7. Aniceto Mateo, et.al. vs. Court of Appeals, et.al.

GR No. 113219, August 14, 1995

FACTS:

Upon complaint of some Morong Water District (MOWAD) employees, petitioners, all Board
Members of MOWAD, conducted an investigation on private respondent Edgar Sta. Maria, then
General Manager. On December 13, 1992, private respondent was placed under preventive
suspension and Maximo San Diego was designated in his place as Acting General Manager. He
was later dismissed on January 7, 1993. On January 18, 1993, private respondent filed a Special
Civil Action for Quo Warranto and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction before the Regional
Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 78, challenging his dismissal by petitioners.

Petitioners, in turn, moved to dismiss the case on two (2) grounds: (1) the court had no
jurisdiction over disciplinary actions of government employees which is vested exclusively in the
Civil Service Commission; and (2) quo warranto was not the proper remedy. Respondent Judge
Arturo Marave denied the Motion to Dismiss on April 26, 1993, and the Motion for
Reconsideration on June 9, 1993.

Petitioners then elevated the matter to this Court through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
which was referred to respondent Court of Appeals for adjudication. In its Decision, dated
November 24, 1993, respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit, and in
its Resolution, dated January 11, 1994, denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC of Rizal has jurisdiction over the dismissal of an employee of a quasi-
public corporation.

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court held that the RTC of Rizal has no jurisdiction over cases involving
dismissal of an employee of a quasi-public corporation.

There is no question that MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to Presidential

Decree (P.D.) No. 198, known as the provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973, as amended. In
Davao City Water District vs. Civil Service Commissions, the Court en banc ruled that
employees of government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter fall under the
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. In another case (Hagonoy Water District v.
NLRC), it also ruled once again that local water districts are quasi-public corporations whose
employees belong to the Civil Service. Indeed, the established rule is that the hiring and firing of
employees of goverment-owned and controlled corporations are governed by the provisions of
the Civil Service Law and Rules and Regulations.
8. Revised Administrative Circular No. I-95, May 16, 1995
TO: COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL,
THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, ALL MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT
PROSECUTION SERVICE, AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES.

SUBJECT: Rules Governing appeals to the Court of Appeals from Judgment or Final Orders
of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies.

1. SCOPE. — These rules shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court
of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any
quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the
Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Office of the President,
Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National
Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications
Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act 6657, Government Service
Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board,
Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, and
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission.

2. CASES NOT COVERED. — These rules shall not apply to judgments or final orders
issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines.

3. WHERE TO APPEAL. — An appeal under these rules may be taken to the Court of
Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves
questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.

4. PERIOD OF APPEAL. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice
of the award, judgment, final order or resolution or from the date of its last publication, if
publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new
trial or reconsideration filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo.
Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment
of the full a mount of the docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court
of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the
petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason
and in no case to exceed another period of fifteen (15) days.

5. HOW APPEAL TAKEN. — Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review
in seven (7) legible copies with the Court of Appeals, with proof of service of a copy thereof on
the adverse party and on the court or agency a quo. The original copy of the petition intended for
the Court of Appeals shall be indicated as such by the petitioner.

Upon filing the petition for review, the petitioner shall pay to the Clerk of Court of the Court of
Appeals the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit the sum of P500.00 for costs.
Exemption from payment of docketing and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs may be
granted by the Court of Appeals upon verified motion setting forth the grounds relied upon. If
the Court of Appeals denies the motion, the petitioner shall pay the docketing and other lawful
fees and deposit for costs within fifteen (15) days from notice of the denial.

6. CONTENTS OF THE PETITION. — The petition for review shall (a) state the full
names of the parties to the case, without impleading the courts or agencies either as petitioners or
respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds
relied upon for the review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified
true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified
true copies of such material portions of the record as are referred to therein and other supporting
papers; and (d) state all the specific material dates showing that it was filed within the
reglementary period provided herein; and (e) contain a sworn certification against forum
shopping as required in Revised Circular No. 28-91.

7. EFFECT OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH REQUIREMENTS. — The failure of the

petitioner to comply with the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and
other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and
the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient grounds for the dismissal
thereof.

8. ACTION ON THE PETITION. — The Court of Appeals may require the respondent to
file a comment on the petition, not a motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. The
Court, however, may dismiss the petition if it finds the same to be patently without merit,
prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to
require consideration.

9. CONTENTS OF COMMENT. — The comment shall be filed within ten (10) days from
notice in seven (7) legible copies and accompanied by clearly legible certified true copies of such
material portions of the record referred to therein together with other supporting papers. It shall
point out insufficiencies or inaccuracies in petitioner's statement of facts and issues, and state the
reasons why the petition should be denied or dismissed. A copy thereof shall be served on the
petitioner, and proof of such service shall be filed with the Court of Appeals.

10. DUE COURSE. — If upon the filing of the comment or such other pleadings or
documents as may be required or allowed by the Court of Appeals or upon the expiration of
period for the filing thereof, and on the bases of the petition or the record the Court of Appeals
finds prima facie that the court or agencies concerned has committed errors of fact or law that
would warrant reversal or modification of the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought
to be reviewed, it may give due course to the petition; otherwise, it shall dismiss the same. The
findings of fact of the court or agency concerned, when supported by substantial evidence, shall
be binding on the Court of Appeals.

11. TRANSMITTAL OF RECORD. — Within fifteen (15) days from notice that the petition
has been given due course, the Court of Appeals may re-quire the court or agency concerned to
transmit the original or a legible certified true copy of the entire record of the proceeding under
review. The record to be transmitted may be abridged by agreement of all parties to the
proceeding. The Court of Appeals may require or permit subsequent correction of or addition to
the record.

12. EFFECT OF APPEAL. — The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or
resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such
terms as it may deem just.

13. SUBMISSION FOR DECISION. — If the petition is given due course, the Court of
Appeals may set the case for oral argument or require the parties to submit memoranda within a
period of fifteen (15) days from notice. The case shall be deemed submitted for decision upon
the filing of the last pleading or memorandum required by these rules or by the Court itself.

14. TRANSITORY PROVISIONS. — All petitions for certiorari against the Civil Service
Commission and The Central Board of Assessment Appeals filed and pending in the Supreme
Court prior to the effectivity of this Revised Administrative Circular shall be treated as petitions
for review hereunder and shall be transferred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition.
Petitions for certiorari against the aforesaid agencies which may be filed after the effectivity
hereof and up to June 30, 1995 shall likewise be considered as petitions for review and shall be
referred to the Court of Appeals for the same purpose.

In both instances, for purposes of the period of appeal contemplated in Section 4 hereof, the date
of receipt by the Court of Appeals of the petitions thus transferred or referred to it shall be
considered as the date of the filing thereof as petitions for review, and the Court of Appeals may
require the filing of amended or supplemental pleadings and the submission of such further
documents or records as it may deem necessary in view of and consequent to the change in the
mode of appellate review.

15. REPEALING CLAUSE. — Rules 43 and 44 of the Rules of Court are hereby repealed
and superseded by this Circular.

16. EFFECTIVITY. — This Circular shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation and shall take effect on June 1, 1995.
9. Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) vs. National Housing
Corp., et.al.
GR No. L-49677, May 4, 1989

FACTS:
Respondent National Housing Corporation (hereinafter referred to as NHC) is a corporation
organized in 1959 in accordance with Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform
Charter of Government Corporations, dated January 1, 1951. Its shares of stock are and have
been one hundred percent (100%) owned by the Government from its incorporation under Act
459, the former corporation law. Petitioner Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services
(TUPAS, for brevity) is a legitimate labor organization with a chapter in NHC.

