"In the liquidation and partition of the properties owned in common by the plaintiff and
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996]
ANTONIO A. S. VALDES, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102,
QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDES, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The petition for review bewails, purely on a question of law, an alleged error committed
by the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-92-12539. Petitioner avers that the court a
quo has failed to apply the correct law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling
in a situation where a marriage is declared void ab initio because of psychological incapacity
on the part of either or both of the parties to the contract.
The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by and large, not in dispute.
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten
during the marriage were five children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdes sought the
declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code (docketed
Civil Case No. Q-92-12539, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102). After hearing
the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial court,[1] in its decision of 29 July 1994,
granted the petition; viz:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
"(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdes and respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes is
hereby declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of their
mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations;
"(2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela Rosario shall
choose which parent they would want to stay with.
"Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their mother, herein
respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes.
"The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children who are in the
custody of the other.
"(3) The petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of
their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with
the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice
of this decision.
"Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila, for proper recording in the registry of marriages."[2] (Italics ours)
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing
compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family
Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in
"unions without marriage." Parenthetically, during the hearing on the motion, the children
filed a joint affidavit expressing their desire to remain with their father, Antonio Valdes,
herein petitioner.
In an Order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following clarification:
"Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the
property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary,
are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be
owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their 'family home' and all
their other properties for that matter in equal shares.
defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply."[3] (Italics
supplied)
In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the family dwelling, the
trial court said:
"Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner
and respondent shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
"The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no application since Article
102 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership property and
Article 129 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the absolute community of
property."[4]
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied on 30
October 1995.
In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the
Family Code should be held controlling; he argues that:
"I
"Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological
incapacitated.
"II
"Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the
disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio,
including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses.
"III
"Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the
ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with
Article 129.
"IV
"It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to stay." [5]
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause
thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by
the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code.
Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in
previous cases;[6] it provides:
"ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
"In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall
be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate
in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance
of the family and of the household.
"Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until
after the termination of their cohabitation.
"When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in
bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of
default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants,
such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place
upon termination of the cohabitation."
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal
impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a
void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in
the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage,
i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38"[7] of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through
their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family household."[8] Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the
fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has clarified
Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act inter vivos his or her share in co-
ownership property, without the consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in
the co-ownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all
of the common children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place
upon the termination of the cohabitation[9] or declaration of nullity of the marriage.[10]
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they
do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife ),only the property acquired by
both of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be
owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and
corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any
party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has
acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
manner already heretofore expressed.[11]
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties'
common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which
has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with
authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible
error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their
common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and
partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under
the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129,[12] of the
Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the
absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized
for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled ),are
irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses.
The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2 ),(3 ),(4) and
(5) of Article 43,[13] relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidablemarriages and,
exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40[14] of the Code, i.e., the declaration of
nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the
latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the
philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning
and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of
remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously contracted void
marriage, the present law aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of
the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to
Articles 41[15] and 42,[16] of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a
subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made
applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also
meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and
voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law spouses or
spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-
ownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. It must
be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may merely state the obvious, that the provisions of
the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the
Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses.
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the
trial court are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., on leave.
Valdes vs RTC
Valdes vs. RTC
260 SCRA 221
FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez
filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their
mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their
mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage”. During the hearing on the
motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered
as having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family.
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner,
vs.
SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages
contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, whose “death benefits” is now the
subject of the controversy between the two Susans whom he married. 1âwphi1.nêt
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages, the
first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño (hereafter referred to as
Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cariño; and
the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño (hereafter
referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year
cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by
pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan
Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed
claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various
government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00
from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,” 3 while respondent Susan
Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from “GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).” 4
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of
money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to
return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00)
collectively denominated as “death benefits” which she (petitioner) received from “MBAI,
PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.” Despite service of summons, petitioner
failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the
subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage
between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of
the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased,
where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her
action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner
and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required
marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the
deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number; 5and 2) a certification
dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads –
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses SANTIAGO
CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on June 20, 1969.
Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true copy or transcription of Marriage License number
from the records of this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cariño for whatever legal
purpose it may serve. 6
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00,
half of the amount which was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the death
of SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of
suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 7
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the
trial court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN THE
INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE
FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE CASE
OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN
ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE. 8
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought
to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in
law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring
the previous marriage void. 9 However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action
is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not
limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to
the determination of the case. 10 In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an
absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
declaring such previous marriage void. 11
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the
validity of the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the determination of
who is rightfully entitled to the subject “death benefits” of the deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage, 12 and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, 13 renders the marriage
void ab initio. 14
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased
does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license,
therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the
records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage
license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their
office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 15 the Court
held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license.
Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the
local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep
a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased
has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their
marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was
declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and
explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and
this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing
an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their
marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being
one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab
initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the “death benefits” under scrutiny
would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family
Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity
of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage,
otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the
deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased
with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without
first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise,
void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of
the spouses according to the applicable property regime. 16 Considering that the two
marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute
community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of
Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.”
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous
marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where
both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married
man, 17 -
“... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions ...”
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint
contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party
belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home,
children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime. 18
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous
marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then
presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148 is
therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM,
Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from
governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan
Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property
or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in
common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent
has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said “death benefits”
of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the
deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the
Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and
not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void
for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. Article 147 of the Family Code
reads -
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned
by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in
the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.
xxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of
default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants,
such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place
upon termination of the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either
party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be
divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not
contribute thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the disputed “death benefits” were earned by the
deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect
thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad
faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith.
Thus, one-half of the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her
share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by,
intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de
Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, 20 where the Court awarded one-half of
the retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second
wife, holding that:
“... [S]ince the defendant’s first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the
conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost
or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled
to share in his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as
conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in
the husband’s share in the property here in dispute....” And with respect to the right of the
second wife, this Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be
void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is
need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed
by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, “[t]he only just
and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her
share of one-half in the property acquired by her and her husband, and consider the other
half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.” 21
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which
requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason
why in the said case, the Court determined the rights of the parties in accordance with their
existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family
Code, clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all
important condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is
previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a
judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second
marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same rule applies even if the
first marriage is patently void because the parties are not free to determine for themselves
the validity or invalidity or their marriage. However, for purposes other than to remarry, like
for filing a case for collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid,
no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is
to present evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the marriage from
which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the
determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage involved and
proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the applicable laws and
jurisprudence. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, 23 the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without
prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause
“on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the
Family Code connoted that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering
petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorney’s fees in the amount of
P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is
hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
SANTIAGO CARINO, petitioner vs. SUSAN CARINO, defendant
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
Facts:
During the lifetime of SP04 Santiago S. Carino, he contracted two marriages, the first with
Susan Nicdao Carino with whom he had two offsprings (Sahlee and Sandee) and with Susan
Yee Carino with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation. In 1988,
Santiago passed away under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and
burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits
and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies.
Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 and Yee received a total of P21,000.00. Yee
filed an action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao, contending that the marriage of
the latter with Santiago is void ab initio because their marriage was solemnized without the
required marriage license. The trial court ruled in favor of Yee, ordering Nicdao to pay Yee
half of acquired death benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Santiago Carino and Susan Nicdao is void for lack of
marriage license.
Ruling:
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of Nicdao and Carino
was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage and the absence
thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar,
the marriage does not fall within any of those exceptionsand a marriage license therefore
was indispensable to the validity of it. This fact is certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, Metro Manila. Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of Nicdao
and Carino has been sufficiently overcome and cannot stand. The marriage of Yee and Carino
is void ab initio as well for lack of judicial decree of nullity of marriage of Carino and Nicdao
at the time it was contracted. The marriages are bigamous; under Article 148 of the Family
Code, properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong
to the co-ownership. The decision of the trial court and Court of Appealsis affirmed.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 163744 February 29, 2008
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO., petitioner,
vs.
NICHOLSON PASCUAL a.k.a. NELSON PASCUAL, respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were married on January 19, 1985.
During the union, Florencia bought from spouses Clarito and Belen Sering a 250-square
meter lot with a three-door apartment standing thereon located in Makati City.
Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. S-101473/T-510 covering the purchased
lot was canceled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 156283 1 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati
City was issued in the name of Florencia, "married to Nelson Pascual" a.k.a. Nicholson
Pascual.
In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-23533. After trial, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 94 in Quezon City rendered, on July 31, 1995, a Decision,2 declaring the
marriage of Nicholson and Florencia null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity
on the part of Nicholson. In the same decision, the RTC, inter alia, ordered the dissolution
and liquidation of the ex-spouses’ conjugal partnership of gains. Subsequent events saw the
couple going their separate ways without liquidating their conjugal partnership.
On April 30, 1997, Florencia, together with spouses Norberto and Elvira Oliveros, obtained a
PhP 58 million loan from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank). To secure
the obligation, Florencia and the spouses Oliveros executed several real estate mortgages
(REMs) on their properties, including one involving the lot covered by TCT No. 156283.
Among the documents Florencia submitted to procure the loan were a copy of TCT No.
156283, a photocopy of the marriage-nullifying RTC decision, and a document denominated
as "Waiver" that Nicholson purportedly executed on April 9, 1995. The waiver, made in favor
of Florencia, covered the conjugal properties of the ex-spouses listed therein, but did not
incidentally include the lot in question.
Due to the failure of Florencia and the spouses Oliveros to pay their loan obligation when it
fell due, Metrobank, on November 29, 1999, initiated foreclosure proceedings under Act No.
3135, as amended, before the Office of the Notary Public of Makati City. Subsequently,
Metrobank caused the publication of the notice of sale on three issues of Remate.3 At the
auction sale on January 21, 2000, Metrobank emerged as the highest bidder.
Getting wind of the foreclosure proceedings, Nicholson filed on June 28, 2000, before the
RTC in Makati City, a Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed
property, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-789 and eventually raffled to Branch 65 of the court.
In it, Nicholson alleged that the property, which is still conjugal property, was mortgaged
without his consent.
Metrobank, in its Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-Claim,4 alleged that the disputed lot,
being registered in Florencia’s name, was paraphernal. Metrobank also asserted having
approved the mortgage in good faith.
Florencia did not file an answer within the reglementary period and, hence, was subsequently
declared in default.
The RTC Declared the REM Invalid
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered, on September 24, 2001, judgment finding for
Nicholson. The fallo reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court renders judgment declaring the real estate
mortgage on the property covered by [TCT] No. 156283 of the Registry of Deeds for
the City of Makati as well as all proceedings thereon null and void.
The Court further orders defendants [Metrobank and Florencia] jointly and severally
to pay plaintiff [Nicholson]:
1. PhP100,000.00 by way of moral damages;
2. PhP75,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees; and
3. The costs.
SO ORDERED.5
Even as it declared the invalidity of the mortgage, the trial court found the said lot to be
conjugal, the same having been acquired during the existence of the marriage of Nicholson
and Florencia. In so ruling, the RTC invoked Art. 116 of the Family Code, providing that "all
property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made,
contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal
unless the contrary is proved." To the trial court, Metrobank had not overcome the
presumptive conjugal nature of the lot. And being conjugal, the RTC concluded that the
disputed property may not be validly encumbered by Florencia without Nicholson’s consent.
The RTC also found the deed of waiver Florencia submitted to Metrobank to be fatally
defective. For let alone the fact that Nicholson denied executing the same and that the
signature of the notarizing officer was a forgery, the waiver document was allegedly
executed on April 9, 1995 or a little over three months before the issuance of the RTC
decision declaring the nullity of marriage between Nicholson and Florencia.
The trial court also declared Metrobank as a mortgagee in bad faith on account of
negligence, stating the observation that certain data appeared in the supporting contract
documents, which, if properly scrutinized, would have put the bank on guard against
approving the mortgage. Among the data referred to was the date of execution of the deed
of waiver.
The RTC dismissed Metrobank’s counterclaim and cross-claim against the ex-spouses.
Metrobank’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Undeterred, Metrobank appealed to the
Court of Appeals (CA), the appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74874.
The CA Affirmed with Modification the RTC’s Decision
On January 28, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision affirmatory of that of the RTC, except for
the award therein of moral damages and attorney’s fees which the CA ordered deleted. The
dispositive portion of the CA’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION with respect to the award of moral damages and attorney’s fees
which is hereby DELETED.
SO ORDERED.6
Like the RTC earlier held, the CA ruled that Metrobank failed to overthrow the presumption
established in Art. 116 of the Family Code. And also decreed as going against Metrobank was
Florencia’s failure to comply with the prescriptions of the succeeding Art. 124 of the Code on
the disposition of conjugal partnership property. Art. 124 states:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property
shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s
 decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy
x x x.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in
the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance
without authority of the court or written consent of the other spouse. In the absence
of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract
upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the
offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
As to the deletion of the award of moral damages and attorney’s fees, the CA, in gist, held
that Metrobank did not enter into the mortgage contract out of ill-will or for some fraudulent
purpose, moral obliquity, or like dishonest considerations as to justify damages.
Metrobank moved but was denied reconsideration by the CA.
Thus, Metrobank filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, raising the
following issues for consideration:
a. Whether or not the [CA] erred in declaring subject property as conjugal by
applying Article 116 of the Family Code.
b. Whether or not the [CA] erred in not holding that the declaration of nullity of
marriage between the respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga ipso
facto dissolved the regime of community of property of the spouses.
c. Whether or not the [CA] erred in ruling that the petitioner is an innocent
purchaser for value.7
Our Ruling
A modification of the CA’s Decision is in order.
The Disputed Property is Conjugal
It is Metrobank’s threshold posture that Art. 160 of the Civil Code providing that "[a]ll
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
prove[n] that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife," applies. To Metrobank,
Art. 116 of the Family Code could not be of governing application inasmuch as Nicholson and
Florencia contracted marriage before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
Citing Manongsong v. Estimo,8 Metrobank asserts that the presumption of conjugal
ownership under Art. 160 of the Civil Code applies when there is proof that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Metrobank adds, however, that for the presumption of
conjugal ownership to operate, evidence must be adduced to prove that not only was the
property acquired during the marriage but that conjugal funds were used for the acquisition,
a burden Nicholson allegedly failed to discharge.
To bolster its thesis on the paraphernal nature of the disputed property, Metrobank
cites Francisco v. Court of Appeals9 and Jocson v. Court of Appeals,10 among other cases,
where this Court held that a property registered in the name of a certain person with a
description of being married is no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses’
marriage.
On the other hand, Nicholson, banking on De Leon v. Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation11 and Wong v. IAC,12contends that Metrobank failed to overcome the legal
presumption that the disputed property is conjugal. He asserts that Metrobank’s arguments
on the matter of presumption are misleading as only one postulate needs to be shown for
the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership to arise, that is, the fact of acquisition during
marriage. Nicholson dismisses, as inapplicable, Francisco and Jocson, noting that they are
relevant only when there is no indication as to the exact date of acquisition of the property
alleged to be conjugal.
As a final point, Nicholson invites attention to the fact that Metrobank had virtually
recognized the conjugal nature of the property in at least three instances. The first was when
the bank lumped him with Florencia in Civil Case No. 00-789 as co-mortgagors and when
they were referred to as "spouses" in the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage.
Then came the published notice of foreclosure sale where Nicholson was again designated as
co-mortgagor. And third, in its demand-letter13 to vacate the disputed lot, Metrobank
addressed Nicholson and Florencia as "spouses," albeit the finality of the decree of nullity of
marriage between them had long set in.
We find for Nicholson.
First, while Metrobank is correct in saying that Art. 160 of the Civil Code, not Art. 116 of the
Family Code, is the applicable legal provision since the property was acquired prior to the
enactment of the Family Code, it errs in its theory that, before conjugal ownership could be
legally presumed, there must be a showing that the property was acquired during
marriage using conjugal funds. Contrary to Metrobank’s submission, the Court did not,
in Manongsong,14 add the matter of the use of conjugal funds as an essential requirement for
the presumption of conjugal ownership to arise. Nicholson is correct in pointing out that only
proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption that the property
is conjugal. Indeed, if proof on the use of conjugal is still required as a necessary condition
before the presumption can arise, then the legal presumption set forth in the law would
veritably be a superfluity. As we stressed in Castro v. Miat:
Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides that "all
property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal partnership, unless it be
prove[n] that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." This article does
not require proof that the property was acquired with funds of the
partnership. The presumption applies even when the manner in which the property
was acquired does not appear.15(Emphasis supplied.)
Second, Francisco and Jocson do not reinforce Metrobank’s theory. Metrobank would thrust
on the Court, invoking the two cases, the argument that the registration of the property in
the name of "Florencia Nevalga, married to Nelson Pascual" operates to describe only the
marital status of the title holder, but not as proof that the property was acquired during the
existence of the marriage.
Metrobank is wrong. As Nicholson aptly points out, if proof obtains on the acquisition of the
property during the existence of the marriage, then the presumption of conjugal ownership
applies. The correct lesson of Francisco and Jocson is that proof of acquisition during the
marital coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of
conjugal ownership. When there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by the
spouse, the fact that a title is in the name of the spouse is an indication that the property
belongs exclusively to said spouse.16
The Court, to be sure, has taken stock of Nicholson’s arguments regarding Metrobank having
implicitly acknowledged, thus being in virtual estoppel to question, the conjugal ownership of
the disputed lot, the bank having named the former in the foreclosure proceedings below as
either the spouse of Florencia or her co-mortgagor. It is felt, however, that there is no
compelling reason to delve into the matter of estoppel, the same having been raised only for
the first time in this petition. Besides, however Nicholson was designated below does not
really change, one way or another, the classification of the lot in question.
Termination of Conjugal Property Regime does
not ipso facto End the Nature of Conjugal Ownership
Metrobank next maintains that, contrary to the CA’s holding, Art. 129 of the Family Code is
inapplicable. Art. 129 in part reads:
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following
procedure shall apply:
xxxx
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the
profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different
proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there
has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code.
Apropos the aforequoted provision, Metrobank asserts that the waiver executed by
Nicholson, effected as it were before the dissolution of the conjugal property
regime, vested on Florencia full ownership of all the properties acquired during the
marriage.
Nicholson counters that the mere declaration of nullity of marriage, without more, does not
automatically result in a regime of complete separation when it is shown that there was no
liquidation of the conjugal assets.
We again find for Nicholson.
While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital bond
and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such
declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and
partition of the partnership. This conclusion holds true whether we apply Art. 129 of the
Family Code on liquidation of the conjugal partnership’s assets and liabilities which is
generally prospective in application, or Section 7, Chapter 4, Title IV, Book I (Arts. 179 to
185) of the Civil Code on the subject, Conjugal Partnership of Gains. For, the relevant
provisions of both Codes first require the liquidation of the conjugal properties before a
regime of separation of property reigns.
In Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we ruled that pending its liquidation following its
dissolution, the conjugal partnership of gains is converted into an implied ordinary co-
ownership among the surviving spouse and the other heirs of the deceased.17
In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the property
relationship between the former spouses, where:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to
the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him
in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In the case at bar, Florencia constituted the mortgage on the disputed lot on April 30, 1997,
or a little less than two years after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership on July 31,
1995, but before the liquidation of the partnership. Be that as it may, what governed the
property relations of the former spouses when the mortgage was given is the aforequoted
Art. 493. Under it, Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her one-half (1/2)
undivided interest in the disputed property even without the consent of Nicholson. However,
the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2 undivided portion that
Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2
undivided portion of the lot is null and void, Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage
of his undivided half.
The conclusion would have, however, been different if Nicholson indeed duly waived his
share in the conjugal partnership. But, as found by the courts a quo, the April 9, 1995 deed
of waiver allegedly executed by Nicholson three months prior to the dissolution of the
marriage and the conjugal partnership of gains on July 31, 1995 bore his forged signature,
not to mention that of the notarizing officer. A spurious deed of waiver does not transfer any
right at all, albeit it may become the root of a valid title in the hands of an innocent buyer for
value.
Upon the foregoing perspective, Metrobank’s right, as mortgagee and as the successful
bidder at the auction of the lot, is confined only to the 1/2 undivided portion thereof
heretofore pertaining in ownership to Florencia. The other undivided half belongs to
Nicholson. As owner pro indiviso of a portion of the lot in question, Metrobank may ask for
the partition of the lot and its property rights "shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to [the bank] in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership."18 This
disposition is in line with the well-established principle that the binding force of a contract
must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so––quando res non valet ut ago,
valeat quantum valere potest.19
In view of our resolution on the validity of the auction of the lot in favor of Metrobank, there
is hardly a need to discuss at length whether or not Metrobank was a mortgagee in good
faith. Suffice it to state for the nonce that where the mortgagee is a banking institution, the
general rule that a purchaser or mortgagee of the land need not look beyond the four
corners of the title is inapplicable.20 Unlike private individuals, it behooves banks to exercise
greater care and due diligence before entering into a mortgage contract. The ascertainment
of the status or condition of the property offered as security and the validity of the
mortgagor’s title must be standard and indispensable part of the bank’s operation.21 A bank
that failed to observe due diligence cannot be accorded the status of a bona
fide mortgagee,22 as here.
But as found by the CA, however, Metrobank’s failure to comply with the due diligence
requirement was not the result of a dishonest purpose, some moral obliquity or breach of a
known duty for some interest or ill-will that partakes of fraud that would justify damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The appealed Decision of the CA dated
January 28, 2004, upholding with modification the Decision of the RTC, Branch 65 in Makati
City, in Civil Case No. 00-789, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the REM over
the lot covered by TCT No. 156283 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City is hereby declared
valid only insofar as the pro indiviso share of Florencia thereon is concerned.
As modified, the Decision of the RTC shall read:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the real estate mortgage on the property covered by TCT No.
156283 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City and all proceedings thereon
are NULL and VOID with respect to the undivided 1/2 portion of the disputed property
owned by Nicholson, but VALID with respect to the other undivided 1/2 portion belonging to
Florencia.
The claims of Nicholson for moral damages and attorney’s fees are DENIED for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST: Metrobank v. Pascual
FACTS:
Florencia Nevalga and Nicholson Pascual were married in 1985. During the union, they
acquired a lot with a three door apartment standing thereon. Their marriage were annulled in
1994 and they went on their separate ways without liquidating their properties.

In 1997, Florencia mortgaged the aforesaid property as a security for the loan she obtained
with spouses Oliveros. Petitioner foreclosed the mortgage, had the property auctioned and
acquired it as the successful bidder. Nicholson filed an action to annul the mortgage alleging
that the subject property is still a conjugal property and it was executed without his consent

RTC ruled that mortgage is invalid. The said lot is a conjugal property, the same having been
acquired during the existence of the marriage of Nicholson and Florencia. (Art 116 NCC)
Metrobank had not overcome the presumptive conjugal nature of the lot. And being conjugal,
the RTC concluded that the disputed property may not be validly encumbered by Florencia
without Nicholson’s consent.CA affirmed the decision

ISSUES:
A. WON the subject property is a conjugal by applying Article 116 of the Family Code.
B. WON the declaration of nullity of marriage between the respondent Nicholson Pascual and
Florencia Nevalga ipso facto dissolved the regime of community of property of the spouses.

RULING:
A.) The property relations of the former spouses are governed by the Civil Code Art 106
(Being contrated prior to effectivity of the Family Code) which provides that all property of
the marriage is presumed to be conjugal partnership, unless it be proven that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. This article does not require proof that the
property was acquired with funds of the partnership. The presumption applies even when the
manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. (Note: The petitioner failed to
overcome the presumption in this case)

