AMORES v.

House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

GR NO. 189600

“When the law is clear, there is no need for construction”

Facts:
In her Petition for Quo Warranto1 seeking the ouster of private respondent, petitioner alleged that,
among other things, private respondent assumed office without a formal proclamation issued by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC); he was disqualified to be a nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC
since, at the time of the filing of his certificates of nomination and acceptance, he was already 31 years
old or beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known
as the Party-List System Act; and his change of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino
workers and their families sector was not effected at least six months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections
so as to be qualified to represent the new sector under Section 15 of RA No. 7941. Respecting the age
qualification for youth sectoral nominees under Section 9 of RA No. 7941, public respondent held that it
applied only to those nominated as such during the first three congressional terms after the ratification
of the Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter registered exclusively as representing
the youth sector, which CIBAC, a multi-sectoral organization, is not.

In the matter of private respondent’s shift of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino
workers and their families sector, public respondent held that Section 15 of RA No. 7941 did not apply as
there was no resultant change in party-list affiliation. Petitioner contends that, among other things, public
respondent created distinctions in the application of Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 that are not found
in the subject provisions, fostering interpretations at war with equal protection of the laws. Hence this
petition.

Issue:
whether Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply to private respondent.

Ruling:
NO.

RA 7941
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a
period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write,
a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty
(30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of
thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied.)
The Court finds no textual support for public respondent’s interpretation that Section 9 applied only to
those nominated during the first three congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution or
until 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter registered exclusively as representing the youth sector.

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity,
there is no room for construction or interpretation.

There is likewise no rhyme or reason in public respondent’s ratiocination that after the third congressional
term from the ratification of the Constitution, which expired in 1998, Section 9 of RA No. 7941 would
apply only to sectoral parties registered exclusively as representing the youth sector. This distinction is
nowhere found in the law. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus. When the law does not
distinguish, we must not distinguish.

Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list representative who changes his political
party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he changes his
political party or sectoral affiliation within six (6) months before an election, he shall not be eligible for
nomination as party-list representative under his new party or organization. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)

What is clear is that the wording of Section 15 covers changes in both political party and sectoral
affiliation. And the latter may occur within the same party since multi-sectoral party-list organizations are
qualified to participate in the Philippine party-list system. Hence, a nominee who changes his sectoral
affiliation within the same party will only be eligible for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if
the change has been effected at least six months before the elections. Again, since the statute is clear and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
This is the plain meaning rule or verba legis, as expressed in the maxim index animi sermo or speech is the
index of intention.

FRANCISCO et al. vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

GR NO. 160261

“Verba Legis”

FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix
William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).” On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and
seven Associate Justices of this Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public
trust and other high crimes.” The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,”9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for
being insufficient in substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to
the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months
and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after
the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint11 was filed with
the Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac)
and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution.
This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment”
signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.13 Since the first
impeachment complaint never made it to the floor for resolution, respondent House of Representatives
concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and
seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective
body, has yet to act on it. Opposing petitioners on the other hand interpreted the word “initiate” to mean
the filing of the complaint. Since there was already a first complaint that never got through the
Committee, no impeachment complaint maybe filed until the lapse of the 1 year period.

ISSUES:
When is an impeachment proceeding initiated? 2. Is the second impeachment complaint valid?

HELD:
1. Art. XI, Sec. 3, pars. (1), (5) & (6) of the Constitution states:
(1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that
purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted
without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
“Initiate” of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or
set going. As Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it
means “to perform or facilitate the first action,” The Court pried the Constitutional Convention Records
to ascertain the intent of the framers of the Constitution. The framers really intended “initiate” to mean
the filing of the verified complaint to the Committee on Justice of the Lower House. This is also based on
the procedure of the U.S. Congress where an impeachment is initiated upon filing of the impeachment
complaint.
2. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5)
of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner,
another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section
3(5) of the Constitution.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION v. The Executive Secretary
GR NO. 83896

“RATIO LEGIS”

FACTS:
These two (2) petitions were consolidated per resolution dated August 9, 19881 and are being resolved
jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President
Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987. Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allows
members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices
or positions in addition to their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs
counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. It is alleged that the above-quoted Section 13,
Article VII prohibits public respondents, as members of the Cabinet, along with the other public officials
from holding any other office or employment during their tenure. In addition to seeking a declaration of
the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284. petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines charges
that notwithstanding the aforequoted "absolute and self-executing" provision of the 1987 Constitution,
then Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez, construing Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par.
(2), Article IX-B, rendered on July 23, 1987 Opinion No. 73, series of 1987,5 declaring that Cabinet
members, their deputies (undersecretaries) and assistant secretaries may hold other public office,
including membership in the boards of government corporations: (a) when directly provided for in the
Constitution as in the case of the Secretary of Justice who is made an ex-officio member of the Judicial
and Bar Council under Section 8, paragraph 1, Article VIII; or (b) if allowed by law; or (c) if allowed by the
primary functions of their respective positions; and that on the basis of this Opinion, the President of the
Philippines, on July 25, 1987 or two (2) days before Congress convened on July 27, 1987: promulgated
Executive Order No. 284. petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines charges that notwithstanding the
aforequoted "absolute and self-executing" provision of the 1987 Constitution, then Secretary of Justice
Sedfrey Ordoñez, construing Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B, rendered
on July 23, 1987 Opinion No. 73, series of 1987,5 declaring that Cabinet members, their deputies
(undersecretaries) and assistant secretaries may hold other public office, including membership in the
boards of government corporations: (a) when directly provided for in the Constitution as in the case of
the Secretary of Justice who is made an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council under Section
8, paragraph 1, Article VIII; or (b) if allowed by law; or (c) if allowed by the primary functions of their
respective positions; and that on the basis of this Opinion, the President of the Philippines, on July 25,
1987 or two (2) days before Congress convened on July 27, 1987: promulgated Executive Order No. 284.
allegedly "abolished the clearly separate, higher, exclusive, and mandatory constitutional rank assigned
to the prohibition against multiple jobs for the President, the Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet,
and their deputies and subalterns, who are the leaders of government expected to lead by example."

The Solicitor General counters that Department of Justice DOJ Opinion No. 73, series of 1987, as further
elucidated and clarified by DOJ Opinion No. 129, series of 19879 and DOJ Opinion No. 155, series of
1988,10 being the first official construction and interpretation by the Secretary of Justice of Section 13,
Article VII and par. (2) of Section 7, Article I-XB of the Constitution, involving the same subject of
appointments or designations of an appointive executive official to positions other than his primary
position, is "reasonably valid and constitutionally firm," and that Executive Order No. 284, promulgated
pursuant to DOJ Opinion No. 73, series of 1987 is consequently constitutional.

In sum, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is being challenged by petitioners on the principal
submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those provided in the Constitution.
According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution," the only
exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the
Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section
3, par. (2), Article VII thereof; and (2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and
Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.

Issue: WON the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members,
their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in
general under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB.

HELD:
NO. This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government soon led to abuses by
unscrupulous public officials who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment.

But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket
prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both
elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate
another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their
tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself.

Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the constitutional provisions in
question, the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or
elsewhere is concerned.

Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second sentence provides: "They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries." These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his
official family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as
the Members of Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of the armed forces, are
proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself
and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.

Moreover, respondents' reading of the provisions in question would render certain parts of the
Constitution inoperative. This observation applies particularly to the Vice-President who, under Section
13 of Article VII is allowed to hold other office or employment when so authorized by the Constitution,
but who as an elective public official under Sec. 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB is absolutely ineligible "for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure." Surely, to
say that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" found in Section 13, Article VII has
reference to Section 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB would render meaningless the specific provisions of the
Constitution authorizing the Vice-President to become a member of the Cabinet,15 and to act as President
without relinquishing the Vice-Presidency where the President shall not nave been chosen or fails to
qualify.16 Such absurd consequence can be avoided only by interpreting the two provisions under
consideration as one, i.e., Section 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB providing the general rule and the other, i.e.,
Section 13, Article VII as constituting the exception thereto. In the same manner must Section 7, par. (2)
of Article I-XB be construed vis-a-vis Section 13, Article VII.

It is a well-established rule in Constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to

be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a
particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes
of the instrument

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction
which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.

NOTES:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under
consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the
object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition
and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which
induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be
accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and
calculated to effect that purpose.

CHIONGBAN v. DE LEON
GR NO. L-2007

FACTS:
This is a petition seeking to permanently prohibit respondent Customs Officials from cancelling the
registration certificates of petitioner's vessels, and respondent Philippine Shipping Administration from
rescinding the sale of three vessels to petitioner. The primary basis for respondents' and intervenor's acts
is the allegation that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen and therefore not qualified by law to operate and
own vessels of Philippine registry. The Philippine Shipping Administration also alleges that petitioner
violated the contract of sale of three vessels executed between them, on the ground of misrepresentation,
petitioner having alleged in said contract that his father was a naturalized Filipino citizen. The Philippine
Shipowners' Association was later allowed to intervene and it filed its answer against the petitioner.
It is argued by respondent that this privilege of citizenship granted by subsection 2 (Article IV,
Constitution) is strictly personal and does not extend to the children of the grantee. In support of this
contention they offer two principal arguments. Firstly, that this subsection was adopted by the
Constitutional Convention merely to grant Filipino citizenship to Delegate Caram and thus obviate the
possibility of a non-Filipino signing the Constitution as one of its framers. Secondly, it is argued that the
original draft of said subsection 2 contained the phrase — "and their descendants," — which was deleted
from the final draft, thus showing that this privilege of citizenship was intended to be strictly personal to
the one who had been elected to public office and did not extend to his descendants.
ISSUE:
whether or not petitioner William Chiongbian is a Filipino citizen

HELD:
YES. In 1925, Victoriano Chiongbian, a Chinese citizen and father of the herein petitioner William
Chiongbian, was elected to and held the office of municipal councilor of the town of Plaridel, Occidental
Misamis. This fact is sufficiently established by the evidence submitted to this Court; by the findings of
the National Bureau of Investigation cited in Opinion No. 27, s. 1948, of the Secretary of Justice; and as
admitted by respondents in their pleadings. It is also shown and admitted that at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution, petitioner William Chiongbian was still a minor.

it is conclusive that upon the adoption of the Constitution, Victoriano Chiongbian, father of herein
petitioner, having been elected to a public office in the Philippines before the adoption of the
Constitution, became a Filipino citizen by virtue of Article IV, section 1, subsection 2 of the Constitution.

William Chiongbian, the herein petitioner, who was then a minor, also became a Filipino citizen by reason
of subsection 3 (Article IV) of the Constitution, his father having become a Filipino citizen upon the
adoption of said Constitution. This is also in conformity with the settled rule of our jurisprudence that a
legitimate minor child follows the citizenship of his father.

With regard to the first argument of the respondent, it may be said that the members of the Constitutional
Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person
without considering that it could also affect others. They adopted said provision fully cognizant of the
transmissive essence of citizenship as provided in subsection 3. Had it been their intention to curtail the
transmission of citizenship in such a particular case, they would have so clearly stated.

The second argument of respondents is similarly untenable. The mere deletion of the phrase — "and their
descendants," — is not determinative of any conclusion. It could have been done because the learned
framers of our Constitution considered it superfluous, knowing full well that the meaning of such a phrase
was adequately covered by subsection 3. Deletion in the preliminary drafts of the Convention are, at best,
negative guides, which cannot prevail over the positive provisions of the finally adopted Constitution.

NOTES:
Article IV
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution,
had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship.

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

SEC. 2. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.

MACALINTAL v. COMELEC
GR NO. 157013

Topic: Application of Statutory Construction

FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the
Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity.

R.A. No. 9189, entitled, "An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens
of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes," appropriates funds
under Section 29 thereof which provides that a supplemental budget on the General Appropriations Act
of the year of its enactment into law shall provide for the necessary amount to carry out its provisions.
Taxpayers, such as herein petitioner, have the right to restrain officials from wasting public funds through
the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.2 The Court has held that they may assail the validity of a
law appropriating public funds3 because expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the
purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. The challenged
provision of law involves a public right that affects a great number of citizens. The Court has adopted the
policy of taking jurisdiction over cases whenever the petitioner has seriously and convincingly presented
an issue of transcendental significance to the Filipino people. Indeed, in this case, the Court may set aside
procedural rules as the constitutional right of suffrage of a considerable number of Filipinos is involved.
The need to consider the constitutional issues raised before the Court is further buttressed by the fact
that it is now more than fifteen years since the ratification of the 1987 Constitution requiring Congress to
provide a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. Thus, strong reasons of public policy
demand that the Court resolves the instant petition10 and determine whether Congress has acted within
the limits of the Constitution or if it had gravely abused the discretion entrusted to it.

ISSUES:
(1)WON Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 violate the residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of
the Constitution?
(2) WON Section 18.5 of the same law violate the constitutional mandate under Section 4, Article VII of
the Constitution.
(3) May Congress through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in Section 25 of Rep. Act
No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and
Regulations that the Commission on Elections shall promulgate without violating the independence of the
COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?

HELD:
(1) YES. As the essence of R.A. No. 9189 is to enfranchise overseas qualified Filipinos, it behooves the
Court to take a holistic view of the pertinent provisions of both the Constitution and R.A. No.
9189. It is a basic rule in constitutional construction that the Constitution should be construed as
a whole. Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies an immigrant or permanent resident
who is "recognized as such in the host country" because immigration or permanent residence in
another country implies renunciation of one’s residence in his country of origin. However, same
Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as voter for as long as
he/she executes an affidavit to show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of
the constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that "all citizens of the
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law" must be entitled to exercise the right of suffrage
and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical
residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to
mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee voting.

Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or
enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the
immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the Philippines, but more
significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of
origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of the affidavit under Section 5(d) violates
the Constitution that proscribes "provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a
condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise."

(2) Yes. The Solicitor General asserts that this provision must be harmonized with paragraph 4,
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and should be taken to mean that COMELEC can only
proclaim the winning Senators and party-list representatives but not the President and Vice-
President.

Indeed, the phrase, proclamation of winning candidates, in Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far too
sweeping that it necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for the
presidency and the vice-presidency. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 appears to be repugnant to
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the
authority given to Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the
positions of president and vice-president.

(3) NO. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional
authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC.
Under such a situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual reticence
in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional. In the same vein, it is not correct to hold that
because of its recognized extensive legislative power to enact election laws, Congress may intrude
into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making
authority.

NOTES:
RA 9189
SEC. 5. Disqualifications. – The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act:

d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, unless
he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission
declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not
later than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall
also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be
cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National
Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.

In Chiongbian vs. De Leon,26 the Court held that a constitutional provision should function to the
full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other
provisions of that great document. Constitutional provisions are mandatory in character unless,
either by express statement or by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest.27 The
intent of the Constitution may be drawn primarily from the language of the document itself.
Should it be ambiguous, the Court may consider the intent of its framers through their debates in
the constitutional convention.

Section 18.5 of the same Act provides:

SEC. 18. On-Site Counting and Canvassing.

18. 5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of a winning candidate if
the outcome of the election will not be affected by the results thereof. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, the Commission is empowered to order the proclamation of winning candidates
despite the fact that the scheduled election has not taken place in a particular country or
countries, if the holding of elections therein has been rendered impossible by events, factors and
circumstances peculiar to such country or countries, in which events, factors and circumstances
are beyond the control or influence of the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)

R.A. No. 9189 created the JCOC, as follows:

SEC. 25. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. – A Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
is hereby created, composed of the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Constitutional
Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws, and seven (7) other Senators designated by the Senate
President, and the Chairman of the House Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, and
seven (7) other Members of the House of Representatives designated by the Speaker of the House
of Representatives: Provided, That, of the seven (7) members to be designated by each House of
Congress, four (4) should come from the majority and the remaining three (3) from the minority.

The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the power to monitor and evaluate the
implementation of this Act. It shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules
and Regulations promulgated by the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)