EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2183, February 14, 2017

CONCERNED LAWYERS OF BULACAN, Complainant, v. PRESIDING JUDGE VICTORIA

VILLALON-PORNILLOS, ETC., Respondent.

RE: PETITION FOR JUDICIAL CLEMENCY OF THEN JUDGE VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

For resolution is a petition for judicial clemency filed by Victoria Villalon-Pornillos (respondent), former
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Malolos City, Bulacan, through a letter 1 dated
December 28, 2016.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Facts

On July 7, 2009, the Court rendered a Decision,2 dismissing respondent from service, after having been
found guilty of gross misconduct, i.e., borrowing money from a lawyer in a case pending before her
court, aggravated by undue delay in rendering decisions or orders, and violation of Supreme Court
rules, directives, and circulars. The dispositive portion of the subject Decision reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, Judge Victoria Villalon-Pornillos, Presiding Judge of Branch 10 of the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos City, is found guilty of violating paragraph 7, Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court
(borrowing money from a lawyer in a case pending before her court) which is also a gross misconduct
constituting violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, aggravated by, inter alia, undue delay in
rendering decision or orders, and violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars. She
is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits,
with prejudice to reemployment in any government agency or instrumentality. Immediately upon service
on her of this decision, she is deemed to have vacated her office and her authority to act as judge is
considered automatically terminated.

SO ORDERED.3ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On August 8, 2016, respondent filed a Petition for Absolute Pardon from 'Dismissal from the Service
Sentence'4 accompanied by a letter5 dated August 4, 2016 addressed to the Office of the President
(OP), which was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), for appropriate action. 6 In a
Resolution7 dated November 8, 2016, the Court denied the said petition for being an improper pleading.

Meanwhile, on November 3, 2016, respondent also filed a letter8 addressed to the OCA, informing the
OP's transmittal of her petition for judicial clemency to the Court, and requesting that the same be
subject for judicial review and, consequently, the subject Decision be reversed in her favor. The Court,
in a Resolution9 dated November 29, 2016, noted the said letter without action.

On December 28, 2016, respondent filed another letter, 10 reiterating her plea for judicial clemency.
Respondent insists that she has endured almost eight (8) years of unfounded punishment as the
charges and findings against her were based on mere gossip. 11 Likewise, she cites the Court's
exoneration of former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, begging that the same privilege be extended
to her in the spirit of Christmas.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Court's Ruling

Judicial clemency is an act of mercy removing any disqualification from the erring judge. 13 It can be
granted only if there is a showing that it is merited; thus, proof of reformation and a showing of
potential and promise are indispensable.14

Proof of remorse and reformation is one of the requirements to grant judicial clemency. As held by the
Court in Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37,
Appealing for Judicial Clemency:15

1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not
be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the
community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an
administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong
presumption of non-reformation.

2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of
reformation.

3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years
ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.

4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal

acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or
administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.

5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify
clemency.16 (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, records are bereft of bowing that respondent has exhibited remorse for her past misdeeds,
which occurred more than eight (8) years ago. Apart from respondent's submission to the Court's
disciplinary authority, there were no signs of repentance showing that at the very least, she accepted
the judgment of the Court in her case. In fact, she even sees nothing wrong with her actions. In her
petition, respondent narrates that she "stood her ground against offers of bribery for her to agree to
issue orders that would give a go signal to the anomalous Bullet Train Project of Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo."17 She even touts herself as a judge who committed "honest acts and deeds,"18 and submits
that the only way to give her justice is through absolute pardon.19 In this relation, she firmly insists that
she was unduly deprived of her fundamental rights under the constitution when she was
unceremoniously disrobed, raising doubts as to the integrity and impartiality of the court process.

Likewise, respondent points out that the charge of borrowing money from a litigant, for which she was
dismissed, occurred more than fourteen (14) years ago and, at that time, she had a very "slim
chance"20of borrowing money since: (a) her "salary as a judge was substantially big enough compared
against other employees or lawyers or businessman"; 21 and (b) both her parents are lawyers who left
her "substantial real and personal property that would easily be sufficient for her and her children to live
for a lifetime."22 She claims the same of her late husband who was "well-off" and landed thus, making
the act imputed against her unbelievable.23

Far from exhibiting remorse and reformation, the tenor of respondent's petition only demonstrates her
attitude of impenitence, self-righteousness, and even, vindictiveness, which unquestionably renders
her undeserving of judicial clemency. Neither did she show compliance with the other requisites for
judicial clemency as cited above. Accordingly, there is no quibble that the instant petition should be
denied.

The Court, in numerous cases, has come down hard and wielded the rod of discipline against members
of the judiciary who have fallen short of the exacting standards of judicial conduct.24 Judicial clemency
is not a privilege or a right that can be availed of at any time, 25cralawred as the Court will grant it only
if there is a showing that it is merited.26 Verily, clemency, as an act of mercy removing any
disqualification, should be balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the courts. 27

WHEREFORE, the petition for judicial clemency is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6697 July 25, 2006

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, respondent.

x-------------------------x

Bar Matter No. 1227 July 25, 2006

RE: OATH-TAKING OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, INCOMING PRESIDENT OF THE

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.

x-------------------------x

A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC July 25, 2006

IN THE MATTER OF THE REMOVAL OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA FROM THE IBP BOARD
OF GOVERNORS AS EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND GOVERNOR.

IN THE MATTER OF THE LETTER-COMPLAINT OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA DATED MAY

18, 2005 TO FORTHWITH DENY/DISAPPROVE THE IBP RESOLUTION UNJUSTLY, ILLEGALLY,
ARBITRARILY, AND ABRUPTLY REMOVING HIM FROM THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
IBP FOR ABSOLUTE LACK OF BASIS AND FOR FLAGRANT DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.

DECISION

Per Curiam:

Before Us are three consolidated cases revolving around Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Governor and Executive Vice-President (EVP) Atty. Leonard de Vera. The first pertains to a disbarment
case questioning Atty. de Vera's moral fitness to remain as a member of the Philippine Bar, the second
refers to Atty. de Vera's letter-request to schedule his oath taking as IBP National President, and the
third case concerns the validity of his removal as Governor and EVP of the IBP by the IBP Board. The
resolution of these cases will determine the national presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.

A.C. No. 6697

The Office of the Bar Confidant, which this Court tasked to make an investigation, report and
recommendation on subject case,1 summarized the antecedents thereof as follows:

In a Complaint dated 11 April 2005, complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the suspension
and/or disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on the following grounds:

1) respondent's alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered

against him by the State Bar of California; and

2) respondent's alleged violation of the so-called "rotation rule" enunciated in

Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (in the Matter: 1989 IBP Elections).
 Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his own benefit funds due his
client, was found to have performed an act constituting moral turpitude by the Hearing Referee
Bill Dozier, Hearing Department – San Francisco, State Bar of California in Administrative Case
No. 86-0-18429. Complainant alleged that the respondent was then forced to resign or surrender
his license to practice law in the said state in order to evade the recommended three (3) year
suspension. Complainant asserted that the respondent lacks the moral competence necessary
to lead the country's most noble profession.

Complainant, likewise, contended that the respondent violated the so-called "rotation rule"
provided for in Administrative Matter No. 491 when he transferred to IBP Agusan del Sur
Chapter. He claimed that the respondent failed to meet the requirements outlined in the IBP By-
Laws pertaining to transfer of Chapter Membership. He surmised that the respondent's transfer
was intended only for the purpose of becoming the next IBP National President. Complainant
prayed that the respondent be enjoined from assuming office as IBP National President.

Meanwhile, in his Comment dated 2 May 2005, respondent stated that the issues raised in
above-mentioned Complaint were the very issues raised in an earlier administrative case filed
by the same complainant against him. In fact, according to him, the said issues were already
extensively discussed and categorically ruled upon by this Court in its Decision dated 11
December 2005 in Administrative Case No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard De
Vera). Respondent prayed that the instant administrative complaint be dismissed following the
principle of res judicata.

On 15 June 2005, both parties appeared before the Office of the Bar Confidant for presentation
of evidence in support of their respective allegations.

Subsequently, in a Memorandum dated 20 June 2005, complainant maintained that there is

substantial evidence showing respondent's moral baseness, vileness and depravity, which could
be used as a basis for his disbarment. Complainant stressed that the respondent never denied
that he used his client's money. Complainant argued that the respondent failed to present
evidence that the Supreme Court of California accepted the latter's resignation and even if such
was accepted, complainant posited that this should not absolve the respondent from liability.

Moreover, complainant added that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at
bar. He asserted that the first administrative case filed against the respondent was one for his
disqualification. x x x.

Bar Matter No. 1227

A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC

As earlier adverted to, Bar Matter No. 1227 refers to Atty. de Vera's letter-request to this Court to
schedule his oath taking as IBP National President. A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, on the other hand, is a letter-
report dated 19 May 2005 of IBP National President Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz (IBP President Cadiz)
furnishing this Court with the IBP's Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, removing Atty. De Vera as member
of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP, for committing acts inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP in general.2

The controversy in Bar Matter No. 1227 and A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC arose from the regular meeting of
the IBP Board of Governors held on 14 January 2005. In said meeting, by 2/3 vote (6 voting in favor
and 2 against), the IBP Board approved the withdrawal of the Petition filed before this Court docketed
as "Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. Senate of the Philippines, et al.
– Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction, SC-R165108." The Petition was intended to question the legality and/or
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9227, authorizing the increase in the salaries of judges and justices,
and to increase filing fees.3

The two IBP Governors who opposed the said Resolution approving the withdrawal of the above-
described Petition were herein respondent Governor and EVP de Vera and Governor Carlos L. Valdez. 4

On 19 January 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed this Court of the decision taken by the IBP Board
to withdraw the afore-mentioned Petition. Attached to his letter was a copy of the IBP Board's 14
January 2005 Resolution.5

On 15 April 2005, Bar Matter No. 1227, pertaining to Atty. de Vera's request for oathtaking as National
President, was filed. The same was subsequently consolidated with A.C. No. 6697, the disbarment
case filed against Atty. de Vera.6

On 22 April 2005, a plenary session was held at the 10th National IBP Convention at the CAP-Camp
John Hay Convention Center, Baguio City. It was at this forum where Atty. de Vera allegedly made
some untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in connection with the IBP Board's Resolution
to withdraw the Petition questioning the legality of Republic Act No. 9227. 7

On 10 May 2005, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining Atty. de Vera from
assuming office as IBP National President.8

On 12 May 2005, IBP Gov. Romulo A. Rivera wrote IBP National President Cadiz a letter wherein he
prayed for the removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board for having committed acts which
were inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP.9

On 13 May 2005, in the 20th Regular Meeting of the Board held at the Waterfront Hotel, Cebu City, the
IBP Board, by 2/3 vote, resolved to remove Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board of Governors
and as IBP Executive Vice President.10 Quoted hereunder is the dispositive portion of said Resolution:

NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that Governor Leonard

S. de Vera is REMOVED as a member of the IBP Board of Governors and Executive Vice
President for committing acts inimical to the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP, to wit:

1. For making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in public about the
Supreme Court and members of the IBP Board of Governors, during the Plenary Session
of the IBP 10th National Convention of Lawyers, held at CAP-Camp John Hay Convention
Center on 22 April 2005, making it appear that the decision of the IBP Board of Governors
to withdraw the PETITION docketed as "Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo
I. Cadiz, et al. vs. The Senate of the Philippines, et al., Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition With Prayer for the Issuance of A Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, S.C.-R. 165108", was due to influence and pressure from the
Supreme Court of the Philippines;

2. For making said untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies that brought the IBP
Board of Governors and the IBP as a whole in public contempt and disrepute;

3. For violating Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers which
mandates that "A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others", by making untruthful
statements, innuendos and blatant lies during the Plenary Session of the IBP 10th
National Convention of Lawyers in Baguio City;
 4. For instigating and provoking some IBP chapters to embarrass and humiliate the IBP
Board of Governors in order to coerce and compel the latter to pursue the
aforesaid PETITION;

5. For falsely accusing the IBP National President, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, during the
Plenary Session of the 10th National Convention in Baguio City of withholding from him
a copy of Supreme Court Resolution, dated 25 January 2005, granting the withdrawal of
the PETITION, thereby creating the wrong impression that the IBP National President
deliberately prevented him from taking the appropriate remedies with respect thereto,
thus compromising the reputation and integrity of the IBP National President and the IBP
as a whole.11

On 18 May 2005, Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to this Court by writing the then Hon. Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. a letter captioned as "Urgent Plea to Correct a Glaring Injustice of the IBP Board
of Governors; Vehement Protest to the Board Resolution Abruptly Removing Atty. Leonard de Vera
from the Board of Governors in Patent Violation of Due Process; Petition to Deny/Disapprove the
Completely Unjustified and Highly Arbitrary Resolution Precipitately Ousting Atty. de Vera from the
Board of Governors in Less Than Twenty Four (24) Hours from Notice and Judgment Without Formal
Investigation."12

In the said letter, Atty. de Vera strongly and categorically denied having committed acts inimical to the
IBP and its Board. He alleged that on the basis of an unverified letter-complaint filed by IBP Governor
Rivera, the IBP Board voted to expel him posthaste, without just cause and in complete disregard of
even the minimum standards of due process. Pertinent portions of his letter read:

It is evident that the Board of Governors has committed a grave and serious injustice against me
especially when, as the incumbent Executive Vice President of the IBP, I am scheduled to
assume my position as National President of the IBP on July 1, 2005. x x x

I was denied the very basic rights of due process recognized by the Supreme Court even in
administrative cases:

1. The denial of the right to answer the charges formally or in writing. The complaint
against me was in writing.

2. The denial of the right to answer the charges within a reasonable period of time after
receipt of the complaint.

3. The denial of the right to a fair hearing.

4. The denial of the right to confront the accuser and the witnesses against me. I
challenged Gov. Rivera to testify under oath so I could question him. He refused. I offered
to testify under oath so I could be questioned. My request was denied.

5. The denial of my right to present witnesses on my behalf.

6. The denial of my right to an impartial judge. Governor Rivera was my accuser,

prosecutor, and judge all at the same time.

7. Gov. Rivera's prejudgment of my case becomes even more evident because when his
motion to expel me was lost in a 5-3 votes (due to his inhibition to vote), Gov. Rivera
 asked for another round of voting so he can vote to support his own complaint and
motion to expel me.13 (Emphasis and underscoring in original.)

On 27 May 2005, the IBP Board responded to the 18 May 2005 letter of Atty. de Vera. 14 In their Reply,
the IBP Board explained to this Court that their decision to remove Atty. de Vera was based on valid
grounds and was intended to protect itself from a recalcitrant member. Among the grounds cited and
elucidated by the IBP Board were the following:

(i) Atty. de Vera engaged himself in a negative media campaign and solicited resolutions from
IBP Chapters to condemn the IBP Board of Governors for its decision to withdraw the Petition,
all with the end in view of compelling or coercing the IBP Board of Governors to reconsider the
decision to withdraw the Petition.

(ii) Atty. de Vera embarrassed, humiliated and maligned the IBP Board of Governors and the
IBP National President in public or during the Plenary Session at the 10th National Convention
of Lawyers.

(iii) Rather than pacify the already agitated 'solicited' speakers (at the plenary session), Atty. de
Vera "fanned the fire", so to speak, and went to the extent of making untruthful statements,
innuendos and blatant lies about the Supreme Court and some members of the IBP Board of
Governors. He deliberately and intentionally did so to provoke the members of the IBP Board of
Governors to engage him in an acrimonious public debate and expose the IBP Board of
Governors to public ridicule.

(iv) Atty. de Vera uttered untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies, e.g., that some of the
members of the IBP Board of Governors voted in favor of the withdrawal of the petition (without
mentioning names) because "nakakahiya kasi sa Supreme Court, nakakaawa kasi ang Supreme
Court, kasi may mga kaibigan tayo sa Court." He made it appear that the IBP Board of Governors
approved the resolution, withdrawing the petition, due to "influence" or "pressure" from the
Supreme Court.15

The IBP Board explained that Atty. de Vera's actuation during the Plenary Session was "the last straw
that broke the camel's back." He committed acts inimical to the interest of the IBP Board and the IBP;
hence, the IBP Board decided to remove him.

On 3 June 2005, Atty. de Vera furnished the Court with copies of resolutions and a position paper
coming from various IBP Chapters all condemning his expulsion from the IBP Board and as IBP EVP. 16

On 15 June 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed Chief Justice Davide that in a special meeting of the
IBP Board held at the EDSA Shangri-la Plaza on 13 June 2005, the IBP Board took note of the vacancy
in the position of the IBP EVP brought about by Atty. de Vera's removal. In his stead, IBP Governor
Pura Angelica Y. Santiago was formally elected and declared as IBP EVP. 17

On 17 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested against the election of Atty. Santiago. 18 On 20 June 2005,
Atty. Santiago voluntarily relinquished the EVP position through a letter addressed to the IBP
Board.19 Thus, on 25 June 2005, during its last regular meeting, the IBP Board elected a new EVP in
the person of IBP Governor Jose Vicente B. Salazar to replace Atty. Santiago.

On 28 June 2005, IBP National President Cadiz, through a letter addressed to Chief Justice Davide,
reported to this Court Atty. Salazar's election.20 IBP National President Cadiz also requested, among
other things, that Atty. Salazar's election be approved and that he be allowed to assume as National
President in the event that Atty. de Vera is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law or should
his removal from the 2003-2005 Board of Governors and as EVP is approved by this Court. 21 Also on
28 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested the election of Atty. Salazar.22

In his Extended Comment23 dated 25 July 2005, Atty. de Vera maintained that there was absolutely no
factual or legal basis to sustain the motion to remove him from the IBP Board because he violated no
law. He argued that if the basis for his removal as EVP was based on the same grounds as his removal
from the IBP Board, then his removal as EVP was likewise executed without due notice and without
the least compliance with the minimum standards of due process of law.

Atty. de Vera strongly averred that, contrary to the utterly false and malicious charges filed against him,
the speakers at the Plenary Session of the Baguio Convention, although undeniably impassioned and
articulate, were respectful in their language and exhortations, not once undermining the stature of the
IBP in general and the IBP Board of Governors in particular. He posited that speaking in disagreement
with the Resolution of the Board during the Convention's Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove
or expel a duly-elected member of the IBP Board of Governors; and the decision to remove him only
shows that the right to freedom of speech or the right to dissent is not recognized by the incumbent IBP
Board.

Anent the charges that he accused the National President of withholding a copy of this Court's
Resolution granting the withdrawal of the Petition questioning the legality of Republic Act No. 9227,
Atty. de Vera avowed that he made no such remarks. As regards the election of a new IBP EVP, Atty.
de Vera contended that the said election was illegal as it was contrary to the provisions of the IBP By-
Laws concerning national officers, to wit:

Section. 49. Term of office. - The President and the Executive Vice President shall hold office
for a term of two years from July 1 following their election until 30 June of their second year in
office and until their successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified.

In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his functions and duties shall be performed
by the Executive Vice President, and in the event of death, resignation, or removal of the
President, the Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting President for the unexpired portion
of the term. In the event of death, resignation, removal or disability of both the President and the
Executive Vice President, the Board of Governors shall elect an Acting President to hold office
for the unexpired portion of the term or during the period of disability.

Unless otherwise provided in these By-Laws, all other officers and employees appointed by the
President with the consent of the Board shall hold office at the pleasure of the Board or for such
term as the Board may fix.24

To bolster his position, Atty. de Vera stressed that when both the President and the EVP die, resign,
are removed, or are disabled, the IBP By-Laws only provides for the election of an Acting President
and that no mention for an election for EVP was made. Thus, when such election for EVP occurs, such
is contrary to the express provision of the IBP By-Laws.

Atty. de Vera also argued that even if he were validly removed as IBP EVP, his replacement should
come from Eastern Mindanao and not from any other region, due to the Rotation Rule embodied in par.
2, Section 47, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws.

In response to Atty. de Vera's averments, the 2003-2005 IBP Board, through its counsel, submitted a
Reply dated 27 January 2006 and clarified as follows:
 (i) The IBP Board of Governors is vested with sufficient power and authority to protect itself from
an intractable member by virtue of Article VI, Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws;

(ii) Atty. de Vera was removed as a member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP not because of
his disagreement with the IBP Board's position but because of the various acts that he committed
which the IBP Board determined to be inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP as a whole;

(iii) Atty. de Vera cannot exculpate himself from liability by invoking his constitutional right to
Free Speech because, as a member of the Bar, it is his sworn duty to observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and to insist on similar conduct by others;

(iv) The IBP Board, in effecting the removal of Atty. de Vera, observed the fundamental principles
of due process. As the records would bear, Atty. de Vera was duly notified of the Regular Meeting
of the IBP Board held on 13 May 2004; was furnished a copy of Governor Rivera's Letter-
Complaint the day before the said meeting; was furnished a copy of the said Meeting's Agenda;
and was allowed to personally defend himself and his accuser, Gov. Rivera;

(v) Atty. de Vera was validly removed because the required number of votes under Section 44
of the IBP By-Laws to remove Atty. de Vera as a member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP was
duly complied with;

(vi) Atty. de Vera's replacement as IBP EVP need not come from Eastern Mindanao Region
because: (a) the rotation rule under Article VII, Section 47, par. 2 of the IBP By-Laws had already
been complied with when Atty. de Vera, who hails from Eastern Mindanao, was elected IBP
EVP; and (b) the rotation rule need not be enforced if the same will not be practicable, possible,
feasible, doable or viable; and, finally, that –

(vii) Atty. Salazar was validly elected as IBP EVP and, thus, should now be allowed to take his
oath as IBP National President.25

The Court's Ruling

AC No. 6697

In his Memorandum26 dated 20 June 2005, complainant tendered the following issues for the
consideration of the Court:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic) COMMITED

MALPRACTICE WHICH AMOUNTED TO MORAL T[U]RPITUDE IN THE STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA AND IN THE PHILIPPINES, IN THE COURSE OF HIS PRACTICE OF LAW.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE OATH OF OFFICE AS LAWYER IS ATTACHED TO THE PERSON

OF ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic) WHEREVER HE MAY GO AND NOT
NECESSARILY BOUND BY THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE PHILIPPINES.

III.
 WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE MORAL
T[U]RPITUDE, AS BASIS FOR DISBARMENT OF RESPONDENT IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDING.

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT RES JUDICATA APPLIES IN THIS CASE, DUE TO ADMIN. CASE NO.
[6052]27

The disposition of the first three related issues hinges on the resolution of the fourth issue.
Consequently, we will start with the last issue.

A.C. No. 6052 is not a bar to the filing of the present administrative case.

In disposing of the question of res judicata, the Bar Confidant opined:

To reiterate, the instant case for suspension and/or disbarment against respondent Leonard De
Vera is grounded on the following:

1) respondent's alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered

against him by the State Bar in California; and

2) respondent's alleged violation of the so-called "rotation rule" enunciated in

Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (In the Matter: 1989 IBP Elections).

It appears that the complainant already raised the said issues in an earlier administrative case
against the respondent. Verily, these issues were already argued upon by the parties in their
respective pleadings, and discussed and ruled upon by this Court in its Decision dated 11
December 2003 in Administrative Matter No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de
Vera).

As such, with respect to the first issue, this Court held that:

"As for the administrative complaint filed against him by one of his clients when he was
practicing law in California, which in turn compelled him to surrender his California license
to practice law, he maintains that it cannot serve as basis for determining his moral
qualification (or lack of it) to run for the position he is aspiring for. He explains that there
is as yet no final judgment finding him guilty of the administrative charge, as the records
relied upon by the petitioners are mere preliminary findings of a hearing referee which are
recommendatory findings of an IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline which are subject to
the review of and the final decision of the Supreme Court. He also stresses that the
complainant in the California administrative case has retracted the accusation that he
misappropriated the complainant's money, but unfortunately the retraction was not
considered by the investigating officer. xxx"

"On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he was
still practicing law in California, he explained that no final judgment was rendered by the
California Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge. He surrendered his license to
protest the discrimination he suffered at the hands of the investigator and he found it
impractical to pursue the case to the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in the
absence of contrary proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has
 the burden to prove the same. In this case, the petitioners have not shown how the
administrative complaint affects respondent De Vera's moral fitness to run for governor.

On the other hand, as regards the second issue:

"Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is
not really from Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in Parañaque and he was
originally a member of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter
membership to pave the way for his ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP post, which
is the national presidency. Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP membership,
respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule.

The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19, Article II, a lawyer
included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the particular IBP
Chapter of his preference or choice, thus:

xxx

It is clearly stated in the aforequoted section of the By-Laws that it is not automatic that a
lawyer will become a member of the chapter where his place of residence or work is
located. He has the discretion to choose the particular chapter where he wishes to gain
membership. Only when he does not register his preference that he will become a
member of the Chapter of the place where he resides or maintains office. The only
proscription in registering one's preference is that a lawyer cannot be a member of more
than one chapter at the same time.

The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this Section,
transfer of IBP membership is allowed as long as the lawyer complies with the conditions
set forth therein, thus:

xxx

The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer must be made not
less than three months prior to the election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer
wishes to transfer.

In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP membership to
Agusan del Sur on 1 August 2001. One month thereafter, IBP National Secretary Jaime
M. Vibar wrote a letter addressed to Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP PPLM
Chapter and Atty. Lyndon J. Romero, Secretary of IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing
them of respondent de Vera's transfer and advising them to make the necessary notation
in their respective records. This letter is a substantial compliance with the certification
mentioned in Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that de Vera's transfer was made
effective sometime between 1 August 2001 and 3 September 2001. On 27 February
2003, the elections of the IBP Chapter Officers were simultaneously held all over the
Philippines, as mandated by Section 29.a of the IBP By-Laws which provides that
elections of Chapter Officers and Directors shall be held on the last Saturday of February
of every other year. Between 3 September 2001 and 27 February 2003, seventeen
months had elapsed. This makes respondent de Vera's transfer valid as it was done more
than three months ahead of the chapter elections held on 27 February 2003.
In the case of Romulo G. Dinsay vs. Atty. Leopoldo D. Cioco (Administrative Case No. 2995, 27
November 1996), this Court declared that:

"The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not
to the exercise of the [Court's] administrative powers."

In the said case, respondent Clerk of Court Cioco was dismissed from service for grave
misconduct highly prejudicial to the service for surreptitiously substituting the bid price in a
Certificate of Sale from P3,263,182.67 to only P730,000.00. Thereafter a complaint for
disbarment was filed against the respondent on the basis of the same incident. Respondent,
interposing res judicata, argued that he may no longer be charged on the basis of the same
incident. This Court held that while the respondent is in effect being indicted twice for the same
misconduct, this does not amount to double jeopardy as both proceedings are admittedly
administrative in nature. This Court qualified that, in the first case, the respondent was
proceeded against as an erring court personnel under the Court's supervisory power over courts
while, in the second case, he was disciplined as a lawyer under the Court's plenary authority
over membersof the legal profession.

In subsequent decisions of this Court, however, it appears that res judicata still applies in
administrative cases. Thus, in the case of Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera vs. Judge William
Layague (Administrastive Matter No. RTJ-93-986), this Court ruled that:

"While double jeopardy does not lie in administrative cases, it would be contrary to equity
and substantial justice to penalize respondent judge a second time for an act which he
had already answered for.";

Likewise, in the recent case of Executive Judge Henry B. Basilia vs. Judge Amado L. Becamon,
Lolita Delos Reyes and Eddie Delos Reyes (Administrative Matter No. MTJ-02-1404, 14
December 2004), this Court held that:

"Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment, the present administrative
case becomes dismissible.

xxx

Under the said doctrine, a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of competent
jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally and conclusively settled if it arises in any
subsequent litigation between the same parties and for the same cause. It provides that

[a] final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive
as to the rights of the parties and their privies; and constitutes an absolute bar to
subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. Res judicata
is based on the ground that the party to be affected, or some other with whom he is in
privity, has litigated the same matter in the former action in a court of competent
jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to litigate it again.

This principle frees the parties from undergoing all over again the rigors of unnecessary
suits and repetitious trials. At the same time, it prevents the clogging of court dockets.
Equally important, res judicata stabilizes rights and promotes the rule of law."

In the instant administrative case, it is clear that the issues raised by the complainant had already
been resolved by this Court in an earlier administrative case. The complainant's contention that
 the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar as the first administrative case
was one for disqualification while the instant administrative complaint is one for suspension
and/or disbarment should be given least credence. It is worthy to note that while the instant
administrative complaint is denominated as one for suspension and/or disbarment, it prayed
neither the suspension nor the disbarment of the respondent but instead merely sought to enjoin
the respondent from assuming office as IBP National President.28

Contrary to the findings of the Bar Confidant, Adm. Case No. 6052 entitled, "In Re: Petition to Disqualify
Atty. Leonard de Vera, on Legal and Moral Grounds, From Being Elected IBP Governor for Eastern
Mindanao in the May 31 IBP Election" and promulgated on 11 December 2003 does not constitute a
bar to the filing of Adm. Case No. 6697. Although the parties in the present administrative case and in
Adm. Case No. 6052 are identical, their capacities in these cases and the issues presented therein are
not the same, thereby barring the application of res judicata.

In order that the principle of res judicata may be made to apply, four essential conditions must concur,
namely: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the
case must be a judgment or order on the merits, and (4) there must be between the first and second
action identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of action.29 In the absence of
any one of these elements, Atty. de Vera cannot argue res judicata in his favor.

It is noteworthy that the two administrative cases involve different subject matters and causes of action.
In Adm. Case No. 6052, the subject matter was the qualification of Atty. de Vera to run as a candidate
for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present administrative complaint, the
subject matter is his privilege to practice law. In the first administrative case, complainants' cause of
action was Atty. de Vera's alleged violation or circumvention of the IBP By-laws. In the present
administrative case, the primary cause of action is Atty. de Vera's alleged violation of lawyer's oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the same relief. In the first case, the complainants
sought to prevent Atty. de Vera from assuming his post as IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the
present case, as clarified by complainant in his Memorandum, what is being principally sought is Atty.
de Vera's suspension or disbarment.

The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The previous case was resolved on the
basis of the parties' rights and obligations under the IBP By-laws. We held therein that Atty. de Vera
cannot be disqualified from running as Regional Governor as there is nothing in the present IBP By-
laws that sanctions the disqualification of candidates for IBP governors. Consequently, we stressed
that the petition had no firm ground to stand on. Likewise, we held that the complainants therein were
not the proper parties to bring the suit as the IBP By-laws prescribes that only nominees - which the
complainants were not - can file with the IBP President a written protest against the candidate. The
Court's statement, therefore, that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the ground that he was not
morally fit was mere obiter dictum. Precisely, the IBP By-laws do not allow for pre-election
disqualification proceedings; hence, Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the basis of the
administrative findings of a hearing officer of the State Bar of California suspending him from the
practice of law for three years. We held in that case that –

There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit before he
can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the determination of moral fitness of a
candidate lies in the individual judgment of the members of the House of Delegates. Indeed,
based on each member's standard of morality, he is free to nominate and elect any member, so
long as the latter possesses the basic requirements under the law. For another, basically the
 disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment
or suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final judgment of an offense
which involves moral turpitude.30

What this simply means is that absent a final judgment by the Supreme Court in a proper case declaring
otherwise, every lawyer aspiring to hold the position of IBP Regional Director is presumed morally fit.
Any person who begs to disagree will not be able to find a receptive audience in the IBP through a
petition for disqualification but must first file the necessary disbarment or suspension proceeding
against the lawyer concerned.

And this is precisely what complainant has chosen to do in the instant case. As his petition is sufficient
in form and substance, we have given it due course pursuant to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. And,
considering that this case is not barred by the prior judgment in Adm. Case No. 6052, the only issue
left for consideration is whether or not Atty. de Vera can be suspended or disbarred under the facts of
the case and the evidence submitted by complainant.

The recommendation of the hearing officer of the State Bar of California, standing alone, is not
proof of malpractice.

In the case of the Suspension From The Practice of Law In The Territory of Guam of Atty. Leon G.
Maquera,31 we were confronted with the question of whether or not a member of the Philippine Bar,
who is concomitantly an attorney in a foreign jurisdiction and who was suspended from the practice of
law in said foreign jurisdiction, can be sanctioned as member of the Philippine Bar for the same
infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction.

We take the issue in Atty. Maquera one notch higher in the case of Atty. de Vera who was admitted to
the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction (State Bar of California, U.S.A.) and against whom charges
were filed in connection with his practice in said jurisdiction. However, unlike the case of Atty. Maquera,
no final judgment for suspension or disbarment was meted against Atty. de Vera despite a
recommendation of suspension of three years as he surrendered his license to practice law before his
case could be taken up by the Supreme Court of California.

In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign
jurisdiction does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the Philippines as the acts
giving rise to his suspension are not grounds for disbarment and suspension in this jurisdiction.
Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may transmute into a similar judgment of suspension
in the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign court's action includes any of the grounds for disbarment
or suspension in this jurisdiction. We likewise held that the judgment of the foreign court merely
constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical acts as lawyer.

The Maquera ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section 48, of the Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

xxxx

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
 In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

In Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. v. Fasgi Enterprises, Inc.,32 we explained that "[a] foreign judgment
is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the
basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum."

In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the
recommendation by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California does not constitute prima
facie evidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera. Complainant must prove by substantial evidence
the facts upon which the recommendation by the hearing officer was based. If he is successful in this,
he must then prove that these acts are likewise unethical under Philippine law.

There is substantial evidence of malpractice on the part of Atty. de Vera independent of the
recommendation of suspension by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California

Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. – A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a
ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts
hereinabove enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima
facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension.33

Disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the court and the public from the misconduct
of officers of the court and to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise
this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and clients may
repose confidence.34 The statutory enunciation of the grounds for disbarment on suspension is not to
be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent
power of the court over its officers cannot be restricted.35

Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Section
27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term "Malpractice." 36 That meaning is in consonance
with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a profession, not a business.37

Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules on ethical code of his profession
or which is unbecoming a member of that profession.38

Now, the undisputed facts:

1. An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State Bar of California, docketed
then as Adm. Case No. 86-0-18429. It arose from an insurance case Atty. de Vera handled involving
Julius Willis, III who figured in an automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de Vera was authorized by the
elder Willis (father of Julius who was given authority by the son to control the case because the latter
was then studying in San Diego California) for the release of the funds in settlement of the case. Atty.
de Vera received a check in settlement of the case which he then deposited to his personal account; 39

2. The Hearing referee in the said administrative case recommended that Atty. de Vera be suspended
from the practice of law for three years;40 and

3. Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which resignation was accepted by the Supreme Court
of California.41

Atty. de Vera vehemently insists that the foregoing facts do not prove that he misappropriated his
client's funds as the latter's father (the elder Willis) gave him authority to use the same and that,
unfortunately, the hearing officer did not consider this explanation notwithstanding the fact that the elder
Willis testified under oath that he "expected de Vera might use the money for a few days."

By insisting that he was authorized by his client's father and attorney-in-fact to use the funds, Atty. de
Vera has impliedly admitted the use of the Willis funds for his own personal use.

In fact, Atty. de Vera did not deny complainant's allegation in the latter's memorandum that he (de Vera)
received US$12,000.00 intended for his client and that he deposited said amount in his personal
account and not in a separate trust account and that, finally, he spent the amount for personal
purposes.42

At this point, it bears stressing that in cases filed before administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, a fact
may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence or that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.43 It means such
evidence which affords a substantial basis from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred. 44

Beyond doubt, the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his client's funds is highly unethical. Canon 16 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic about this, thus:

CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME TO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.

Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and
those of others kept by him.

In Espiritu v. Ulep45 we held that –

The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature. Being such, it requires
utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity and disinterestedness on the part of the attorney. Its fiduciary
nature is intended for the protection of the client.

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all money and
properties of his client that may come into his possession. Accordingly, he shall account for all
 money or property collected or received for or from the client. Even more specific is the Canon
of Professional Ethics:

The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he
abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.

Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the
possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not
under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him.

Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property held by him on
behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own
use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client. It is a gross
violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs the public confidence in
the legal profession and deserves punishment.

Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional
ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. Those who are guilty
of such infraction may be disbarred or suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.
(Emphases supplied.)

In herein case, as it is admitted by Atty. de Vera himself that he used his client's money for personal
use, he has unwittingly sealed his own fate since this admission constitutes more than substantial
evidence of malpractice. Consequently, Atty. de Vera now has the burden of rebutting the evidence
which he himself supplied.

In his defense, Atty. de Vera claims that he was duly authorized by the elder Willis to use the funds
intended for the latter's son. Atty. de Vera also points out that he had restituted the full amount of
US$12,000.00 even before the filing of the administrative case against him in the State Bar of
California.46

Aside from these self-serving statements, however, we cannot find anywhere in the records of this case
proof that indeed Atty. de Vera was duly authorized to use the funds of his client. In Radjaie v. Atty.
Alovera47 we declared that –

When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the
charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must
show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is
expected of him.

Atty. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by the hearing officer that the elder Willis had indeed
testified that he "expected de Vera might use the money for a few days." As Atty. de Vera had vigorously
objected to the admissibility of the document containing this statement, he is now estopped from relying
thereon. Besides, that the elder Willis "expected de Vera might use the money for a few days" was not
so much an acknowledgment of consent to the use by Atty. de Vera of his client's funds as it was an
acceptance of the probability that Atty. de Vera might, indeed, use his client's funds, which by itself did
not speak well of the character of Atty. de Vera or the way such character was perceived.

In the instant case, the act of Atty. de Vera in holding on to his client's money without the latter's
acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. It is clear that Atty. de Vera, by
depositing the check in his own account and using the same for his own benefit is guilty of deceit,
malpractice, gross misconduct and unethical behavior. He caused dishonor, not only to himself but to
the noble profession to which he belongs. For, it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants to the
profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the profession betrays their trust and
confidence.48 Respondent violated his oath to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his client.

Nevertheless, we do not agree with complainant's plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law.
The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution.49 Where any lesser penalty can accomplish
the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed.

In Mortera v. Pagatpatan,50 we imposed upon Atty. Pagatpatan two years suspension from his practice
of law for depositing the funds meant for his client to his personal account without the latter's knowledge.
In Reyes v. Maglaya;51 Castillo v. Taguines;52 Espiritu v. Atty. Cabredo IV,53 the respondents were
meted one year suspension each for failing to remit to their clients monies in the amounts of P1,500.00;
P500.00, and P51,161.00, respectively, received by them for their clients without the latter's permission.
In Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya,54 we indefinitely suspended respondent for failure to remit to his client
the amount of the measly sum of P4,344.00 representing the amount received pursuant to a writ of
execution. Considering the amount involved here – US$12,000.00, we believe that the penalty of
suspension for two (2) years is appropriate.

Transferring IBP membership to a chapter where the lawyer is not a resident of is not a ground
for his suspension or disbarment

Complainant insists that Atty. de Vera's transfer of membership from the Pasay, Parañaque, Las Piñas
and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter is a circumvention of the rotation
rule as it was made for the sole purpose of becoming IBP National President. Complainant stresses
that Atty. de Vera is not a resident of Agusan del Sur nor does he hold office therein.

In Adm. Case No. 6052, we held that Atty. de Vera's act of transferring to another IBP Chapter is not a
ground for his disqualification for the post of IBP Governor as the same is allowed under Section 19 of
the IBP By-Laws with the qualification only that the transfer be made not less than three months
immediately preceding any chapter election.

As it was perfectly within Atty. de Vera's right to transfer his membership, it cannot be said that he is
guilty of unethical conduct or behavior. And while one may incessantly argue that a legal act may not
necessarily be ethical, in herein case, we do not see anything wrong in transferring to an IBP chapter
that -- based on the rotation rule – will produce the next IBP EVP who will automatically succeed to the
National Presidency for the next term. Our Code of Professional Responsibility as well as the Lawyer's
Oath do not prohibit nor punish lawyers from aspiring to be IBP National President and from doing
perfectly legal acts in accomplishing such goal.

Bar Matter No. 1227

Administrative Matter No. 05-5-15-SC

To resolve Bar Matter No. 1227 and Administrative Matter No. 05-5- 15-SC, the following issues must
be addressed:

I. Whether the IBP Board of Governors acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing Atty.
de Vera as Governor and EVP of the IBP on 13 May 2005.

i. Whether the IBP Board of Governors complied with administrative due process in
removing Atty. de Vera.

ii. Whether the IBP removed Atty. De Vera for just and valid cause.
 II. Whether Governor Salazar was validly elected as EVP of the IBP on 25 June 2005, and can
consequently assume the Presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.

The IBP Board observed due process in its removal of Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor

We start the discussion with the veritable fact that the IBP Board is vested with the power to remove
any of its members pursuant to Section 44, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws, which states:

Sec. 44. Removal of members. – If the Board of Governors should determine after proper
inquiry that any of its members, elective or otherwise, has for any reason become unable to
perform his duties, the Board, by resolution of the Majority of the remaining members, may
declare his position vacant, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.

Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including
three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by
resolution adopted by two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the
approval of the Supreme Court.

In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever cause, the delegates from the
region shall by majority vote, elect a successor from among the members of the Chapter to which
the resigned governor is a member to serve as governor for the unexpired portion of the term.
(Emphasis supplied)

Under the aforementioned section, a member of the IBP Board may be removed for cause by resolution
adopted by two-thirds (2/3) of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of this
Court.

In the main, Atty. de Vera questions his removal from the Board of Governors on procedural and
substantive grounds. He argues that he was denied "very basic rights of due process recognized by
the Honorable Court even in administrative cases" like the right to answer formally or in writing and
within reasonable time, the right to present witnesses in his behalf, the right to a fair hearing. Atty. de
Vera protests the fact that he was not able to cross-examine the complainant, IBP Gov. Romulo H.
Rivera (Atty. Rivera) and that Atty. Rivera voted as well for his expulsion which made him accuser,
prosecutor and judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera emphasized the fact that Atty. Rivera initially
inhibited himself from voting on his own motion. However, when his inhibition resulted in the defeat of
his motion as the necessary 2/3 votes could not be mustered, Atty. Rivera asked for another round of
voting so he could vote to support his own motion.

The IBP Board counters that since its members were present during the plenary session, and personally
witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera's actuations, an evidentiary or formal hearing was no longer
necessary. Since they all witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera, it was enough that he was given an
opportunity to refute and answer all the charges imputed against him. They emphasized that Atty. de
Vera was given a copy of the complaint and that he was present at the Board Meeting on 13 May 2005
wherein the letter-complaint against him was part of the agenda. Therein, he was given the opportunity
to be heard and that, in fact, Atty. de Vera did argue his case.

We are in agreement with the IBP Board.

First, it needs stressing that the constitutional provision on due process safeguards life, liberty and
property.55 It cannot be said that the position of EVP of the IBP is property within the constitutional
sense especially since there is no right to security of tenure over said position as, in fact, all that is
required to remove any member of the board of governors for cause is a resolution adopted by 2/3 of
the remaining members of the board.

Secondly, even if the right of due process could be rightfully invoked, still, in administrative proceedings,
the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side. 56 At the outset, it is here
emphasized that the term "due process of law" as used in the Constitution has no fixed meaning for all
purposes due "to the very nature of the doctrine which, asserting a fundamental principle of justice
rather than a specific rule of law, is not susceptible of more than one general statement."57 The phrase
is so elusive of exact apprehension,58 because it depends on circumstances and varies with the subject
matter and the necessities of the situation.59

Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with "judicial process" for a trial in court is
not always essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, it
is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon different principles. The due process
clause guarantees no particular form of procedure and its requirements are not technical. Thus, in
certain proceedings of administrative character, the right to a notice or hearing are not essential to due
process of law. The constitutional requirement of due process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly
established administrative agency or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had before the making
of a determination if thereafter, there is available trial and tribunal before which all objections and
defenses to the making of such determination may be raised and considered. One adequate hearing
is all that due process requires. What is required for "hearing" may differ as the functions of the
administrative bodies differ.60

The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process. 61 Nor is an actual hearing
always essential62 especially under the factual milieu of this case where the members of the IBP Board
-- upon whose shoulders the determination of the cause for removal of an IBP governor is placed
subject to the approval of the Supreme Court – all witnessed Atty. de Vera's actuations in the IBP
National Convention in question.

It is undisputed that Atty. de Vera received a copy of the complaint against him and that he was present
when the matter was taken up. From the transcript of the stenographic notes of the 13 May 2005
meeting wherein Atty. de Vera was removed, it is patent that Atty. de Vera was given fair opportunity
to defend himself against the accusations made by Atty. Rivera.

Atty. de Vera, however, additionally questions the fact that Atty. Rivera, who authored the complaint
against him, also voted for his expulsion making him accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same time.
Atty. de Vera likewise laments the fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself from voting but when
this resulted in the defeat of his motion for lack of the necessary 2/3 vote, he agreed to another round
of voting and that, this time, he voted in favor of his motion.

For the record, of the nine governors comprising the IBP Board, six voted for Atty. de Vera's expulsion
(including Atty. Rivera) while 3 voted against it (including Atty. de Vera).

Section 44 (second paragraph) of the IBP By-Laws provides:

Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three
consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by
two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme
Court. (Emphasis supplied.)

Under the rules, a resolution for expulsion of an IBP Governor is done via a resolution adopted by 2/3
of the remaining members. The phrase "remaining members" refers to the members exclusive of the
complainant member and the respondent member. The reason therefore is that such members are
interested parties and are thus presumed to be unable to resolve said motion impartially. This being
the case, the votes of Attys. Rivera and de Vera should be stricken-off which means that only the votes
of the seven remaining members are to be counted. Of the seven remaining members, five voted for
expulsion while two voted against it which still adds up to the 2/3 vote requirement for expulsion.

The IBP Board removed Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor for just and valid cause

All the concerned parties to this case agree that what constitutes cause for the removal of an IBP
Governor has not been defined by Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws albeit it includes three consecutive
absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse. Thus, the IBP Board argues that it is vested
with sufficient power and authority to protect itself from an intractable member whose removal was
caused not by his disagreement with the IBP Board but due to various acts committed by him which
the IBP Board considered as inimical to the IBP Board in particular and the IBP in general.

Atty. de Vera, on the other hand, insists that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of the Board
during the Convention's Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or expel a duly-elected member
of the IBP Board of Governors and the decision to remove him only shows that the right to freedom of
speech or the right to dissent is not recognized by the IBP Board.

After weighing the arguments of the parties and in keeping with the fundamental objective of the IBP to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively, we hereby find that Atty. de Vera's removal from the
IBP Board was not capricious or arbitrary.

Indubitably, conflicts and disagreements of varying degrees of intensity, if not animosity, are inherent
in the internal life of an organization, but especially of the IBP since lawyers are said to disagree before
they agree.

However, the effectiveness of the IBP, like any other organization, is diluted if the conflicts are brought
outside its governing body for then there would be the impression that the IBP, which speaks through
the Board of Governors, does not and cannot speak for its members in an authoritative fashion. It would
accordingly diminish the IBP's prestige and repute with the lawyers as well as with the general public.

As a means of self-preservation, internecine conflicts must thus be adjusted within the governing board
itself so as to free it from the stresses that invariably arise when internal cleavages are made public.

The doctrine of majority rule is almost universally used as a mechanism for adjusting and resolving
conflicts and disagreements within the group after the members have been given an opportunity to be
heard. While it does not efface conflicts, nonetheless, once a decision on a contentious matter is
reached by a majority vote, the dissenting minority is bound thereby so that the board can speak with
one voice, for those elected to the governing board are deemed to implicitly contract that the will of the
majority shall govern in matters within the authority of the board.63

The IBP Board, therefore, was well within its right in removing Atty. de Vera as the latter's actuations
during the 10th National IBP Convention were detrimental to the role of the IBP Board as the governing
body of the IBP. When the IBP Board is not seen by the bar and the public as a cohesive unit, it cannot
effectively perform its duty of helping the Supreme Court enforce the code of legal ethics and the
standards of legal practice as well as improve the administration of justice.

In view of the importance of retaining group cohesiveness and unity, the expulsion of a member of the
board who insists on bringing to the public his disagreement with a policy/resolution approved by the
majority after due discussion, cannot be faulted. The effectiveness of the board as a governing body
will be negated if its pronouncements are resisted in public by a board member.

Indeed, when a member of a governing body cannot accept the voice of the majority, he should resign
therefrom so that he could criticize in public the majority opinion/decision to his heart's content;
otherwise, he subjects himself to disciplinary action by the body.

The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his removal
as EVP as well

The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his removal as
EVP as well. Section 47, Article VII of the By-Laws of the IBP provides:

SEC. 47. National Officers. – The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President and
Executive Vice President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional
governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. x x x

Thus, to be EVP of the IBP, one must necessarily be a member of IBP Board of Governors. Atty. de
Vera's removal from the Board of Governors, automatically disqualified him from acting as IBP EVP.
To insist otherwise would be contrary to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.

The Court will not interfere with the Resolution of the IBP Board to remove Atty. de Vera since
it was rendered without grave abuse of discretion

While it is true that the Supreme Court has been granted an extensive power of supervision over the
IBP,64 it is axiomatic that such power should be exercised prudently. The power of supervision of the
Supreme Court over the IBP should not preclude the IBP from exercising its reasonable discretion
especially in the administration of its internal affairs governed by the provisions of its By-Laws. The IBP
By-Laws were precisely drafted and promulgated so as to define the powers and functions of the IBP
and its officers, establish its organizational structure, and govern relations and transactions among its
officers and members. With these By-Laws in place, the Supreme Court could be assured that the IBP
shall be able to carry on its day-to-day affairs, without the Court's interference.

It should be noted that the general charge of the affairs and activities of the IBP has been vested in the
Board of Governors. The members of the Board are elective and representative of each of the nine
regions of the IBP as delineated in its By-Laws.65 The Board acts as a collegiate body and decides in
accordance with the will of the majority. The foregoing rules serve to negate the possibility of the IBP
Board acting on the basis of personal interest or malice of its individual members. Hence, the actions
and resolutions of the IBP Board deserve to be accorded the disputable presumption66 of validity, which
shall continue, until and unless it is overcome by substantial evidence and actually declared invalid by
the Supreme Court. In the absence of any allegation and substantial proof that the IBP Board has acted
without or in excess of its authority or with grave abuse of discretion, we shall not be persuaded to
overturn and set aside the Board's action or resolution.

There is no question that the IBP Board has the authority to remove its members as provided in Article
VI, Section 4467 of the IBP By-Laws. Issue arises only as to whether the IBP Board abused its authority
and discretion in resolving to remove Atty. de Vera from his post as an IBP Governor and EVP. As has
been previously established herein, Atty. de Vera's removal from the IBP Board was in accordance with
due process and the IBP Board acted well within the authority and discretion granted to it by its By-
Laws. There being no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the IBP Board, we find no reason to
interfere in the Board's resolution to remove Atty. de Vera.
The election of Atty. Salazar by the IBP Board as IBP EVP in replacement of Atty. De Vera was
conducted in accordance with the authority granted to the Board by the IBP By-Laws

In the same manner, we find no reason to disturb the action taken by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of
Governors in holding a special election to fill-in the vacant post resulting from the removal of Atty. de
Vera as EVP of the IBP since the same is a purely internal matter, done without grave abuse of
discretion, and implemented without violating the Rules and By-Laws of the IBP.

With the removal of Atty. de Vera from the Board, by virtue of the IBP Board Resolution dated 13 May
2005, he was also removed from his post as EVP; thus, there was a resultant vacancy in the position
of IBP EVP.

Article VI, Section 41(g) of the IBP By-Laws expressly grants to the Board the authority to fill vacancies,
however arising, in the IBP positions, subject to the provisions of Section 8 of the Integration Rule, 68 and
Section 11 (Vacancies),69 Section 44 (Removal of members),70 Section 47 (National officers),71 Section
48 (other officers),72and Section 49 (Terms of Office)73 of the By-Laws. The IBP Board has specific and
sufficient guidelines in its Rules and By-Laws on how to fill-in the vacancies after the removal of Atty.
de Vera. We have faith and confidence in the intellectual, emotional and ethical competencies of the
remaining members of the 2005-2007 Board in dealing with the situation within the bounds of the IBP
Rules and By-Laws.

The election by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors of a new EVP, who will assume the Presidency
for the term 2005-2007, was well within the authority and prerogative granted to the Board by the IBP
By-Laws, particularly Article VII, Section 47, which provides that "[t]he EVP shall automatically become
President for the next succeeding term." The phrase "for the next succeeding term" necessarily implies
that the EVP that should succeed Atty. Cadiz as IBP President for the next succeeding term (i.e., 2005-
2007) should come from the members of the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors. Hence, in A.M. No.
05-7-19-SC, we restrained now IBP EVP Feliciano Bautista from assuming the position of Acting
President because we have yet to resolve the question as to who shall succeed Atty. Cadiz from the
2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors.

Accordingly, the elections of Governor Santiago on 13 June 2005 as IBP EVP, and thereafter, Governor
Salazar on 25 June 2005, as the new IBP EVP, upon the relinquishment of Gov. Santiago of the
position, were valid.

Neither can this Court give credence to the argument of Atty. De Vera that, assuming his removal as
IBP Governor and EVP was valid, his replacement as IBP EVP should come from Eastern Mindanao
Region pursuant to the rotation rule set forth in Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws.

According to Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws, the EVP shall be chosen by the Board of
Governors from among the nine Regional Governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. This
is based on our pronouncements in Bar Matter 491, wherein we ruled:

"ORDER

xxxx

3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the
Board of Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [9] IBP regions) from among
themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right
of automatic succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the expiration
 of their two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9, 1985 in Bar
Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored.

4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically
succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of governors shall then elect an Executive
Vice-President from among themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be
rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president may not run for
election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until after the rotation of the
presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall
begin anew.

xxxx

(Emphasis Supplied)"

In Bar Matter 491, it is clear that it is the position of IBP EVP which is actually rotated among the nine
Regional Governors. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is merely a result of the automatic
succession rule of the IBP EVP to the Presidency. Thus, the rotation rule pertains in particular to the
position of IBP EVP, while the automatic succession rule pertains to the Presidency. The rotation with
respect to the Presidency is but a consequence of the automatic succession rule provided in Section
47 of the IBP By-Laws.

In the case at bar, the rotation rule was duly complied with since upon the election of Atty. De Vera as
IBP EVP, each of the nine IBP regions had already produced an EVP and, thus, the rotation was
completed. It is only unfortunate that the supervening event of Atty. de Vera's removal as IBP Governor
and EVP rendered it impossible for him to assume the IBP Presidency. The fact remains, however, that
the rotation rule had been completed despite the non-assumption by Atty. de Vera to the IBP
Presidency.

Moreover, the application of the rotation rule is not a license to disregard the spirit and purpose of the
automatic succession rule, but should be applied in harmony with the latter. The automatic succession
rule affords the IBP leadership transition seamless and enables the new IBP National President to
attend to pressing and urgent matters without having to expend valuable time for the usual adjustment
and leadership consolidation period. The time that an IBP EVP spends assisting a sitting IBP President
on matters national in scope is in fact a valuable and indispensable preparation for the eventual
succession. It should also be pointed out that this wisdom is further underscored by the fact that an IBP
EVP is elected from among the members of the IBP Board of Governors, who are serving in a national
capacity, and not from the members at large. It is intrinsic in the IBP By-Laws that one who is to assume
the highest position in the IBP must have been exposed to the demands and responsibilities of national
leadership.

It would therefore be consistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule for
Governor Salazar to assume the post of IBP President. By electing the replacement EVP from among
the members of the 2003-2005 Board of Governors, the IBP benefits from the experience of the IBP
EVP of 2003-2005 – in this case, Governor Salazar – who would have served in a national capacity
prior to his assumption of the highest position.

It will also be inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule if the EVP for
the term 2003-2005 will be elected exclusively by the members of the House of Delegates of the
Eastern Mindanao region. This Court notes that the removal of Atty. De Vera in 13 May 2005 was about
a month before the expiration of the term of office of the 2003-2005 Board of Governors. Hence, the
replacement Governor would not have been able to serve in a national capacity for two years prior to
assuming the IBP Presidency.

In any case, Section 47 of the IBP Rules uses the phrase "as much as practicable" to clearly indicate
that the rotation rule is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar exceptions in compelling and exceptional
circumstances.

It is in view of the foregoing that the argument advanced by Atty. De Vera that the IBP national
presidency should be assumed by a nominee from Eastern Mindanao region from where he comes,
can not hold water. It would go against the intent of the IBP By-Laws for such a nominee would be
bereft of the wealth of experience and the perspective that only one who is honed in service while
serving in a national post in the IBP would have.

We therefore rule that the IBP Board of Governors acted in accordance with the IBP By-Laws, in
electing Atty. Salazar as IBP EVP and in ensuring a succession in the leadership of the IBP. Had the
Board of Governors not done so, there would have been no one qualified to assume the Presidency of
the IBP on 1 July 2005, pursuant to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows:

1) SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C. No. 6697 from the practice of law for TWO (2)
YEARS, effective from the finality of this Resolution. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached
to the personal record of Atty. Leonard de Vera and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts;

2) DISMISS the letter-complaint of Atty. Leonard de Vera, dated 18 May 2005, in A.M. No. 05-
5-15-SC, praying for the disapproval of the Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, of the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines removing him from his posts as Governor and
Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the said Resolution having
been rendered without grave abuse of discretion;

3) AFFIRM the election by the Board of Governors of Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar as Executive
Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the remainder of the term 2003-2005,
such having been conducted in accordance with its By-Laws and absent any showing of grave
abuse of discretion; and

4) DIRECT Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar to immediately take his oath of office and assume the
Presidency of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the term 2005-2007 in accordance with
the automatic succession rule in Article VII, Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws, upon receipt of this
Resolution.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10543, March 16, 2016
NENITA D. SANCHEZ, Petitioner, v. ATTY. ROMEO G. AGUILOS, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This administrative case relates to the performance of duty of an attorney towards his client in which
the former is found and declared to be lacking in knowledge and skill sufficient for the engagement.
Does quantum meruit attach when an attorney fails to accomplish tasks which he is naturally expected
to perform during his professional engagement?
Antecedents

Complainant Nenita D. Sanchez has charged respondent Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos (respondent) with
misconduct for the latter's refusal to return the amount of P70,000.00 she had paid for his professional
services despite his not having performed the contemplated professional services. She avers that in
March 2005, she sought the legal services of the respondent to represent her in the annulment of her
marriage with her estranged husband, Jovencio C. Sanchez; that the respondent accepted the
engagement, fixing his fee at P150,000.00, plus the appearance fee of P5,000.00/hearing; that she
then gave to him the initial amount of P90,000.00; 1 that she had gone to his residence in May 2005 to
inquire on the developments in her case, but he told her that he would only start working on the case
upon her full payment of the acceptance fee; that she had only learned then that what he had
contemplated to file for her was a petition for legal separation, not one for the annulment of her
marriage; that he further told her that she would have to pay a higher acceptance fee for the annulment
of her marriage;2 that she subsequently withdrew the case from him, and requested the refund of the
amounts already paid, but he refused to do the same as he had already started working on the
case;3 that she had sent him a letter, through Atty. Isidro S.C. Martinez, to demand the return of her
payment less whatever amount corresponded to the legal services he had already performed;4 that the
respondent did not heed her demand letter despite his not having rendered any appreciable legal
services to her;5 and that his constant refusal to return the amounts prompted her to bring an
administrative complaint against him6 in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 20, 2007.

In his answer dated May 21, 2007,7 the respondent alleges that the complainant and her British fiancee
sought his legal services to bring the petition for the annulment of her marriage; that based on his
evaluation of her situation, the more appropriate case would be one for legal separation anchored on
the psychological incapacity of her husband; that she and her British fiancee agreed on P150,000.00
for his legal services to bring the action for legal separation, with the fiancee paying him P70,000.00,
as evidenced by his handwritten receipt;8 that for purposes of the petition for legal separation he
required the complainant to submit copies of her marriage contract and the birth certificates of her
children with her husband, as well as for her to submit to further interviews by him to establish the
grounds for legal separation; that he later on communicated with her and her fiancee upon finalizing
the petition, but they did not promptly respond to his communications; that in May 2005, she admitted
to him that she had spent the money that her fiancee had given to pay the balance of his professional
fees; and that in June 2005, she returned to him with a note at the back of the prepared petition for
legal separation essentially requesting him not to file the petition because she had meanwhile opted to
bring the action for the annulment of her marriage instead.

The respondent admits that he received the demand letter from Atty. Martinez, but states that he
dismissed the letter as a mere scrap of paper because the demand lacked basis in law. It is noted that
he wrote in the last part of his answer dated May 21, 2007 in relation to the demand letter the following:
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Hence, respondent accordingly treated the said letter demand for refund dated 15 August 2005 (Annex
"B" of the complaint) as a mere scrap of paper or should have been addressed by her counsel ATTY.
ISIDRO S.C. MARTINEZ, who unskillfully relied on an unverified information furnished him, to the
urinal project of the MMDA where it may serve its rightful purpose.9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) summoned the parties to a mandatory conference
on August 3, 2007,10 but only the complainant and her counsel attended the conference. On his part,
the respondent sent a letter dated July 20, 2007 to the IBP-CBD to reiterate his answer.11 Due to his
non-appearance, the IBP-CBD terminated the conference on the same day, but required the
complainant to submit a verified position paper within 10 days. She did not submit the position paper in
the end.

In his commissioner's report dated July 25, 2008, 12 IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De La
Rama, Jr. declared that the respondent's insistence that he could have brought a petition for legal
separation based on the psychological incapacity of the complainant's husband was sanctionable
because he himself was apparently not conversant with the grounds for legal separation; that because
he rendered some legal services to the complainant, he was entitled to receive only P40,000.00 out of
the P70,000.00 paid to him as acceptance fee, the P40,000.00 being the value of the services rendered
under the principle of quantum meruit; and that, accordingly, he should be made to return to her the
amount of P30,000.00.

IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. observed that the respondent's statement in the last
part of his answer, to the effect that the demand letter sent by Atty. Martinez in behalf of the complainant
should be treated as a scrap of paper, or should have been addressed "to the urinal project of the
MMDA where it may serve its rightful purpose," was uncalled for and improper; and he opined that such
offensive and improper language uttered by the respondent against a fellow lawyer violated Rule
8.0113of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. ultimately recommended as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The undersigned Commissioner is most respectfully recommending the following:

(1) To order the respondent to return to the complainant the amount of P30,000.00 which he
received for the purpose of preparing a petition for legal separation. Undersigned believes that
considering the degree of professional services he has extended, the amount of P40,000.00 he
received on March 10, 2005 would be sufficient payment for the same.
 (2) For failure to distinguish between the grounds for legal separation and annulment of marriage,
respondent should be sanctioned.

(3) Lastly, for failure to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness towards his colleagues and for using
offensive or improper language in his pleading, which was filed right before the Commission on
Bar Discipline, he must also be sanctioned and disciplined in order to avoid repetition of the
said misconduct.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is most respectfully recommended that Atty. Romeo G.
Aguilos be ordered to return to complainant Nenita D. Sanchez the amount of P30,000.00 which the
former received as payment for his services because it is excessive.

It is also recommended that the Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months for failure to show his respect to his fellow lawyer and for using offensive and
improper language in his pleadings.
Through Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 dated September 20, 2008,14 the IBP Board of Governors
affirmed the findings of Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr., but modified the recommendation
of the penalty, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED AND
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
of the above entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering respondent's failure to show respect to his fellow lawyer and for showing offensive and
improper words in his pleadings, Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos, is hereby WARNED and Ordered to
Return the Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos to complainant within thirty (30) days from receipt of
notice.15ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,16 which the IBP Board of Governors denied through
Resolution No. XXI-2014-177 dated March 23, 2014.17
Issues

The two issues for consideration and resolution are: (a) whether or not the respondent should be held
administratively liable for misconduct; and (b) whether or not he should be ordered to return the
attorney's fees paid.
Ruling of the Court

We adopt and affirm Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 and Resolution No. XXI-2014-177, but modify the
recommended penalty.
1.
Respondent was liable for misconduct, and he should be ordered to return the entire amount
received from the client

The respondent offered himself to the complainant as a lawyer who had the requisite professional
competence and skill to handle the action for the annulment of marriage for her. He required her to pay
P150,000.00 as attorney's fees, exclusive of the filing fees and his appearance fee of
P5,000.00/hearing. Of that amount, he received the sum of P70,000.00.

On the respondent's conduct of himself in his professional relationship with the complainant as his
client, we reiterate and adopt the thorough analysis and findings by IBP Investigating Commissioner
De La Rama, Jr. to be very apt and cogent, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As appearing in Annex "4", which is the handwritten retainer's contract between the respondent and
the complainant, there is a sweeping evidence that there is an attorney-client relationship. The
respondent agreed to accept the case in the amount of P150,000.00. The acceptance fee was agreed
upon to be paid on installment basis. Excluded in the agreement is the payment of appearance fee,
filing fee and other legal documentation.

That next question is - for what case the P150,000.00 was intended for? Was it intended for the filing
of the annulment case or legal separation?

In the verified Answer filed by the respondent, even the latter is quite confused as to what action he is
going to file in court. The intention of the British national and the complainant was to get married. At
that time and maybe up to now, the complainant is still legally married to a certain Jovencio C. Sanchez.
That considering that the two are intending to get married, we can safely assume that the complainant
was contemplating of filing a petition for annulment of marriage in order to free her from the marriage
bond with her husband. It is only then, granting that the petition will be granted, that the complainant
will be free to marry the British subject. The legal separation is but a separation of husband and wife
from board and bed and the marriage bond still exists. Granting that the petition for legal separation
will be granted, one is not free to marry another person.

A reading of the answer filed by the respondent would show that he himself is not well versed in the
grounds for legal separation. He stated the following;
. . . respondent suggested to them to file instead a legal separation case for the alleged psychological
incapacity of her husband to comply with his marital obligations developed or of their marriage on
February 6, 1999. (please see par. 2 of the Answer).
If the intention was to file a petition for legal separation, under A.M. 02-11-11-SC, the grounds are as
follows:
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Sec. 2. Petition-

(a) Who may and when to file - (1) A petition for legal separation may be filed only by the husband or
the wife, as the case may be, within five years from the time of the occurrence of any of the following
causes:
(a) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common
child, or a child of the petitioner;

(b) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;

(c) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner,
to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;

(d) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned;

(e) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;

(f) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;

(g) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in or outside the
Philippines;

(h) Sexual infidelity or perversion of the respondent;

(i) Attempt on the life of petitioner by the respondent; or

(j) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
Psychological incapacity, contrary to what respondent explained to the complainant, is not one of those
mentioned in any of the grounds for legal separation.

Even in Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, psychological incapacity is never a ground for
the purpose of filing a petition for legal separation.

On the other hand, psychological incapacity has always been used for the purpose of filing a petition
for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage.

That as provided for by Article 36 of the New Family Code, it stales that "a marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization."

That lawyers shall keep abreast of the legal developments and participate in continuing legal education
program (Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility) in order to prevent repetition of such kind
of advise that respondent gave to the complainant. In giving an advise, he should be able to distinguish
between the grounds for legal separation and grounds for annulment of marriage. But as the respondent
stated in his answer, it appears that he is mixed up with the basic provisions of the
law.18ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Clearly, the respondent misrepresented his professional competence and skill to the complainant. As
the foregoing findings reveal, he did not know the distinction between the grounds for legal separation
and for annulment of marriage. Such knowledge would have been basic and expected of him as a
lawyer accepting a professional engagement for either causes of action. His explanation that the client
initially intended to pursue the action for legal separation should be disbelieved. The case
unquestionably contemplated by the parties and for which his services was engaged, was no other than
an action for annulment of the complainant's marriage with her husband with the intention of marrying
her British fiancee. They did not contemplate legal separation at all, for legal separation would still
render her incapacitated to re-marry. That the respondent was insisting in his answer that he had
prepared a petition for legal separation, and that she had to pay more as attorney's fees if she desired
to have the action for annulment was, therefore, beyond comprehension other than to serve as a hallow
afterthought to justify his claim for services rendered.

As such, the respondent failed to live up to the standards imposed on him as an attorney. He thus
transgressed Canon 18, and Rules 18.01, 18.02 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
to wit:
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CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rules 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal serviee which he knows or should know that
he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his client,
he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.

Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable. (Emphasis supplied)
The next to be dealt with is the matter of the attorney's fees. We can easily agree that every attorney
is entitled to have and receive a just and reasonable compensation for services performed at the special
instance and request of his client. As long as the attorney is in good faith and honestly trying to
represent and serve the interests of the client, he should have a reasonable compensation for such
services.19

The attorney's fees shall be those stipulated in the retainer's agreement between the client and the
attorney, which constitutes the law between the parties for as long as it is not contrary to law, good
morals, good customs, public policy or public order.20 The underlying theory is that the retainer's
agreement between them gives to the client the reasonable notice of the arrangement on the fees.
Once the attorney has performed the task assigned to him in a valid agreement, his compensation is
determined on the basis of what he and the client agreed. 21 In the absence of the written agreement,
the lawyer's compensation shall be based on quantum meruit, which means "as much as he
deserved."22The determination of attorney's fees on the basis of quantum meruit is also authorized
"when the counsel, for justifiable cause, was not able to finish the case to its
conclusion."23 Moreover, quantum meruit becomes the basis of recovery of compensation by the
attorney where the circumstances of the engagement indicate that it will be contrary to the parties'
expectation to deprive the attorney of all compensation.

Nevertheless, the court shall determine in every case what is reasonable compensation based on the
obtaining circumstances,24 provided that the attorney does not receive more than what is reasonable,
in keeping with Section 24 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees - An attorney shall be entitled to have
and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to
the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert
witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion
on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid
therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
The courts supervision of the lawyer's compensation for legal services rendered is not only for the
purpose of ensuring the reasonableness of the amount of attorney's fees charged, but also for the
purpose of preserving the dignity and integrity of the legal profession. 25cralawred

The respondent should not have accepted the engagement because as it was later revealed, it was
way above his ability and competence to handle the case for annulment of marriage. As a consequence,
he had no basis to accept any amount as attorney's fees from the complainant. He did not even begin
to perform the contemplated task he undertook for the complainant because it was improbable that the
agreement with her was to bring the action for legal separation. His having supposedly prepared the
petition for legal separation instead of the petition for annulment of marriage was either his way of
covering up for his incompetence, or his means of charging her more. Either way did not entitle him to
retain the amount he had already received.

The written receipt dated March 10, 2005 shows that the respondent received P70,000.00 as
acceptance fee. His refusal to return the amount to the complainant rested on his claim of having
already completed the first phase of the preparation of the petition for legal separation after having held
conferences with the complainant and her British fiancee. In this respect, IBP Investigating Commission
De la Rama, Jr. opined that the respondent could retain P40,000.00 of the P70,000.00 because the
respondent had rendered some legal services to the complainant, specifically: (a) having the
complainant undergo further interviews towards establishing the ground for legal separation; (b)
reducing into writing the grounds discussed during the interviews based on her statement in her own
dialect (Annexes 1 and 2) after he could not understand the written statement prepared for the purpose
by her British fiancee; (c) requiring her to submit her marriage contract with her husband Jovencio C.
Sanchez (Annex 3), and the certificates of live birth of her four children: Mary Joy, Timothy, Christine,
and Janette Anne, all surnamed Sanchez (Annexes 4, 5, 6 and 7); and (d) finalizing her petition for
legal separation (Annex 8) in the later part of April, 2007.

The opinion of IBP Investigating Commission De la Rama, Jr. in favor of the respondent was too
generous. We cannot see how the respondent deserved any compensation because he did not really
begin to perform the contemplated tasks if, even based on his version, he would prepare the petition
for legal separation instead of the petition for annulment of marriage. The attorney who fails to
accomplish the tasks he should naturally and expectedly perform during his professional engagement
does not discharge his professional responsibility and ethical duty toward his client. The respondent
was thus guilty of misconduct, and may be sanctioned according to the degree of the misconduct. As
a consequence, he may be ordered to restitute to the client the amount received from the latter in
consideration of the professional engagement, subject to the rule on quantum meruit, if warranted.

Accordingly, the respondent shall be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 for his misrepresentation of his
professional competence, and he is further to be ordered to return the entire amount of P70,000.00
received from the client, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the date of this decision
until full payment.
2.

Respondent did not conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his
professional colleague

The Rules of Court mandates members of the Philippine Bar to "abstain from all offensive personality
and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by
the justice of the cause with which he is charged." 26 This duty of lawyers is further emphasized in
the Code of Professional Responsibility, whose Canon 8 provides: "A lawyer shall conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics
against opposing counsel." Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 specifically demands that: "A lawyer shall not, in his
professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper."

The Court recognizes the adversarial nature of our legal system which has necessitated lawyers to use
strong language in the advancement of the interest of their clients. 27 However, as members of a noble
profession, lawyers are always impressed with the duty to represent their clients' cause, or, as in this
case, to represent a personal matter in court, with courage and zeal but that should not be used as
license for the use of offensive and abusive language. In maintaining the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession, a lawyer's language - spoken or in his pleadings - must be dignified.28 As such, every
lawyer is mandated to carry out his duty as an agent in the administration of justice with courtesy,
dignity and respect not only towards his clients, the court and judicial officers, but equally towards his
colleagues in the Legal Profession.

The respondent's statement in his answer that the demand from Atty. Martinez should be treated "as a
mere scrap of paper or should have been addressed by her counsel x x x to the urinal project of the
MMDA where it may service its rightful purpose" constituted simple misconduct that this Court cannot
tolerate.

In his motion for reconsideration, the respondent tried to justify the offensive and improper language
by asserting that the phraseology was not per se uncalled for and improper. He explained that he had
sufficient cause for maintaining that the demand letter should be treated as a mere scrap of paper and
should be disregarded. However, his assertion does not excuse the offensiveness and impropriety of
his language. He could have easily been respectful and proper in responding to the letter.

As penalty for this particular misconduct, he is reprimanded, with the stern warning that a repetition of
the offense will be severely punished.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 dated September 20, 2008 of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors, with the MODIFICATION that Atty. Romeo
G. Aguilos is hereby FINED P10,000.00 for misrepresenting his professional competence to the client,
and REPRIMANDS him for his use of offensive and improper language towards his fellow attorney,
with the stern warning that a repetition of the offense shall be severely punished.