B.) While the declared nullity of marriage severe marital bond and dissolved the conjugal
partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such declaration continues to
subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the
partnership. In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the
property relationship between the former spouses. Thus, applying the provision to the
present case, the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners,
shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership. Accordingly, the mortgage contract insofar as it covered the
remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is null and void, Nicholson not having consented to
the mortgage of his undivided half.
SECOND DIVISION On July 5, 1991 while Mary Ann was outside the house and the four children were in
school, Pedro together with armed members of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit
PATROCINIA RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA, G.R. No. 160708 (CAFGU) and acting in connivance with petitioners[6] began transferring all their belongings
Petitioners, from the house to an apartment.
Present: When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille came home, they were stopped
from entering it. They waited outside the gate until evening under the rain. They sought help
- versus - QUISUMBING, Acting C.J., Chairperson,
from the Talomo Police Station, but police authorities refused to intervene, saying that it was
CARPIO MORALES, a family matter. Mary Ann alleged that the incident caused stress, tension and anxiety to her
BRION, and children, so much so that one flunked at school. Thus, respondents Mary Ann and her
MARY ANN P. VILLA ABRILLE, for herself and in BERSAMIN,* children filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale, Specific Performance, Damages and
behalf of INGRID DLYN P. VILLA ABRILLE, ABAD, JJ. Attorneys Fees with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction[7] against Pedro and herein petitioners
INGREMARK DWIGHT VILLA ABRILLE, INGRESOLL (the Ravinas) in the RTC of Davao City.
DIELS VILLA ABRILLE AND INGRELYN DYAN VILLA During the trial, Pedro declared that the house was built with his own
ABRILLE, money. Petitioner Patrocinia Ravina testified that they bought the house and lot from Pedro,
Respondents. and that her husband, petitioner Wilfredo Ravina, examined the titles when they bought the
Promulgated: property.
October 16, 2009 On September 26, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of herein respondent Mary
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x Ann P. Villa Abrille as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
DECISION 1. The sale of lot 8 covered by TCT No. 26471 by
defendant Pedro Abrille appearing in the Deed of Sale marked as Exh. E is
QUISUMBING, Acting C.J.: void as to one half or 277.5 square meters representing the share of
For review are the Decision[1] dated February 21, 2002 and the plaintiff Mary Villa Abrille.
Resolution[2] dated October 7, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54560. The 2. That sale of Lot 7 covered by TCT No. [88674] by
appellate court modified the Decision[3] dated September 26, 1995 of the Regional Trial defendant Pedro Villa Abrille in the Deed of Sale (Exh. A) is valid as to one
Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 15. half or 277.5 square meters of the 555 square meters as one half belongs
Simply stated, the facts as found by the Court of Appeals[4] are as follows: to defendant Pedro Abrille but it is void as to the other half or 277.5 square
Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and meters as it belongs to plaintiff Mary Abrille who did not sell her share nor
wife. They have four children, who are also parties to the instant case and are represented give her consent to the sale.
by their mother, Mary Ann. 3. That sale of the house mentioned in the Deed of
In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-square meter parcel of land denominated Sale (Exh. A) is valid as far as the one half of the house representing the
as Lot 7, located at Kamuning Street, Juna Subdivision, Matina, Davao City, and covered by share of defendant Pedro Abrille is concerned but void as to the other half
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-88674 in their names. Said lot is adjacent to a parcel which is the share of plaintiff Mary Abrille because she did not give her
of land which Pedro acquired when he was still single and which is registered solely in his consent/sign the said sale.
name under TCT No. T-26471. 4. The defendants shall jointly pay the plaintiffs.
Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the Development Bank of 4. A. Seventeen Thousand Pesos (P17,000.00) representing the
the Philippines (DBP), the spouses built a house on Lot 7 and Pedros lot.The house was value of the movables and belonging[s] that were lost when unknown men
finished in the early 1980s but the spouses continuously made improvements, including a unceremoniously and without their knowledge and consent removed their
poultry house and an annex. movables from their house and brought them to an apartment.
In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family. Mary Ann was forced
to sell or mortgage their movables to support the family and the studies of her children. By 4. B. One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P 100,000.00) to plaintiff
himself, Pedro offered to sell the house and the two lots to herein petitioners, Patrocinia and Mary Abrille as moral damages.
Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified the petitioners of her objections, but Pedro
nonetheless sold the house and the two lots without Mary Anns consent, as evidenced by a 4. C. Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) to each of the four
Deed of Sale[5] dated June 21, 1991. It appears on the said deed that Mary Ann did not sign children as moral damages, namely:
on top of her name.
a) Ingrid Villa Abrille Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), b)
Ingremark Villa Abrille Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), c) Ingresoll Villa
 Abrille Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and d) Ingrelyn Villa Abrille Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
5. Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as exemplary damages by
way of example and correction for the public good.
6. The costs of suit.[8]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby MODIFIED as
follows:
1. The sale of lot covered by TCT No. 26471 in favor of
defendants spouses Wilfredo and Patrocinia Ravina is declared valid.
2. The sale of lot covered by TCT No. 88674 in favor of said
defendants spouses Ravina, together with the house thereon, is
declared null and void.
3. Defendant Pedro Abrille is ordered
to return the value of the consideration for the lot covered by TCT No.
88674 and the house thereon to co-defendants spouses Ravina.
4. Defendants spouses Ravina [a]re ordered to reconvey the lot and house
covered by TCT No. 88674 in favor of spouses Pedro and Mary Villa Abrille
and to deliver possession to them.
5. Plaintiffs are given the option to exercise their rights under
Article [450] of the New Civil Code with respect to the improvements
introduced by defendant spouses Ravina.
6. Defendants Pedro Villa Abrille and spouses Ravina are
ordered to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs as follows:
a) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) to plaintiff Mary
Villa Abrille as moral damages.
b) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages to each
of the four children, namely: Ingrid Villa Abrille, Ingremark Villa Abrille,
Ingresoll Villa Abrille and Ingrelyn Villa Abrille.
c) Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) as exemplary damages
by way of example and correction for the public good.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed this
petition. Petitioners argue that:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED x x x
THE SALE OF LOT COVERED BY TCT NO. 88674 IN FAVOR OF SPOUSES
RAVINA, TOGETHER WITH THE HOUSE THEREON, AS NULL AND VOID
SINCE IT IS CLEARLY CONTRARY TO LAW AND EVIDENCE.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONERS
PATROCIN[I]A RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA ARE NOT INNOCENT
PURCHASERS FOR VALUE, THE SAME BEING CONTRARY TO LAW AND
EVIDENCE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONERS
PATROCIN[I]A RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA ARE LIABLE FOR
DAMAGES, THE SAME BEING CONTRARY TO LAW AND EVIDENCE.[10]
In essence, petitioners assail the appellate courts declaration that the sale to them
by Pedro of the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 is null and void. However, in addressing this
issue, it is imperative to determine: (1) whether the subject property covered by TCT No. T-
88674 is an exclusive property of Pedro or conjugal property, and (2) whether its sale by
Pedro was valid considering the absence of Mary Anns consent.
Petitioners assert that the subject lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was the exclusive
property of Pedro having been acquired by him through barter or exchange.[11] They allege
that the subject lot was acquired by Pedro with the proceeds of the sale of one of his
exclusive properties. Allegedly, Pedro and his sister Carmelita initially agreed to exchange
their exclusive lots covered by TCT No. T-26479 and TCT No. T-26472, respectively. Later,
however, Pedro sold the lot covered by TCT No. T-26472 to one Francisca Teh Ting and
purchased the property of Carmelita using the proceeds of the sale. A new title, TCT No. T-
88674, was issued thereafter. Thus, petitioners insist that the subject lot remains to be an
exclusive property of Pedro as it was acquired or purchased through the exclusive funds or
money of the latter.
We are not persuaded. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides, All property of
the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
There is no issue with regard to the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, which was an
exclusive property of Pedro, having been acquired by him before his marriage to Mary
Ann. However, the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was acquired in 1982 during the
marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann. No evidence was adduced to show that the subject
property was acquired through exchange or barter. The presumption of the conjugal nature
of the property subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to
overcome said presumption or to prove that the subject property is exclusively owned by
Pedro.[12] Petitioners bare assertion would not suffice to overcome the presumption that TCT
No. T-88674, acquired during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann, is conjugal. Likewise, the
house built thereon is conjugal property, having been constructed through the joint efforts of
the spouses, who had even obtained a loan from DBP to construct the house.
Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same
Code that now treats such a disposition to be void if done (a) without the consent of both the
husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouses inability, the authority of the
court. Article 124 of the Family Code, the governing law at the time the assailed sale was
contracted, is explicit:
 ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to
the court by the wife for proper remedy which must be availed of within
five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable
to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the
authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed
as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance
by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Emphasis supplied.)
The particular provision in the New Civil Code giving the wife ten (10) years to
annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear
that alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal partnership property by the husband without
the consent of the wife is null and void.
Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the husband, without
knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal property, such sale is void. If the sale was
with the knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a
disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given five (5) years
from the date the contract implementing the decision of the husband to institute the case.[13]
Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of sale within five
(5) years from the date of sale and execution of the deed. However, her action to annul the
sale pertains only to the conjugal house and lot and does not include the lot covered by TCT
No. T-26471, a property exclusively belonging to Pedro and which he can dispose of freely
without Mary Anns consent.
On the second assignment of error, petitioners contend that they are buyers in good
faith.[14] Accordingly, they need not inquire whether the lot was purchased by money
exclusively belonging to Pedro or of the common fund of the spouses and may rely on the
certificates of title.
The contention is bereft of merit. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, a
purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some
other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the
same at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some
other person in the property.[15] To establish his status as a buyer for value in good faith, a
person dealing with land registered in the name of and occupied by the seller need only show
that he relied on the face of the sellers certificate of title. But for a person dealing with land
registered in the name of and occupied by the seller whose capacity to sell is restricted, such
as by Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code or Article 124 of the Family Code, he must
show that he inquired into the latters capacity to sell in order to establish himself as a buyer
for value in good faith.[16]
In the present case, the property is registered in the name of Pedro and his wife,
Mary Ann. Petitioners cannot deny knowledge that during the time of the sale in 1991, Pedro
was married to Mary Ann. However, Mary Anns conformity did not appear in the deed. Even
assuming that petitioners believed in good faith that the subject property is the exclusive
property of Pedro, they were apprised by Mary Anns lawyer of her objection to the sale and
yet they still proceeded to purchase the property without Mary Anns written
consent. Moreover, the respondents were the ones in actual, visible and public possession of
the property at the time the transaction was being made. Thus, at the time of sale,
petitioners knew that Mary Ann has a right to or interest in the subject properties and yet
they failed to obtain her conformity to the deed of sale. Hence, petitioners cannot now
invoke the protection accorded to purchasers in good faith.
Now, if a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of what has been given is
proper. The relationship between the parties in any contract even if subsequently annulled
must always be characterized and punctuated by good faith and fair dealing.[17] Hence, in
consonance with justice and equity and the salutary principle of non-enrichment at anothers
expense, we sustain the appellate courts order directing Pedro to return to petitioner spouses
the value of the consideration for the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 and the house
thereon.
However, this court rules that petitioners cannot claim reimbursements for
improvements they introduced after their good faith had ceased. As correctly found by the
Court of Appeals, petitioner Patrocinia Ravina made improvements and renovations on the
house and lot at the time when the complaint against them was filed.Ravina continued
introducing improvements during the pendency of the action.[18]
Thus, Article 449 of the New Civil Code is applicable. It provides that, (h)e who
builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown
without right to indemnity.[19]
On the last issue, petitioners claim that the decision awarding damages to
respondents is not supported by the evidence on record.[20]
The claim is erroneous to say the least. The manner by which respondent and her
children were removed from the family home deserves our condemnation. On July 5, 1991,
while respondent was out and her children were in school, Pedro Villa Abrille acting in
connivance with the petitioners[21] surreptitiously transferred all their personal belongings to
another place. The respondents then were not allowed to enter their rightful home or family
abode despite their impassioned pleas.
Firmly established in our civil law is the doctrine that: Every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.[22] When a right is exercised in a manner that does
not conform with such norms and results in damages to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrong doer must be held responsible. Similarly, any person who
willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages caused.[23] It is patent
in this case that petitioners alleged acts fall short of these established civil law standards.
WHEREFORE, we deny the instant petition for lack of merit. The Decision
dated February 21, 2002 and the Resolution dated October 7, 2003 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 54560 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160708, October 16, 2009 and her children were in school, Pedro Villa Abrilleacting in connivance with the
petitioners[21] surreptitiously transferred all their personal belongings to another place. The
PATROCINIA RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA VS. MARY ANN P. VILLA ABRILLE, respondents then were not allowed to enter their rightful home or family abode despite their
FOR HERSELF AND IN BEHALF OF INGRID D’LYN P. VILLA ABRILLE, INGREMARK impassioned pleas.
D’WIGHT VILLA ABRILLE, INGRESOLL DIELSVILLA ABRILLE AND INGRELYN
DYAN VILLA ABRILLE Firmly established in our civil law is the doctrine that: “Every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
QUISUMBING, ACTING C.J.: everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.”[22]When a right is exercised in
a manner that does not conform with such norms and results in damages to another, a legal
FACTS: wrong is thereby committed for which the wrong doer must be held responsible. Similarly,
Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife. They any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
have four children, who are also parties to the instant case and are represented by their morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages
mother, Mary Ann. caused. [23] It is patent in this case that petitioners’ alleged acts fall short of these established
civil law standards.
In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-square meter parcel of land denominated as Lot 7,
located in Davao City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-88674 in their
names. Said lot is adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he was still single
and which is registered solely in his name under TCT No. T-26471.
Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP), the spouses built a house on Lot 7 and Pedro’s lot. The house was finished
in the early 1980’s but the spouses continuously made improvements, including a poultry
house and an annex.
In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family. Mary Ann was forced to sell or
mortgage their movables to support the family and the studies of her children. By himself,
Pedro offered to sell the house and the two lots to herein petitioners, Patrocinia and
Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified the petitioners of her objections, but Pedro
nonetheless sold the house and the two lots without Mary Ann’s consent, as evidenced by a
Deed of Sale[5]. It appears on the said deed that Mary Ann did not sign on top of her name.
On July 5, 1991 while Mary Ann was outside the house and the four children were in school,
Pedro together with armed members of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU)
and acting in connivance with petitioners[6] began transferring all their belongings from the
house to an apartment.
When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille came home, they were stopped from
entering it. They waited outside the gate until evening under the rain. They sought help from
the Talomo Police Station, but police authorities refused to intervene, saying that it was a
family matter. Mary Ann alleged that the incident caused stress, tension and anxiety to her
children, so much so that one flunked at school.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners patrocin[i]a ravina and wilfredo ravina are liable for damages, the same
being contrary to law and evidence.[10]
RULING:
The claim is erroneous to say the least. The manner by which respondent and her children
were removed from the family home deserves our condemnation. While respondent was out
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK, petitioner, vs. MIGUELA
DAILO, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59986 rendered on June 3,
2002, which affirmed with modification the October 18, 1997 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 29, San Pablo City, Laguna in Civil Case No. SP-4748 (97).
The following factual antecedents are undisputed.
Respondent Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967.
During their marriage, the spouses purchased a house and lot situated at Barangay San
Francisco, San Pablo City from a certain Sandra Dalida. The subject property was declared
for tax assessment purposes under Assessment of Real Property No. 94-051-2802. The Deed
of Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as
vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife.[3]
On December 1, 1993, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
in favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner
Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot in
San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan in the amount
of P300,000.00 from petitioner. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the same day a
Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner. The
abovementioned transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took
place without the knowledge and consent of respondent.[4]
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale
thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder. After the
lapse of one year without the property being redeemed, petitioner, through its vice-
president, consolidated the ownership thereof by executing on June 6, 1996 an Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale.[5]
In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died on December 20, 1995. In one of her visits
to the subject property, respondent learned that petitioner had already employed a certain
Roldan Brion to clean its premises and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion
allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject
property, which was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 29, San Pablo City, Civil Case No. SP-2222 (97) for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage
and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance
with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner. In the latters Answer
C. with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that
the property in question was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision on October 18, 1997. The
dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff having proved by the preponderance of evidence the allegations of
the Complaint, the Court finds for the plaintiff and hereby orders:
ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. The declaration of the following documents as null and void:
(a) The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage dated December 1, 1993 executed
before Notary Public Romulo Urrea and his notarial register entered as
Doc. No. 212; Page No. 44, Book No. XXI, Series of 1993.
(b) The Certificate of Sale executed by Notary Public Reynaldo Alcantara on
April 20, 1995.
(c) The Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership executed by the defendant
(c) The Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership executed by the defendant
over the residential lot located at Brgy. San Francisco, San Pablo City,
covered by ARP No. 95-091-1236 entered as Doc. No. 406; Page No.
83, Book No. III, Series of 1996 of Notary Public Octavio M. Zayas.
(d) The assessment of real property No. 95-051-1236.
2. The defendant is ordered to reconvey the property subject of this complaint to the
plaintiff.
ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
1. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P40,000.00 representing the value of
the car which was burned.
ON BOTH CAUSES OF ACTION
1. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P25,000.00 as attorneys fees;
2. The defendant to pay plaintiff P25,000.00 as moral damages;
 3. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. To pay the cost of the suit.
The counterclaim is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Upon elevation of the case to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the trial
courts finding that the subject property was conjugal in nature, in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that the subject property acquired during the
marriage of spouses Dailo belongs to their conjugal partnership.[7] The appellate court
declared as void the mortgage on the subject property because it was constituted without
the knowledge and consent of respondent, in accordance with Article 124 of the Family Code.
Thus, it upheld the trial courts order to reconvey the subject property to respondent.[8] With
respect to the damage to respondents car, the appellate court found petitioner to be liable
therefor because it is responsible for the consequences of the acts or omissions of the person
it hired to accomplish the assigned task.[9] All told, the appellate court affirmed the trial
courts Decision, but deleted the award for damages and attorneys fees for lack of basis.[10]
Hence, this petition, raising the following issues for this Courts consideration:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR.
ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS CO-OWNER THEREOF IS VALID AS TO HIS UNDIVIDED
SHARE.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE
LOAN OBTAINED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. THE SAME HAVING REDOUNDED TO
THE BENEFIT OF THE FAMILY.[11]
First, petitioner takes issue with the legal provision applicable to the factual milieu of
this case. It contends that Article 124 of the Family Code should be construed in relation to
Article 493 of the Civil Code, which states:
ART. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But
the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited
to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. . . .
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which
must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. . . .
Petitioner argues that although Article 124 of the Family Code requires the consent of
the other spouse to the mortgage of conjugal properties, the framers of the law could not
have intended to curtail the right of a spouse from exercising full ownership over the portion
of the conjugal property pertaining to him under the concept of co-ownership.[12]Thus,
petitioner would have this Court uphold the validity of the mortgage to the extent of the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr.s share in the conjugal partnership.
In Guiang v. Court of Appeals,[13] it was held that the sale of a conjugal property
requires the consent of both the husband and wife.[14] In applying Article 124 of the Family
Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null
and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who
contracted the sale. The same principle in Guiang squarely applies to the instant case. As
shall be discussed next, there is no legal basis to construe Article 493 of the Civil Code as an
exception to Article 124 of the Family Code.
Respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. In the
absence of a marriage settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership
of gains governed the property relations between respondent and her late husband.[15] With
the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of
Gains in the Family Code was made applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already
established before its effectivity unless vested rights have already been acquired under the
Civil Code or other laws.[16]
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent
and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal
partnership of gains is a special type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in a
common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and
those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance. [17] Unlike the
absolute community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory
manner,[18] the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of
partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on
conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their marriage settlements.[19] Thus, the
property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by
Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules
on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil
Code provisions on partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and
consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject
property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124
of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other
spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.
The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who
makes the disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-ownership
under Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should
not distinguish.[20] Thus, both the trial court and the appellate court are correct in declaring
the nullity of the real estate mortgage on the subject property for lack of respondents
consent.
Second, petitioner imposes the liability for the payment of the principal obligation
obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. on the conjugal partnership to the extent that it
redounded to the benefit of the family.[21]
Under Article 121 of the Family Code, [T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . .
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the
extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . . For the subject property to be held
liable, the obligation contracted by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. must have redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. There must be the requisite showing then of some
advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal
partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and
frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the
solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.[22]
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such.[23] Ei incumbit
probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who denies, must
prove).[24] Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo,
Jr. to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of
his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Other than
petitioners bare allegation, there is nothing from the records of the case to compel a finding
that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to the benefit of
the family. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of
the principal obligation.
In addition, a perusal of the records of the case reveals that during the trial, petitioner
vigorously asserted that the subject property was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino
Dailo, Jr. Nowhere in the answer filed with the trial court was it alleged that the proceeds of
the loan redounded to the benefit of the family. Even on appeal, petitioner never claimed
that the family benefited from the proceeds of the loan. When a party adopts a certain
theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, for to
permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive
to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.[25] A party may change his legal
theory on appeal only when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of any
further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised
in the new theory.[26]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO,
G.R. No. 153802
March 11, 2005
FACTS: Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr were married on August 8, 1967. During their
marriage the spouses purchased a house and lot situated at San Pablo City from a certain
Dalida. The subject property was declared for tax assessment purposes The Deed of Absolute
Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as
vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife.
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Gesmundo,
authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to
be secured by the spouses Dailo’s house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA,
Gesmundo obtained a loan from petitioner. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the
same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner.
The abovementioned transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo,
took place without the knowledge and consent of respondent.[
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a
Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder. After the lapse of
one year without the property being redeemed, petitioner consolidated the ownership thereof
by executing an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale.
In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died. In one of her visits to the subject property,
Miguela learned that petitioner had already employed a certain Brion to clean its premises
and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire
within the premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property,
which was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with the RTC San Pablo City a Civil Case
for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Damages against petitioner. In the latter’s Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the property in question was the exclusive
property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision declaring the said documents null
and void and further ordered the defendant is ordered to reconvey the property subject of
this complaint to the plaintiff, to pay the plaintiff the sum representing the value of the car
which was burned, the attorney’s fees, moral and exemplary damages.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s Decision, but deleted the award for damages
and attorney’s fees for lack of basis. Hence, this petition
ISSUE:
1. WON THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. ON THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY AS CO-OWNER THEREOF IS VALID AS TO HIS UNDIVIDED SHARE.
2. WON THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE LOAN
OBTAINED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. THE SAME HAVING REDOUNDED TO THE
BENEFIT OF THE FAMILY.
HELD: the petition is denied.
1. NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. . . .
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which
must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. . . .
In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the
consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal
property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale.
Respondent and the late Marcelino. were married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a
marriage settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
governed the property relations between respondent and her late husband. With the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of
Gains in the Family Code was made applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already
established before its effectivity unless vested rights have already been acquired under
the Civil Code or other laws.
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and the
late Marcelino even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of gains
is a special type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund the
proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by
either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute community of
property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal
partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all that is not in
conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains)
or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus, the property relations of respondent
and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of
Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code.
In case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply
only when the Family Code is silent on the matter.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent
of his wife, Marcelino constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which
formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family
Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any
disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.
The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who
makes the disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-ownership
under Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should
not distinguish. Thus, both the trial court and the appellate court are correct in declaring the
nullity of the real estate mortgage on the subject property for lack of respondent’s consent.
2. NO. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, “[T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable for: .
..
(1) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to
the extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . .”Certainly, to make a conjugal
partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and
frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the
solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.[The burden of proof that the debt was
contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party
litigant claiming as such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat(he who asserts, not he
who denies, must prove). Petitioner’s sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late
Marcelino to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the
benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal
obligation.
NOTES:In addition, a perusal of the records of the case reveals that during the trial,
petitioner vigorously asserted that the subject property was the exclusive property of the
late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. Nowhere in the answer filed with the trial court was it alleged that
the proceeds of the loan redounded to the benefit of the family. Even on appeal, petitioner
never claimed that the family benefited from the proceeds of the loan. When a party adopts
a certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal,
for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be
offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. A party may change his legal
theory on appeal only when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of
any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue
raised in the new theory.
SECOND DIVISION
Siochi v. Gozon
X--------------------------------------------------X
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
This is a consolidation of two separate petitions for review,[1] assailing the 7 July 2005
Decision[2] and the 30 September 2005 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 74447.
THIS CASE INVOLVES A 30,000 SQ.M. PARCEL OF LAND (PROPERTY) COVERED BY TCT NO.
5357.[4] THE PROPERTY IS SITUATED IN MALABON, METRO MANILA AND IS REGISTERED IN
THE NAME OF ALFREDO GOZON (ALFREDO), MARRIED TO ELVIRA GOZON (ELVIRA).
ON 23 DECEMBER 1991, ELVIRA FILED WITH THE CAVITE CITY REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
(CAVITE RTC) A PETITION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION AGAINST HER HUSBAND ALFREDO. ON 2
JANUARY 1992, ELVIRA FILED A NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS, WHICH WAS THEN
ANNOTATED ON TCTNO. 5357.
ON 31 AUGUST 1993, WHILE THE LEGAL SEPARATION CASE WAS STILL PENDING, ALFREDO
AND MARIO SIOCHI (MARIO) ENTERED INTO AN AGREEMENT TO BUY AND
SELL[5] (AGREEMENT) INVOLVING THE PROPERTY FOR THE PRICE OF P18 MILLION. AMONG
THE STIPULATIONS IN THE AGREEMENT WERE THAT ALFREDO WOULD: (1) SECURE AN
AFFIDAVIT FROM ELVIRA THAT THE PROPERTY IS ALFREDOS EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY AND TO
ANNOTATE THE AGREEMENT AT THE BACK OF TCT NO. 5357; (2) SECURE THE APPROVAL OF
THE CAVITE RTC TO EXCLUDE THE PROPERTY FROM THE LEGAL SEPARATION CASE; AND (3)
SECURE THE REMOVAL OF THE NOTICE OF LIS PENDENSPERTAINING TO THE SAID CASE
AND ANNOTATED ON TCT NO. 5357. HOWEVER, DESPITE REPEATED DEMANDS FROM
MARIO, ALFREDO FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THESE STIPULATIONS. AFTER PAYING THE P5
MILLION EARNEST MONEY AS PARTIAL PAYMENT OF THE PURCHASE PRICE, MARIO TOOK
POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY IN SEPTEMBER 1993. ON 6 SEPTEMBER 1993, THE
AGREEMENT WAS ANNOTATED ON TCTNO. 5357.
Meanwhile, on 29 June 1994, the Cavite RTC rendered a decision[6] in the legal separation
case, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the legal separation
between petitioner and respondent. Accordingly, petitioner Elvira
Robles Gozon is entitled to live separately from respondent
Alfredo Gozon without dissolution of their marriage bond. The conjugal
partnership of gains of the spouses is hereby declared DISSOLVED and
LIQUIDATED. Being the offending spouse, respondent is deprived of his
share in the net profits and the same is awarded to their child Winifred
R. Gozon whose custody is awarded to petitioner.
FURTHERMORE, SAID PARTIES ARE REQUIRED TO MUTUALLY SUPPORT THEIR CHILD
WINIFRED R. GOZON AS HER NEEDS ARISES.
SO ORDERED.[7]
As regards the property, the Cavite RTC held that it is deemed conjugal property.
ON 22 AUGUST 1994, ALFREDO EXECUTED A DEED OF DONATION OVER THE PROPERTY IN
FAVOR OF THEIR DAUGHTER, WINIFRED GOZON (WINIFRED). THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
MALABON, GIL TABIJE, CANCELLED TCT NO. 5357 AND ISSUED TCT NO. M-10508[8] IN THE
NAME OF WINIFRED, WITHOUT ANNOTATING THE AGREEMENT AND THE NOTICE OF LIS
PENDENS ON TCT NO. M-10508.
ON 26 OCTOBER 1994, ALFREDO, BY VIRTUE OF A SPECIAL POWER OF
ATTORNEY[9] EXECUTED IN HIS FAVOR BY WINIFRED, SOLD THE PROPERTY TO INTER-
DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC. (IDRI) FOR P18 MILLION.[10] IDRI PAID ALFREDO P18 MILLION,
REPRESENTING FULL PAYMENT FOR THE PROPERTY.[11] SUBSEQUENTLY, THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF MALABON CANCELLED TCT NO. M-10508 AND ISSUED TCT NO. M-10976[12] TO
IDRI.
MARIO THEN FILED WITH THE MALABON REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (MALABON RTC) A
COMPLAINT FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND DAMAGES, ANNULMENT OF DONATION AND
SALE, WITH PRELIMINARY MANDATORY AND PROHIBITORY INJUNCTION AND/OR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER.
ON 3 APRIL 2001, THE MALABON RTC RENDERED A DECISION,[13] THE DISPOSITIVE
PORTION OF WHICH READS:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, JUDGMENT IS HEREBY RENDERED
AS FOLLOWS:
01. On the preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction:
1.1 THE SAME IS HEREBY MADE PERMANENT BY:
1.1.1 ENJOINING DEFENDANTS ALFREDO GOZON,
WINIFRED GOZON, INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC.
AND GIL TABIJE, THEIR AGENTS, REPRESENTATIVES
AND ALL PERSONS ACTING IN THEIR BEHALF FROM ANY
ATTEMPT OF COMMISSION OR CONTINUANCE OF THEIR
WRONGFUL ACTS OF FURTHER ALIENATING OR
DISPOSING OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY;
1.1.2. ENJOINING DEFENDANT INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC. FROM ENTERING AND
FENCING THE PROPERTY;
1.1.3. ENJOINING DEFENDANTS ALFREDO GOZON, WINIFRED GOZON, INTER-DIMENSIONAL
REALTY, INC. TO RESPECT PLAINTIFFS POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY.
02. THE AGREEMENT TO BUY AND SELL DATED 31 AUGUST 1993,
BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT ALFREDO GOZON IS HEREBY
APPROVED, EXCLUDING THE PROPERTY AND RIGHTS OF DEFENDANT
 ELVIRA ROBLES-GOZON TO THE UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF SHARE IN THE
CONJUGAL PROPERTY SUBJECT OF THIS CASE.
03. THE DEED OF DONATION DATED 22 AUGUST 1994, ENTERED INTO BY AND BETWEEN
DEFENDANTS ALFREDO GOZON AND WINIFRED GOZON IS HEREBY NULLIFIED AND
VOIDED.
04. THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED 26 OCTOBER 1994, EXECUTED BY DEFENDANT
WINIFRED GOZON, THROUGH DEFENDANT ALFREDO GOZON, IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT
INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC. IS HEREBY NULLIFIED AND VOIDED.
05. DEFENDANT INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC. IS HEREBY ORDERED TO DELIVER ITS
TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. M-10976 TO THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MALABON,
METRO MANILA.
06. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MALABON, METRO MANILA IS HEREBY ORDERED TO
CANCEL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NOS. 10508 IN THE NAME OF WINIFRED GOZON AND M-
10976 IN THE NAME OF INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC., AND TO RESTORE TRANSFER
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 5357 IN THE NAME OF ALFREDO GOZON, MARRIED TO ELVIRA
ROBLES WITH THE AGREEMENT TO BUY AND SELL DATED 31 AUGUST 1993 FULLY
ANNOTATED THEREIN IS HEREBY ORDERED.
07. DEFENDANT ALFREDO GOZON IS HEREBY ORDERED TO DELIVER A DEED OF ABSOLUTE
SALE IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF OVER HIS ONE-HALF UNDIVIDED SHARE IN THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY AND TO COMPLY WITH ALL THE REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTERING SUCH DEED.
08. ORDERING DEFENDANT ELVIRA ROBLES-GOZON TO SIT WITH PLAINTIFF TO AGREE ON
THE SELLING PRICE OF HER UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF SHARE IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY,
THEREAFTER, TO EXECUTE AND DELIVER A DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OVER THE SAME IN
FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF AND TO COMPLY WITH ALL THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
REGISTERING SUCH DEED, WITHIN FIFTEEN (15) DAYS FROM THE RECEIPT OF THIS
DECISION.
09. THEREAFTER, PLAINTIFF IS HEREBY ORDERED TO PAY DEFENDANT ALFREDO GOZON
THE BALANCE OF FOUR MILLION PESOS (P4,000,000.00) IN HIS ONE-HALF UNDIVIDED
SHARE IN THE PROPERTY TO BE SET OFF BY THE AWARD OF DAMAGES IN PLAINTIFFS
FAVOR.
10. PLAINTIFF IS HEREBY ORDERED TO PAY THE DEFENDANT ELVIRA ROBLES-GOZON THE
PRICE THEY HAD AGREED UPON FOR THE SALE OF HER ONE-HALF UNDIVIDED SHARE IN
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
11. DEFENDANTS ALFREDO GOZON, WINIFRED GOZON AND GIL TABIJE ARE HEREBY
ORDERED TO PAY THE PLAINTIFF, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, THE FOLLOWING:
11.1 TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00) AS ACTUAL AND
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES;
11.2 ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00) AS MORAL DAMAGES;
11.3 FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) AS EXEMPLARY DAMAGES;
11.4 FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P400,000.00) AS ATTORNEYS FEES; AND
11.5 ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) AS LITIGATION EXPENSES.
11.6 THE ABOVE AWARDS ARE SUBJECT TO SET OFF OF PLAINTIFFS OBLIGATION IN
PARAGRAPH 9 HEREOF.
12. DEFENDANTS ALFREDO GOZON AND WINIFRED GOZON ARE HEREBY
ORDERED TO PAY INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC. JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY THE FOLLOWING:
12.1 EIGHTEEN MILLION PESOS (P18,000,000.00) WHICH
CONSTITUTE THE AMOUNT THE FORMER RECEIVED FROM THE
LATTER PURSUANT TO THEIR DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED 26
OCTOBER 1994, WITH LEGAL INTEREST THEREFROM;
12.2 ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00) AS MORAL DAMAGES;
12.3 FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) AS EXEMPLARY DAMAGES; AND
12.4 ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) AS ATTORNEYS FEES.
13. DEFENDANTS ALFREDO GOZON AND WINIFRED GOZON ARE HEREBY
ORDERED TO PAY COSTS OF SUIT.
SO ORDERED.[14]
ON APPEAL, THE COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED THE MALABON RTCS DECISION WITH
MODIFICATION. THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION DATED 7 JULY 2005 READS:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, THE ASSAILED DECISION DATED
APRIL 3, 2001 OF THE RTC, BRANCH 74, MALABON IS HEREBY AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATIONS, AS FOLLOWS:
1. THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT LAND BY DEFENDANT ALFREDO GOZON TO PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT SIOCHI IS DECLARED NULL AND VOID FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
A) THE CONVEYANCE WAS DONE WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
ELVIRA GOZON;
B) DEFENDANT ALFREDO GOZONS ONE-HALF () UNDIVIDED SHARE HAS BEEN FORFEITED
IN FAVOR OF HIS DAUGHTER, DEFENDANT WINIFRED GOZON, BY VIRTUE OF THE DECISION
IN THE LEGAL SEPARATION CASE RENDERED BY THE RTC, BRANCH 16, CAVITE;
2. DEFENDANT ALFREDO GOZON SHALL RETURN/DELIVER TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT SIOCHI
THE AMOUNT OF P5 MILLION WHICH THE LATTER PAID AS EARNEST MONEY IN
CONSIDERATION FOR THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT LAND;
3. DEFENDANTS ALFREDO GOZON, WINIFRED GOZON AND GIL TABIJE ARE HEREBY
ORDERED TO PAY PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT SIOCHI JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, THE
FOLLOWING:
A) P100,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES;
B) P100,000.00 AS EXEMPLARY DAMAGES;
C) P50,000.00 AS ATTORNEYS FEES;
D) P20,000.00 AS LITIGATION EXPENSES; AND
E) THE AWARDS OF ACTUAL AND COMPENSATORY DAMAGES ARE HEREBY
ORDERED DELETED FOR LACK OF BASIS.
4. DEFENDANTS ALFREDO GOZON AND WINIFRED GOZON ARE HEREBY
ORDERED TO PAY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT IDRI JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY
THE FOLLOWING:
A) P100,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES;
B) P100,000.00 AS EXEMPLARY DAMAGES; AND
C) P50,000.00 AS ATTORNEYS FEES.
DEFENDANT WINIFRED GOZON, WHOM THE UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF SHARE OF DEFENDANT
ALFREDO GOZON WAS AWARDED, IS HEREBY GIVEN THE OPTION WHETHER OR NOT TO
DISPOSE OF HER UNDIVIDED SHARE IN THE SUBJECT LAND.
THE REST OF THE DECISION NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THIS RULING STANDS.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Only Mario and IDRI appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals. In his petition, Mario
alleges that the Agreement should be treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected
by the acceptance of the other spouse before the offer is withdrawn. Since Elviras conduct
signified her acquiescence to the sale, Mario prays for the Court to direct Alfredo and Elvira
to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property upon his payment of P9 million to
Elvira.
ON THE OTHER HAND, IDRI ALLEGES THAT IT IS A BUYER IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE.
THUS, IDRI PRAYS THAT THE COURT SHOULD UPHOLD THE VALIDITY OF IDRIS TCT NO. M-
10976 OVER THE PROPERTY.
WE FIND THE PETITIONS WITHOUT MERIT.
THIS CASE INVOLVES THE CONJUGAL PROPERTY OF ALFREDO AND ELVIRA. SINCE THE
DISPOSITION OF THE PROPERTY OCCURRED AFTER THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY CODE,
THE APPLICABLE LAW IS THE FAMILY CODE. ARTICLE 124 OF THE FAMILY CODE PROVIDES:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husbands decision shall prevail, subject to the recourse to the court by the
wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from
the date of the contract implementing such decision.
IN THE EVENT THAT ONE SPOUSE IS INCAPACITATED OR OTHERWISE UNABLE TO
PARTICIPATE IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE CONJUGAL PROPERTIES, THE
OTHER SPOUSE MAY ASSUME SOLE POWERS OF ADMINISTRATION. THESE POWERS
DO NOT INCLUDE THE POWERS OF DISPOSITION OR ENCUMBRANCE WHICH MUST
HAVE THE AUTHORITY OF THE COURT OR THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE OTHER
SPOUSE. IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH AUTHORITY OR CONSENT, THE DISPOSITION
OR ENCUMBRANCE SHALL BE VOID. HOWEVER, THE TRANSACTION SHALL BE
CONSTRUED AS A CONTINUING OFFER ON THE PART OF THE CONSENTING SPOUSE AND
THE THIRD PERSON, AND MAY BE PERFECTED AS A BINDING CONTRACT UPON THE
ACCEPTANCE BY THE OTHER SPOUSE OR AUTHORIZATION BY THE COURT BEFORE THE
OFFER IS WITHDRAWN BY EITHER OR BOTH OFFERORS. (EMPHASIS SUPPLIED)
In this case, Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because Elvira, with whom
Alfredo was separated in fact, was unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
property. However, as sole administrator of the property, Alfredo still cannot sell the
property without the written consent of Elvira or the authority of the court. Without such
consent or authority, the sale is void.[16] The absence of the consent of one of the spouse
renders the entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the
spouse who contracted the sale.[17] Even if the other spouse actively participated in
negotiating for the sale of the property, that other spouses written consent to the sale is still
required by law for its validity.[18] The Agreement entered into by Alfredo and Mario was
without the written consent of Elvira. Thus, the Agreement is entirely void. As regards
Marios contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected by
Elviras acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently
donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was
already withdrawn.
However, we disagree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the one-half undivided
share of Alfredo in the property was already forfeited in favor of his daughter Winifred, based
on the ruling of the Cavite RTC in the legal separation case. The Court of Appeals
misconstrued the ruling of the Cavite RTC that Alfredo, being the offending spouse, is
deprived of his share in the net profits and the same is awarded to Winifred.
THE CAVITE RTC RULING FINDS SUPPORT IN THE FOLLOWING PROVISIONS OF THE FAMILY
CODE:
ART. 63. THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION SHALL HAVE THE
FOLLOWING EFFECTS:
(1) THE SPOUSES SHALL BE ENTITLED TO LIVE SEPARATELY
FROM EACH OTHER, BUT THE MARRIAGE BONDS SHALL NOT
BE SEVERED;
(2) THE ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OR THE CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP SHALL BE DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED
BUT THE OFFENDING SPOUSE SHALL HAVE NO RIGHT
TO ANY SHARE OF THE NET PROFITS EARNED BY THE
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OR THE CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP, WHICH SHALL BE FORFEITED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE
43(2);
(3) THE CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILDREN SHALL BE
AWARDED TO THE INNOCENT SPOUSE, SUBJECT TO THE
PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 213 OF THIS CODE; AND
THE OFFENDING SPOUSE SHALL BE DISQUALIFIED FROM INHERITING FROM THE INNOCENT
SPOUSE BY INTESTATE SUCCESSION. MOREOVER, PROVISIONS IN FAVOR OF THE
OFFENDING SPOUSE MADE IN THE WILL OF THE INNOCENT SPOUSE SHALL BE REVOKED BY
OPERATION OF LAW.
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall
produce the following effects:
XXX
(2) THE ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY OR THE CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP, AS THE CASE MAY BE, SHALL BE DISSOLVED AND
LIQUIDATED, BUT IF EITHER SPOUSE CONTRACTED SAID MARRIAGE IN
BAD FAITH, HIS OR HER SHARE OF THE NET PROFITS OF THE
COMMUNITY PROPERTY OR CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY
SHALL BE FORFEITED IN FAVOR OF THE COMMON CHILDREN OR, IF
 THERE ARE NONE, THE CHILDREN OF THE GUILTY SPOUSE BY A
PREVIOUS MARRIAGE OR, IN DEFAULT OF CHILDREN, THE INNOCENT
SPOUSE; (EMPHASIS SUPPLIED)
Thus, among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is
dissolved and liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the
net profits earned by the conjugal partnership. It is only Alfredos share in the net profits
which is forfeited in favor of Winifred. Article 102(4) of the Family Code provides that [f]or
purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Article 43, No.
(2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value
of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market
value at the time of its dissolution. Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not
Alfredos share in the conjugal partnership property but merely in the net profits of the
conjugal partnership property.
WITH REGARD TO IDRI, WE AGREE WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS IN HOLDING THAT IDRI
IS NOT A BUYER IN GOOD FAITH. AS FOUND BY THE RTC MALABON AND THE COURT OF
APPEALS, IDRI HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH SHOULD
IMPEL A REASONABLY CAUTIOUS PERSON TO MAKE FURTHER INQUIRIES ABOUT THE
VENDORS TITLE TO THE PROPERTY. THE REPRESENTATIVE OF IDRI TESTIFIED THAT HE
KNEW ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF THE NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS ON TCT NO. 5357 AND THE
LEGAL SEPARATION CASE FILED BEFORE THE CAVITE RTC. THUS, IDRI COULD NOT FEIGN
IGNORANCE OF THE CAVITE RTC DECISION DECLARING THE PROPERTY AS CONJUGAL.
Furthermore, if IDRI made further inquiries, it would have known that the cancellation of the
notice of lis pendens was highly irregular. Under Section 77 of Presidential Decree No.
1529,[19] the notice of lis pendens may be cancelled (a) upon order of the court, or (b) by
the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party who caused the registration of
the lis pendens. In this case, the lis pendens was cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon
the request of Alfredo. There was no court order for the cancellation of the lis pendens.
Neither did Elvira, the party who caused the registration of the lis pendens, file a verified
petition for its cancellation.
Besides, had IDRI been more prudent before buying the property, it would have discovered
that Alfredos donation of the property to Winifred was without the consent of Elvira. Under
Article 125[20] of the Family Code, a conjugal property cannot be donated by one spouse
without the consent of the other spouse. Clearly, IDRI was not a buyer in good faith.
Nevertheless, we find it proper to reinstate the order of the Malabon RTC for the
reimbursement of the P18 million paid by IDRI for the property, which was inadvertently
omitted in the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitions. We AFFIRM the 7 July 2005 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74447 with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) We DELETE the portions regarding the forfeiture of Alfredo Gozons one-half undivided
share in favor of Winifred Gozon and the grant of option to Winifred Gozon whether or not to
dispose of her undivided share in the property; and
(2) We ORDER Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon to pay Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc.
jointly and severally the Eighteen Million Pesos (P18,000,000) which was the amount paid
by Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. for the property, with legal interest computed from the
finality of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Marital Consent, Essential to Sale of Conjugal Property Even If Separated De Facto
(Siochi v. Gozon Case Digest)
G.R. No. 169900 March 18, 2010
MARIO SIOCHI, Petitioner, vs. ALFREDO GOZON, et al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 169977
INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC., Petitioner, vs. MARIO SIOCHI, ELVIRA GOZON,
et al., Respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
FIRST ISSUE:
In this case, the Supreme Court of the Philippines once again had the occasion to mention
that sale of the property forming part of the conjugal partnership without the consent of the
other spouse is void. This is true even if the spouses were separated in fact and Alfredo was
the sole administrator of the property at the time of sale.
The sale is void absent such consent or authority. The absence of the consent of one of the
spouse renders the entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining
to the spouse who contracted the sale. Even if the other spouse actively participated in
negotiating for the sale of the property, that other spouse’s written consent to the sale is still
required by law for its validity. The Agreement entered into by Alfredo and Mario was without
the written consent of Elvira. Thus, the Agreement is entirely void. As regards Mario’s
contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected by Elvira’s
acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently
donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was
already withdrawn.
SECOND ISSUE:
It was ruled by the CA that the one-half undivided share of Alfredo in the property was
already forfeited in favor of their daughter based on the ruling of the RTC that the offending
spouse in an action for legal separation is deprived of his share in the net profits of the
conjugal properties.
The Supreme Court found the ruling of the CA to be in error.
Under Article 63 of the Family Code, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership
shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of
the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be
forfeited in accordance with the provisions of article 43(2).
Article 43 of the Family Code likewise provides that, the termination of the subsequent
marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following:
xxx
(2) the absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be,
shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith,
his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership
property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children
of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse.
Therefore, among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal
partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to any
share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership. It is only the share in the net
profits which is forfeited in favor of their daughter. Article 102(4) of the Family Code
provides that “[f]or purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance
with Article 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value
between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the
marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.” Clearly, what is forfeited in
favor of their daughter is not his share in the conjugal partnership property but merely in the
net profits of the conjugal partnership property
ARTURO SARTE FLORES, G.R. No. 183984
SPOUSES ENRICO L. LINDO, JR. Promulgated:
and EDNA C. LINDO,
Respondents. April 13, 2011
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 30 May 2008 Decision2 and the 4
August 2008 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94003.
The Antecedent Facts
The facts, as gleaned from the Court of Appeals Decision, are as follows:
On 31 October 1995, Edna Lindo (Edna) obtained a loan from Arturo Flores (petitioner)
amounting to P400,000 payable on 1 December 1995 with 3% compounded monthly interest
and 3% surcharge in case of late payment. To secure the loan, Edna executed a Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage4 (the Deed) covering a property in the name of Edna and her
husband Enrico (Enrico) Lindo, Jr. (collectively, respondents). Edna also signed a Promissory
Note5 and the Deed for herself and for Enrico as his attorney-in-fact.
Edna issued three checks as partial payments for the loan. All checks were dishonored for
insufficiency of funds, prompting petitioner to file a Complaint for Foreclosure of Mortgage
with Damages against respondents. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 33 (RTC, Branch 33) and docketed as Civil Case No. 00-97942.
In its 30 September 2003 Decision,6 the RTC, Branch 33 ruled that petitioner was not
entitled to judicial foreclosure of the mortgage. The RTC, Branch 33 found that the Deed was
executed by Edna without the consent and authority of Enrico. The RTC, Branch 33 noted
that the Deed was executed on 31 October 1995 while the Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
executed by Enrico was only dated 4 November 1995.
The RTC, Branch 33 further ruled that petitioner was not precluded from recovering the loan
from Edna as he could file a personal action against her. However, the RTC, Branch 33 ruled
that it had no jurisdiction over the personal action which should be filed in the place where
the plaintiff or the defendant resides in accordance with Section 2, Rule 4 of the Revised
Rules on Civil Procedure.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its Order7 dated 8 January 2004, the RTC,
Branch 33 denied the motion for lack of merit.
On 8 September 2004, petitioner filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages against
respondents. It was raffled to Branch 42 (RTC, Branch 42) of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, and docketed as Civil Case No. 04-110858.
Respondents filed their Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims where they
admitted the loan but stated that it only amounted to P340,000. Respondents further alleged
that Enrico was not a party to the loan because it was contracted by Edna
without Enricos signature. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case on the grounds
of improper venue, res judicata and forum-shopping, invoking the Decision of the RTC,
Branch 33. On 7 March 2005, respondents also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of
res judicata and lack of cause of action.
The Decision of the Trial Court
On 22 July 2005, the RTC, Branch 42 issued an Order8 denying the motion to dismiss. The
RTC, Branch 42 ruled that res judicata will not apply to rights, claims or demands which,
although growing out of the same subject matter, constitute separate or distinct causes of
action and were not put in issue in the former action. Respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration. In its Order9 dated 8 February 2006, the RTC, Branch 42 denied
respondents motion. The RTC, Branch 42 ruled that the RTC, Branch 33 expressly stated that
its decision did not mean that petitioner could no longer recover the loan petitioner extended
to Edna.
Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order before the Court of Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 30 May 2008 Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside the 22 July 2005 and 8 February
2006 Orders of the RTC, Branch 42 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The Court of Appeals ruled that while the general rule is that a motion to dismiss is
interlocutory and not appealable, the rule admits of exceptions. The Court of Appeals ruled
that the RTC, Branch 42 acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying respondents motion
to dismiss.
The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 3, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. If two or more suits
are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one on a judgment upon
the merits in any one is available ground for the dismissal of the others. The Court of
Appeals ruled that on a nonpayment of a note secured by a mortgage, the creditor has a
single cause of action against the debtor, that is recovery of the credit with execution of the
suit. Thus, the creditor may institute two alternative remedies: either a personal action for
the collection of debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage, but not both. The Court of
Appeals ruled that petitioner had only one cause of action against Edna for her failure to pay
her obligation and he could not split the single cause of action by filing separately a
foreclosure proceeding and a collection case. By filing a petition for foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner had already waived his personal
action to recover the amount covered by the promissory note.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 4 August 2008 Resolution, the Court of
Appeals denied the motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
dismissing the complaint for collection of sum of money on the ground of multiplicity of suits.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
The rule is that a mortgage-creditor has a single cause of action against a mortgagor-debtor,
that is, to recover the debt.10 The mortgage-creditor has the option of either filing a personal
action for collection of sum of money or instituting a real action to foreclose on the mortgage
security.11 An election of the first bars recourse to the second, otherwise there would be
multiplicity of suits in which the debtor would be tossed from one venue to another
depending on the location of the mortgaged properties and the residence of the parties.12
The two remedies are alternative and each remedy is complete by itself.13 If the mortgagee
opts to foreclose the real estate mortgage, he waives the action for the collection of the
debt, and vice versa.14 The Court explained:
x x x in the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may
institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or a real
action to foreclose the mortgage. In other words, he may pursue either of the two
remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause of action can by no means be
impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete in itself. Thus, an election to
bring a personal action will leave open to him all the properties of the debtor for
attachment and execution, even including the mortgaged property itself. And, if he
waives such personal action and pursues his remedy against the mortgaged
property, an unsatisfied judgment thereon would still give him the right to sue for
deficiency judgment, in which case, all the properties of the defendant, other than
the mortgaged property, are again open to him for the satisfaction of the deficiency.
In either case, his remedy is complete, his cause of action undiminished, and any
advantages attendant to the pursuit of one or the other remedy are purely
accidental and are all under his right of election. On the other hand, a rule that
would authorize the plaintiff to bring a personal action against the debtor and
simultaneously or successively another action against the mortgaged property,
would result not only in multiplicity of suits so offensive to justice (Soriano
v. Enriques, 24 Phil. 584) and obnoxious to law and equity (Osorio v. San Agustin,
25 Phil. 404), but also in subjecting the defendant to the vexation of being sued in
the place of his residence or of the residence of the plaintiff, and then again in the
place where the property lies.15
The Court has ruled that if a creditor is allowed to file his separate complaints simultaneously
or successively, one to recover his credit and another to foreclose his mortgage, he will, in
effect, be authorized plural redress for a single breach of contract at so much costs to the
court and with so much vexation and oppressiveness to the debtor.16
In this case, however, there are circumstances that the Court takes into consideration.
Petitioner filed an action for foreclosure of mortgage. The RTC, Branch 33 ruled that
petitioner was not entitled to judicial foreclosure because the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
was executed without Enricos consent. The RTC, Branch 33 stated:
All these circumstances certainly conspired against the plaintiff who has the burden
of proving his cause of action. On the other hand, said circumstances tend to
support the claim of defendant Edna Lindo that her husband did not consent to the
mortgage of their conjugal property and that the loan application was her personal
decision.
Accordingly, since the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed by defendant
Edna Lindo lacks the consent or authority of her husband Enrico Lindo, the Deed of
Real Estate Mortgage is void pursuant to Article 96 of the Family Code.
This does not mean, however, that the plaintiff cannot recover the P400,000 loan
plus interest which he extended to defendant Edna Lindo. He can institute a
personal action against the defendant for the amount due which should be filed in
the place where the plaintiff resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides at the election of the plaintiff in accordance with Section 2, Rule
4 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure. This Court has no jurisdiction to try such
personal action.17
Edna did not deny before the RTC, Branch 33 that she obtained the loan. She claimed,
however, that her husband did not give his consent and that he was not aware of the
transaction.18 Hence, the RTC, Branch 33 held that petitioner could still recover the amount
due from Edna through a personal action over which it had no jurisdiction.
Edna also filed an action for declaratory relief before the RTC, Branch 93 of San Pedro
Laguna (RTC, Branch 93), which ruled:
At issue in this case is the validity of the promissory note and the Real Estate
Mortgage executed by Edna Lindo without the consent of her husband.
 The real estate mortgage executed by petition Edna Lindo over their conjugal
property is undoubtedly an act of strict dominion and must be consented to by her
husband to be effective. In the instant case, the real estate mortgage, absent the
authority or consent of the husband, is necessarily void. Indeed, the real estate
mortgage is this case was executed on October 31, 1995 and the subsequent
special power of attorney dated November 4, 1995 cannot be made to retroact to
October 31, 1995 to validate the mortgage previously made by petitioner.
The liability of Edna Lindo on the principal contract of the loan however subsists
notwithstanding the illegality of the mortgage. Indeed, where a mortgage is not
valid, the principal obligation which it guarantees is not thereby rendered null and
void. That obligation matures and becomes demandable in accordance with the
stipulation pertaining to it. Under the foregoing circumstances, what is lost is merely
the right to foreclose the mortgage as a special remedy for satisfying or settling the
indebtedness which is the principal obligation. In case of nullity, the mortgage deed
remains as evidence or proof of a personal obligation of the debtor and the amount
due to the creditor may be enforced in an ordinary action.
In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the deed of real
estate mortgage as void in the absence of the authority or consent of petitioners
spouse therein. The liability of petitioner on the principal contract of loan however
subsists notwithstanding the illegality of the real estate mortgage.19
The RTC, Branch 93 also ruled that Ednas liability is not affected by the illegality of the real
estate mortgage.
Both the RTC, Branch 33 and the RTC, Branch 93 misapplied the rules.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property
shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision
shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which
must be availed of within five years from the date of contract implementing such
decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in
the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance
without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on
the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerors. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 124 of the Family Code of which applies to conjugal partnership property, is a
reproduction of Article 96 of the Family Code which applies to community property.
Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family Code provide that the powers do not include
disposition or encumbrance without the written consent of the other spouse. Any disposition
or encumbrance without the written consent shall be void. However, both provisions also
state that the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract
upon the acceptance by the other spouse x x x before the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerors.
In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage were executed on 31
October 1995. The Special Power of Attorney was executed on 4 November 1995. The
execution of the SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the
continuing offer as a binding contract between the parties, making the Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage a valid contract.
However, as the Court of Appeals noted, petitioner allowed the decisions of the RTC, Branch
33 and the RTC, Branch 93 to become final and executory without asking the courts for an
alternative relief. The Court of Appeals stated that petitioner merely relied on the
declarations of these courts that he could file a separate personal action and thus failed to
observe the rules and settled jurisprudence on multiplicity of suits, closing petitioners avenue
for recovery of the loan.
Nevertheless, petitioner still has a remedy under the law.
In Chieng v. Santos,20 this Court ruled that a mortgage-creditor may institute against the
mortgage-debtor either a personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage.
The Court ruled that the remedies are alternative and not cumulative and held that the filing
of a criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was in effect a collection suit or a
suit for the recovery of the mortgage-debt.21 In that case, however, this Court pro hac vice,
ruled that respondents could still be held liable for the balance of the loan, applying the
principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another.22
The principle of unjust enrichment is provided under Article 22 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other
means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter
without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or
when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of
justice, equity and good conscience.23 The principle of unjust enrichment requires two
conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that
such benefit is derived at the expense of another.24
The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to prevent one from
enriching himself at the expense of another without just cause or consideration.25 The
principle is applicable in this case considering that Edna admitted obtaining a loan from
petitioners, and the same has not been fully paid without just cause. The Deed was declared
void erroneously at the instance of Edna, first when she raised it as a defense before the
RTC, Branch 33 and second, when she filed an action for declaratory relief before the RTC,
Branch 93. Petitioner could not be expected to ask the RTC, Branch 33 for an alternative
remedy, as what the Court of Appeals ruled that he should have done, because the RTC,
Branch 33 already stated that it had no jurisdiction over any personal action that petitioner
might have against Edna.
Considering the circumstances of this case, the principle against unjust enrichment, being a
substantive law, should prevail over the procedural rule on multiplicity of suits. The Court of
Appeals, in the assailed decision, found that Edna admitted the loan, except that she claimed
it only amounted to P340,000. Edna should not be allowed to unjustly enrich herself because
of the erroneous decisions of the two trial courts when she questioned the validity of the
Deed. Moreover, Edna still has an opportunity to submit her defenses before the RTC, Branch
42 on her claim as to the amount of her indebtedness.
WHEREFORE, the 30 May 2008 Decision and the 4 August 2008 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94003 are SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
42 is directed to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. 04-110858.
SO ORDERED.
FLORES V. LINDO
G.R. No. 183984, [April 13, 2011]
FACTS:
Respondent Edna Lindo obtained a loan from Petitioner Arturo Flores amounting to P400,000
and secured it with a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage. The mortgage covered property in the
name of Edna and her husband, co-respondent Enrico Lindo, Jr. Edna likewise signed a
Promissory Note and the Deed for herself and for Enrico as his attorney-in-fact.
She issued three checks as partial loan payments, all of which were dishonored for
insufficiency of funds. Flores therefore filed a complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage with
damages. The RTC ruled that petitioner was not entitled to judicial foreclosure as the Deed
was without consent and authority of Edna’s husband. The Deed was executed on October
31, 1995, while the Special Power of Attorneywas executed by Enrico only on November 4,
1995. Accordingly, the mortgage is void pursuant to Article 96 of the Family Code. The RTC,
however, ruled that petitioner may still recover the loan through a personal action against
Edna, but that it had no jurisdiction over the said personal action which should be filed where
plaintiff or defendant resides.
Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages. The respondents alleged that
Enrico was not a party to the loan because it was contracted by Edna without Enrico’s
signature. They also prayed for the dismissal of the case on grounds of improper venue, res
judicata and forum-shopping. The RTC ruled that res judicata will not apply to rights, claims
or demands which, though growing out of the same subject matter, constitute separate or
distinct causes of action.
The Court of Appeals set aside the RTC ruling. It noted that petitioner allowed the earlier
decision of the RTC to become final and executory without asking the courts for an
alternative relief. The Court of Appeals stated that petitioner merely relied on the
declarations of these courts that he could file a separate personal action and thus failed to
observe the rules and settled jurisprudence on multiplicity of suits, closing petitioner’s
avenue for recovery of the loan.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the promissory note and deed of mortgage are void
(2) Whether there remains an available remedy for petitioner
HELD:
(1) NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugalpartnership property shall belong
to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject
to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five
years from the date of contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of
the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either
or both offerors. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 124 of the Family Code of which applies to conjugal partnership property, is a
reproduction of Article 96 of the Family Code which applies to community property.
Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family Code provide that the powers do not include
disposition or encumbrance without the written consent of the other spouse. Any disposition
or encumbrance without the written consent shall be void. However, both provisions also
state that “the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse x x x beforethe offer is withdrawn by
either or both offerors.”
In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage were executed on 31
October 1995. The Special Power of Attorney was executed on 4 November
1995. The execution of the SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse that
perfected the continuing offer as a binding contract between the parties, making
the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract.
(2) YES. In Chieng v. Santos, this Court ruled that a mortgage-creditor may institute against
the mortgage-debtor either a personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose the
mortgage. The Court ruled that the remedies are alternative and not cumulative and held
that the filing of a criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was in effect a
collection suit or a suit for the recovery of the mortgage-debt. In that case, however, this
Court pro hac vice, ruled that respondents could still be held liable for the balance of the
loan, applying the principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at the expense of
another.
The principle of unjust enrichment is provided under Article 22 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or
legal ground, shall return the same to him.
There is unjust enrichment “when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another,
or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of
justice, equity and good conscience.” The principle of unjust enrichment requires two
conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that
such benefit is derived at the expense of another. The main objective of the principle against
unjust enrichment is to prevent one from enriching himself at the expense of another without
just cause or consideration. The principle is applicable in this case considering that Edna
admitted obtaining a loan from petitioners, and the same has not been fully paid without just
cause. The Deed was declared void erroneously at the instance of Edna, first when she raised
it as a defense before the RTC, Branch 33 and second, when she filed an action for
declaratory relief before the RTC, Branch 93. Petitioner could not be expected to ask the
RTC, Branch 33 for an alternative remedy, as what the Court of Appeals ruled that he should
have done, because the RTC, Branch 33 already stated that it had no jurisdiction over any
personal action that petitioner might have against Edna.

Edna should not be allowed to unjustly enrich herself because of the erroneous decisions of
the two trial courts when she questioned the validity of the Deed.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000]
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be
established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the
respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua
non for such declaration.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588,
which disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the parties is
hereby declared valid."[2]
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her
Motion for Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G.
Marcos, solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab
initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved
[sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51
and 52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties' children. In the best interest
and welfare of the minor children, their custody is granted to petitioner subject to the
visitation rights of respondent.
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig
City where the marriage was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila
and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate action consistent with
this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on September 6,
1982 which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig
(Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L.
Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacaang
Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E
and F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he
was transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacaang during the Marcos
Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps
under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a
discharge from the military service.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacaang
Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President
Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became acquainted and eventually
became sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo
Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development
Corporation when she was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged
in different business ventures that did not however prosper.As a wife, she always urged him
to look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the
family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they
would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force
her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their
children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for
several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were
already living separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chickens. While
she was still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in the morning before going
to Malacaang. When she was discharged from the military service, she concentrated on her
business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was
able to put up a trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and Construction
Development Corporation.
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a
bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in their
house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she
lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her
mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left
the house and sought refuge in her sister's house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong
Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the
Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko.Upon seeing them, he got
mad. After knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a
samurai and even [beat] her driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in Camella,
Paraaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their
father as cruel and physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological
evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the other hand, did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family
and his violent attitude towards appellee and their children, x x x."[3]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established
by the totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse's
psychological incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently
proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and
Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such non-complied marital obligations must
similarly be alleged in the petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric
evaluation. The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan
were based only on the interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to prove that the parties were or
any one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital
obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make him or her x x x unable to assume
them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to show that he [was] not psychologically
incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity was not alleged in the petition, nor
medically or clinically identified as a psychological illness or sufficiently proven by an
expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would show that the appellant was suffering
from an incapacity which [was] psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he
could not have known the obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave,
ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was] incurable."[4]
Hence, this Petition.[5]
Issues
In her Memorandum,[6] petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the following
issues:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by
the Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a
Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the respondent
did not subject himself to psychological evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the
witnesses should be the basis of the determination of the merits of the
Petition."[7]
The Court's Ruling
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of
respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.Nevertheless,
the totality of the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity.
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were
submitted to determine respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the obligations of
marriage should not have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply because
respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have
realized that under the circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other sources of
information in order to determine the psychological capacity of respondent, who had refused
to submit himself to such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina,[8] the guidelines governing the application and the
interpretation of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code[9] were
laid down by this Court as follows:
 "1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It
decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties.Both the family and marriage are to be 'protected'
by the state.
xxxxxxxxx
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not
to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to
the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure
them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven
by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
xxxxxxxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."[10]
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court
in Santos v. Court of Appeals:[11] "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not
require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In
fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the
presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party'spsychological condition. For
indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted
to.
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the
present case -- including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's
sister and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent
failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological
incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present
at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job
and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period
that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
the family home. abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his “defects” were already present
inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent
is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk,
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home. Thus, his alleged
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage.
is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. In sum, this Court cannot declare the
are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code. dissolution of the marriage for failure of the petitioner to show that the alleged psychological
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurabilty and for her
be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral failure to observe the guidelines as outline in Republic v. CA and Molina.
corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like.[12] At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to
grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down
the procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not
faithfully observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner
to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that
portion requiring personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of
psychological incapacity. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARCOS V. MARCOS
Facts
Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children. Alleging
that the husband failed to provide material support to the family and have resorted to
physical abuse and abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage for
psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage null and void under Art. 36 which
was however reversed by CA.

Issues
Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a physician is a
requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity.

