1992 is to hold in abeyance the implementation of petitioners'
preventive suspension, the status quo obtaining the time of the filing of the instant petition; (c)
respondent Secretary's acts in refusing to hold in abeyance implementation of petitioners'
preventive suspension and in tolerating and approving the acts of Dr. Abueva, the OIC
appointed to replace petitioner Buenaseda, are in violation of the Resolution dated September
22, 1992; and
(d) therefore, respondent Secretary should be directed to comply with the Resolution dated
September 22, 1992 immediately, by restoring the status quo ante contemplated by the
aforesaid resolution" (Comment attached to Rollo without paginations between pp. 613-614
thereof).
In the Resolution dated November 25, 1992, this Court required respondent Secretary to
comply with the aforestated status quo order, stating inter alia, that:
It appearing that the status quo ante litem motam, or the last peaceable uncontested status
which preceded the present controversy was the situation obtaining at the time of the filing of
the petition at bar on September 7, 1992 wherein petitioners were then actually occupying their
respective positions, the Court hereby ORDERS that petitioners be allowed to perform the
duties of their respective positions and to receive such salaries and benefits as they may be
lawfully entitled to, and that respondents and/or any and all persons acting under their authority
desist and refrain from performing any act in violation of the aforementioned Resolution of
September 22, 1992 until further orders from the Court (Attached to Rollo after p. 615 thereof).
On December 9, 1992, the Solicitor General, commenting on the Petition, Supplemental
Petition and Supplemental Manifestation, stated that (a) "The authority of the Ombudsman is
only to recommend suspension and he has no direct power to suspend;" and (b) "Assuming
the Ombudsman has the power to directly suspend a government official or employee, there
are conditions required by law for the exercise of such powers; [and] said conditions have not
been met in the instant case" (Attached to Rollo without pagination).
In the pleading filed on January 25, 1993, petitioners adopted the position of the Solicitor
General that the Ombudsman can only suspend government officials or employees connected
with his office. Petitioners also refuted private respondents' motion to disbar petitioners'
counsel and to cite them for contempt (Attached to Rollo without pagination).
The crucial issue to resolve is whether the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government
officials and employees working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending
the investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said officials and employees.
In upholding the power of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend petitioners, respondents

(Urgent Motion to Lift Status Quo, etc, dated January 11, 1993, pp. 10-11), invoke Section 24
of R.A. No. 6770, which provides:
Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend
any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the
evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the
charge would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office
may prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of
Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the
disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or
petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in
computing the period of suspension herein provided.
Respondents argue that the power of preventive suspension given the Ombudsman under
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 was contemplated by Section 13 (8) of Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that the Ombudsman shall exercise such other power or perform
such functions or duties as may be provided by law."
On the other hand, the Solicitor General and the petitioners claim that under the 1987
Constitution, the Ombudsman can only recommend to the heads of the departments and other
agencies the preventive suspension of officials and employees facing administrative
investigation conducted by his office. Hence, he cannot order the preventive suspension
himself.
They invoke Section 13(3) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the Office of the
Ombudsman shall have inter alia the power, function, and duty to:
Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at
fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution, and
ensure compliance therewith.
The Solicitor General argues that under said provision of the Constitutions, the Ombudsman
has three distinct powers, namely: (1) direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action
against public officials or employees at fault; (2) recommend their removal, suspension,
demotion fine, censure, or prosecution; and (3) compel compliance with the recommendation
(Comment dated December 3, 1992, pp. 9-10).
The line of argument of the Solicitor General is a siren call that can easily mislead, unless one
bears in mind that what the Ombudsman imposed on petitioners was not a punitive but only a
preventive suspension.
When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power "to recommend the suspension"
of a public official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to "suspension," as a punitive measure.
All the words associated with the word "suspension" in said provision referred to penalties in
administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of Noscitor a sociis,
the word "suspension" should be given the same sense as the other words with which it is
associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct
construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or
with which it is associated (Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 371 [1945]; Caltex (Phils.)
Inc. v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 [1966]).
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend
public officials and employees facing administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a
penal statute. The preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with the requisites
therein set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the administrative charges.
Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly authorized to recommend to the

appropriate official the discipline or prosecution of erring public officials or employees. In order
to make an intelligent determination whether to recommend such actions, the Ombudsman
has to conduct an investigation. In turn, in order for him to conduct such investigation in an
expeditious and efficient manner, he may need to suspend the respondent.
The need for the preventive suspension may arise from several causes, among them, the
danger of tampering or destruction of evidence in the possession of respondent; the
intimidation of witnesses, etc. The Ombudsman should be given the discretion to decide when
the persons facing administrative charges should be preventively suspended.
Penal statutes are strictly construed while procedural statutes are liberally construed (Crawford,
Statutory Construction, Interpretation of Laws, pp. 460-461; Lacson v. Romero, 92 Phil. 456
[1953]). The test in determining if a statute is penal is whether a penalty is imposed for the
punishment of a wrong to the public or for the redress of an injury to an individual (59 Corpuz
Juris, Sec. 658; Crawford, Statutory Construction, pp. 496-497). A Code prescribing the
procedure in criminal cases is not a penal statute and is to be interpreted liberally (People v.
Adler, 140 N.Y. 331; 35 N.E. 644).
The purpose of R.A. No. 6770 is to give the Ombudsman such powers as he may need to
perform efficiently the task committed to him by the Constitution. Such being the case, said
statute, particularly its provisions dealing with procedure, should be given such interpretation
that will effectuate the purposes and objectives of the Constitution. Any interpretation that will
hamper the work of the Ombudsman should be avoided.
A statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution should be liberally

construed for the advancement of the purposes and objectives for which it was created (Cf.
Department of Public Utilities v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas. Co., 200 Ark. 983, 142 S.W. (2d)
213 [1940]; Wallace v. Feehan, 206 Ind. 522, 190 N.E., 438 [1934]).
In Nera v. Garcia, 106 Phil. 1031 [1960], this Court, holding that a preventive suspension is
not a penalty, said:
Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such investigation,

the charges are established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his
removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty.
To support his theory that the Ombudsman can only preventively suspend respondents in
administrative cases who are employed in his office, the Solicitor General leans heavily on the
phrase "suspend any officer or employee under his authority" in Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770.
The origin of the phrase can be traced to Section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code,
which dealt with preventive suspension and which authorized the chief of a bureau or office to
"suspend any subordinate or employee in his bureau or under his authority pending an
investigation . . . ."
Section 34 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2266), which superseded Section 694 of
the Revised Administrative Code also authorized the chief of a bureau or office to "suspend
any subordinate officer or employees, in his bureau or under his authority."
However, when the power to discipline government officials and employees was extended to
the Civil Service Commission by the Civil Service Law of 1975 (P.D. No. 805), concurrently
with the President, the Department Secretaries and the heads of bureaus and offices, the
phrase "subordinate officer and employee in his bureau" was deleted, appropriately leaving
the phrase "under his authority." Therefore, Section 41 of said law only mentions that the
proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend "any subordinate officer or employee
under his authority pending an investigation . . ." (Sec. 41).
The Administrative Code of 1987 also empowered the proper disciplining authority to
"preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation" (Sec. 51).
The Ombudsman Law advisedly deleted the words "subordinate" and "in his bureau," leaving
the phrase to read "suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation . . . ." The conclusion that can be deduced from the deletion of the word
"subordinate" before and the words "in his bureau" after "officer or employee" is that the
Congress intended to empower the Ombudsman to preventively suspend all officials and
employees under investigation by his office, irrespective of whether they are employed "in his
office" or in other offices of the government. The moment a criminal or administrative complaint
is filed with the Ombudsman, the respondent therein is deemed to be "in his authority" and he
can proceed to determine whether said respondent should be placed under preventive
suspension.
In their petition, petitioners also claim that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he issued the suspension order without
affording petitioners the opportunity to confront the charges against them during the
preliminary conference and even after petitioners had asked for the disqualification of Director
Arnaw and Atty. Villa-Rosero (Rollo, pp. 6-13). Joining petitioners, the Solicitor General
contends that assuming arguendo that the Ombudsman has the power to preventively
suspend erring public officials and employees who are working in other departments and
offices, the questioned order remains null and void for his failure to comply with the requisites
in Section 24 of the Ombudsman Law (Comment dated December 3, 1992, pp. 11-19).
Being a mere order for preventive suspension, the questioned order of the Ombudsman was
validly issued even without a full-blown hearing and the formal presentation of evidence by the
parties. In Nera, supra, petitioner therein also claimed that the Secretary of Health could not
preventively suspend him before he could file his answer to the administrative complaint. The
contention of petitioners herein can be dismissed perfunctorily by holding that the suspension
meted out was merely preventive and therefore, as held in Nera, there was "nothing improper
in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before tho charges against him are
heard . . . (Nera v. Garcia., supra).
There is no question that under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the Ombudsman cannot order
the preventive suspension of a respondent unless the evidence of guilt is strong and (1) the
charts against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct
or neglect in the performance of duty; (2) the charge would warrant removal from the service;
or (3) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
The same conditions for the exercise of the power to preventively suspend officials or
employees under investigation were found in Section 34 of R.A. No. 2260.
The import of the Nera decision is that the disciplining authority is given the discretion to decide
when the evidence of guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770,
which expressly left such determination of guilt to the "judgment" of the Ombudsman on the
basis of the administrative complaint. In the case at bench, the Ombudsman issued the order
of preventive suspension only after: (a) petitioners had filed their answer to the administrative
complaint and the "Motion for the Preventive Suspension" of petitioners, which incorporated
the charges in the criminal complaint against them (Annex 3, Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp.
288-289; Annex 4, Rollo,
pp. 290-296); (b) private respondent had filed a reply to the answer of petitioners, specifying
23 cases of harassment by petitioners of the members of the private respondent (Annex 6,
Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 309-333); and (c) a preliminary conference wherein the
complainant and the respondents in the administrative case agreed to submit their list of
witnesses and documentary evidence.
Petitioners herein submitted on November 7, 1991 their list of exhibits (Annex 8 of Omnibus
Submission, Rollo, pp. 336-337) while private respondents submitted their list of exhibits
(Annex 9 of Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 338-348).
Under these circumstances, it can not be said that Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy
de Villa-Rosero acted with manifest partiality and bias in recommending the suspension of
petitioners. Neither can it be said that the Ombudsman had acted with grave abuse of
discretion in acting favorably on their recommendation.
The Motion for Contempt, which charges the lawyers of petitioners with unlawfully causing or
otherwise inducing their clients to openly defy and disobey the preventive suspension as
ordered by the Ombudsman and the Secretary of Health can not prosper (Rollo, pp. 259-261).
The Motion should be filed, as in fact such a motion was filed, with the Ombudsman. At any
rate, we find that the acts alleged to constitute indirect contempt were legitimate measures
taken by said lawyers to question the validity and propriety of the preventive suspension of
their clients.
On the other hand, we take cognizance of the intemperate language used by counsel for
private respondents hurled against petitioners and their counsel (Consolidated: (1) Comment
on Private Respondent" "Urgent Motions, etc.;
(2) Adoption of OSG's Comment; and (3) Reply to Private Respondent's Comment and
Supplemental Comment, pp. 4-5).
A lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client's cause. The language of a lawyer,
both oral or written, must be respectful and restrained in keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession and with his behavioral attitude toward his brethren in the profession (Lubiano v.
Gordolla, 115 SCRA 459 [1982]). The use of abusive language by counsel against the
opposing counsel constitutes at the same time a disrespect to the dignity of the court of justice.
Besides, the use of impassioned language in pleadings, more often than not, creates more
heat than light.
The Motion for Disbarment (Rollo, p. 261) has no place in the instant special civil action, which
is confined to questions of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion for the purpose of relieving
persons from the arbitrary acts of judges and quasi-judicial officers. There is a set of procedure
for the discipline of members of the bar separate and apart from the present special civil action.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the Status quo ordered to be maintained in the
Resolution dated September 22, 1992 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo,
Puno and Vitug, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
BELLOSILLO, J., concurring:
I agree that the Ombudsman has the authority, under Sec. 24 of R.A.
No. 6770, to preventively suspend any government official or employee administratively
charged before him pending the investigation of the complaint, the reason being that
respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the prosecution of the case.
However, in the case before us, I am afraid that the facts thus far presented may not provide
adequate basis to reasonably place petitioners under preventive suspension. For, it is not
enough to rule that the Ombudsman has authority to suspend petitioners preventively while
the case is in progress before him. Equally important is the determination whether it is
necessary to issue the preventive suspension under the circumstances. Regretfully, I cannot
see any sufficient basis to justify the preventive suspension. That is why, I go for granting oral
argument to the parties so that we can truthfully determine whether the preventive suspension
of respondents are warranted by the facts. We may be suspending key government officials
and employees on the basis merely of speculations which may not serve the ends of justice
but which, on the other hand, deprive them of their right to due process. The simultaneous
preventive suspension of top officials and employees of the National Center for Mental Health
may just disrupt, the hospital's normal operations, much to the detriment of public service. We
may safely assume that it is not easy to replace them in their respective functions as those
substituting them may be taking over for the first time. The proper care of mental patients may
thus be unduly jeopardized and their lives and limbs imperilled.
I would be amenable to holding oral argument to hear the parties if only to have enough factual
and legal bases to justify the preventive suspension of petitioners.
# Separate Opinions
BELLOSILLO, J., concurring:
I agree that the Ombudsman has the authority, under Sec. 24 of R.A.
No. 6770, to preventively suspend any government official or employee administratively
charged before him pending the investigation of the complaint, the reason being that
respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the prosecution of the case.
However, in the case before us, I am afraid that the facts thus far presented may not provide
adequate basis to reasonably place petitioners under preventive suspension. For, it is not
enough to rule that the Ombudsman has authority to suspend petitioners preventively while
the case is in progress before him. Equally important is the determination whether it is
necessary to issue the preventive suspension under the circumstances. Regretfully, I cannot
see any sufficient basis to justify the preventive suspension. That is why, I go for granting oral
argument to the parties so that we can truthfully determine whether the preventive suspension
of respondents are warranted by the facts. We may be suspending key government officials
and employees on the basis merely of speculations which may not serve the ends of justice
but which, on the other hand, deprive them of their right to due process. The simultaneous
preventive suspension of top officials and employees of the National Center for Mental Health
may just disrupt, the hospital's normal operations, much to the detriment of public service. We
may safely assume that it is not easy to replace them in their respective functions as those
substituting them may be taking over for the first time. The proper care of mental patients may
thus be unduly jeopardized and their lives and limbs imperilled.
I would be amenable to holding oral argument to hear the parties if only to have enough factual
and legal bases to justify the preventive suspension of petitioners.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 141314 April 9, 2003
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ENERGY REGULATORY

BOARD, petitioner,
vs.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, respondent.
x-----------------------------x
G.R. No. 141369 April 9, 2003
LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP) consisting of CEFERINO

PADUA, Chairman, G. FULTON ACOSTA, GALILEO BRION, ANATALIA
BUENAVENTURA, PEDRO CASTILLO, NAPOLEON CORONADO, ROMEO ECHAUZ,
FERNANDO GAITE, ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, ROGELIO KARAGDAG, JR., MA. LUZ
ARZAGA-MENDOZA, ANSBERTO PAREDES, AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, MARIO REYES,
EMMANUEL SANTOS, RUDEGELIO TACORDA, members, and ROLANDO ARZAGA,
Secretary-General, JUSTICE ABRAHAM SARMIENTO, SENATOR AQUILINO
PIMENTEL, JR. and COMMISSIONER BARTOLOME FERNANDEZ, JR., Board of
Consultants, and Lawyer GENARO LUALHATI, petitioners,
vs.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO), respondent.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
The business and operations of a public utility are imbued with public interest. In a very real
sense, a public utility is engaged in public service-- providing basic commodities and services
indispensable to the interest of the general public. For this reason, a public utility submits to
the regulation of government authorities and surrenders certain business prerogatives,
including the amount of rates that may be charged by it. It is the imperative duty of the State
to interpose its protective power whenever too much profits become the priority of public
utilities.
For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Manila Electric Company
(MERALCO) on December 5, 2002 from the decision of this Court dated November 15, 2002
reducing MERALCO's rate adjustment in the amount of P0.017 per kilowatthour (kwh) for its
billing cycles beginning 1994 and further directing MERALCO to credit the excess average
amount of P0.167 per kwh to its customers starting with MERALCO's billing cycles beginning
February 1994.1
First, we leapfrog through the facts. On December 23, 1993, MERALCO filed with the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for revised rates, with an average increase of P0.21
per kwh in its distribution charge. On January 28, 1994 the ERB granted a provisional
increase of P0.184 per kwh subject to the condition that in the event the ERB determines that
MERALCO is entitled to a lesser increase in rates, all excess amounts collected by MERALCO
shall be refunded to its customers or credited in their favor. The Commission on Audit (COA)
conducted an examination of the books of accounts and records of MERALCO and thereafter
recommended, among others, that: (1) income taxes paid by MERALCO should not be
included as part of MERALCO's operating expenses and (2) the "net average investment
method" or the "number of months use method" should be applied in determining the
proportionate value of the properties used by MERALCO during the test year.
In its decision dated February 16, 1998, the ERB adopted the recommendations of the
COA and authorized MERALCO to adopt a rate adjustment of P0.017 per kilowatthour
(kwh) for its billing cycles beginning 1994. The ERB further directed MERALCO to credit the
excess average amount of P0.167 per kwh to its customers starting with MERALCO's billing
cycles beginning February 1994. The said ruling of the ERB was affirmed by this Court in its
decision dated November 15, 2002.
In its Motion for Reconsideration, respondent MERALCO contends that: (1) the deduction of
income tax from revenues allowed for rate determination of public utilities is part of its
constitutional right to property; (2) it correctly used the "average investment method" or the
"simple average" in computing the value of its properties entitled to a return instead of the "net
average investment method" or the "number of months use method"; and (3) the decision of
the ERB ordering the refund of P0.167 per kwh to its customers should not be given retroactive
effect.2
The Republic of the Philippines through the ERB, now Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC),
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Comment on March 7, 2003.
Surprisingly, in its Comment, the ERC proffered a divergent view from the Office of the Solicitor
General. The ERC submits that income taxes are not operating expenses but are reasonable
costs that may be recoverable from the consuming public. While the ERC admits that "there is
still no categorical determination on whether income tax should indeed be deducted from
revenues of a public utility," it agrees with MERALCO that to disallow public utilities from
recovering its income tax payments will effectively lower the return on rate base enjoyed by a
public utility to 8%. The ERC, however, agrees with this Court's ruling that the use of the "net
average investment method" or the "number of months use method" is not unreasonable.3
The Office of the Solicitor General, under its solemn duty to protect the interests of the people,
defended the thesis that income tax payments by a public utility should not be recovered as
costs from the consuming public. It contended that: (1) the foreign jurisprudence cited by
MERALCO in support of its position is not applicable in this jurisdiction; (2) MERALCO was
given a fair rate of return; (3) the COA and the ERB followed the National Accounting and
Auditing Manual which expressly disallows the treatment of income tax as operating expense;
(4) Executive Order No. 72 does not grant electric utilities the privilege of treating income tax
as operating expense; (5) the COA and the ERB have been consistent in not allowing income
tax as part of operating expenses; (6) ERB decisions allowing the application of a tax recovery
clause are inapropos; (7) allowing MERALCO to treat income tax as an operating expense
would set a dangerous precedent; (8) assuming that the disallowance of income tax as
operating expense would discourage foreign investors and lenders, the government is not
precluded from enacting laws and instituting measures to lure them back; and (9) the findings
and conclusions of the ERB carry great weight and should be binding on the courts in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion. The Solicitor General agrees with the ERC that the "net
average investment method" is a reasonable method for property valuation. Finally, the
Solicitor General argues that the ERB decision may be applied retroactively and the use of a
test period to determine the rate base and allowable rates to be collected by a public utility is
an accepted practice.4
We shall discuss the main issues in seriatim.
MERALCO argues that deduction of all kinds of taxes, including income tax, from the gross
revenues of a public utility is firmly entrenched in American jurisprudence. It contends that the
Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 146) was patterned after Act 2306 of the Philippine
Commission, which, in turn, was borrowed from American state public utility laws such as the
New Jersey Public Utility Act. Hence, it maintains that American jurisprudence on the inclusion
of income taxes as a lawful charge to operating expenses should be controlling. It cites the
rule on statutory construction that a statute adopted from a foreign country will be presumed
to be adopted with the construction placed upon it by the courts of that country before its
adoption.5
We are not persuaded. American decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in this
jurisdiction. At best, they are persuasive for no court holds a patent on correct decisions. Our
laws must be construed in accordance with the intention of our own lawmakers and such intent
may be deduced from the language of each law and the context of other local legislation related
thereto. More importantly, they must be construed to serve our own public interest which is the
be-all and the end-all of all our laws. And it need not be stressed that our public interest is
distinct and different from others.
Rate regulation calls for a careful consideration of the totality of facts and circumstances
material to each application for an upward rate revision. Rate regulators should strain to strike
a balance between the clashing interests of the public utility and the consuming public and the
balance must assure a reasonable rate of return to public utilities without being unreasonable
to the consuming public. What is reasonable or unreasonable depends on a calculus of
changing circumstances that ebb and flow with time. Yesterday cannot govern today, no more
than today can determine tomorrow.
Prescinding from these premises, we reject MERALCO's insistence that the non-inclusion of
income tax payments as a legitimate operating expense will deny public utilities a fair return of
their investment. This stubborn stance is belied by the report submitted by the COA on the
audit conducted on MERALCO's books of accounts and the findings of the ERB.6
Upon the instructions of the ERB, the COA conducted an audit of the operations of MERALCO
covering the period from February 1, 1994 to January 31, 1995, or the period immediately after
the implementation of the provisional rate increase.7 Hence, amounts culled by the COA from
its examination of the books of MERALCO already included the provisional rate increase of
P0.184 granted by the ERB.
From the figures submitted by the COA, the ERB was able to determine that MERALCO
derived excess revenue during the test year in the amount of P2,448,378,000.8 This means
that during the test year, and after the rates were increased by P0.184, MERALCO
earned P2,448,378,000 or 8.15% more than the amount it should have earned at a 12% rate
of return on rate base. Accordingly, based on this amount of excess revenue, the ERB
determined that the provisional rate granted by it to MERALCO was P0.167 per kwh more than
the amount MERALCO ought to charge its customers to obtain the prescribed 12% rate of
return on rate base. Thus, the ERB correspondingly lowered the provisional increase
by P0.167 per kwh and ordered MERALCO to increase its rates at a reduced amount
of P0.017 per kwh, computed as follows:9
At appraised value
Total Invested Capital Entitled P 30,059,614,00010
to Return
12% return thereon P 3,607,154,000
Add: Total Operating expenses P 38,260,420,00011
for Rate Determination
Purposes P 41,867,573,000
Computed Revenue
Actual Revenue P 44,315,951,000
Excess Revenue P 2,448,378,000
Percent of Excess Revenue to 8.15%
Invested Capital
Authorized Rate of Return 12.00%
Actual Rate of Return 20.15%
Total kwh sold 14,640,094,000
Ratio of Excess Revenue to
Total kwh Sold P 0.167
In fact, even if MERALCO's income tax liability would be included as an operating expense,
MERALCO would still enjoy excess revenue of P312,738,000.00 or 1.04% above the
authorized rate of return of 12%. Based on its audit, the COA determined that the provision for
income tax liability of MERALCO amounted to P2,135,639,000.00.12 Thus, even if such amount
of income tax liability would be included as operating expense, the amount of excess revenue
earned by MERALCO during the test year would be more than sufficient to cover the additional
income tax expense. Thus:
At appraised
value
Total Invested Capital Entitled to Return P 30,059,614,000
12% return thereon P 3,607,154,000
Add: Total Operating expenses for Rate P
Determination Purposes 40,396,059,00013
Computed Revenue P 44,003,213,000
Actual Revenue P 44,315,951,000
Excess Revenue P 312,738,000
Percent of Excess Revenue to Invested 1.04%
Capital
Authorized Rate of Return 12.00%
Actual Rate of Return 13.04%
It is crystal clear, therefore, that even if income tax is to be included as an operating expense
and hence, recoverable from the consuming public, MERALCO would still enjoy a rate of return
that is above the authorized rate of 12%. Public utilities cannot be allowed to overcharge at
the expense of the public and worse, they cannot complain that they are not overcharging
enough.
Be that as it may, MERALCO contends that considering income tax payments of public utilities
constitute one-third of their net income, public utilities will effectively get, not the 12% rate of
return on rate base allowed them, but only about 8%.14 Again, we are not persuaded.
The foregoing argument assumes that the 12% return allowed to public utilities is equivalent
to its taxable income which will be subject to income tax. The 12% rate of return is
computed only for the purpose of fixing the allowable rates to be charged by a public utility and
is in no way determinative of the income subject to income tax of the public utility. The
computation of a corporation's income tax liability is an altogether different matter, with the
corporation's taxable income derived by taking into account the corporation's gross revenues
less allowable deductions.15
At any rate, even on the assumption that in the test year involved (February 1, 1994 to January
31, 1995), MERALCO's computed revenue of P 41,867,573,000 or the amount that it is allowed
to earn based on a 12% rate of return is its taxable income, after payment of its income tax
liability of P2,135,639,000.00, MERALCO would still obtain an 11.38% rate of return or a return
that is well within the 12% rate allowed to public utilities.16
MERALCO also contends that even the successor of the ERB or the ERC created under the
Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA)17 "adheres to the principle that income
tax is part of operating expense."18 To bolster its argument, MERALCO cites Article 36 of the
EPIRA which charges the ERC with the responsibility of unbundling the rates of the National
Power Corporation (NPC) and each distribution utility coming within the coverage of the
law.19 MERALCO alleges that pursuant to said provision, the ERC issued a set of Uniform Rate
Filing Requirements (UFR) containing guidelines to be followed with respect to rate unbundling
applications to be filed. MERALCO asserts that under the UFR, the enumeration of the
expenses which are to be recovered through the rates, and which are to be separated or
allocated for the purpose of unbundling of these rates include income tax expenses.
Under Section 36 of the EPIRA, the NPC and every distribution facility covered by the law is
mandated to unbundle, segregate or itemize its rates according to the various sectors of the
electric power industry identified in the law, namely: generation, transmission, distribution and
supply.20 The law further directs the ERC to regulate and facilitate the unbundling of rates
prescribed by Section 36. Thus, on October 30, 2001, the ERC issued guidelines prescribing
the uniform rate filing requirements to be followed by distribution facilities for the purposes of
unbundling rates.21
A proper appreciation of the UFR shows that it simply specifies a uniform accounting system
to be complied with by a distribution facility when filing an application for revised rates under
the EPIRA. As the EPIRA requires the unbundling or segregation of rates according to the
different sectors of the electric power industry, the UFR seeks to facilitate this process by
properly identifying the accounts or information required for proper evaluation by the ERB.
Thus, the introductory statements of the UFR provide:
These uniform rate filing requirements are intended to promote consistency and completeness
in the rate filings required by Republic Act No. 9136 (RA 9136), Section 36. To that end, the
filing requirements only specify minimum form and content. A rate application in all its aspects
continues to be subject to subsequent Commission review and deliberation.22
At the onset, it is clear that the UFR does not seek to determine which accounting method will
be used by the ERC for determination of rate base or the items of expenses that may be
recovered by a public utility from its customers. The UFR only seeks to prescribe a uniform
system or format to standardize or facilitate the process of unbundling of rates mandated by
the EPIRA. At best, the UFR prescribes the set of raw data or figures to be disclosed by a
distribution facility that the ERC will need to determine the authorized rates that a distribution
facility may charge. The UFR does not, in any way, determine the manner by which the set of
data or figures indicated in the rate application will be evaluated by the ERC for rate
determination purposes.
II
MERALCO also challenges the use of the "net average investment method" or the "number of
months use method" on the ground that MERALCO and the Public Service Commission (PSC)
have been consistently applying the "average investment method" or "simple average", which
it alleged was also affirmed by this Court in the case of MERALCO v. PSC23 and Republic v.
Medina.24
It is true that in MERALCO v. PSC,25 the issue of the proper valuation method to be used in
determining the value of MERALCO's utility plants for rate fixing purposes was brought to fore.
In the said case, MERALCO applied the "average investment method" or "simple average" by
obtaining the average value of the utility plants, using its values at the beginning and at the
end of the test year. In contrast, the General Auditing Office used the "appraisal method" which
fixes the value of the utility plants by ascertaining the cost of production per kilowatt and
multiplying the same by the total capacity of said plants, less the corresponding
depreciation.26 In upholding the "average investment method" used by MERALCO, this Court
adopted the findings of the PSC for being "by and large, supported by the records of the
case."27 This Court did not make an independent assessment of the validity or applicability of
the average investment method but simply did not disturb the findings of the PSC for being
supported by substantial evidence. To conclude that the said decision "affirmed" the use of the
"average investment method" thereby implying that the said method is the only method to be
applied in all instances, is a strained reading of the decision.
In fact, in the case of Republic v. Medina,28 also cited by MERALCO to have affirmed the use
of the "average investment method", this Court ruled:
The decided weight of authority, however, is to the effect that property valuation is not to be
solved by formula but depends upon the particular circumstances and relevant facts affecting
each utility as to what constitutes a just rate base and what would be a fair return, just to both
the utility and the public.29
Further, Mr. Justice Castro in his concurring opinion in the same case elucidated:
A regulatory commission's field of inquiry, however, is not confined to the computation of the
cost of service or capital nor to a mere prognostication of the future behavior of the money and
capital markets. It must also balance investor and consumer expectations in such a way that
broad requirements of public interest may be meaningfully realized. It would hence appear in
keeping with its public duty if a regulatory body is allowed wide discretion in the choice of
methods rationally related to the achievement of this end.30
Thus, the rule then as it is now, is that rate regulating authorities are not hidebound to use any
single formula or combination of formulas for property valuation purposes because the rate-
making process involves the balancing of investor and consumer interests which takes into
account various factors that may be unique or peculiar to a particular rate revision application.
We again stress the long established doctrine that findings of administrative or regulatory
agencies on matters which are within their technical area of expertise are generally accorded
not only respect but at times even finality if such findings and conclusions are supported by
substantial evidence.31 Rate fixing calls for a technical examination and a specialized review
of specific details which the courts are ill-equipped to enter, hence, such matters are primarily
entrusted to the administrative or regulating authority.32
Thus, this Court finds no reversible error on the part of the COA and the ERB in adopting the
"net average investment method" or the "number of months use method" for property valuation
purposes in the cases at bar.
III
MERALCO also rants against the retroactive application of the rate adjustment ordered by the
ERB and affirmed by this Court. In its decision, the ERB, after authorizing MERALCO to adopt
a rate adjustment in the amount of P0.017 per kwh, directed MERALCO to refund or credit to
its customers' future consumption the excess average amount of P0.167 per kwh from its billing
cycles beginning February 199433 until its billing cycles beginning February 1998.34 In the
decision appealed from, this Court likewise ordered that the refund in the average amount of
P0.167 per kwh be made to retroact from MERALCO's billing cycles beginning February 1994.
MERALCO contends that the refund cannot be given retroactive effect as the figures
determined by the ERB only apply to the test year or the period subject of the COA Audit, i.e.,
February 1, 1994 to January 31, 1995. It reasoned that the amounts used to determine the
proper rates to be charged by MERALCO would vary from year to year and thus the
computation of the excess average charge of P0.167 would hold true only for the test year.
Thus, MERALCO argues that if a refund of P0.167 would be uniformly applied to its billing
cycles beginning 1994, with respect to periods after January 31, 1995, there will be instances
wherein its operating revenues would fall below the 12% authorized rate of return. MERALCO
therefore suggests that the dispositive portion be modified and order that "the refund applicable
to the periods after January 31, 1995 is to be computed on the basis of the excess collection
in proportion to the excess over the 12% return."35
The purpose of the audit procedures conducted in a rate application proceeding is to determine
whether the rate applied for will generate a reasonable return for the public utility, which, in
accordance with settled laws and jurisprudence, is 12% on rate base or the present value of
the assets used in the operations of a public utility. For audit purposes, however, there is a
need to obtain a sample set of data-- usually derived from figures within a designated period
of time-- to determine the amount of returns obtained by a public utility during such period. In
the cases at bar, the COA conducted an audit for the test year beginning February 1, 1994
and ending January 31, 1995 or a 12-month period immediately after the order of the ERB
granting a provisional increase in the amount of P0.184 per kwh was issued. Thus, the ultimate
issue resolved by the COA when it conducted its audit was whether the provisional increase
granted by the ERB generated an amount of return well within the rates authorized by law. As
stated earlier, based on the findings of the ERB, with the increase of P0.184 per kwh,
MERALCO obtained a rate of return which was 8.15% more than the authorized rate of return
of 12%.36 Thus, a refund in the amount of P0.167 was determined and ordered by ERB.
The essence of the use of a "test year" for auditing purposes is to obtain a sample or
representative set of figures to enable the examining authority to arrive at a conclusion or
finding based on the gathered data. The use of a "test year" does not mean that the information
and conclusions so derived would only be correct for that year and would be incorrect on the
succeeding years. The use of a "test year" assumes that within a reasonable period after such
test year, figures used to determine the amount of return would only vary slightly from the
figures culled during the test year such that the impact on the utility's rate of return would not
be very significant. Thus, in the event that there is a substantial change in circumstances
significantly affecting the variable amounts that would determine the reasonableness of a
return, an event which would normally occur after a certain period of time has elapsed, the
public utility may subsequently apply for a rate revision.
We agree with the Solicitor General that following MERALCO's reasoning that the figures
culled from a test year would only be relevant during such year, there would be a need for
public utilities to apply for a rate adjustment every year and perform an audit examination on
a public utility's books of accounts every year as the amount of a utility's revenue may fall
above or below the authorized rates at any given year. Needless to say, the trajectory of
MERALCO's arguments will lead to an absurdity.
From the time the order granting a provisional increase was issued by the ERB, nowhere in
the records does it appear that the subsequent refund of P0.167 per kwh ordered by the ERB
was ever implemented or executed by MERALCO.37 Accordingly, from January 28, 1994
MERALCO imposed on its customers a charge that is P0.167 in excess of the proper amount.
In fact, any application for rate adjustment that may have been applied for and/or granted to
MERALCO during the intervening period would have to be reckoned from rates increased by
P0.184 per kwh as these were the rates prevailing at the time any application for rate
adjustment was made by MERALCO.
While we agree that the amounts used to determine the utility's rate of return would vary from
year to year, we are unable to subscribe to the view that the refund applicable to the periods
after January 31, 1995 should be computed on the basis of the excess collection in proportion
to the excess over the 12% return. MERALCO's contention that the refund for periods after
January 31, 1995 should be computed on the basis of revenue of each year in excess of the
12% authorized rate of return calls for a year-by-year computation of MERALCO's revenues
and assets which would be contrary to the essence of an audit examination of a public utility
based on a test year. To grant MERALCO's prayer would, in effect, allow MERALCO the
benefit of a year-by-year adjustment of rates not normally enjoyed by any other public utility
required to adopt a subsequent rate modification. Indeed, had the ERB ordered an increase in
the provisional rates it previously granted, said increase in rates would apply retroactively and
would not have varied from year to year, depending on the variable amounts used to determine
the authorized rates that may be charged by MERALCO. We find no significant circumstance
prevailing in the cases at bar that would justify the application of a yearly adjustment as
requested by MERALCO.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED
WITH FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

Panganiban, J., please see separate opinion.
Separate Opinions
PANGANIBAN, J.:
After perusing the respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, the Comment thereon by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the other pleadings filed by the parties, I believe
there are still lingering questions that need to be answered or clarified before the Motion for
Reconsideration should be resolved. Some of the more important questions are the following:
Effect of ERC's
Self-Reversal
First, this case reached this Court because the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB), now known
as the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), appealed to us the Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA), which upheld Meralco. In its Comment to Meralco's Motion for Reconsideration,
however, the OSG — as counsel for ERC — informed this Court that ERC has reversed its
position and now believes that "income taxes . . . are reasonable costs that may be recoverable
from the consuming public." In the words of the ponencia, ERC "agrees with Meralco that to
disallow public utilities from recovering its income tax payments will effectively lower the return
on rate base enjoyed by a public utility to 8%."
1. By reversing itself, is the ERC effectively abandoning its appeal before this Court? If so, is
it still proper for this Court to uphold the old ERB Decision? Be it remembered that our own
Decision is anchored on the theory that ERB should be affirmed, because it is the
knowledgeable and specialized government agency tasked with electric rate determination,
and thus its findings and opinions — unless obviously faulty — merit full faith and credit.
2. Is the OSG, as counsel for the ERC and the government, authorized to argue against its
own clients' position and thereby leave them without any lawyer?
Effects of New
EPIRA Law
Second, in its Comment, OSG informs us that a new law, RA 9136 — the Electric Power
Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) — was enacted on June 16, 2002. This law allegedly authorizes
ERC to determine rates that will "allow the recovery of a just and reasonable return of rate
base (RORB) to enable the entity to operate viably." On this basis, ERC opines that actual
income taxes paid should now be deemed "reasonable costs" of operating a public utility.
1. Does this mean that effective June 16, 2002, ERC may allow the deduction of income taxes
from operating expenses? Does this render our Decision obsolete?
Our Decision Allegedly

Reduce Earnings to Only 8%
Third, citing the report of the Commission on Audit (COA), the OSG originally opined that
MERALCO — after the infusion of the provisional rate increase of 18.4 centavos — would still
earn 13% RORB if income taxes are not treated as operating expenses, and 20% if they are
deducted as operating expenses.
1. If this is so, why is Meralco still complaining that the old ERB Decision, which this Court is
affirming, bars it from earning the maximum allowable profit of 12%? How accurate are the
OSG and COA computations? Or, is Meralco just misleading the Court?
2. In any event, despite the COA figures, the OSG contends that — at least theoretically —
Meralco's profit would be reduced by our Decision to a maximum of only 8% RORB, instead
of the allowable 12%. At the same time, it justifies the 8% RORB by arguing that the World
Bank and the Asian Development Bank consider a public utility of 8% RORB still viable (p. 42
of the OSG Comment). Which is which?
Special Privilege
to Meralco
Fourth, in its Comment, the OSG argues that other public utilities are not allowed to deduct
income taxes as operating expenses. Why then should Meralco be given this special privilege,
it rhetorically asks?
1. Is this true? If so, why has the ERC changed its position? Why is it now allowing Meralco to
deduct income tax payments as "reasonable costs" of operation?
Oral Argument
Is the Proper Thing
The foregoing are the more important questions I posed when I asked the Third Division to
refer this case to the Court en banc and to conduct oral arguments on the Motion for
Reconsideration of Meralco. These questions were not fully taken up by the pleadings of the
parties. Thus, it would be pretentious for me to render an opinion on them. On the other hand,
I believe that a decision that does not take up these questions would be incomplete.
Hearing the parties on Oral Argument before the entire Court or even by just the Third
Division, prior to resolving with finality the motion for reconsideration on a very important
matter such as the present case is not unusual. In fact, with due respect, I believe that this is
the proper thing to do.
After all, very recently in PLDT v. City of Davao (GR No. 143863, March 27, 1993), the
Court en banc conducted an Oral Argument on the Motion for Reconsideration challenging the
unanimous Decision of the Second Division. That case involved the legality of whether a local
government unit (LGU) like the City of Davao may impose local taxes on the Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company. The amount involved there was only about P4 million. On the
other hand, the present case involves the refund of about P2.5 billion per year starting 1994,
or about P20 billion up to the year 2003.
Apart from the monetary consideration, I believe the issues raised — including the foregoing
questions — are important enough to merit a hearing also. May I stress that this case will affect
not only Meralco and its customers but all electric utilities and all their customers all over the
Philippines, which means this case will affect all the people of this country.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the unanimous Second Division Decision in the above
cited PLDT case was upheld by the banc with some dissents led by the herein ponente, Mr.
Justice Reynato S. Puno himself, but only after a full hearing by the full Court.
WHEREFORE, I regret I cannot cast my vote in favor of (or even against) the ponencia until
and unless an Oral Argument is first called, preferably by the full Court, to clarify the above
questions.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-49774 February 24, 1981
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION (CAGAYAN COCA-COLA PLANT), petitioner,

vs.
Hon. AMADO G. INCIONG, Deputy Minister of Labor and CAGAYAN COCA-COLA
FREE WORKERS UNION, respondents.
DE CASTRO, J.:
Petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction to review the Order dated
1
December 19, 1978 rendered by the Deputy Minister of Labor in STF ROX Case No. 009-77
docketed as "Cagayan Coca-Cola Free Workers Union vs. Cagayan Coca-Cola Plant, San
Miguel Corporation, " which denied herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration and ordered
the immediate execution of a prior Order dated June 7, 1978.
2
On January 3, 1977, Cagayan Coca-Cola Free Workers Union, private respondent herein, filed
a complaint against San Miguel Corporation (Cagayan Coca-Cola Plant), petitioner herein,
alleging failure or refusal of the latter to include in the computation of 13th- month pay such
items as sick, vacation or maternity leaves, premium for work done on rest days and special
holidays, including pay for regular holidays and night differentials.
An Order dated February 15, 1977 was issued by Regional Office No. X where the complaint
3
was filed requiring herein petitioner San Miguel Corporation (Cagayan Coca-Cola Plant) "to
pay the difference of whatever earnings and the amount actually received as 13th month pay
excluding overtime premium and emergency cost of living allowance. "
Herein petitioner appealed from that Order to the Minister of Labor in whose behalf the Deputy
Minister of Labor Amado G. Inciong issued an Order dated June 7, 1978 affirming the Order
4
of Regional Office No. X and dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration having been denied, it filed the instant petition.
On February 14, 1979, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining 5
respondents from enforcing the Order dated December 19, 1978.
The crux of the present controversy is whether or not in the computation of the 13th-month pay
under Presidential Decree 851, payments for sick, vacation or maternity leaves, premium for
work done on rest days and special holidays, including pay for regular holidays and night
differentials should be considered.
Public respondent's consistent stand on the matter since the effectivity of Presidential Decree
851 is that "payments for sick leave, vacation leave, and maternity benefits, as well as salaries
paid to employees for work performed on rest days, special and regular holidays are included
in the computation of the 13th-month pay. On its part, private respondent cited innumerable
6
past rulings, opinions and decisions rendered by then Acting Labor Secretary Amado G.
Inciong to the effect that, "in computing the mandatory bonus, the basis is the total gross basic
salary paid by the employer during the calendar year. Such gross basic salary includes: (1)
regular salary or wage; (2) payments for sick, vacation and maternity leaves; (3) premium for
work performed on rest days or holidays: (4) holiday pay for worked or unworked regular
holiday; and (5) emergency allowance if given in the form of a wage adjustment." 7
Petitioner, on the other hand, assails as erroneous the aforesaid order, ruling and opinions,
vigorously contends that Presidential Decree 851 speaks only of basic salary as basis for the
determination of the 13th-month pay; submits that payments for sick, vacation, or maternity
leaves, night differential pay, as well as premium paid for work performed on rest days, special
and regular holidays do not form part of the basic salary; and concludes that the inclusion of
those payments in the computation of the 13th-month pay is clearly not sanctioned by
Presidential Decree 851.
The Court finds petitioner's contention meritorious.
The provision in dispute is Section 1 of Presidential Decree 851 and provides:

All employers are hereby required to pay all their employees receiving a basic salary of not
more than Pl,000 a month, regardless of the nature of the employment, a 13th-month pay not
later than December 24 of every year.
Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations for the implementation of Presidential Decree 851
provides:
a) Thirteenth-month pay shall mean one twelfth (1/12) of the basic salary of an employee within
a calendar year
b) Basic salary shall include all remunerations on earnings paid by an employer to an employee
for services rendered but may not include cost-of-living allowances granted pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 525 or Letter of Instructions No. 174, profit sharing payments and all
allowances and monetary benefits which are not considered or integrated as part of the regular
or basic salary of the employee at the time of the promulgation of the Decree on December 16,
1975.
Under Presidential Decree 851 and its implementing rules, the basic salary of an employee is
used as the basis in the determination of his 13th-month pay. Any compensations or
remunerations which are deemed not part of the basic pay is excluded as basis in the
computation of the mandatory bonus.
Under the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851, the following
compensations are deemed not part of the basic salary:
a) Cost-of-living allowances granted pursuant to Presidential Decree 525 and Letter of

Instructions No. 174;
b) Profit sharing payments;
c) All allowances and monetary benefits which are not considered or integrated as part of the
regular basic salary of tile employee at the time of the promulgation of the Decree on December
16, 1975.
Under a later set of Supplementary Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree
851 issued by the then Labor Secretary Blas Ople, overtime pay, earnings and other
remunerations are excluded as part of the basic salary and in the computation of the 13th-
month pay.
The exclusion of cost-of-living allowances under Presidential Decree 525 and Letter of
Instructions No. 174, and profit sharing payments indicate the intention to strip basic salary of
other payments which are properly considered as "fringe" benefits. Likewise, the catch-all
exclusionary phrase "all allowances and monetary benefits which are not considered or
integrated as part of the basic salary" shows also the intention to strip basic salary of any and
all additions which may be in the form of allowances or "fringe" benefits.
Moreover, the Supplementary Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851
is even more emphatic in declaring that earnings and other remunerations which are not part
of the basic salary shall not be included in the computation of the 13th-month pay.
While doubt may have been created by the prior Rules and Regulations Implementing
Presidential Decree 851 which defines basic salary to include all remunerations or
earnings paid by an employer to an employee, this cloud is dissipated in the later and more
controlling Supplementary Rules and Regulations which categorically, exclude from the
definition of basic salary earnings and other remunerations paid by employer to an employee.
A cursory perusal of the two sets of Rules indicates that what has hitherto been the subject of
a broad inclusion is now a subject of broad exclusion. The Supplementary rules and
Regulations cure the seeming tendency of the former rules to include all remunerations and
earnings within the definition of basic salary.
The all-embracing phrase "earnings and other renumeration" which are deemed not part of the
basic salary includes within its meaning payments for sick, vacation, or maternity leaves.
Maternity premium for works performed on rest days and special holidays pays for regular
holidays and night differentials. As such they are deemed not part of the basic salary and shall
not be considered in the computation of the 13th-month they, were not so excluded, it is hard
to find any "earnings and other remunerations" expressly excluded in the computation of the
13th-month pay. Then the exclusionary provision would prove to be Idle and with no purpose.
This conclusion finds strong support under the Labor Code of the Philippines. To cite a few
provisions:
Art. 87. — overtime work. Work may be performed beyond eight hours a day provided what
the employee is paid for the overtime work, additional compensation equivalent to his regular
wage plus at least twenty-five (25%) percent thereof.
It is clear that overtime pay is an additional compensation other than and added to the regular
wage or basic salary, for reason of which such is categorically excluded from the definition of
basic salary under the Supplementary Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential
Decree 851.
In Article 93 of the same Code, paragraph
c) work performed on any special holiday shall be paid an additional compensation of at least
thirty percent (30%) of the regular wage of the employee.
It is likewise clear that prernium for special holiday which is at least 30% of the regular wage
is an additional compensation other than and added to the regular wage or basic salary. For
similar reason it shall not be considered in the computation of the 13th- month pay.
WHEREFORE, the Orders of the Deputy Labor Minister dated June 7, 1978 and December
19, 1978 are hereby set aside and a new one entered as above indicated. The Temporary
Restraining Order issued by this Court on February 14, 1979 is hereby made permanent. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Mr. Justice de Castro was designated to sit with the First Division under Special Order No. 225.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 157264 January 31, 2008
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), claiming that it
terminated in 1995 the employment of several rank-and-file, supervisory, and executive
employees due to redundancy; that in compliance with labor law requirements, it paid those
separated employees separation pay and other benefits; and that as employer and withholding
agent, it deducted from the separation pay withholding taxes in the total amount
of P23,707,909.20 which it remitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), filed on
November 20, 1997 with the BIR a claim for tax credit or refund of the P23,707,909.20,
invoking Section 28(b)(7)(B) of the 1977 National Internal Revenue Code1 which excluded from
gross income
[a]ny amount received by an official or employee or by his heirs from the employer as a
consequence of separation of such official or employee from the service of the employer due
to death, sickness or other physical disability or for any cause beyond the control of the said
official or employee.2 (Underscoring supplied)
As the BIR took no action on its claim, PLDT filed a claim for judicial refund before the Court
of Tax Appeals (CTA).
In its Answer,3 respondent, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, contended that PLDT failed
to show proof of payment of separation pay and remittance of the alleged withheld taxes.4
PLDT later manifested on March 19, 1998 that it was reducing its claim to P16,439,777.61
because a number of the separated employees opted to file their respective claims for refund
of taxes erroneously withheld from their separation pay.5
PLDT thereafter retained Sycip Gorres Velayo and Company (SGV) to conduct a special audit
examination of various receipts, invoices and other long accounts, and moved to avail of the
procedure laid down in CTA Circular No. 1-95, as amended by CTA Circular No. 10-97,
allowing the presentation of a certification of an independent certified public accountant in lieu
of voluminous documents.6 The CTA thereupon appointed Amelia Cabal (Cabal) of SGV as
Commissioner of the court.7 Cabal's audit report, which formed part of PLDT's
evidence,8 adjusted PLDT's claim to P6,679,167.72.9
By Decision10 of July 25, 2000, the CTA denied PLDT's claim on the ground that it "failed to
sufficiently prove that the terminated employees received separation pay and that taxes were
withheld therefrom and remitted to the BIR."11
PLDT filed a Motion for New Trial/Reconsideration, praying for an opportunity to present the
receipts and quitclaims executed by the employees and prove that they received their
separation pay.12 Justifying its motion, PLDT alleged that
x x x [t]hese Receipts and Quitclaims could not be presented during the course of the trial
despite diligent efforts, the files having been misplaced and were only recently found. Through
excusable mistake or inadvertence, undersigned counsel relied on the audit of SGV & Co. of
the voluminous cash salary vouchers, and was thus not made wary of the fact that the cash
salary vouchers for the rank and file employees do not have acknowledgement receipts, unlike
the cash salary vouchers for the supervisory and executive employees. If admitted in evidence,
these Receipts and Quitclaims, together with the cash salary vouchers, will prove that the rank
and file employees received their separation pay from petitioner.13 (Underscoring supplied)
The CTA denied PLDT's motion.14
PLDT thus filed a Petition for Review15 before the Court of Appeals which, by Decision16 of
February 11, 2002, dismissed the same. PLDT's Motion for Reconsideration17 having been
denied,18 it filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,19 faulting the appellate court to
have committed grave abuse of discretion
A.
. . . WHEN IT HELD THAT PROOF OF PAYMENT OF SEPARATION PAY TO THE

EMPLOYEES IS REQUIRED IN ORDER TO AVAIL OF REFUND OF TAXES
ERRONEOUSLY PAID TO THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
B.
. . . WHEN IT HELD THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT PETITIONER'S

EMPLOYEES RECEIVED THEIR SEPARATION PAY.
C.
. . . IN DISREGARDING THE CERTIFICA-TION/REPORT OF SGV & CO., WHICH

CERTIFIED THAT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO A REFUND OF THE AMOUNT
OF P6,679,167.72.
D.
. . . IN NOT ORDERING A NEW TRIAL TO ALLOW PETITIONER TO PRESENT ADDITIONAL

EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT THEREOF.20
PLDT argues against the need for proof that the employees received their separation pay and
proffers the issue in the case in this wise:
It is not essential to prove that the separation pay benefits were actually received by the
terminated employees. This issue is not for the CTA, nor the Court of Appeals to resolve, but
is a matter that falls within the competence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Labor and Employment and/or the National Labor Relations Commission. x x x
Proving, or submitting evidence to prove, receipt of separation pay would have been material,
relevant and necessary if its deductibility as a business expense has been put in issue. But
this has never been an issue in the instant case. The issue is whether or not the withholding
taxes, which Petitioner remitted to the BIR, should be refunded for having been erroneously
withheld and paid to the latter.
For as long as there is no legal basis for the payment of taxes to the BIR, the taxpayer is
entitled to claim a refund therefore. Hence, any taxes withheld from separation benefits
and paid to the BIR constitute erroneous payment of taxes and should therefore, be
refunded/credited to the taxpayer/withholding agent, regardless of whether or not
separation pay was actually paid to the concerned employees.21 (Emphasis in the original;
underscoring supplied)
PLDT's position does not lie. Tax refunds, like tax exemptions, are construed strictly against
the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority, and the taxpayer bears the burden of
establishing the factual basis of his claim for a refund.22
Under the earlier quoted portion of Section 28 (b)(7)(B) of the National Internal Revenue Code
of 1977 (now Section 32(B)6(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997), it is incumbent
on PLDT as a claimant for refund on behalf of each of the separated employees to show that
each employee did
x x x reflect in his or its own return the income upon which any creditable tax is required to be
withheld at the source. Only when there is an excess of the amount of tax so withheld over the
tax due on the payee's return can a refund become possible.
A taxpayer must thus do two things to be able to successfully make a claim for the tax refund:
(a) declare the income payments it received as part of its gross income and (b) establish the
fact of withholding. On this score, the relevant revenue regulation provides as follows:
"Section 10. Claims for tax credit or refund. - Claims for tax credit or refund of income tax
deducted and withheld on income payments shall be given due course only when it is shown
on the return that the income payment received was declared as part of the gross income and
the fact of withholding is established by a copy of the statement duly issued by the payer to
the payee (BIR Form No. 1743.1) showing the amount paid and the amount of tax withheld
therefrom."23 (Underscoring supplied)
In fine, PLDT must prove that the employees received the income payments as part of gross
income and the fact of withholding.
The CTA found that PLDT failed to establish that the redundant employees actually received
separation pay and that it withheld taxes therefrom and remitted the same to the BIR, thus:
With respect to the redundant rank and file employees' final payment/terminal pay x x x, the
cash salary vouchers relative thereto have no payment acknowledgement receipts.
Inasmuch as these cash vouchers were not signed by the respective employees to prove
actual receipt of payment, the same merely serves as proofs of authorization for payment and
not actual payment by the Petitioner of the redundant rank and file employees' separation pay
and other benefits. In other words, Petitioner failed to prove that the rank and file employees
were actually paid separation pay and other benefits.
To establish that the withholding taxes deducted from the redundant employees' separation
pay/other benefits were actually remitted to the BIR, therein petitioner submitted the following:
Exhibit
a) Monthly Remittance Return of Income D
Taxes Withheld for December 1995
b) Revised SGV & Co. Certification E to E-3-d
c) Annual Information Return of Income Tax E-6
Withheld on Compensation, Expanded and
Final Withholding Taxes for the year 1995
d) Summary of Income Taxes Withheld for the E-6-a
calendar year ended December 31, 1995
e) Summary of Gross Compensation and Tax E-6-b to E-6-e
Withheld
However, it cannot be determined from the above documents whether or not Petitioner actually
remitted the total income taxes withheld from the redundant employees' taxable compensation
(inclusive of the separation pay/other benefits) for the year 1995. The amounts of total taxes
withheld for each redundant employees (Exhs. E-4, E-5, E-7, inclusive) cannot be
verified against the "Summary of Gross Compensation and Tax Withheld for 1995"
(Exhs. E-6-b to E-6-e, inclusive) due to the fact that this summary enumerates the
amounts of income taxes withheld from Petitioner's employees on per district/area
basis. The only schedule (with names, corresponding gross compensation, and withholding
taxes) attached to the summary was for the withholding taxes on service terminal pay (Exh. E-
6-e). However, the names listed thereon were not among the names of the redundant
separated employees being claimed by petitioner.
xxxx
It is worthy to note that Respondent presented a witness in the person of Atty. Rodolfo L.
Salazar, Chief of the BIR Appellate Division, who testified that a portion of the Petitioner's
original claim for refund of P23,706,908.20 had already been granted. He also testified that
out of 769 claimants, who opted to file directly with the BIR, 766 had been processed and
granted. In fact, x x x three claims were not processed because the concerned taxpayer failed
to submit the income tax returns and withholding tax certificates. Considering that no
documentary evidence was presented to bolster said testimony, We have no means of
counter checking whether the 766 alleged to have been already granted by the
Respondent pertained to the P16,439,777.61 claim for refund withdrawn by the
Petitioner from the instant petition or to the remaining balance of P6,679,167.72 which
is the subject of this claim.24 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The appellate court affirmed the foregoing findings of the CTA. Apropos is this Court's ruling
in Far East Bank and Trust Company v. Court of Appeals:25
The findings of fact of the CTA, a special court exercising particular expertise on the subject
of tax, are generally regarded as final, binding, and conclusive upon this Court, especially if
these are substantially similar to the findings of the C[ourt of] A[ppeals] which is normally the
final arbiter of questions of fact.26 (Underscoring supplied)
While SGV certified that it had "been able to trace the remittance of the withheld
taxes summarized in the C[ash] S[alary] V[ouchers] to the Monthly Remittance Return of
Income Taxes Withheld for the appropriate period covered by the final payment made to the
concerned executives, supervisors, and rank and file staff members of PLDT,"27 the same
cannot be appreciated in PLDT's favor as the courts cannot verify such claim. While the
records of the case contain the Alphabetical List of Employee from Whom Taxes Were
Withheld for the year 1995 and the Monthly Remittance Returns of Income Taxes Withheld for
December 1995, the documents from which SGV "traced" the former to the latter have not
been presented. Failure to present these documents is fatal to PLDT's case. For the relevant
portions of CTA Circular 1-95 instruct:
1. The party who desires to introduce as evidence such voluminous documents must, after
motion and approval by the Court, present: (a) a Summary containing, among others, a
chronological listing of the numbers, dates and amounts covered by the invoices or receipts
and the amount/s of tax paid; and (b) a Certification of an independent Certified Public
Accountant attesting to the correctness of the contents of the summary after making an
examination, evaluation and audit of the voluminous receipts and invoices x x x
2. The method of individual presentation of each and every receipt, invoice or account for
marking, identification and comparison with the originals thereof need not be done before the
Court or Clerk of Court anymore after the introduction of the summary and CPA certification. It
is enough that the receipts, invoices, vouchers or other documents covering the said
accounts or payment to be introduced in evidence must be pre-marked by the party
concerned and submitted to the Court in order to be made accessible to the adverse party
who desires to check and verify the correctness of the summary and CPA certification.
Likewise the originals of the voluminous receipts, invoices and accounts must be ready for
verification and comparison in case of doubt on the authenticity thereof is raised during the
hearing or resolution of the formal offer of evidence. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal

Revenue,28 citing Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Manila Mining Corporation29 explains
the need for the promulgation of the immediately-cited CTA Circular and its effect:
x x x The circular, in the interest of speedy administration of justice, was promulgated to avoid
the time-consuming procedure of presenting, identifying and marking of documents before the
Court. It does not relieve respondent of its imperative task of premarking photocopies of
sales receipts and invoices and submitting the same to the court after the independent CPA
shall have examined and compared them with the originals. Without presenting these pre-
marked documents as evidence - from which the summary and schedules were based, the
court cannot verify the authenticity and veracity of the independent auditor's
conclusions. (Italics in the original; Emphasis and underscoring supplied).30
On the denial of PLDT's motion for new trial: new trial may be granted on either of these
grounds:
a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in
his rights; or
b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result.31
Newly discovered evidence as a basis of a motion for new trial should be supported by
affidavits of the witnesses by whom such evidence is expected to be given, or by duly
authenticated documents which are proposed to be introduced in evidence.32 And the grant or
denial of a new trial is, generally speaking, addressed to the sound discretion of the court
which cannot be interfered with unless a clear abuse thereof is shown.33 PLDT has not shown
any such abuse, however.
The affirmance by the appellate court of the CTA's denial of PLDT's motion for new trial on the
ground of "newly discovered evidence," viz:
xxxx
The petitioner appended to its "Motion for New Trial", etc. , unnotarized copies of "Receipts,
Release and Quitclaim" bearing the signatures purportedly of those employees for whom the
Petitioner filed the "Petition" before the CTA, dated December 28, 1995 x x x[.]34
xxxx
Although the Rules require the appendage, by the Petitioner, of the "Affidavits of Witnesses"
it intends to present in a new trial, the Petitioner failed to append to its "Motion for New
Trial" any affidavits of said witnesses. The "Receipts, Releases, and Quitclaims" appended
to the Petition are not authenticated. Indeed, the said deeds were not notarized, despite their
having been signed, allegedly by the employees, as early as December 28, 1995, or
approximately two (2) years before the Petitioner filed the Petition before the CTA. It behooved
the Petitioner to have appended the Affidavits of the separated employees to authenticate
the "Receipts, Releases and Quitclaims" purportedly executed by them, respectively. The
petitioner did not.
The Petitioner wanted the CTA to believe that the employees executed the
aforesaid "Receipts, Releases and Quitclaims" as early as December 28, 1995, and kept
the same in its possession and custody. However, the petitioner divulged the existence of said
Receipts, etc., only when it filed its "Motion for New Trial, etc." on August 18, 2000, or
an interregnum of almost five (5) years. None of the responsible officers of the Petitioner,
especially the custodian of said Receipts, etc., executed an "Affidavit" explaining why the
same (a) were not notarized on or about December 28, 1995; (b) whether the said deeds were
turned over to its counsel when it filed the Petition at bench; (c) why it failed to present the said
Receipts to the SGV & Co., while the latter was conducting its examination and/or audit of the
records of the Petitioner. It is incredible that, if it is true, as claimed by Petitioner, the employees,
indeed, signed the said Receipts on December 28, 1995, the Petitioner, one of the biggest
corporations in the Philippines and laden with competent execu-tives/officers/employees, did
not bother having the same notarized on or about December 28, 1995. For sure, when the
Petitioner endorsed the preparation and filing of the Petition to its counsel, it should have
collated all the documents necessary to support its Petition and submit the same to its counsel.
If the Petitioner did, its counsel has not explained why it failed to present the same before the
Commissioner and/or adduce the same in evidence during the hearing of the Petition on its
merits with the CTA. We are convinced that the said Receipts, etc. were antedated and
executed only after the CTA rendered its Decision and only in anticipation of the "Motion for
New Trial, etc." filed by the Petitioner.35 (Emphasis and underscoring in the original),
is thus in order.
Finally, on PLDT's plea for a liberal application of the rules of procedure,36 Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. A. Soriano Corporation37 furnishes a caveat on the matter:
Perhaps realizing that under the Rules the said report cannot be admitted as newly discovered
evidence, the petitioner invokes a liberal application of the Rules. He submits that Section 8 of
the Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals declaring that the latter shall not be governed strictly by
technical rules of evidence mandates a relaxation of the requirements of new trial on the basis
of newly discovered evidence. This is a dangerous proposition and one which we refuse to
countenance. We cannot agree more with the Court of Appeals when it stated thus,
"To accept the contrary view of the petitioner would give rise to a dangerous precedent in
that there would be no end to a hearing before respondent court because, every time a party
is aggrieved by its decision, he can have it set aside by asking to be allowed to present
additional evidence without having to comply with the requirements of a motion for new trial
based on newly discovered evidence. Rule 13, Section 5 of the Rules of the Court of Tax
Appeals should not be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the orderly presentation
of issues and their resolution. To do so would affect, to a considerable extent, the stability of
judicial decisions."
We are left with no recourse but to conclude that this is a simple case of negligence on the
part of the petitioner. For this act of negligence, the petitioner cannot be allowed to seek refuge
in a liberal application of the Rules. For it should not be forgotten that the first and fundamental
concern of the rules of procedure is to secure a just determination of every action. In the case
at bench, a liberal application of the rules of procedure to suit the petitioner's purpose would
clearly pave the way for injustice as it would be rewarding an act of negligence with undeserved
tolerance.38 (Underscoring supplied)
At all events, the alleged "newly discovered evidence" that PLDT seeks to offer does not suffice
to establish its claim for refund, as it would still have to comply with Revenue Regulation 6-85
by proving that the redundant employees, on whose behalf it filed the claim for refund, declared
the separation pay received as part of their gross income. Furthermore, the same Revenue
Regulation requires that "the fact of withholding is established by a copy of the statement duly
issued by the payor to the payee (BIR Form No. 1743.1) showing the amount paid and the
amount of tax withheld therefrom."
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO C. CARPIO DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[G.R. No. L-9408. October 31, 1956.]

EMILIO Y. HILADO, Petitioner, vs. THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE
COURT OF TAX APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On March 31, 1952, Petitioner filed his income tax return for 1951 with the treasurer of Bacolod
City wherein he claimed, among other things, the amount of P12,837.65 as a deductible item
from his gross income pursuant to General Circular No. V-123 issued by the Collector of
Internal Revenue. This circular was issued pursuant to certain rules laid down by the Secretary
of Finance On the basis of said return, an assessment notice demanding the payment of
P9,419 was sent to Petitioner, who paid the tax in monthly installments, the last payment
having been made on January 2, 1953.
Meanwhile, on August 30, 1952, the Secretary of Finance, through the Collector of Internal
Revenue, issued General Circular No. V-139 which not only revoked and declared void his
general Circular No. V- 123 but laid down the rule that losses of property which occurred during
the period of World War II from fires, storms, shipwreck or other casualty, or from robbery,
theft, or embezzlement are deductible in the year of actual loss or destruction of said property.
As a consequence, the amount of P12,837.65 was disallowed as a deduction from the gross
income of Petitioner for 1951 and the Collector of Internal Revenue demanded from him the
payment of the sum of P3,546 as deficiency income tax for said year. When the petition for
reconsideration filed by Petitioner was denied, he filed a petition for review with the Court of
Tax Appeals. In due time, this court rendered decision affirming the assessment made
by Respondent Collector of Internal Revenue. This is an appeal from said decision.
It appears that Petitioner claimed in his 1951 income tax return the deduction of the sum of
P12,837.65 as a loss consisting in a portion of his war damage claim which had been duly
approved by the Philippine War Damage Commission under the Philippine Rehabilitation Act
of 1946 but which was not paid and never has been paid pursuant to a notice served upon him
by said Commission that said part of his claim will not be paid until the United States Congress
should make further appropriation. He claims that said amount of P12,837.65 represents a
“business asset” within the meaning of said Act which he is entitled to deduct as a loss in his
return for 1951. This claim is untenable.
To begin with, assuming that said a mount represents a portion of the 75% of his war damage
claim which was not paid, the same would not be deductible as a loss in 1951 because,
according to Petitioner, the last installment he received from the War Damage Commission,
together with the notice that no further payment would be made on his claim, was in 1950. In
the circumstance, said amount would at most be a proper deduction from his 1950 gross
income. In the second place, said amount cannot be considered as a “business asset” which
can be deducted as a loss in contemplation of law because its collection is not enforceable as
a matter of right, but is dependent merely upon the generosity and magnanimity of the U. S.
government. Note that, as of the end of 1945, there was absolutely no law under
which Petitioner could claim compensation for the destruction of his properties during the battle
for the liberation of the Philippines. And under the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1946, the
payments of claims by the War Damage Commission merely depended upon its discretion to
be exercised in the manner it may see fit, but the non-payment of which cannot give rise to
any enforceable right, for, under said Act, “All findings of the Commission concerning the
amount of loss or damage sustained, the cause of such loss or damage, the persons to whom
compensation pursuant to this title is payable, and the value of the property lost or damaged,
shall be conclusive and shall not be reviewable by any court”. (section 113).
It is true that under the authority of section 338 of the National Internal Revenue Code the
Secretary of Finance, in the exercise of his administrative powers, caused the issuance of
General Circular No. V-123 as an implementation or interpretative regulation of section 30 of
the same Code, under which the amount of P12,837.65 was allowed to be deducted “in the
year the last installment was received with notice that no further payment would be made until
the United States Congress makes further appropriation therefor”, but such circular was found
later to be wrong and was revoked. Thus, when doubts arose as to the soundness or validity
of such circular, the Secretary of Finance sought the advice of the Secretary of Justice who,
accordingly, gave his opinion the pertinent portion of which reads as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Yet it might be argued that war losses were not included as deductions for the year when they
were sustained because the taxpayers had prospects that losses would be compensated for
by the United States Government; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat since only uncompensated
losses are deductible, they had to wait until after the determination by the Philippine War
Damage Commission as to the compensability in part or in whole of their war losses so that
they could exclude from the deductions those compensated for by the said Commission; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand that, of necessity, such determination could be complete only much
later than in the year when the loss was sustained. This contention falls to the ground when it
is considered that the Philippine Rehabilitation Act which authorized the payment by the United
States Government of war losses suffered by property owners in the Philippines was passed
only on August 30, 1946, long after the losses were sustained. It cannot be said therefore, that
the property owners had any conclusive assurance during the years said losses were
sustained, that the compensation was to be paid therefor. Whatever assurance they could
have had, could have been based only on some information less reliable and less conclusive
than the passage of the Act itself. Hence, as diligent property owners, they should adopt the
safest alternative by considering such losses deductible during the year when they were
sustained.”
In line with this opinion, the Secretary of Finance, through the Collector of Internal Revenue,
issued General Circular No. V-139 which not only revoked and declared void his previous
Circular No. V — 123 but laid down the rule that losses of property which occurred during the
period of World War II from fires, storms, shipwreck or other casualty, or from robbery, theft,
or embezzlement are deductible for income tax purposes in the year of actual destruction of
said property. We can hardly argue against this opinion. Since we have already stated that the
amount claimed does not represent a “business asset” that may be deducted as a loss in 1951,
it is clear that the loss of the corresponding asset or property could only be deducted in the
year it was actually sustained. This is in line with section 30 (d) of the National Internal Revenue
Code which prescribes that losses sustained are allowable as deduction only within the
corresponding taxable year.
Petitioner’s contention that during the last war and as a consequence of enemy occupation in
the Philippines “there was no taxable year” within the meaning of our internal revenue laws
because during that period they were unenforceable, is without merit. It is well known that our
internal revenue laws are not political in nature and as such were continued in force during the
period of enemy occupation and in effect were actually enforced by the occupation government.
As a matter of fact, income tax returns were filed during that period and income tax payment
were effected and considered valid and legal. Such tax laws are deemed to be the laws of the
occupied territory and not of the occupying enemy.
“Furthermore, it is a legal maxim, that excepting that of a political nature, ‘Law once established
continues until changed by some competent legislative power. It is not changed merely by
change of sovereignty.’ (Joseph H. Beale, Cases on Conflict of Laws, III, Summary section 9,
citing Commonwealth vs. Chapman, 13 Met., 68.) As the same author says, in his Treatise on
the Conflict of Laws (Cambridge, 1916, section 131):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary ‘There can be
no break or interregnun in law. From the time the law comes into existence with the first-felt
corporateness of a primitive people it must last until the final disappearance of human society.
Once created, it persists until a change takes place, and when changed it continues in such
changed condition until the next change and so forever. Conquest or colonization is impotent
to bring law to an end; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryinspite of change of constitution, the law
continues unchanged until the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.’“ (Co Kim
Chan vs. Valdes Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil., 113, 142-143.)
It is likewise contended that the power to pass upon the validity of General Circular No. V-123
is vested exclusively in our courts in view of the principle of separation of powers and, therefore,
the Secretary of Finance acted without valid authority in revoking it and approving in lieu
thereof General Circular No. V-139. It cannot be denied, however, that the Secretary of
Finance is vested with authority to revoke, repeal or abrogate the acts or previous rulings of
his predecessor in office because the construction of a statute by those administering it is not
binding on their successors if thereafter the latter become satisfied that a different construction
should be given. [Association of Clerical Employees vs. Brotherhood of Railways & Steamship
Clerks, 85 F. (2d) 152, 109 A.L.R., 345.]
“When the Commissioner determined in 1937 that the Petitioner was not exempt and never
had been, it was his duty to determine, assess and collect the tax due for all years not barred
by the statutes of limitation. The conclusion reached and announced by his predecessor in
1924 was not binding upon him. It did not exempt the Petitioner from tax, This same point was
decided in this way in Stanford University Bookstore, 29 B. T. A., 1280; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryaffd., 83 Fed. (2d) 710.” (Southern Maryland Agricultural Fair Association
vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 40 B. T. A., 549, 554).
With regard to the contention that General Circular No. V-139 cannot be given retroactive effect
because that would affect and obliterate the vested right acquired by Petitioner under the
previous circular, suffice it to say that General Circular No. V-123, having been issued on a
wrong construction of the law, cannot give rise to a vested right that can be invoked by a
taxpayer. The reason is obvious:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary a vested right cannot spring from
a wrong interpretation. This is too clear to require elaboration.
“It seems too clear for serious argument that an administrative officer cannot change a law
enacted by Congress. A regulation that is merely an interpretation of the statute when once
determined to have been erroneous becomes nullity. An erroneous construction of the law by
the Treasury Department or the collector of internal revenue does not preclude or estop the
government from collecting a tax which is legally due.” (Ben Stocker, et al., 12 B. T. A., 1351.)
“Art. 2254. — No vested or acquired right can arise from acts or omissions which are against
the law or which infringe upon the rights of others.” (Article 2254, New Civil Code.)
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed Without pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia and
Felix, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 128690 January 21, 1999
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, REPUBLIC BROADCASTING CORP, VIVA
PRODUCTION, INC., and VICENTE DEL ROSARIO, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., CJ.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. (hereafter ABS-
CBN) seeks to reverse and set aside the decision of 31 October 1996 and the resolution of
1 2
10 March 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44125. The former affirmed with
modification the decision of 28 April 1993 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
3
Branch 80, in Civil Case No. Q-92-12309. The latter denied the motion to reconsider the
decision of 31 October 1996.
The antecedents, as found by the RTC and adopted by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
In 1990, ABS-CBN and Viva executed a Film Exhibition Agreement (Exh. "A") whereby Viva
gave ABS-CBN an exclusive right to exhibit some Viva films. Sometime in December 1991, in
accordance with paragraph 2.4 [sic] of said agreement stating that —.
1.4 ABS-CBN shall have the right of first refusal to the next twenty-four (24) Viva films for TV
telecast under such terms as may be agreed upon by the parties hereto, provided, however,
that such right shall be exercised by ABS-CBN from the actual offer in writing.
Viva, through defendant Del Rosario, offered ABS-CBN, through its vice-president Charo
Santos-Concio, a list of three(3) film packages (36 title) from which ABS-CBN may exercise its
right of first refusal under the afore-said agreement (Exhs. "1" par, 2, "2," "2-A'' and "2-B"-Viva).
ABS-CBN, however through Mrs. Concio, "can tick off only ten (10) titles" (from the list) "we
can purchase" (Exh. "3" - Viva) and therefore did not accept said list (TSN, June 8, 1992, pp.
9-10). The titles ticked off by Mrs. Concio are not the subject of the case at bar except the film
''Maging Sino Ka Man."
For further enlightenment, this rejection letter dated January 06, 1992 (Exh "3" - Viva) is hereby
quoted:
6 January 1992
Dear Vic,
This is not a very formal business letter I am writing to you as I would like to express my
difficulty in recommending the purchase of the three film packages you are offering ABS-CBN.
From among the three packages I can only tick off 10 titles we can purchase. Please see
attached. I hope you will understand my position. Most of the action pictures in the list do not
have big action stars in the cast. They are not for primetime. In line with this I wish to mention
that I have not scheduled for telecast several action pictures in out very first contract because
of the cheap production value of these movies as well as the lack of big action stars. As a film
producer, I am sure you understand what I am trying to say as Viva produces only big action
pictures.
In fact, I would like to request two (2) additional runs for these movies as I can only schedule
them in our non-primetime slots. We have to cover the amount that was paid for these movies
because as you very well know that non-primetime advertising rates are very low. These are
the unaired titles in the first contract.
1. Kontra Persa [sic].
2. Raider Platoon.
3. Underground guerillas
4. Tiger Command
5. Boy de Sabog
6. Lady Commando
7. Batang Matadero
8. Rebelyon
I hope you will consider this request of mine.
The other dramatic films have been offered to us before and have been rejected because of
the ruling of MTRCB to have them aired at 9:00 p.m. due to their very adult themes.
As for the 10 titles I have choosen [sic] from the 3 packages please consider including all the
other Viva movies produced last year. I have quite an attractive offer to make.
Thanking you and with my warmest regards.
Charo Santos-Concio
On February 27, 1992, defendant Del Rosario approached ABS-CBN's Ms. Concio, with a list
consisting of 52 original movie titles (i.e. not yet aired on television) including the 14 titles
subject of the present case, as well as 104 re-runs (previously aired on television) from which
ABS-CBN may choose another 52 titles, as a total of 156 titles, proposing to sell to ABS-CBN
airing rights over this package of 52 originals and 52 re-runs for P60,000,000.00 of which
P30,000,000.00 will be in cash and P30,000,000.00 worth of television spots (Exh. "4" to "4-
C" Viva; "9" -Viva).
On April 2, 1992, defendant Del Rosario and ABS-CBN general manager, Eugenio Lopez III,
met at the Tamarind Grill Restaurant in Quezon City to discuss the package proposal of Viva.
What transpired in that lunch meeting is the subject of conflicting versions. Mr. Lopez testified
that he and Mr. Del Rosario allegedly agreed that ABS-CRN was granted exclusive film rights
to fourteen (14) films for a total consideration of P36 million; that he allegedly put this
agreement as to the price and number of films in a "napkin'' and signed it and gave it to Mr.
Del Rosario (Exh. D; TSN, pp. 24-26, 77-78, June 8, 1992). On the other hand, Del Rosario
denied having made any agreement with Lopez regarding the 14 Viva films; denied the
existence of a napkin in which Lopez wrote something; and insisted that what he and Lopez
discussed at the lunch meeting was Viva's film package offer of 104 films (52 originals and 52
re-runs) for a total price of P60 million. Mr. Lopez promising [sic]to make a counter proposal
which came in the form of a proposal contract Annex "C" of the complaint (Exh. "1"·- Viva; Exh.
"C" - ABS-CBN).
On April 06, 1992, Del Rosario and Mr. Graciano Gozon of RBS Senior vice-president for
Finance discussed the terms and conditions of Viva's offer to sell the 104 films, after the
rejection of the same package by ABS-CBN.
On April 07, 1992, defendant Del Rosario received through his secretary, a handwritten note
from Ms. Concio, (Exh. "5" - Viva), which reads: "Here's the draft of the contract. I hope you
find everything in order," to which was attached a draft exhibition agreement (Exh. "C''- ABS-
CBN; Exh. "9" - Viva, p. 3) a counter-proposal covering 53 films, 52 of which came from the
list sent by defendant Del Rosario and one film was added by Ms. Concio, for a consideration
of P35 million. Exhibit "C" provides that ABS-CBN is granted films right to 53 films and contains
a right of first refusal to "1992 Viva Films." The said counter proposal was however rejected
by Viva's Board of Directors [in the] evening of the same day, April 7, 1992, as Viva would not
sell anything less than the package of 104 films for P60 million pesos (Exh. "9" - Viva), and
such rejection was relayed to Ms. Concio.
On April 29, 1992, after the rejection of ABS-CBN and following several negotiations and
meetings defendant Del Rosario and Viva's President Teresita Cruz, in consideration of P60
million, signed a letter of agreement dated April 24, 1992. granting RBS the exclusive right to
air 104 Viva-produced and/or acquired films (Exh. "7-A" - RBS; Exh. "4" - RBS) including the
fourteen (14) films subject of the present case. 4
On 27 May 1992, ABS-CBN filed before the RTC a complaint for specific performance with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order against private
respondents Republic Broadcasting Corporation (hereafter RBS ), Viva Production (hereafter
5
VIVA), and Vicente Del Rosario. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-92-12309.
On 27 May 1992, RTC issued a temporary restraining order enjoining private respondents
6
from proceeding with the airing, broadcasting, and televising of the fourteen VIVA films subject
of the controversy, starting with the film Maging Sino Ka Man, which was scheduled to be
shown on private respondents RBS' channel 7 at seven o'clock in the evening of said date.
On 17 June 1992, after appropriate proceedings, the RTC issued an

order directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon ABS-CBN's posting of P35
7
million bond. ABS-CBN moved for the reduction of the bond, while private respondents
8
moved for reconsideration of the order and offered to put up a counterbound. 9
In the meantime, private respondents filed separate answers with counterclaim. RBS also
10
set up a cross-claim against VIVA..
On 3 August 1992, the RTC issued an order dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction upon
11
the posting by RBS of a P30 million counterbond to answer for whatever damages ABS-CBN
might suffer by virtue of such dissolution. However, it reduced petitioner's injunction bond to
P15 million as a condition precedent for the reinstatement of the writ of preliminary injunction
should private respondents be unable to post a counterbond.
At the pre-trial on 6 August 1992, the parties, upon suggestion of the court, agreed to explore
12
the possibility of an amicable settlement. In the meantime, RBS prayed for and was granted
reasonable time within which to put up a P30 million counterbond in the event that no
settlement would be reached.
As the parties failed to enter into an amicable settlement RBS posted on 1 October 1992 a
counterbond, which the RTC approved in its Order of 15 October 1992. 13
On 19 October 1992, ABS-CBN filed a motion for reconsideration of the 3 August and 15
14
October 1992 Orders, which RBS opposed. 15
On 29 October 1992, the RTC conducted a pre-trial. 16
Pending resolution of its motion for reconsideration, ABS-CBN filed with the Court of Appeals
a petition challenging the RTC's Orders of 3 August and 15 October 1992 and praying for the
17
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the RTC from enforcing said orders. The
case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 29300.
On 3 November 1992, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin the
18
airing, broadcasting, and televising of any or all of the films involved in the controversy.
On 18 December 1992, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision dismissing the petition
19
in CA -G.R. No. 29300 for being premature. ABS-CBN challenged the dismissal in a petition
for review filed with this Court on 19 January 1993, which was docketed as G.R. No. 108363.
In the meantime the RTC received the evidence for the parties in Civil Case No. Q-192-1209.
Thereafter, on 28 April 1993, it rendered a decision in favor of RBS and VIVA and against
20
ABS-CBN disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, under cool reflection and prescinding from the foregoing, judgments is
rendered in favor of defendants and against the plaintiff.
(1) The complaint is hereby dismissed;
(2) Plaintiff ABS-CBN is ordered to pay defendant RBS the following:
a) P107,727.00, the amount of premium paid by RBS to the surety which issued defendant
RBS's bond to lift the injunction;
b) P191,843.00 for the amount of print advertisement for "Maging Sino Ka Man" in various
newspapers;
c) Attorney's fees in the amount of P1 million;
d) P5 million as and by way of moral damages;
e) P5 million as and by way of exemplary damages;
(3) For defendant VIVA, plaintiff ABS-CBN is ordered to pay P212,000.00 by way of reasonable
attorney's fees.
(4) The cross-claim of defendant RBS against defendant VIVA is dismissed.
(5) Plaintiff to pay the costs.
According to the RTC, there was no meeting of minds on the price and terms of the offer. The
alleged agreement between Lopez III and Del Rosario was subject to the approval of the VIVA
Board of Directors, and said agreement was disapproved during the meeting of the Board on
7 April 1992. Hence, there was no basis for ABS-CBN's demand that VIVA signed the 1992
Film Exhibition Agreement. Furthermore, the right of first refusal under the 1990 Film Exhibition
Agreement had previously been exercised per Ms. Concio's letter to Del Rosario ticking off ten
titles acceptable to them, which would have made the 1992 agreement an entirely new contract.
On 21 June 1993, this Court denied ABS-CBN's petition for review in G.R. No. 108363, as no
21
reversible error was committed by the Court of Appeals in its challenged decision and the case
had "become moot and academic in view of the dismissal of the main action by the court a
quo in its decision" of 28 April 1993.
Aggrieved by the RTC's decision, ABS-CBN appealed to the Court of Appeals claiming that
there was a perfected contract between ABS-CBN and VIVA granting ABS-CBN the exclusive
right to exhibit the subject films. Private respondents VIVA and Del Rosario also appealed
seeking moral and exemplary damages and additional attorney's fees.
In its decision of 31 October 1996, the Court of Appeals agreed with the RTC that the contract
between ABS-CBN and VIVA had not been perfected, absent the approval by the VIVA Board
of Directors of whatever Del Rosario, it's agent, might have agreed with Lopez III. The appellate
court did not even believe ABS-CBN's evidence that Lopez III actually wrote down such an
agreement on a "napkin," as the same was never produced in court. It likewise rejected ABS-
CBN's insistence on its right of first refusal and ratiocinated as follows:
As regards the matter of right of first refusal, it may be true that a Film Exhibition Agreement
was entered into between Appellant ABS-CBN and appellant VIVA under Exhibit "A" in 1990,
and that parag. 1.4 thereof provides:
1.4 ABS-CBN shall have the right of first refusal to the next twenty-four (24) VIVA films for TV
telecast under such terms as may be agreed upon by the parties hereto, provided, however,
that such right shall be exercised by ABS-CBN within a period of fifteen (15) days from the
actual offer in writing (Records, p. 14).
[H]owever, it is very clear that said right of first refusal in favor of ABS-CBN shall still be subject
to such terms as may be agreed upon by the parties thereto, and that the said right shall be
exercised by ABS-CBN within fifteen (15) days from the actual offer in writing.
Said parag. 1.4 of the agreement Exhibit "A" on the right of first refusal did not fix the price of
the film right to the twenty-four (24) films, nor did it specify the terms thereof. The same are
still left to be agreed upon by the parties.
In the instant case, ABS-CBN's letter of rejection Exhibit 3 (Records, p. 89) stated that it can
only tick off ten (10) films, and the draft contract Exhibit "C" accepted only fourteen (14) films,
while parag. 1.4 of Exhibit "A'' speaks of the next twenty-four (24) films.
The offer of V1VA was sometime in December 1991 (Exhibits 2, 2-A. 2-B; Records, pp. 86-88;
Decision, p. 11, Records, p. 1150), when the first list of VIVA films was sent by Mr. Del Rosario
to ABS-CBN. The Vice President of ABS-CBN, Ms. Charo Santos-Concio, sent a letter dated
January 6, 1992 (Exhibit 3, Records, p. 89) where ABS-CBN exercised its right of refusal by
rejecting the offer of VIVA.. As aptly observed by the trial court, with the said letter of Mrs.
Concio of January 6, 1992, ABS-CBN had lost its right of first refusal. And even if We reckon
the fifteen (15) day period from February 27, 1992 (Exhibit 4 to 4-C) when another list was
sent to ABS-CBN after the letter of Mrs. Concio, still the fifteen (15) day period within which
ABS-CBN shall exercise its right of first refusal has already expired. 22
Accordingly, respondent court sustained the award of actual damages consisting in the cost of
print advertisements and the premium payments for the counterbond, there being adequate
proof of the pecuniary loss which RBS had suffered as a result of the filing of the complaint by
ABS-CBN. As to the award of moral damages, the Court of Appeals found reasonable basis
therefor, holding that RBS's reputation was debased by the filing of the complaint in Civil Case
No. Q-92-12309 and by the non-showing of the film "Maging Sino Ka Man." Respondent court
also held that exemplary damages were correctly imposed by way of example or correction for
the public good in view of the filing of the complaint despite petitioner's knowledge that the
contract with VIVA had not been perfected, It also upheld the award of attorney's fees,
reasoning that with ABS-CBN's act of instituting Civil Case No, Q-92-1209, RBS was
"unnecessarily forced to litigate." The appellate court, however, reduced the awards of moral
damages to P2 million, exemplary damages to P2 million, and attorney's fees to P500, 000.00.
On the other hand, respondent Court of Appeals denied VIVA and Del Rosario's appeal
because it was "RBS and not VIVA which was actually prejudiced when the complaint was
filed by ABS-CBN."
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, ABS-CBN filed the petition in this case,
contending that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in
. . . RULING THAT THERE WAS NO PERFECTED CONTRACT BETWEEN PETITIONER

AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT VIVA NOTWITHSTANDING PREPONDERANCE OF
EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY PETITIONER TO THE CONTRARY.
II
. . . IN AWARDING ACTUAL AND COMPENSATORY DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE

RESPONDENT RBS.
III
. . . IN AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE

RESPONDENT RBS.
IV
. . . IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES IN FAVOR OF RBS.
ABS-CBN claims that it had yet to fully exercise its right of first refusal over twenty-four titles
under the 1990 Film Exhibition Agreement, as it had chosen only ten titles from the first list. It
insists that we give credence to Lopez's testimony that he and Del Rosario met at the Tamarind
Grill Restaurant, discussed the terms and conditions of the second list (the 1992 Film
Exhibition Agreement) and upon agreement thereon, wrote the same on a paper napkin. It also
asserts that the contract has already been effective, as the elements thereof, namely, consent,
object, and consideration were established. It then concludes that the Court of Appeals'
pronouncements were not supported by law and jurisprudence, as per our decision of 1
December 1995 in Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, which cited Toyota Shaw,
23
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, Ang Yu Asuncion v. Court of Appeals, and Villonco Realty
24 25
Company v. Bormaheco. Inc. 26
Anent the actual damages awarded to RBS, ABS-CBN disavows liability therefor. RBS spent
for the premium on the counterbond of its own volition in order to negate the injunction issued
by the trial court after the parties had ventilated their respective positions during the hearings
for the purpose. The filing of the counterbond was an option available to RBS, but it can hardly
be argued that ABS-CBN compelled RBS to incur such expense. Besides, RBS had another
available option, i.e., move for the dissolution or the injunction; or if it was determined to put
up a counterbond, it could have presented a cash bond. Furthermore under Article 2203 of the
Civil Code, the party suffering loss or injury is also required to exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family to minimize the damages resulting from the act or omission. As regards the
cost of print advertisements, RBS had not convincingly established that this was a loss
attributable to the non showing "Maging Sino Ka Man"; on the contrary, it was brought out
during trial that with or without the case or the injunction, RBS would have spent such an
amount to generate interest in the film.
ABS-CBN further contends that there was no clear basis for the awards of moral and
exemplary damages. The controversy involving ABS-CBN and RBS did not in any way
originate from business transaction between them. The claims for such damages did not arise
from any contractual dealings or from specific acts committed by ABS-CBN against RBS that
may be characterized as wanton, fraudulent, or reckless; they arose by virtue only of the filing
of the complaint, An award of moral and exemplary damages is not warranted where the record
is bereft of any proof that a party acted maliciously or in bad faith in filing an action. In any
27
case, free resort to courts for redress of wrongs is a matter of public policy. The law recognizes
the right of every one to sue for that which he honestly believes to be his right without fear of
standing trial for damages where by lack of sufficient evidence, legal technicalities, or a
different interpretation of the laws on the matter, the case would lose ground. One who makes
28
use of his own legal right does no injury. If damage results front the filing of the complaint, it
29
is damnum absque injuria. Besides, moral damages are generally not awarded in favor of a
30
juridical person, unless it enjoys a good reputation that was debased by the offending party
resulting in social humiliation. 31
As regards the award of attorney's fees, ABS-CBN maintains that the same had no factual,
legal, or equitable justification. In sustaining the trial court's award, the Court of Appeals acted
in clear disregard of the doctrines laid down in Buan v. Camaganacan that the text of the
32
decision should state the reason why attorney's fees are being awarded; otherwise, the award
should be disallowed. Besides, no bad faith has been imputed on, much less proved as having
been committed by, ABS-CBN. It has been held that "where no sufficient showing of bad faith
would be reflected in a party' s persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the
righteousness of his cause, attorney's fees shall not be recovered as cost." 33
On the other hand, RBS asserts that there was no perfected contract between ABS-CBN and
VIVA absent any meeting of minds between them regarding the object and consideration of
the alleged contract. It affirms that the ABS-CBN's claim of a right of first refusal was correctly
rejected by the trial court. RBS insist the premium it had paid for the counterbond constituted
a pecuniary loss upon which it may recover. It was obliged to put up the counterbound due to
the injunction procured by ABS-CBN. Since the trial court found that ABS-CBN had no cause
of action or valid claim against RBS and, therefore not entitled to the writ of injunction, RBS
could recover from ABS-CBN the premium paid on the counterbond. Contrary to the claim of
ABS-CBN, the cash bond would prove to be more expensive, as the loss would be equivalent
to the cost of money RBS would forego in case the P30 million came from its funds or was
borrowed from banks.
RBS likewise asserts that it was entitled to the cost of advertisements for the cancelled showing
of the film "Maging Sino Ka Man" because the print advertisements were put out to announce
the showing on a particular day and hour on Channel 7, i.e., in its entirety at one time, not a
series to be shown on a periodic basis. Hence, the print advertisement were good and relevant
for the particular date showing, and since the film could not be shown on that particular date
and hour because of the injunction, the expenses for the advertisements had gone to waste.
As regards moral and exemplary damages, RBS asserts that ABS-CBN filed the case and
secured injunctions purely for the purpose of harassing and prejudicing RBS. Pursuant then to
Article 19 and 21 of the Civil Code, ABS-CBN must be held liable for such
damages. Citing Tolentino, damages may be awarded in cases of abuse of rights even if the
34
act done is not illicit and there is abuse of rights were plaintiff institutes and action purely for
the purpose of harassing or prejudicing the defendant.
In support of its stand that a juridical entity can recover moral and exemplary damages, private
respondents RBS cited People v. Manero, where it was stated that such entity may recover
35
moral and exemplary damages if it has a good reputation that is debased resulting in social
humiliation. it then ratiocinates; thus:
There can be no doubt that RBS' reputation has been debased by ABS-CBN's acts in this case.
When RBS was not able to fulfill its commitment to the viewing public to show the film "Maging
Sino Ka Man" on the scheduled dates and times (and on two occasions that RBS advertised),
it suffered serious embarrassment and social humiliation. When the showing was canceled,
late viewers called up RBS' offices and subjected RBS to verbal abuse ("Announce kayo nang
announce, hindi ninyo naman ilalabas," "nanloloko yata kayo") (Exh. 3-RBS, par. 3). This alone
was not something RBS brought upon itself. it was exactly what ABS-CBN had planned to
happen.
The amount of moral and exemplary damages cannot be said to be excessive. Two reasons
justify the amount of the award.
The first is that the humiliation suffered by RBS is national extent. RBS operations as a
broadcasting company is [sic] nationwide. Its clientele, like that of ABS-CBN, consists of those
who own and watch television. It is not an exaggeration to state, and it is a matter of judicial
notice that almost every other person in the country watches television. The humiliation
suffered by RBS is multiplied by the number of televiewers who had anticipated the showing
of the film "Maging Sino Ka Man" on May 28 and November 3, 1992 but did not see it owing
to the cancellation. Added to this are the advertisers who had placed commercial spots for the
telecast and to whom RBS had a commitment in consideration of the placement to show the
film in the dates and times specified.
The second is that it is a competitor that caused RBS to suffer the humiliation. The humiliation
and injury are far greater in degree when caused by an entity whose ultimate business
objective is to lure customers (viewers in this case) away from the competition. 36
For their part, VIVA and Vicente del Rosario contend that the findings of fact of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals do not support ABS-CBN's claim that there was a perfected contract.
Such factual findings can no longer be disturbed in this petition for review under Rule 45, as
only questions of law can be raised, not questions of fact. On the issue of damages and
attorneys fees, they adopted the arguments of RBS.
The key issues for our consideration are (1) whether there was a perfected contract between
VIVA and ABS-CBN, and (2) whether RBS is entitled to damages and attorney's fees. It may
be noted that the award of attorney's fees of P212,000 in favor of VIVA is not assigned as
another error.
I.
The first issue should be resolved against ABS-CBN. A contract is a meeting of minds between
two persons whereby one binds himself to give something or to render some service to
another for a consideration. there is no contract unless the following requisites concur: (1)
37
consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the subject of the contract; and
(3) cause of the obligation, which is established. A contract undergoes three stages:
38
(a) preparation, conception, or generation, which is the period of negotiation and bargaining,
ending at the moment of agreement of the parties;
(b) perfection or birth of the contract, which is the moment when the parties come to agree on
the terms of the contract; and
(c) consummation or death, which is the fulfillment or performance of the terms agreed upon
in the contract.39
Contracts that are consensual in nature are perfected upon mere meeting of the minds, Once
there is concurrence between the offer and the acceptance upon the subject matter,
consideration, and terms of payment a contract is produced. The offer must be certain. To
convert the offer into a contract, the acceptance must be absolute and must not qualify the
terms of the offer; it must be plain, unequivocal, unconditional, and without variance of any sort
from the proposal. A qualified acceptance, or one that involves a new proposal, constitutes a
counter-offer and is a rejection of the original offer. Consequently, when something is desired
which is not exactly what is proposed in the offer, such acceptance is not sufficient to generate
consent because any modification or variation from the terms of the offer annuls the offer. 40
When Mr. Del Rosario of VIVA met with Mr. Lopez of ABS-CBN at the Tamarind Grill on 2 April
1992 to discuss the package of films, said package of 104 VIVA films was VIVA's offer to ABS-
CBN to enter into a new Film Exhibition Agreement. But ABS-CBN, sent, through Ms. Concio,
a counter-proposal in the form of a draft contract proposing exhibition of 53 films for a
consideration of P35 million. This counter-proposal could be nothing less than the counter-
offer of Mr. Lopez during his conference with Del Rosario at Tamarind Grill Restaurant. Clearly,
there was no acceptance of VIVA's offer, for it was met by a counter-offer which substantially
varied the terms of the offer.
ABS-CBN's reliance in Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v. Court of

Appeals and Villonco Realty Company v. Bormaheco, Inc., is misplaced. In these cases, it
41 42
was held that an acceptance may contain a request for certain changes in the terms of the
offer and yet be a binding acceptance as long as "it is clear that the meaning of the acceptance
is positively and unequivocally to accept the offer, whether such request is granted or not."
This ruling was, however, reversed in the resolution of 29 March 1996, which ruled that the
43
acceptance of all offer must be unqualified and absolute, i.e., it "must be identical in all respects
with that of the offer so as to produce consent or meeting of the minds."
On the other hand, in Villonco, cited in Limketkai, the alleged changes in the revised counter-
offer were not material but merely clarificatory of what had previously been agreed upon.
It cited the statement in Stuart v. Franklin Life Insurance Co. that "a vendor's change in a
44
phrase of the offer to purchase, which change does not essentially change the terms of the
offer, does not amount to a rejection of the offer and the tender of a counter-offer." However,
45
when any of the elements of the contract is modified upon acceptance, such alteration amounts
to a counter-offer.
In the case at bar, ABS-CBN made no unqualified acceptance of VIVA's offer. Hence, they
underwent a period of bargaining. ABS-CBN then formalized its counter-proposals or counter-
offer in a draft contract, VIVA through its Board of Directors, rejected such counter-offer, Even
if it be conceded arguendo that Del Rosario had accepted the counter-offer, the acceptance
did not bind VIVA, as there was no proof whatsoever that Del Rosario had the specific authority
to do so.
Under Corporation Code, unless otherwise provided by said Code, corporate powers, such
46
as the power; to enter into contracts; are exercised by the Board of Directors. However, the
Board may delegate such powers to either an executive committee or officials or contracted
managers. The delegation, except for the executive committee, must be for specific
purposes, Delegation to officers makes the latter agents of the corporation; accordingly, the
47
general rules of agency as to the bindings effects of their acts would

apply. For such officers to be deemed fully clothed by the corporation to exercise a power of
48
the Board, the latter must specially authorize them to do so. That Del Rosario did not have the
authority to accept ABS-CBN's counter-offer was best evidenced by his submission of the draft
contract to VIVA's Board of Directors for the latter's approval. In any event, there was between
Del Rosario and Lopez III no meeting of minds. The following findings of the trial court are
instructive:
A number of considerations militate against ABS-CBN's claim that a contract was perfected at
that lunch meeting on April 02, 1992 at the Tamarind Grill.
FIRST, Mr. Lopez claimed that what was agreed upon at the Tamarind Grill referred to the
price and the number of films, which he wrote on a napkin. However, Exhibit "C"
contains numerous provisions which, were not discussed at the Tamarind Grill, if Lopez
testimony was to be believed nor could they have been physically written on a napkin. There
was even doubt as to whether it was a paper napkin or a cloth napkin. In short what were
written in Exhibit "C'' were not discussed, and therefore could not have been agreed upon, by
the parties. How then could this court compel the parties to sign Exhibit "C" when the provisions
thereof were not previously agreed upon?
SECOND, Mr. Lopez claimed that what was agreed upon as the subject matter of the contract
was 14 films. The complaint in fact prays for delivery of 14 films. But Exhibit "C" mentions 53
films as its subject matter. Which is which If Exhibits "C" reflected the true intent of the parties,
then ABS-CBN's claim for 14 films in its complaint is false or if what it alleged in the complaint
is true, then Exhibit "C" did not reflect what was agreed upon by the parties. This underscores
the fact that there was no meeting of the minds as to the subject matter of the contracts, so as
to preclude perfection thereof. For settled is the rule that there can be no contract where there
is no object which is its subject matter (Art. 1318, NCC).
THIRD, Mr. Lopez [sic] answer to question 29 of his affidavit testimony (Exh. "D") states:
We were able to reach an agreement. VIVA gave us the exclusive license to show these
fourteen (14) films, and we agreed to pay Viva the amount of P16,050,000.00 as well as grant
Viva commercial slots worth P19,950,000.00. We had already earmarked this P16, 050,000.00.
which gives a total consideration of P36 million (P19,950,000.00 plus P16,050,000.00. equals
P36,000,000.00).
On cross-examination Mr. Lopez testified:

Q. What was written in this napkin?
A. The total price, the breakdown the known Viva movies, the 7 blockbuster movies and the
other 7 Viva movies because the price was broken down accordingly. The none [sic] Viva and
the seven other Viva movies and the sharing between the cash portion and the concerned spot
portion in the total amount of P35 million pesos.
Now, which is which? P36 million or P35 million? This weakens ABS-CBN's claim.
FOURTH. Mrs. Concio, testifying for ABS-CBN stated that she transmitted Exhibit "C" to Mr.
Del Rosario with a handwritten note, describing said Exhibit "C" as a "draft." (Exh. "5" - Viva;
tsn pp. 23-24 June 08, 1992). The said draft has a well defined meaning.
Since Exhibit "C" is only a draft, or a tentative, provisional or preparatory writing prepared for
discussion, the terms and conditions thereof could not have been previously agreed upon by
ABS-CBN and Viva Exhibit "C'' could not therefore legally bind Viva, not having agreed thereto.
In fact, Ms. Concio admitted that the terms and conditions embodied in Exhibit "C" were
prepared by ABS-CBN's lawyers and there was no discussion on said terms and conditions. . . .
As the parties had not yet discussed the proposed terms and conditions in Exhibit "C," and
there was no evidence whatsoever that Viva agreed to the terms and conditions thereof, said
document cannot be a binding contract. The fact that Viva refused to sign Exhibit "C" reveals
only two [sic] well that it did not agree on its terms and conditions, and this court has no
authority to compel Viva to agree thereto.
FIFTH. Mr. Lopez understand [sic] that what he and Mr. Del Rosario agreed upon at the
Tamarind Grill was only provisional, in the sense that it was subject to approval by the Board
of Directors of Viva. He testified:
Q. Now, Mr. Witness, and after that Tamarind meeting ... the second meeting wherein you
claimed that you have the meeting of the minds between you and Mr. Vic del Rosario, what
happened?
A. Vic Del Rosario was supposed to call us up and tell us specifically the result of the
discussion with the Board of Directors.
Q. And you are referring to the so-called agreement which you wrote in [sic] a piece of paper?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So, he was going to forward that to the board of Directors for approval?
A. Yes, sir. (Tsn, pp. 42-43, June 8, 1992)
Q. Did Mr. Del Rosario tell you that he will submit it to his Board for approval?
A. Yes, sir. (Tsn, p. 69, June 8, 1992).
The above testimony of Mr. Lopez shows beyond doubt that he knew Mr. Del Rosario had no
authority to bind Viva to a contract with ABS-CBN until and unless its Board of Directors
approved it. The complaint, in fact, alleges that Mr. Del Rosario "is the Executive Producer of
defendant Viva" which "is a corporation." (par. 2, complaint). As a mere agent of Viva, Del
Rosario could not bind Viva unless what he did is ratified by its Board of Directors. (Vicente
vs. Geraldez, 52 SCRA 210; Arnold vs. Willets and Paterson, 44 Phil. 634). As a mere agent,
recognized as such by plaintiff, Del Rosario could not be held liable jointly and severally with
Viva and his inclusion as party defendant has no legal basis. (Salonga vs. Warner Barner [sic] ,
COLTA , 88 Phil. 125; Salmon vs. Tan, 36 Phil. 556).
The testimony of Mr. Lopez and the allegations in the complaint are clear admissions that what
was supposed to have been agreed upon at the Tamarind Grill between Mr. Lopez and Del
Rosario was not a binding agreement. It is as it should be because corporate power to enter
into a contract is lodged in the Board of Directors. (Sec. 23, Corporation Code). Without such
board approval by the Viva board, whatever agreement Lopez and Del Rosario arrived at could
not ripen into a valid contract binding upon Viva (Yao Ka Sin Trading vs. Court of Appeals, 209
SCRA 763). The evidence adduced shows that the Board of Directors of Viva rejected Exhibit
"C" and insisted that the film package for 140 films be maintained (Exh. "7-1" - Viva ). 49
The contention that ABS-CBN had yet to fully exercise its right of first refusal over twenty-four
films under the 1990 Film Exhibition Agreement and that the meeting between Lopez and Del
Rosario was a continuation of said previous contract is untenable. As observed by the trial
court, ABS-CBN right of first refusal had already been exercised when Ms. Concio wrote to
VIVA ticking off ten films, Thus:
[T]he subsequent negotiation with ABS-CBN two (2) months after this letter was sent, was for
an entirely different package. Ms. Concio herself admitted on cross-examination to having
used or exercised the right of first refusal. She stated that the list was not acceptable and was
indeed not accepted by ABS-CBN, (TSN, June 8, 1992, pp. 8-10). Even Mr. Lopez himself
admitted that the right of the first refusal may have been already exercised by Ms. Concio (as
she had). (TSN, June 8, 1992, pp. 71-75). Del Rosario himself knew and understand [sic] that
ABS-CBN has lost its rights of the first refusal when his list of 36 titles were rejected (Tsn, June
9, 1992, pp. 10-11) 50
II
However, we find for ABS-CBN on the issue of damages. We shall first take up actual damages.
Chapter 2, Title XVIII, Book IV of the Civil Code is the specific law on actual or compensatory
damages. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to compensation for
actual damages only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. The 51
indemnification shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the
profits that the obligee failed to obtain. In contracts and quasi-contracts the damages which
52
may be awarded are dependent on whether the obligor acted with good faith or otherwise, It
case of good faith, the damages recoverable are those which are the natural and probable
consequences of the breach of the obligation and which the parties have foreseen or could
have reasonably foreseen at the time of the constitution of the obligation. If the obligor acted
with fraud, bad faith, malice, or wanton attitude, he shall be responsible for all damages which
may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. In crimes and quasi-
53
delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of, whether or not such damages has been
foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant. 54
Actual damages may likewise be recovered for loss or impairment of earning capacity in cases
of temporary or permanent personal injury, or for injury to the plaintiff's business standing or
commercial credit. 55
The claim of RBS for actual damages did not arise from contract, quasi-contract, delict, or
quasi-delict. It arose from the fact of filing of the complaint despite ABS-CBN's alleged
knowledge of lack of cause of action. Thus paragraph 12 of RBS's Answer with Counterclaim
and Cross-claim under the heading COUNTERCLAIM specifically alleges:
12. ABS-CBN filed the complaint knowing fully well that it has no cause of action RBS. As a
result thereof, RBS suffered actual damages in the amount of P6,621,195.32. 56
Needless to state the award of actual damages cannot be comprehended under the above law
on actual damages. RBS could only probably take refuge under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the
Civil Code, which read as follows:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for tile same.
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
It may further be observed that in cases where a writ of preliminary injunction is issued, the
damages which the defendant may suffer by reason of the writ are recoverable from the
injunctive bond. In this case, ABS-CBN had not yet filed the required bond; as a matter of
57
fact, it asked for reduction of the bond and even went to the Court of Appeals to challenge the
order on the matter, Clearly then, it was not necessary for RBS to file a counterbond. Hence,
ABS-CBN cannot be held responsible for the premium RBS paid for the counterbond.
Neither could ABS-CBN be liable for the print advertisements for "Maging Sino Ka Man" for
lack of sufficient legal basis. The RTC issued a temporary restraining order and later, a writ of
preliminary injunction on the basis of its determination that there existed sufficient ground for
the issuance thereof. Notably, the RTC did not dissolve the injunction on the ground of lack of
legal and factual basis, but because of the plea of RBS that it be allowed to put up a
counterbond.
As regards attorney's fees, the law is clear that in the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees
may be recovered as actual or compensatory damages under any of the circumstances
provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. 58
The general rule is that attorney's fees cannot be recovered as part of damages because of
the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. They are not to be awarded
59
every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney's fees under Article
2208 demands factual, legal, and equitable justification. Even when claimant is compelled to
60
litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still attorney's fees may not
be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a party's persistence
in a case other than erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause. 61
As to moral damages the law is Section 1, Chapter 3, Title XVIII, Book IV of the Civil Code.
Article 2217 thereof defines what are included in moral damages, while Article 2219
enumerates the cases where they may be recovered, Article 2220 provides that moral
damages may be recovered in breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or
in bad faith. RBS's claim for moral damages could possibly fall only under item (10) of Article
2219, thereof which reads:
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
Moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual
injury suffered. and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. The award is not meant to
62
enrich the complainant at the expense of the defendant, but to enable the injured party to
obtain means, diversion, or amusements that will serve to obviate then moral suffering he has
undergone. It is aimed at the restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status
quo ante, and should be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Trial courts must then guard
63
against the award of exorbitant damages; they should exercise balanced restrained and
measured objectivity to avoid suspicion that it was due to passion, prejudice, or corruption on
the part of the trial court.
64
The award of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of a corporation because, being an
artificial person and having existence only in legal contemplation, it has no feelings, no
emotions, no senses, It cannot, therefore, experience physical suffering and mental anguish,
which call be experienced only by one having a nervous system. The statement in People
65
v. Manero and Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB that a corporation may recover moral
66 67
damages if it "has a good reputation that is debased, resulting in social humiliation" is an obiter
dictum. On this score alone the award for damages must be set aside, since RBS is a
corporation.
The basic law on exemplary damages is Section 5, Chapter 3, Title XVIII, Book IV of the Civil
Code. These are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. They are recoverable in criminal
68
cases as part of the civil liability when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances; in quasi-contracts, if the defendant acted with gross negligence; and in
69 70
contracts and quasi-contracts, if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,

oppressive, or malevolent manner. 71
It may be reiterated that the claim of RBS against ABS-CBN is not based on contract, quasi-
contract, delict, or quasi-delict, Hence, the claims for moral and exemplary damages can only
be based on Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code.
The elements of abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) the existence of a legal
right or duty, (2) which is exercised in bad faith, and (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which
do not especially provide for their own sanction; while Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus
mores, and has the following elements; (1) there is an act which is legal, (2) but which is
contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy, and (3) and it is done with intent
to injure.72
Verily then, malice or bad faith is at the core of Articles 19, 20, and 21. Malice or bad faith
implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or
moral obliquity. Such must be substantiated by evidence.
73 74
There is no adequate proof that ABS-CBN was inspired by malice or bad faith. It was honestly
convinced of the merits of its cause after it had undergone serious negotiations culminating in
its formal submission of a draft contract. Settled is the rule that the adverse result of an action
does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to damages, for the law could
not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. If damages result from a person's
exercise of a right, it is damnum absque injuria.75
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No, 44125 is hereby REVERSED except as to unappealed award of
attorney's fees in favor of VIVA Productions, Inc. 1âwphi1.n êt
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Kapunan, Martinez and Pardo JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4316 May 28, 1952
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. HIGINIO MACADAEG, HON. POTENCIANO PECSON, HON. RAMON SAN JOSE,
as Chairman and Members, respectively; of the Seventh Guerrilla Amnesty
Commission, and ANTONIO GUILLERMO, alias, SLIVER, as an interested
party, respondents.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Esmeraldo Umali for
petitioner.
Hon. Higinio B. Macadaeg, Hon. Potenciano Pecson and Hon. Ramon R. San Jose in their
own behalf. Antonio V. Raquiza and Marcelino N. Sayo for respondent Antonio Guillermo.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an action of prohibition against the Seventh Guerilla Amnesty Commission, composed
of Honorables Higinio Macadaeg, Potenciano Pecson, and Ramon R. San Jose, Judges of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, to restrain and prevent it from taking jurisdiction and
cognizance of a petition for amnesty filed by respondent Antonio Guillermo, alias Silver, who
was convicted and sentenced by this Court on May 19, 1950, for murder in G.R. No. L-
2188. * The grounds upon which the petition are based are (1) that this Court has already
expressly ruled in its judgment of conviction of said case that said Antonio Guillermo is not
entitled to the benefits of amnesty, because the murders of which he was convicted were
committed "not in furtherance of the resistance movement but in the course of a fratricidal strife
between two rival guerilla units," and (2) that the Seventh Guerilla Amnesty Commission can
take cognizance only of cases pending appeal in the Supreme Court on October 2, 1946 (date
of Administrative Order No. 1 of the President), at that time. The respondents filed answers
independently of each other, and with the exception of Judge Ramon R. San Jose, they oppose
the petition, alleging (1) that the decision of this Court does not prevent the respondent Antonio
Guillermo from invoking his right to the provisions of the amnesty, because said right was not
an issue at the trial on the case against him, and the pronouncement of this Court thereon is
not final and conclusive and is merely an obiter dictum, and (2) that under a liberal
interpretation of the administrative orders implementing the President's Amnesty Proclamation,
the respondent Commission has jurisdiction of said petition.
The record discloses that the original information against respondent Antonio Guillermo was
filed in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte on September 16, 1946, and as amended
information, on July 15, 1947. The Court of First Instance rendered judgment on March 29,
1948. Thereupon, Guillermo presented an appeal to this Court, and this Court rendered its
judgement on May 19, 1950. On June 5, 1950, Guillermo's Counsel filed a motion for
reconsideration, but this motion was denied on July 13, 1950. On June 20, 1950, even before
his motion for reconsideration was acted upon, respondent Guillermo filed a motion with this
Court for the suspension of the proceedings and the reference of the case to the Seventh
Guerilla Amnesty Commission, but this motion was denied by this Court on July 13, 1950.
Antonio Guillermo filed his petition for amnesty for respondent Commission on July 8, 1950.
On August 2, 1950, the records of the case against Guillermo were remanded to the clerk of
the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte for the execution of the judgment, and on October
17, 1950, the respondent Commission required the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte to forward the records of the case to it, and on November 9, 1950, it is set the case for
hearing over the opposition of the Solicitor General. It was at this stage that this action of
prohibition was filed in this Court.
The first ground upon which the opposition to the petition is based, namely, that the holding of
this Court that the respondent Guillermo is not entitled to the benefits of the amnesty
proclamation, is merely an obiter dictum, is without any legal foundation, and must be
dismissed. An obiter dictum is an opinion "uttered by the way, not upon the point or question
pending, as if turning aside from the main topic of the case to collateral subjects"
(Newman vs. Kay, 49 S.E. 926, 931, 57 W. Va. 98, 68 L.R.A. 908, 4 Ann. Cas. 39 citing United
States ex rel. Johnston vs. Clark County Court, 96 U.S. 211, 24 Ed. 628), or the opinion of the
court upon any point or principle which it is not required to decide (29 Words & Phrases 15),
or an opinion of the court which does not embody its determination and is made without
argument or full consideration of the point, and is not professed deliberate determinations of
the judge himself (29 Words & Phrases 13.). A cursory reading of the decision of this Court in
G. R. No. L-2188 ** against respondent Antonio Guillermo discloses that the ruling of the Court
that the said respondent is not entitled to the benefits of the amnesty is not an obiter dictum,
but is a ruling of the Court on an issue expressly raised by the party appellant on facts or
evidence adduced in the course of the trial of his case. It is not an opinion uttered by the way;
it is a direct ruling on an issue expressly raised by a party. It was not unnecessary to make
that ruling; the ruling was absolutely essential to a determination of a question of fact and of
law directly in issue. It was not made without argument or full consideration of the point; it was
deliberately entered by the Court after arguments on both sides had been heard. This Could
not have avoided determining the issue without the peril of rendering an incomplete decision.
Hereinbelow we quote portions of the decision of this Court, from it which it can readily be seen
that it had before it evidence of the claim of amnesty expressly raised before the Court, and its
ruling that appellant was not entitled thereto.
xxx xxx xxx

Apparently realizing the inconsistency and untenability of that position appellant also contends
that granting for the sake of argument that the accused was the author of the crime, there is
proof "that the ill-starred seven were charged of (with) being spies for the Japanese.
The insincerity and weakness of this last-ditch plea is manifest. Appellant does not claim that
he killed the seven victims because he had proof and believe that they were spies for the
Japanese. He merely says that they were charged (by Sagad) with being spies for the
Japanese.
xxx xxx xxx
At any rate, the amnesty proclamation now invoked is not applicable. We are satisfied from
the proofs that the massacre in question was committed not in furtherance of the resistance
movement but in the course of a fracticidad strife between two rival guerrilla units. That was to
hinder and not a further the resistance against the Japanese enemy. It was a shame: and it
would be adding insult to injury to stigmatize the memory of the unfortunate victims of such
lust for power of and supremacy as spies and traitors to their country, in the absence of the
competent proof as they really were. We spurn the baseless suggestion as rank injustice.
A more serious contention is, May not respondent Guillermo raise the issue before the
corresponding guerrilla amnesty commission in view of our ruling in the case of Viray vs.
Crisologo, et al.*** G. R. No. L-2540, in which we held that the fact that the defendant has
declined to take advantage of the amnesty proclamation at the beginning of his trial before a
court martial does not preclude him from invoking it after he was found guilty and convicted.
The express holding of this Court is that case is as follows:
In our opinion the fact that respondent Crisologo had declined to take advantage of the
amnesty proclamation at the beginning of his trial before the court martial does not now
preclude him from invoking it, specially after he was found guilty and convicted. Before his trial
he may and he must have entertained the idea and the belief that the killing was justified and
was done in the performance of his duties as an official according to the criminal law, and that
consequently there was no need for amnesty. However, after the court martial had disagreed
with him and disabused him of his belief, he realized the necessity of invoking amnesty. There
is nothing in the law that stands in his way toward seeking the benefits of a law which in his
opinion covers and obliterates the act of which he had been found criminally responsible.
We hold that the above cited is not applicable to the case at bar, for in that case the defendant
did not invoke the benefits of the amnesty at the time of the trial or on appeal, and only did so
after he had been adjudge guilty and convicted, while in the case at bar he did so. It is true
that the appellant Guillermo did not expressly plead amnesty, but the facts and circumstances
surrounding the commission of the act charged against him as an offense were disclosed at
the trial, from which facts and circumstances he later predicated the issue, before this Court,
that he was entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. It may be true that the appellant Guillermo
did not expressly plead amnesty as a defense at the trial of his case. But the rules on the
criminal procedure do not include to be expressly pleaded. (Section 1, Rule 113, Rule of Court.)
Even without an express plea of amnesty, a defendant may submit evidence that the
commission of the act imputed to him falls within the provisions of the amnesty proclamation,
without a previous formal announcement of such a defense before or during the trial. And even
without such express plea, if the court finds that the case falls under the provisions of the
amnesty proclamation, it is the duty of the court to declare the fact, if the fact justify such a
finding, and extend the benefits of the amnesty to him.
. . .; and the accused, during such trial, may present evidence to prove that his case falls within
the terms of this amnesty. If the fact is legally proved, the trial judge shall so declare and this
amnesty shall be immediately affective as to the accused, who shall forthwith be released or
discharged. (Proclamation No. 8, September 7, 1946, 42 Off. Gaz., No. 9 p. 2073.)
That the respondent herein Guillermo did not submit evidence to that effect is inferred from the
claim of his counsel in the case against him that "there is proof that the ill starred seven were
charged with being spies for the Japanese." Not only that, he expressly raised that issue in
this Court on appeal. May he rise this issue again before the guerrilla amnesty commission,
and thus have this administrative body reverse or change the finding of this Court?
Under the circumstances of the present case, we hold that he should no longer be permitted
to do so in view of "the general rule common to all civilized systems of jurisprudence that the
solemn and deliberate sentence of the law, pronounced by its appointed organs, upon a
disputed fact or state of facts, should be regarded as a final and conclusive determination of
the question litigated, and should forever set the controversy at rest. Indeed it has been well
said that this more maxim is more than a rule of law, more even than an important principle of
public policy; and that it is a fundamental concept in the organization of every jural society."
(Peñalosa vs. Tuason, 22 Phil., 303, 310; section 44, Rule 39, Rules of Court).
It is also argued, in support of the claim that this Court had no jurisdiction to make the ruling
that respondent Guillermo is not entitled to amnesty, that the guerrilla amnesty commissions
are the first ones to pass upon petitions for amnesty, that regular judicial tribunals can not rule
upon such an issue (of amnesty) unless it has first been resolved by a commission, and that
these are not judicial tribunals but administrative bodies acting as arms of the executive in
carrying out the purposes of the amnesty proclamation, which is merely a form of executive
clemency. It is true that the grant of amnesty originates in an exclusive act. But the
proclamation was issued under expressly authority in the Constitution [Article VII, section 10
(6)], was expressly sanctioned by the Congress (Resolution No. 13 dated September 18, 1946),
and has the nature, force, effect, and operation of a law. That the cognizance of applications
for amnesty is vested in the guerrilla amnesty commissions are mere screening bodies is not
denied, but there is nothing in the proclamation to support the contention that the authority to
decide any claim for amnesty is to be exercised but said commissions alone, to the exclusion
of the courts. Neither can it be denied that any one charged before the courts may claim as a
defense, waive the filing of an application therefor, and submit evidence thereof in the trial of
his case. In this latter case it would be a cumbersome procedure, indeed, if said defense were
first required to be submitted to commission for decision, latter to be reviewed by a court. The
only sensible interpretation of the law is that while all applications should be passed upon by
commissions, an accused may, instead of filing an application, choose the alternative remedy
of just raising the issue in a court of justice in the trial of his case. And if this second alternative
is chosen, the applicant should be declared estopped from contesting the decision, as well as
the authority of the court that adversely passed upon his claim.
But there are further and other considerations, also weighty and important, that attend
respondent Guillermo's petition for amnesty. He is not one filed during the pendency of this
case in the Court of First Instance it is a petition filed after final judgment of conviction in this
Supreme Court. It does not appear in the record that during the one and a half-year period
(September 16, 1946, to March 29, 1948) that this case was being coursed and tried in the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, that he ever filed an application for amnesty. Neither
does it appear that the provincial fiscal has ever reported Guillermo's case to the Guerrilla
Amnesty Commission for Ilocos Norte, pursuant to the direct mandate of the amnesty
proclamation. Nor did Guillermo ever claim amnesty as his defense at the time of the trial. May
we not justly infer from these positive circumstances that, during all the time the case was
pending and up to the filling of appellant's brief in the Supreme Court, amnesty was never
thought of as a defense, either by the accused himself or by the fiscal, or by the judge trying
the case? As a matter of fact, this Court found that the issue of amnesty raised in this Court of
Appeal was a "last-ditch plea." Guillermo only thought of amnesty on June 20, 1950, after this
Court had found him guilty, overruling his defense of amnesty, and before his motion for
reconsideration was denied. We are therefore, constrained to hold that his present petition is
not entirely free from a reasonable suspicion as to its ends and purposes. It seems to us to be
a last desperate attempt by technicality to avert or delay the execution of the judgment of
conviction rendered against him. Of course, no court of justice would countenance such ill-
advised attempt.
The second ground upon which the petition for prohibition is based is that the Seventh Guerilla
Amnesty Commission has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of respondent Guillermo's
application. We also find this contention to be correct. Administrative Order No. 11, which
creates the guerrilla amnesty commission, expressly assigns to the Seventh "cases from the
different provinces and cities now pending appeal in the Supreme Court." (Emphasis ours.)
Said administrative order was promulgated on October 2, 1946, on which date the criminal
case against respondent Guillermo was still pending in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte. His case was a case in the province (Ilocos Norte) assigned to the Second Guerrilla
Amnesty Commission. Respondents cite administrative Order No. 217 of the Department of
Justice dated December 1, 1948 to support their claim that the Seventh has jurisdiction of the
application, because of that date Guillermo's case was already pending in the Supreme Court.
This department order was issued, as it expressly states, "in view of the appointments of new
Judges of First Instances," not for the purpose of setting forth cases cognizable by each of the
different commissions, which the President had already done. Besides, it can not be
interpreted to modify the President's administrative order apportioning the cases among the
amnesty commissions.
In resume of our conclusions, we state (1) that the finding of this Court that Guillermo is not
entitled to the benefits of amnesty, is not an obiter dictum but a pronouncement on a material
issue, and is final and conclusive against him and may not, under the principle of res judicata,
be again raised in issue by him in any tribunal, judicial or administrative; (2) that having
voluntarily raised the issue in this Court during the consideration of his case, he is now
estopped from contesting the judgment, of the jurisdiction of the court that rendered the
adverse ruling; (3) that this petition is an ill-advised attempt of doubtful good faith, to arrest or
delay the execution of a final judgement of conviction; and (4) that the respondent Commission
has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the application for amnesty.
Wherefore, the petition for prohibition is hereby granted, and the preliminary injunction issued
by this Court on November 24, 1950, made absolute, with costs against respondent Antonio
Guillermo, alias Silver.
Paras, C. J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-33628 December 29, 1987

BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, SANTIAGO EISMA, MIRUFO CELERIAN, JOSE SAYSON,

No. L-34162 December 29, 1987

BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, petitioner,

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx;

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

required by law in such cases, in support of the appointment he extended to ELIZABETH

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

required by law in such cases, in support of the appointment he extended to TERESITO

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

That on or about December 1, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Provincial

That on February 5, 1970, at Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Provincial Governor

II. SPECIFICATION FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 4 (b), R.A. 3019

required by law in such cases, in support of the appointment he extended to TERESITO

required by law in such cases, in support of the appointment he extended to ELIZABETH

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

That on or about December 2, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO EBARLE, Provincial

That on or about January 1, 1970, at Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO EBARLE, Provincial

That on or about November 1, 1969, at Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO EBARLE, Provincial

ALL CONTRARY TO AFORECITED LAW.

xxx xxx xxx

We dismiss these petitions.

RESIDENCE OF THE PRESIDENT

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 264

OUTLINING THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH COMPLAINANTS CHARGING GOVERNMENT

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of

(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

President of the Philippines

For as a general rule, a criminal action is commenced by complaint or information, both of

Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras, and Padilla, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-42050-66 November 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

G.R. No. L-46229-32 November 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

G.R. No. L-46313-16 November 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

G.R. No. L-46997 November 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

Norberto Parto for respondents Candelosas, Baes and Garcia.

Amado C. de la Marced for respondents Simeon Bundalian Jr., et al.

Manuel F. de Jesus for all the respondents in L-46229-32 and L-46313-16.

Norberto L. Apostol for respondent Panchito Refuncion.

MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:

A — The Information filed by the People —

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN,

Crim. Case No. 19639

VIOLATION OF PAR. 3, PRES. DECREE No. 9 OF PROCLAMATION 1081

The undersigned accuses PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN of a violation of paragraph 3,

Contrary to law. (p. 32, rollo of L-42050-66)

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO,

CRIM. CASE NO. 29677