Page 1 of 20
DUE PROCESS appealed the decision to the Intermediate
1. YNOT v. IAC, March 20, 1987
DOCTRINE: The minimum requirements of due
process are notice and hearing which, generally
speaking, may not be dispensed with because they
are intended as a safeguard against official
arbitrariness. In the exceptional cases accepted,
however, there is a justification for the omission
of the right to a previous hearing, to wit,
the immediacy of the problem sought to be
corrected and the urgency of the need to correct
it.
FACTS: On January 13, 1984, the petitioner had
transported six carabaos in a pump boat from
Masbate to Iloilo when they were confiscated by
the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo,
Iloilo, for violation of EO 626-A, an order issued
by then Pres. Marcos prohibiting the
interprovincial movement and slaughtering of
carabaos, regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose and prohibiting the
transport of carabeef from one province to
another. The carabao or carabeef transported in
violation of the said EO, as amended, shall be
subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the
government, to be distributed to charitable
institutions and other similar institutions as the
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may ay see fit, in the case of
carabeef, and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry
may see fit, in the case of carabaos. The
petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ
of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond
of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of
the case, the court sustained the confiscation of
the carabaos and, since they could no longer be
produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond.
The court also declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the executive order, as raise
by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also
for its presumed validity. The petitioner
Appellate Court, which upheld the trial
court, and he has now come before us in this
petition for review
ISSUE: WON the outright confiscation of the
carabaos or carabeef, as provided in the said EO,
is a violation of the petitioner’s constitutional
right to due process and is, therefore, among
other things, unconstitutional.
RULING: The challenged measure is
denominated an executive order but it is really
presidential decree, promulgating a new rule
instead of merely implementing an existing law.
The due process clause was kept intentionally
vague so it would remain also conveniently
resilient. This was felt necessary because due
process is not, like some provisions of the
fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an
implacable and immutable command for all
seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the
best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of
the due process clause was meant to make it
adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or
constricting its protection as the changing times
and circumstances may require. The minimum
requirements of due process are notice and
hearing which, generally speaking, may not be
dispensed with because they are intended as a
safeguard against official arbitrariness. In the
instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily
confiscated by the police station commander,
were returned to the petitioner only after he
had filed a complaint for recovery and given
a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was
ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce
the carabaos when ordered by the trial court.
The executive order defined the prohibition,
convicted the petitioner and immediately
imposed punishment, which was carried out
forthright. The measure struck at once and
pounced upon the petitioner without giving him
a chance to be heard, thus denying him the
centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
It has already been remarked that there are
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occasions when notice and hearing may be
validly dispensed with notwithstanding the
usual requirement for these minimum
guarantees of due process. It is also conceded
that summary action may be validly taken in
administrative proceedings as procedural due
process is not necessarily judicial only. In the
exceptional cases accepted, however, there is a
justification for the omission of the right to a
previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the
problem sought to be corrected and
the urgency of the need to correct it. In the case
before us, there was no such pressure of time
or action calling for the petitioner's
peremptory treatment. The properties
involved were not even inimical per se as to
require their instant destruction. There
certainly was no reason why the offense
prohibited by the executive order should not
have been proved first in a court of justice,
with the accused being accorded all the
rights safeguarded to him under the
Constitution. Considering that, as we held
in Pesigan v. Angeles, Executive Order No. 626-A
is penal in nature, the violation thereof should
have been pronounced not by the police only
but by a court of justice, which alone would have
had the authority to impose the prescribed
penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the
accused. Due process is violated because the
owner of the property confiscated is denied
the right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished. The
conferment on the administrative authorities of
the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed
offender is a clear encroachment on judicial
functions and militates against the doctrine of
separation of powers. There is, finally, also an
invalid delegation of legislative powers to the
officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons,
we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A
unconstitutional.
2. ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL
OPERATORS ASSOC. INC. v. HON. CITY
MAYOR OF MANILA, G.R. No. L-24693, July
31, 1967
DOCTRINE: Licenses for non-useful occupations
are also incidental to the police power and the
right to exact a fee may be implied from the
power to license and regulate, but in fixing
amount of the license fees the municipal
corporations are allowed a much wider
discretion in this class of cases than in the former,
and aside from applying the well-known legal
principle that municipal ordinances must not be
unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts
have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with
such discretion.
The broad taxing authority conferred to
cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to
cover a wide range of subjects with the only
limitation that the tax so levied is for public
purposes, just and uniform.
FACTS: Petitioner is a non-stock corporation
dedicated to the promotion and protection of
the interest of its 18 members who are
operating hotels and motels, characterized as
legitimate businesses duly licensed by both
national and city authorities, regularly paying
taxes, employing and giving livelihood to not
less than 2,500 person and representing an
investment of more than P3 million.
Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition
against the City Mayor of Manila with regard the
execution and enforcement of Ordinance No.
4760. Said Ordinance classifies hotels and
motels into first-class and second-class for
purposes of an annual fee of P6,000 and P4,000,
respectively. The Ordinance requires the
operators of the h/m’s to get personal
information of anyone who checks in to their
rooms. Petitioner said that the Ordinance is
unconstitutional for being oppressive, arbitrary
and against due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 4760 of
the City of Manila is violative of the due process
clause
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RULING: No. The Ordinance No. 4760 of the City
of Manila is not violative of the due process
clause.
The presumption is all in favor of
validity. The action of the elected
representatives of the people cannot be lightly
set aside. The councilors must be familiar with
the necessities of their particular municipality
and with all the facts and circumstances which
surround the subject and necessitate action. The
local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance,
has in effect given notice that the regulations are
essential to the well-being of the people. The
Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative
action when there is not a clear invasion of
personal or property rights under the guise of
police regulation.
As in this case, there is no factual
foundation laid. The lower court decided the
matter based only upon the pleadings and the
stipulation of facts. Such cannot prevail over the
presumption of validity and judgment against
the Ordinance set aside.
Further, the Ordinance is a valid exercise
of Police Power. There is no question but that
the challenged Ordinance was precisely enacted
to minimize certain practices hurtful to public
morals. This is to minimize prostitution. The
increase in taxes not only discourages h/m’s in
doing any business other than legal but also
increases the revenue of the LGU concerned. As
was explained more in detail in the Cu Unjieng
case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are
also incidental to the police power and the right
to exact a fee may be implied from the power to
license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the
license fees the municipal corporations are
allowed a much wider discretion in this class of
cases than in the former, and aside from
applying the well-known legal principle that
municipal ordinances must not be
unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts
have, as a general rule, declined to interfere
with such discretion. The desirability of
imposing restraint upon the number of persons
who might otherwise engage in non-useful
enterprises is, of course, generally an important
factor in the determination of the amount of this
kind of license fee. Hence license fees clearly in
the nature of privilege taxes for revenue have
frequently been upheld, especially in of licenses
for the sale of liquors.
Moreover, in the equally leading case of
Lutz v. Araneta this Court affirmed the doctrine
earlier announced by the American Supreme
Court that taxation may be made to implement
the state's police power. Only the other day, this
Court had occasion to affirm that the broad
taxing authority conferred by the Local
Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and
municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a
wide range of subjects with the only limitation
that the tax so levied is for public purposes, just
and uniform.
As a matter of fact, even without
reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the
City of Manila in imposing licenses for revenue,
it has been explicitly held in one case that "much
discretion is given to municipal corporations in
determining the amount," here the license fee of
the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were
viewed purely as a police power measure.26
The discussion of this particular matter may
fitly close with this pertinent citation from
another decision of significance: "It is urged on
behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the
enforcement of the ordinance could deprive
them of their lawful occupation and means of
livelihood because they can not rent stalls in the
public markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are
also dealers in refrigerated or cold storage meat,
the sale of which outside the city markets under
certain conditions is permitted. And surely, the
mere fact, that some individuals in the
community may be deprived of their present
business or a particular mode of earning a living
cannot prevent the exercise of the police power.
As was said in a case, persons licensed to pursue
occupations which may in the public need and
interest be affected by the exercise of the police
power embark in these occupations subject to
the disadvantages which may result from the
legal exercise of that power."
The due process contention is likewise
untenable, due process has no exact definition
but has reason as a standard. In this case, the
precise reason why the Ordinance was enacted
was to curb down prostitution in the City which
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is reason enough and cannot be defeated by
mere singling out of the provisions of the said
Ordinance alleged to be vague.
3. LUZON SURETY CO., INC. v. JESUS
PANAGUITON, ET AL., G.R. No. L-26054,
July 21, 1978
DOCTRINE: A fundamental part of due process is
the essential requisite that a party should be
given an opportunity to be heard by notifying or
informing him or his counsel as to when such a
hearing will take place, affording him reasonable
notice of the time fixed for the hearing or trial of
the case.
FACTS: On April 1955, plaintiff, as surety, and
defendant Jesus Panaguiton, as principal,
executed jointly and severally a surety bond for
P10,000.00 in favor of the International
Tobacco Co., Inc. to secure the payment of all his
monetary liabilities, as well as the faithful
performance of his obligation to said Company.
In consideration of the execution by plaintiff of
the said Surety Bond, there were, in turn,
executed in the latter's favor an Indemnity
Agreement by defendant Panaguiton, and
others.
For failure of defendant Panaguiton to
comply with the terms and conditions of the
Surety Bond, the International Tobacco Co., Inc.
filed Civil Case at CFI Manila against plaintiff and
said Panaguiton. A decision was rendered
sentencing the defendants therein to pay to the
International Tobacco Co., Inc. Plaintiff paid to
the International Tobacco Co., Inc. and that
notwithstanding demands made by plaintiff on
defendants for the reimbursement, said
defendants have failed and refused to make said
reimbursement.
On July 1960, the trial court rendered
judgment ordering defendants to pay plaintiff.
On October 1960, defendant-appellant Custodia
J. Vda. de Velasco (administratrix of the estate of
the deceased Angeles Velasco) filed a petition
for relief from judgment which states the ff: 1)
That the said decision is a complete nullity for
the reason that she was not notified of the
hearing of the case; 2) That if she was duly
notified of the hearing she would be able to
show that the Indemnity Agreement was not at
all signed by the deceased Angeles Velasco; and
3) That the petitioning defendant, not having
been represented by legal counsel, was of the
mistaken belief that she has 60 days within
which to file a petition for new trial, or
reconsideration or appeal from the decision.
After the trial court's denial of her petition for
relief from judgment on December 1960,
defendant-appellant filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order denying her
petition for relief, which motion was also
denied, hence the present appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in
denying the appellant's petition for relief from
judgment without considering that the decision
subject matter of the petition is a complete
nullity in so far as appellant is concerned
because she was never notified of the hearing of
the case and was deprived of her day in court.
RULING: The defendant-appellant was not
notified of the hearings set for March l and May
13, 1960 is borne by the records. Her name as a
party defendant does not even appear in the list
of persons to be given notice of the hearings by
the Clerk of Court. She was, therefore, denied
the fundamental right to be heard, an essential
element of procedural due process. In El Banco
Español Filipino vs. Palanca: Due process of
law implies that there must be a court or
tribunal clothed with power to hear and
determine the matter before it, that
jurisdiction shall have been lawfully
acquired, that the defendant shall have an
opportunity to be heard, and that judgment
shall be rendered upon lawful hearing.
Philippine jurisprudence is replete with
decisions of this Court laying down as a
fundamental part of due process the essential
requisite that a party should be given an
opportunity to be heard by notifying or
informing him or his counsel as to when such a
hearing will take place, affording him
reasonable notice of the time fixed for the
hearing or trial of the case.
In the instant case, the trial court had
peremptorily rejected defendant-appellant's
petition for relief from judgment, declaring that
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her failure to appeal within 30 days from receipt
of the decision was fatal to her cause. SC
disagrees with the lower court's ruling. It is
precisely because of the expiration of the
period for appeal that she seeks to avail of
the remedy of relief from judgment, alleging
that being a layman and without the benefit
of counsel, she was of the mistaken belief
that she had 60 days within which to appeal
the decision. Such remedy of relief from
judgment is available to her as provided under
Rule 38, Sec. 2 and 3, Revised Rules of Court. The
trial court gravely erred in denying appellant' s
petition for relief.
4. NAMIL v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
150540. October 28, 2003
DOCTRINE: Due process in quasi-judicial
proceedings before the COMELEC requires due
notice and hearing. The proclamation of a
winning candidate cannot be annulled if he has
not been notified of any motion to set aside his
proclamation.
FACTS: On May 14, 2001, the election for the
members of the Sangguniang Bayan was held in
Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat. On May 20, 2001,
the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Palimbang
issued Certificate of Canvass of Votes and
Proclamation (COCVP) which contained the
petitioners and the Sangguniang Bayan winning
candidates. They took their oath, and assumed
their offices as members of SB of Palimbang. The
next day, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Palimbang issued a COCVP which listed the
private respondents as winners.
Private respondent Joenime B. Kapina
wrote the COMELEC requesting that she and the
others who were proclaimed as winners on May
21, 2001 be recognized as the winning
candidates and the new members of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Palimbang, Sultan
Kudarat. Commissioner-in-Charge for Region
XII, Mehol K. Sadain conducted an investigation
on the matter and required the Law
Department, the Regional Election Registrar
and the Provincial Election Supervisor to submit
reports/memoranda. Acting on the respective
memoranda submitted by the officers,
Commissioner Sadain submitted his
recommendation to the COMELEC that there
was a valid proclamation of the private
respondents as the winning candidates.
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 4615 for the
immediate installation of the private
respondents as the duly elected members of SB
Palimbang.
The petitioners contend that the
COMELEC’s Resolution No. 4615 is null and void
since it was issued without according them due
notice and hearing, contrary to the enshrined
principle of due process. The petitioners allege
that they were never accorded the chance to
present their side in connection with the
investigation that was purportedly conducted
by Commissioner Sadain and on the
memoranda/report of COMELEC’s officers.
COMELEC simply approved the
recommendation of Commissioner Sadain. The
petitioners were kept in the dark, learned about
the controversy only when they were notified of
the assailed resolution of the public respondent.
On the other hand, COMELEC asserts that the
twin requirement of notice and hearing in
annulment of proclamation is not applicable
when the proclamation of the petitioners as
winning candidates is null and void, citing Utto
v. Commission on Elections.
ISSUE: Whether Resolution 4615 is null and
void.
RULING: Yes. While it is true that the COMELEC
is vested with a broad power to enforce all
election laws, the same is subject to the right of
the parties to due process. In this case, the
petitioners had been proclaimed as the winning
candidates and had assumed their office. Since
then, they had been exercising their rights and
performing their duties as members of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Palimbang, Sultan
Kudarat. Their proclamation on May 20,
2001 enjoys the presumption of regularity and
validity since no contest or protest was even
filed assailing the same. The petitioners cannot
be removed from office without due process of
law.
Due process in the proceedings before
the public respondent exercising its quasi-
judicial functions, requires due notice and
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hearing, among others. Thus, although the
COMELEC possesses, in appropriate cases, the
power to annul or suspend the proclamation of
any candidate, it is without power to partially or
totally annul a proclamation or suspend the
effects of a proclamation without notice and
hearing.
In this case, the public respondent
nullified the proclamation of the petitioners and
ousted them from their office as members of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Palimbang, based
solely on the recommendations of its law
department and of Commissioner Sadain, and
on the memoranda of its officers. The
petitioners were not accorded a chance to be
heard on the said recommendations and the
memorandum of Regional Election Director
Clarita Callar, certification of Celia Romero, and
certification of Election Officer Malic Sansarona
dated September 12, 2001 before it issued the
assailed resolution.
Although public office is not property
under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution, and one cannot acquire a vested
right to public office, it is, nevertheless, a
protected right. Due process in quasi-judicial
proceedings before the COMELEC requires due
notice and hearing. The proclamation of a
winning candidate cannot be annulled if he has
not been notified of any motion to set aside his
proclamation. The public respondent’s reliance
on the ruling of this Court in Utto vs. Commission
on Elections is misplaced. The Court, in that case,
held that the twin-requirement of notice and
hearing in an annulment of proclamation is not
applicable because of the illegality of
petitioner’s proclamation. The factual
circumstances in the instant petition are far
different from those obtaining in Utto. In
the Utto case, a notice of appeal was filed
questioning the ruling of the board of
canvassers but, the latter proceeded in
proclaiming Utto as the winning candidate. This
made the proclamation illegal. In the present
case, nobody questioned the petitioner’s
proclamation.
5. NHA v. Evangelista, May 16, 2005
DOCTRINE: A person who was not impleaded in
the complaint cannot be bound by the decision
rendered therein, for no man shall be affected by
a proceeding in which he is a stranger.
FACTS: NHA filed a case for recovery involving
a real property measuring 915.50 square
meters and located in V. Luna Road, Quezon
City, originally awarded in 1968 by the People’s
Homesite and Housing Corporation
(petitioner’s predecessor) to a certain Adela
Salindon.
After the death of Salindon, her heirs
executed an extra-judicial settlement where the
property was transferred to Arsenio Florendo,
Jr., Milagros Florendo, Beatriz Florendo and
Eloisa Florendo-Kulphongpatana. However, the
award in favor of Salindon was nullified and set
aside by the court in 1984 for having been
issued in excess of jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion, and petitioner was declared
the owner of the property.
Despite said decision, the property was
auctioned off by the Quezon City Treasurer’s
Office on April 23, 1986, for unpaid real
property taxes by the Florendos. The highest
bidder was Luisito Sarte. Because the Register
of Deeds refused to register the final deed of sale
issued by the City Treasurer, Sarte filed a
petition for issuance of title and confirmation of
sale, which was granted by the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City (Branch 84).
Consequently, the Register of Deeds issued
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 28182 in
the name of Sarte, who divided the property into
Lot 1-A, measuring 570.50 square meters and
covered by TCT No. 108070, and Lot 1-B,
measuring 345 square meters and covered by
TCT No. 108071.
It was in 1991 that petitioner filed Civil
Case No. Q-91-10071 with Sarte, the City
Treasurer of Quezon City and the Quezon City
Register of Deeds, as defendants. While the case
was pending, Sarte executed in favor of
respondent Jose Evangelista, a Deed of
Assignment dated December 2, 1994, covering
Lot 1-A. TCT No. 108070 was cancelled and TCT
No. 122944 was issued in the name of
respondent on December 21, 1994.
Page 7 of 20
Subsequently, the Register of Deeds annotated
on TCT No. 122944 an Affidavit of Adverse
Claim of petitioner.
On May 1, 1995, petitioner filed a motion
for leave to file supplemental complaint in Civil
Case No. Q-91-10071, seeking to include
respondent Evangelista, Northern Star Agri-
Business Corporation and BPI Agricultural
Development Bank as defendants. The proposed
additional defendants were the subsequent
purchasers of Lots 1-A and 1-B. The trial court,
however, denied the motion.
Thus, petitioner, on May 31, 1995, filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
(Branch 82) a complaint for Annulment of Deed
of Assignment, Deed of Absolute Sale, Real
Estate Mortgage, Cancellation of TCT Nos.
122944 and 126639, and Damages, against
Sarte, respondent Evangelista, Northern Star
Agri-Business Corporation, BPI Agricultural
Development Bank and the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City.
RTC dismissed this second case on the
ground of litis pendencia. In 1995, it rendered a
decision in favor of petitioner declaring the
auction sale to Sarte as well as the TCT issued in
his name as null and void. Paragraph 3 of said
decision also declares any transfer made by
Sarte or his agents before or during the
pendency of the case as void.
Respondent then filed with the CA a
petition for annulment of the trial court’s
judgment, particularly to the portion referring
to the nullity of any transfer, assignment, sale or
mortgage made by Sarte. In his petition,
respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as ground.
According to respondent, since he was not a
party to Civil Case No. Q-91-10071, he was
prevented from ventilating his cause, right or
interest over the property, and the judgment
was not binding on him, as the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over his person.
The CA granted the petition and declared
null and void paragraph 3 of the dispositive
portion of the trial court’s decision insofar as
petitioner’s title to the property is
concerned. The CA found that respondent was
not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-10071 and the
trial court did not acquire any jurisdiction over
his person. The CA also ruled that the judgment
violated respondent’s right against deprivation
of the property without due process of law. Its
motion for reconsideration having been denied
by the CA, petitioner took the present recourse.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in annulling
paragraph 3 of the trial courts decision on
grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of due
process of law.
RULING: No. It is basic that no man shall be
affected by any proceeding to which he is a
stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound
by judgment rendered by the court.
In this case, it is undisputed that respondent
was never made a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-
10071. Yet, the assailed paragraph 3 of said
decision decreed that (A)ny transfers,
assignment, sale or mortgage of whatever nature
of the parcel of land subject of this case made by
defendant Luisito Sarte or his/her agents or
assigns before or during the pendency of the
instant case are hereby declared null and void,
together with any transfer certificates of title
issued in connection with the aforesaid
transactions by the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City who is likewise ordered to cancel or cause the
cancellation of such TCTs. Respondent is
adversely affected by such judgment, as he was
the subsequent purchaser of the subject
property from Sarte, and title was already
transferred to him. It will be the height of
inequity to allow respondents title to be
nullified without being given the opportunity to
present any evidence in support of his
ostensible ownership of the property. Much
more, it is tantamount to a violation of the
constitutional guarantee that no person shall be
deprived of property without due process of
law. Clearly, the trial courts judgment is void
insofar as paragraph 3 of its dispositive portion
is concerned.
6. Government of Hongkong Special
Administrative Region v. Hon Olalia,
April 19, 2007
Page 8 of 20
DOCTRINE: An extradition proceeding being sui
generis, the standard of proof required in
granting or denying bail can neither be the proof
beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor
the standard of proof of preponderance of
evidence in civil cases. While administrative in
character, the standard of substantial evidence
used in administrative cases cannot likewise
apply given the object of extradition law which is
to prevent the prospective extradite from fleeing
our jurisdiction.
FACTS: On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the
Philippines and the then British Crown Colony
of Hong Kong signed an “Agreement for the
Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons.” It
took effect on June 20, 1997. On July 1, 1997,
Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s
Republic of China and became the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region.
Private respondent Munoz was charged
before the Hong Kong Court within three (3)
counts of the offense of “accepting and
advantage as agent,” in violation of Section 9 (1)
(a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap.
201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7)
counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud,
penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On
August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999,
warrants of arrest were issued against him. If
convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to
fourteen (14) years of charge. On September 13,
1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong
Department of Justice a request for the
provisional arrest of private respondent. The
DOJ then forwarded the request to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn,
filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an
application for the provisional arrest of private
respondent. On September 23, 1999, the RTC,
Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest
against private respondent. That same day, the
NBI agents arrested and detained him. On
October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with
the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with application for
preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ
of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the
Order of Arrest. On November 9, 1999, the Court
of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the
Order of Arrest void.
As early as November 22, 1999,
petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for
the extradition of private respondent, docketed
as Civil Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to Branch
10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For
his part, private respondent filed in the same
case a petition for bail which was opposed by
petitioner. After hearing, or on October 8, 2001,
Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the
petition for bail, holding that there is no
Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases
and that private respondent is a high “flight
risk.”
On October 30, 2001, private respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order
denying his application for bail. This was
granted by the respondent judge in an Order
dated December 20, 2001 subject to conditions.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not there is nothing in the
Constitution or statutory law providing that a
potential extradite has a right to bail, the right
being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
2.) Whether or not Juan Munoz as a
potential extradite be granted the right to bail
on the basis of clear and convincing evidence
that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all
the orders processes of the extradition court.
RULING:
The Philippines, along with the other
members of the family of nations, committed to
uphold the fundamental human rights as well as
value the worth and dignity of every person.
This commitment is enshrined in Section II,
Article II of our Constitution which provides:
“The State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human
rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the
right of every person to liberty and due process,
ensuring that those detained or arrested can
participate in the proceedings before a court, to
enable it to decide without delay on the legality
of the detention and order their release if
justified. In other words, the Philippine
Page 9 of 20
authorities are under obligation to make
available to every person under detention such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental
right to liberty. These remedies include the right
to be admitted to bail. While this Court in
Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail
to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the
various international treaties giving recognition
and protection to human rights, particularly the
right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this
Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the
State’s power to deprive an individual of his
liberty is nit necessarily limited to criminal
proceedings. Respondents in administrative
proceedings, such as deportation and
quarantine, have likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings
would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential
history. Philippine jurisprudence has not
limited the exercise of the right to bail criminal
proceedings only. This Court has admitted to
bail persons who are not involved in criminal
proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in
this jurisdiction to persons in detention during
the pendency of administrative proceedings,
taking into cognizance the obligation of the
Philippines under international conventions to
uphold human rights.
If a bail can be granted in deportation
cases, we see no justification why it should not
be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise,
considering that the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights applies to deportation cases,
there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in
extradition cases. After all, both are
administrative proceedings where the
innocence or guilt of the person detained is not
in issue. Clearly the right of a prospective
extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction
must be viewed in the light of the various treaty
obligations of the Philippines concerning
respect for the promotion and protection of
human rights. Under these treaties, the
presumption lies in favor of human liberty.
Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the
right to liberty of every individual is not
impaired.
Section 2 (a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law)
defines “extradition” as the removal of an
accused from the Philippines with the object of
placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities
to enable the requesting state or government to
hold him in connection with any criminal
investigation directed against him or the
execution of a penalty imposed on him under
the penal or criminal law of the requesting state
or government. It has been characterized as the
right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to
demand the surrender of one accused or
convicted of a crime within its territorial
jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the
other state to surrender him to the demanding
state. It is not a criminal proceeding. Even if the
potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition
proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is
not punishment for a crime, even though such
punishment may follow extradition. It is sui
generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty
obligations between different nations. It is not a
trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the
potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil
action, but one that is merely administrative in
character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a
person accused or convicted of a crime and to
secure his return to the state from which he fled,
for the purpose of trial or punishment.
But while extradition is not a criminal
proceeding, it is characterized by the following:
(a) it entails a deprivation of the liberty on the
part of the potential extradite and (b) the means
employed to attain the purpose of extradition is
also “the machinery of criminal law”. This is
shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The
Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates
the “immediate arrest and temporary detention
of the accused” if such “will best serve the
interest of justice.”
While our extradition law does not
provide for the grant of bail to an extradite,
however, there is no provision prohibiting him
or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due
process under the constitution.
An extradition proceeding being sui
generis, the standard of proof required in
granting or denying bail can neither be the proof
Page 10 of 20
beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor
the standard of proof of preponderance of
evidence in civil cases. While administrative in
character, the standard of substantial evidence
used in administrative cases cannot likewise
apply given the object of extradition law which
is to prevent the prospective extradite from
fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion
in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new
standard which he termed “clear and convincing
evidence” should be used in granting bail in
extradition cases. According to him, this
standard should be lower than proof beyond
reasonable doubt but higher than
preponderance of evidence. The potential
extradite must prove by “clear and convincing
evidence” that he is not a flight risk and will
abide with all the orders and processes of the
extradition court.
7. Espero Salaw v. NLRC, G.R. No. 90786,
September 27, 1991
DOCTRINE: It is true that administrative and
quasi-judicial bodies are not bound by the
technical rules of procedure in the adjudication
cases. However, the right to counsel, a very basic
requirement of substantive due process, has to be
observed.
FACTS: Petitioner, Espero Santos Salaw,
worked as employee (credit investigator-
appraiser—his duties include inspecting and
appraising the company’s foreclosed assets) of
private respondent Associated Bank.
Sometime in November, the Criminal
Investigation Service (CIS) of the Philippine
Constabulary extracted a sworn statement of
petitioner, WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL, to the effect that he, along with a co-
employee Madrigal, sold twenty sewing
machines and electric generators foreclosed by
the company and divided the proceeds by
themselves.
In December, petitioner was requested
by the bank manager to appear before the
bank’s Personnel Discipline and Investigation
Committee (PDIC) and requested in a letter that
he should appear WITHOUT COUNSEL. Later on,
petitioner was terminated from employment.
The Labor Arbiter held that he was illegally
dismissed, but it was reversed by NLRC, hence
this petition.
ISSUE: WON the requirements of due process
was satisfied.
RULING: No because the investigation of
Petitioner by the respondent Bank violated his
constitutional right to due process. He was not
given the opportunity to defend himself as
provided in the IRR of the Labor Code, Section 5.
It provides that "the employer shall afford the
worker ample opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself with the assistance of his
representative, if he so desires." Here, he was
perfunctorily denied the assistance of counsel
during investigation to be conducted by the
PDIC. No reasons preferred which vitiated the
denial with irregularity and unfairness. Even
the minutes of the proceeding during the
investigation were not presented. This is a
glaring denial of due process.
Under the Labor Code, as amended, the
requirements for the lawful dismissal of an
employee by his employer are two-fold: the
substantive and the procedural. It must be for a
valid or authorized cause (substantive) and
there must be notice and hearing (procedural).
It is true that administrative and quasi-
judicial bodies are not bound by the technical
rules of procedure in the adjudication cases.
However, the right to counsel, a very basic
requirement of substantive due process, has to
be observed. Indeed, rights to counsel and to
due process of law are two of fundamental
rights guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution to
person under investigation, be the proceeding
administrate civil, or criminal. Section 12(1),
Article III thereof specifically provides: "Any
person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to ... have
compete and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
service of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing in the presence of counsel." To
underscore the inviolability this provision, the
third paragraph of the same section explicitly
Page 11 of 20
states that, "any confession or admission
obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible evidence against
him.
Thus, petitioner’s admission before the
CIS is inadmissible.
Case Notes:
The cardinal primary rights must be
respected even in proceedings of administrative
character. As provided in the Ang Tibay Case:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to
a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case
and submit evidence in support thereof. This
means the rudimentary requirements of fair
play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an
opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights, which
he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not
impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity that cannot be disregarded
namely, that of having something to support its
decision.
(4) Not only must there be some
evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but
the evidence must be "substantial." "Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept adequate to support a conclusion."
(5) The decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to parties
affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations
(now the National Relations Commission) or
any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his
own independent consideration of the law and
facts of controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate arriving at a decision
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations
(now NLRC) should, in controversial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that parties
to the proceeding can know the various issues
involved, the reasons for the decisions
rendered.
8. PO2 RUEL C. MONTOYA vs. POLICE
DIRECTOR REYNALDO P. VARILLA, G.R.
No. 180146, December 18, 2008
DOCTRINE: The cardinal precept is that where
there is a violation of basic constitutional rights,
courts are ousted from their jurisdiction. The
violation of a party’s right to due process raises a
serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be
glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the
denial of the fundamental right of due process is
apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that
right is void for lack of jurisdiction. The rule must
be equally true for quasi-judicial administrative
bodies, for the constitutional guarantee that no
man shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process is unqualified by what type
of proceedings (whether judicial or
administrative) he stands to lose the same.
FACTS: Montoya was dismissed due to failure to
attend LEEC and AWOL for 67 days. Montoya
filed MR to PNP Regional Director (RD). RD then
cancel the dropping of Montoya from rolls but
with preventive suspension. Summary
Dismissal Proceeding follows dismissing
Montoya. Montoya filed MR to PNP Chief but
because decision of RD is only appealable to
RAB, he then filed MR to RAB. RAB then ordered
reinstatement of Montoya. RD filed MR to DILG
but denied. RD filed MR to CSC and reaffirmed
the decision of dismissal. Montoya filed MR to
DILG but denied, then filed petition for
certiorari in CA but denied.
ISSUE: WON the right to due process of
petitioner was violated.
RULING: Yes, right to due process was violated.
(Although Montoya filed MR of RD’s decision of
dismissing him beyond the 10 days of receipt of
copy of decision) As a general rule, the
perfection of an appeal in the manner and
within the period permitted by law is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional, and the
Page 12 of 20
failure to perfect the appeal renders the
judgment of the court final and executory. The
Court, however, reiterates its previous
pronouncements herein that the Summary
Dismissal Proceedings were conducted without
notice to Montoya and in violation of his right to
due process. The violation of Montoyas
fundamental constitutional right deprived the
NCR Regional Director of jurisdiction over
Montoyas administrative case; and the decision
rendered by the NCR Regional Director therein
was void. A void judgment does not become
final and executory and may be challenged at
any time.
Facts:
REASON FOR DISMISSAL
Ruel C. Montoya, a police officer assigned
in Quezon City, when the NAPOLCOM issued
Special Order No. 1044 on 9 September 1998
dropping him from the rolls (as a member of
PNP), effective 15 August 1998, for failure to
attend the Law Enforcement and
Enhancement Course (LEEC). Montoya had
been absent without official leave (AWOL)
for a period of 67 days, from 23 January
1998 to 31 March 1998.
FILE MR TO PNP REGIONAL DIRECTOR
Four months after he was dropped from
the rolls, Montoya filed a Motion for
Reconsideration addressed to the PNP Regional
Director (NCR), explaining that on 22 January
1998, he went to the Baler Police
Station/Police Station 2 to have his Sick
Leave Form approved by the station
commander. Allegedly due to the fact that his
name had already been forwarded to the NCRPO
for the LEEC, his Sick Leave Form was not
approved. Montoya averred that his failure to
attend the LEEC was beyond his control,
since he was suffering from arthritis with on
and off symptoms of severe body
pain. Montoya attached to his Motion a
certification simply dated 1998, issued by a
certain Dr. Jesus G. de Guzman, and
authenticated by Police Chief Inspector
(P/CINSP.) Ethel Y. Tesoro, Chief, Medical
Service, CPD.
CANCEL THE ORDER OF DROPPING FROM
ROLLS BUT WITH PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION
Upon the recommendation of the Chief of
the NCRPO Legal Division, the NCR Regional
Director issued on 11 June 1999 Special Order
No. 990 canceling Special Order No. 1044 (the
order of dropping him from the rolls) . Montoya
was also preventively suspended for 30 days,
from 8 June to 8 July 1999, pending Summary
Proceedings of his administrative liability. The
67 days when Montoya went on absence
without leave (AWOL) were immediately
deducted from his leave credits.
SUMMARY DISMISSAL PROCEEDINGS
The Summary Dismissal Proceedings
against Montoya were conducted by Hearing
Officer Police Superintendent (P/Supt.)
Francisco Don C. Montenegro, and based on his
findings, the NCR Regional Director rendered a
Decision on 23 June 2000 dismissing Montoya
from the police service for Serious Neglect of
Duty (due to AWOL), effective
immediately. Montoya received a copy of said
Decision on 20 July 2000.
FILED MR TO PNP CHIEF
Allegedly unassisted by counsel,
Montoya filed on 1 August 2000 with the CPD
office a Petition for Review/Motion for
Reconsideration of the 23 June 2000 Decision of
the NCR Regional Director, which he addressed
to the PNP Chief. In a Memorandum issued on 3
July 2002, Montoya’s Petition/Motion was
denied for lack of jurisdiction, since a
disciplinary action involving demotion or
dismissal from service imposed by a PNP
regional director may only be appealed to the
Regional Appellate Board (RAB).
FILED MR TO RAB
Montoya next filed on 2 September
2002 an appeal of the 23 June 2000 Decision of
the NCR Regional Director before the RAB of the
National Capital Region (RAB-NCR), alleging
lack of due process considering that he was not
even notified of any hearing by the Summary
Hearing Officer and was thus deprived of the
Page 13 of 20
opportunity to present evidence in his
defense. The Summary Hearing Officer in the
Summary Dismissal Proceedings against him
recommended his dismissal from police service
based on his failure to report for the LEEC,
without even looking into his side of the
controversy.
RAB ORDERED REISTATEMENT
On 11 December 2002, the RAB-NCR
rendered its Decision granting Montoyas appeal
and ordering his reinstatement.
REGIONAL DIRECTOR (NCR) APPEAL THE
RAB DECISION TO DILG
Thereafter, the NCR Regional Director
authorized Police Senior Superintendent
(P/SSupt.) Rufino Jeffrey L. Manere (Manere) to
appeal several RAB-NCR decisions involving
different police officers, including the Decision
dated 11 December 2002 on Montoyas case,
before the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG). The NCR Regional Director
assailed the RAB-NCR decision reinstating
Montoya in the police service.
MONTOYA et.al. FILED A MOTION TO
DISMISS AND/OR OPPOSITION
On 8 August 2003, Montoya, together
with the other police personnel reinstated in the
service by RAB-NCR (hereinafter collectively
referred to as Montoya, et al.), filed before the
DILG an Urgent Motion to Dismiss and/or
Opposition to the Appeal of the NCR Regional
Director.
DILG DENIED THE APPEAL OF THE NCR
REGIONAL DIRECTOR
On 10 November 2003, DILG Secretary
Jose D. Lina, Jr. issued an Order denying the
appeal of the NCR Regional Director.
BEYOND REGLEMANTARY PERIOD- DILG
Secretary Lina noted that the NCR Regional
Director received a copy of the RAB-NCR
decision on Montoya’s case on 10 February
2003, but it only appealed the same to the DILG
on 30 April 2003, beyond the 15-day
reglementary period for appeals.
NO PERSONALITY - DILG Secretary Lina also
declared that neither Manere nor the NCR
Regional Director has personality to appeal the
RAB-NCR decision to the DILG.
LACK OF JURISDICTION OF RAB- Finally, DILG
Secretary Lina explained that the filing of an
appeal by either party under Section 45 of
Republic Act No. 6975 covers only demotion
and dismissal from the service and never
exoneration and suspension.
Thus, the appeal of the RAB-NCR decision
exonerating Montoya should be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction and for the reason that the
said decision had already become final and
executory.
NCR REGIONAL DIRECTOR APPEALED TO
CSC
The NCR Regional Director, represented
by Manere, appealed the Order dated 10
November 2003 of DILG Secretary Lina to the
Civil Service Commission (CSC). The NCR
Regional Director asserted its right to appeal
citing Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy.
NCR REGIONAL DIRECTOR REINSTATED
MONTOYA et.al.
On 23 March 2004, the NCR Regional
Director issued Special Order No. 611
reinstating Montoya, et al., without prejudice to
the pending appeal of the NCR Regional Director
before the CSC.
CSC AFFIRMED THE DISMISSAL OF
MONTOYA et. al.
Subsequently, the CSC issued on 24
August 2005 Resolution No. 05-1200 which
recognized the right of the PNP disciplining
authorities to appeal the decision of the RAB-
NCR to the DILG. The CSC set aside the 10
November 2003 Order of DILG Secretary Lina
and affirmed the decisions of the NCR Regional
Director dismissing Montoya, et al., from police
service. According to the CSC, Montoya, in
Page 14 of 20
particular, was guilty of laches and
abandonment of his position. It also held that
the 11 December 2002 Decision of the RAB-NCR
on Montoyas case, affirmed by DILG Secretary
Lina, was based on mere affidavits which were
not substantiated.
MONTOYA FILED MR BUT DENIED
The CSC denied the Motion for
Reconsideration of Montoya, et al., in
Resolution No. 06-1500 dated 23 August
2006 for lack of new evidence or any valid
reason that warrants the setting aside or
modification of its Resolution No. 05-1200.
MONTOYA FILED PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI W/ TRO AND PRELIMINARY
INJUCTION (RULE 43) BUT DISMISSED
Montoya, et al., sought recourse to the
Court of Appeals via a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 43 with Application
for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and
Preliminary Injunction, but on 9 August 2007,
the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision
dismissing the same, since there was no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the CSC.
ISSUES:
1. WON Montoya failed to exhaust
administrative remedies.
2. WON Respondent Manere
(representative of RD) has legal
personality to appeal the decision
exonerating the petitioner.
3. WON the right to due process of
petitioner was violated.
4. WON petitioner delayed in appealing the
decision summarily dismissing him
5. WON petitioner deserved to be
dismissed from service.
RULING:
1. Montoya’s reliance on the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is
misplaced, for said doctrine does not find
application in the instant case. The doctrine
intends to preclude premature resort from a
quasi-judicial administrative body to the
court. Such is not the situation in this
case. Montoya is questioning the supposed
premature resort of the NCR Regional Director
from the decision of the DILG Secretary to
the CSC, instead of to the Office of the
President; obviously, he is challenging the
resort from one administrative body to
another.
2. No, it should be the PNP as a bureau.
The party who has the personality and interest
to appeal the decisions of the RAB-NCR and
DILG Secretary Lina exonerating Montoya from
the administrative charges against him and
reinstating him to the service is the PNP as a
bureau. It was the PNP, in the exercise of its
authority to implement internal discipline
among its members, which instigated the
administrative investigation of Montoya, so it
may be deemed the prosecuting government
party. And it is the PNP which stands to suffer as
a result of the purportedly wrongful
exoneration of Montoya, since it would be
compelled to take back to its fold a delinquent
member.
Given all of the foregoing, the Court upholds the
decision of the RAB-NCR, affirmed by DILG Secretary
Lina, reinstating Montoya to the service. It was only the
RAB-NCR which properly acquired jurisdiction over
the appeal filed before it and was able to render a
decision after a consideration of both sides to the
controversy.
3. Yes, the right to due process of
petitioner was violated. In the instant case, the
Summary Dismissal Proceedings against
Montoya were flawed from the very beginning
when these were conducted without due notice
to him. The NCR Regional Director, through
Manere, never contested the fact that the
Hearing Officer proceeded with his
investigation without giving notice to Montoya.
Without notice, Montoya was unable to attend
the hearings, present written or oral arguments,
and submit evidence in his favor; he was
completely deprived of the opportunity to be
heard on the administrative charges against
him and was irrefragably denied due
process.
Page 15 of 20
4. No. the petitioner is not delayed in
appealing. The decision of the summarily
dismissing him. The Court reviews the vital
dates. Montoya was able to receive a copy of
the 23 June 2000 Decision of the NCR Regional
Director dismissing him from service on 20 July
2000. He erroneously filed his Petition for
Review/Motion for Reconsideration with the
PNP Chief on 1 August 2000. The PNP denied
Montoyas Petition/Motion on 3 July 2002, two
years after the filing thereof, citing lack of
jurisdiction, considering that the proper
appellate body is the RAB-NCR. Thus, Montoya
was only able to file his appeal of the decision of
the NCR Regional Director before the RAB-NCR
on 2 September 2002.
Obviously, Montoyas appeal on 2
September 2002 with the RAB-NCR, the
appellate body with jurisdiction, was filed way
beyond 10 days from his receipt of a copy of
the NCR Regional Directors decision on 20 July
2000. However a void judgment does not
become final and executory and may be
challenged at any time.
5. Yes, HEREFORE, premises
considered, the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Philippine
National Police is ORDERED to reinstate
petitioner PO2 Ruel C. Montoya to the police
service without loss of seniority rights and with
full payment of his salaries and backwages
covering the period effective from the time of
his dismissal from the service up to his
reinstatement.
9. ATENEO DE MANILA VS. HON. CAPULONG,
MAY 27, 1993
DOCTRINE: Minimum standards to be satisfied
in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in
academic institutions, such as Petitioner
University herein, thus:
1. The students must be informed in
writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them;
2. That they shall have the right to
answer the charges against them with
the assistance of counsel, if desired:
3. They shall be informed of the evidence
against them
4. They shall have the right to adduce
evidence in their own behalf; and
5. The evidence must be duly considered
by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school
authorities to hear and decide the
case.
FACTS: As a requisite to membership, the
Aquila Legis, a fraternity organized in the
Ateneo Law School, a fraternity organized in the
Ateneo Law School, held its initiation rites on
February 8, 9 and 10, 1991, for students
interested in joining its ranks. As a result of such
initiation rites, Leonardo "Lennie" H. Villa, a first
year student of petitioner university, died of
serious physical injuries at Chinese General
Hospital on February 10, 1991. He was not the
lone victim, though, for another freshman by the
name of Bienvenido Marquez was also
hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center for
acute renal failure occasioned by the serious
physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same
occasion.
February 11, 1991 - Petitioner Dean
Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating
Committee which was tasked to investigate and
submit a report within 72 hours on the
circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie
Villa. Said notice also required respondent
students to submit their written statements
within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt.
Although respondent students received a copy
of the written notice, they failed to file a reply.
In the meantime, they were placed on
preventive suspension.
February 14, 1991 – JSAF Investigating
Committee, after receiving the written
statements and hearing the testimonies of
several witness, found a prima facie case against
respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of
the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline."
Respondent students were then
required to file their written answers to the
formal charge on or before February 18, 1991;
Page 16 of 20
otherwise, they would be deemed to have
waived their right to present their defenses.
February 20, 1991 - Petitioner Dean
Castillo created a Disciplinary Board to hear the
charges against respondent students.
In a letter dated February 20, 1991 –
(Respondent students were informed that they
had violated Rule No. 3 of the Rules on
Discipline contained in the Law School
Catalogue. Said letter also states: "The
complaint/charge against you arose from
initiations held on February 8-10, 1991. The
evidence against you consist of testimonies of
students, showing your participation in acts
prohibited by the School regulations." Finally, it
ordered respondent students to file their
written answers to the above charge on or
before February 22 1991, otherwise they would
be deemed to have waived their defenses.
In a motion dated February 21, 1991 -
respondent students, through counsel,
requested that the investigation against them be
held in abeyance, pending action on their
request for copies of the evidence against them.
Respondent students were then directed
by the Board to appear before it at a hearing on
February 28, 1991 to clarify their answer with
regard to the charges filed by the investigating
committee for violation of Rule No. 3.
However, in a letter to a petitioners
dated February 27, 1991, counsel for
respondent students moved to postpone the
hearing from February 28, 1991 to March 1,
1991.
Respondent students were directed to
appear on March 2, 1991 for clarificatory
questions.
March 5, 1991 - Petitioner Bernas wrote
Dean Castillo that, "in cases where the
Disciplinary Board is not prepared to impose
the penalty of dismissal, I would prefer that the
Board leave the decision on the penalty to the
Administration so that this case be decided not
just on the Law School level but also on the
University level."
In a resolution dated March 9, 1991 - The
Board found respondent students guilty of
violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School
Rules on Discipline which prohibits
participation in hazing activities. The Board
found that respondent students acted as master
auxiliaries or "auxies" during the initiation rites
of Aquila Legis, and exercised the "auxies
privilege," which allows them to participate in
the physical hazing.
However, the respondent students claim
that they were there to assist and attend to the
needs of the neophytes, actually they were
assigned a definite supportive role to play in the
organized activity.
In conclusion, the Board pronounced
respondents guilty of hazing, either by active
participation or through acquiescence.
However, in view of the lack of unanimity
among the members of the Board on the penalty
of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the
penalty to the University Administration.
Petitioner Dean del Castillo waived her
prerogative to review the decision of the Board
and left to the President of the University the
decision of whether to expel respondents or not.
In a resolution dated March 10, 1991-
petitioner Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, as President of
the Ateneo de Manila University, accepted the
factual findings of the Board, thus: "that as
Master Auxiliaries they exercised the 'auxie's
privilege;' that even assuming they did not lay
hands on the neophytes," respondents students
are still guilty in accordance with the principle
that "where two or more persons act together in
the commission of a crime, whether they act
through the physical volition of one or of all,
proceeding severally or collectively, each
individual whose will contributes to the
wrongdoing is responsible for the whole."
Fr. Bernas, in describing the offense
which led to the death of Leonardo Villa,
concluded that the "offense of the respondents
can be characterized as grave and serious,
subversive of the goals of Christian education
and contrary to civilized behavior." Accordingly,
Page 17 of 20
he imposed the penalty of dismissal on all
respondent students.
In a resolution dated March 18, 1991-
The Board excluded respondent students Abas
and Mendoza from the coverage of the
resolution of March 10, 1991, inasmuch as at the
time the latter resolution was promulgated,
neither had as yet submitted their case to the
Board. Said resolution also set the investigation
of the two students on March 21, 1991.
On March 18, 1991- Respondent
students filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with prayer for temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction 14
alleging that they were currently enrolled as
students for the second semester of school year
1990-91. Unless a temporary restraining order
is issued, they would be prevented from taking
their examinations. The petition principally
centered on the alleged lack of due process in
their dismissal. (Granted)
Judge Madayag issued a temporary
restraining order the enjoining petitioners from
dismissing respondent students and stopping
the former from conducting hearings relative to
the hazing incident.
On April 7, 1991- The temporary
restraining order were issued on March 18,
1991 lapsed. Consequently, a day after the
expiration of the temporary restraining order,
Dean del Castillo created a Special Board to
investigate the charges of hazing against
respondent students Abas and Mendoza.
Respondent students reacted
immediately by filing a Supplemental Petition of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
prayer for a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction, to include the aforesaid
members of the Special Board, as additional
respondents to the original petition.
Petitioners moved to strike out the
Supplement Petition arguing that the creation of
the Special Board was totally unrelated to the
original petition which alleged lack of due
process in the conduct of investigations by the
Disciplinary Board against respondent
students; that a supplemental petition cannot be
admitted without the same being set for hearing
and that the supplemental petition for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order will,
in effect, extend the previous restraining order
beyond its mandatory 20-day lifetime.
Acting on the urgent motion to admit the
supplemental petition with prayer for a
temporary restraining order, Judge Amin, as
pairing judge of respondents Judge Capulong,
granted respondent students' prayer on April
10, 1991.
On May 17, 1991- Respondent Judge
ordered petitioners to reinstate respondent
students. Simultaneously, the court ordered
petitioners to conduct special examinations in
lieu of the final examinations which allegedly
the students were not allowed to take, and
enjoined them to maintain the status quo with
regard to the cases of Adel Abas and Zosimo
Mendoza pending final determination of the
issue of the instant case. Lastly, it directed
respondent students to file a bond in the
amount of P50,000.00. The Special Board
investigating petitioners Abas and Mendoza and
directed the dropping of their names from its
roll of students.
May 21, 1991- Respondent judge issued
the writ of preliminary injunction upon posting
by respondents of a bond dated May 17, 1991 in
the amount of P50,000.00.
ISSUES:
1. Whether a school is within its rights in
expelling students from it economic community
pursuant to its disciplinary rules and moral
standards
2. Was there a denial of dues process
against the respondent students
RULING: We grant the petition and reverse the
order of respondent judge ordering
readmission of respondent students.
Respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion when he ruled that respondent
Page 18 of 20
students had been denied due process in the
investigation of the charges against them.
Issue 1: Yes, Ateneo has the competence and the
power to dismiss its erring students therefore it
had validly exercised such power. The students
do not deserve to claims such venerable
instirtuion such as Ateneo as their own a minute
longer for they may foreseeable cast a
malevolent institution on students currently
enrolled as well as those who come after them.
We have consistently upheld the salutary
proposition that admission to an institution of
higher learning is discretionary upon a school,
the same being a privilege on the part of the
student rather than a right. While under the
education Act of 1982, students have a right "to
freely choose their field of study, subject to
existing curricula and to continue their course
therein up to graduation," such right is subject,
as all rights are, to the established academic and
disciplinary standards laid down by the
academic institution
It will seriously impair petitioner
university's academic freedom which has been
enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and the present
1987 Constitutions. At this juncture, it would be
meet to recall the essential freedoms subsumed
by Justice Felix Frankfurter in the term
"academic freedom" cited in the case of Sweezy
v. New Hampshire, 37 thus:
1. who may teach:
2. what may be taught;
3. how it shall be taught; and
4. who may be admitted to study.
Issue 2: It is the threshold argument of
respondent students that the decision of
petitioner Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S. J., then
President of the Ateneo de Manila University, to
expel them was arrived at without affording
them their right to procedural due process. We
are constrained to disagree as we find no
indication that such right has been violated. On
the contrary, respondent students' rights in a
school disciplinary proceeding, as enunciated in
the cases of Guzman v. National University, 22
Alcuaz v. PSBA, Q.C. Branch 23 and Non v.
Dames II 24 have been meticulously respected
by petitioners in the various investigative
proceedings held before they were expelled.
Minimum standards to be satisfied in the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic
institutions, such as Petitioner University
herein, thus:
1. The students must be informed in
writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them;
2. That they shall have the right to answer
the charges against them with the assistance of
counsel, if desired:
3. They shall be informed of the evidence
against them
4. They shall have the right to adduce
evidence in their own behalf; and
5. The evidence must be duly considered by
the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and
decide the case.
There was no denial of due process
because the Dean of the Ateneo Law School,
notified and required respondent students on
February 11, 1991 to submit within twenty-four
hours their written statement on the incident,
27 the records show that instead of filing a
reply, respondent students requested through
their counsel, copies of the charges. The nature
and cause of the accusation were adequately
spelled out in petitioners' notices dated
February 14 and 20, 1991. 30 It is to be noted
that the February 20, 1991 letter which quoted
Rule No. 3 of its Rules of Discipline as contained
in the Ateneo Law School Catalogue was
addressed individually to respondent students.
Petitioners' notices/letters dated February 11,
February 14 and 20 clearly show that
respondent students were given ample
opportunity to adduce evidence in their behalf
and to answer the charges leveled against them.
The requisite assistance of counsel was
met when, from the very start of the
Page 19 of 20
investigations before the Joint Administration
Faculty-Student Committee, the law firm of
Gonzales Batiler and Bilog and Associates put in
its appearance and filed pleadings in behalf of
respondent students. Respondent students may
not use the argument that since they were not
accorded the opportunity to see and examine
the written statements which became the basis
of petitioners' February 14, 1991 order, they
were denied procedural due process. Granting
that they were denied such opportunity, the
same may not be said to detract from the
observance of due process, for disciplinary
cases involving students need not necessarily
include the right to cross examination.
It is accepted legal doctrine that an
exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of
remedies is when the case involves a question of
law, 36 as in this case, where the issue is
whether or not respondent students have been
afforded procedural due process prior to their
dismissal from petitioner university.
10. JONATHAN I. SANG-AN vs. EQUATOR
KNIGHTS DETECTIVE AND SECURITY
AGENCY, INC., G.R. No. 173189, February
13, 2013
DOCTRINE: In order to validly dismiss an
employee, the observance of both substantive and
procedural due process by the employer is a
condition sine qua non. The termination of
employment must be based on a just or
authorized cause and the dismissal can only be
effected, after due notice and hearing.
Procedural due process requires that the
employee be given a notice of the charge against
him, an ample opportunity to be heard, and a
notice of termination. Jurisprudence has
expounded on the guarantee of due process,
requiring the employer to furnish the employee
with two written notices before termination of
employment can be effected: a first written
notice that informs the employee of the
particular acts or omissions for which his or her
dismissal is sought, and a second written notice
which informs the employee of the employer's
decision to dismiss him. In considering whether
the charge in the first notice is sufficient to
warrant dismissal under the second notice, the
employer must afford the employee ample
opportunity to be heard.
The Labor Code provides that an
employee may be dismissed on the ground of
serious misconduct. The misconduct, to be serious
within the meaning of the Labor Code, must be of
such grave and aggravated character and not
merely trivial or unimportant. It is also important
that the misconduct be in connection with the
employee's work to constitute just cause for his
separation.
FACTS: The Petitioner was the Assistant
Operation Manager of the Respondent, who was
tasked with the duty of assisting in the
operations of the security services and
safekeeping of firearms. On April 21, 2001,
Respondent discovered that two firearms were
missing from its inventory, and the
investigation revealed that it was the Petitioner
who might have been responsible for the loss.
As a result, the Petitioner was temporarily
suspended from work pending further
investigation.
During the suspension of the Petitioner,
a security guard under the supervision of the
former was apprehended for having an
unlicensed firearm, of which was issued by the
Petitioner. Accordingly, the Respondent
dismissed the Petitioner based on the two
violations he committed, on the ground of
serious misconduct, a just cause to terminate an
employee.
The Petitioner filed with the NLRC a
complaint for illegal suspension with prayer for
reinstatement, however, he treated his case as
one for illegal dismissal and alleged that he had
been denied due process when he was
dismissed. Likewise, the Petitioner contended
that no charge had been laid against him, and
there was no hearing or investigation of any
kind, as well as and he was not given any chance
or opportunity to defend himself.
Respondent opposed that they
substantially complied with the procedural
requirements of due process for a letter was
given to the Petitioner, which did not mean as
his dismissal, rather, he was only suspended –
Page 20 of 20

the very reason for the case for illegal
suspension was filed by the Petitioner before
the LA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioner was
afforded both substantive and procedural due
process by the Respondent in order for the
former to be validly dismissed from
employment.
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the
Respondent was able to comply with the
substantive due process since the Petitioner
clearly committed a serious misconduct, a just
cause to terminate an employee. However, the
Respondent fails to comply with the procedural
due process as prescribe in Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code.
the charge in the first notice is sufficient to
warrant dismissal under the second notice, the
employer must afford the employee ample
opportunity to be heard.
The Supreme Court’s review of the
records shows that the Petitioner was not
furnished with any written notice that informed
him of the acts he committed justifying his
dismissal from employment. Additionally, the
Petitioner was never given any notice that
allowed him to air his side and to avail of the
guaranteed opportunity to be heard.

The rules require that for termination of

employment based on just causes as defined in
Article 282 of the Labor Code the following
procedure must be observe by the employer:

(a) A written notice served on the employee

specifying the ground or grounds for
termination, and giving to said employee
reasonable opportunity within which to
explain his side;
(b) A hearing or conference during which
the employee concerned, with the
assistance of counsel if the employee so
desires, is given opportunity to respond
to the charge, present his evidence, or
rebut the evidence presented against
him; and
(c) A written notice of termination served
on the employee indicating that upon
due consideration of all the
circumstances, grounds have been
established to justify his termination.

Also, jurisprudence has expounded on

the guarantee of due process, requiring the
employer to furnish the employee with two
written notices before termination of
employment can be effected: a first written
notice that informs the employee of the
particular acts or omissions for which his or her
dismissal is sought, and a second written notice
which informs the employee of the employer's
decision to dismiss him. In considering whether