Held
Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be
established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however that the
respondent be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for
such declaration. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 151867. January 29, 2004]
DAVID B. DEDEL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL
a.k.a. JANE IBRAHIM, respondents.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel while he was working
in the advertising business of his father. The acquaintance led to courtship and romantic
relations, culminating in the exchange of marital vows before the City Court of Pasay on
September 28, 1966.[1] The civil marriage was ratified in a church wedding on May 20,
1967.[2]
The union produced four children, namely: Beverly Jane, born on September 18,
1968;[3] Stephanie Janice born on September 9, 1969;[4] Kenneth David born on April 24,
1971;[5] and Ingrid born on October 20, 1976.[6] The conjugal partnership, nonetheless,
acquired neither property nor debt.
Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and
immature wife and mother. She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines; a Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command and later
a Jordanian national.
Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes
Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not
stop her illicit relationship with the Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she
married and with whom she had two children. However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the
country, Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner
accepted her back and even considered the two illegitimate children as his own.Thereafter,
on December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two
children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the country on special occasions.
Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner filed on April 1,
1997 a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, as defined in Article 36 of the Family Code, before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 149. Summons was effected by publication in the Pilipino Star
Ngayon, a newspaper of general circulation in the country considering that Sharon did not
reside and could not be found in the Philippines.[7]
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she conducted a
psychological evaluation of petitioner and found him to be conscientious, hardworking,
diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks and projects completed up to the final detail and
who exerts his best in whatever he does.
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social
Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several
indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two children of
Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the
marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of
Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the
essential obligations of marriage.[8]
After trial, judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the civil and church marriages between DAVID B.
DEDEL and SHARON L. CORPUZ celebrated on September 28, 1966 and May 20, 1967 are
hereby declared null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the
respondent to perform the essential obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing between the parties is dissolved and
in lieu thereof a regime of complete separation of property between the said spouses is
established in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Family Code, without prejudice
to rights previously acquired by creditors.
Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in
accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, appealed alleging
that
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION DESPITE THE
ABSENCE OF A VALID GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE CHURCH MARRIAGE
BETWEEN PETITIONER IS NULL AND VOID.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION WITHOUT A
CERTIFICATION HAVING BEEN ISSUED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS
REQUIRED IN THE MOLINA CASE.
The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered
dismissal of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.[10]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated January 8,
2002.[11] Hence, the instant petition.
 Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion and manifestly
erred in its conclusion that the: (1) respondent was not suffering from psychological
incapacity to perform her marital obligations; (2) psychological incapacity of respondent is
not attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and permanence or incurability; and (3)
totality of evidence submitted by the petitioner falls short to prove psychological incapacity
suffered by respondent.
The main question for resolution is whether or not the totality of the evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated. More specifically, does the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to
by petitioner fall within the term psychological incapacity?
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[12] it was ruled:
x x x psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the
other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion
is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the
judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be legitimate.
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a
party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to
Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under
Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the
possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance
that may have some bearing on the degree, extent and other conditions of that incapacity
must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and
indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinion of psychiatrists,
psychologists and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable.[13]
The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a personality disorder is a
very complex and elusive phenomenon which defies easy analysis and definition. In this
case, respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to
such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof.[14] It appears that respondents
promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in fact,
disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church
rites, and which produced four children.
Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves
constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.Neither could
her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity.[15] It
must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make
respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not
merely due to her youth, immaturity[16] or sexual promiscuity.
At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds for legal separation
under Article 55[17] of the Family Code. However, we pointed out in Marcos v. Marcos[18]that
Article 36 is not to be equated with legal separation in which the grounds need not be rooted
in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. In short, the
evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring
a marriage void.
We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court has no jurisdiction to
dissolve the church marriage of petitioner and respondent. The authority to do so is
exclusively lodged with the Ecclesiastical Court of the Roman Catholic Church.
All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the appellate court. We cannot
deny the grief, frustration and even desperation of petitioner in his present
situation.Regrettably, there are circumstances, like in this case, where neither law nor
society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.[19] While we sympathize
with petitioners marital predicament, our first and foremost duty is to apply the law no
matter how harsh it may be.[20]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60406, which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 97-
467 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
In 1966, David and Sharon married each other. They’ve had four children since then. David
then found out that Sharon is irresponsible as a wife and as a mother because during the
marriage Sharon had extra-marital affairs with various other guys particularly with one
Mustafa Ibrahim, a Jordanian, with whom she had 2 children. She even married Ibrahim.
David averred that Sharon is psychologically incapacitated and David submitted the findings
of Dr. Dayan which shows that Sharon is indeed psychologically incapacitated. Dr. Dayan
declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her
blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for
remorse, even bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner.
Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts of
infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder
amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not PI has been proven.
HELD: PI is not proven in court in this case. The evidence is not sufficient. PI is intended to
the most serious cases of personality disorders which make one be incapable of performing
the essential marital obligations. Sharon’s sexual infidelity does not constitute PI nor does it
constitute the other forms of psychoses which if existing at the inception of marriage, like
the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable
pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions, however, do not
necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Sexual infidelity is not one of those contemplated in law. Until further statutory or
jurisprudential parameters are set or established, SI cannot be appreciated in favor of the
dissolution of marriage.
 [G.R. No. 127358. March 31, 2005]
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA
SINGH BUENAVENTURA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 127449. March 31, 2005]
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA
SINGH BUENAVENTURA, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, which was filed
by petitioner Noel Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged psychological
incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. After respondent filed
her answer, petitioner, with leave of court, amended his petition by stating that both he and
his wife were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. In response, respondent filed an amended answer denying the allegation that she
was psychologically incapacitated.[1]
On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Declaring and decreeing the marriage entered into between plaintiff Noel A.
Buenaventura and defendant Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura on July 4,
1979, null and void ab initio;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant moral damages in the amount of 2.5
million pesos and exemplary damages of 1 million pesos with 6% interest
from the date of this decision plus attorneys fees of P100,000.00;
3) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant expenses of litigation of P50,000.00,
plus costs;
4) Ordering the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property[,]
particularly the plaintiffs separation/retirement benefits received from the Far
East Bank [and] Trust Company[,] by ceding, giving and paying to her fifty
percent (50%) of the net amount of P3,675,335.79 or P1,837,667.89
together with 12% interest per annum from the date of this decision and
one-half (1/2) of his outstanding shares of stock with Manila Memorial Park
and Provident Group of Companies;
5) Ordering him to give a regular support in favor of his son Javy Singh
Buenaventura in the amount of P15,000.00 monthly, subject to modification
as the necessity arises;
6) Awarding the care and custody of the minor Javy Singh Buenaventura to his
mother, the herein defendant; and
7) Hereby authorizing the defendant to revert back to the use of her maiden
family name Singh.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the appropriate civil registry and registries of
properties.
SO ORDERED.[2]
Petitioner appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals. While the case was
pending in the appellate court, respondent filed a motion to increase the P15,000 monthly
support pendente lite of their son Javy Singh Buenaventura. Petitioner filed an opposition
thereto, praying that it be denied or that such incident be set for oral argument.[3]
On September 2, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution increasing the
support pendente lite to P20,000.[4] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration questioning
the said Resolution.[5]
On October 8, 1996, the appellate court promulgated a Decision dismissing petitioners
appeal for lack of merit and affirming in toto the trial courts decision.[6] Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration which was denied. From the abovementioned Decision, petitioner
filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.
On November 13, 1996, through another Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration of the September 2, 1996 Resolution, which increased
the monthly support for the son.[7] Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari to question these
two Resolutions.
On July 9, 1997, the Petition for Review on Certiorari[8] and the Petition
for Certiorari[9] were ordered consolidated by this Court.[10]
In the Petition for Review on Certiorari petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals
decided the case not in accord with law and jurisprudence, thus:
1. WHEN IT AWARDED DEFENDANT-APPELLEE MORAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P2.5
MILLION AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES OF P1 MILLION, WITH 6% INTEREST FROM THE DATE
OF ITS DECISION, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL AND MORAL BASIS;
2. WHEN IT AWARDED P100,000.00 ATTORNEYS FEES AND P50,000.00 EXPENSES OF
LITIGATION, PLUS COSTS, TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE, WITHOUT FACTUAL AND LEGAL
BASIS;
3. WHEN IT ORDERED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT NOEL TO PAY DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-
HALF OR P1,837,667.89 OUT OF HIS RETIREMENT BENEFITS RECEIVED FROM THE FAR EAST
BANK AND TRUST CO., WITH 12% INTEREST THEREON FROM THE DATE OF ITS DECISION,
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT SAID RETIREMENT BENEFITS ARE GRATUITOUS AND EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTY OF NOEL, AND ALSO TO DELIVER TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF OF HIS
SHARES OF STOCK WITH THE MANILA MEMORIAL PARK AND THE PROVIDENT GROUP OF
COMPANIES, ALTHOUGH SAID SHARES OF STOCK WERE ACQUIRED BY NOEL BEFORE HIS
MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT ISABEL AND ARE, THEREFORE, AGAIN HIS EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTIES; AND
4. WHEN IT AWARDED EXCLUSIVE CARE AND CUSTODY OVER THE PARTIES MINOR CHILD
TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE WITHOUT ASKING THE CHILD (WHO WAS ALREADY 13 YEARS
OLD AT THAT TIME) HIS CHOICE AS TO WHOM, BETWEEN HIS TWO PARENTS, HE WOULD
LIKE TO HAVE CUSTODY OVER HIS PERSON.[11]
In the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner advances the following contentions:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO SET
RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR INCREASED SUPPORT FOR THE PARTIES SON FOR HEARING.[12]
THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO INCREASE JAVYS MONTHLY
SUPPORT OF P15,000.00 BEING GIVEN BY PETITIONER EVEN AT PRESENT PRICES.[13]
IN RESOLVING RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR THE INCREASE OF JAVYS SUPPORT, THE COURT
OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE EXAMINED THE LIST OF EXPENSES SUBMITTED BY
RESPONDENT IN THE LIGHT OF PETITIONERS OBJECTIONS THERETO, INSTEAD OF MERELY
ASSUMING THAT JAVY IS ENTITLED TO A P5,000 INCREASE IN SUPPORT AS SAID AMOUNT
IS TOO MINIMAL.[14]
LIKEWISE, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE GIVEN PETITIONER AN OPPORTUNITY TO
PROVE HIS PRESENT INCOME TO SHOW THAT HE CANNOT AFFORD TO INCREASE JAVYS
SUPPORT.[15]
With regard to the first issue in the main case, the Court of Appeals articulated:
On Assignment of Error C, the trial court, after findings of fact ascertained from the
testimonies not only of the parties particularly the defendant-appellee but likewise, those of
the two psychologists, awarded damages on the basis of Articles 21, 2217 and 2229 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
Thus, the lower court found that plaintiff-appellant deceived the defendant-appellee into
marrying him by professing true love instead of revealing to her that he was under heavy
parental pressure to marry and that because of pride he married defendant-appellee; that he
was not ready to enter into marriage as in fact his career was and always would be his first
priority; that he was unable to relate not only to defendant-appellee as a husband but also to
his son, Javy, as a father; that he had no inclination to make the marriage work such that in
times of trouble, he chose the easiest way out, that of leaving defendantappellee and their
son; that he had no desire to keep defendant-appellee and their son as proved by his
reluctance and later, refusal to reconcile after their separation; that the aforementioned
caused defendant-appellee to suffer mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation,
sleepless nights not only in those years the parties were together but also after and
throughout their separation.
Plaintiff-appellant assails the trial courts decision on the ground that unlike those arising
from a breach in ordinary contracts, damages arising as a consequence of marriage may not
be awarded. While it is correct that there is, as yet, no decided case by the Supreme Court
where damages by reason of the performance or non-performance of marital obligations
were awarded, it does not follow that no such award for damages may be made.
Defendant-appellee, in her amended answer, specifically prayed for moral and exemplary
damages in the total amount of 7 million pesos. The lower court, in the exercise of its
discretion, found full justification of awarding at least half of what was originally prayed for.
We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court.[16]
The award by the trial court of moral damages is based on Articles 2217 and 21 of the
Civil Code, which read as follows:
ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are
the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission.
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
The trial court referred to Article 21 because Article 2219[17] of the Civil Code
enumerates the cases in which moral damages may be recovered and it mentions Article 21
as one of the instances. It must be noted that Article 21 states that the individual must
willfully cause loss or injury to another. There is a need that the act is willful and hence done
in complete freedom. In granting moral damages, therefore, the trial court and the Court of
Appeals could not but have assumed that the acts on which the moral damages were based
were done willfully and freely, otherwise the grant of moral damages would have no leg to
stand on.
On the other hand, the trial court declared the marriage of the parties null and void
based on Article 36 of the Family Code, due to psychological incapacity of the petitioner, Noel
Buenaventura. Article 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus:
. . . no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. . . .[18]
The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the
marriage as proof of his psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or
inability to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said courts
considered these acts as willful and hence as grounds for granting moral damages. It is
contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond
the control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the same time considering the
same set of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the
possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of
moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but
on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had
knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence
appears to have been adduced in this case.
For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that one must assume and discharge as a consequence of
marriage, it removes the basis for the contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the
private respondent. If the private respondent was deceived, it was not due to a willful act on
the part of the petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral damages was without basis in law
and in fact.
Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that the grant of
exemplary damages cannot stand since the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages are
imposed in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.[19]
With respect to the grant of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation the trial court
explained, thus:
Regarding Attorneys fees, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code authorizes an award of attorneys fees
and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, when as in this case the plaintiffs act or
omission has compelled the defendant to litigate and to incur expenses of litigation to protect
her interest (par. 2), and where the Court deems it just and equitable that attorneys fees
and expenses of litigation should be recovered. (par. 11)[20]
The Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:
On Assignment of Error D, as the award of moral and exemplary damages is fully justified,
the award of attorneys fees and costs of litigation by the trial court is likewise fully
justified.[21]
The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower court to deduce his psychological
incapacity, and his act in filing the complaint for the annulment of his marriage cannot be
considered as unduly compelling the private respondent to litigate, since both are grounded
on petitioners psychological incapacity, which as explained above is a mental incapacity
causing an utter inability to comply with the obligations of marriage. Hence, neither can be a
ground for attorneys fees and litigation expenses. Furthermore, since the award of moral and
exemplary damages is no longer justified, the award of attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation is left without basis.
Anent the retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank and Trust Co. and the
shares of stock in the Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of Companies, the trial
court said:
The third issue that must be resolved by the Court is what to do with the assets of the
conjugal partnership in the event of declaration of annulment of the marriage. The Honorable
Supreme Court has held that the declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a
judgment for the liquidation of property (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
104818, Sept. 17, 1993, 226 SCRA, pp. 572 573, 586). Thus, speaking through Justice
Flerida Ruth P. Romero, it was ruled in this case:
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein
shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,
the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of their presumptive
legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in the previous proceedings.
The parties here were legally married on July 4, 1979, and therefore, all property acquired
during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or
registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the
contrary is proved (Art. 116, New Family Code; Art. 160, Civil Code). Art. 117 of the Family
Code enumerates what are conjugal partnership properties. Among others they are the
following:
1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund,
whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both of the
spouses;
3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage from the
common property, as well as the net fruits from the exclusive property of each spouse. . . .
Applying the foregoing legal provisions, and without prejudice to requiring an inventory of
what are the parties conjugal properties and what are the exclusive properties of each
spouse, it was disclosed during the proceedings in this case that the plaintiff who worked
first as Branch Manager and later as Vice-President of Far East Bank & Trust Co. received
separation/retirement package from the said bank in the amount of P3,701,500.00 which
after certain deductions amounting to P26,164.21 gave him a net amount of P3,675,335.79
and actually paid to him on January 9, 1995 (Exhs. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11). Not having shown
debts or obligations other than those deducted from the said retirement/separation pay,
under Art. 129 of the Family Code The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties
shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless
a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlement or unless there
has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code. In this
particular case, however, there had been no marriage settlement between the parties, nor
had there been any voluntary waiver or valid forfeiture of the defendant wifes share in the
conjugal partnership properties. The previous cession and transfer by the plaintiff of his one-
half (1/2) share in their residential house and lot covered by T.C.T. No. S-35680 of the
Registry of Deeds of Paraaque, Metro Manila, in favor of the defendant as stipulated in their
Compromise Agreement dated July 12, 1993, and approved by the Court in its Partial
Decision dated August 6, 1993, was actually intended to be in full settlement of any and all
demands for past support. In reality, the defendant wife had allowed some concession in
favor of the plaintiff husband, for were the law strictly to be followed, in the process of
liquidation of the conjugal assets, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated
shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom
their only child has chosen to remain (Art. 129, par. 9). Here, what was done was one-half
(1/2) portion of the house was ceded to defendant so that she will not claim anymore for
past unpaid support, while the other half was transferred to their only child as his
presumptive legitime.
Consequently, nothing yet has been given to the defendant wife by way of her share in the
conjugal properties, and it is but just, lawful and fair, that she be given one-half (1/2) share
of the separation/retirement benefits received by the plaintiff the same being part of their
conjugal partnership properties having been obtained or derived from the labor, industry,
work or profession of said defendant husband in accordance with Art. 117, par. 2 of the
Family Code. For the same reason, she is entitled to one-half (1/2) of the outstanding shares
of stock of the plaintiff husband with the Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of
Companies.[22]
The Court of Appeals articulated on this matter as follows:
On Assignment of Error E, plaintiff-appellant assails the order of the trial court for him to
give one-half of his separation/retirement benefits from Far East Bank & Trust Company and
half of his outstanding shares in Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies to
the defendant-appellee as the latters share in the conjugal partnership.
On August 6, 1993, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision approving the Compromise
Agreement entered into by the parties. In the same Compromise Agreement, the parties had
agreed that henceforth, their conjugal partnership is dissolved. Thereafter, no steps were
taken for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Finding that defendant-appellee is entitled to at least half of the separation/retirement
benefits which plaintiff-appellant received from Far East Bank & Trust Company upon his
retirement as Vice-President of said company for the reason that the benefits accrued from
plaintiffappellants service for the bank for a number of years, most of which while he was
married to defendant-appellee, the trial court adjudicated the same. The same is true with
the outstanding shares of plaintiff-appellant in Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of
Companies. As these were acquired by the plaintiff-appellant at the time he was married to
defendant-appellee, the latter is entitled to one-half thereof as her share in the conjugal
partnership. We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court.[23]
Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the
provisions of Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for
the dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may
be, do not apply. Rather, the general rule applies, which is that in case a marriage is
declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and
distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
In Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City,[24] this Court expounded on
the consequences of a void marriage on the property relations of the spouses and specified
the applicable provisions of law:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof,
the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the
provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article
147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous
cases; it provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned
by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in
the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until
after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of
default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants,
such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place
upon termination of the cohabitation.
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal
impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a
void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in
the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage,
i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through
their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the
fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article 144
of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act[s] inter vivos [of] his or her share in co-
ownership property, without the consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the
co-ownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of
the common children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place
upon the termination of the cohabitation or declaration of nullity of the marriage.
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common
property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which had
jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with authority
to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling
that petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property
in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property
owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles
50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly prevail.
The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in
the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-
ownership that exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the
Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43, relates only, by its
explicit terms, to voidablemarriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 of
the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of
a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule
that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are
inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their
nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final
judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away with
any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for
the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 and 42, of the Family Code, on the
effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of a
previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be
assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand,
between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other,
between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter
case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and Article
148 of the Family Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may merely state the
obvious, that the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions
found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the
property regime of the spouses.[25]
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by
the trial court and the Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the
parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of
one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said distribution. The
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties owned in common by the parties
herein as ordered by the court a quo should, therefore, be sustained, but on the basis of co-
ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
As to the issue on custody of the parties over their only child, Javy Singh
Buenaventura, it is now moot since he is about to turn twenty-five years of age on May 27,
2005[26]and has, therefore, attained the age of majority.
With regard to the issues on support raised in the Petition for Certiorari, these would
also now be moot, owing to the fact that the son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, as previously
stated, has attained the age of majority.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 8, 1996 and its
Resolution dated December 10, 1996 which are contested in the Petition for Review (G.R.
No. 127449), are hereby MODIFIED, in that the award of moral and exemplary damages,
attorneys fees, expenses of litigation and costs are deleted. The order giving respondent
one-half of the retirement benefits of petitioner from Far East Bank and Trust Co. and one-
half of petitioners shares of stock in Manila Memorial Park and in the Provident Group of
Companies is sustained but on the basis of the liquidation, partition and distribution
of the co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. The rest
of said Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 127358) contesting the Court of Appeals
Resolutions of September 2, 1996 and November 13, 1996 which increased the
support pendente lite in favor of the parties son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, is now MOOT and
ACADEMIC and is, accordingly, DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Spouses Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 126376. November 20, 2003
FACTS:
Defendant spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the parents of plaintiffs
Consolacion, Nora, Emma and Natividad as well as of defendants Fidel, Tomas, Artemio,
Clarita, Felicitas, Fe, and Gavino, all surnamed JOAQUIN. The married Joaquin children are
joined in this action by their respective spouses. Sought to be declared null and void ab initio
are certain deeds of sale covering 6 parcels of land executed by defendant
parents Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito in favor of their co-defendant children and
the corresponding certificates of title issued in their names. In seeking the declaration of
nullity of the aforesaid deeds of sale and certificates of title, plaintiffs, in their
complaint, aver that the purported sale of the properties in litis was the result of a deliberate
conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the compulsory heirs (plaintiffs herein) of
their legitime.
ISSUE:
Whether Petitioners have a legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale
RULING:
Petitioners do not have any legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale. As
the appellate court stated, petitioners’ right to their parents’ properties is merely inchoate
and vests only upon their parents’ death. While still living, the parents of petitioners are free
to dispose of their properties. In their overzealousness to safeguard their future legitime,
petitioners forget that theoretically, the sale of the lots to their siblings does not affect the
value of their parents’ estate. While the sale of the lots reduced the estate, cash of
equivalent value replaced the lots taken from the estate
 SECOND DIVISION identification of the parents of an illegitimate child.[10] Private respondent sought
PHILIP S. YU, G.R. No. 154115 reconsideration of the Order, but the motion was denied by the trial court.[11]
Petitioner,
Present: Aggrieved, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
PUNO, J., Judge Hernandez in issuing the 10 May 2001 Order.[12] The Court of Appeals summarized the
Chairman, issues as follows: (i) whether or not an insurance policy and its corresponding application
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, form can be admitted as evidence to prove a partys extra-marital affairs in an action for legal
CALLEJO, SR., separation; and (ii) whether or not a trial court has the discretion to deny a partys motion to
TINGA, and attach excluded evidence to the record under Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.[13]
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, According to the Court of Appeals, private respondent was merely seeking the production of
Second Division, and VIVECA the insurance application and contract, and was not yet offering the same as part of her
LIM YU, Promulgated: evidence. Thus, it declared that petitioners objection to the admission of the documents was
Respondents. premature, and the trial courts pronouncement that the documents are inadmissible,
November 29, 2005 precipitate.[14] The contents of the insurance application and insurance documents cannot be
considered as privileged information, the Court of Appeals added, in view of the opinion of
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x the Insurance Commissioner dated 4 April 2001 to the effect that Circular Letter No.11-2000
was never intended to be a legal impediment in complying with lawful orders.[15] Lastly, the
Court of Appeals ruled that a trial court does not have the discretion to deny a partys
privilege to tender excluded evidence, as this privilege allows said party to raise on appeal
DECISION the exclusion of such evidence.[16] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but to no
avail.
TINGA, J.: In the present petition, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals blundered in delving into
errors of judgment supposedly committed by the trial court as if the petition filed therein was
This treats of the petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals Decision and an ordinary appeal and not a special civil action. Further, he claims that the Court of Appeals
Resolution in CA G.R. SP No. 66252 dated 30 April 2002 [1] and 27 June 2002,[2] respectively, failed to show any specific instance of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court
which set aside the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City[3] dated 10 May in issuing the assailed Order.Additionally, he posits that private respondent had already
2001, declaring an application for insurance and an insurance policy as inadmissible mooted her petition before the Court of Appeals when she filed her formal offer of rebuttal
evidence. exhibits, with tender of excluded evidence before the trial court.[17]
For her part, private respondent maintains that the details surrounding the insurance policy
The facts of the case are undisputed. are crucial to the issue of petitioners infidelity and his financial capacity to provide support to
her and their children. Further, she argues that she had no choice but to make a tender of
On 15 March 1994, Viveca Lim Yu (private respondent) brought against her excluded evidence considering that she was left to speculate on what the insurance
husband, Philip Sy Yu (petitioner), an action for legal separation and dissolution of conjugal application and policy ruled out by the trial court would contain.[18]
partnership on the grounds of marital infidelity and physical abuse. The case was filed before
the RTC of Pasig and raffled to Branch 158, presided by Judge Jose R. Hernandez. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to correct errors of jurisdiction
and grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by a
During trial, private respondent moved for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and ad lower court.[19] Where a respondent does not have the legal power to determine the case and
testificandum[4] to certain officers of Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd. to compel production of yet he does so, he acts without jurisdiction; where, being clothed with power to determine
the insurance policy and application of a person suspected to be petitioners illegitimate the case, oversteps his authority as determined by law, he is performing a function in excess
child.[5] The trial court denied the motion.[6] It ruled that the insurance contract is of jurisdiction.[20]
inadmissible evidence in view of Circular Letter No. 11-2000, issued by the Insurance
Commission which presumably prevents insurance companies/agents from divulging Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals passed upon errors of judgment, not errors of
confidential and privileged information pertaining to insurance policies.[7] It added that the jurisdiction, since it delved into the propriety of the denial of the subpoena duces
production of the application and insurance contract would violate Article 280[8] of the Civil tecum and subpoena ad testificandum. The argument must fail.
Code and Section 5 of the Civil Registry Law,[9] both of which prohibit the unauthorized
 While trial courts have the discretion to admit or exclude evidence, such power is
exercised only when the evidence has been formally offered.[21] For a long time, the Court
has recognized that during the early stages of the development of proof, it is impossible for a
trial court judge to know with certainty whether evidence is relevant or not, and thus the
practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality should be
avoided.[22] As well elucidated in the case of Prats & Co. v. Phoenix Insurance Co.:[23]
Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat of the battle
over which he presides a judge of first instance may possibly fall into error
in judging of the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical connection is in
fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the proof is erroneously
ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed
and possibly unable to correct the effects of the error without returning the
case for a new trial, a step which this court is always very loath to take. On
the other hand, the admission of proof in a court of first instance, even if
the question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never
result in much harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed
to know the law; and it is its duty, upon final consideration of the case, to
distinguish the relevant and material from the irrelevant and immaterial. If
this course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme Court
upon appeal, this court then has all the material before it necessary to
make a correct judgment.
In the instant case, the insurance application and the insurance policy were yet to
be presented in court, much less formally offered before it. In fact, private respondent was
merely asking for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum and subpoena ad
testificandum when the trial court issued the assailed Order. Even assuming that the
documents would eventually be declared inadmissible, the trial court was not then in a
position to make a declaration to that effect at that point. Thus, it barred the production of
the subject documents prior to the assessment of its probable worth. As observed by
petitioners, the assailed Order was not a mere ruling on the admissibility of evidence; it was,
more importantly, a ruling affecting the proper conduct of trial.[24]
Excess of jurisdiction refers to any act which although falling within the general
powers of the judge is not authorized and is consequently void with respect to the particular
case because the conditions under which he was only authorized to exercise his general
power in that case did not exist and therefore, the judicial power was not legally
exercised.[25] Thus, in declaring that the documents are irrelevant and inadmissible even
before they were formally offered, much less presented before it, the trial court acted in
excess of its discretion.
Anent the issue of whether the information contained in the documents is privileged
in nature, the same was clarified and settled by the Insurance Commissioners opinion that
the circular on which the trial court based its ruling was not designed to obstruct lawful court
orders.[26] Hence, there is no more impediment to presenting the insurance application and
policy.
Petitioner additionally claims that by virtue of private respondents tender of excluded
evidence, she has rendered moot her petition before the Court of Appeals since the move
evinced that she had another speedy and adequate remedy under the law. The Court holds
otherwise.
Section 40, Rule 132 provides:
Sec.40. Tender of excluded evidence.If documents or things offered in
evidence are excluded by the court, the offeror may have the same
attached to or made part of the record. If the evidence excluded is oral,
the offeror may state for the record the name and other personal
circumstances of the witness and the substance of the proposed testimony.
It is thus apparent that before tender of excluded evidence is made, the evidence
must have been formally offered before the court. And before formal offer of evidence is
made, the evidence must have been identified and presented before the court. While private
respondent made a Tender of Excluded Evidence, such is not the tender contemplated by the
above-quoted rule, for obviously, the insurance policy and application were not formally
offered much less presented before the trial court. At most, said Tender of Excluded
Evidence was a
manifestation of an undisputed fact that the subject documents were declared inadmissible
by the trial court even before these were presented during trial. It was not the kind of plain,
speedy and adequate remedy which private respondent could have resorted to instead of the
petition for certiorari she filed before the Court of Appeals. It did not in any way render the
said petition moot.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 30
April 2002 and Resolution dated 27 June 2002 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
YU V. JUDGE REYES-CARPIO AND YU
G.R. No. 189207, [June 15, 2011]
DOCTRINE:
It is more proper to rule first on the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of each
party’s psychological incapacity to perform their respective marital obligations. If the Court
eventually finds that the parties’ respective petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage is
indeed meritorious on the basis of either or both of the parties’ psychological incapacity, then
the parties shall proceedto comply with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code before a final
decree of absolute nullity of marriage can be issued. Pending such ruling on the declaration
of nullity of the parties’ marriage, the Court finds no legal ground, at this stage,
to proceed with the reception of evidence in regard the issues on custody and property
relations, since these are mere incidents of the nullity of the parties’ marriage.
FACTS:
Eric Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Caroline T. Yu with the
RTC of Pasig. Judge Suarez on May 30, 2006 issued an order stating that Eric’s partial offer
of evidence dated April 18, 2006 would be submitted for resolution after certain exhibits
have been remarked. But the exhibits were only relative to the issue of the nullity of the
marriage of Eric and Caroline. On September 12, 2006, Caroline moved to submit the case
for resolution, considering that the incidents on custody, support, and property relations
(incidental issues) were mere consequences of the declaration of nullity of the parties’
marriage.
Eric opposed this motion saying that the incident on declaration of nullity cannot be resolved
without presentation of evidence for the incidents on custody, support, and property
relations. Eric added that the incidental issues and the issue on declaration of nullity
can both proceed and be simultaneously resolved. RTC ruled in favour of Eric’s opposition.
Caroline caused the inhibition of Judge Suarez, so that the case was re-raffled to
another branch presided by Judge Reyes-Carpio. While the case was being tried by Judge
Reyes-Carpio, Carolinefiled an Omnibus Motion seeking the strict observation by the said
judge of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage as codified in A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, and that the case on the declaration on nullity be already submitted for
resolution ahead of the incidental issues, and not simultaneously. Eric opposed this motion.
Judge Reyes-Carpio granted the Omnibus Motion, saying that the main cause of action is the
declaration of nullity of the marriage and the incidental issues are merely ancillary incidents
thereto. Eric moved for reconsideration, which was denied by Judge Reyes-Carpio. Eric then
filed for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65. CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
ISSUES/HELD:
Whether the main issue of nullity of marriage must be submitted for resolution first before
the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations (incidental issues) –
NO.
RATIO:
It appears in the records that the Orders in question, or what are alleged to have been
exercised with grave abuse of discretion, are interlocutory orders. An interlocutory order is
one which “does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court’s task of
adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards
each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court. Eric Yu
to prove that the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion and that those
were patently erroneous. Considering that the requisites that would justify certiorari as an
appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order have not been complied with, the proper
recourse for petitioner should have been an appeal in due course of the judgment of the trial
court on the merits, incorporating the grounds for assailing the interlocutory orders.
It must be noted that Judge Reyes-Carpio did not disallow the presentation of evidence on
the incidents on custody, support, and property relations. It is clear in the assailed orders
that the trial court judge merely deferred the reception of evidence relating to custody,
support, and property relations. And the trial judge’s decision was not without basis. Judge
Reyes-Carpio finds support in the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages. Particularly, Secs. 19 and 21 of the Rule clearly allow the reception of evidence on
custody, support, and property relations after the trial court renders a decision granting the
petition, or upon entry of judgment granting the petition:
Section 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall
declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by
the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented
under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children and
delivery of their presumptive legitimes. – Upon entry of the judgment granting the petition,
or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate court granting
the petition, the Family Court, on motion of either party, shall proceed with the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, including custody, support of
common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and 51
of the Family Code unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings.
Evidently, Judge Reyes-Carpio did not deny the reception of evidence on custody, support,
and property relations but merely deferred it, based on the existing rules issued by this
Court, to a time when a decision granting the petition is already at hand and before a final
decree is issued. Conversely, the trial court, or more particularly the family court,
shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common
children, and delivery of their presumptive legitimes upon entry of judgment granting the
petition. And following the pertinent provisions of the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, this act is undoubtedly consistent with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code,
contrary to what petitioner asserts. Particularly, Arts. 50 and 51 of the Family Code state:
Article 50. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in the previous judicial proceedings.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash,
property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved,
had already provided for such matters.
Also, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly allows the deferment of the reception of evidence on
custody, support, and property relations. Conversely, the trial court may receive evidence on
the subject incidents after a judgment granting the petition but before the decree of nullity
or annulment of marriage is issued. And this is what Judge Reyes-Carpio sought
to comply with in issuing the assailed orders. As correctly pointed out by the CA, Eric Yu’s
assertion that ruling the main issue without receiving evidence on the subject incidents
would result in an ambiguous and fragmentary judgment is certainly speculative and, hence,
contravenes the legal presumption that a trial judge can fairly weigh and appraise the
evidence submitted by the parties.
Therefore, it cannot be said at all that Judge Reyes-Carpio acted in a capricious and
whimsical manner, much less in a way that is patently gross and erroneous, when she issued
the assailed orders deferring the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property
relations. To reiterate, this decision is left to the trial court’s wisdom and legal soundness.
Consequently, therefore, the CA cannot likewise be said to have committed grave abuse of
discretion in upholding the Orders of Judge Reyes-Carpio and in ultimately finding an
absence of grave abuse of discretion on her part.
FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. O.C.A.-00-01. September 6, 2000]
JULIETA B. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. RONALDO O. NAVARRO and ROBERLYN JOY
C. MARIAS, respondents.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
On March 15, 1999, Mrs. Julieta B. Navarro filed with the Office of the Deputy Court
Administrator Reynaldo Suarez, an affidavit-complaint charging for gross immorality Ronaldo
O. Navarro, Legal Researcher, of the Office of Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo Suarez,
and Roberlyn Joy C. Marias, also a Legal Researcher in the Legal Office, Office of the Court
Administrator. The affidavit-complaint alleges:
I, JULIETA B. NAVARRO, of legal age, and a resident of 276 Bunga Mayor, Bustos,
Bulacan, under oath, depose and say:
1. That I am the lawful wife of RONALDO O. NAVARRO, the marriage having
been solemnized at Sto Nio Church, Bustos, Bulacan on June 19, 1988.
Attached herewith is a certified true copy of our Marriage Certificate as ANNEX
"A."
2. That sometime in the year 1997, I received some information that my husband
is keeping a mistress, which information I verified, as a result of which, I
personally came to know that he is living with another woman
named ROBERYN (sic) JOY C. MARIAS, with whom he has a child
named MARIA LOURDES M. NAVARRO. A certified true copy of the birth
certificate and baptismal certificate is hereto attached as ANNEX "B" and "C"
respectively;
3. That my husband has abandoned and stopped supporting us (me and our child)
and as a consequence of which we are now living with my parents;
4. That my husband and his mistress are now living with each other at 82 Libis
Espina, Kaloocan City and are deporting themselves as husband and wife,
which fact appears in the birth certificate of their child.
5. That my husband and his mistress are both employees of the Supreme Court,
both holding the position of Legal Researcher III and are assigned with the
Office of DCA Suarez and Legal Office, OCA respectively;
6. That I am executing this affidavit to formally file an administrative complaint
against them for GROSS IMMORALITY.
The case was in due course referred to the Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation report and recommendation.[1] Court Administrator Alfredo L Benipayo in his
memorandum report[2]to the Chief Justice, summarizes the facts of the case as follows:
On March 15, 1999, a complaint for gross immorality was filed by Mrs. Julieta B. Navarro
against Ronaldo O. Navarro, Legal Researcher, Office of DCA Reynaldo Suarez and Roberyn
(sic) Joy C. Marias, also a Legal Researcher in the Legal Office, Office of the Court
Administrator. The complaint was received at the Office of DCA Suarez.
Complainant alleged that she is the lawful wife of respondent Ronaldo O. Navarro, their
marriage having been solemnized on June 19, 1988 at Sto. Nio Church, Bustos,
Bulacan. According to her, sometime in 1997, she received information that her husband,
respondent herein, is keeping a mistress.Complainant allegedly verified the information and
personally discovered that respondent Navarro is indeed living with another woman with
whom he has a child. The woman is respondent Roberyn (sic) Joy C. Marias. Attached to the
complaint are certified true copies of the birth and baptismal certificates of the respondents'
child, Maria Lourdes M. Navarro. Complainant further claims that respondent
Navarro abandoned and stopped supporting her and their child. As a consequence, she has
to live with her parents. It is also alleged that respondents are living together at 82 Libis
Espina, Caloocan City and deport themselves as husband and wife.
In an undated letter addressed to the Chief Justice, complainant inquired about the status of
her complaint. In the letter, she claimed that she was an employee of the Supreme Court
assigned at MISO but she was made to resign by respondent Navarro so that she can take
care of their only child; that respondent Navarro's motive in asking her to resign is to cover
up his alleged affair with respondent Marias; and that respondent Navarro no longer provides
any financial support to her and their child.
The Court En Banc, in a resolution dated November 16, 1999, required respondents to
comment on the charge of gross immorality within ten (10) days from notice.
On December 10, 1999, respondent Marias requested for a copy of the complaint and
supporting documents, which according to her was not attached to the resolution she
received. The letter-request was forwarded to the Office of the Court Administrator on
December 13, 1999.
On the other hand, respondent Navarro, submitted his comment on January 21, 2000. In his
comment, respondent Navarro implored the Court's compassion and mercy for the dismissal
of the complaint. He admits that complainant is his lawful wife and that he has a child by the
name of Maria Lourdes M. Navarro with his co-respondent. Respondent Navarro likewise
does not deny the veracity and truthfulness of the child's birth and baptismal
certificates.However, he denied that his co-respondent Marias is his mistress and that they
are living together and deporting themselves as husband wife.
Respondent Navarro acknowledged having had an intimate relationship with respondent
Marias while they were schoolmates at the Far Eastern University, Institute of Law. Allegedly,
what drove them into that illicit affair were their respective personal problems. He claims
that they did not realize the moral and legal repercussions of their relationship until
respondent Marias got pregnant with his child. It was at that time that they decided to end
their relationship but both agreed to jointly support their child. According to respondent
Navarro he admits without any reservation and without any feeling of remorse that he had
an affair with respondent Marias, such an affair being a product of mutual love, trust and
respect. He however disputes complainant's allegation that he and respondent Marias live
together and deport themselves as husband and wife. Respondent Navarro asserts that his
co-respondent together with her sister used to rent a house at No. 82 Libis Espina, Caloocan
City since they live separately from their parents. Now, the only reason he and respondent
Marias see each other is when he delivers a meager financial support to their child who is
asthmatic. Respondent Navarro further claims that whenever they are within the premises of
the Court, they act as if they are strangers to each other to avoid the impression that they
are proud of their relationship.
Anent the respondents' married status as reflected in the birth certificate of their child, Maria
Lourdes, respondent Navarro explained that they were constrained to supply such
information not because of any criminal intent but for the sole purpose of shielding their child
from the share and disgrace that the latter might encounter by reason of her illegitimacy.
Respondent Navarro denies that he had abandoned and has stopped supporting the
complainant and their child. He contends that in the first place, he and complainant have no
conjugal dwelling because the latter together with their son are staying at her parents' house
in Bustos, Bulacan. According to respondent Navarro, he was driven out of the house by his
parents-in-law without any objections from the complainant. He likewise claims that
whenever he gives his financial support, he can only visit his son at a neighbor's house since
he is prohibited to enter his parents-in-law's premises. And in case he is unable to personally
deliver his support, he often requested complainant's distant relative who is an employee of
the Supreme Court, assigned at MISO, to do so. Contrary to complainant's allegation,
respondent Navarro avers that he has never forgotten his duties and obligations to his
son. But allegedly, he is only capable of providing his son with a measly sum considering that
his monthly take home pay amounts to merely P2,120.80. However, in case there are
benefits received from the Court, respondent Navarro increases the amount of support given
to complainant and their child. Prior to the filing of the instant administrative complaint, he
even offered to give his son all the benefits that he will receive from the Court.
While admitting that he had an affair with respondent Marias, respondent Navarro insists
that his co-respondent can no longer be regarded as a "mistress" since they had already
ended their illicit relationship. He even invoked sympathy and kindness for such women who
carry on affairs with married men saying that they are merely human beings who are weak.
Respondent Navarro disclaims the allegation that he forced complainant to resign. According
to him, complainant was merely a contractual employee assigned at MISO and as such, her
employment was good only for a limited period of time. Due to the long absence of
complainant, her contract was allegedly no longer renewed.
To mitigate his liability, respondent Navarro cited his almost fourteen years of dedicated and
devoted service to the Supreme Court and alleged that during these years he had never
been involved in any scandal nor had he even been a subject of an administrative
complaint. He further claims that he is effective and responsible in the performance of his
duties. Similarly, respondent Navarro entreats the Supreme Court to be lenient in the
imposition of penalty in this administrative case considering that he is an ordinary employee
upon whom the high standard of integrity and ethical conduct required of a judge should not
be applied. Moreover, he avers that his infraction should not be measured against the
standards of moral integrity expected of a lawyer. He insists that a very minor distinction
should be made on the yardstick of morality between an ordinary employee and that of a
judge or a lawyer.
Respondent Navarro waived the conduct of a formal investigation in this administrative case
and agreed that the matter be evaluated on the basis of available documents on hand. He
also informed the Court that an action for Declaration of Nullity of his marriage with
complainant is presently pending before the Regional Trial Court, San Fernando, Pampanga.
The Supreme Court En Banc in a resolution dated February 1, 2000 referred the instant
administrative case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation within twenty (20) days from notice.
The record of the administrative case shows that respondent Marias had not filed any
comment. Thus, the Court Administrator required her to comment within five (5) days from
notice. Respondent Marias received the memorandum on February 15, 2000. On February
15, 2000, the Office of the Court Administrator requested for an extension of fifteen (15)
days within which to comply with the Court's resolution. The Court in a resolution dated
February 22, 2000 granted the request and gave the Office of the Court Administrator until
March 9, 2000 to submit the evaluation. Meanwhile, respondent Marias filed an Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion (with reiteration of the letter dated December 10, 1999) wherein she prayed to:
(a) be furnished with the supporting documents mentioned in the complaint; (b) be given a
non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of the subject documents within which to
submit her comment; and (c) hold in abeyance the evaluation of the complaint until she has
been furnished with the subject documents. The request to be furnished with the following
documents attached to the complaint was granted:
(a) Certificate of Live Birth of Maria Lourdes Marias; and
(b) Certificate of Baptism of Maria Lourdes Marias Navarro
However, the marriage certificate of respondent Navarro and complainant referred to an
Annex "A" in the complaint was not included in the attachments submitted. Further,
respondent Marias was given a non-extendible period of five (5) days from receipt of the
documents within which to submit her comment.
On March 6, 2000, respondent Marias submitted her comment wherein she admitted without
any feeling of regret that she had a child with respondent Navarro. She similarly
acknowledged the veracity and truthfulness of their child's birth and baptismal certificates
but denies that she is the mistress of respondent Navarro. Respondent Marias confirmed that
she had an intimate relationship with respondent Navarro when they were still schoolmates
at the Far Eastern University. According to her, at that time, she was beset with personal
problems which clouded her judgment and she only come into her senses when she got
pregnant with respondent Navarro's child. She decided to continue with the pregnancy and
face the consequences of her action than to undergo an abortion. It was at this time that she
and Navarro severed their illicit relationship but they agreed to jointly support their
child. Having terminated their affair, respondent Marias asserts that she can no longer be
regarded as a mistress. She similarly claims that she and her co-respondent never lived in
the same house which negates complainant's allegation that they are living as husband and
wife in No. 82 Libis Espina, Caloocan City.Allegedly, respondent Marias is living with her
youngest sister away from her parents due to the scandal brought about by complainant in
making exaggerated stories to discredit her.
Regarding the birth certificate of their child, Maria Lourdes Marias Navarro, respondent
Marias clarified that it was respondent Navarro who provided the information that they are
husband and wife for the purpose of shielding their child from the stigma and shame of being
illegitimate.
Respondent Marias spoke of her almost eight years of dedicated and devoted service to the
Supreme Court wherein, according to her, she has an unblemished record. Just like her co-
respondent, respondent Marias agreed to forego any formal investigation of the instant
administrative case to avoid further sufferings of her family.
 Accordingly, the Court Administrator recommends the suspension of both respondents The exacting standards of ethics and morality upon court judges and court employees
for a period of one year.[3] are required to maintain the people's faith in the courts as dispensers of justice, and whose
Based on the memorandum report of the OCA, the case was docketed as a regular image is mirrored by their actuations. In the language of Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma -
administrative matter. The parties were then asked to manifest if they are willing to submit
the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings already filed,[4] to which the
"[T]he image of the court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or
complaint[5]and both respondents[6]responded in the affirmative.
otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge to the least and lowest
The facts of the case are not in issue as both respondents admit begetting a child out of
of its personnel - hence, it becomes the imperative sacred duty of each and everyone in the
wedlock; they, however, deny that are still living together. As complainant failed to adduce
court to maintain its good name and standing as a true temple of justice."[12]
any proof to support her bare allegation that respondents are still living together purporting
to be husband and wife, we see no reason to disbelieve respondents' claim to the
contrary. Hence, what remains to be resolved is the penalty to be imposed on the Disgraceful and immoral conduct is a grave offense, punishable by suspension of six (6)
respondents for having had an illicit relationship in the past. months and one day to one (1) year for the first offense and for the second offense by
Respondent Navarro entreats the Court to be lenient in the imposition of penalty in this dismissal.[13]
administrative case considering that he is an ordinary employee upon whom the high WHEREFORE, private respondents Ronaldo Navarro and Roberyn Joy C. Marias are
standard of integrity and ethical conduct required of a judge should not be SUSPENDED for a period of one (1) year without pay with a stern warning that subsequent
applied. Moreover, he avers that his infraction should not be measured against the standards violations of similar nature will be dealt with a more severe penalty.
of moral integrity expected of a lawyer. He insists that a minor distinction should be made on
the yardstick of morality between an ordinary employee and that of a judge or a lawyer. SO ORDERED.
We disagree.
Under the Administrative Code of 1987, disgraceful and immoral conduct is a ground for
disciplinary action.[7] The disciplinary authority may impose the penalty of removal from the
service, demotion in rank, suspension for not more than one year without pay, fine in an
amount not exceeding six month's salary, or reprimand.[8]
In Ecube-Badel v. Badel,[9] this Court suspended a court employee for one (1) year for
having illicit relations with another woman not his wife by whom he begot a child.Under Rule
XIV, Sec. 23 (o) of the Civil Service Rules and applicable rulings, immorality is considered a
grave offense and is punished by suspension for 6 months and 1 day to 1 year for the first
offense and, for the second offense, by dismissal.
In a recent case, Edgar Bucatcat and Gene Jaro, Court Interpreter and Clerk of Court
respectively, were dismissed from service for maintaining an illicit relationship.[10]
In Lim-Arce v. Arce,[11] a staff assistant of the trial court was dismissed from service for
disgraceful and immoral conduct for having illicit relations with a married man while
employed in government. In that case, we stressed that:

Time and again we have stressed adherence to the principle that public office is a public
trust. All government officials and employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives.This constitutional mandate should always be in the minds
of all public servants to guide them in their actions during their entire tenure in the
government service. The good of the service and the degree of morality which every official
and employee in the public service must observe, if respect and confidence are to be
maintained by the Government in the enforcement of the law, demand that no untoward
conduct on his part, affecting morality, integrity and efficiency while holding office should be
left without proper and commensurate sanction, all attendant circumstances taken into
account.
FIRST DIVISION Per sheriff's return, summons was served through substituted service as personal service
proved futile. Respondent, however, did not file an answer.
G.R. No. 173294 February 27, 2008
Thereafter, the RTC ordered Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua to investigate if
there was collusion between the parties and to intervene for the State to see to it that
RENNE ENRIQUE BIER, petitioner,
evidence was not fabricated. Assistant City Prosecutor Paragua manifested that, since both
vs.
parties failed to appear before him, he was unable to make a ruling on the issue of collusion
MA. LOURDES A. BIER and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
and determine if the evidence was fabricated.

DECISION
After petitioner filed his pre-trial brief, Prosecutor Paragua filed a second manifestation
stating that petitioner had appeared before him and that, after investigation, he was
CORONA, J.: convinced that there was no collusion between the parties and that the evidence was not
fabricated.
This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside the March 20, 2006 decision2 and
July 3, 2006 resolution3of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 66952. At pre-trial, only petitioner appeared. As respondent failed to attend the same, the RTC
declared her to have waived the pre-trial. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. Again,
Petitioner Renne Enrique E. Bier met respondent Ma. Lourdes A. Bier through his sister. Their respondent did not take part in the proceedings.
courtship, which blossomed as a result of the exchange of long distance calls between them,
lasted six months. Back then, petitioner observed respondent to be a very sweet and Petitioner filed a written offer of exhibits which was admitted by the trial court.
thoughtful person. This, he said, made him fall in love with her.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a certification and manifested its disfavor
On July 26, 1992, six months after their first meeting, they were married at the UST towards declaring the marriage null and void. It argued that no persuasive evidence was
Santissimo Rosario Parish Church. Everything went well for the first three years of their presented warranting the grant of the petition, specially since petitioner failed to comply with
marriage. Respondent was everything petitioner could hope for in a wife — sweet, loving and the guidelines laid down in Republic v. CA and Molina4 (Molina).
caring. She also took good care of the house. As petitioner was based in Saudi Arabia as an
electronics technician at Saudia Airlines, the parties decided to maintain two residences, one
After trial, the trial court rendered judgment5 granting the petition:
in the Philippines and another in Saudi Arabia. They took turns shuttling between the two
countries just so they could spend time together.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID,
based upon the respondent's psychological incapacity, the marriage contracted on
The couple started experiencing marital problems after three years of marriage. According to
July 26, 1992 between Renne Enrique E. Bier and Ma. Lourdes A. Bier. As such,
petitioner, respondent ceased to be the person he knew and married. She started becoming
their property relations shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership pursuant to
aloof towards him and began to spend more time with her friends than with him, refusing
Article 147 of the Family Code. Henceforth, their property relations shall be
even to have sexual relations with him for no apparent reason. She became an alcoholic and
governed by the regime of complete separation of property.
a chain-smoker. She also started neglecting her husband's needs and the upkeep of their
home, and became an absentee wife. After being gone from their home for days on end, she
would return without bothering to account for her absence. As a result, they frequently Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General, National Census
quarreled. Finally, on April 10, 1997, respondent suddenly left for the United States. and Statistics Office and the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, ordering them to attach
Petitioner has not heard from her since. a copy of this Decision to the Marriage Contract of herein petitioner and respondent
on file with respective office.
On April 1, 1998, petitioner instituted in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 89, a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that respondent With costs against the respondent.
was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations to petitioner. It
was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-33993.
SO ORDERED.
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, appealed the decision of the RTC
to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 66952. The CA held that petitioner failed to comply
with the guidelines laid down in Molina as the root cause of respondent's psychological
incapacity was not medically or clinically identified. Worse, the same was not even alleged in
the petition filed in the court a quo. As such, it granted the appeal and reversed the decision
of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision6 read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated
06 March 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 in Civil Case
No. Q-98-33993, which declared as void the marriage between appellee and
respondent, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Renne Enrique E. Bier
and respondent Ma. Lourdes A. Bier remains valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the CA decision. The same was denied. Hence, this
recourse.
Petitioner contends that the guidelines enunciated in Molina, specifically its directive that the
root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained, and that it must be proven to be existing at the
inception of the marriage, need not be strictly complied with as Molina itself stated the
guidelines were merely "handed down for the guidance of the bench and bar" and were not
meant to be a checklist of requirements in deciding cases involving psychological incapacity.
Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that the Molina doctrine should be applied, the RTC
erred in ruling that he failed to comply therewith.
The petition must fail.
Preliminarily, we must pass upon petitioner’s argument that the finding of the trial court on
the existence or non-existence of psychological incapacity is final and binding on us absent
any showing that its factual findings and evaluation of the evidence were clearly and
manifestly erroneous.7 Petitioner’s position is of course the general rule. In the instant case,
however, it is the exception to the general rule which must be applied; the court a
quo clearly erred in granting the petition. It stated in the body of its decision that:
While this Court agrees with the observation of the Office of the Solicitor
General that the juridical antecedence of the psychological disorder and its
root cause were not established, the same will not serve as a hindrance for
the Court to declare that respondent is indeed suffering from a
psychological incapacity. The failure of the Psychological Report to identify the
root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity is not a fatal flaw that will
prevent the Court from declaring a marriage a nullity based on psychological
incapacity. (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court apparently overlooked the fact that this Court has been consistent in holding
that if a petition for nullity based on psychological incapacity is to be given due course, its
gravity, root cause, incurability and the fact that it existed prior to or at the time of
celebration of the marriage must always be proved.8 As early as Santos v. CA, et al.,9 we
already held that:
[P]sychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage;
and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.
xxx This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. xxx (Emphasis supplied)
These must be strictly complied with as the granting of a petition for nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity must be confined only to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.10 This is specially so since the Family Code does
not define psychological incapacity. The determination thereof is left solely to the discretion
of the courts and must be made on a case-to-case basis.11
Also, even if Molina was never meant to be a checklist of the requirements in deciding cases
involving Article 36 (psychological incapacity) of the Family Code, a showing of the gravity,
juridical antecedence and incurability of the party's psychological incapacity and its existence
at the inception of the marriage cannot be dispensed with. In Marcos v. Marcos (Marcos),12 a
case cited by petitioner to support his argument that the totality of evidence presented was
enough to prove the existence of respondent's psychological incapacity, this Court reiterated
that:
The [Molina] guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier
mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability. The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician
examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root
cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence
of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For
indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to.
xxx xxx xxx
 [t]he totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on
his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already
present at the inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable. (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, the 2005 case of Republic v. Iyoy 13 held that even if Marcos (2000) relaxed
the rules such that the personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of
nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, the totality of evidence must still
prove the gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability of the alleged psychological
incapacity. Failure in this regard will spell the failure of the petition.
From the foregoing, one can conclude that petitioner's insistence that Marcos effectively
overturned the need to present evidence on the aforesaid requirements has no merit. Thus,
unless the law itself or the Court provides otherwise, these requirements must be established
before a petition for nullity of the marriage based on psychological incapacity can be granted.
We hold that the trial court's decision to declare the parties' marriage void ab initio by reason
of respondent's psychological incapacity was clearly and manifestly erroneous as it
overlooked the need to show the gravity, root cause and incurability of respondent's
psychological incapacity and that it was already present at the inception of the marriage.
Be that as it may, the main question that begs to be answered in the instant case is whether
the totality of the evidence presented was enough to establish that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. We rule in the
negative.
Petitioner had the burden of proving the nullity of his marriage with respondent.14 He failed
to discharge it.
The evidence for petitioner consisted of his own testimony and that of his brother, Roderico
Bier. He also presented as evidence a psychological report written by Dr. Nedy Tayag, a
clinical psychologist, who also testified on the matters contained therein.
Dr. Tayag's report, which found respondent to be suffering from psychological incapacity,
particularly a narcissistic personality disorder, relied only on the information fed by
petitioner. This was admitted by petitioner in his petition for review on certiorari and
memorandum filed in this Court. In both instances, petitioner reasoned out that the personal
examination of respondent was impossible as her whereabouts were unknown despite
diligent efforts on his part to find her. Consequently, Dr. Tayag's report was really hearsay
evidence since she had no personal knowledge of the alleged facts she was testifying on. Her
testimony should have thus been dismissed for being unscientific and unreliable.15
Furthermore, as already stated, the report also failed to identify the root cause of
respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of
the marriage. It merely concluded that:
This extremely egocentric attitude manifest a person suffering Narcissistic
Personality Disorder that is considered to be severe, incurable and deeply rooted
with her functioning. Thus, making herself psychologically incapacitated so as to
comply with the essential marital functions.
Although there is no requirement that a party to be declared psychologically incapacitated
should be personally examined by a physician or a psychologist (as a condition sine qua
non), there is nevertheless still a need to prove the psychological incapacity
through independent evidence adduced by the person alleging said disorder.16
In the case at bar, petitioner was able to establish that respondent was remiss in her duties
as a wife and had become a happy-go-lucky woman who failed to attend to her husband's
needs and who eventually abandoned him. However, the totality of her acts, as testified to
by petitioner and his brother, was not tantamount to a psychological incapacity, as petitioner
would have us believe. Habitual alcoholism, chain-smoking, failure or refusal to meet one's
duties and responsibilities as a married person and eventual abandonment of a spouse do
not suffice to nullify a marriage on the basis of psychological incapacity, if not shown to be
due to some psychological (as opposed to physical) illness.17
The undeniable fact is that the marriage, according to petitioner's own evidence, was off to a
good start. According to him, respondent used to be a sweet, loving and caring wife who
took good care of him and their home. She even willingly consented to the difficult living
arrangement of taking turns in going back and forth between the Philippines and Saudi
Arabia just so they could be together. Perhaps it was this unusual arrangement which took a
heavy toll on their relationship. They barely saw and spent time with each other. Respondent
could have gotten used to petitioner’s absence. And although absence can indeed make the
heart grow fonder, the opposite can just as well be true: out of sight, out of mind. The
couple drifted apart and respondent obviously fell out of love with petitioner.
Nevertheless, we agree with the CA that the change in respondent's feelings towards
petitioner could hardly be described as a psychological illness. It was not enough that
respondent, the party adverted to as psychologically incapacitated to comply with her marital
obligations, had difficulty or was unwilling to perform the same. Proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor, an adverse integral element in respondent's personality
structure that effectively incapacitated her from complying with her essential marital
obligations,18 had to be shown. This petitioner failed to do. Consequently, we are
unconvinced that respondent's condition was rooted in some incapacitating or debilitating
disorder.
Even if we assume the correctness of petitioner's contention that the Molina guidelines are overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and itm us t b e i nc ur ab le o r ,
not set in stone, there is still no reason to disavow the same as the facts and circumstances e v e n if i t w e r e o t he r w is e , t he c ur e w o u ld b e b e y o nd the m e a ns o f th e
in this case do not warrant a deviation therefrom. p ar ty involved.This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
The court overlookedthe need to show the gravity, root cause and incurability of
respondent's psychological incapacity atthe inception of the marriage.The evidence for
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The March 20, 2006 decision and July 3,
petitioner consisted of his own testimony and that of his brother, Roderico Bier. Healso
2006 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66952 are AFFIRMED.
presented as evidence a psychological report written by Dr. Nedy Tayag, a clinical
psychologist.P e t i t i o n e r r e a s o n e d o u t t h a t t h e p e r s o n a l e x a m i n
No pronouncement as to costs. a t i o n o f r e s p o n d e n t w a s i m p o s s i b l e a s h e r whereabouts were
unknown despite diligent efforts on his part to find her. Consequently, Dr. Tayag'sr e p o r t
SO ORDERED. w as r e a l ly h e ar s ay e v id e nc e s i nc e s he ha d no p e r s o n al k no w le d g e o f t h e
a l le g e d facts
s he w a s t e s t i f y i n g o n . H e r t e s t i m o n y s h o u l d h a v e t h u s b e e n d i s m i
s s e d f o r b e i n g u n s c i e n t i f i c a n d unreliable.I t w as no t e no ug h t ha t
r e s p o nd e n t , th e p ar ty ad v e r te d to as p s y c h o lo g ic a l ly in c ap ac i ta te d to
c o m p ly w i t h he r m ar i t al o b l ig a tio ns , h ad d if f ic u lty o r w as unw i l l ing to
p e r f o r m t he s am e . Pr o o f o f a na t al o r s up e r v e n ing d is ab l ing f ac to r , a n
RENNE ENRIQUE BIER, petitioner,vs.MA. LOURDES A. BIER and THE REPUBLIC OF a d v e r s e i nt e g r a l e le m e n t in r e s p o n d e n t ' s p e r s o nal i ty s tr uc t ur e t h a
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.FACTS:
Petitioner Renne Enrique E. Bier and respondent Ma. Lourdes A. Bier gets married after
sixm o n t hs o f c o ur t s h i p . B ac k t he n, p e t it io ne r o b s e r v e d r e s p o nd e n t to b e a
v e r y s w e e t a nd t ho ug h tf ul p e r s o n. Ev e r y t h ing w e n t w e l l f o r t he f ir s t thr e e
y e ar s o f t he i r m ar r i ag e . R e s p o nd e n t w as e v e r y t h i ng petitioner could hope for in a
wife — sweet, loving and caring
.
The couple started experiencing marital problems after three yea
r s o f m a r r i a g e . A c c o r d i n g t o p e t i t io ne r , r e s p o nd e nt s t ar te d b e c o m in g
a l o o f to w ar d s h i m a nd b e g an to s p e nd m o r e t i m e w it h he r f r ie nd s t h an w i th
h i m , r e f us i ng e v e n to hav e s e x u al r e l a tio ns w it h hi m f o r no ap p ar e n t
r e as o n. S he b e c a m e a n a l c o ho l i c a nd a c h a in - s m o k e r . S he a ls o s tar te d
n e g l e c t i ng h e r h us b a nd ' s ne e d s and t he up k e e p o f t he ir ho m e , a nd b e c a m e
a n ab s e n te e w i f e . A f te r b e i ng g o n e f r o m the ir h o m e f o r d ay s o n e n d , s h e
would return without bothering to account for her absence. As a
r e s u l t , t h e y f r e q u e n t l y q uar r e l e d . F in a l ly , r e s p o nd e n t s ud d e nly le f t f o r
t h e U n i te d S ta te s . Pe t i t i o ne r h as no t he ar d f r o m h e r since.Petitioner instituted a
petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that respondentwas
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations to petitioner.RTC
granted the petition but the CA reversed and set aside the decision of RTC.
ISSUE
: W/N the totality of the evidence presented by petitioner
w a s e n o u g h t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
perform her essential marital obligations.
RULING:
The petition is without merit.P s y c ho l o g i c a l in c ap ac ity m us t b e c h ar ac te r i z e d b y
(a) g r av i ty , (b ) j ur i d i c al an te c e d e nc e , a nd (c) i n c u r a b i l i t y . The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would
b e i n c a p a b l e o f c ar r y i n g o u t th e o r d i nar y d u t ie s r e q u ir e d i n m ar r iag e ; i t
m us t b e r o o te d i n th e h i s to r y o f th e p ar ty antedating the marriage, although the
SECOND DIVISION
MARYWIN ALBANOSALES, G.R. No. 174803
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
CHICO-NAZARIO,*
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,** and
BRION, JJ.
MAYOR REYNOLAN T. SALES and COURT OF Promulgated:
APPEALS,
Respondents. July 13, 2009
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
The instant petition for review assails the Decision[1] dated July 26, 2006, of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 82869. The Court of Appeals had set aside the Orders
dated November 28, 2003[2] and April 12, 2004[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, Branch 102 in Civil Case Nos. Q-94-19236 and Q-97-32303, and remanded the case to
the RTC for further hearing in accordance with the RTC Order[4] dated September 3, 2003.
The present controversy stemmed from Civil Case No. Q-94-19236 filed by Marywin
Albano Sales against her husband, Mayor Reynolan T. Sales, for the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership and separation of properties, and Civil Case No. Q-97-32303 filed by
Mayor Reynolan T. Sales for the declaration of nullity of their marriage. The two cases were
consolidated and tried jointly.
On January 4, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment[5] declaring the marriage of
Marywin and Reynolan void on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity. It also ordered
the dissolution of their conjugal partnership. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) The marriage between plaintiff/defendant Reynolan
Sales and defendant/plaintiff Marywin Albano Sales is hereby declared
void ab initio on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity of the
parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code;
2) The parties Reynolan Sales and Marywin Albano
Sales are hereby directed to liquidate, partition and distribute their
common property as defined in Article 147 of the Family Code within sixty
(60) days from receipt of this decision, and to comply with the provisions
of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code insofar as they may be
applicable;
3) Reynolan Sales and Marywin Sales shall share in
the expenses for the support and education of their only child Maindryann
Sales in proportion with their respective resources.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.[6]
On June 16, 2003, after the decision became final, Marywin filed a motion for
execution and a manifestation listing her assets with Reynolan for the purpose of having
them partitioned. Reynolan opposed the motion arguing that the RTC Decision had ordered
the distribution of their common properties without specifying what they were. He also
claimed that Marywin has no share in the properties she specified because said properties
were the fruits solely of his industry. He added that their property relations should not be
governed by the rules of co-ownership because they did not live together as husband and
wife. He also alleged that Marywin appropriated the rentals of his properties and even
disposed one of them without his consent, in violation of Article 147 [7] of the Family
Code. Accordingly, he prayed for the deferral of the resolution of the motion for execution,
maintaining that no partition of properties can be had until after all the matters he raised are
resolved after due notice and hearing.
In an Order dated September 3, 2003, the RTC set the case for hearing
on September 25, 2003 and ordered the reception of evidence on the parties respective
claims. The hearing was reset twice to November 13, 2003 and January 22,
2004. The November 13, 2003 hearing was cancelled due to the absence of the presiding
judge who was on a seminar at Tagaytay during that time. But the minutes of the session
that day shows that the counsels for both parties signed for the next hearing on January 22,
2004.
On November 24, 2003, Marywin filed a reiterative motion for execution to implement
the decision and to order partition of their common properties.[8] She brought to the attention of
the court the 12 units of townhouses at Xavierville Subdivision, Quezon City, four units of which
were sold, leaving eight units for disposition between her and Reynolan. She proposed to give out
two units to their son Maindryann and equally divide the remaining six units between her and
Reynolan. She also alleged that she tried to obtain Reynolans approval on the proposed partition
of properties, but to no avail.
The reiterative motion was set for hearing on November 28, 2003 with the words at
the foot of the last page copy furnished Atty. Oscar G. Raro, Reynolans counsel and a rubber
stamped imprint showing receipt. Said stamp imprint reads, Raro Palomique Pagunuran
Acosta and Villanueva, RECEIVED, date: 24 Nov. 2003, Time: 11:45 am, By: Amy.[9]
On November 28, 2003, the reiterative motion was heard in the absence of
Reynolan and his counsel. On the same date, the RTC issued an order approving the
proposed project of partition since the proposal appears to be reasonable and there has been
no opposition or appearance from Reynolan despite several resetting of
hearings. Consequently, the branch clerk of court was ordered to execute the necessary
deeds of conveyance to distribute the eight townhouse units in accordance with the motion.
On December 16, 2003, Reynolan moved to reconsider the RTCs Order
dated November 28, 2003, prayed for its reversal and the reinstatement of the RTCs
previous Order dated September 25, 2003, which ordered the reception of evidence before
resolving the proper partition of their properties. In his motion, he alleged that the sudden
grant of Marywins reiterative motion preempted the issues he previously raised, i.e., the
alleged fraudulent sale and non-accounting of rentals of the townhouses, and whether their
property relations is governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Marywin opposed Reynolans motion and argued that the issues of alleged fraudulent
sale and non-accounting of rentals were already waived by Reynolan when he failed to set
them up as compulsory counterclaims in the case. She also contends that the court has
ordered the liquidation and distribution of their common property; thus, the question on their
property relations was already a resolved issue. Reynolan replied that the reiterative motion
was itself superfluous because the RTC had ordered the reception of evidence in
its September 3, 2003 Order.
On April 12, 2004, the RTC denied Reynolans motion for reconsideration. It ruled
that reception of evidence is no longer necessary because the parties were legally married
prior to its nullification and the fact that they begot a son whom they raised together proved
that their connubial relations were more than merely transient.
Aggrieved, Reynolan appealed to the Court of Appeals claiming that the RTC hastily
and improvidently granted the reiterative motion without regard to its previous order calling
for the reception of evidence before ordering the partition of their properties. He averred that
there is a genuine need for a hearing to adjudicate the matters he raised because it is
decisive of the proper liquidation and partition of their properties. He also alleged that there
was no proof of notice to him of the reiterative motion.
In a Decision dated July 26, 2006, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of
Reynolan. The appellate court set aside the RTC Orders dated November 28, 2003 and April
12, 2004 and remanded the case to the lower court for reception of evidence in accordance
with the RTCs Order dated September 3, 2003. The Court of Appeals held that the RTCs
recall of its previous order for further reception of evidence deprives and violates Reynolans
constitutional right to property. While the RTC is not prohibited from setting aside an
interlocutory order, the Court of Appeals said that due process must still be observed.
The Court of Appeals further held that the reiterative motion was an ingenious
strategy to circumvent the September 3, 2003 Order of the RTC. It stated that there was
nothing in the reiterative motion that calls for the review of the previous RTC order calling
for further reception of evidence. Thus, when the RTC treated the reiterative motion as a
motion for reconsideration when it was not such a motion, it had unwittingly denied
Reynolan of his right to be heard which emanated from the RTCs September 3,
2003 Order. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals disposed of the case as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the orders of November 28,
2003 and April 12, 2004 are SET ASIDE, and the case is remanded to the
lower court for a hearing in accordance with its order of September 3,
2003.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Hence, the instant petition, assigning the following as errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
ENTERTAINED THE APPEAL FROM AN ORDER WHICH IS IN THE NATURE OF
A WRIT OF EXECUTION.
II.
THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
RENDERING JUDGMENT BASED ON MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS,
SPECULATIONS, SURMISES, CONJECTURES THAT ARE MANIFESTLY
MISTAKEN AND ABSURD.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER MANIPULATED THE ISSUANCE OF THE ORDER DATED 28
NOVEMBER 2003.[11]
Stated simply, the issue is: did the Court of Appeals err when it entertained
respondents appeal from an order granting the issuance of a writ of execution?
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals exceeded its jurisdiction when it
decided respondents appeal because under Section 1,[12] Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, no
appeal can be taken from an order of execution. She further contends that respondent was
not deprived of his right to due process when the RTC approved the project of partition of
their common properties without prior hearing because the right to be heard does not only
refer to the right to present verbal arguments in court, but also includes the right to be
heard through ones pleadings. Respondents right to due process was not violated as he was
given sufficient opportunity to submit his written opposition but failed to do so.
Respondent counters that the RTC should not have granted the reiterative motion to
implement the decision and order the partition of their common properties without prior
hearing because its previous order calling for the reception of evidence had long become final
and executory. He also posits that no partition can be had without proper accounting and
determination of the extent of their common properties. He alleges that: (1) for 10 long
years, petitioner had been collecting all the rentals from their townhouse units; (2) she had
sold some units without his consent; and (3) she misappropriated the proceeds thereof.
After carefully considering the parties contentions and submissions, we reject
petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals erred when it entertained respondents appeal
assailing the RTC Orders dated November 28, 2003 and April 12, 2004, which had reversed its
previous Order dated September 3, 2003 and dispensed with the need for the reception of
evidence before ordering the partition and liquidation of the parties common properties.
To emphasize, what is being questioned by respondent was not really the January
4, 2000 Decision of the RTC declaring their marriage void ab initio on the ground of mutual
psychological incapacity, but the Orders of the trial court dividing their common properties in
accordance with the proposed project of partition without the benefit of a hearing. The issue
on the validity of their marriage has long been settled in the main decision and may no
longer be the subject of review.
Incidentally, however, there were matters of genuine concern that had to be
addressed prior to the dissolution of the property relations of the parties as a result of the
declaration of nullity of their marriage. Allegations regarding the collection of rentals without
proper accounting, sale of common properties without the husbands consent and
misappropriation of the proceeds thereof, are factual issues which have to be addressed in
order to determine with certainty the fair and reasonable division and distribution of
properties due to each party.
The extent of properties due to respondent is not yet discernible without further
presentation of evidence on the incidental matters he had previously raised before the
RTC. Since the RTC resolved these matters in its Orders dated November 28, 2003 and April
12, 2004, disregarding its previous order calling for the reception of evidence, said orders
became final orders as it finally disposes of the issues concerning the partition of the parties
common properties. As such, it may be appealed by the aggrieved party to the Court of
Appeals via ordinary appeal.[13]
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 26, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 82869 is hereby AFFIRMED. The instant case is remanded to the lower court for further
reception of evidence in accordance with the RTCs Order dated September 3, 2003. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION prejudice to the prior rights of known and unknown creditors of the
conjugal partnership.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrars of Cainta,
Rizal and Pasig City and the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City, for record
G.R. No. 171260 purposes.

Present: SO ORDERED.[5]

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Said Decision is final and executory.

AMPARO ROBLES CABREZA, Chairperson,
Petitioner, CHICO-NAZARIO, On March 7, 2003, respondent filed with the RTC a Motion for Execution (Re: Dissolution of
VELASCO, JR., Conjugal Partnership). In said motion, respondent sought to implement the order for the
NACHURA, and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, which consisted solely in the real property located at
- versus - PERALTA, JJ. No. 20 United Street, Bo. Capitolyo, Pasig City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
17460. For this purpose, he moved that said property be sold and the proceeds be divided
Promulgated: and distributed.[6]

September 11, 2009
CEFERINO S. CABREZA, JR., JUDGE PABLITO
ROXAS, SHERIFF RONBERTO VALINO,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 70 PASIG
CITY,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to set aside the December 7, 2005 Decision[2] and February 7, 2006 Resolution[3] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 86770.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Ceferino S. Cabreza, Jr. (respondent) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 70, of
Pasig City, a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Amparo Robles Cabreza
(petitioner). The same was docketed as JDRC Case No. 3705.
On January 3, 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision[4] granting the petition, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby grants the instant petition and declares the
marriage of petitioner and respondent a nullity pursuant to Art. 36 of the
Family Code.
Further, the conjugal partnership is hereby dissolved and must be
liquidated in accordance with Art. 129 of the Family Code, without
On May 26, 2003, the RTC issued an Order[7] granting respondents motion, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders that the property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17460 be sold and the proceeds
thereof be divided and distributed, as follows:
a) or 50% of the total proceeds shall be delivered to the
common children of the petitioner and the respondent as
their presumptive legitime;
b) the other half or 50% of the proceeds shall be equally
divided between the petitioner and the respondent. From
the share of the respondent should be deducted the total
amount of PHP 1,500,000.00 which was earlier advanced
by petitioner to respondent, but which was adjudged to
be returned to the former by the latter pursuant to the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated November 14,
1994 (Exh. F) and reiterated in the final and executory
Decision in this case by this Court.
All of the foregoing are subject to the claim of creditors of the
conjugal partnership or of the petitioner and respondent, if any.
SO ORDERED.[8]
On July 30, 2003, the RTC issued an order granting respondents motion to allow
prospective buyers to inspect the property.[9]
On October 2, 2003, the RTC issued another order granting respondents motion
which prayed for the approval of the deed of absolute sale, for the authorization for
respondent to sign said deed in behalf of petitioner, and for an order requiring the occupants
to vacate the property.[10]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration questioning the October 2, 2003 Order which
was however denied by the said court in an Order dated November 4, 2003.[11]
On May 12, 2004, the RTC issued another order granting respondents prayer for the issuance
of a writ of possession, thus:
The Decision in this case having attained finality, petitioners motion (for
issuance of Writ of Possession) is impressed with merit and is hereby
GRANTED.
However, before the Court issues the said Writ of Possession, the buyer,
BJD Holdings Corporation, is first directed to comply with its undertaking to
submit to the Court a Certificate of Bank Deposit in the amount of Ten
Million Pesos (PHP 10,000,000.00), representing the total purchase price
for the property as contained in the Deed of Absolute Sale which was
approved by this Court in its Order dated October 2, 2003.
SO ORDERED.[12]
On June 25, 2004, the RTC issued an Order[13] granting a writ of possession in favor of the
buyer of the property, BJD Holdings Corporation. Thereafter, on June 30, 2004, a writ of
possession[14] was issued. On July 5, 2004, a Notice to Vacate[15] was served on petitioner.
On July 8, 2004, petitioner filed a Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Writ of Possession and
Notice to Vacate,[16] arguing that Article 129(9) of the New Civil Code provides that, in the
partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and lot on which it is situated shall be
adjudicated to the spouse with whom majority of the children choose to remain. Hence, since
the majority of the children, albeit of legal age, opted to stay with petitioner, she asserted
that the family home should be given to her.
On August 4, 2004, the RTC issued an Order[17] denying the motion of petitioner, the
pertinent portions of which read:
The Decision in this case having long become final and executory the
appeals before the Court of Appeals, as well as with the Supreme Court
were dismissed with finality there is noting more to be done other than to
have the Decision implemented.
xxxx
It is evident from Article 129 of the Family Code that the same
presupposes a situation where there are other properties aside from the
property subject of the motion that constitute the conjugal partnership. In
the instant case, there is only one (1) piece of property involved which is
the real property covered by TCT No. 17460 located at No. 20 United St.,
Bo. Capitolyo, Pasig City. Pursuant to the order of this Court dated 26 May
2003, granting the Motion for Execution of the Decision, said property was
ordered to be sold and the proceeds distributed, x x x.
xxxx
It will be noted from the foregoing sequence of events that there
is nothing more that remains to be done, but to enforce the final and
executory Decision, as well as its implementing orders.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Hold in Abeyance Writ of Possession
and Motion to Vacate is hereby DENIED, for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[18]
On August 6, 2004, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was however denied
by the RTC in an order dated August 27, 2004.
On September 2, 2004, the Sheriff issued a Final Notice to Vacate[19].
On October 4, 2004, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari[20] assailing
the order of possession, writ of possession and notice to vacate.
On December 7, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision[21] denying the petition for certiorari. The
CA ruled in the wise:
We do not agree, to begin with, that the assailed issuances were tainted by
lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Instead, we consider the
contention of the respondent husband, that Art. 129 (9), Family
Code, supra, is applicable only when the spouses had other assets to be
divided between them, to be correct. Indeed Art. 129(9), Family
Code, supra, obviously refers to partition of the properties. Hence, the
respondent Judge was not guilty of any arbitrariness, whimsicality or
capriciousness in issuing the assailed orders and writ. It is not disputed
that the conjugal dwelling in question (Transfer Certificate of Title No.
17460) was the only asset of the conjugal partnership that was the subject
of partition between the spouses.
The more decisive fact is, however, the finality of the RTC
judgment dated May 26, 2003.
The petitioner wife wants to change the final judgment, insisting that the
conjugal dwelling should be awarded exclusively to her because the
common children of the spouses, albeit of legal age, have chosen to live
with her. We cannot permit what petitioner wants because it does
not (sic) accord with the decree of the final judgment dated May
26, 2003, which specifically and plainly directed that the property
was to be sold and the proceeds of the sale was divided and
distributed, x x x x[22]
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was however denied by the CA in a
Resolution[23] dated February 7, 2006.
Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising the following issues, to wit:
 ARE THE ORDER OF POSSESSION, WRIT OF EXECUTION/POSSESSION AND
NOTICE TO VACATE THAT VARY THE TERMS OF THE DISPOSITIVE
PORTION OF THE DECISION IN ACCORDANCE WITH SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS?
IS THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION IN ACCORDANCE WITH SUPREME
COURT DECISION?[24]
The petition is bereft of merit.
Petitioner argues in the main that the order of possession, writ of possession and notice to
vacate vary the terms of the dispositive portion of the January 3, 2001 RTC Decision,
because the same authorize the sale of the family home. Specifically, petitioner anchors her
petition on Article 129 (9) of the Civil Code, which reads:
In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and lot on which it
is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of
the common children choose to remain.
Petitioner also argues against the contention of respondent that article 129(9) does
not apply because of the lack of other properties. She points out that there is another
property, the same covered by TCT No. 17461, which she alleges was presented and forms
part of the record.[25]
Respondent, for his part, contends that the petition must be dismissed because the
same raises a question of fact, and it raises an issue that has already been resolved with
finality.
For clarity, the pertinent portion of the final and executory January 3, 2001 RTC decision
reads:
Further, the conjugal partnership is hereby dissolved and must be
liquidated in accordance with Art. 129 of the Family Code, without
prejudice to the prior rights of known and unknown creditors of the
conjugal partnership.[26]
In addition, the pertinent portion of the May 26, 2003 RTC Order granting respondents
motion for execution reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders that the property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17460 be sold[27] and the proceeds
thereof be divided and distributed, as follows: x x x[28]
Before anything else, this Court shall address the procedural issue raised by respondent. He
argues that the May 26, 2003 Order is already final and executory; hence, he contends that
petitioner can no longer question the order that the property covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 17460 be sold.[29]
It is this Courts finding that petitioner is not candid, as she omits certain facts that are
pertinent to the petition at bar. Quite noticeably, her narration of facts begins from the
January 3, 2001 Decision of the RTC and then suddenly jumps to its June 25, 2004 Order of
Possession. She would impress upon this Court that nothing significant happened between
January 3, 2001 and June 25, 2004, when on the contrary, the events that transpired during
the said interval are material and important for a just resolution of the case at bar.
After a perusal of the records, this Court takes note of the following events that
occurred between January 3, 2001 and June 25, 2004:
On June 12, 2003, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Review[30] assailing the May 26,
2003 Order of the RTC, which ordered the sale of the family home. The same was docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 77506.
On July 31, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution[31] dismissing the petition for review, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[32]
On March 30, 2004, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari[33] before this Court assailing the
CA Resolution. The same was docketed as G.R. No. 162745.
On May 24, 2004, this Court issued a Resolution[34] denying the petition. Accordingly, on July
23, 2004, an Entry of Judgment[35] was issued rendering the May 24, 2004 Resolution final
and executory.
In addition, this Court also takes note that there is another case filed by petitioner with the
CA, docketed as CA-GR. CV No. 8651,[36] questioning the validity of the Deed of Sale
between respondent and BJD Holdings Corporation. The CA granted said petition and ordered
that the case be remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.
In summary, the three cases including herein petition, are the following:
G.R. No. 162745, Amparo R. Cabreza v. Court of Appeals, et al., questioning the May 26,
2003 RTC Order granting respondents motion to sell the family home. Said petition was
denied by this Court and an Entry of Judgment was issued on July 23, 2004.
G.R. No. 171260, Amparo R. Cabreza v. Ceferino Cabreza et al., herein petition, questioning
the writ of execution/possession and notice to vacate because they allegedly varied the
terms of the dispositive portion of the January 3, 2001 judgment of the RTC.
CA-GR. CV No. 86511, Amparo R. Cabreza v. Ceferino S. Cabreza, et
al., questioning the Deed of Sale between respondent and BJD Holdings Corporation,
allegedly because of petitioners lack of consent thereto. The petition was granted by the CA,
which ordered for the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings.
Based on the foregoing, herein petition must fail.
Petitioner cannot hide from the fact that the May 26, 2003 Order of the RTC is already final
and executory as a necessary consequence of the Entry of Judgment dated July 23, 2004.
Said Order categorically authorized the sale of the family home. Although the CA may have
mistakenly denominated the May 26, 2003 Order as a judgment, the same does not detract
from the fact that the said order should be considered final and executory, as petitioners
attempt to question the same has already been denied by this Court.
Inescapably, this Court must consider, in the event herein petition is granted, will
the same change or vary the final May 26, 2003 RTC Order which ordered that the family
home be sold and the proceeds be divided? This Court finds that it does.
In her Memorandum,[37] petitioner maintains that it is not true that the issues
regarding the sale of the subject property has long been settled by the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court,[38] and thus she argues in this wise:
The Order to Sell the subject property is questioned before this Honorable
Court on the ground that the same varies the dispositive portion of the
final decision of the court a quo. The dispositive portion of the final decision
does not decree sale but the lower court a quo ordered sale of the family
home.
Likewise, it is judicially admitted by the private respondent that a
Complaint to Annul the Deed of Sale is pending appeal in the Court of
Appeals (Comment, par. 2.7, p. 5) based of lack of consent to and
signature of herein petitioner in the Deed of Sale. This Complaint for
Annulment of Sale is different from the instant case that seeks to annul the
Order to Sell and to vacate which varies the dispositive portion of the final
decision.
Premises considered, it is not true that the challenged Order to Sell has
become final and executory.
Assuming, arguendo, that the Order to Sell is valid, the Deed of Sale is
void due to lack of consent to and signature of the herein petitioner
thereon. Assuming further, without admitting, the sale was valid, the Order
to vacate is not valid for lack of delivery of price.[39]
It is very apparent that petitioner tries to hide from the fact that the January 3, 2001
Decision was implemented by the RTC in its May 26, 2003 Order. She also tries to hide from
the fact that this Court has denied her earlier petition, which questioned the May 26, 2003
Order.
In CA G.R. CV No. 77506, petitioner already questioned the sale of the family home,
as can be gleaned from her allegations, as follows:
1.4 The Court erred in ordering that the property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17460 be sold, in violation of Provision of
Article 102 (6) of the Family Code of the Philippines, which stipulates that:
Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in
the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and
the lot shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the
majority of the common children choose to remain[40].
In addition, petitioner alleges: FURTHERMORE, HER FAMILY DOMICILE IS ORDERED
BY THE COURT TO BE SOLD.[41] Lastly, petitioner prays that x x x the Order dated May 26,
2003 in the instant case be set aside and reversed x x x.[42]
Thus, the issue in herein petition of whether or not the sale of the property varies the
January 3, 2001 Decision should no longer be litigated anew. To allow so, would permit
petitioner to indirectly reopen its failed petition in G.R. No. 162745 (CA G.R. CV No. 77506).
The May 26, 2003 Order was the first order that varied the January 3, 2001
Decision, as it categorically decreed the sale of the property. The order of possession, writ of
possession and notice to vacate, which are now assailed by petitioner, were all implemented
after the May 26, 2003 Order. Hence, petitioner should have already raised herein argument
in its first petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 77506, as the facts on which she anchors her argument
were already operative then. She did not raise the same in CA-G.R. SP No. 77506, and it
would be unfair to allow her to raise said argument in this petition in the guise of questioning
the subsequent implementing orders of the RTC.
There is also no compelling reason for this Court to exercise its equity jurisdiction in
the case at bar. It is of notice that in her failed petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 77506, petitioner
filed the same on her behalf and without the services of a lawyer. Thus, the same was
dismissed by the CA on procedural grounds; among the reasons given was that petitioner
had availed herself of the wrong remedy, and that she had failed to attach the necessary
documents.
Petitioner then sought redress in this Court through a petition which was docketed
as G.R. No. 162745. As in her petition before the CA, petitioner again did not avail herself of
the services of a lawyer. Thus, the petition before this Court suffered the same fate, as it
dismissed the same via a resolution again on technicalities.
While there is no prohibition for private parties to file a petition on their own behalf,
it necessarily follows that they take the risk of not having a lawyer who is well-versed in
appellate practice. After her failed petition in the CA, petitioner already had the opportunity
to rectify the situation by engaging the services of a lawyer when she filed her petition
before this Court; yet for some reason, she chose not to do so. Thus, she has no one else to
blame but herself.
Based on the foregoing, this Court finds no compelling reason to entertain
petitioners argument, which should have been timely raised in her petition before the CA in
CA -G.R. SP No. 77506.
Moreover, in her effort to salvage her petition, petitioner contends that the deed of sale
between respondent and the BJD Holdings Corporation is not valid because of her lack of
consent thereto. Such argument, however, deserves scant consideration, as petitioner
herself manifested that there is a pending case involving the validity of the deed of sale
pursuant to the CAs ruling in CA-G.R CV No. 86511. The same therefore cannot be the
proper subject of herein petition.
SO ORDERED.
Anent petitioners allegation that there is another conjugal property other than that covered
by TCT No. 17460, the same is a question of fact which should not be the proper subject of a
petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

J.R. Blanco v. Quasha[43] is instructive, to wit:

To begin with, this Court is not a trier of facts. It is not its function to
examine and determine the weight of the evidence supporting the assailed
decision. In Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (275 SCRA 621
[1997]), the Court held that factual findings of the Court of Appeals which
are supported by substantial evidence are binding, final and conclusive
upon the Supreme Court. So also, well-established is the rule that
"factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the
parties and carry even more weight when the said court affirms the
factual findings of the trial court." Moreover, well entrenched is the
prevailing jurisprudence that only errors of law and not of facts are
reviewable by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court, which applies with greater force to the
Petition under consideration because the factual findings by the
Court of Appeals are in full agreement with what the trial court
found.[44]

In the case at bar, the RTC in its August 4, 2004 Order found:
x x x In the instant case, there is only one (1) piece of property involved
which is the real property covered by TCT No. 17460 located at No. 20
United St., Bo. Capitolyo, Pasig City. x x x[45]

Likewise, the CA in its December 7, 2005 Decision found:

x x x x It is not disputed that the conjugal dwelling in question (Transfer

Certificate of Title No. 17460) was the only asset of the conjugal
partnership that was the subject of partition between the spouses.[46]

Based on the foregoing, this Court finds no reason to reverse the findings of fact made by
the CA, more so, since the same is in accordance with the findings of fact of the RTC.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The December
7, 2005 Decision and February 7, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
86770 are AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court First, we unfurl the facts.
Manila
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the University of
SECOND DIVISION the Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when they were both nineteen (19) years old. They
were simply classmates then in one university subject when respondent cross-enrolled from
MA. SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, G.R. No. 185286 the UP Los Baos campus. The casual acquaintanceship quickly developed into a boyfriend-
Petitioner, girlfriend relationship. Petitioner was initially attracted to respondent who she thought was
Present: free spirited and bright, although he did not follow conventions and traditions.[4] Since both
resided in Mandaluyong City, they saw each other every day and drove home together from
CARPIO, J., the university.
Chairperson, Easily impressed, petitioner enjoyed respondents style of courtship which included dining
- versus - NACHURA, out, unlike other couples their age who were restricted by a university students budget. At
PERALTA, that time, respondent held a job in the family business, the Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioners
ABAD and good impression of the respondent was not diminished by the latters habit of cutting classes,
MENDOZA, JJ. not even by her discovery that respondent was taking marijuana.

Promulgated: Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university studies, obtaining a degree in AB
RAMON REYES, Sociology from the UP. By 1974, respondent had dropped out of school on his third year, and
Respondent. August 18, 2010 just continued to work for the Aristocrat Restaurant.

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This case is, again, an instance of the all-too-familiar tale of a marriage in disarray.
In this regard, we air the caveat that courts should be extra careful before making a
finding of psychological incapacity or vicariously diagnosing personality disorders in spouses
where there are none. On the other hand, blind adherence by the courts to the exhortation in
the Constitution[1] and in our statutes that marriage is an inviolable social
On December 5, 1976, the year following petitioners graduation and her fathers death,
petitioner and respondent got married. At that time, petitioner was already five (5) months
pregnant and employed at the Population Center Foundation.
Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the respondents family in Mandaluyong City. All living
expenses were shouldered by respondents parents, and the couples respective salaries were
spent solely for their personal needs. Initially, respondent gave petitioner a monthly
allowance of P1,500.00 from his salary.
When their first child was born on March 22, 1977, financial difficulties started. Rearing a
child entailed expenses. A year into their marriage, the monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from
respondent stopped. Further, respondent no longer handed his salary to petitioner. When
petitioner mustered enough courage to ask the respondent about this, the latter told her that
he had resigned due to slow advancement within the family business. Respondents game
plan was to venture into trading seafood in the province, supplying hotels and restaurants,
including the Aristocrat Restaurant. However, this new business took respondent away from
his young family for days on end without any communication. Petitioner simply endured the
set up, hoping that the situation will change.

institution, and validating a marriage that is null and void despite convincing proof of
psychological incapacity, trenches on the very reason why a marriage that is doomed from
its inception should not be forcibly inflicted upon its hapless partners for life.
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA
-G.R. CV No. 89761[2] which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89,
Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854.[3]
To prod respondent into assuming more responsibility, petitioner suggested that they live
separately from her in-laws. However, the new living arrangement engendered further
financial difficulty. While petitioner struggled to make ends meet as the single-income earner
of the household, respondents business floundered. Thereafter, another attempt at business,
a fishpond in Mindoro, was similarly unsuccessful. Respondent gave money to petitioner
sporadically. Compounding the familys financial woes and further straining the parties
relationship was the indifferent attitude of respondent towards his family. That his business
took him away from his family did not seem to bother respondent; he did not exert any
effort to remain in touch with them while he was away in Mindoro.
After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence and, this time, moved in
with petitioners mother. But the new set up did not end their marital difficulties. In fact, the
parties became more estranged. Petitioner continued to carry the burden of supporting a
family not just financially, but in most aspects as well.
In 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered a miscarriage, gave birth to their third son.
At that time, respondent was in Mindoro and he did not even inquire on the health of either
the petitioner or the newborn. A week later, respondent arrived in Manila, acting
nonchalantly while playing with the baby, with nary an attempt to find out how the hospital
bills were settled.
In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondents fishpond business stopped operations.
Although without any means to support his family, respondent refused to go back to work for
the family business. Respondent came up with another business venture, engaging in scrap
paper and carton trading. As with all of respondents business ventures, this did not succeed
and added to the trail of debt which now hounded not only respondent, but petitioner as
well. Not surprisingly, the relationship of the parties deteriorated.
Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital affair.
She overheard respondent talking to his girlfriend, a former secretary, over the phone
inquiring if the latter liked respondents gift to her. Petitioner soon realized that respondent
was not only unable to provide financially for their family, but he was, more importantly,
remiss in his obligation to remain faithful to her and their family.
One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties marriage was a surgical operation
on petitioner for the removal of a cyst. Although his wife was about to be operated on,
respondent remained unconcerned and unattentive; and simply read the newspaper, and
played dumb when petitioner requested that he accompany her as she was wheeled into the
operating room. After the operation, petitioner felt that she had had enough of respondents
lack of concern, and asked her mother to order respondent to leave the recovery room.
Still, petitioner made a string of final attempts to salvage what was left of their marriage.
Petitioner approached respondents siblings and asked them to intervene, confessing that she
was near the end of her rope. Yet, even respondents siblings waved the white flag on
respondent.
Adolfo Reyes, respondents elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina, members of a
marriage encounter group, invited and sponsored the parties to join the group. The elder
couple scheduled counseling sessions with petitioner and respondent, but these did not
improve the parties relationship as respondent remained uncooperative.
In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological
assessment to determine benchmarks of current psychological functioning. As with all other
attempts to help him, respondent resisted and did not continue with the clinical psychologists
recommendation to undergo psychotherapy.
At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of respondents siblings, told respondent to
move out of their house. Respondent acquiesced to give space to petitioner.
With the de facto separation, the relationship still did not improve. Neither did respondents
relationship with his children.
Finally, in 2001,[5] petitioner filed (before the RTC) a petition for the declaration of nullity of
her marriage with the respondent, alleging the latters psychological incapacity to fulfill the
essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioners allegations that he was psychologically
incapacitated. Respondent maintained that he was not remiss in performing his obligations to
his familyboth as a spouse to petitioner and father to their children.
After trial (where the testimonies of two clinical psychologists, Dr. Dayan and Dr. Estrella
Magno, and a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, were presented in evidence), the RTC granted
the petition and declared the marriage between the parties null and void on the ground of
their psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled, thus:
Wherefore, on the ground of psychological incapacity of both
parties, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the marriage between
petitioner MA. SOCORRO PERPETUA CAMACHO and respondent RAMON
REYES contracted on December 4, 1976 at the Archbishops Chapel Villa
San Miguel Mandaluyong, Rizal, is declared null and void under Art. 36 of
the Family Code, as amended. Henceforth, their property relation is
dissolved.
Parties are restored to their single or unmarried status.
Their children JESUS TEODORO CAMACHO REYES and JOSEPH
MICHAEL CAMACHO REYES, who are already of age and have the full civil
capacity and legal rights to decide for themselves having finished their
studies, are free to decide for themselves.
The Decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen (15)
days from notice to the parties. Entry of Judgment shall be made if no
Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial or Appeal is filed by any of the
parties, the Public Prosecutor or the Solicitor General.
Upon finality of this Decision, the Court shall forthwith issue the
corresponding Decree if the parties have no properties[.] [O]therwise, the
Court shall observe the procedure prescribed in Section 21 of AM 02-11-10
SC.
The Decree of Nullity quoting the dispositive portion of the
Decision (Sec. 22 AM 02-11-10 SC) shall be issued by the Court only after
compliance with Articles 50 & 51 of the Family Code as implemented under
 the Rules on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Property (Sections 19
& 21, AM 02-11-10 SC) in a situation where the parties have properties.
The Entry of Judgment of this Decision shall be registered in the
Local Civil Registry of Mandaluyong and Quezon City.
Let [a] copy of this Decision be furnished the parties, their
counsel, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Public Prosecutor, the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar, Mandaluyong City, the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar, Quezon City and the Civil Registrar General at their respective
office addresses.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Finding no cogent reason to reverse its prior ruling, the trial court, on motion for
reconsideration of the respondent, affirmed the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage.
Taking exception to the trial courts rulings, respondent appealed to
the Court of Appeals, adamant on the validity of his marriage to petitioner. The appellate
court, agreeing with the respondent, reversed the RTC and declared the parties marriage as
valid and subsisting. Significantly, a special division of five (two members dissenting from
the majority decision and voting to affirm the decision of the RTC) ruled, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision
dated May 23, 2007 and Order dated July 13, 2007 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 in Civil Case No. Q-01-
44854 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Amended Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is hereby DISMISSED. No
pronouncement as to costs.[7]
Undaunted by the setback, petitioner now appeals to this Court positing the following issues:
I VIII
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL
OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT PETITIONER IS
LIKEWISE PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE
ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE EXPERT WITNESSES PRESENTED BY PETITIONER.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE FINDINGS OF
THE TRIAL COURT ARE BINDING ON IT.
V
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE TOTALITY OF
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED DULY ESTABLISHED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITIES OF THE PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL
OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.
VI
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITIES OF THE PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE
ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE WERE ESTABLISHED, NOT
MERELY BY A TOTALITY, BUT BY A PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE.
VII
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PARTIES
MARRIAGE, WHICH IS UNDOUBTEDLY VOID AB INITIO UNDER ARTICLE 36
OF THE FAMILY CODE, DOES NOT FURTHER THE INITIATIVES OF THE
STATE CONCERNING MARRIAGE AND FAMILY AND THEREFORE, NOT
COVERED BY THE MANTLE OF THE CONSTITUTION ON THE PROTECTION
OF MARRIAGE.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE AMENDED
PETITION WAS VALIDLY AMENDED TO CONFORM TO EVIDENCE.[8]
Essentially, petitioner raises the singular issue of whether the marriage between the
parties is void ab initio on the ground of both parties psychological incapacity, as provided in
Article 36 of the Family Code.
In declaring the marriage null and void, the RTC relied heavily on the oral and
documentary evidence obtained from the three (3) experts i.e., Doctors Magno, Dayan and
Villegas. The RTC ratiocinated, thus:
After a careful evaluation of the entire evidence presented, the Court finds
merit in the petition.
Article 36 of the Family Code reads:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after solemnization.
and Art. 68 of the same Code provides:
The husband and wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support.
Similarly, Articles 69-71 further define the mutual obligations of a marital
partner towards each other and Articles 220, 225 and 271 of the Family
Code express the duties of parents toward their children.
Article 36 does not define what psychological incapacity means. It left the
determination of the same solely to the Court on a case to case basis.
xxxx
Taking into consideration the explicit guidelines in the determination of
psychological incapacity in conjunction to the totality of the evidence
presented, with emphasis on the pervasive pattern of behaviors of the
respondent and outcome of the assessment/diagnos[is] of expert witnesses,
Dra. Dayan, Dra. Mango and Dra. Villegas on the psychological condition of
the respondent, the Court finds that the marriage between the parties from
its inception has a congenital infirmity termed psychological incapacity which
pertains to the inability of the parties to effectively function emotionally,
intellectually and socially towards each other in relation to their essential
duties to mutually observe love, fidelity and respect as well as to mutually
render help and support, (Art. 68 Family Code). In short, there was already
a fixed niche in the psychological constellation of respondent which created
the death of his marriage. There is no reason to entertain any slightest
doubt on the truthfulness of the personality disorder of the respondent.
The three expert witnesses have spoken. They were unanimous in their
findings that respondent is suffering from personality disorder which
psychologically incapacitated him to fulfill his basic duties to the marriage.
Being professionals and hav[ing] solemn duties to their profession, the
Court considered their assessment/diagnos[is] as credible or a product of an
honest evaluation on the psychological status of the respondent. This
psychological incapacity of the respondent, in the uniform words of said
three (3) expert witnesses, is serious, incurable and exists before his
marriage and renders him a helpless victim of his structural constellation. It
is beyond the respondents impulse control. In short, he is weaponless or
powerless to restrain himself from his consistent behaviors simply because
he did not consider the same as wrongful. This is clearly manifested from
his assertion that nothing was wrong in his marriage with the petitioner and
considered their relationship as a normal one. In fact, with this belief, he
lent deaf ears to counseling and efforts extended to them by his original
family members to save his marriage. In short, he was blind and too
insensitive to the reality of his marital atmosphere. He totally disregarded
the feelings of petitioner who appeared to have been saturated already that
she finally revealed her misfortunes to her sister-in-law and willingly
submitted to counseling to save their marriage. However, the hard position
of the respondent finally constrained her to ask respondent to leave the
conjugal dwelling. Even the siblings of the respondent were unanimous that
separation is the remedy to the seriously ailing marriage of the parties.
Respondent confirmed this stand of his siblings.
xxxx
The process of an ideal atmosphere demands a give and take relationship
and not a one sided one. It also requires surrender to the fulfillment of the
essential duties to the marriage which must naturally be observed by the
parties as a consequence of their marriage. Unfortunately, the more than
21 years of marriage between the parties did not create a monument of
marital integrity, simply because the personality disorder of the respondent
which renders him psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his basic duties to
his marriage, is deeply entombed in his structural system and cure is not
possible due to his belief that there is nothing wrong with them.
The checkered life of the parties is not solely attributable to the
respondent. Petitioner, too, is to be blamed. Dra. Villegas was firm that
she, too, is afflicted with psychological incapacity as her personality cannot
be harmonized with the personality of the respondent. They are poles
apart. Petitioner is a well-organized person or a perfectionist while
respondent is a free spirited or carefree person. Thus, the weakness of the
respondent cannot be catered by the petitioner and vice-versa.
Resultantly, the psychological incapacities of both parties constitute the
thunder bolt or principal culprit on their inability to nurture and reward
their marital life with meaning and significance. So much so that it is a pity
that though their marriage is intact for 21 years, still it is an empty
kingdom due to their psychological incapacity which is grave, incurable and
has origin from unhealthy event in their growing years.

Both parties to the marriage are protected by the law. As human beings,
they are entitled to live in a peaceful and orderly environment conducive to
a healthy life. In fact, Article 72 of the Family Code provides remedy to any
party aggrieved by their marital reality. The case of the parties is already a
settled matter due to their psychological incapacity. In the words of Dra.
Magno, their marriage, at the very inception, was already at the funeral
parlor. Stated differently, there was no life at all in their marriage for it
never existed at all. The Court finds that with this reality, both parties
suffer in agony by continuously sustaining a marriage that exists in paper
only. Hence, it could no longer chain or jail the parties whose marriage
remains in its crib with its boots and diaper due to factors beyond the
physical, emotional, intellectual and social ability of the parties to
sustain.[9]
In a complete turnaround, albeit disposing of the case through a divided decision,
the appellate court diverged from the findings of the RTC in this wise:
On the basis of the guidelines [in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina] vis--vis the totality of evidence presented by herein [petitioner],
we find that the latter failed to sufficiently establish the alleged
psychological incapacity of her husband, as well as of herself. There is thus
no basis for declaring the nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
[Petitioner] presented several expert witnesses to show that [respondent]
is psychologically incapacitated. Clinical psychologist Dayan diagnosed
[respondent] as purportedly suffering from Mixed Personality Disorder
(Schizoid Narcissistic and Anti-Social Personality Disorder). Further, clinical
psychologist Magno found [respondent] to be suffering from an Antisocial
Personality Disorder with narcissistic and dependent features, while Dr.
Villegas diagnosed [respondent] to be suffering from Personality Disorder
of the anti-social type, associated with strong sense of Inadequacy
especially along masculine strivings and narcissistic features.
Generally, expert opinions are regarded, not as conclusive, but as purely
advisory in character. A court may place whatever weight it chooses upon
such testimonies. It may even reject them, if it finds that they are
inconsistent with the facts of the case or are otherwise unreasonable. In
the instant case, neither clinical psychologist Magno nor psychiatrist Dr.
Villegas conducted a psychological examination on the [respondent].
Undoubtedly, the assessment and conclusion made by Magno and Dr.
Villegas are hearsay. They are unscientific and unreliable as they have no
personal knowledge of the psychological condition of the [respondent] as
they never personally examined the [respondent] himself.
xxxx
[I]t can be gleaned from the recommendation of Dayan that the purported
psychological incapacity of [respondent] is not incurable as the [petitioner]
would like this Court to think. It bears stressing that [respondent] was
referred to Dayan for psychological evaluation to determine benchmarks of
current psychological functioning. The undeniable fact is that based on
Dayans personal examination of the [respondent], the assessment
procedures used, behavioral observations made, background information
gathered and interpretation of psychological data, the conclusion arrived at
is that there is a way to help the [respondent] through individual therapy
and counseling sessions.
Even granting arguendo that the charges cast by the [petitioner] on
[respondent], such as his failure to give regular support, substance abuse,
infidelity and come and go attitude are true, the totality of the evidence
presented still falls short of establishing that [respondent] is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
xxxx
In the case at bar, we hold that the court a quos findings regarding the
[respondents] alleged mixed personality disorder, his come and go
attitude, failed business ventures, inadequate/delayed financial support to
his family, sexual infidelity, insensitivity to [petitioners] feelings,
irresponsibility, failure to consult [petitioner] on his business pursuits,
unfulfilled promises, failure to pay debts in connection with his failed
business activities, taking of drugs, etc. are not rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition but on serious marital difficulties/differences and
mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. [Respondents] defects were not present at the inception of
marriage. They were even able to live in harmony in the first few years of
their marriage, which bore them two children xxx. In fact, [petitioner]
admitted in her Amended Petition that initially they lived comfortably and
[respondent] would give his salary in keeping with the tradition in most
Filipino households, but the situation changed when [respondent] resigned
from the family-owned Aristocrat Restaurant and thereafter, [respondent]
failed in his business ventures. It appears, however, that [respondent] has
been gainfully employed with Marigold Corporation, Inc. since 1998, which
fact was stipulated upon by the [petitioner].
xxxx
As regards the purported psychological incapacity of [petitioner], Dr.
Villegas Psychiatric Report states that [petitioner] manifested inadequacies
along her affective sphere, that made her less responsive to the emotional
needs of her husband, who needed a great amount of it, rendering her
relatively psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of marriage.

However, a perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to
specifically allege the complete facts showing that petitioner was
psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriage at the time of celebration [thereof] even if such
incapacity became manifest only after its celebration xxx. In fact, what was
merely prayed for in the said Amended Petition is that judgment be
rendered declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent
solemnized on 04 December 1976 to be void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent at the time of the
celebration of marriage x x x.
xxxx
What is evident is that [petitioner] really encountered a lot of difficulties in
their marriage. However, it is jurisprudentially settled that psychological
incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in the
performance of some marital obligations, it is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
While [petitioners] marriage with [respondent] failed and appears to be
without hope of reconciliation, the remedy, however, is not always to have
it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. An
unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. No less
than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of
the family; it decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to
be protected by the State.
Thus, in determining the import of psychological incapacity under Article
36, it must be read in conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct
from Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for different
reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45 that would make
the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for
legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various
circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were
indifferent on the matter. Article 36 should not be confused with a divorce
law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest
themselves. x x x
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of
marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its
mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.[10]
After a thorough review of the records of the case, we cannot subscribe to the appellate
courts ruling that the psychological incapacity of respondent was not sufficiently established.
We disagree with its decision declaring the marriage between the parties as valid and
subsisting. Accordingly, we grant the petition.
Santos v. Court of Appeals[11] solidified the jurisprudential foundation of the principle that the
factors characterizing psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations
are: (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and (3) incurability. We explained:
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would
be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage;
and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved.[12]
As previously adverted to, the three experts were one in diagnosing respondent
with a personality disorder, to wit:
1. Dra. Cecilia C. Villegas
PSYCHODYNAMICS OF THE CASE
[Petitioner] is the second among 6 siblings of educated parents. Belonging
to an average social status, intellectual achievement is quite important to
the family values (sic). All children were equipped with high intellectual
potentials (sic) which made their parents proud of them. Father was
disabled, but despite his handicap, he was able to assume his financial and
emotional responsibilities to his family and to a limited extent, his social
functions (sic). Despite this, he has been described as the unseen strength
in the family.
Mother [of petitioner] was [actively involved] in activities outside the
home. Doing volunteer and community services, she was not the
demonstrative, affectionate and the emotional mother (sic). Her love and
concern came in the form of positive attitudes, advices (sic) and
encouragements (sic), but not the caressing, sensitive and soothing
touches of an emotional reaction (sic). Psychological home environment did
not permit one to nurture a hurt feeling or depression, but one has to
stand up and to help himself (sic). This trained her to subjugate (sic)
emotions to reasons.
Because of her high intellectual endowment, she has easy facilities for any
undertakings (sic). She is organized, planned (sic), reliable, dependable,
systematic, prudent, loyal, competent and has a strong sense of duty (sic).
But emotionally, she is not as sensitive. Her analytical resources and
strong sense of objectivity predisposed her to a superficial adjustments
(sic). She acts on the dictates of her mind and reason, and less of how she
feels (sic). The above qualities are perfect for a leader, but less effective in
a heterosexual relationship, especially to her husband, who has deep
seated sense of inadequacy, insecurity, low self esteem and self-worth
despite his intellectual assets (sic). Despite this, [petitioner] remained in
her marriage for more than 20 years, trying to reach out and lending a
hand for better understanding and relationship (sic). She was hoping for
the time when others, like her husband would make decision for her (sic),
instead of being depended upon. But the more [petitioner] tried to
compensate for [respondents] shortcomings, the bigger was the
discrepancy in their coping mechanisms (sic). At the end, [petitioner] felt
unloved, unappreciated, uncared for and she characterized their marriage
as very much lacking in relationship (sic).
On the other hand, [respondent] is the 9th of 11 siblings and belonged to
the second set of brood (sic), where there were less bounds (sic) and
limitations during his growing up stage. Additionally, he was acknowledged
as the favorite of his mother, and was described to have a close
relationship with her. At an early age, he manifested clinical behavior of
conduct disorder and was on marijuana regularly. Despite his apparent
high intellectual potentials (sic), he felt that he needed a push to keep him
going. His being a free spirit, attracted [petitioner], who adored him for
being able to do what he wanted, without being bothered by untraditional,
unacceptable norms and differing ideas from other people. He presented no
guilt feelings, no remorse, no anxiety for whatever wrongdoings he has
committed. His studies proved too much of a pressure for him, and quit at
the middle of his course, despite his apparent high intellectual resources
(sic).
His marriage to [petitioner] became a bigger pressure. Trying to prove his
worth, he quit work from his family employment and ventured on his own.
With no much planning and project study, his businesses failed. This
became the sources (sic) of their marital conflicts, the lack of relationships
(sic) and consultations (sic) with each other, his negativistic attitudes (sic)
and sarcasm, stubbornness and insults, his spitting at her face which
impliedly meant you are nothing as compared to me were in reality, his
defenses for a strong sense of inadequacy (sic).
As described by [petitioner], he is intelligent and has bright ides. However,
this seemed not coupled with emotional attributes such as perseverance,
patience, maturity, direction, focus, adequacy, stability and confidence to
make it work. He complained that he did not feel the support of his wife
regarding his decision to go into his own business. But when he failed, the
more he became negativistic and closed to suggestions especially from
[petitioner]. He was too careful not to let go or make known his strong
sense of inadequacy, ambivalence, doubts, lack of drive and motivation or
even feelings of inferiority, for fear of rejection or loss of pride. When
things did not work out according to his plans, he suppressed his hostilities
in negative ways, such as stubbornness, sarcasm or drug intake.
His decision making is characterized by poor impulse control, lack of insight
and primitive drives. He seemed to feel more comfortable in being
untraditional and different from others. Preoccupation is centered on
himself, (sic) an unconscious wish for the continuance of the gratification of
his dependency needs, (sic) in his mother-son relationship. From this
stems his difficulties in heterosexual relationship with his wife, as
pressures, stresses, (sic) demands and expectations filled up in (sic) up in
their marital relationship. Strong masculine strivings is projected.
For an intelligent person like [respondent], he may sincerely want
to be able to assume his duties and responsibilities as a husband
and father, but because of a severe psychological deficit, he was
unable to do so.
Based on the clinical data presented, it is the opinion of the
examiner, that [petitioner] manifested inadequacies along her affective
sphere, that made her less responsive to the emotional needs of her
husband, who needed a great amount of it, rendering her relatively
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of
marriage. [Respondent], on the other hand, has manifested strong
clinical evidences (sic), that he is suffering from a Personality
Disorder, of the antisocial type, associated with strong sense of
Inadequacy along masculine strivings and narcissistic features that
renders him psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties
and responsibilities of marriage. This is characterized by his
inability to conform to the social norms that ordinarily govern many
aspects of adolescent and adult behavior. His being a free spirit
associated with no remorse, no guilt feelings and no anxiety, is
distinctive of this clinical condition. His prolonged drug intake
[marijuana] and maybe stronger drugs lately, are external factors
to boost his ego.
The root cause of the above clinical conditions is due to his
underlying defense mechanisms, or the unconscious mental
processes, that the ego uses to resolve conflicts.His prolonged and
closed attachments to his mother encouraged cross identification and
developed a severe sense of inadequacy specifically along masculine
strivings. He therefore has to camouflage his weakness, in terms of
authority, assertiveness, unilateral and forceful decision making, aloofness
and indifference, even if it resulted to antisocial acts. His narcissistic
supplies rendered by his mother was not resolved (sic).
It existed before marriage, but became manifest only after the
celebration, due to marital demands and stresses. It is considered as
 permanent in nature because it started early in his psychological
development, and therefore became so engrained into his personality
structures (sic). It is considered as severe in degree, because it hampered,
interrupted and interfered with his normal functioning related to
heterosexual adjustments. (emphasis supplied)[13]
2. Dr. Natividad A. Dayan
Adolfo and Mandy[, respondent]s brothers, referred [respondent] to the
clinic. According to them, respondent has not really taken care of his wife
and children. He does not seem to have any direction in life. He seems to
be full of bright ideas and good at starting things but he never gets to
accomplish anything. His brothers are suspecting (sic) that until now
[respondent] is still taking drugs. There are times when they see that
[respondent] is not himself. He likes to bum around and just spends the
day at home doing nothing. They wish that hed be more responsible and
try to give priority to his family. [Petitioner,] his wife[,] is the breadwinner
of the family because she has a stable job. [Respondent]s brothers learned
from friends that [petitioner] is really disappointed with him. She has
discussed things with him but he always refused to listen. She does not
know what to do with him anymore. She has grown tired of him.
When [respondent] was asked about his drug problem, he mentioned that
he stopped taking it in 1993. His brothers think that he is not telling the
truth. It is so hard for [respondent] to stop taking drugs when he had been
hooked to it for the past 22 years. When [respondent] was also asked what
his problems are at the moment, he mentioned that he feels lonely and
distressed. He does not have anyone to talk to. He feels that he and his
wife [have] drifted apart. He wants to be close to somebody and discuss
things with this person but he is not given the chance. He also mentioned
that one of his weak points is that he is very tolerant of people[,] that is
why he is taken advantage of most of the time. He wants to avoid conflict
so hed rather be submissive and compliant. He does not want to hurt
anyone [or] to cause anymore pain. He wants to make other people happy.
xxxx
Interpretation of Psychological Data
A. Intellectual / Cognitive Functioning
xxxx
B. Vocational Preference
xxxx
C. Socio Emotional Functioning
xxxx
In his relationships with people, [respondent] is apt to project a reserved,
aloof and detached attitude. [Respondent] exhibits withdrawal patterns. He
has deep feelings of inadequacy. Due to a low self-esteem, he tends to feel
inferior and to exclude himself from association with others. He feels that
he is different and as a result is prone to anticipate rejections. Because of
the discomfort produced by these feelings, he is apt to avoid personal and
social involvement, which increases his preoccupation with himself and
accentuates his tendency to withdraw from interpersonal contact.
[Respondent] is also apt to be the less dominant partner. He feels better
when he has to follow than when he has to take the lead. A self-contained
person[,] he does not really need to interact with others in order to enjoy
life and to be able to move on. He has a small need of companionship and
is most comfortable alone. He, too[,] feels uncomfortable in expressing his
more tender feelings for fear of being hurt. Likewise, he maybe very angry
within but he may choose to repress this feeling. [Respondents] strong
need for social approval, which could have stemmed from some deep
seated insecurities makes him submissive and over [compliant]. He tends
to make extra effort to please people. Although at times[, he] already feels
victimized and taken advantage of, he still tolerates abusive behavior for
fear of interpersonal conflicts. Despite
his [dis]illusion with people, he seeks to minimize dangers of indifference
and disapproval [of] others. Resentments are suppressed. This is likely to
result in anger and frustrations which is likewise apt to be repressed.
There are indications that [respondent] is[,] at the moment[,] experiencing
considerable tension and anxiety. He is prone to fits of apprehension and
nervousness. Likewise, he is also entertaining feelings of hopelessness and
is preoccupied with negative thought. He feels that he is up in the air but
with no sound foundation. He is striving [for] goals which he knows he will
never be able to attain. Feeling discouraged and distressed, he has
difficulty concentrating and focusing on things which he needs to prioritize.
He has many plans but he cant accomplish anything because he is unable
to see which path to take. This feeling of hopelessness is further
aggravated by the lack of support from significant others.
Diagnostic Impression
Axis I : Drug Dependence
Axis II : Mixed Personality Disorder
[Schizoid, Narcissistic and
Antisocial Personality Disorder]
Axis III : None
 Axis IV : Psychosocial and Environmental Problems:
Severe Axis II Antisocial Personality Disorder with marked narcissistic,
He seems to be very good at planning aggressive sadistic and dependent features
and starting things but is unable to
accomplish anything; unable to give Axis III No diagnosis
priority to the needs of his family; in
social relationships. Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (successful wife)
Severity: 4 (severe)
Axis V : Global Assessment of Functioning Fair (Emphasis
supplied)[14] xxxx
3. Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno
One has to go back to [respondents] early childhood in order to understand
Summary and Conclusion the root cause of his antisocial personality disorder. [Respondent] grew
up the ninth child in a brood of 11. His elder siblings were taken cared of
From the evidence available from [petitioners] case history and by his grandmother. [Respondents] father was kind, quiet and blind and
from her psychological assessment, and despite the non- [respondent] was [reared] by his mother. Unfortunately, [respondents]
cooperation of the respondent, it is possible to infer with certainty mother grew up believing that she was not her mothers favorite child, so
the nullity of this marriage. Based on the information available she felt api, treated like poor relations. [Respondents] mothers reaction to
about the respondent, he suffers from [an] antisocial personality her perceived rejection was to act outwith poor impulse control and poor
disorder with narcissistic and dependent features that renders him mood regulation (spent money like water, had terrible temper tantrums,
too immature and irresponsible to assume the normal obligations etc.). Unwittingly, his mother became [respondents] role model.
of a marriage. As for the petitioner, she is a good, sincere, and
conscientious person and she has tried her best to provide for the needs of However, because [respondent] had to get on with the business of living,
her children. Her achievements in he learned to use his good looks and his charms, and learned to size up the
weaknesses of others, to lie convincingly and to say what people wanted to
hear (esp. his deprived mother who liked admiration and attention, his
this regard are praiseworthy. But she is emotionally immature and her siblings from whom he borrowed money, etc.). In the process, his ability to
comprehension of human situations is very shallow for a woman of her love and to empathize with others was impaired so that he cannot sustain
academic and professional competence. And this explains why she married a relationship with one person for a long time, which is devastating in a
RRR even when she knew he was a pothead, then despite the abuse, took marriage.
so long to do something about her situation.
[Respondents] narcissistic personality features were manifested by his
self-centeredness (e.g. moved to Mindoro and lived there for 10 years,
Diagnosis for [petitioner]: leaving his family in Manila); his grandiose sense of self-importance (e.g.
he would just come and go, without telling his wife his whereabouts, etc.);
Axis I Partner Relational Problem his sense of entitlement (e.g. felt entitled to a mistress because
[petitioner] deprived him of his marital rights, etc.); interpersonally
Axis II Obsessive Compulsive Personality Style with Self-Defeating features exploitative (e.g. let his wife spend for all the maintenance needs of the
family, etc.); and lack of empathy (e.g. when asked to choose between his
Axis III No diagnosis mistress and his wife, he said he would think about it, etc.)
The aggressive sadistic personality features were manifested whom he
Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (spouses has physically, emotionally and verbally abusive [of] his wife when high on
immaturity, drug abuse, and infidelity) drugs; and his dependent personality features were manifested by his need
Severity: 4-severe for others to assume responsibility for most major areas of his life, and in
his difficulty in doing things on his own.
Diagnosis for [respondent]
[Respondent], diagnosed with an antisocial personality disorder
Axis I Partner Relational Problem with marked narcissistic features and aggressive sadistic and
 dependent features, is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the (2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, liability,
essential obligations of marriage: to love, respect and render and appropriateness of emotional response)
support for his spouse and children. A personality disorder is not
curable as it is permanent and stable over time.
(3) interpersonal functioning
From a psychological viewpoint, therefore, there is evidence that (4) impulse control
the marriage of [petitioner] and [respondent is] null and void from
the very beginning. (emphasis supplied)[15] B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a
broad range of personal and social situations.
C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant distress or
Notwithstanding these telling assessments, the CA rejected, wholesale, the impairment in social, occupational or other important areas of functioning.
testimonies of Doctors Magno and Villegas for being hearsay since they never personally D. The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its onset can
examined and interviewed the respondent. be traced back at least to adolescence or early adulthood.
E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a
We do not agree with the CA. manifestation or a consequence of another mental disorder.
F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological
The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other effects of a substance (i.e., a drug of abuse, a medication) or a general
person diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the medical condition (e.g., head trauma).
doctors. Neither do their findings automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their
exclusion as evidence. Specifically, the DSM IV outlines the diagnostic criteria for Antisocial Personality
Disorder:
For one, marriage, by its very definition,[16] necessarily involves only two persons.
The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally A. There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of
and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other. In this case, the experts testified on their the rights of others occurring since age 15 years, as indicated by three (or
individual assessment of the present state of the parties marriage from the perception of one more) of the following:
of the parties, herein petitioner. Certainly, petitioner, during their marriage, had occasion to
interact with, and experience, respondents pattern of behavior which she could then validly (1) failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful
relay to the clinical psychologists and the psychiatrist. behaviors as indicated by repeatedly performing acts that
are grounds for arrest
For another, the clinical psychologists and psychiatrists assessment were not based (2) deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or
solely on the narration or personal interview of the petitioner. Other informants such as conning others for personal profit or pleasure
respondents own son, siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-law (sister of petitioner), testified (3) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead
on their own observations of respondents behavior and interactions with them, spanning the (4) irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated
period of time they knew him.[17] These were also used as the basis of the doctors physical fights or assaults
assessments. (5) reckless disregard for safety of self or others
(6) consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to
The recent case of Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,[18] citing The Diagnostic and Statistical sustain consistent work behavior or honor financial
Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM IV),[19] instructs us on thegeneral diagnostic obligations
criteria for personality disorders: (7) lack of remorse as indicated by being indifferent to or
rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another
A. An enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that
deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual's culture. This B. The individual is at least 18 years.
pattern is manifested in two (2) or more of the following areas:
C. There is evidence of conduct disorder with onset before age 15
years.
(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting self,
other people, and events)
 D. The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively during
the course of schizophrenia or a manic episode.[20]
Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological
make up of a person based on a number of factors culled from various sources. A person
afflicted with a personality disorder will not necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In
this case, considering that a personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-
diagnosis by the respondent consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors separate
diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of
experts.
The CA declared that, based on Dr. Dayans findings and recommendation, the
psychological incapacity of respondent is not incurable.
The appellate court is mistaken.
A recommendation for therapy does not automatically imply curability. In general,
recommendations for therapy are given by clinical psychologists, or even psychiatrists, to
manage behavior. In Kaplan and Saddocks textbook entitled Synopsis of
Psychiatry,[21] treatment, ranging from psychotherapy to pharmacotherapy, for all the listed
kinds of personality disorders are recommended. In short, Dr. Dayans recommendation that
respondent should undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the finding that respondents
psychological incapacity is incurable.
Moreover, Dr. Dayan, during her testimony, categorically declared that respondent
is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.[22] As aptly
stated by Justice Romero in her separate opinion in the ubiquitously cited case of Republic v.
Court of Appeals & Molina:[23]
[T]he professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly
important in such cases. Data about the persons entire life, both before
and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were
asked to give professional opinions about a partys mental capacity at the
time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to
be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
[Because] of advances made in psychology during the past decades. There
was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between
a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and the
respective testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have
problems; and (2) these problems include chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize and
work towards providing the needs of his family; several failed business attempts; substance
abuse; and a trail of unpaid money obligations.
It is true that a clinical psychologists or psychiatrists diagnoses that a person has
personality disorder is not automatically believed by the courts in cases of declaration of
nullity of marriages. Indeed, a clinical psychologists or psychiatrists finding of a personality
disorder does not exclude a finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting, and not beset by
one of the parties or both parties psychological incapacity.
On more than one occasion, we have rejected an experts opinion concerning the
supposed psychological incapacity of a party.[24] In Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,[25]we ruled that,
even without delving into the non-exclusive list found in Republic v. Court of Appeals &
Molina,[26] the stringent requisites provided in Santos v. Court of Appeals[27] must be
independently met by the party alleging the nullity of the marriage grounded on Article 36 of
the Family Code. We declared, thus:
It was folly for the trial court to accept the findings and
conclusions of Dr. Villegas with nary a link drawn between the
"psychodynamics of the case" and the factors characterizing the
psychological incapacity. Dr. Villegas' sparse testimony does not lead to the
inevitable conclusion that the parties were psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations. Even on questioning from the
trial court, Dr. Villegas' testimony did not illuminate on the parties'
alleged personality disorders and their incapacitating effect on their
marriage x x x.
Curiously, Dr. Villegas' global conclusion of both
parties' personality disorders was not supported by psychological tests
properly administered by clinical psychologists specifically trained in the
tests' use and interpretation. The supposed personality disorders of the
parties, considering that such diagnoses were made, could have been fully
established by psychometric and neurological tests which are designed to
measure specific aspects of people's intelligence, thinking, or personality.
xxxx
The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of
seven (7) hours of interview, and unsupported by separate psychological
tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its
own factual finding on what happened in this case. The probative force of
the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of his theory
or opinion, but rather in the assistance that he can render to the courts in
showing the facts that serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons
upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded.
In the case at bar, however, even without the experts conclusions, the factual
antecedents (narrative of events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point
to the inevitable conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations.
Article 68 of the Family Code provides:
 Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
In this connection, it is well to note that persons with antisocial personality disorder exhibit
the following clinical features:
Patients with antisocial personality disorder can often seem to be normal
and even charming and ingratiating. Their histories, however, reveal many
areas of disordered life functioning. Lying, truancy, running away from
home, thefts, fights, substance abuse, and illegal activities are typical
experiences that patients report as beginning in childhood. x x x Their own
explanations of their antisocial behavior make it seem mindless, but their
mental content reveals the complete absence of delusions and other signs
of irrational thinking. In fact, they frequently have a heightened sense of
reality testing and often impress observers as having good verbal
intelligence.
x x x Those with this disorder do not tell the truth and cannot be trusted to
carry out any task or adhere to any conventional standard of morality. x x
x A notable finding is a lack of remorse for these actions; that is, they
appear to lack a conscience.[28]
In the instant case, respondents pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a
psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1)
sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business
attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with
the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.
On the issue of the petitioners purported psychological incapacity, we agree with the
CAs ruling thereon:
A perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically allege
the complete facts showing that petitioner was
psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if
such incapacity became manifest only after its celebration x x x. In fact,
what was merely prayed for in the said Amended Petition is that judgment
be rendered declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the
respondent solemnized on 04 December 1976 to be void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent at the
time of the celebration of the marriage x x x
At any rate, even assuming arguendo that [petitioners] Amended Petition
was indeed amended to conform to the evidence, as provided under
Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, Dr. Villegas finding that
[petitioner] is supposedly suffering from an Inadequate Personality
[Disorder] along the affectional area does not amount to psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Such alleged condition of
[petitioner] is not a debilitating psychological condition that incapacitates
her from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage. In
fact, in the Psychological Evaluation Report of clinical psychologist Magno,
[petitioner] was given a glowing evaluation as she was found to be a good,
sincere, and conscientious person and she has tried her best to provide for
the needs of her children. Her achievements in this regard are
praiseworthy. Even in Dr. Villegas psychiatric report, it was stated that
[petitioner] was able to remain in their marriage for more than 20 years
trying to reach out and lending a hand for better understanding and
relationship. With the foregoing evaluation made by no less than
[petitioners] own expert witnesses, we find it hard to believe that she is
psychologically incapacitated within the contemplation of Article 36 of the
Family Code.[29]
All told, it is wise to be reminded of the caveat articulated by Justice Teodoro R.
Padilla in his separate statement in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina:[30]
x x x Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In the field
of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is
trite to say that no case is on all fours with another case. The trial judge
must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court
must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of
the trial court.
In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in light of the foregoing disquisition,
we find ample basis to conclude that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential marital obligations at the time of his marriage to the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. CV
No. 89761 is REVERSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in
Civil Case No. Q-01-44854 declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 185286 August 18, 2010 preponderance of evidence.Issue:Whether or not the marriage between the parties is void ab
initio
MA. SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, on the ground of both parties’
Petitioner,vs. psychological incapacity, as provided in Article 36 of the Family Code.Held:The Supreme
RAMON REYES, Court held that the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The decision of theRegional
Respondent.Facts:Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes and Ramon Reyes got married Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854 declaring the marriage
on December 5, 1976 whenthe petitioner was already five months pregnant. The newlyweds
lived with Ramon’s family and all
their living expenses
were shouldered by Ramon’s parents. Salary of the spouses was spent solely
between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code
for the personal expenses of each. Initially, Ramon gave Socorro a monthly allowance of
isREINSTATED.The appellate court is mistaken in declaring that the psychological incapacity
P1,500from his salary. When their first child was born on March 22, 1977,
of Ramon is notincurable. A recommendation of therapy does not automatically
financial difficulties started. Ayear into their marriage, the monthly allowance
imply curability. In general,recommendations for therapy are given by clinical psychologists,
stopped. Ramon resigned from his job in their familybusiness and decided to venture in
or even psychiatrists, to manage
different businesses, which took him away from his family.Ramon however did not exert any
behavior. In Kaplan and Saddock’s textbook entitled Synopsis of Psychiatry, treatment,
effort to communicate with his family, even after Socorro gave birthto their third child. As
ranging from
with Ramon
psychotherapy to pharmacotherapy, for all the listed kinds of personality disorders are
’s business ventures, all did not succeed and added to the trail of
recommended.
debt. Not surprisingly, the relationship of the parties deteriorated.In 1996, Socorro
In short, Dr. Dayan’s recommendation that respondent should undergo therapy does not
confirmed that Ramon was having an extra marital affair, and soon realized thatRamon was
necessarilynegate the finding that respondent’s psychological incapacity is incurable.
not only unable to provide financially for their family, but he was, more importantly, remissin
Moreover, Dr. Dayan,during her testimony, categorically declared that respondent is
his obligation to remain faithful to her and their family. One last episode that sealed the fate
psychologically incapacitated toperform the essential marital obligations. As aptly stated by
of the
Justice Romero in her separate opinion inthe ubiquitously cited case of Republic v. Court of
parties’ marriage was a surgical operation on Socorro for the r
Appeals & Molina:
emoval of a cyst. Although his wife wasabout to be operated on, Ramon remained
The professional opinion of a
unconcerned and unattentive.
psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person’s
In an attempt to salvage what was left in their marriage, Socorro approach Ramon’s siblings,
entire life,
who in
both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked
turn invited the parties to counseling sessions which still did not improve the
to give p
relationship. Adolfo,
rofessional opinions about a party’s mental capacity at the time of the wedding
Ramon’s sibling, also brought Ramon to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological
assessment to
"determine benchmarks of current psychological functioning." Ramon resisted and did not
continuewith
the clinical psychologist’s recommendation to undergo psychotherapy. Socorro then told
Ramon
to move out of their house. The separation did not improve the relationship of the parties
andbetween Ramon and the children, thus the petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage was filebefore the RTC
alleging the latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations
under Article 36 of the Family Code. This petition was granted by the RTC. A motion
forreconsideration was filed by Ramon before the RTC but denied the same. Ramon then
appealed tothe Court of Appeals, which on its decision on May 23, 2007, stated that the
decision of RTC wasreversed and set aside
despite the testimony of experts regarding Ramon’s condition
. Socorro thenappealed to the Supreme Court by reason that the Court of Appeals erred in
not ruling that bothparties are psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of the marriage andthat the psychological incapacity was established in court by a
THIRD DIVISION Despite their efforts to keep their meetings strictly friendly, however, Noel and
Maribel had several romantic moments together. Noel took these episodes of sexual contact
NOEL B. BACCAY, G.R. No. 173138 casually since Maribel never demanded anything from him except his company. Then,
Petitioner, sometime in November 1998, Maribel informed Noel that she was pregnant with his child.
Present: Upon advice of his mother, Noel grudgingly agreed to marry Maribel. Noel and Maribel were
immediately wed on November 23, 1998before Judge Gregorio Dayrit, the Presiding Judge of
CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City.
BRION, After the marriage ceremony, Noel and Maribel agreed to live with Noels family in
- versus - BERSAMIN, their house at Rosal, Pag-asa, Quezon City. During all the time she lived with Noels family,
VILLARAMA, JR., and Maribel remained aloof and did not go out of her way to endear herself to them. She would
SERENO, JJ. just come and go from the house as she pleased. Maribel never contributed to the familys
Promulgated: coffer leaving Noel to shoulder all expenses for their support. Also, she refused to have any
MARIBEL C. BACCAY and REPUBLIC OF sexual contact with Noel.
THE PHILIPPINES, December 1, 2010 Surprisingly, despite Maribels claim of being pregnant, Noel never observed any
Respondents. symptoms of pregnancy in her. He asked Maribels office mates whether she manifested any
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x signs of pregnancy and they confirmed that she showed no such signs. Then, sometime in
January 1999, Maribel did not go home for a day, and when she came home she announced
DECISION to Noel and his family that she had a miscarriage and was confined at the Chinese
General Hospital where her sister worked as a nurse.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.: Noel confronted her about her alleged miscarriage sometime in February 1999. The
discussion escalated into an intense quarrel which woke up the whole household. Noels
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil mother tried to intervene but Maribel shouted Putang ina nyo, wag kayo makialam at her.
Procedure, as amended, assails the Decision[1] dated August 26, 2005 and Because of this, Noels mother asked them to leave her house. Around 2:30 a.m., Maribel
Resolution[2] dated June 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. called her parents and asked them to pick her up. Maribel left Noels house and did not come
74581. The CA reversed the February 5, 2002 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of back anymore. Noel tried to communicate with Maribel but when he went to see her at her
Manila, Branch 38, which declared the marriage of petitioner Noel B. Baccay (Noel) and house nobody wanted to talk to him and she rejected his phone calls.[6]
Maribel Calderon-Baccay (Maribel) void on the ground of psychological incapacity under On September 11, 2000 or after less than two years of marriage, Noel filed a
Article 36[4] of the Family Code of the Philippines. petition[7] for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of Manila. Despite summons,
The undisputed factual antecedents of the case are as follows: Maribel did not participate in the proceedings. The trial proceeded after the public prosecutor
Noel and Maribel were schoolmates at the Mapua Institute of Technology where manifested that no collusion existed between the parties. Despite a directive from the RTC,
both took up Electronics and Communications Engineering. Sometime in 1990, they were the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) also did not submit a certification manifesting its
introduced by a mutual friend and became close to one another. Noel courted Maribel, but it agreement or opposition to the case.[8]
was only after years of continuous pursuit that Maribel accepted Noels proposal and the two On February 5, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Noel. The dispositive
became sweethearts. Noel considered Maribel as the snobbish and hard-to-get type, which portion of the decision reads:
traits he found attractive.[5] WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of the
Noels family was aware of their relationship for he used to bring Maribel to their parties hereto celebrated on November 23, 1998 at the sala of Judge
house. Noel observed that Maribel was inordinately shy when around his family so to bring Gregorio Dayrit of the Metropolitan Trial Court in Quezon City as NULL and
her closer to them, he always invited Maribel to attend family gatherings and other festive VOID.
occasions like birthdays, Christmas, and fiesta celebrations. Maribel, however, would try to The Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Chief of the
avoid Noels invitations and whenever she attended those occasions with Noels family, he National Statistics Office are hereby directed to record and enter this
observed that Maribel was invariably aloof or snobbish. Not once did she try to get close to decree into the marriage records of the parties in their respective marriage
any of his family members. Noel would talk to Maribel about her attitude towards his family registers.
and she would promise to change, but she never did. The absolute community property of the parties is hereby
Around 1997, Noel decided to break up with Maribel because he was already dissolved and, henceforth, they shall be governed by the property regime
involved with another woman. He tried to break up with Maribel, but Maribel refused and of complete separation of property.
offered to accept Noels relationship with the other woman so long as they would not sever With costs against respondent.
their ties. To give Maribel some time to get over their relationship, they still continued to see SO ORDERED.[9]
each other albeit on a friendly basis.
 The RTC found that Maribel failed to perform the essential marital obligations of
marriage, and such failure was due to a personality disorder called Narcissistic Personality
Disorder characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability as determined by a
clinical psychologist. The RTC cited the findings of Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist
presented as witness by Noel, that Maribel was a very insecure person. She entered into the
marriage not because of emotional desire for marriage but to prove something, and her
attitude was exploitative particularly in terms of financial rewards. She was emotionally
immature, and viewed marriage as a piece of paper and that she can easily get rid of her
husband without any provocation.[10]
On appeal by the OSG, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila Branch 38 declaring as null and void the marriage
between petitioner-appellee and respondent is hereby REVERSED.
Accordingly, the instant Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is
hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[11]
The appellate court held that Noel failed to establish that Maribels supposed
Narcissistic Personality Disorder was the psychological incapacity contemplated by law and
that it was permanent and incurable. Maribels attitudes were merely mild peculiarities in
character or signs of ill-will and refusal or neglect to perform marital obligations which did
not amount to psychological incapacity, said the appellate court. The CA noted that Maribel
may have failed or refused to perform her marital obligations but such did not indicate
incapacity. The CA stressed that the law requires nothing short of mental illness sufficient to
render a person incapable of knowing the essential marital obligations.[12]
The CA further held that Maribels refusal to have sexual intercourse with Noel did
not constitute a ground to find her psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of
the Family Code. As Noel admitted, he had numerous sexual relations with Maribel before
their marriage. Maribel therefore cannot be said to be incapacitated to perform this particular
obligation and that such incapacity existed at the time of marriage.[13]
Incidentally, the CA held that the OSG erred in saying that what Noel should have filed
was an action to annul the marriage under Article 45 (3)[14] of the Family Code. According to
the CA, Article 45 (3) involving consent to marriage vitiated by fraud is limited to the instances
enumerated under Article 46[15] of the Family Code. Maribels misrepresentation that she was
pregnant to induce Noel to marry her was not the fraud contemplated under Article 45 (3) as it
was not among the instances enumerated under Article 46.[16]
On June 13, 2006, the CA denied Noels motion for reconsideration. It held that
Maribels personality disorder is not the psychological incapacity contemplated by law. Her
refusal to perform the essential marital obligations may be attributed merely to her stubborn
refusal to do so. Also, the manifestations of the Narcissistic Personality Disorder had no
connection with Maribels failure to perform her marital obligations. Noel having failed to
prove Maribels alleged psychological incapacity, any doubts should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.[17]
Hence, the present petition raising the following assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE CASE OF CHI MING TSOI vs.
COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT FIND APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT
CASE.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT IS NOT
SUFFERING FROM NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY DISORDER; AND
THAT HER FAILURE TO PERFORM HER ESSENTIAL MARITAL
OBLIGATIONS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY.[18]
The issue to be resolved is whether the marriage between the parties is null and
void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner Noel contends that the CA failed to consider Maribels refusal to procreate
as psychological incapacity. Insofar as he was concerned, the last time he had sexual
intercourse with Maribel was before the marriage when she was drunk. They never had any
sexual intimacy during their marriage. Noel claims that if a spouse senselessly and
constantly refuses to perform his or her marital obligations, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity rather than to stubborn refusal. He insists
that the CA should not have considered the pre-marital sexual encounters between him and
Maribel in finding that the latter was not psychologically incapacitated to procreate through
marital sexual cooperation. He argues that making love for procreation and consummation of
the marriage for the start of family life is different from plain, simple and casual sex. He
further stresses that Maribel railroaded him into marrying her by seducing him and later
claiming that she was pregnant with his child. But after their marriage, Maribel refused to
consummate their marriage as she would not be sexually intimate with him.[19]
Noel further claims that there were other indicia of Maribels psychological incapacity
and that she consistently exhibited several traits typical of a person suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder before and during their marriage. He points out that Maribel would only
mingle with a few individuals and never with Noels family even if they lived under one (1) roof.
Maribel was also arrogant and haughty. She was rude and disrespectful to his mother and was
also interpersonally exploitative as shown by her misrepresentation of pregnancy to force Noel
to marry her. After marriage, Maribel never showed respect and love to Noel and his family.
She displayed indifference to his emotional and sexual needs, but before the marriage she
would display unfounded jealousy when Noel was visited by his friends. This same jealousy
motivated her to deceive him into marrying her.
Lastly, he points out that Maribels psychological incapacity was proven to be
permanent and incurable with the root cause existing before the marriage. The psychologist
testified that persons suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder were unmotivated to
participate in therapy session and would reject any form of psychological help rendering their
condition long lasting if not incurable. Such persons would not admit that their behavioral
manifestations connote pathology or abnormality. The psychologist added that Maribels
psychological incapacity was deeply rooted within her adaptive system since early childhood
and manifested during adult life. Maribel was closely attached to her parents and mingled
with only a few close individuals. Her close attachment to her parents and their over-
protection of her turned her into a self-centered, self-absorbed individual who was insensitive
to the needs of others. She developed the tendency not to accept rejection or failure.[20]
On the other hand, the OSG maintains that Maribels refusal to have sexual intercourse
with Noel did not constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code as her
traits were merely mild peculiarities in her character or signs of ill-will and refusal or neglect to
perform her marital obligations. The psychologist even admitted that Maribel was capable of
entering into marriage except that it would be difficult for her to sustain one. Also, it was
established that Noel and Maribel had sexual relations prior to their marriage. The OSG further
pointed out that the psychologist was vague as to how Maribels refusal to have sexual
intercourse with Noel constituted Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
The petition lacks merit.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The Court held in Santos v. Court of Appeals[21] that the phrase psychological
incapacity is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than
a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as expressed by Article 68[22] of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
In Republic of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals,[23] the Court laid down the guidelines
in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family
Code, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as
legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and
the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to
limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may
be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time
of the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I dos. The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear
and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x.
xxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095. (Emphasis ours.)
In this case, the totality of evidence presented by Noel was not sufficient to sustain a
finding that Maribel was psychologically incapacitated. Noels evidence merely established that
Maribel refused to have sexual intercourse with him after their marriage, and that she left him
after their quarrel when he confronted her about her alleged miscarriage. He failed to prove the
root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity and establish the requirements of gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability. As correctly observed by the CA, the report of the
psychologist, who concluded that Maribel was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder
traceable to her experiences during childhood, did not establish how the personality disorder
incapacitated Maribel from validly assuming the essential obligations of the marriage. Indeed, the
same psychologist even testified that Maribel was capable of entering into a marriage except that
it would be difficult for her to sustain one.[24] Mere difficulty, it must be stressed, is not the
incapacity contemplated by law.
The Court emphasizes that the burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove that
private respondent suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that such psychological
disorder renders her truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.[25] Psychological incapacity must
be more than just a difficulty, a refusal, or a neglect in the performance of some marital
obligations. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. As we stated
in Marcos v. Marcos:[26]
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady
so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. x x x.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 74581 is AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Sometime in 1999, Noel and Maribel had an intense quarrel about Maribel's alleged
miscarriage causing the latter to leave the house and never came back.
Noel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of Manila. RTC
declared the marriage null and void on the ground of Maribel's alleged psychological
incapacity. Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist who presented as Noel's witness, found
Maribel unable to perform the essential marital obligations of marriage due to a Narcissistic
Personality Disorder.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between Noel and Maribel null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
RULING:
No. Noel failed to provide sufficient evidence to sustain a finding that Maribel was
psychologically incapacitated. Noel's evidence merely established that Maribel refused to
have sexual intercourse with him after their marriage, and that she left him after their
quarrel when he confronted her about her alleged miscarriage. The psychologist failed to
establish that Maribel's alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder incapacitated her from
validly assuming the essential obligations of the marriage. The same psychologist even
testified that Maribel was capable of entering into marriage except that it would be difficult
for her to sustain one. Mere difficulty, it must be stressed, is not the incapacity contemplated
under the Article 36 of the Family Code.
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal," or a "neglect" in
the performance of some marital obligations. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and
void marriage.

BACCAY VS BACCAY AND REPUBLIC, G.R. NO. 173138

Posted by kaye lee on 7:04 PM
G.R. No. 173138

Baccay vs Baccay and Republic

FACTS:
Noel and Maribel were sweethearts. He found Maribel's snobbish and hard-to get traits
attractive.

Around 1997, he decided to break up with Maribel because he was already involved with
another woman. They agreed to see each other on a friendly basis but the two had several
romantic episodes.

In November 1998, Maribel informed Noel that she was pregnant with his child. Upon advice
of his mother, Noel grudgingly married Maribel. The two lived on Noel's family. Maribel
remained aloof and didn't contribute to his family's coffer. She refused to have sex with him.
SECOND DIVISION
ALAIN M. DIO , G.R. No. 178044
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
MA. CARIDAD L. DIO, Promulgated:
Respondent. January 19, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 18 October 2006 Decision2 and the 12
March 2007 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 254 (trial court) in
Civil Case No. LP-01-0149.
The Antecedent Facts
Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dio (respondent) were childhood friends and
sweethearts. They started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In
1996, petitioner and respondent decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they
were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Pias City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner
alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and
had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees
and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged
that respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him.
Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the time of the filing
of the petition, was already living in the United States of America. Despite receipt of the
summons, respondent did not file an answer to the petition within the reglementary period.
Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage
with petitioner, which was granted by the Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001.
Petitioner also learned that on 5 October 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel
V. Alcantara.
On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Pias prosecutor found that there were no indicative
facts of collusion between the parties and the case was set for trial on the merits.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report
establishing that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was
deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that
respondents disorder was long-lasting and by nature, incurable.
In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground that
respondent was psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations
at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
The Decision of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was able to establish
respondents psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled that even without
Dr. Tayags psychological report, the allegations in the complaint, substantiated in the
witness stand, clearly made out a case of psychological incapacity against respondent. The
trial court found that respondent committed acts which hurt and embarrassed petitioner and
the rest of the family, and that respondent failed to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity
required of her under Article 68 of the Family Code. The trial court also ruled that respondent
abandoned petitioner when she obtained a divorce abroad and married another man.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIO and
defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIO on January 14, 1998, and all its
effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and
2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon
compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor
General, Office of the City Prosecutor, Las Pias City and the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Las PiasCity, for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the dissolution of the absolute
community of property and the ruling that the decree of annulment shall only be issued upon
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court partially granted the motion and modified its 18
October 2006 Decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIO and defendant MA.
CARIDAD L. DIO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and
VOID from the beginning; and
2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation,
partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family
Code.
Let copies of this Order be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General,
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City and the Local Civil Registrar of
Las Pias City, for their information and guidance.5
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of
the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages6 (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code.
We agree with petitioner.
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage,
regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation
is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family
Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void,8 such as
petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.
Article 147 of the Family Code provides:
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other,
live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage
or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal
shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a
party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property
shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the
property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent
of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the
party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or
their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.9
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the
Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.
We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity
of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section
19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family
Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall
declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be
issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code
as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of
Properties.
The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the Rule are:
Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43
and in Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared
void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.10
 The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the
common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such
matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community of the conjugal
partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be
adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common
children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be
delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual
agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.
The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for the
enforcement of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way
prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of
either or both of the parents; but the value of the properties already received under
the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on
their legitime.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to
marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40
and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to
marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should
be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or bigamous marriage
was contracted. Under Article 40, [t]he absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. Thus we ruled:
x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring a
previous marriage void.11
Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages, meaning,
marriages which are valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in
an action for annulment.12 In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are
governed either by absolute community of property13 or conjugal partnership of
gains14 unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage
settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is
governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a
need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could
be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code
because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of the
Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties
owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes,
the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.16 The rules
on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance
with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code,
[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial
proceedings. x x x. It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same
proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with the MODIFICATION that the
decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial courts
decision without waiting for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.
DIÑO V. DIÑO
G.R. No. 178044, [January 19, 2011]
DOCTRINE:
Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio
under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the
liquidation of the properties of the parties. In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent
was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus,
what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent
are the rules on co-ownership.
FACTS:
Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño(respondent) got married on 14 January
1998 before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag) submitted a psychological report establishing that respondent
was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was incurable and deeply ingrained
in her system since her early formative years.
The trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of
the marriage and declared their marriage void ab initio. It ordered that a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family
Code.
Trial court, upon motion for partial reconsideration of petitioner, modified its decision holding
that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued after liquidation, partition and
distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
 Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that adecree of absolute nullity of marriage on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance
shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code,
under Article 147 of the Family Code. “[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x
HELD: x.” It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding
Yes. The trial court’s decision is affirmed with modification. Decree of absolute nullity of the for declaration of nullity of marriage.
marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial court’s decision without waiting for the
liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code.
RATIO:
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union
of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the
case before the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elementsmust be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the
Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.
The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued
only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of
the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to
cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule
provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare
therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the
court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under
the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to
marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40
and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to
marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should
be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute
community of property or conjugalpartnership of gains unless the parties agree to a
complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage.
Since the property relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of property
or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the
properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case
for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is
governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the
Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties
owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes,
the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period
of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules
 FIRST DIVISION
On September 28, 2006, petitioner opposed private respondents Motion, claiming
that the incident on the declaration of nullity of marriage cannot be resolved without the
presentation of evidence for the incidents on custody, support, and property
ERIC U. YU, G.R. No. 189207 relations.[6] Petitioner, therefore, averred that the incident on nullity of marriage, on the one
hand, and the incidents on custody, support, and property relations, on the other, should
Petitioner, Present: both proceed and be simultaneously resolved.

VELASCO, JR., J., On March 21, 2007, RTC-Branch 163 issued an Order in favor of petitioners
- versus - Acting Chairperson,* opposition. Particularly, it stated that:
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,** The Court agrees with the contention of the Petitioner that it
HONORABLE JUDGE AGNES REYES-CARPIO, in DEL CASTILLO, would be more in accord with the rules if the Parties were first allowed to
her official capacity as Presiding Judge, PEREZ, JJ. present their evidence relative to the issues of property relations, custody
Regional Trial Court of Pasig-Branch 261; and and support to enable the Court to issue a comprehensive decision
CAROLINE T. YU, thereon.[7]
Respondents. Promulgated:
June 15, 2011
Subsequently, private respondent was able to successfully cause the inhibition of
Judge Cruz Suarez of the RTC-Branch 163. Consequently, the case was re-raffled to another
DECISION branch of the Pasig RTC, particularly Branch 261, presided by Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio.[8]

VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to annul and set aside the
March 31, 2009 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 106878. The CA
Decision affirmed the Orders dated August 4, 2008[2] and October 24, 2008[3] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 261 in Pasig City.
The Facts
The instant petition stemmed from a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
filed by petitioner Eric U. Yu against private respondent Caroline T. Yu with the RTC
in Pasig City. The case was initially raffled to Branch 163.
Thereafter, while the case was being heard by the RTC-Branch 261, private
respondent filed an Omnibus Motion on May 21, 2008. The Omnibus Motion sought (1) the
strict observation by the RTC-Branch 261 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages, as codified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, in the subject proceedings; and (2)
that the incident on the declaration of nullity of marriage be already submitted for
resolution.[9] Conversely, private respondent prayed that the incident on the declaration of
nullity of marriage be resolved ahead of the incidents on custody, support, and property
relations, and not simultaneously.
Quite expectedly, petitioner opposed the Omnibus Motion, arguing that the issues
that were the subject of the Omnibus Motion had already been resolved in the March 21,
2007 Order. Concurrently, petitioner prayed that the incidents on nullity, custody, support,
and property relations of the spouses be resolved simultaneously.[10]
In its Order dated August 4, 2008, the RTC-Branch 261 granted the Omnibus
Motion. Judge Reyes-Carpio explained that:

On May 30, 2006, Judge Leili Cruz Suarez of the RTC-Branch 163 issued an Order, At the outset, the parties are reminded that the main cause of
stating that petitioners Partial Offer of Evidence dated April 18, 2006 would already be action in this case is the declaration of nullity of marriage of the parties and
submitted for resolution after certain exhibits of petitioner have been remarked. But the the issues relating to property relations, custody and support are merely
exhibits were only relative to the issue of the nullity of marriage of the parties.[4] ancillary incidents thereto.

On September 12, 2006, private respondent moved to submit the incident on the xxxx
declaration of nullity of marriage for resolution of the court, considering that the incidents on
custody, support, and property relations were mere consequences of the declaration of Consistent, therefore, with Section 19 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
nullity of the parties marriage.[5] the Court finds it more prudent to rule first on the petitioners petition and
 respondents counter-petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of each others psychological incapacity to perform their respective
marital obligations. If the Court eventually finds that the parties respective
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage is indeed meritorious on the
basis of either or both of the parties psychological incapacity, then the
parties shall proceed to comply with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code
before a final decree of absolute nullity of marriage can be issued. Pending
such ruling on the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage, the Court
finds no legal ground, at this stage, to proceed with the reception of
evidence in regard the issues on custody and property relations, since
these are mere incidents of the nullity of the parties marriage.[11]
On August, 28, 2008, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the August 4,
2008 Order. On October 24, 2008, Judge Reyes-Carpio issued an Order denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration. In denying the motion, Judge Reyes-Carpio reasoned:
x x x [I]t is very clear that what petitioner seeks to reconsider in
the Courts Order dated August 4, 2008 is the procedure regarding the
reception of evidence on the issues of property relations, custody and
support. He opposes the fact that the main issue on declaration of nullity is
submitted for decision when he has not yet presented evidence on the
issues on property relations, custody and support.
Considering that what he seeks to set aside is the procedural
aspect of the instanct case, i.e. the reception of evidence which is a matter
of procedure, there is no question that it is A.M. 02-11-[10]-SC which
should be followed and not the procedures provided in Articles 50 and 51 of
the Family Code. While it is true that the Family Code is a substantive law
and rule of procedure cannot alter a substantive law, the provisions laid in
Articles 50 and 51 relative to the liquidation and dissolution of properties
are by nature procedural, thus there are no substantive rights which may
be prejudiced or any vested rights that may be impaired.
In fact, the Supreme Court in a number of cases has even held
that there are some provisions of the Family Code which are procedural in
nature, such as Article[s] 185 and 50 of the Family Code which may be
given retroactive effect to pending suits. Adopting such rationale in the
instant case, if the Court is to adopt the procedures laid down in A.M. No.
02-11-[10]-SC, no vested or substantive right will be impaired on the part
of the petitioner or the respondent. Even Section 17 of A.M. No. 02-11-
[10]-SC allows the reception of evidence to a commissioner in matters
involving property relations of the spouses.
xxxx
Lastly, it is the policy of the courts to give effect to both
procedural and substantive laws, as complementing each other, in the just
and speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties. Moreover, as
previously stated, the Court finds it more prudent to rule first on the
petitioners petition and respondents counter-petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of each others psychological incapacity to
perform their respective marital obligations. If the Court eventually
finds that the parties respective petitions for declaration of nullity
of marriage is indeed meritorious on the basis of either or both of
the parties psychological incapacity, then the parties shall proceed
to comply with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code before a
final decree of absolute nullity of marriage can be issued.[12]
The Ruling of the Appellate Court
On January 8, 2009, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the
CA, assailing both the RTC Orders dated August 4, 2008 and October 24, 2008. The petition
impleaded Judge Reyes-Carpio as respondent and alleged that the latter committed grave
abuse of discretion in the issuance of the assailed orders.
On March 31, 2009, the CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court and dismissed
the petition. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
All told, absent any arbitrary or despotic exercise of judicial power
as to amount to abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge in
issuing the assailed Orders, the instant petition for certiorari cannot
prosper.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[13]
The Issues
This appeal is, hence, before Us, with petitioner maintaining that the CA committed
grave abuse of discretion in upholding the assailed orders issued by the trial court and
dismissing the Petition for Certiorari. Particularly, petitioner brings forth the following issues:
A. Whether or not the [CA] committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in holding that a petition for certiorari
is not a proper remedy of the Petitioner
B. Whether or not the [CA] committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack [or excess] of jurisdiction in upholding the
Respondent Judge in submitting the main issue of nullity of marriage
for resolution ahead of the reception of evidence on custody, support,
and property relations
 C. Whether or not the reception of evidence on custody, support and
property relations is necessary for a complete and comprehensive
adjudication of the parties respective claims and [defenses].[14]
The Courts Ruling
We find the petition without merit.
A Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy in assailing that a judge
has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Section
1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court clearly sets forth when a petition for certiorari can be used
as a proper remedy:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. (Emphasis Ours.)
The term grave abuse of discretion has a specific meaning. An act of a court or
tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in
a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[15] The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion and hostility.[16] Furthermore, the use of a petition for certiorari is
restricted only to truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-
judicial body is wholly void.[17] From the foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for having been done with
grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show that such act was patent
and gross.[18]But this is not the case here.
Nowhere in the petition was it shown that the acts being alleged to have been
exercised with grave abuse of discretion(1) the Orders of the RTC deferring the presentation
of evidence on custody, support, and property relations; and (2) the appellate courts
Decision of upholding the Orderswere patent and gross that would warrant striking down
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
At the very least, petitioner should prove and demonstrate that the RTC Orders and
the CA Decision were done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment.[19] This,
however, has not been shown in the petition.
It appears in the records that the Orders in question, or what are alleged to have
been exercised with grave abuse of discretion, are interlocutory orders. An interlocutory
order is one which does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Courts task of
adjudicating the parties contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards
each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court.[20] To
be clear, certiorari under Rule 65 is appropriate to strike down an interlocutory order only
when the following requisites concur:
(1) when the tribunal issued such order without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion; and
(2) when the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the
remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief.[21]
In this case, as We have discussed earlier, petitioner failed to prove that the
assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion and that those were patently
erroneous. Considering that the requisites that would justify certiorari as an appropriate
remedy to assail an interlocutory order have not been complied with, the proper recourse for
petitioner should have been an appeal in due course of the judgment of the trial court on the
merits, incorporating the grounds for assailing the interlocutory orders.[22] The appellate
court, thus, correctly cited Triplex Enterprises, Inc. v. PNB-Republic Bank and Solid Builders,
Inc., penned by Chief Justice Renato Corona, which held:
Certiorari as a special civil action is proper when any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion,
and there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy at
law. The writ may be issued only where it is convincingly proved
that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, or an act
too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a duty, or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation
of law, or that the trial court exercised its power in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.
While certiorari may be maintained as an appropriate
remedy to assail an interlocutory order in cases where the tribunal
has issued an order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion, it does not lie to correct every
controversial interlocutory ruling. In this connection, we quote with
approval the pronouncement of the appellate court:
In this jurisdiction, there is an erroneous impression that
interlocutory [orders] of trial courts on debatable legal points may
be assailed by certiorari. To correct that impression and to avoid
clogging the appellate court with future certiorari petitions it
should be underscored that the office of the writ of certiorari has
been reduced to the correction of defects of jurisdiction solely and
cannot legally be used for any other purpose.

The writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases
wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void.
Moreover, it is designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors in
judgment. The rationale of this rule is that, when a court exercises its
jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. Otherwise, every
mistake made by a court will deprive it of its jurisdiction and every
erroneous judgment will be a void judgment.
When the court has jurisdiction over the case and person of the
defendant, any mistake in the application of the law and the appreciation of
evidence committed by a court may be corrected only by appeal. The
determination made by the trial court regarding the admissibility of
evidence is but an exercise of its jurisdiction and whatever fault it may
have perpetrated in making such a determination is an error in judgment,
not of jurisdiction. Hence, settled is the rule that rulings of the trial court on
procedural questions and on admissibility of evidence during the course of a
trial are interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of a separate
appeal or review on certiorari. They must be assigned as errors and
reviewed in the appeal properly taken from the decision rendered by the
trial court on the merits of the case.
Here, petitioner assails the order of the trial court disallowing the
admission in evidence of the testimony of Roque on the opinion of the
OGCC. By that fact alone, no grave abuse of discretion could be imputed to
the trial court. Furthermore, the said order was not an error of jurisdiction.
Even assuming that it was erroneous, the mistake was an error in
judgment not correctable by the writ of certiorari.[23]
Be that as it may, even dwelling on the merits of the case just as the CA has
already done and clearly explicated, We still find no reason to grant the petition.
It must be noted that Judge Reyes-Carpio did not disallow the presentation of
evidence on the incidents on custody, support, and property relations. It is clear in the
assailed orders that the trial court judge merely deferred the reception of evidence relating
to custody, support, and property relations, to wit:
August 4, 2008 Order
Consistent, therefore, with Section 19 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
the Court finds it more prudent to rule first on the petitioners petition and
respondents counter-petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of each others psychological incapacity to perform their respective
marital obligations. If the Court eventually finds that the parties
respective petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage is indeed
meritorious on the basis of either or both of the parties
psychological incapacity, then the parties shall proceed to comply
with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code before a final decree of
absolute nullity of marriage can be issued. Pending such ruling on
the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage, the Court finds no
legal ground, at this stage, to proceed with the reception of
evidence in regard the issues on custody and property relations,
since these are mere incidents of the nullity of the parties
marriage.[24]
October 24, 2008 Order
Lastly, it is the policy of the courts to give effect to both
procedural and substantive laws, as complementing each other, in the just
and speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties. Moreover, as
previously stated, the Court finds it more prudent to rule first on the
petitioners petition and respondents counter-petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of each others psychological incapacity to
perform their respective marital obligations. If the Court eventually
finds that the parties respective petitions for declaration of nullity
of marriage is indeed meritorious on the basis of either or both of
the parties psychological incapacity, then the parties shall proceed
to comply with Article (sic) 50 and 51 of the Family Code before a
final decree of absolute nullity of marriage can be issued.[25]
And the trial judges decision was not without basis. Judge Reyes-Carpio finds
support in the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Particularly, Secs.
19 and 21 of the Rule clearly allow the reception of evidence on custody, support, and
property relations after the trial court renders a decision granting the petition, or upon entry
of judgment granting the petition:
Section 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the
petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree
of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the
Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
xxxx
Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of
common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes. - Upon entry
of the judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal, upon
receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate court granting the petition,
the Family Court, on motion of either party, shall proceed with the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, including custody, support of common children and
delivery of their presumptive legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and
 51 of the Family Code unless such matters had been adjudicated in abuse of discretion in upholding the Orders of Judge Reyes-Carpio and in ultimately finding
previous judicial proceedings. an absence of grave abuse of discretion on her part.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.

Evidently, Judge Reyes-Carpio did not deny the reception of evidence on custody, 106878 finding that Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio did not commit grave abuse of discretion
support, and property relations but merely deferred it, based on the existing rules issued by amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is AFFIRMED.
this Court, to a time when a decision granting the petition is already at hand and before a
final decree is issued. Conversely, the trial court, or more particularly the family court, shall SO ORDERED.
proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children,
and delivery of their presumptive legitimes upon entry of judgment granting the
petition. And following the pertinent provisions of the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, this act is undoubtedly consistent with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code,
contrary to what petitioner asserts. Particularly, Arts. 50 and 51 of the Family Code state:
YU V. JUDGE REYES-CARPIO AND YU
G.R. No. 189207, [June 15, 2011]
Article 50. x x x
DOCTRINE:
It is more proper to rule first on the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of each
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the
party’s psychological incapacity to perform their respective marital obligations. If the Court
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
eventually finds that the parties’ respective petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage is
spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the
indeed meritorious on the basis of either or both of the parties’ psychological incapacity, then
delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
the parties shall proceedto comply with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code before a final
adjudicated in the previous judicial proceedings.
decree of absolute nullity of marriage can be issued. Pending such ruling on the declaration
xxxx
of nullity of the parties’ marriage, the Court finds no legal ground, at this stage,
to proceed with the reception of evidence in regard the issues on custody and property
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes
relations, since these are mere incidents of the nullity of the parties’ marriage.
of all common children, computed as of the date of the final judgment
FACTS:
of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities,
Eric Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Caroline T. Yu with the
unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already
RTC of Pasig. Judge Suarez on May 30, 2006 issued an order stating that Eric’s partial offer
provided for such matters. (Emphasis Ours.)
of evidence dated April 18, 2006 would be submitted for resolution after certain exhibits
have been remarked. But the exhibits were only relative to the issue of the nullity of the
marriage of Eric and Caroline. On September 12, 2006, Caroline moved to submit the case
Finally, petitioner asserts that the deferment of the reception of evidence on
for resolution, considering that the incidents on custody, support, and property relations
custody, support, and property relations would amount to an ambiguous and fragmentary
(incidental issues) were mere consequences of the declaration of nullity of the parties’
judgment on the main issue.[26] This argument does not hold water. The Court En
marriage.
Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly allows the deferment of the reception of
Eric opposed this motion saying that the incident on declaration of nullity cannot be resolved
evidence on custody, support, and property relations. Conversely, the trial court may receive
without presentation of evidence for the incidents on custody, support, and property
evidence on the subject incidents after a judgment granting the petition but before the
relations. Eric added that the incidental issues and the issue on declaration of nullity
decree of nullity or annulment of marriage is issued. And this is what Judge Reyes-Carpio
can both proceed and be simultaneously resolved. RTC ruled in favour of Eric’s opposition.
sought to comply with in issuing the assailed orders. As correctly pointed out by the CA,
Caroline caused the inhibition of Judge Suarez, so that the case was re-raffled to
petitioners assertion that ruling the main issue without receiving evidence on the subject
another branch presided by Judge Reyes-Carpio. While the case was being tried by Judge
incidents would result in an ambiguous and fragmentary judgment is certainly speculative
Reyes-Carpio, Carolinefiled an Omnibus Motion seeking the strict observation by the said
and, hence, contravenes the legal presumption that a trial judge can fairly weigh and
judge of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage as codified in A.M. No.
appraise the evidence submitted by the parties.[27]
02-11-10-SC, and that the case on the declaration on nullity be already submitted for
resolution ahead of the incidental issues, and not simultaneously. Eric opposed this motion.
Therefore, it cannot be said at all that Judge Reyes-Carpio acted in a capricious and
Judge Reyes-Carpio granted the Omnibus Motion, saying that the main cause of action is the
whimsical manner, much less in a way that is patently gross and erroneous, when she issued
declaration of nullity of the marriage and the incidental issues are merely ancillary incidents
the assailed orders deferring the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property
thereto. Eric moved for reconsideration, which was denied by Judge Reyes-Carpio. Eric then
relations. To reiterate, this decision is left to the trial courts wisdom and legal
filed for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65. CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
soundness. Consequently, therefore, the CA cannot likewise be said to have committed grave
ISSUES/HELD: children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
Whether the main issue of nullity of marriage must be submitted for resolution first before adjudicated in the previous judicial proceedings.
the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations (incidental issues) – Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children,
NO. computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash,
RATIO: property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved,
It appears in the records that the Orders in question, or what are alleged to have been had already provided for such matters.
exercised with grave abuse of discretion, are interlocutory orders. An interlocutory order is Also, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly allows the deferment of the reception of evidence on
one which “does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court’s task of custody, support, and property relations. Conversely, the trial court may receive evidence on
adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards the subject incidents after a judgment granting the petition but before the decree of nullity
each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court. Eric Yu or annulment of marriage is issued. And this is what Judge Reyes-Carpio sought
to prove that the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion and that those to comply with in issuing the assailed orders. As correctly pointed out by the CA, Eric Yu’s
were patently erroneous. Considering that the requisites that would justify certiorari as an assertion that ruling the main issue without receiving evidence on the subject incidents
appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order have not been complied with, the proper would result in an ambiguous and fragmentary judgment is certainly speculative and, hence,
recourse for petitioner should have been an appeal in due course of the judgment of the trial contravenes the legal presumption that a trial judge can fairly weigh and appraise the
court on the merits, incorporating the grounds for assailing the interlocutory orders. evidence submitted by the parties.
It must be noted that Judge Reyes-Carpio did not disallow the presentation of evidence on Therefore, it cannot be said at all that Judge Reyes-Carpio acted in a capricious and
the incidents on custody, support, and property relations. It is clear in the assailed orders whimsical manner, much less in a way that is patently gross and erroneous, when she issued
that the trial court judge merely deferred the reception of evidence relating to custody, the assailed orders deferring the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property
support, and property relations. And the trial judge’s decision was not without basis. Judge relations. To reiterate, this decision is left to the trial court’s wisdom and legal soundness.
Reyes-Carpio finds support in the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Consequently, therefore, the CA cannot likewise be said to have committed grave abuse of
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable discretion in upholding the Orders of Judge Reyes-Carpio and in ultimately finding an
Marriages. Particularly, Secs. 19 and 21 of the Rule clearly allow the reception of evidence on absence of grave abuse of discretion on her part.
custody, support, and property relations after the trial court renders a decision granting the
petition, or upon entry of judgment granting the petition:
Section 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall
declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by
the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented
under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children and
delivery of their presumptive legitimes. – Upon entry of the judgment granting the petition,
or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate court granting
the petition, the Family Court, on motion of either party, shall proceed with the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, including custody, support of
common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and 51
of the Family Code unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings.
Evidently, Judge Reyes-Carpio did not deny the reception of evidence on custody, support,
and property relations but merely deferred it, based on the existing rules issued by this
Court, to a time when a decision granting the petition is already at hand and before a final
decree is issued. Conversely, the trial court, or more particularly the family court,
shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common
children, and delivery of their presumptive legitimes upon entry of judgment granting the
petition. And following the pertinent provisions of the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, this act is undoubtedly consistent with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code,
contrary to what petitioner asserts. Particularly, Arts. 50 and 51 of the Family Code state:
Article 50. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
SECOND DIVISION injunction against petitioners and the deputy sheriff. Respondent, as plaintiff therein, alleged
that the defendants, now petitioners, connived and directly levied upon and execute his real
property without exhausting the personal properties of Erlinda Nicol. Respondent averred
G.R. No. 145222 April 24, 2009
that there was no proper publication and posting of the notice of sale. Furthermore,
SPOUSES ROBERTO BUADO and VENUS BUADO, Petitioners,
respondent claimed that his property which was valued at ₱500,000.00 was only sold at a
vs.
"very low price" of ₱51,685.00, whereas the judgment obligation of Erlinda Nicol was only
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Division, and ROMULO
₱40,000.00. The case was assigned to Branch 21 of the RTC of Imus, Cavite.
NICOL, Respondents.
In response, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and
DECISION
that they had acted on the basis of a valid writ of execution. Citing De Leon v.
TINGA, J.:
Salvador,4 petitioners claimed that respondent should have filed the case with Branch
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in
19 where the judgment originated and which issued the order of execution, writ of
CA-G.R. CV No. 47029 and its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
execution, notice of levy and notice of sheriff’s sale.
The case stemmed from the following factual backdrop:
In an Order5 dated 18 April 1994, the RTC dismissed respondent’s complaint and ruled
On 30 April 1984, Spouses Roberto and Venus Buado (petitioners) filed a complaint for
that Branch 19 has jurisdiction over the case, thus:
damages against Erlinda Nicol (Erlinda) with Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
As correctly pointed out by the defendants, any flaw in the implementation of the writ of
Bacoor, Cavite, docketed as Civil Case No. 84-33. Said action originated from Erlinda Nicol’s
execution by the implementing sheriff must be brought before the court issuing the writ of
civil liability arising from the criminal offense of slander filed against her by petitioners.
execution. Besides, there are two (2) remedies open to the plaintiff, if he feels that the
On 6 April 1987, the trial court rendered a decision ordering Erlinda to pay damages. The
property being levied on belongs to him and not to the judgment debtor. The first remedy is
dispositive portion reads:
to file a third-party claim. If he fails to do this, a right is reserved to him to vindicate his
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff[s] and against defendant
claim over the property by any proper action. But certainly, this is not the proper action
ordering the latter to pay the former the amount of thirty thousand (₱30,000.00) pesos as
reserved to the plaintiff to vindicate his claim over the property in question to be ventilated
moral damages, five thousand (₱5,000.00) pesos as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses,
before this court. As earlier stated, this case should have been addressed to Branch 19, RTC
another five thousand (₱5,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages and the cost of suit.2
Bacoor as it was that court which issued the writ of execution.6
Said decision was affirmed, successively, by the Court of Appeals and this Court. It became
Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied on 26 July 1994.
final and executory on 5 March 1992.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that Branch 21 has
On 14 October 1992, the trial court issued a writ of execution, a portion of which provides:
jurisdiction to act on the complaint filed by appellant. The dispositive portion reads:
Now, therefore, you are commanded that of the goods and chattels of the defendant Erlinda
WHEREFORE, the Orders appealed from are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. This case is
Nicol, or from her estates or legal heirs, you cause the sum in the amount of forty thousand
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 21 for further proceedings.
pesos (₱40,000.00), Philippine Currency, representing the moral damages, attorney’s fees
SO ORDERED.7
and litigation expenses and exemplary damages and the cost of suit of the plaintiff aside
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied on 23 August 2000. Hence, the instant
from your lawful fees on this execution and do likewise return this writ into court within sixty
petition attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals.
(60) days from date, with your proceedings endorsed hereon.
A petition for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy that is adopted to correct errors of
But if sufficient personal property cannot be found whereof to satisfy this execution and
jurisdiction committed by the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, or when there is grave
lawful fees thereon, then you are commanded that of the lands and buildings of said
abuse of discretion on the part of such court or agency amounting to lack or excess of
defendant you make the said sum of money in the manner required by the Rules of Court,
jurisdiction. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of law or fact which is a mistake of
and make return of your proceedings with this writ within sixty (60) days from date.3
judgment, the proper remedy should be appeal. In addition, an independent action for
Finding Erlinda Nicol’s personal properties insufficient to satisfy the judgment, the Deputy
certiorari may be availed of only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
Sheriff issued a notice of levy on real property on execution addressed to the Register of
remedy in the ordinary course of law.8
Deeds of Cavite. The notice of levy was annotated on the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
Nowhere in the petition was it shown that the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals was
125322.
questioned. The issue devolves on whether the husband of the judgment debtor may file an
On 20 November 1992, a notice of sheriff’s sale was issued.
independent action to protect the conjugal property subject to execution. The alleged error
Two (2) days before the public auction sale on 28 January 1993, an affidavit of third-party
therefore is an error of judgment which is a proper subject of an appeal.
claim from one Arnulfo F. Fulo was received by the deputy sheriff prompting petitioners to
Nevertheless, even if we were to treat this petition as one for review, the case should still be
put up a sheriff’s indemnity bond. The auction sale proceeded with petitioners as the highest
dismissed on substantive grounds.
bidder.
Petitioners maintain that Branch 19 retained jurisdiction over its judgment to the exclusion
On 4 February 1993, a certificate of sale was issued in favor of petitioners.
of all other co-ordinate courts for its execution and all incidents thereof, in line with De Leon
Almost a year later on 2 February 1994, Romulo Nicol (respondent), the husband of Erlinda
v. Salvador. Petitioners insist that respondent, who is the husband of the judgment debtor, is
Nicol, filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary
not the "third party" contemplated in Section 17 (now Section 16), Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, hence a separate action need not be filed. Furthermore, petitioners assert that the
obligation of the wife redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership and cited
authorities to the effect that the husband is liable for the tort committed by his wife.
Respondent on the other hand merely avers that the decision of the Court of Appeals is
supported by substantial evidence and in accord with law and jurisprudence.9
Verily, the question of jurisdiction could be resolved through a proper interpretation of
Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 16. Proceedings where property claimed by third person.
If the property levied on is claimed by any person other than the judgment obligor or his
agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession
thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves the same upon the officer
making the levy and a copy thereof upon the judgment obligee, the officer shall not be
bound to keep the property, unless such judgment obligee, on demand of the officer, files a
bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the
value of the property levied on. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be
determined by the court issuing the writ of execution. No claim for damages for the taking or
keeping of the property may be enforced against the bond unless the action therefor is filed
within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond.
The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the property, to any
third-party claimant if such bond is filed. Nothing herein contained shall prevent such
claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the property in a separate action,
or prevent the judgment obligee from claiming damages in the same or a separate action
against a third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim.
When the writ of execution is issued in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, or any officer
duly representing it, the filing of such bond shall not be required, and in case the sheriff or
levying officer is sued for damages as a result of the levy, he shall be represented by the
Solicitor General and if held liable therefor, the actual damages adjudged by the court shall
be paid by the National Treasurer out of such funds as may be appropriated for the purpose.
(Emphasis Supplied)
Apart from the remedy of terceria available to a third-party claimant or to a stranger to the
foreclosure suit against the sheriff or officer effecting the writ by serving on him an affidavit
of his title and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor, a third-party claimant may also
resort to an independent separate action, the object of which is the recovery of ownership or
possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages arising from wrongful
seizure and detention of the property. If a separate action is the recourse, the third-party
claimant must institute in a forum of competent jurisdiction an action, distinct and separate
from the action in which the judgment is being enforced, even before or without need of
filing a claim in the court that issued the writ.101awphi1.zw+
A third-party claim must be filed a person other than the judgment debtor or his agent. In
other words, only a stranger to the case may file a third-party claim.
This leads us to the question: Is the husband, who was not a party to the suit but whose
conjugal property is being executed on account of the other spouse being the judgment
obligor, considered a "stranger?"
In determining whether the husband is a stranger to the suit, the character of the property
must be taken into account. In Mariano v. Court of Appeals,11 which was later adopted in
Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals,12 this Court held that the husband of the judgment
debtor cannot be deemed a "stranger" to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his wife
for an obligation that has redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. 13 On the
other hand, in Naguit v. Court of Appeals14 and Sy v. Discaya,15 the Court stated that a
spouse is deemed a stranger to the action wherein the writ of execution was issued and is
therefore justified in bringing an independent action to vindicate her right of ownership over
his exclusive or paraphernal property.lawphil.net
Pursuant to Mariano however, it must further be settled whether the obligation of the
judgment debtor redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership or not.
Petitioners argue that the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is
chargeable to the conjugal partnership. We do not agree.
There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122 of the Family
Code16 explicitly provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the
wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except
insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by
reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the
absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage
is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of
gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse.
Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil obligation
arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.
To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by
one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal
partnership.17
In Guadalupe v. Tronco,18 this Court held that the car which was claimed by the third party
complainant to be conjugal property was being levied upon to enforce "a judgment for
support" filed by a third person, the third-party claim of the wife is proper since the
obligation which is personal to the husband is chargeable not on the conjugal property but on
his separate property.
Hence, the filing of a separate action by respondent is proper and jurisdiction is thus vested
on Branch 21. Petitioners failed to show that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse
of discretion in remanding the case to Branch 21 for further proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO and VENUS BUADO vs COURT OF APPEALS and ROMULO NICOL
FACTS:
- Mr. and Mrs. Buado filed a civil case against Erlinda Nicol.- On April 1987, the trial court
rendered a decision ordering Erlinda to pay damages to the petitioners.-
The personal properties of Erlinda were insufficient to pay the damages.-
The sheriff levied and auctioned the property of Erlinda.- An auction sale was held with the
petitioners as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued in favor of Mr.and Mrs.
Buado.- After almost one year, the husband of Erlinda, Romulo Nicol, filed a complaint for
the annulment of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunction against
petitioners and deputy sheriff.- He argued that there was no proper publication and
posting for the auction sale. He also claimed that the judgmentobligation of Erlinda Nicol
amounted to P40,000 only. The spouses Buado obtained the P500,000 worth of propertyfor
only P51,685.- The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition of Romulo Nicol.- The Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and held that Branch 21 has jurisdiction to act
on thecomplaint filed by the respondent in this case.- The petitioners filed a petition
where they said that the Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion
for reversing the decision given by the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the obligation of Erlinda Nicol arising from her criminal liability is chargeable
to the conjugal partnership.
HELD:
NO. Erlinda Nicol‟s liability is not
chargeable to the conjugal partnership.Unlike in the system of absolute community where
liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or
quasi-delict
is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the
exclusive property of thedebtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of
conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugalpartnership of gains has no duty to make advance
payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse.Petitioners argue that the obligation of the
wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.The Supreme
Court does not agree to the contention of Mr. and Mrs. Buado.In Guadalupe v. Tronco, this
Court held that the car which was claimed by the third party complainant to be
conjugalproperty was being levied upon to enforce "a judgment for support" filed by a third
person, the third-party claim of the wifeis proper since the obligation which is personal to the
husband is chargeable not on the conjugal property but on hisseparate property. Hence, the
filing of a separate action by Romulo Nicol was proper.The decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed