Case # 85

Valerio Kalaw vs. Ma. Elena Fernandez

G.R. NO 166357 January 14, 2015

FACTS:
In the case at bar, Kalaw presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong
sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that
respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as
mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD. However, the Supreme Court in its September 19, 2011
decision dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity of the marriage on the ground that there was no factual basis for the
conclusion of psychological incapacity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage was void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:
YES. The Court in granting the Motion for Reconsideration held that Fernandez was indeed psychologically incapacitated as they
relaxed the previously set forth guidelines with regard to this case.

Case # 86
ROBERT F. MALLILIN VS. LUZ G. JAMESOLAMIN AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL.
G.R. NO 192718 February 18, 2015
FACTS:
Robert and Luz were married on September 6, 1972. They begot three (3) children. On March 16, 1994, Robert filed a complaint for declaration
of nullity of marriage before the RTC, Branch 23, Cagayan de Oro City (RTC-Br. 23). In the complaint, Robert alleged that at the time of the
celebration of their marriage, Luz was suffering from psychological and mental incapacity and unpreparedness to enter into such marital life and
to comply with its essential obligations and responsibilities. Such incapacity became even more apparent during their marriage when Luz
exhibited clear manifestation of immaturity, irresponsibility, deficiency of independent rational judgment, and inability to cope with the heavy
and oftentimes demanding obligation of a parent. Luz filed her Answer with Counterclaim contesting the complaint. She averred that it was
Robert who manifested psychological incapacity in their marriage. Despite due notice, however, she did not appear during the trial. Assistant
City Prosecutor Isabelo Sabanal appeared for the State. When Robert testified, he disclosed that Luz was already living in California, USA, and
had married an American. He also revealed that when they were still engaged, Luz continued seeing and dating another boyfriend, a certain Lt.
Liwag. He also claimed that from the outset, Luz had been remiss in her duties both as a wife and as a mother as shown by the following
circumstances: (1) it was he who did the cleaning of the room because Luz did not know how to keep order; (2) it was her mother who prepared
their meal while her sister was the one who washed their clothes because she did not want her polished nails destroyed; (3) it was also her sister
who took care of their children while she spent her time sleeping and looking at the mirror; (4) when she resumed her schooling, she dated
different men; (5) he received anonymous letters reporting her loitering with male students; (6) when he was not home, she would receive male
visitors; (7) a certain Romy Padua slept in their house when he was away; and (6) she would contract loans without his knowledge. In addition,
Robert presented the testimony of Myrna Delos Reyes Villanueva (Villanueva), Guidance Psychologist II of Northern Mindanao Medical Center.
On May 8, 2000, while the case was pending before the trial court, Robert filed a petition for marriage annulment with the Metropolitan Tribunal
of First Instance for the Archdiocese of Manila (Metropolitan Tribunal). On October 10, 2002, the Metropolitan Tribunal handed down a decision
declaring their marriage invalid ab initio on the ground of grave lack of due discretion on the part of both parties as contemplated by the second
paragraph of Canon1095. This decision was affirmed by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal (NAMT). Prior to that, on September 20,
2002, the RTC had rendered a decision declaring the marriage null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Luz as she
failed to comply with the essential marital obligations. The CA, in its November 20, 2009 Decision,4 granted the petition and reversed the RTC
decision. The decision, including the decretal portion, partially reads: [W]e find that the trial court committed a reversible error. Closer scrutiny
of the records reveals, as correctly noted by the Solicitor General, sexual infidelity are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition
but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

ISSUE:
Whether the totality of the evidence adduced proves that Luz was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
RULING:
"Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental not merely
physical incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed... and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations
to live together; observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support. There is hardly a doubt that the intendment of... the law has
been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo C. De Quintos, Jr.,[9]the Court reiterated the well-settled guidelines in resolving petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage, embodied in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,[10] based on Article 36 of the Family Code.

Thus:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven
by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be... psychological not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes.

The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.

Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.

The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state

Guided by these pronouncements, the Court is of the considered view that Robert's evidence failed to establish the psychological incapacity of
Luz.

First, the testimony of Robert failed to overcome the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage. Other than his self-serving testimony,
no other evidence was adduced to show the alleged incapacity of Luz.

Second, the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz was not medically or clinically identified, and sufficiently proven during the
trial.

As correctly found by the CA, sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not, by themselves, constitute grounds for declaring a marriage
void based on psychological incapacity.

Third, the psychological report of Villanueva, Guidance Psychologist II of the Northern Mindanao Medical Center, Cagayan de Oro City, was
insufficient to prove the psychological incapacity of Luz.

Fourth, the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal is insufficient to prove the psychological incapacity of Luz. Although it is true that in the case
of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,[14] the Court stated that interpretations given by... the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts, still it is subject to the law on evidence.

In fine, the Court holds that the CA decided correctly. Petitioner Robert failed to adduce sufficient and convincing evidence to prove the alleged
psychological incapacity of Luz.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Case # 87
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS COURT OF APPEALS AND MOLINA
G.R. NO 108763 February 13, 1997
268 SCRA 198, 212
FACTS:
The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of
psychological incapacity. The couple got married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as
husband and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered his money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance
and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances. In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was
estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their
child. Since then he abandoned them.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:
The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and confliction personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet the
essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness. Reynaldo’s action at the time of the marriage did not manifest
such characteristics that would comprise grounds for psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her
husband cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In
addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered as
psychological incapacity.

The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in this case:

 burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff

 root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined
 such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
 such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of marital obligations of marriage
 such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code
 decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be respected
 court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the state.

Case # 88
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS QUINTERO - HAMANO
G.R. NO 149498 May 20, 2004
428 SCRA 735
FACTS:
Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the
ground of psychological incapacity. She and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a
month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then gave birth on November 16, 1987. In 1988, Lolita
and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a month of their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas
to celebrate the holidays with his family. Toshio sent money for two months and after that he stopped giving financial support. She wrote him
several times but never respondent. In 1991, she learned from her friend that Toshio visited the country but did not bother to see her nor their
child. Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to him remained unserved. Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an
ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The motion was granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy of
the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Toshio filed to respond after the lapse
of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita filed a motion to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation.

ISSUE:
Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligation.

HELD:
The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological
illness. Although as rule, actual medical examinations are not needed, it would have greatly helped Lolita had she presented evidence that
medically or clinically identified Toshio’s illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. It is essential that a person show
incapability of doing marital obligation due to some psychological, not physical illness. Hence, Toshio was not considered as psychologically
incapacitated.
Case # 89
CHI MING SOI VS CA
G.R. NO 119190 January 16, 1997
266 SCRA 324
FACTS:
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the celebration of their wedding, they proceed to the house of defendant’s
mother. There was no sexual intercourse between them during their first night and same thing happened until their fourth night. In an effort
to have their honeymoon in a private place, they went to Baguio but Gina’s relatives went with them. Again, there was no sexual intercourse
since the defendant avoided by taking a long walk during siesta or sleeping on a rocking chair at the living room. Since May 1988 until March
1989 they slept together in the same bed but no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Because of this, they submitted themselves for
medical examination to an urologist in Chinese General Hospital in 1989. The result of the physical examination of Gina was disclosed, while
that of the husband was kept confidential even the medicine prescribed. There were allegations that the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married her
is to maintain his residency status here in the country. Gina does not want to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and want their marriage declared
void on the ground of psychological incapacity. On the other hand, the latter does not want to have their marriage annulled because he loves
her very much, he has no defect on his part and is physically and psychologically capable and since their relationship is still young, they can still
overcome their differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another physical examination and the result was there is no evidence of
impotency and he is capable of erection.

ISSUE:
Whether Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife constitutes psychological incapacity.

HELD:
The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the
mind of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marital
obligations and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to
stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children thus constant non-
fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity and wholeness of the marriage.

Case # 90
MARABLE VS MARABLE
G.R. NO 178741 January 17, 2011
639 SCRA 557

FACTS:
On December 19, 1970, petitioner and respondent eloped and were married in civil rights at Tanay, Rizal before Mayor Esguerra. A church
wedding followed on December 30, 1970 and their marriage was blessed with 5 children. Their marriage turned sour. Verbal and physical
quarrels became common occurrences. Petitioner developed a relationship with another woman. Respondent learned about the affair, and
petitioner promptly terminated it. But despite the end of the affair, their quarrels aggravated. Petitioner felt that he was unloved, unwanted
and unappreciated and this made him indifferent towards respondent. Petitioner left the family home and stayed with his sister in Antipolo City.
He gave up all the properties which he and respondent had accumulated during their marriage in favor of respondent and their children. Later,
he converted to Islam after dating several women. On October 8, 2001, petitioner decided to sever his marital bonds and filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent on the ground of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential responsibilities of
marital life. Petitioner averred that he came from a poor family and was already exposed to the hardships of farm life at an early age. His father
left their family to live with another woman with whom he had seven other children. This caused petitioner’s mother and siblings to suffer
immensely. He further alleged that he supported himself through college and worked hard for the company he joined. But despite his success
at work, he alleged that his misery and loneliness as a child lingered as he experienced a void in his relationship with his own family. Petitioner
presented the Psychological Report of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist from the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Tayag’s report
stated that petitioner is suffering from “Antisocial Personality Disorder,” characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness,
impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness and lack of remorse. The report also revealed that petitioner’s personality disorder is rooted in deep
feelings of rejection starting from the family to peers, and that his experiences have made him so self-absorbed for needed attention. It was Dr.
Tayag’s conclusion that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. The RTC rendered a decision annulling
petitioner’s marriage to respondent on the ground of petitioner’s psychological incapacity. Upon appeal by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), the CA reversed the RTC decision. CA denied MR.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is psychologically incapacitated.

HELD:
NO! CA’s decision was upheld. Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Case # 91
OCHOSA VS ALANO
G.R. NO 167459 January 26, 2011
640 SCRA 517
FACTS:
Bona’s illicit affairs with other men started at the onset of their marriage on October 27, 1973, when Jose was assigned in various parts of the
country as an officer in the AFP. She continued her infidelity even when they lived together at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City sometime in 1985,
whenever Jose was out of their living quarters.

In 1987, Jose was incarcerated in Camp Crame for rebellion for the alleged participation of the failed coup d’etat. He heard circulation of rumors
of Bona getting caught having sex with his driver, Corporal Gagarin.

He got a military pass from his jail warden and confronted Bona about the rumors, which she and Gagarin admitted. Since then they were
separated, and their foundling, Ramona Celeste, stayed with Bona in Basilan until 1994 to live with Jose.

Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa filed a Petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage between him and Bona J. Alano, based on the ground of the
latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations of marriage.

Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist, one of the witnesses, testified and submitted a psychological evaluation report on Bona’s mental state. The
interviews she had with Jose and two of his witnesses brought her to the conclusion that respondent was suffering from histrionic personality
disorder, and it was traceable to her family history.

On January 11, 1999, the dispositive portion of the trial court declared the marriage of Jose and Bona void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity of the respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Court finds that Bona’s illness exhibited gravity, antecedence, and
incurability.

OSG appealed the said ruling to the CA, and the CA subsequently granted the appeal and reversed the ruling of the trial court decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.

RULING:
No. There is inadequate credible evidence that her defects were already present at the inception of, or prior to, the marriage. Bona’s alleged
psychological incapacity did not satisfy the jurisprudential requisite of “juridical antecedence”. Her persistent sexual infidelity and abandonment
are not badges of psychological incapacity nor can’t it be traced to the inception of their marriage.

Case # 92
YAMBAO VS REPUBLIC
G.R. NO 184063 January 24, 2011
640 SCRA 355

FACTS:
Petitioner Cynthia Yambao (hereinafter petitioner wife) filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of her marriage with respondent Patricio
Yambao (hereinafter respondent husband) after 35 years of marriage. She invoked the ground of psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36
of the Family Code.

Petitioner wife alleged that since the beginning, her marriage with the respondent husband had been marred by bickering, quarrels, and
recrimination due to the latter’s inability to comply with the essential obligations to married life. She elaborated by saying that through all the
years of their married life, she was the only one who earned a living and took care of the children and that respondent husband just ate and
slept all day and would spend time with friends. In addition, she claimed that respondent husband would venture into several businesses but all
of these failed. Respondent husband was also a gambler. Petitioner wife also claimed that, when their children were babies, respondent did not
even help to change their diapers or feed them, even while petitioner was recovering from her caesarean operation, proffering the excuse that
he knew nothing about children. Later, respondent husband became insecure and jealous and would get mad every time he would see petitioner
 talking to other people, even to her relatives. When respondent husband started threatening to kill petitioner, she decided to leave
the conjugal abode and live separately from him. She then consulted a psychiatrist who concluded that respondent was indeed psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.

Respondent husband denied that he has refused to work. He claimed that he had been trying to find a decent job, but was always unable to
because of his old age and lack of qualifications. He also claimed that he did not stay long in the jobs he had because the same could not
support the needs of his family, and yielded benefits that were not commensurate to the efforts he exerted. He had ventured into small
businesses but they failed due to various economic crises. Respondent further claimed that he was not, in fact, contented with living with
petitioner’s relatives since his every move was being watched with eagle eyes. He also denied that he gambled. He alleged that even without a
steady source of income, he still shared in the payment of the amortization of their house in BF Homes, Parañaque City. He also denied that he
threatened to kill petitioner, considering that there was never any evidence that he had ever harmed or inflicted physical injury on petitioner to
justify the latter having a nervous breakdown. He further alleged that he never consulted any psychiatrist, and denied that he was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

RTC dismissed the petition for lack of merit holding that petitioner wife’s evidence failed to support her argument that respondent husband was
indeed psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations. Thus:

• The court said that, even as petitioner claimed to be unhappy in the marriage, it is incontrovertible that the union lasted for over thirty years
and the parties were able to raise three children into adulthood without suffering any major parenting problems.

o The court also noted that respondent was faithful to petitioner and never physically abused her.

o Likewise, when the parties lived with petitioner’s parents, respondent got along well enough with her family.

• The court recognized that respondent did indeed have many faults, such as his indolence and utter irresponsibility. However, the RTC said,
respondent’s failure to find decent work was due to his not having obtained a college degree and his lack of other qualifications. Likewise,
respondent’s failure in business could not be entirely attributed to him, since petitioner was a business partner in some of these ventures.

• RTC also rejected the supposed negative effect of respondent’s Dependent Personality Disorder. The RTC said that, although the evidence
tended to show that respondent would unduly rely upon petitioner to earn a living for the family, there was no evidence to show that the latter
resented such imposition or suffered with the additional financial burdens passed to her by her husband.

• The RTC concluded that while respondent might have been deficient in providing financial support, his presence, companionship, and love
allowed petitioner to accomplish many things. Thus, respondent could be relied on for love, fidelity, and moral support, which are obligations
expected of a spouse under Article 68 of the Family Code.

• Lastly, the RTC rejected petitioner’s claim that she suffered through respondent’s overbearing jealousy. It found that respondent only became
jealous when he thought that petitioner was cheating on him. The RTC determined that jealousy was not a character trait that contributed to
respondent’s psychological dysfunction; much less did it amount to psychological or mental torture on petitioner.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. It held that:

o Petitioner failed to show that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage

o Petitioner exerted efforts to find a source of income to support his family. However, his failure to find a suitable job and the failure of his business
ventures were not mental but physical defects and, hence, could not be considered “psychological incapacity” as contemplated under the law.

o The fact that the parties lived together for 35 years and raised three children well, and the fact that respondent never
physically abused petitioner belied the former’s psychological incapacity.

o The respondent’s refusal to care for the children was not psychological incapacity but “merely constituted refusal to perform the task,” which is
not equivalent to an incapacity or inability.

• It rejected petitioner’s allegation of respondent’s unbearable jealousy. It said that the same must be shown as a manifestation of a disordered
personality which would make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state. The CA averred that a
jealous attitude simply evinced respondent’s love for his wife, whom he could not bear to lose to another man.

o The the purported threats to kill petitioner is an “emotional immaturity” and not psychological incapacity.

o Lastly, the CA found the report of expert witness Dr. Edgardo Juan Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino) to be unsupported by sufficient evidence since the
findings therein were not corroborated by any other witness. Moreover, the CA said, neither the report nor petitioner’s testimony established
that respondent’s psychological condition was grave enough to bring about the inability of the latter to assume the essential obligations of
marriage, so that the same was medically permanent or incurable.
ISSUE:
WON the totality of petitioner wife’s evidence establish respondent’s psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage?

HELD:
NO.

Case # 93
GALANG VS REPUBLIC
G.R. NO 168335 June 6, 2011
650 SCRA 524
FACTS:
In March 1994, Nestor and Juvy contracted marriage in Pampanga. In August 1999, Nestor filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage with Juvy alleging the latter’s psychological incapacity to exercise the essential obligations of marriage, as the same was a
kleptomaniac, gambler and a swindler; that Juvy suffers from “mental deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted discernment and total lack of
care, love and affection [towards him and their] child” basing these allegations on Juvy’s unwillingness to prepare breakfast and the incident
where Juvy almost lost their son in the market. He posited that Juvy’s incapacity was “extremely serious” and “appears to be incurable.”

Nestor presented Anna Liza Guiang, a psychologist, who testified that she conducted psychological test on the former. In her Psychological
Report, the psychologist made the findings on couple, stating that the husband is psychologically mature while his wife is not, without citing the
tests conducted and the reason for the wife’s incapacity.

RTC ruled on the nullity of the marriage which was affirmed by the CA, citing that the facts presented satisfied the Santos doctrine.

ISSUE:
Whether there is basis to nullify the respondent’s marriage to Juvy on the ground that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, Juvy
suffered from psychological incapacity that prevented her from complying with her essential marital obligations.

RULING:
None. The Supreme Court held that the totality of Nestor’s evidence – his testimonies and the psychologist, and the psychological report and
evaluation – insufficient to prove Juvy’s psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. Psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. The defect should refer to “no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage.” It must be confined to “the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. The defect should refer to “no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.

It is not absolutely necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that
psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. [Brenda Marcos v. Marcos]

Instead of serving as a guideline, Molina Doctrine unintentionally became a straight jacket; it forced all cases involving psychological incapacity
to fit into and be bound by it. [Ngo Te v. Yu-Te] In Ting v Velez-Ting, far from abandoning Molina, the Ngo Te case simply suggested the relaxation
of its stringent requirements; the Ngo Te case merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriages based on psychological incapacity.

In the present case, the psychologist did not even identify the types of psychological tests which she administered on Nestor and the root cause
of Juvy’s psychological condition. There was no showing that any mental disorder existed at the inception of the marriage. The report failed to
prove the gravity or severity of Juvy’s alleged condition, specifically, why and to what extent the disorder is serious, and how it incapacitated her
to comply with her marital duties; the report did not even categorically state the particular type of personality disorder found. The report failed
to establish the incurability of Juvy’s condition. The report’s pronouncements that Juvy “lacks the initiative to change” and that her mental
incapacity “appears incorrigible” are insufficient to prove that her mental condition could not be treated, or if it were otherwise, the cure would
be beyond her means to undertake.

Petition was granted. Galang’s petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Juvy Salazar under Article 36 of the Family Code was
dismissed.
Case # 94
AURELIO VS AURELIO
G.R. NO 175367 June 6, 2011
650 SCRA 561
FACTS:
Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on March 23, 1988. They have two sons, namely: Danilo
Miguel and Danilo Gabriel. Respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
In her petition, respondent alleged that both she and petitioner were psychologically incapacitated of performing and complying with their
respective essential marital obligations. In addition, respondent alleged that such state of psychological incapacity was present prior and even
during the time of the marriage ceremony. Hence, respondent prays that her marriage be declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Petitioner filed a Motion to dismiss the petition. Petitioner principally argued that the petition failed to state a cause of action and that it
failed to meet the standards set by the Court for the interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC issued an
Order denying petitioner's motion. In denying petitioner's motion, the RTC ruled that respondent's petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
complied with the requirements of the Molina doctrine, and whether or not the allegations are meritorious would depend upon the proofs
presented by both parties during trial. The CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC and held that
respondent's complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage when scrutinized in juxtaposition with Article 36 of the Family Code and the Molina
doctrine revealed the existence of a sufficient cause of action.

ISSUE:
Is the declaration of nullity of marriage valid under art. 36 of the Family Code?

HELD:
Petitioner anchors his petition on the premise that the allegations contained in respondent's petition are insufficient to support a declaration of
nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Specifically, petitioner contends that the petition failed to comply with three of the Molina
guidelines, namely: that the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be alleged in the complaint; that such illness must be grave enough
to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage; and that the non-complied marital obligation must be
stated in the petition.

First, contrary to petitioner's assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of psychological incapacity was stated and alleged in the complaint.
We agree with the manifestation of respondent that the family backgrounds of both petitioner and respondent were discussed in the complaint
as the root causes of their psychological incapacity. Moreover, a competent and expert psychologist clinically identified the same as the root
causes.

Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a nature as to bring about a disability for them to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. The psychologist reported that respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic
Features. Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder. The incapacity of both
parties to perform their marital obligations was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and incurable.

Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital obligations that were not complied with were alleged in the petition. As can be easily
gleaned from the totality of the petition, respondent's allegations fall under Article 68 of the Family Code which states that "the husband and
the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support."

Given the allegations in respondent's petition for nullity of marriage, this Court rules that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioner's motion to dismiss. By grave abuse of discretion is meant capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. DENIED.

Case # 95
TYRONE KALAW VS MALYN FERNANDEZ
G.R. NO 166357 September 19, 2011
657 SCRA 822
FACTS:
Tyrone Kalaw and Malyn Fernandez got married in 1976. After the birth of their 4th child, Tyrone had an affair with Jocelyn Quejano. In May
1985, Malyn left the conjugal home and her four children with Tyrone. Meanwhile, Tyrone started living with Jocelyn, and they had three more
children. In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children. On July 6, 1994, nine years since the de facto separation
from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged that Malyn was
psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of their marriage. He
alleged that 1) She leaves the children without proper care and attention as she played mahjong all day and all night; 2) She leaves the house to
party with male friends and returned in the early hours of the following day; and 3) She committed adultery on June 9, 1985 in Hyatt Hotel with
one Benjie whom he saw half-naked in the hotel room. Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a Catholic canon law
expert, Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on Malyn’s psychological incapacity. Dr. Gates explained that Malyn suffers from Narcissistic
Personalityu Disorder and that it “may have been evident even prior to her marriage” because it is rooted in her family background and
upbringing. Fr. Healy concluded that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital duties. He explained that her psychological
incapacity is rooted in her role as the breadwinner of her family. This role allegedly inflated Malyn’s ego to the point that her needs became
priority, while her kids’ and husband’s needs became secondary.

ISSUE:
Whether Tyrone has sufficiently proven that Malynsuffers from psychological incapacity

HELD:
No. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the
conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. No proof
whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to beauty salons or her frequent partying with friends. Malyn’s sexual infidelity was also not
proven because she was only dating other men. Even assuming that she had an extramarital affair with another man, sexual infidelity cannot
be equated with obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity.

Case # 96
RICARDO TORING VS TERESITA TORING
G.R. NO 165321 August 3, 2010
626 SCRA 389
FACTS:
Ricardo and Teresita were married and had 3 children. Ricardo then filed a petition for annulment based on Teresita psychological incapacity.
He alleged that Teresita was an adulteress and a squanderer. The doctor who performed the psychological evaluation conducted on Ricardo and
their son, Richardson, testified that the major factor that contributed to the demise of the marriage is Teresita Narcissistic Personality Disorder
that rendered her incapable to fulfill her essential marital obligations.

ISSUE:
Is there sufficient basis to declare Ricardo and Teresita marriage void due to psychological incapacity?

HELD:
No. Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability, to be sufficient basis to annul a marriage. The psychological incapacity should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage." It is not acceptable that a mere narration of the statements of Ricardo and Richardson, coupled with the results of the
psychological tests administered only on Ricardo, without more, already constitutes sufficient basis for the conclusion that Teresita suffered
from Narcissistic Personality Disorder.

Case # 97
BACCAY VS BACCAY
G.R. NO 173138 December 1, 2010
636 SCRA 519
FACTS:
Noel and Maribel were sweethearts. He found Maribel's snobbish and hard-to get traits attractive.

Around 1997, he decided to break up with Maribel because he was already involved with another woman. They agreed to see each other on a
friendly basis but the two had several romantic episodes.

In November 1998, Maribel informed Noel that she was pregnant with his child. Upon advice of his mother, Noel grudgingly married Maribel.
The two lived on Noel's family. Maribel remained aloof and didn't contribute to his family's coffer. She refused to have sex with him.

Sometime in 1999, Noel and Maribel had an intense quarrel about Maribel's alleged miscarriage causing the latter to leave the house and never
came back.

Noel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of Manila. RTC declared the marriage null and void on the ground of
Maribel's alleged psychological incapacity. Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist who presented as Noel's witness, found Maribel unable to
perform the essential marital obligations of marriage due to a Narcissistic Personality Disorder.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between Noel and Maribel null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
RULING:
No. Noel failed to provide sufficient evidence to sustain a finding that Maribel was psychologically incapacitated. Noel's evidence merely
established that Maribel refused to have sexual intercourse with him after their marriage, and that she left him after their quarrel when he
confronted her about her alleged miscarriage. The psychologist failed to establish that Maribel’s alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder
incapacitated her from validly assuming the essential obligations of the marriage. The same psychologist even testified that Maribel was capable
of entering into marriage except that it would be difficult for her to sustain one. Mere difficulty, it must be stressed, is not the incapacity
contemplated under the Article 36 of the Family Code. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal," or a "neglect"
in the performance of some marital obligations. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage.

Case # 98
AGRAVIADOR VS AGRAVIADOR
G.R. NO 170729 December 8, 2010
637 SCRA 519
FACTS:
On May 23, 1973, the petitioner and the respondent contracted marriage. They begot four children. On March 1, 2001, the petitioner filed with
the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the respondent, under Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged that the
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as she was carefree and irresponsible, and refused
to do household chores like cleaning and cooking; stayed away from their house for long periods of time; had an affair with a lesbian; did not
take care of their sick child; consulted a witch doctor in order to bring him bad fate; and refused to use the family name Agraviador in her
activities. The respondent moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the root cause of her psychological incapacity was not medically
identified and alleged in the petition. The RTC nullified the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent in its decision. It saw merit in the
petitioner’s testimony and the psychiatric evaluation report. The CA reversed and set aside the RTC resolution, and dismissed the petition.

ISSUE:
Is there basis to nullify the petitioner’s marriage to the respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations?

HELD:
The court resolves to deny the petition for lack of merit, and hold that no sufficient basis exists to annul the marriage, pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code and its related jurisprudence. The totality of evidence presented failed to establish the respondent’s psychological incapacity.
In the present case, the petitioner’s testimony failed to establish that the respondent’s condition is a manifestation of a disordered personality
rooted on some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that makes her completely unable to discharge the essential marital
obligations. If at all, the petitioner merely showed that the respondent had some personality defects that showed their manifestation during the
marriage; his testimony sorely lacked details necessary to establish that the respondent’s defects existed at the inception of the marriage. In
addition, the petitioner failed to discuss the gravity of the respondent’s condition; neither did he mention that the respondent’s malady was
incurable, or if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the respondent’s means to undertake. The petitioners declarations that the
respondent "does not accept her fault," "does not want to change," and "refused to reform" are insufficient to establish a psychological or
mental defect that is serious, grave, or incurable as contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. The Court also finds that the Psychiatric
Evaluation Report fell short in proving that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital duties. The doctor
did not personally evaluate and examine the respondent. Largely, the doctor relied on the information provided by the petitioner. DENIED.

Case # 99
MENDOZA VS REPUBLIC
G.R. NO 157649 November 12, 2012
685 SCRA
FACTS:
Petitioner wife appeals the decision promulgated on March 19, 2003, whereby the CA reversed the judgment of the RTC declaring her marriage
with respondent Dominic C. Mendoza as null and void. The CA held the testimonies of petitioner’s witnesses insufficient to establish Dominic’s
psychological affliction to be of such a grave or serious nature that it was medically or clinically rooted.

Petitioner assails the CA’s refusal to be bound by the expert testimony and psychiatric evaluation she had presented in the trial of the case, and
the CA’s reliance on the pronouncements in Dagdag, Hernandez and Pesca, supra. She contends that the report on the psychiatric evaluation
conducted by Dr. Samson more than complied with the requirements prescribed in Santos v. Court of Appeals and Molina. She insists that the
CA should have applied the ruling in Marcos v. Marcoso the effect that personal medical or psychological examination was not a requirement
for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
ISSUE:
Is OSG appeal no longer required under A.M. No. 02-11-10?Whether or not the totality of evidence presented was enough to support a finding
of respondent’s psychological incapacity.

RULING:
1. The contention is grossly erroneous and unfounded. The Resolution nowhere stated that appeals by the OSG were no longer required. On
the contrary, the Resolution explicitly required the OSG to actively participate in all stages of the proceedings. The obvious intent of the
Resolution was to require the OSG to appear as counsel for the State in the capacity of a defensor vinculi (i.e., defender of the marital bond) to
oppose petitions for, and to appeal judgments in favor of declarations of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby
ensuring that only the meritorious cases for the declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity-those sufficiently
evidenced by gravity, incurability and juridical antecedence-would succeed.

2. We consider the CA’s refusal to accord credence and weight to the psychiatric report to be well taken and warranted. The CA correctly
indicated that the ill-feelings that she harbored towards Dominic, which she admitted during her consultation with Dr. Samson, furnished the
basis to doubt the findings of her expert witness; that such findings were one-sided, because Dominic was not himself subjected to an actual
psychiatric evaluation by petitioner’s expert; and that he also did not participate in the proceedings; and that the findings and conclusions on
his psychological profile by her expert were solely based on the self-serving testimonial descriptions and characterizations of him rendered by
petitioner and her witnesses.

By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and understandable to give weight to the expert opinions
furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in
granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in
determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,
then actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case
presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of
evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.

Case # 100
REPUBLIC VS ENCELAN
G.R. NO 170022 January 9, 2013
688 SCRA 215
FACTS:
Respondent Cesar married Lolita and the union bore two children. To support his family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia. While still in Saudi
Arabia, Cesar learned that Lolita had been having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez (Alvin). Subsequently, Lolita allegedly left the conjugal home
with her children and lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated. Thereafter, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against
Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolitas psychological incapacity.

At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolitas infidelity and subsequent abandonment of the family home. He testified that he continued
to provide financial support for Lolita and their children even after he learned of her illicit affair with Alvin.

RTC declared Cesars marriage to Lolita void. Upon reconsideration, CA affirmed the RTCs decision. The Office of the Solicitor General then filed
the present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there exists sufficient basis to nullify the marriage.

HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
Case # 101
GLEN VINAS VS MARY GRACE PAREL – VINAS
G.R. NO 208790 January 21, 2015

FACTS:
Glenn filed a Petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace. Glenn sought professional guidance and submitted himself
to a psychological evaluation by Clinical Psychologist. The doctor found him as “amply aware of his marital roles” and “capable of maintaining
mature and healthy heterosexual relationship.” On the other hand, Mary Grace’s personality was assessed through the data gathered from Gle
nn and his cousin and diagnosed her to be suffering from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder with antisocial traits. The doctor then concluded th
at Mary Grace and Glenn’s relationship is not founded on mutual love, trust, respect, commitment and fidelity to each other. Hence, Dr. Tayag
recommended the propriety of declaring the nullity of the couple’s marriage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lack of personal examination or assessment of a psychologist or psychiatrist is fatal in a petition for the decla
ration of nullity of marriage.

RULING:
No. The lack of personal examination or assessment of the respondent by a psychologist or psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a petition for t
he declaration of nullity of marriage. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. In the case of Mary Grace, however, the documentary evidence offered
do not sufficiently prove the root cause, gravity, incurability of Mary Grace’s condition and that it existed at the inception of marriage.
Moreover, while the various tests administered on the petitioner could have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological conditi
on, this same statement cannot be made with respect to the respondent’s condition. To make conclusions and generalizations on the respond
ent’s psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as p
roof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.

Case # 102
MARCOS VS MARCOS
G.R. NO 136490 October 19, 2000

FACTS:
Wilson Marcos and Brenda Marcos first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacanang Palace, she as an escort of
Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. They got married twice, first was on September 6, 1982 and on May
8, 1983 and blessed with five children. After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in different
business ventures that did not succeeded. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a
consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would also inflict physical harm on their children. In 1992, they were already living separately. On
October 16, 1994, when Brenda saw him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. Wilson then turned violent, inflicting physical
harm on her and even on her mother who came to her aid. On October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and sought refuge in her
sister’s house. On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself to medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center. Thus, petitioner filed
for annulment of marriage in the RTC assailing Article 36 of the Family Code. The court ruled the respondent to be psychologically incapacitated
to perform his marital obligations. But the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC because psychological incapacity had not been
established by the totality of the evidence presented. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a need for personal medical examination of respondent to prove psychological incapacity? Whether the totality of
evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity?

HELD:
The testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner’s sister and the social worker were not enough to sustain a finding that the
respondent was psychologically incapacitated. Personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement for a
declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity. Although
Supreme Court is convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of these acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that
his “defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Case # 103
BUENAVENTURA VS CA
G.R. NO 126376 November 20, 2003

FACTS:
Defendant spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the parents of plaintiffs Consolacion, Nora, Emma and Natividad as well as
of defendants Fidel, Tomas, Artemio, Clarita, Felicitas, Fe, and Gavino, all surnamed JOAQUIN. The married Joaquin children are joined in
this action by their respective spouses. Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds of sale covering 6 parcels of land executed
by defendant parents Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito in favor of their co-defendant children and the corresponding certificates of title
issued in their names. In seeking the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid deeds of sale and certificates of title, plaintiffs, in their
complaint, aver that the purported sale of the properties in litis was the result of a deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest
of the compulsory heirs (plaintiffs herein) of their legitime.

ISSUE:
Whether Petitioners have a legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale.

RULING:
Petitioners do not have any legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale. As the appellate court stated, petitioners’ right to
their parents’ properties is merely inchoate and vests only upon their parents’ death. While still living, the parents of petitioners are free to
dispose of their properties. In their overzealousness to safeguard their future legitime, petitioners forget that theoretically, the sale of the lots
to their siblings does not affect the value of their parents’ estate. While the sale of the lots reduced the estate, cash of equivalent value replaced
the lots taken from the estate.

Case # 104
NINAL VS BAYADOG
G.R. NO 133778 March 14, 2000
328 SCRA 122

FACTS:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. She was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on
April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On
February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident

After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging
that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity
or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for
annulment of marriage under Article 47 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:
(a) Whether or not Pepito and Norma’ living together as husband and wife for at least five years exempts them from obtaining a
marriage license under Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
(b) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their
deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her especially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal
is already dead.

RULING:
(a) On the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-
year period should be computed on the basis of cohabitation as “husband and wife” where the only missing factor is the special contract of
marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date
of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. The five-year period should be the
years immediately before the day the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity—meaning no third party
was involved at any time within the five years, and continuity—that is, unbroken. Otherwise, if that five-year cohabitation period is computed
without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be
sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived
faithfully with their spouse.

(b) The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. Consequently,
void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the
parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
Case # 105
ABLAZA VS REPUBLIC
G.R. NO 158298 August 11, 2010
628 SCRA 27

FACTS:
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the RTC in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage
contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The petitioner alleged that the marriage
between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950,
thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the
surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before
his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between
Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio. On October 18, 2000, the
RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that petition is filed out of time and that petitioner is not a party to marriage. Motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC on the ground that the action must
be filed by the proper party, which in this case should be filed by any of the parties to the marriage. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is a real party in interest inthe action to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother?

HELD:
Yes. The applicable law when marriage was contracted between Cresenciano and Leonila on December 26, 1949, is the old Civil Code, the law in
effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate
the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner. The case was
reinstated and its records returned to RTC for further proceedings.

Case # 106
ATIENZA VS BRILLIANTES
A.M. NO MTJ – 92 – 706 March 29, 1995
243 SCRA 32, 35

FACTS:
Lupo Almodiel Atienza filed an administrative case against Judge Brillantes for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety. Complainant
alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at a subdivision in Makati, which he purchased in 1987. One
day, he caught the respondent asleep in his bedroom. He asked the houseboy about him and the latter said that the judge had been cohabiting
with De Castro. Atienza did not bother to wake up the respondent instead asked the houseboy to take care of his two children. After that, the
respondent prevented him from visiting his child and has alienated the affection of his children. The Complainant also claims that the respondent
is married to Zenaida Ongkiko. The judge denies having been married to Ongkiko because their marriage was celebrated twice without marriage
license, therefore, his marriage to De Castro in civil rights in Los Angeles, California was because he believed in good faith and for all legal
purposes, that his first marriage was solemnized without marriage license. He further argues that Article 40 of the Family Code is not applicable
in his case because his first marriage in 1965 was governed by the Civil Code and the 2nd relationship was 1991 under the Family Code. No
retroactive Effect.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the absence of marriage license of his previous marriage justifi3es his act to cohabit with De Castro.

HELD:
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At the time he went through the two
marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license. Any law student would know that a
marriage license is necessary before one can get married. Respondent was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he
and Ongkiko were married for the second time. His failure to secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and
bad faith.

Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first
marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given “retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested
or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.” This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure.
Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
Case # 107
MERCADO VS TAN
G.R. NO 137110 August 1, 2000
337 SCRA 122
FACTS:
The accused, Vincent Mercado was in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976. Despite the
prior marriage he got married to complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991. On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed
by complainant through counsel with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present case before
this Court against said accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated January 22, 1993. On November 13, 1992, or
more than a month after the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutor’s Office, accused filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma.
Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void. Despite this, the Trial Court charged Vincent with bigamy since his prior marriage was still subsisting
at the time he had contracted his second marriage. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The petitioner then filed a case to
the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Is the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior marriage necessary for remarriage?

RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the assailed decision. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, ‘the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.’ But here, the
final judgment declaring null and void accused’s previous marriage came not before the celebration of the second marriage, but after, when the
case for bigamy against accused was already tried in court. And what constitutes the crime of bigamy is the act of any person who shall contract a
second subsequent marriage ‘before’ the former marriage has been legally dissolved.

It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage,
there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage before contracting the second marriage.

Case # 108
MORIGO VS PEOPLE
G.R. NO 145226 February 6, 2004
422 SCRA 376
FACTS:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a while but after receiving a card from Barrete and various
exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts. They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition
for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration
of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arraignment
since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete
was void ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good faith.

ISSUE:
Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from the
bigamy case.

RULING:
No. considering that the first marriage was void ab initio makes Morigo acquitted in the Bigamy case.

As provided by Art. 3, part 3 of the Family Code “A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before
the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age”. “The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35 (2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.” As provided by Art. 4. Given these 2
articles, Morigo’s first marriage is considered void ab initio.

Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a
solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his
marriage when he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.
Case # 109
JANILO VS PEOPLE
G.R. NO 164435 Sept 29, 2009
601 SCRA 236

FACTS:
On November 1979, the accused Victoria S. Jarillo, being previously united in lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo in 1974, and without the
said marriage having been legally dissolved, contracted a second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was only discovered
in 1999. On the same year, Emmanuel Uy (2nd husband) filed against the appellant a civil case for annulment of marriage before the RTC.
Parenthetically, Jarillo filed for declaration of nullity of their marriage against Alocillo in 2000. For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her
marriage to Alocillo was null and void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of
their marriage; (2) her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage license; and (3) the action had prescribed,
since Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978. Notwithstanding her defenses, the RTC found Jarillo guilty for the crime of
bigamy in 2001 and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of six years to ten years of prision mayor. On appeal to the CA,
petitioner’s conviction was affirmed. It held that petitioner committed bigamy when she contracted marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy
because, at that time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by the court. This being so, the presumption is, her
previous marriage to Alocillo was still existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also struck down, for lack of sufficient evidence,
petitioner’s contentions that her marriages were celebrated without a marriage license, and that Uy had notice of her previous marriage as far
back as 1978. In the meantime, the RTC rendered a decision in 2003, declaring petitioner’s 1974 marriage to Alocillo null and void ab initio on
the ground of Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. Said decision became final and executory. In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked
said declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her conviction.

ISSUE:
W/N CA committed a reversible error in affirming the conviction of Jarillo for the crime of bigamy despite the supervening proof that her
marriage to Alocillo had been declared void.

HELD:
No. Jarillo’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Alocillo cannot
be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one having
been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated. Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or
voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s
marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy,
because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted. Without a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, it is presumed to be subsisting. Any decision in the civil action for nullity
would not erase the fact that the guilty party entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in
the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.

Case # 110
TENEBRO VS CA
G.R. NO 150758 February 18, 2004
423 SCRA 272

FACTS:
Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas in 1990. The two lived together continuously and without interruption until the later
part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Petitioner thereafter
left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner contracted yet
another marriage with a certain Nilda Villegas. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas countered that his
marriage with Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there being no record of such. He further argued that his second marriage, with Ancajas, has
been declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for bigamy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Tenebro can use psychological incapacity as ground for absolution of bigamy case against him.

RULING:
No. In invoking Article 36 of the Family Code, petitioner failed to realize that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned. The subsequent judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the
Philippines’ penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the first marriage. As a second or subsequent marriage contracted
during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely
regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently,
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes “any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage
has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings”. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Case # 111
ANTONE VS BERONILLA
G.R. NO 183824 December 8, 2010
637 SCRA 615

FACTS:
Myrna Antone alleged in her Affidavit-Complaint,filed in March 2007, that she and Leo were married in 1978. However, Leo contracted a second
marriage with Cecile Maguillo in 1991. The prosecution filed the Information in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in a criminal case of Bigamy.
Pending the setting of the case for arraignment, Leo moved to quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense because his marriage with Myrna was declared null and void as of April 2007 and became final and executory on May 2007. Leo argues
that since the marriage had been declared null and void from the beginning, there was actually no first marriage to speak of. Thus, absent the
first marriage, the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute the crime of bigamy. The prosecution argued that the marriage of Myrna
and Leo on 1978 was not severed prior to his second marriage on 1991, for which bigamy has already been committed before the court declared
the first marriage null and void on 2007. The RTC sustained the motion to quash relying on Morigo v. People. Similarly, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether a subsequent declaration of nullity of the first marriage only after contracting the subsequent marriage is immaterial in the crime of
bigamy.

RULING:
Article 40 of the Family Code has reversed the previous ruling of People v. Mendoza (under the Civil Code) declaring that: (a) a case for bigamy
based on a void ab initio marriage will not prosper because there is no need fora judicial decree to establish that a void ab initio marriage is
invalid; and (b) a marriage declared void ab initio has retroactive legal effect such that there would be no first valid marriage to speak of after
all, which renders the elements of bigamy complete. In fact, this was exhaustively discussed in Mercado v. Tan. It stated that, under the Family
Code a subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage is immaterial in a bigamy case because, by then the crime had already
been consummated. Otherwise stated, a person who contracts a subsequent marriage absent a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage is guilty of bigamy. While, Morigo v. People was promulgated after Mercado, the facts are different. In Mercado, the first marriage
was actually solemnized, although later declared void ab initio. While in Mendoza, no marriage ceremony was performed by a
duly authorized solemnizing officer, because what occurred was a mere signing of a marriage contract through a private act. Thus, there is no
need to secure a judicial declaration of nullity before Morigo can contract a subsequent marriage. The ruling of Morigo is not applicable to this
case.

Case # 112
TEVES VS PEOPLE
G.R. NO 188775 August 24, 2011
656 SCRA 307

FACTS:
On 26 November 1992, a marriage was solemnized between Cenon Teves (Cenon) and Thelma Jaime-Teves (Thelma). After the marriage, Thelma
left to work abroad and would only come home to the Philippines for vacations. In 2002, Thelma was informed that her husband had contracted
marriage with a certain Edita Calderon. Thelma then went to the National Statistics Office and secured a copy of the Certificate of Marriage
indicating that her husband (Cenon) and Edita contracted marriage on 10 December 2001 in Bulacan. In 2006, the uncle of Thelma, filed a
complaint accusing petitioner Cenon of bigamy. Petitioner was charged with bigamy under Article 349 of the RPC on June 2006. However, during
the pendency of the criminal case for bigamy, the RTC of Caloocan City, rendered a decision dated May 2006 (one month before the case for
bigamy was decided) declaring the marriage of petitioner and Thelma null and void on the ground that Thelma is physically incapacitated to
comply with her essential marital obligations pursuant to Article 36, Family Code. Said decision became final by a Certification of Finality issued
on 27 June 2006. Petitioner Cenon appealed before the CA contending that the court a quo erred in not ruling that his criminal liability had
already been extinguished. Petitioner claims that since his previous marriage was declared null and void, “there is in effect no marriage at all,
and thus, there is no bigamy to speak of.” Petitioner further contends that the ruling of the Court in Mercado v. Tan is inapplicable in his case
because in the Mercado case the prosecution for bigamy was initiated before the declaration of nullity of marriage was filed. Petitioner says that
in his case, the first marriage had already been legally dissolved at the time the bigamy case was filed in court.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner may be held guilty for the crime of Bigamy (Article 346, RPC) despite the judicial declaration that his previous marriage with
Thema is null and void.

HELD:
YES. The court held that it does not matter whether the case for declaration of nullity was filed before the case for bigamy was instituted, for as
long as the offender contracted a subsequent marriage while his previous marriage is subsisting thereby not being able to secure a Declaration
of Nullity of the First marriage AT THE TIME HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.