On July 13, 1977, TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a certification election with
Regional Office No. IV of the Department of Labor in order to determine the exclusive
bargaining representative of the workers in NHC. It was claimed that its members comprised the
majority of the employees of the corporation. The petition was dismissed by med-arbiter
Eusebio M. Jimenez in an order, dated November 7, 1977, holding that NHC "being a
government-owned and/or controlled corporation its employees/workers are prohibited to form,
join or assist any labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining pursuant to Section 1,
Rule II, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code."

TUPAS appealed the case to the BLR which reversed the order of dismissal and ordered the
holding of the certification election. The order was however set aside by OIC Virgilio Sy, in his
resolution of November 21, 1978, upon a motion for reconsideration of respondent, NHC.
TUPAS filed before the Supreme Court, in a petition for Certiorari, seeking the reversal of the
said resolution and praying that a certification election be held among the rank-and-file
employees of the NHC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the members of the NHC have a right to form a union.

RULING:
Yes. The workers or employees of NHC undoubtedly have the right to form unions or
employees' organizations. The right to unionize or to form organizations is now explicitly
recognized and granted to employees in both the governmental and the private sectors. The Bill
of Rights provides that "(t)he right of the people, including those employed in the public and
private sectors, to form unions, associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall
not be abridged"

Specifically with respect to government employees, the right to unionize is recognized in

Paragraph (5), Section 2, Article IX B which provides that "(t)he right to self-organization shall
not be denied to government employees."

There is, therefore, no impediment to the holding of a certification election among the workers of
NHC for it is clear that they are covered by the Labor Code, the NHC being a government-
owned and/or controlled corporation without an original charter. Statutory implementation of the
last cited section of the Constitution is found in Article 244 of the Labor Code, as amended by
Executive Order No. 111, thus: “... Right of employees in the public service — Employees of the
government corporations established under the Corporation Code shall have the right to
organize and to bargain collectively with their respective employers. All other employees in the
civil service shall have the right to form associations for purposes not contrary to law.”
10. Melania Salazar vs. Ismael Mathay, Jr.
GR No. L-44061, September 20, 1976

FACTS:
On January 20, 1960, petitioner Melania Salazar was appointed by the Auditor General
confidential agent in the Office of the Auditor General of the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS). Her appointment was noted by the Commissioner of Civil Service. On March
28, 1962, she was extended another appointment, and on February 12, 1965 she was extended
another appointment by way of promotion as confidential agent in the same office. On March 18,
1966, much to her surprise, petitioner received a notice from the Auditor General that her
services as "confidential agent" in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS have been terminated as of the
close of office hours on March 31, 1966

On December 27, 1966, petitioner wrote the Commissioner of Civil Service requesting that she
be reinstated to her former position as "confidential agent" in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS.
However, no action was taken on said letter. On March 18, 1967, petitioner filed a petition for
mandamus with the Supreme Court to compel the Auditor General to reinstate her to her former
position as "confidential agent" in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS, but the Supreme Court
dismissed the petition for mandamus without prejudice to her filing the proper action to the
Court of First Instance which petitioner did by filing the proper action in the Court of First
Instance of Manila an action for mandamus to compel the Auditor General to return her to her
former position as "confidential agent" in the Office of the Auditor General.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the services of petitioner as "confidential agent" in the Office of the Auditor,
GSIS was validly terminated on the alleged ground of loss of confidence, and if not, whether or
not she could still be reinstated to said position after accepting the position of Junior Examiner in
the same office.

RULING:
The crux of the problem in this appeal hinges on the nature of the position held by the petitioner
in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS — whether it is primarily confidential or not. If it is, then her
services as confidential agent can be terminated any time at the pleasure of the appointing power.
There are two instances when a position may be considered primarily confidential: (1) When the
President upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service (now Civil Service
Commission) has declared the position to be primarily confidential; or (2) In the absence of such
declaration when by the nature of the functions of the office, there exists "close intimacy
between the appointee and appointing power which insures freedom of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom from misgiving or betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters
of state."

In the case before Us, the provision of Executive Order No. 265, declaring "... confidential
agents in the several department and offices of the Government, unless otherwise directed by the
President, to be primarily confidential" brings within the fold of the aforementioned executive
order the position of confidential agent in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS, as among those
positions which are primarily confidential. Since the position of the petitioner falls under the
first category of primarily confidential positions, it is no longer necessary to inquire into the
nature of the functions attached to the office in order to determine whether her position is
primarily confidential or not. Her position being primarily confidential, petitioner cannot
complain that the termination of her services as confidential agent in the Office of the Auditor,
GSIS is in violation of her security of tenure. Accordingly, it can be said that petitioner was not
removed from her office as confidential agent in the office of the Auditor, GSIS, but that her
term in said position has already expired when the appointing power terminated her services.
11. R. Marino Corpus vs. Miguel Cuaderno, Sr.
GR No. L-16969, April 30, 1966

FACTS:
Marino Corpus, Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank was administratively
charged with dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty and violation of internal regulations of
the office. He was suspended by the Monetary Board despite recommendation of the
investigating committee that he be reinstated and that there was no basis for actions against him.

The board considered him resigned as of the date of his suspension. Corpus moved for
reconsideration, but the same was denied. He filed the petition to the CFI of Manila which ruled
in his favor and declared the resolution of the board as null and void. Both petitioner and
respondent appealed such judgment. Petitioner as to the amount of award, while Respondent
claimed that an officer holding highly technical position may be removed at any time for lack of
confidence by the appointing power.

ISSUE:
Whether or not lack of confidence by the appointing power be a ground for removing an
employee of public officer.

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court held that, in connection with the first issue it is pertinent to state that the
question of legality of appellant's removal by resolution of the Monetary Board of July 20, 1959
has been decided in another case (G.R. No. L-23721, March 31, 1965). In that case, the court
found there that he had been removed not for any of the charges in the administrative complaint
against him in 1958 — charges as to which no specific findings were made by the Monetary
Board — but by reason of loss of confidence by the Governor of the Bank; and held that loss of
confidence alone is not a sufficient and legitimate cause for removal even if the position
involved, as in appellant's case, belongs to the category of policy-determining, primarily
confidential or highly technical positions referred to in the Constitution. In that case, therefore,
the Court ordered appellant's reinstatement in the service.
12. Felimon Luego vs. Civil Service Commission and Felicula Tuozo
GR No. L-69137, August 5, 1986

FACTS:
The petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer 11, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by
Mayor Florentino Solon on February 18, 1983. 1 The appointment was described as “permanent”
but the Civil Service Commission approved it as "temporary," subject to the final action taken in
the protest filed by the private respondent and another employee, and provided "there (was) no
pending administrative case against the appointee, no pending protest against the appointment
nor any decision by competent authority that will adversely affect the approval of the
appointment.”

On March 22, 1984, the Civil Service Commission found the private respondent better qualified
than the petitioner for the contested position and, accordingly, directed "that Felicula Tuozo be
appointed to the position of Administrative Officer 11 in the Administrative Division, Cebu City,
in place of Felimon Luego whose appointment as Administrative Officer II is hereby revoked."
The private respondent was so appointed on June 28, 1984, by the new mayor, Mayor Ronald
Duterte. The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, is now before us to
question that order and the private respondent's title.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment
on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this
finding, order his replacement by the latter?

RULING:
The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore protected
by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to
do so, and it was not for the respondent Civil Service Commission to reverse him and call it
temporary. The stamping of the words "APPROVED as TEMPORARY" did not change the
character of the appointment, which was clearly described as "Permanent" in the space provided
for in Civil Service Form No. 33, dated February 18, 1983. What was temporary was the
approval of the appointment, not the appointment it sell and what made the approval temporary
was the fact that it was made to depend on the condition specified therein and on the verification
of the qualifications of the appointee to the position.

The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the
appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or
reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the
appointee is qualified and authorizing the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission
has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws.