Prove that the Pakistan is the Fort of Islam geographically and Politically?

Introduction

Pakistan is world’s ninth most populous country. It is situated in North West part of south Asian
sub continent and lies between 24’ and 37 ‘north latitude and 67’ and 75’ east longitude. It is
bounded on the east by India (1950 km) on north & north west by Afghanistan(1200 km) on
south west by Iran (800 km) on the south by Arabian Sea. It has also a common border on the
north with China (600 km).

Pakistan has a land of 769095 sq km, spread over a diverse terrain, comprising steep mountains
and deep valleys, fertile plains of Indus valley and deserts in sindh and balochistan.

Geographical importance

‘’ The foreign policy of a country is determined by its geography’’. (Napoleon)

This may be an exaggeration, but there can be no question that geography has had decisive effect
upon civilization and upon national development.

I will try to high light the geographic factor in the light of following points like Size, Location,
Natural resources & geo politics.

Size

The land area of a state in itself is an element of power. Size effects on the conduct of warfare,
population and natural resources. Size also effects on national unity. It is important from
administrative and cultural point of view.

In this perspective Pakistan is ideal. Its size is greater than many developed countries like UK,
France, Japan and its population is less than Japan Indonesia and Malaysia. In this regard land of
Pakistan is quite enough for its inhabitants for their use like residence , agriculture , forestry,
industry and other facilities of infrastructure like dams roads and motorways.

Location

Location is perhaps more important than size. Location tends to make a state a land power or a
sea power. Pakistan has two of the largest countries of the world as its neighbor’s .china with a
population of over one billion and India with nearly a billion.

During the cold war era Pakistan played a role of buffer zone in communism and capitalism.
Pakistan is located at the mouth of Indian Ocean. Thus it is the gate way for central Asian states
to reach the Indian Ocean. Worlds 75% trade pass through Arabian Sea and Pakistan enjoys the
privilege of being a central point in that trade route having 700 km of coastal line and deep sea
port of Gawader.
Natural Resources

Pakistan has the best natural resources of the world. Lack of technology fragile infrastructure and
limited financial resources are the main hurdles in the way to explore and utilize these resources.

Population

Pakistan is fortunate in this regard that it has greater ratio of young generation while in contrast
to that the west is far behind from us. Our only need is to properly educate our youngsters. The
vivid proof of our talent is that Pakistanis are showing excellent performance in every sphere of
life in the developed countries. Our atomic bomb is another example of the talent of our
scientists.

Now the question is how to exploit all these positive factors in favor of Pakistan and why so far
our leaders failed to avail the opportunities which are spread on all over the horizon and waiting
for us to grasp them . May be our young generation find the answer of this question?

Write a detail note on Khilafat Movement, its impact on Indian Independence movement
and on Pan-Islamism?
The Khilafat movement was a religio-political movement launched by the Muslims of British
India for the retention of the Ottoman Caliphate and for not handing over the control of Muslim
holy places to non-Muslims.

Turkey sided with Germany in World War 1. As it began to lose the war, concerns were
expressed in India about the future of Turkey. It was a peak period from 1919 to 1922 casting
demonstrations, boycott, and other pressure by the two major communities, the Hindus and the
Muslims. Being brothers, the Indian Muslims realized their religious duty to help the Muslim
country. It was the extra territorial attachments based on Islam. Another factor same to the first
was that the Indian Muslims considered Ottoman Caliphate a symbol of unity of the Muslim
world as Ummah.

Goals:

1. Ottoman Khilafat should be kept intact.

2. To preserved the Territorial solidarity.
3. Control of holy the places should not be given to non-Muslims.

Dimensions:

The writings of the Muslim intellectuals provoked the sentiments for the preservation of Khilafat
and retention of the Muslims control of the holy places. The Muslims journalism played a vital
role to steer the direction of the struggle. Zamindar of Zafar Ali Khan, Comrade and Hamdard of
Maulana Muhammad Ali Jauhar, and Al-Hilal of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad etc. were the
prominent newspapers and magazines which performed their duties to express their resentment.
The Allies imposed humiliating terms on vanquished Turkey.
Protests in India:

All India Khilafat Committee was formed at Bombay in July 1919. The first Khilafat Conference
at Delhi in November 1919 was arranged in which the Congress leaders like Gandhi and Nehru
participated. In this way, the major political parties joined hands to assault the injustice with the
Muslim community. These steps were announced:

No participation in victory celebrations.

Boycott of British goods
Non Cooperation with the Government

The second Khilafat Conference (Amritsar) was held in Dec. 1919. Maulana Muhammad Ali and
Shaukat Ali joined the session after being released from prison. In Jan. 1920, M. A. Ansari led a
delegation to Viceroy while Maulana M. A. Jauhar to Europe. The Khilafat Committee decided
to start non-cooperation in collaboration with the Congress in May 1920.

Rowlett Act, 1919

Rowlett Act was a black law introduced in India. To the law, the government got authority to
persecute any Indian and the arrested had no facility of legal assistance and right to appeal just as
the ‘Lettres de Cachet’ in France before the French Revolution. Jinnah resigned from the central
legislature as a protest.

Jallianwala Bagh Incident, April 1919

The people gathered in Jallianwala Bagh at Amritsar but General Dyer opened fire to disperse
the throng that cast huge human casualties (379). It is considered one of the great tragedies
in India. In 1940, by killing Governor Punjab, Sir Michaal O’ Dayer, ‘Ram Muhammad Singh
Azad’ got revenge of the Indian massacre.

Non-Cooperation:

The Nagpur Session of the Congress (Dec. 1920) approved non cooperation with Government
but Jinnah opposed and left the Congress on 13th April 1923, because he was against the use of
extra-constitutional means of protests.

The country was passing through a critical period and both the Congress and the Muslim League
fully felt the necessity of mutual co-operation to the Khilafat Movement. The leaders of the two
movements met at Amritsar and resolved to launch a country-wide agitation under the leadership
of Mr. Gandhi. So the two movements, one led by Maulana Muhammad Ali and the other by Mr.
Gandhi merged into one and it was directed against the British Government.

The policy of ‘progressive, non-violent, non-cooperation’ was to be given effect to in the

following manner:
 Renunciation of all Government titles.
Boycott of courts and educational institutions.
Resign from jobs.
Later resign from police and military jobs.
Refusal to pay taxes.
Boycott of foreign goods.

Khilafat Conference, Karachi, July 1921

In the session the participants expressed their loyalty to Turkish Sultan. They decided to continue
the agitation and supported Attaturk to expel foreign forces from Turkey.

Hijrat Movement 1920-21

The Indian ulama (religious leaders) declared India ‘Darul Harab.’ Darul Harab means the place
(country) where Muslims are not allowed to perform their religious practices. In the said
situation, the Muslims should migrate to the nearest safe place. The ulama issued verdicts to go
to Darul Islam, Afghanistan. There was an impression that King of Afghanistan would welcome
them. So the migration took place at large scale. Initially Afghans welcomed them. Later, they
closed the border and pushed the migrants back to the Indian territories. It resulted in loss of
lives and money. Many died during this mission. Some went to Soviet
Union from Afghanistan because they had nothing in India now.

End of the Movement

Moplah Revolt Malabar Coast, near Kalicut

Moplahs were the descendents of the Arab Muslims settled in the Sub Continent even before
the arrival of Muhammad Bin Qasim. In August 1921, they revolted against Hindu landlords
whose treatment was very brutal with them. Later this clash changed as Moplahs versus the
Police and Hindu. This embittered the Hindu-Muslim relations. There was an increase in
violence day by day and the Chorachori Incident (UP) in February 1922 worsened the
situation. The Congress volunteers set a police station on fire and 21 policemen were killed.
Gandhi suddenly called off the movement without consulting other leaders.

Developments in Turkey

In 1922 Attaturk emerged as a national leader and restricted powers of Sultan. Next he was
appointed Chief of the state by Grand National Assembly. In March 1924, Khilafat was
abolished. This caused a widespread resentment among the Indian Muslims. They sent
delegations to Turkey but failed to achieve their objectives.
Results of the Khilafat Movement

Despite its failure, the Khilafat Movement left a far-reaching impact on the Indian politics.
Following are the most significant influences which the Khilafat Movement left on the Indian
Politics:

The Khilafat Movement was a great Muslim struggle which provided dynamic leadership
to the Muslims and established foundations to launch further Muslim Freedom movement on
stable and firm basis.
It confirmed to the Muslims that the Hindu mind can never be sincere to the Muslims.
The Khilafat Movement effectively demonstrated the religious enthusiasm of the Muslims
to the British. The British now seriously felt of giving independence to India.
The Khilafat Movement also cultivated a new outlook amongst the Muslims not to rely on
others support and to wholly depend on self-determination for the achievement of national
cause.
The Khilafat Movement developed a sense of concern amongst the Muslims about their
national matters and inculcated among them the awareness about their future.
The Khilafat Movement immensely strengthened the Two-Nation Theory which became
the basis of establishment of Pakistan.
The Khilafat Movement added much to the economic miseries of the Muslims who
resigned their jobs.

Reasons for the Failure of the Khilafat Movement

Following factors can be attributed towards the failure of the movement.

Gandhi’s action of calling off the Non-Cooperation movement at a moment when the
Government was about to make major concessions, was a severe set-back to the movement.
The Government arrested all important leaders of the movement which left the Muslims
leaderless who drifted aimlessly from one side to the other. The Government after arresting
leaders, adopted repressive measures on the masses to quell their agitation.
The Grand National Assembly of Turkey elected Mustafa Kamal as their leader who
abolished the institution of Caliphate and the last Caliph Sultan Abdul Majeed was banished
from Turkey.
The Hindu-Muslim unity, achieved at Lucknow, disappeared in the beginning of the
movement and could not be recaptured.
The extremist Hindu movements, Shuddi and Sanghtan, began converting the Muslims to
Hinduism which provided a new cause of bitterness between Hindus and Muslims.
The communal clashes and riots erupted in the country which adversely affected the
political conditions of India.

Conclusions:

The Khilafat Movement was of considerable importance in the history of Muslim India. It
served the important purpose of the mass-awakening if the Muslims. It also served to
demonstrate the religious and political cohesion among the Muslims of the sub-continent. Its
failure led them to believe that the Muslims, if they wanted to survive in the sub-continent,
must rely upon their own strength and work out their political destiny. The movement later
gave and impetus to the struggle for the independence and for a separate homeland for the
Muslims.
Discuss Pakistan’s Nuclear issue in detail, focus on propaganda b West?

Pakistan's nuclear weapons program was established in 1972 by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who
founded the program while he was Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources, and later
became President and Prime Minister. Shortly after the loss of East Pakistan in the 1971 war
with India, Bhutto initiated the program with a meeting of physicists and engineers at Multan in
January 1972.

India's 1974 testing of a nuclear "device" gave Pakistan's nuclear program new momentum.
Through the late 1970s, Pakistan's program acquired sensitive uranium enrichment technology
and expertise. The 1975 arrival of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan considerably advanced these efforts.
Dr. Khan is a German-trained metallurgist who brought with him knowledge of gas centrifuge
technologies that he had acquired through his position at the classified URENCO uranium
enrichment plant in the Netherlands. Dr. Khan also reportedly brought with him stolen uranium
enrichment technologies from Europe. He was put in charge of building, equipping and operating
Pakistan's Kahuta facility, which was established in 1976. Under Khan's direction, Pakistan
employed an extensive clandestine network in order to obtain the necessary materials and
technology for its developing uranium enrichment capabilities.

In 1985, Pakistan crossed the threshold of weapons-grade uranium production, and by 1986 it is
thought to have produced enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Pakistan continued
advancing its uranium enrichment program, and according to Pakistani sources, the nation
acquired the ability to carry out a nuclear explosion in 1987.

Pakistan Nuclear Weapons - A Chronology

Nuclear Tests

On May 28, 1998 Pakistan announced that it had successfully conducted five nuclear tests. The
Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission reported that the five nuclear tests conducted on May 28
generated a seismic signal of 5.0 on the Richter scale, with a total yield of up to 40 KT
(equivalent TNT). Dr. A.Q. Khan claimed that one device was a boosted fission device and that
the other four were sub-kiloton nuclear devices.

On May 30, 1998 Pakistan tested one more nuclear warhead with a reported yield of 12 kilotons.
The tests were conducted at Balochistan, bringing the total number of claimed tests to six. It has
also been claimed by Pakistani sources that at least one additional device, initially planned for
detonation on 30 May 1998, remained emplaced underground ready for detonation.

Pakistani claims concerning the number and yields of their underground tests cannot be
independently confirmed by seismic means, and several sources, such as the Southern Arizona
Seismic Observatory have reported lower yields than those claimed by Pakistan. Indian sources
have also suggested that as few as two weapons were actually detonated, each with yields
considerably lower than claimed by Pakistan. However, seismic data showed at least two and
possibly a third, much smaller, test in the initial round of tests at the Ras Koh range. The single
test on 30 May provided a clear seismic signal.

YIELD YIELD
DEVICE DATE
[announced] [estimated]
[boosted device?] 28 May 1998 25-36 kiloton
total 9-12 kiloton
Fission device 28 May 1998 12 kiloton
Low-yield device 28 May 1998 sub-kiloton --
Low-yield device 28 May 1998 sub-kiloton --
Low-yield device 28 May 1998 sub-kiloton --
Fission device 30 May 1998 12 kiloton 4-6 kiloton
Fission device not detonated 12 kiloton --
This table lists the nuclear tests that Pakistan claims to have carried out in May 1998 as well as
the announced yields. Other sources have reported lower yields than those claimed by Pakistan.
The Southern Arizona Seismic Observatory reports that the total seismic yield for the May 28th
tests was 9-12 kilotons and that the yield for the May 30th tests was 4-6 kilotons.

According to a preliminary analysis conducted at Los Alamos National Laboratory, material

released into the atmosphere during an underground nuclear test by Pakistan in May 1998
contained low levels of weapons-grade plutonium. The significance of the Los Alamos finding
was that Pakistan had either imported or produced plutonium undetected by the US intelligence
community. But Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and other agencies later contested the
accuracy of this finding.

These tests came slightly more than two weeks after India carried out five nuclear tests of its
own on May 11 and 13 and after many warnings by Pakistani officials that they would respond
to India.

Pakistan's nuclear tests were followed by the February 1999 Lahore Agreements between Prime
Ministers Vajpayee and Sharif. The agreements included confidence building measures such as
advance notice of ballistic missile testing and a continuation of their unilateral moratoria on
nuclear testing. But diplomatic advances made that year were undermined by Pakistan's
incursion into Kargil. Under US diplomatic pressure, Prime Minister Sharif withdrew his troops,
but lost power in October 1999 due to a military coup in which Gen. Pervez Musharraf took
over.

Satellite Imagery of Pakistan's May 28 and May 30 nuclear testing sites

Nuclear Infrastructure
Pakistan's nuclear program is based primarily on highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is
produced at the A. Q. Khan research laboratory at Kahuta, a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment
facility. The Kahuta facility has been in operation since the early 1980s. By the early 1990s,
Kahuta had an estimated 3,000 centrifuges in operation, and Pakistan continued its pursuit of
expanded uranium enrichment capabilities.

In the 1990s Pakistan began to pursue plutonium production capabilities. With Chinese
assistance, Pakistan built the 40 MWt (megawatt thermal) Khusab research reactor at Joharabad,
and in April 1998, Pakistan announced that the reactor was operational. According to public
statements made by US officials, this unsafeguarded heavy water reactor generates an estimated
8-10 kilotons of weapons grade plutonium per year, which is enough for one to two nuclear
weapons. The reactor could also produce tritium if it were loaded with lithium-6. According to J.
Cirincione of Carnegie, Khusab's plutonium production capacity could allow Pakistan to develop
lighter nuclear warheads that would be easier to deliver with a ballistic missile.

Plutonium separation reportedly takes place at the New Labs reprocessing plant next to
Pakistan's Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (Pinstech) in Rawalpindi and at the larger
Chasma nuclear power plant, neither of which are subject to IAEA inspection.

Nuclear Arsenal

The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) estimates that Pakistan has built 24-48 HEU-
based nuclear warheads, and Carnegie reports that they have produced 585-800 kg of HEU,
enough for 30-55 weapons. Pakistan's nuclear warheads are based on an implosion design that
uses a solid core of highly enriched uranium and requires an estimated 15-20 kg of material per
warhead. According to Carnegie, Pakistan has also produced a small but unknown quantity of
weapons grade plutonium, which is sufficient for an estimated 3-5 nuclear weapons.

Pakistani authorities claim that their nuclear weapons are not assembled. They maintain that the
fissile cores are stored separately from the non-nuclear explosives packages, and that the
warheads are stored separately from the delivery systems. In a 2001 report, the Defense
Department contends that "Islamabad's nuclear weapons are probably stored in component form"
and that "Pakistan probably could assemble the weapons fairly quickly." However, no one has
been able to ascertain the validity of Pakistan's assurances about their nuclear weapons security.

Pakistan's reliance primarily on HEU makes its fissile materials particularly vulnerable to
diversion. HEU can be used in a relatively simple gun-barrel-type design, which could be within
the means of non-state actors that intend to assemble a crude nuclear weapon.

The terrorist attacks on September 11th raised concerns about the security of Pakistan's nuclear
arsenal. According to press reports, within two days of the attacks, Pakistan's military began
relocating nuclear weapons components to six new secret locations. Shortly thereafter, Gen.
Pervez Musharraf fired his intelligence chief and other officers and detained several suspected
retired nuclear weapons scientists, in an attempt to root out extremist elements that posed a
potential threat to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.
Concerns have also been raised about Pakistan as a proliferant of nuclear materials and expertise.
In November, 2002, shortly after North Korea admitted to pursuing a nuclear weapons program,
the press reported allegations that Pakistan had provided assistance in the development of its
uranium enrichment program in exchange for North Korean missile technologies.

Foreign Assistance

In the past, China played a major role in the development of Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure,
especially when increasingly stringent export controls in western countries made it difficult for
Pakistan to acquire materials and technology elsewhere. According to a 2001 Department of
Defense report, China has supplied Pakistan with nuclear materials and expertise and has
provided critical assistance in the construction of Pakistan's nuclear facilities.

In the 1990s, China designed and supplied the heavy water Khusab reactor, which plays a key
role in Pakistan's production of plutonium. A subsidiary of the China National Nuclear
Corporation also contributed to Pakistan's efforts to expand its uranium enrichment capabilities
by providing 5,000 custom made ring magnets, which are a key component of the bearings that
facilitate the high-speed rotation of centrifuges.

According to Anthony Cordesman of CSIS, China is also reported to have provided Pakistan
with the design of one of its warheads, which is relatively sophisticated in design and lighter than
U.S. and Soviet designed first generation warheads.

China also provided technical and material support in the completion of the Chasma nuclear
power reactor and plutonium reprocessing facility, which was built in the mid 1990s. The project
had been initiated as a cooperative program with France, but Pakistan's failure to sign the NPT
and unwillingness to accept IAEA safeguards on its entire nuclear program caused France to
terminate assistance.

According to the Defense Department report cited above, Pakistan has also acquired nuclear
related and dual-use and equipment and materials from the Former Soviet Union and Western
Europe.

Intermittent US Sanctions

On several occasions, under the authority of amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act, the U.S.
has imposed sanctions on Pakistan, cutting off economic and military aid as a result of its pursuit
of nuclear weapons. However, the U.S. suspended sanctions each time developments in
Afghanistan made Pakistan a strategically important "frontline state," such as the 1981 Soviet
occupation and in the war on terrorism.

Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine

Several sources, such as Jane's Intelligence Review and Defense Department reports maintain
that Pakistan's motive for pursuing a nuclear weapons program is to counter the threat posed by
its principal rival, India, which has superior conventional forces and nuclear weapons.
Pakistan has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT). According to the Defense Department report cited above, "Pakistan remains
steadfast in its refusal to sign the NPT, stating that it would do so only after India joined the
Treaty. Consequently, not all of Pakistan's nuclear facilities are under IAEA safeguards.
Pakistani officials have stated that signature of the CTBT is in Pakistan's best interest, but that
Pakistan will do so only after developing a domestic consensus on the issue, and have disavowed
any connection with India's decision."

Pakistan does not abide by a no-first-use doctrine, as evidenced by President Pervez Musharraf's
statements in May, 2002. Musharraf said that Pakistan did not want a conflict with India but that
if it came to war between the nuclear-armed rivals, he would "respond with full might." These
statements were interpreted to mean that if pressed by an overwhelming conventional attack
from India, which has superior conventional forces, Pakistan might use its nuclear weapons.

Sources and Resources

 UN Nuclear Chief Warns of Global Black Market Mohammed ElBaradei commenting on

questions raised by the Khan confession, February 6, 2004.
 Abdul Qadeer Khan "Apologizes" for Transferring Nuclear Secrets Abroad, broadcast on
Pakistani television, February 4, 2004.
 Documents Indicate A.Q. Khan Offered Nuclear Weapon Designs to Iraq in 1990: Did
He Approach Other Countries? By David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, February 4,
2004


Deadly Arsenals, chapter on Paksitan - by Joseph Cirincione, John B.Wolfsthal and

Miriam Rajkumar (Carnegie, June 2002). The chapter discusses Pakistan's WMD, missile
and aircraft capabilities. It also presents the strategic context of the nuclear arms race
between India and Pakistan and the history of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program,
touching on foreign assistance from China and on-and-off US economic assistance.

 Proliferation: Threat and Response, Jan. 2001 - A Defense Department report on the
status of nuclear proliferation in South Asia. It includes a brief historical background on
the conflict between India and Pakistan as well as an assessment of their nuclear
capabilities, chem/bio programs, ballistic missile programs and other means of delivery.
 ENHANCING NUCLEAR SECURITY IN THE COUNTER-TERRORISM
STRUGGLE: India and Pakistan as a New Region for Cooperation - by Rose
Gottemoeller, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 2002. This working
paper explores possible cooperative programs that could enhance the security of Pakistan
and India's nuclear arsenals, in order to prevent the diversion of dangerous materials into
the hands of terrorists or rogue state leaders.
 "Pakistan's Nuclear Forces, 2001" from NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of Atomic
Scientists Jan/Feb 2002. A Two-page update on the state of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. It
makes rough estimates of the number of nuclear weapons and the amount of fissile
material in Pakistan's possession and touches on fissile material production capabilities.
Also included is a brief discussion of delivery mechanisms such as aircraft and missiles.
 Monterey Institute Resource Page on India and Pakistan - last updated July 7, 2000. This
page has many useful links to relevant maps, news articles and analytical pieces on India
and Pakistan's nuclear programs.
 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - Pakistan resources
 Pakistan Nuclear Weapons - A Chronology - a timeline of the Pakistan's Nuclear
Development program since 1965.
 "The Threat of Pakistani Nuclear Weapons" - a CSIS report by Anthony H. Cordesman
(Last updated Nov. 2001). - This report tells the history of Pakistan's nuclear weapons
program and discusses China role in its development. It also lists recent US intelligence
reports on Pakistan's activities.
 From Testing to Deploying Nuclear Forces: The Hard Choices Facing India and
Pakistan - Gregory S. Jones. (Rand, 2000). "This issue paper describes the requirements
for a nuclear deterrent force in general terms, discusses how the Indian-Pakistani nuclear
relationship is affected by China, and then considers the specific decisions that still must
be made in India and Pakistan."
 Pakistan Nuclear Update, 2001 - Wisconsin Project. This three-page document provides a
brief summary of Pakistan's main nuclear sites and an update on developments in
Pakistan's nuclear program.
 Securing Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal: Principles for Assistance - by David Albright,
Kevin O'Neill and Corey Hinderstein, Oct. 4, 2001. An ISIS issue brief on the potential
threats to the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.
 The May 1998 India and Pakistan Nuclear Tests - by Terry C. Wallace, Southern Arizona
Seismic Observatory (SASO), 1998. This technical paper provides a seismic analysis of
India and Pakistan's 1998 nuclear tests. It concludes that Pakistan's May 28 tests had a
seismic yield of 9-12 kt, and the May 30 test had a yield of 4-6 kt. An updated web page
on this report can be found here
 Satellite Imagery of Pakistan's May 28 and May 30 nuclear testing sites, hosted on
the Center for Monitoring Research Commercial Satellite Imagery Page
 "Pakistan's Nuclear Dilemma" - September 23 2001, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. Transcripts from a Carnegie panel on developments in Pakistan in
the aftermath of the Septempber 11th attacks. The panel included three speakers -- Shirin
Tahir-Kheli, George Perkovich and Rose Gottemoeller-- and was moderated by Joseph
Cirincione.
 Chapter on Pakistan, from Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts,
1998 by Rodney W. Jones, Mark G. McDonough, with Toby F. Dalton and Gregory D.
Koblentz (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, July 1998). This chapter documents
the history of Pakistan's nuclear program and tracks the development of its nuclear
infrastructure. It also covers in detail the sanctions the US imposed on Pakistan in light of
these developments, as well Pakistan's missile program.
 "U.S. Appears to be Losing Track of Pakistan's Nuclear Program" and "U.S. Now
Believes Pakistan to use Khushab Plutonium in Bomb Program" By Mark Hibbs July,
1998. Two brief articles written in the aftermath of Paksistan's 1998 nuclear tests -- they
discuss Pakistan's weapons grade uranium and plutonium production capacities and the
implications for its nuclear arsenal.
 "U.S. Labs at Odds on Whether Pakistani Blast Used Plutonium," by Dana
Priest Washington Post Sunday, January 17, 1999; Page A02. This article discusses the
 controversy over the preliminary analysis carried out by Los Alamos National
Laboratory, which found that plutonium traces had been released into the atomosphere
during Pakistan's May 30th underground nuclear test. Scientists at Lawrence Livermore
National Labs contested the accuracy of this finding and alleged that Los Alamos had
contaminated and then lost the air sample. At the time, Los Alamos' findings were highly
controversial because they implied that Pakistan had obtained plutonium either though
imports or indigenous production, and there was uncertainty about Pakistan's plutonium
production capabilities. It is now public knowledge that Pakistan can produce and isolate
plutonium at its Khusbab reactor and at the New Labs and Chasma separation facilities.

Discuss Middle East crises with concept of Saudi-Yemen, Syria Political instability,
Saudi-Iran relationship and Palestine issue?

In spite of escalating public and diplomatic tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia - and most
recently a rise in military tension with Iranian naval forces warning against Saudi Arabia’s
military exercises in the Strait of Hormuz, Iran still wants to avoid conflict with Saudi Arabia.

Iran sees the problem as much wider and going beyond bilateral ties between Iran and Saudi
Arabia. It is concerned by the possibility of a US return to the region.

The roots of conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia are often assigned to ideological Shia-Sunni
rivalry or geopolitical competition over each country’s role in the region. These were escalated
by the Hajj incident last year in which hundreds of Iranian pilgrims died.

But one should not ignore another significant factor in the equation: the two states’ conflicting
views on the presence of the US in the region and the security challenges which flow from it.

The Saudis have traditionally perceived the US presence in the region as supporting their
interests and for regional security. From their perspective, such presence is essential for
containing Iran’s growing regional role. They complain that, by overthrowing the Taliban and
Saddam Hussein, the US changed the regional balance of power in favour of Iran. They fear that
Barak Obama’s engagement policy in light of the nuclear deal means that Washington has
embarked on the the path of accepting Iran’s dominant role in the region.

To counter this, the Saudis have adopted a two-pronged policy. First, they have embarked on an
independent and offensive policy in the region, known as the Salman Doctrine, which is aimed
primarily at containing Iran everywhere in the region and the world by all available political,
military and economic means. Second, they are using intensive lobbying in the US Congress and
US think-tanks in order to challenge the positive results of the nuclear deal between Iran and the
US.

Tug-of-war over US

Beneath the Saudis’ new policy there exists a deeper aim and that is to force the US to choose
between Iran and Saudi Arabia in a possible conflict and thereby return to the region.
For instance, they hope to get the US militarily involved in Syria in order to change the field
equation in favour of the Assad regime’s Saudi-supported opposition. They also hope to commit
the US to an institutionalised military treaty in the Persian Gulf region, with the Saudis as leader
of the smaller Arab states. For this reason, the Saudis are eagerly awaiting the end of Obama’s
presidency.

In contrast, Iran perceives the US presence in the region as being against Iranian interests as well
as against the regional security. From Iran’s perspective, beyond its traditional security concerns
about US attempts to bring about “regime change” and other US efforts to minimise Iran’s
regional role, Iran sees the US presence as the root cause of increased extremism and
sectarianism.

The wars which the US waged in Iraq and Afghanistan gave violent terrorist groups the
justification they needed for recruiting new forces to continue their “sacred fight” with foreign
forces in the region. The result has been new regional security challenges beyond Iran’s
boundaries, which can potentially pull the country into unwanted conflicts.

To counter this situation, Iran has also adopted a two-pronged policy. First, it is helping to
strengthen inclusive national governments in friendly states such as Iraq - through helping the
government for the sake of the country's unity and reducing sectarian conflict - and Syria where,
by focusing on a political solution in peace talks, Iran essentially accepts that non-terrorism
elements could participate in the country's future government. Iran has also mobilised local
forces in order to battle terrorist groups such as the Islamic State (IS) group and al-Qaeda.

Second, it is attempting to expand regional cooperation especially with key players such as Saudi
Arabia and Turkey with the aim of solving regional issues. The main goal of this policy is to
remove the justification for any possible US military intervention in the region.

Make no mistake, however. Iran is not seeking to deny or endanger US interests in the region.
Rather, Iran is striving to preserve its political-security interests by institutionalising its own and
regional allies’ role as an essential component in any comprehensive solution in a multilateral
context. For this reason, Iran has never sought to exclude the US, Saudi Arabia or any other actor
in the Syrian peace talks, as it believes no individual political-security coalition can win in this
multi-layered crisis.

Such an understanding is evident in the suggestion by Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad
Zarif for the creation of a regional dialogue forum for solving the region’s problems. In his
recent comment on the tensions between Iran’s and US naval forces in the Persian Gulf, he
argued that it was the Americans who got close to Iran’s borders and endangered the country’s
security and not Iranians who approached US borders. This shows how the sense of insecurity
created by the US presence is perceived on the Iranian side.

Policy of patience

At present, there are two perspectives in Iran for how to deal with Saudi Arabia’s offensive
policies. One view maintains that Iran should take a tougher stance towards Saudi Arabia
because it will otherwise send a wrong message to the US about Iran’s role and strength in the
region and this might dismay Iran’s regional allies, subsequently weakening Iran’s regional
stances.

But the other perspective, and this is the dominant one, supports a policy of patience towards the
Saudis. From this perspective, Saudi Arabia is currently acting beyond its strategic capability and
national strength and since the US is not in favour of getting involved militarily in Syria and
Yemen, the Saudis’ current offensive and warmongering policy in these countries will not last
long.

In fact, Iran’s continued policy of avoiding tension and conflict with Saudi Arabia is aimed at
defusing the Saudis’ bid to involve or commit the US militarily in the region. The reality is that
Obama’s non-intervention policy in Syria, along with stressing the necessity for all actors,
especially Iran, to take part in any regional peace talks, is a strategic development toward
enhancing multilateral diplomacy in the region.

This is the only way to reduce tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The next US president,
whether it is Clinton or Trump, should continue this policy and thereby pave the way to
sustainable peace and security in the region.

- Kayhan Barzegar, a political scientist and international affairs expert, is currently the director
of the Institute for Middle East Strategic Studies in Tehran and a former research fellow at
Harvard University. He also chairs the department of International Relations at the Islamic Azad
University, Science and Research Branch. His latest book, Iran's Foreign Policy in the Middle
East after the Arab Spring, was published in 2015.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the
editorial policy of Middle East Eye.

Discuss USSR invade in Afghanistan and external politics of Pakistan?

At the end of December 1979, the Soviet Union sent thousands of troops into Afghanistan and
immediately assumed complete military and political control of Kabul and large portions of the
country. This event began a brutal, decade-long attempt by Moscow to subdue the Afghan civil
war and maintain a friendly and socialist government on its border. It was a watershed event of
the Cold War, marking the only time the Soviet Union invaded a country outside the Eastern
Bloc—a strategic decision met by nearly worldwide condemnation. While the massive,
lightning-fast military maneuvers and brazenness of Soviet political objectives constituted an
“invasion” of Afghanistan, the word “intervention” more accurately describes these events as the
culmination of growing Soviet domination going back to 1973. Undoubtedly, leaders in the
Kremlin had hoped that a rapid and complete military takeover would secure Afghanistan’s place
as an exemplar of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which held that once a country became socialist
Moscow would never permit it to return to the capitalist camp. The United States and its
European allies, guided by their own doctrine of containment, sharply criticized the Soviet move
into Afghanistan and devised numerous measures to compel Moscow to withdraw. Soviet
combat vehicles move through Afghanistan. (Department of Defense)

In the summer of 1973, Mohammed Daoud, the former Afghan Prime Minister, launched a
successful coup against King Zahir. Although Daoud himself was more nationalist than socialist,
his coup was dependent on pro-Soviet military and political factions. Since 1955 Moscow had
provided military training and materiel to Afghanistan; by 1973, a third of active troops had
trained on Soviet soil. Additionally, Daoud enjoyed the support of the People’s Democratic Party
of Afghanistan (PDPA), founded in 1965 upon Marxist ideology and allegiance to Moscow. In
1967 the PDPA split into two factions: the Parchamists, led by Babrak Karmal (who supported
Daoud), and the “Khalqis” led by Noor Taraki. For the next five years, Daoud attempted the
impossible task of governing Afganistan’s Islamic tribal regions, while also struggling to
reconcile the PDPA split. But the more radical Khalq faction never fully recognized Daoud’s
leadership, while Karmal viewed the coup largely as a means to consolidate his own power. In
response, Daoud hoped to mitigate both of these threats by steering Afghanistan away from
Soviet influence and improving U.S. relations, while decreasing the influence of radical elements
in the government and military.

Daoud’s middle course ended in disaster. On April 28, 1978, soldiers aligned with Taraki’s
“Khalq” faction assaulted the presidential palace, where troops executed Daoud and his family.
In the following days Taraki became the Prime Minister, and, in an attempt to end the PDPA’s
divisions, Karmal became Deputy Prime Minister. In Washington, this Communist revolution
was met with alarm. The Carter administration recognized that Taraki would undo Daoud’s
attempt to steer Afghanistan away from Moscow, and it debated whether to cut ties with
Afghanistan or recognize Taraki in the hopes that Soviet influence could be contained. Although
the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski advocated the former
course, Carter supported the Department of State’s advocacy of recognition. Shortly after the
revolution, Washington recognized the new government and soon named Adolph Dubs its
Ambassador to Afghanistan. Until his kidnapping and death at the hands of Afghan Shia
dissidents in February 1979, Dubs strongly pursued good relations with the Taraki regime in the
hopes that U.S. support would keep Soviet influence at bay.

Once again, the tumult of internal Afghan politics complicated both U.S. and Soviet jockeying.
In the summer of 1979, Hafizullah Amin, a longtime ally of Taraki who became Deputy Prime
Minister following the April Revolution, received word that Babrak Karmal (Daoud’s early
supporter) was leading a Parcham plot to overthrow the Taraki regime. Amin took the
opportunity to purge and execute many Parchamists and consolidate his own power.
Complicating matters further, this internal strife damaged the Kabul Government’s major
national program, namely, to bring the Communist revolution to the Islamic tribal areas beyond
Kabul. By the winter of 1978, this program was met by armed revolt throughout the country. In
response, Amin and Taraki traveled to Moscow to sign a friendship treaty which included a
provision that would allow direct Soviet military assistance should the Islamic insurgency
threaten the regime. This insurrection intensified over the next year and it became increasingly
obvious to the Soviets that Taraki could not prevent all-out civil war and the prospect of a hostile
Islamic government taking control. By mid-1979 Moscow was searching to replace Taraki and
Amin, and dispatched combat troops to Bagram Air Base outside of Kabul. This move prompted
the Carter administration to begin supplying non-lethal aid to Afghan mujahedeen, or Islamic
insurgents. In August, a high-ranking Soviet military delegation arrived in Kabul to assess the
situation. U.S. officials interpreted this mission as one last Soviet attempt to shore up the Taraki
regime, and also an opportunity to devise a military takeover. Regarding the latter, most analysts
in Washington believed that such a move remained possible but unlikely.

But this calculus was bound to change. Amin sensed the Soviet mission was designed to
strengthen Taraki at his expense. In response, forces loyal to Amin executed Taraki in October—
a move that infuriated Moscow, which began amassing combat units along its border. At this
juncture Washington was still unsure how to interpret the Soviet maneuvers: was the Soviet
Union planning a full takeover or did it remain committed to preserving the April Revolution?
Analysts remained skeptical that Moscow would occupy the country given the political and
economic costs. By the winter of 1979, faced with mutinies and an uncertain leadership, the
Afghan Army was unable to provide basic security to the government against the onslaught of
Islamic fighters nearing Kabul. By that point the Soviets were sending in motorized divisions
and Special Forces. Washington demanded an explanation, which the Soviets ignored. Finally,
on Christmas Eve, the invasion began. Soviet troops killed Amin and installed Babrak Karmal as
the Soviet’s puppet head of government.

Although the Carter administration had closely watched this buildup from the outset, its reaction
following the invasion revealed that, until the end, it clung to the hope that the Soviets would not
invade, based on the unjustified assumption that Moscow would conclude that the costs of
invasion were too high. In response, Carter wrote a sharply-worded letter to Brezhnev
denouncing Soviet aggression, and during his State of the Union address he announced his own
doctrine vowing to protect Middle Eastern oil supplies from encroaching Soviet power. The
administration also enacted economic sanctions and trade embargoes against the Soviet Union,
called for a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics, and stepped up its aid to the Afghan
insurgents. In sum, these actions were Washington’s collective attempt to make the Soviets’
“adventure” in Afghanistan as painful and brief as possible. Instead, it took ten years of grinding
insurgency before Moscow finally withdrew, at the cost of millions of lives and billions of
dollars. In their wake, the Soviets left a shattered country in which the Taliban, an Islamic
fundamentalist group, seized control, later providing Osama bin Laden with a training base from
which to launch terrorist operations worldwide.