The Court ORDERS Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos to RETURN to the complainant within thirty (30) days from
notice the sum of P70,000.00, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the date of this
decision until full payment.

Let copies of this decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos as a member
of the Philippine Bar, and be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for proper dissemination to all courts throughout
the country.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6281 September 26, 2011
VALENTIN C. MIRANDA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MACARIO D. CARPIO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a disbarment case against Atty. Macario D. Carpio filed by Valentin C. Miranda. 1
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Complainant Valentin C. Miranda is one of the owners of a parcel of land consisting of 1,890 square
meters located at Barangay Lupang Uno, Las Piñas, Metro Manila. In 1994, complainant initiated Land
Registration Commission (LRC) Case No. M-226 for the registration of the aforesaid property. The case
was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 275. During the course of the
proceedings, complainant engaged the services of respondent Atty. Carpio as counsel in the said case
when his original counsel, Atty. Samuel Marquez, figured in a vehicular accident.
In complainant's Affidavit,2 complainant and respondent agreed that complainant was to pay
respondent Twenty Thousand Pesos (PhP20,000.00) as acceptance fee and Two Thousand Pesos
(PhP2,000.00) as appearance fee. Complainant paid respondent the amounts due him, as evidenced
by receipts duly signed by the latter. During the last hearing of the case, respondent demanded the
additional amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (PhP10,000.00) for the preparation of a memorandum,
which he said would further strengthen complainant's position in the case, plus twenty percent (20%)
of the total area of the subject property as additional fees for his services.
Complainant did not accede to respondent's demand for it was contrary to their agreement. Moreover,
complainant co-owned the subject property with his siblings, and he could not have agreed to the
amount being demanded by respondent without the knowledge and approval of his co-heirs. As a result
of complainant's refusal to satisfy respondent's demands, the latter became furious and their
relationship became sore.
On January 12, 1998, a Decision was rendered in LRC Case No. M-226, granting the petition for
registration, which Decision was declared final and executory in an Order dated June 5, 1998. On
March 24, 2000, the Land Registration Authority (LRA) sent complainant a copy of the letter addressed
to the Register of Deeds (RD) of Las Piñas City, which transmitted the decree of registration and the
original and owner's duplicate of the title of the property.
On April 3, 2000, complainant went to the RD to get the owner's duplicate of the Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) bearing No. 0-94. He was surprised to discover that the same had already been claimed
by and released to respondent on March 29, 2000. On May 4, 2000, complainant talked to respondent
on the phone and asked him to turn over the owner's duplicate of the OCT, which he had claimed
without complainant's knowledge, consent and authority. Respondent insisted that complainant first
pay him the PhP10,000.00 and the 20% share in the property equivalent to 378 square meters, in
exchange for which, respondent would deliver the owner's duplicate of the OCT. Once again,
complainant refused the demand, for not having been agreed upon.
In a letter3 dated May 24, 2000, complainant reiterated his demand for the return of the owner's
duplicate of the OCT. On June 11, 2000, complainant made the same demand on respondent over the
telephone. Respondent reiterated his previous demand and angrily told complainant to comply, and
threatened to have the OCT cancelled if the latter refused to pay him.
On June 26, 2000, complainant learned that on April 6, 2000, respondent registered an adverse claim
on the subject OCT wherein he claimed that the agreement on the payment of his legal services was
20% of the property and/or actual market value. To date, respondent has not returned the owner's
duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 to complainant and his co-heirs despite repeated demands to effect the
same.
In seeking the disbarment or the imposition of the appropriate penalty upon respondent, complainant
invokes the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Canon 20. A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.
Canon 16. A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession.
Canon 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and properties of his client when due or upon demand. x
xx
In defense of his actions, respondent relied on his alleged retaining lien over the owner's duplicate of
OCT No. 0-94. Respondent admitted that he did not turn over to complainant the owner's duplicate of
OCT No. 0-94 because of complainant's refusal, notwithstanding repeated demands, to complete
payment of his agreed professional fee consisting of 20% of the total area of the property covered by
the title, i.e., 378 square meters out of 1,890 square meters, or its equivalent market value at the rate
of PhP7,000.00 per square meter, thus, yielding a sum of PhP2,646,000.00 for the entire 378-square-
meter portion and that he was ready and willing to turn over the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94,
should complainant pay him completely the aforesaid professional fee.
Respondent admitted the receipt of the amount of PhP32,000.00, however, he alleged that the amount
earlier paid to him will be deducted from the 20% of the current value of the subject lot. He alleged that
the agreement was not reduced into writing, because the parties believed each other based on their
mutual trust. He denied that he demanded the payment of PhP10,000.00 for the preparation of a
memorandum, since he considered the same unnecessary.
In addition to the alleged agreement between him and complainant for the payment of the 20%
professional fees, respondent invoked the principle of "quantum meruit" to justify the amount being
demanded by him.
In its Report and Recommendation4 dated June 9, 2005, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months for unjustly withholding from complainant the owner's
duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 in the exercise of his so-called attorney's lien. In Resolution No. XVII-2005-
173,5 dated December 17, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors adopting
the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Pending the resolution of his motion for
reconsideration, respondent filed a petition for review6 with this Court. The Court, in a Resolution7 dated
August 16, 2006, directed that the case be remanded to the IBP for proper disposition, pursuant to this
Court's resolution in Noriel J. Ramientas v. Atty. Jocelyn P. Reyala.8
In Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-672, dated December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors
affirmed Resolution No. XVII-2005-173, dated December 17, 2005, with modification that respondent
is ordered to return the complainant's owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 within fifteen days from receipt
of notice. Hence, the present petition.
The Court sustains the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, which affirmed with modification the
findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD. Respondent's claim for his unpaid professional fees
that would legally give him the right to retain the property of his client until he receives what is allegedly
due him has been paid has no basis and, thus, is invalid.
Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides:
Section 37. Attorney’s liens. – An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and papers of
his client, which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his lawful fees
and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall also
have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in
pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time
when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the
court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof
to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over
such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of
his just fees and disbursements.
An attorney's retaining lien is fully recognized if the presence of the following elements concur: (1)
lawyer-client relationship; (2) lawful possession of the client's funds, documents and papers; and
(3) unsatisfied claim for attorney's fees.9 Further, the attorney's retaining lien is a general lien for the
balance of the account between the attorney and his client, and applies to the documents and funds of
the client which may come into the attorney's possession in the course of his employment. 10
In the present case, complainant claims that there is no such agreement for the payment of professional
fee consisting of 20% of the total area of the subject property and submits that their agreement was
only for the payment of the acceptance fee and the appearance fees.
As correctly found by the IBP-CBD, there was no proof of any agreement between the complainant and
the respondent that the latter is entitled to an additional professional fee consisting of 20% of the total
area covered by OCT No. 0-94. The agreement between the parties only shows that respondent will
be paid the acceptance fee and the appearance fees, which the respondent has duly received. Clearly,
there is no unsatisfied claim for attorney's fees that would entitle respondent to retain his client's
property. Hence, respondent could not validly withhold the title of his client absence a clear and
justifiable claim.
Respondent's unjustified act of holding on to complainant's title with the obvious aim of forcing
complainant to agree to the amount of attorney's fees sought is an alarming abuse by respondent of
the exercise of an attorney's retaining lien, which by no means is an absolute right, and cannot at all
justify inordinate delay in the delivery of money and property to his client when due or upon demand.11
Atty. Carpio failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer by unlawfully withholding and failing to deliver the
title of the complainant, despite repeated demands, in the guise of an alleged entitlement to additional
professional fees. He has breached Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which read:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESS.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT
THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand.1âwphi1 However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may
be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client.
He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his
client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Further, in collecting from complainant exorbitant fees, respondent violated Canon 20 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which mandates that "a lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees."
It is highly improper for a lawyer to impose additional professional fees upon his client which were never
mentioned nor agreed upon at the time of the engagement of his services. At the outset, respondent
should have informed the complainant of all the fees or possible fees that he would charge before
handling the case and not towards the near conclusion of the case. This is essential in order for the
complainant to determine if he has the financial capacity to pay respondent before engaging his
services.
Respondent's further submission that he is entitled to the payment of additional professional fees on
the basis of the principle of quantum meruit has no merit. "Quantum meruit, meaning `as much as he
deserved' is used as a basis for determining the lawyer's professional fees in the absence of a contract
but recoverable by him from his client."12The principle of quantum meruit applies if a lawyer is employed
without a price agreed upon for his services. In such a case, he would be entitled to receive what he
merits for his services, as much as he has earned. 13 In the present case, the parties had already
entered into an agreement as to the attorney's fees of the respondent, and thus, the principle
of quantum meruit does not fully find application because the respondent is already compensated by
such agreement.
The Court notes that respondent did not inform complainant that he will be the one to secure the owner's
duplicate of the OCT from the RD and failed to immediately inform complainant that the title was already
in his possession. Complainant, on April 3, 2000, went to the RD of Las Piñas City to get the owner's
duplicate of OCT No. 0-94, only to be surprised that the said title had already been claimed by, and
released to, respondent on March 29, 2000. A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings
with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond reproach. His relationship with his clients
should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith and fairness. 14 By keeping secret with the
client his acquisition of the title, respondent was not fair in his dealing with his client. Respondent could
have easily informed the complainant immediately of his receipt of the owner's duplicate of the OCT on
March 29, 2000, in order to save his client the time and effort in going to the RD to get the title.
Respondent's inexcusable act of withholding the property belonging to his client and imposing
unwarranted fees in exchange for the release of said title deserve the imposition of disciplinary sanction.
Hence, the ruling of the IBP Board of Governors, adopting and approving with modification the report
and recommendation of the IBP-CBD that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months and that respondent be ordered to return the complainant's owner's duplicate
of OCT No. 0-94 is hereby affirmed. However, the fifteen-day period from notice given to respondent
within which to return the title should be modified and, instead, respondent should return the same
immediately upon receipt of the Court's decision.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Macario D. Carpio is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months, effective upon receipt of this Decision. He is ordered to RETURN to the complainant the
owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 immediately upon receipt of this decision. He is WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the
personal record of Atty. Macario D. Carpio as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines;
and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country for their information
and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5408, February 07, 2017
ANITA SANTOS MURRAY, Complainant, v. ATTY. FELICITO J. CERVANTES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
We sustain, with modification, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors' Resolution No.
XVI-2004-4811 and Resolution No. XVIII-2008-711.2
Resolution No. XVI-2004-481 modified the Board of Governors' Resolution No. XV-2002-599.3 The
latter ruled that respondent Atty. Felicito J. Cervantes must be reprimanded and ordered to return to
complainant Anita Santos Murray the sum of P80,000.00. 4 Resolution No. XVI-2004-481 modified this
with the penalty of one (1)-year suspension from the practice of law, with an additional three (3)-month
suspension for every month (or fraction) that respondent is unable to deliver to complainant the sum of
P80,000.00.5 Resolution No. XVIII-2008-711 denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration.6
On February 2, 2001, complainant filed before this Court a Complaint 7 charging respondent with
violating Canon 188 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complainant alleged that sometime in June 2000, she sought the services of a lawyer to assist in the
naturalization (that is, acquisition of Philippine citizenship) of her son, Peter Murray, a British national.
Respondent was later introduced to her. On June 14, 2000, she and respondent agreed on the latter's
services, with complainant handing respondent the sum of P80,000.00 as acceptance fee. 9
About three (3) months passed without respondent doing "anything substantial." 10 Thus, on September
11, 2000, complainant wrote respondent to inform him that she was terminating his services. She
explained:
I am not satisfied with the way things are going regarding my petition. I am expecting that you keep me
abreast of your activities but I am left in the dark as to what have you done so far. You do not show up
on our scheduled appointments nor do you call me up to let me know why you cannot come. You stood
me up twice already which shows that you are not even interested in my case.
....
Since I already paid the P80,000.00 acceptance fee in full, I expect to get a refund of the same from
you.11
As respondent failed to return the P80,000.00 acceptance fee, complainant instituted the Complaint in
this case. She also instituted criminal proceedings against respondent for violation of Article
315(1)(b)12of the Revised Penal Code.13
This case was subsequently referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its investigation, report,
and recommendation.14
After the proceedings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Investigating Commissioner
Demaree J.B. Raval (Commissioner Raval) furnished a Report 15 dated September 9, 2002
recommending that respondent be reprimanded and required to return the sum of P80,000.00 to
complainant. In its Resolution No. XV-2002-599,16 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors adopted Commissioner Raval's recommendations.
Respondent filed before this Court a Motion for Leave to Admit Additional Evidence with Motion to
Dismiss.17 He asserted that he never required complainant to immediately pay him P80,000.00 as
acceptance fee.18 This Motion was forwarded to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines19 and was treated
as respondent's Motion for Reconsideration.20 For her part, complainant filed several manifestations
and motions asking that a heavier penalty be imposed on respondent.21
Acting on the pending incidents of the case, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa
(Commissioner Funa) furnished a Report22 recommending that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for one (1) year, with an additional three (3)-month suspension for every month (or
fraction) that respondent fails to deliver to complainant the sum of P80,000.00.
Commissioner Funa justified the penalty of suspension by emphasizing that, in a hearing conducted by
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on August 18, 2004, respondent was "orally directed" to return the
P80,000.00 not later than the end of August 2004.23 Respondent acceded to this; however, he failed to
return the P80,000.00.24
In its Resolution No. XVI-2004-481,25 the Board of Governors adopted Commissioner Puna's
recommendation.
The Board of Governors' Resolution No. XVIII-2008-711 later denied respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration.26
It is evident from the records that respondent failed to deliver on the services that he committed to
complainant despite receiving the amount of P80,000.00 as acceptance fee. Although respondent
asserted that he did not actively solicit this amount from complainant, it remains, as Commissioner
Funa underscored, that respondent accepted this amount as consideration for his services.27 Moreover,
following complainant's engagement of his services, respondent failed to communicate with
complainant or update her on the progress of the services that he was supposed to render. Not only
did he fail in taking his own initiative to communicate; he also failed to respond to complainant's queries
and requests for updates.
Respondent's failure to timely and diligently deliver on his professional undertaking justifies the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines' conclusion that he must restitute complainant the amount of
P80,000.00.
Luna v. Galarrita28 has explained the parameters for ordering restitution in disciplinary proceedings:
In Ronquillo v. Atty. Cezar, the parties entered a Deed of Assignment after which respondent received
P937,500.00 from complainant as partial payment for the townhouse and lot. However, respondent did
not turn over this amount to developer Crown Asia, and no copy of the Contract to Sell was given to
complainant. This court suspended Atty. Cezar from the practice of law for three (3) years, but did not
grant complainant's prayer for the return of the P937,500.00.
Ronquillo held that "[d]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers do not involve a trial of an action, but
rather investigations by the court into the conduct of one of its officers." Thus, disciplinary proceedings
are limited to a determination of "whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to continue as a
member of the Bar."
Later jurisprudence clarified that this rule excluding civil liability determination from disciplinary
proceedings "remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature — for
instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction
separate and distinct [from] and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement." This court has
thus ordered in administrative proceedings the return of amounts representing legal fees.
This court has also ordered restitution as concomitant relief in administrative proceedings when
respondent's civil liability was already established:
Although the Court renders this decision m an administrative proceeding primarily to exact the ethical
responsibility on a member of the Philippine Bar, the Court's silence about the respondent lawyer's
legal obligation to restitute the complainant will be both unfair and inequitable. No victim of gross ethical
misconduct concerning the client's funds or property should be required to still litigate in another
proceeding what the administrative proceeding has already established as the respondent's liability.
That has been the reason why the Court has required restitution of the amount involved as a
concomitant relief in the cited cases of Mortera v. Pagatpatan, Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, Small v.
Banares.29 (Citations and emphases omitted)
It is proper, in the course of these disciplinary proceedings, that respondent be required to return to
complainant the amount of P80,000.00. This amount was delivered to respondent during complainant's
engagement of his professional services, or in the context of an attorney-client relationship. This is
neither an extraneous nor purely civil matter.
By the same failure to timely and diligently deliver on his professional undertaking (despite having
received fees for his services), as well as by his failure to keep complainant abreast of relevant
developments in the purposes for which his services were engaged, respondent falls short of the
standards imposed by Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that he is not
qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain
as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.
Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within
a reasonable time to the client's request for information. (Emphasis supplied)
Disciplinary sanctions more severe than those considered proper by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines are warranted.
We emphasize that, during the proceedings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, respondent
acknowledged his duty to compensate complainant for the amount of P80,000.00. He then made a
commitment to return that sum to her. To date, however, he has failed to deliver on the commitment
made almost twelve and a half years ago.
We clarify that the oral instruction given to respondent in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines' August
18, 2004 hearing was not a juridically binding order. Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court sanctions and
spells out the terms of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines' involvement in cases involving the
disbarment and/or discipline of lawyers. The competence of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is only
recommendatory. Under Article VIII, Section 5(5)30 of the 1987 Constitution, only this Court has the
power to actually rule on disciplinary cases of lawyers, and to impose appropriate penalties.
Rule 139-B merely delegates investigatory functions to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. With the
exercise of its delegated investigatory power, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines refers proposed
actions to this Court. Recognizing the Integrated Bar of the Philippines' limited competence in
disciplinary cases impels a concomitant recognition that, pending favorable action by this Court on its
recommendations, its determinations and conclusions are only provisional. Therefore, rulings on
disciplinary cases attain finality and are enforceable only upon this Court's own determination that they
must be imposed.
The oral instruction given to respondent in the August 18, 2004 hearing has, thus, not attained such a
degree of finality as would immutably require him to comply, such that failure to comply justifies
additional or increased penalties. Penalizing him for non-compliance is premature.
Nevertheless, respondent acknowledged his duty to compensate complainant for the amount of
P80,000.00 and made his own commitment to make this compensation. 31 He may not have been bound
by a juridical instruction, but he was certainly bound by his own honor. That he has failed to adhere to
his own freely executed commitment after more than a decade speaks volumes of how he has
miserably failed to live up to the "high standard of ... morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing" 32 that
is apropos to members of the legal profession.
For this reason, we exact upon respondent a penalty more severe than that initially contemplated by
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors. Moreover, to impress upon respondent the
urgency of finally returning to complainant the amount he received, we impose on him an additional
penalty corresponding to the duration for which he fails to make restitution. We adopt the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors' position in Resolution No. XVI-2004-481 that an additional
period of suspension must be imposed on respondent for every month (or fraction) that he fails to pay
in full the amount he owes complainant. However, instead of a three (3)-month suspension for every
month (or fraction) of non-payment or incomplete payment, he is to be suspended for one (1) month
for every such period of failure to make full payment.
This approach hopefully underscores the burden that respondent must justly carry. By automatically
extending his suspension should he not return the amount, we save complainant, the victim, from the
additional costs of having to find and retain another counsel to compel the return of what is due her.
Counsels who have caused harm on their clients must also suffer the costs of restitution.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Felicito J. Cervantes is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
(1) year and six (6) months. He is ORDERED to restitute complainant Anita Santos Murray the sum of
P80,000.00. For every month (or fraction) the he fails to fully restitute complainant the sum of
P80,000.00, respondent shall suffer an additional suspension of one (1) month.
He is likewise WARNED that a repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance. Let a copy of this Resolution
be attached to respondent's personal record as attorney.
SO ORDERED.
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Cobalt Resources, Inc. (CRI) against
respondent Atty. Ronald C. Aguado (Atty. Aguado) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the lawyer's oath.

The Antecedents

In its Complaint,[1] CRI alleged that on March 5, 2010, a group of armed men, clad in vests bearing the
mark "PASG" and pretending to be agents of the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Group (PASG), hi-jacked
its delivery van which was then loaded with cellular phones worth P1.3 million; that Dennis Balmaceda
(Balmaceda), the driver of the delivery van, and his companions were all forcibly taken away at gun
point and were dropped at the Country Hill and Golf Club; that Balmaceda called Antonio Angeles
(Angeles), the Security Director of CRI, who immediately reported the incident to the Philippine National
Police-Criminal Investigation Detection Unit (PNP-CIDU); that with the use of Global Positioning
Satellite (GPS) Tracking Device installed in the cellular phones, Angeles and the PNP-CIDU tracked
down the location of the cellular phones to be in front of Pegasus Bar along Quezon Avenue, Quezon
City; that the PNP-CIDU, together with Angeles proceeded to Pegasus Bar and found three (3) vehicles
parked in front of the bar: (1) Toyota Fortuner with Plate No. UNO-68 owned by Atty. Aguado, (2)
Chevrolet Optra with Plate No. ZDW-764 and (3) a motorcycle with Plate No. NK-1180; that when the
PNP-CIDU approached the vehicles, Anthony Palmes (Palmes) ran but he was chased by the police
officers and was arrested; that Atty. Aguado who was then standing in the reception area of Pegasus
Bar was not arrested as none of the police officers knew, at that time, of his participation in the crime;
that the PNP-CIDU searched the vehicles and found the cellular phones, the Identification Card (ID)
showing Atty. Aguado as Legal Consultant of the PASG, the Mission Order identifying Atty. Aguado as
the Assistant Team Leader, and a vest bearing the mark PASG.

CRI further averred that the men who hijacked its delivery van used the fake mission order when it
flagged down the delivery van; that the mission order identified Atty. Aguado as the assistant team
leader and authorized the armed men to seize CRTs cellular phones; that the PASG issued a
certification stating that the mission order was fake; that Atty. Aguado carried an ID bearing his picture
and name which showed that he was a PASG legal consultant; and that this ID was likewise fake as
evidenced by a certification issued by the PASG.

Based on the Sinumpaang Salaysay,[2] dated September 8, 2010, executed by Palmes, CRI concluded
that it was Atty. Aguado who prepared the fake mission order and masterminded the crime as he was
the one who conceived it and laid down the nitty-gritty details of its execution; and that it was; he who
recruited the armed men who actually executed the hijacking.

Eventually, two separate Informations for Robbery[3] and Caraapping[4] were filed against Atty. Aguado
and several others.

The IBP directed Atty. Aguado to submit his answer but, despite several extensions, he failed to do so.

The IBP then set the case for mandatory conference.

In his Conference Brief,[5] Atty. Aguado denied the allegations. He averred that "on March 5, 2010, at
about 11:00 to 12:00 in the afternoon,"[6] his Toyota Fortuner with Plate No. UNO-68 was carnapped
along Scout Mandarin while in the custody of his driver; that he reported the incident to the police
authorities; that on March 7, 2010, he was awakened by relatives informing him that his name was on
the front page of several tabloids in a story connecting him to the alleged hijacking; and that he was
indicted in the case because of the ID found hanging in his carnapped vehicle.

In its Report and Recommendation,[7] dated May 3, 2011, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
found Atty. Aguado liable for unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct in falsifying the ID and
mission order showing him as the Legal Consultant and the Assistant Team Leader, respectively, of
the PASG. The IBP-CBD recommended that he be suspended for two (2) years. It, however, deferred
the issue of Atty. Aguado's purported participation in the alleged hijacking incident as the issue
pertained to a judicial function.

On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report of the CBD, as
follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering that Respondent committed
unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct by falsifying the ID and Mission Order, Atty. Ronaldo
Aguado is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years.[8]
Not satisfied, CRI filed a motion for reconsideration[9] praying that the May 3, 2011 report of the IBP-
CBD be set aside and that a new resolution ordering the disbarment of Atty. Aguado be issued. CRI
claimed that Atty. Aguado deserved the ultimate penalty of disbarment as the falsification of public
documents was sufficiently established and, as the CBD knew, he masterminded the hijacking using
his profession to commit the crime.

On July 25, 2013, Atty. Aguado also filed a motion for reconsideration [10] of the March 20, 2013
Resolution praying that it be set aside and a new one be issued dismissing the complaint. He averred
that the charges of usurpation of authority and falsification filed against him had been dismissed by the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City; that he could not be presumed to be the author of the
falsification because he was never in possession of the falsified ID and mission order; and that he never
used, took advantage or profit therefrom. Atty. Aguado asserted that this case should, at the very least,
be suspended pending the resolution of the robbery and carnapping charges against him.

In a Resolution,[11] dated September 27, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied both motions and
affirmed its March 20, 2013 Resolution.

Pursuant to Section 12(c), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, CRI filed a petition for review[12] before the
Court. CRI was firm in its stand that Atty. Aguado be meted out the penalty of disbarment for his
falsification of a PASG mission order and ID and for his involvement in the hijacking of the CIR delivery
van and its cargo.

Similarly, Atty. Aguado filed a petition for review insisting on his innocence and praying for the dismissal
of the complaint.

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds merit in the petition of CRI.

It must be emphasized that a disbarment proceeding, being administrative in nature, is separate and
distinct from a criminal action filed against a lawyer and they may proceed independently of each
other.[13] A finding of guilt in the criminal case does not necessarily mean a finding of liability in the
administrative case.[14] In the same way, the dismissal of a criminal case on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence against an accused, who is also a respondent in an administrative case, does not
necessarily exculpate him administratively because the quantum of evidence required is different. In
criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required.[15] "In administrative cases for disbarment
or suspension against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is clearly preponderant evidence and the
burden of proof rests upon the complainant."[16] Preponderance of evidence means "evidence which is
more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto." [17]

Clearly, Atty. Aguado committed the act complained of as it was established that he was in possession
of a falsified ID showing him as a legal consultant of the PASG and mission order identifying him as
the Assistant Team Leader of the anti-smuggling operation. Although Atty. Aguado claimed in his
Conference Brief that he was indicted merely on the basis of an ID found hanging in his carnapped
Toyota Fortuner,[18] his counsel, Atty. Letecia Amon (Atty. Amon), during the mandatory conference
held on February 25, 2011, acknowledged that the ID and mission order were found in the Toyota
Fortuner owned by Atty. Aguado, thus:

ATTY. HARON:

Is she willing to admit that respondent is the same person referred to in the document called
mission order marked as Annex "F" issued by the PASG.

ATTY. AMON:

I have no exact knowledge on that, Your Honor.

ATTY. HARON:

I'm showing counsel for respondent with a copy of a mission order marked as Annex "F"....
COMM. CACHAPERO:

Machine copy.

ATTY. HARON:

This is the copy.

COMM. CACHAPERO:

Take a look, is that a machine copy?

ATTY. HARON:

Yes, Your Honor. Annex "F" states that Atty. Ronald C. Aguado is the assistant team leader of the
team by mission order.

COMM. CACHAPERO:

He is only asking, the respondent is the one who owns that document. He is not yet asking whether
that document is authentic or not.

ATTY. AMON:

Yes, Your Honor, as written here.

COMM. CACHAPERO:

Yes, he is the one.

ATTY. HARON:
 Would the respondent also like to admit that the identification card and the mission order
were found inside his Toyota Fortuner, Plate No. UNO-68.

ATTY. AMON:

Of which he is the owner, yes.

ATTY. HARON:

Admitted also, Your Honor.

ATTY. HARON:

Would the respondent also like to admit the certifications Annexes "G" and "H" issued by the
PASG are genuine and duly executed. I'm showing counsel copies of the certifications, Your
Honor, marked as Annexes "G" and "H" which bears the seal of that office, Your Honor.

COMM. CACHAPERO:

What is your proposal Atty. Haron?

x x x.[19] [Emphasis supplied]

Moreover, the Sinumpaang Salaysay[20] of Palmes explicitly described Atty. Aguado's participation in
the crime as follows:

xxx

2. Alam ko kung sinu-sino ang mga taong kasama sa pagplano at pagsasagawa ng nasabing 'hijacking'.
Bagamat may partisipasyon ako sa krimen, hindi ko alam na ang gagawing paghuli sa mga nasabing
cellphone ay labag sa batas dahil ako ay pinaniwala na ang gagawin naming paghuli sa mga cellphone
ng Cobalt ay isang lehitimong operasyon ng PASG.

3. Bago pa man naganap ang nasabing hijacking ay dati akong empleyado ng Cobalt na nakatalaga
sa Delivery Section/Pull Out Service. Ngunit hindi nagtagal ay nag-resign ako.

4. Noong ikalawang lingo ng Pebrero, nilapitan ako ni Jaime "James" Abedes at sinabi sa akin ng kung
pwede ay i-monitor ko daw ang ruta ng delivery van ng Cobalt at ako ay bibgyan niya ng "budget"
upang ang kanyang grupo ay makapagsagawa ng 'seizure operations.'

5. Noong una ay nag-alangan akong sumangayon sa mungkahi ni James ngunit ako ay pinapanatag
niya na lahat ng dokumento at papeles ay kumpleto. Sabi pa ni James, "Si Atty. Aguado ang
magbibigay ng complete documents at Mission Order dahil naka-direkta siya sa PASG Malacanang
para ma-flag down ang delivery van".

6. Ako ay naniwala sa kanyang sinabi dahil sa pagbanggit niya na may kasama kaming abogado. Dahil
dito ay pumayag ako sa mungkahi ni James.

7. Kinabukasan ay nagkita kami ni James sa Caltex Pioneer corner Shaw Boulevard. Nalaman ko kay
James na may hawak siyang Security Guard doon. Pinakilala niya ako kay Eliseo De Rosas alias
Nonoy na isa ring tauhan ni James. Siya ay may gamit na Honda na motorsiklo na kulay berde na may
plakang 1180 NK. Noong araw din na iyon ay nagtungo kami sa Brixton Street upang i-monitor ang
warehouse ng Cobalt dahil may warehouse ang Cobalt sa Brixton Street.

8. Pagkatapos naming pumunta sa Brixton Street ay nagtungo naman kami sa P. Tuazon Street kung
saan may mga clients ang Cobalt, at doon naming nakita ang delivery van na Mitsubishi L-300 ng
Cobalt.

9. Sinimulan namin ni Nonoy ang pagmonitor ng ruta ng delivery van ng Cobalt. Sa aming ginawang
pag-monitor ay napansin naming madalas magpakarga ng gas ang nasabing delivery van sa Petron
Station sa Ortigas Avenue corner B. Serrano Street. Isang lingo kaming nag-monitor ni Nonoy sa ruta
ng Cobalt.

Ipinaalam naming kay James ang nakakalap naming impormasyon. Noong natiyak naming ang ruta ng
delivery van ay nagpaschedule si James ng 'meeting' kay Atty. Aguado.

10. Ika-22 ng Pebrero 2010 alas-6 ng gabi sa McDonald's Quezon Avenue ay nag meeting kami. Ang
mga kasama sa meeting ay si James, Atty. Aguado, Joe Almonte, at Nonoy. Noong kami ay nandoon
ay lumipat ng lamesa si Atty. Aguado, James at Joe Almonte at sila ay nagusap.

11. Pagkatapos ng usapan nila ay pumunta sa amin si James at sinabi sa amin kung ano ang kanilang
napagusapan. Sinabi sa amin ni James na mag-iisue daw ng Mission Order si Atty. Aguado. Si Atty.
Aguado na rin daw ang magbubuo ng grupo ng mga lalake upang i-flag down ang delivery van ng
Cobalt.

12. Noong ika-25 ng Pebrero 2010 alas 7 ng gabi, ay muli kaming nagkita nila James, Nonoy at Joe
Almonte sa McDonald's Quezon Avenue. Pagsapit ng alas-8 ng gabi ay tumawag si Atty. Aguado na
nasa Starbucks Cafe sa Tomas Morato Avenue daw siya naka-puwesto. Kaya't kaming apat ay
sumunod sa Starbucks. Pagdating naming sa Starbucks ay nandoon nga si Atty. Aguado at may
kasama siyang isang pulis.

13. Hindi nagtagal ay umalis sila Atty. Aguado at James sakay ng Toyota Fortuner na may plakang
UNO-68. Sinabi sa amin ni James na sila ay magsasagawa ng "ocular" ng lugar kung saan gagawin
ang pag-flag down ng delivery van. Nang sila ay magbalik, kami ay sinabihan na gagawin namin ang
operasyon sa umaga ng kinabukasan (ika-26 ng Pebrero, Biernes).
Ayon pa sa kanila, ako raw ay pupuwesto sa Petron Station sa may Boni Serrano corner Ortigas
Avenue ng alas-8 ng umaga upang doon abangan ang pagdaan ng delivery van. Samantalang, ang
mga taong magsasagawa ng pag flag down (pawang mga tao ni Atty. Aguado) ay pupuwesto na rin sa
may Benitez Street. Kapag nakita ko na raw ang delivery van ay agad akong tumawag kay James
upang ipagbigay alam ang pagdaan nito at i-alert ang mga nasabing mga lalake, pagkatapos ay
tumungo raw ako sa Benitez Street upang siguraduhin na tama ang delivery van na ipa-flag-down.

Pagkatapos ng meeting ng gabi na iyon ay isa-isa na kaming nagsi-uwian.

14. Kaya't kinabukasan, ika-26 ng Pebrero, alas-8 ng umaga ay nagtungo ako sa nasabing Petron
Station. Ngunit tumawag si James na hindi raw matutuloy ang operation dahil kulang sa tao si Atty.
Aguado.

15. Kami (ako, Joe Almonte at Nonoy) ay muling pinulong ni James sa McDonald's Quezon Avenue
noong ika-i ng Marso alas-7 ng gabi. Bandang alas-8 ng gabi ay dumating na rin si Atty. Aguado. Sila
Atty. Aguado, James at Joe Almonte [ay] nag-usap sa labas ng Smoking Area samantalang kami ni
Nonoy ay nanatili sa loob.

16. Nang matapos ang usapan ay sinabi sa amin ni James na nag-set ulit ng operation si Atty. Aguado
kinabukasan, ika-2 ng Marso, Martes, ngunit hintayin daw naming ang feedback mula kay Atty. Aguado
dahil kelangan daw ng gamit ang mga tao ni Atty. Aguado.

17. Muli akong nagtungo kinabukasan, ika-2 ng Marso, alas- 8 ng umaga, ngunit maya-maya lamang
ay tumawag sa akin si James at sinabi niya sa akin na hindi na naman daw tuloy ang operation dahil
hindi nakakuha ng gamit ang mga tao ni Atty. Aguado.

Sa puntong ito ay sinabi ko na kay James na sana sigurado ang mga papeles ni Atty. Aguado dahil
ayaw ko ng illegal na trabaho. Sinabi naman sa akin ni James na kumpleto naman daw ang mga
papeles at legal ang gagawing operation.

18. Ika-4 ng Marso 2010, ay tumawag sa akin si James at sinabi niya sa akin na tuloy na daw ang
operation kinabukasan (ika- 5 ng Marso). Sinabi rin niya sa akin na alas-8 ng umaga ay kailangan daw
na naka-puwesto na ako sa Petron Station.

19. Kaya noong ika-5 ng Marso 2010, alas-8 ng umaga, ako ay pumuwesto na sa Petron Gasoline
Station sa Boni Serrano corner Ortigas Avenue sakay ng isang motorsiklo. Bandang alas-8:3O ng
umaga ay dumating naman si James sakay ng isang Chevrolet na may plakang ZDW 764 at may
kasama pa siya na pinakilala sa aking "Larry."

Bandang alas-9 ng umaga ay dumating ang Toyota Fortuner ni Atty. Aguado. Nakita ko na sakay ng
nasabing Toyota Fortuner si Atty. Aguado at Joe Almonte. Hindi sila bumaba bagkus ay nagpakarga
lamang ito ng gasolina sa nasabing Petron Station. Hindi nagtagal ay umalis na rin sila. Sumunod
namang umalis si James at Larry sakay ng Chevrolet.

20. Bandang alas-9:3O ng umaga, nakita ko na dumating ang delivery van ng Cobalt sa Petron upang
ito ay magpakarga ng gasolina. Tumawag ako kay James gamit ang aking cellphone at sinabi ko,
"Nandito na ang delivery van na white, may plakang NKQ 734." Sumagot si James, "ok nakapuwesto
na kami. Andito na kami sa area"
21. Agad akong umalis patungo sa Benitez Street upang abangan ang pagdaan ng delivery van upang
ma-flag down ito. Gamit ang aking motorsiklo, ako ay dali-daling nagtungo sa Benitez Street.

Pagdating ko doon ay nakita ko ang nasabing Chevrolet ni James at isang L-300 van na kulay blue-
green na may plakang DFN-733. Nadatnan ko rin ang tatlong lalake na pawang armado at nakasuot
ng tsalekong may tatak na PASG at nag-aabang sa gilid ng daan. Mayroon din akong napansin na
nakasakay sa loob ng nasabing blue-green na L-300 van ngunit hindi ko na nabilang ang dami nila.

22. Ako ay pumunta sa Chevrolet (driver side), at binuksan naman ni James ang bintana nito. Sinabi
ko ulit sa kanya na parating na ang delivery van. Sumagot siya, "Sige. Timbrehan mo lang sila pag
malapit na. Hintayin mo relay kung saan ka susunod." Pagkatapos noon ay umalis na sila.

23. Pagkaalis nila, kami at nang tatlong nasabing lalake ay nag-abang sa pagdaan ng delivery van.
Nang makita ko itong paparating, agad kong sinabi "approaching na. yang puti, yang puti." Pagkatapos
noon ay agad pinara ng isa sa mga nasabing lalakeng nakasumbrero ang delivery van. Sumenyas ito
sa driver ng delivery van na itabi ito sa gilid. Pilit binuksan ng tatlong lalake ang magkabilang pintuan
ng delivery van at nang mabuksan ang mga nasabing pintuan ay agad hinila palabas ang tatlo nitong
pahinante at agad silang pinosasan.

xxxx
From the foregoing, it can be clearly deduced that Atty. Aguado had participation in the crime as
charged in the complaint, from the planning stage up to its execution. These falsified documents found
in his possession, as certified found in his possession, as certified as evidenced by the PASG, were
used to facilitate the commission of the crime. The well-settled rule is that "in the absence of satisfactory
explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged document is the forger and therefore
guilty of falsification."[21] Atty. Aguado failed to rebut the allegations. Other than the police blotter
showing that he reported the carnapping of his vehicle, Atty. Aguado presented no other convincing
evidence to support his denial of the crime. He also failed to show any ill motive on the part of Palmes
in testifying against him whom he claimed to have met only in February 2010.

Moreover, his story of the carnapping of his Fortuner cannot be given credence considering his
inconsistent statements on the matter. In this regard, the Court quotes a portion of the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner Oliver Cachapero. Thus:

He, too, blabbered about the supposed carnapping of his Fortuner car on the same day the hijacking
was staged by supposed PASG personnel suggesting that he was a victim and not a perpetrator.
However, his allegations in this regard is put in serious doubt. In the QC PD alarm sheet, Respondent
reported that the carnapping took place at 2:30 of March 5, 2010 while in his sworn statement, he
claimed that his car was carnapped at 4:31 p.m. the precise time the supposed carnapping was staged
is too vital that Respondent could not have overlooked the same in his narration of facts in his counter-
affidavit or in his statement before the police authorities expecially because he supposedly reported the
incident on the very same day it happened. But as correctly observed by the Complainant, even if the
report on the time of the carnapping incident would have been properly made, the hijacking took place
much earlier and therefore the same does not negate the commission of the crime by the Respondent.
Also, the reporting did not prove the fact of carnapping especially where, as in this case, no eyewitness
account was presented, no suspect apprehended, and no criminal case was filed.[22]
The Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) explicitly mandates:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
It must be emphasized that a membership in the Bar is a privilege laden with conditions, [23] and granted
only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers as
instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice. [24] As officers of the courts and
keepers of the public's faith, lawyers are burdened with the highest degree of social responsibility and
so mandated to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor.[25] They are expected
to maintain not only legal proficiency but also this high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing.[26]

Atty, Aguado has committed acts that showed he was unfit and unable to faithfully discharge his
bounden duties as a member of the legal profession. Because he failed to live up to the exacting
standards demanded of him, he proved himself unworthy of the privilege to practice law. As vanguards
of our legal system, lawyers, are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
professor and to refrain from any act or omission which might diminish the trust and confidence reposed
by the public in the integrity of the legal profession. [27]

In several cases, the Court, after finding the lawyer guilty of gross dishonesty, imposed the supreme
penalty of disbarment for engaging in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful acts by falsifying documents.
In Brennisen v. Atty. Contawi,[28] the Court disbarred the lawyer when he falsified a special power of
attorney so he could mortgage and sell his client's property. In Embido v. Atty. Pe, Jr.,[29] the penalty of
disbarment was meted out against the lawyer who authored the falsification of an inexistent court
decision.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Ronald C. Aguado is DISBARRED for gross misconduct and violation of Rules
1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF the
roll of attorneys.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be made part of his personal
records; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation
to all courts.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 8172, April 12, 2016
ALEX NULADA, Complainant, v. ATTY. ORLANDO S. PAULMA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint1 for disbarment by reason of dishonesty
and conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude filed by Complainant Alex Nulada (complainant)
against respondent Atty. Orlando S. Paulma (respondent).
The Facts

Complainant alleged that on September 30, 2005, respondent issued in his favor a check in the amount
of P650,000.00 as payment for the latter's debt. Because of respondent's standing as a respected
member of the community and his being a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of
Miagao,2 Province of Iloilo, complainant accepted the check without question. 3

Unfortunately, when he presented the check for payment, it was dishonored due to insufficient fluids.
Respondent failed to make good the amount of the check despite notice of dishonor and repeated
demands, prompting complainant to file a criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang (BP) 224 against respondent,5 before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Province of Iloilo,
docketed as I.S. No. 2006-637,6 which issued a Resolution7 dated May 26, 2006 recommending the
filing of the appropriate information against respondent before the Municipal Trial Court of Miagao,
Province of Iloilo (MTC).8 Subsequently, said information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2604. 9

After due proceedings, the MTC rendered a Decision 10 dated October 30, 2008 finding respondent
guilty of violation of BP 22 and ordering him to pay the amount of P150,000.00 as fine, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of failure to pay. Furthermore, he was ordered to pay: (1) the sum of P650,000.00
representing the amount of the check with interest pegged at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per
annum computed from the time of the filing of the complaint; (2) filing fees in the amount of P10,000.00;
and (3) attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00 plus appearance fees of P1,500.00 per hearing. 11

Records show that respondent appealed his conviction to the Regional Trial Court of Guimbal, Iloilo,
Branch 67 (RTC), docketed as Criminal Case No. 346. 12 In a Decision13 dated March 13, 2009, the
RTC affirmed in toto the MTC ruling. On April 16, 2009, the RTC Decision became final and executory.14

Prior to the promulgation of the RTC Decision, or on February 12, 2009, complainant filed this
administrative complaint before the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant.

In his defense,15 respondent denied that he committed dishonesty against complainant, as prior to
September 30, 2005, he informed the latter that there were insufficient funds to cover the amount of
the check. Respondent claimed that he merely issued the check in order to accommodate a friend in
whose favor he obtained the loan, stressing that he did not personally benefit from the proceeds
thereof.16Unfortunately, said friend had died and respondent had no means by which to pay for the
amount of the check.17 He also claimed that complainant threatened him and used his unfunded check
to the latter's personal advantage.18
Thereafter, the Court, in its Resolution dated November 14, 2011,19 referred this administrative case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for its investigation, report, and recommendation.
The IBP's Report and Recommendation

After conducting mandatory conferences, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP issued a
Report and Recommendation20 dated June 26, 2013, recommending that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for violation of the lawyer's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), as well as for having been found guilty of a crime involving moral
turpitude.21

It found that the offense for which respondent was found guilty of, i.e., violation of BP 22, involved moral
turpitude, and that he violated his lawyer's oath and the CPR when he committed the said offense.
Stressing the importance of the lawyer's oath, the IBP held that by his conviction of the said crime,
respondent has shown that he is "unfit to protect the administration of justice or that he is no longer of
good moral character"22 which justifies either his suspension or disbarment.23

Subsequently, or on October 10, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Notice of
Resolution24adopting and approving with modification the IBP's Report and Recommendation dated
June 26, 2013, suspending respondent from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years for having
violated the lawyer's oath and the CPR, as well as for having been found guilty of a crime involving
moral turpitude.25cralawred
The Issue Before the Court

The issue advanced for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be administratively
disciplined for having been found guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude.
The Court's Ruling

The Court sustains the findings and conclusions of the CBD of the IBP, as approved, adopted, and
modified by the IBP Board of Governors.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
Or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Canon 1 of the CPR mandates all members of the bar "to obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law x x x." Rule 1.01 thereof specifically provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." By taking the lawyer's oath, a lawyer becomes a guardian of
the law and an indispensable instrument for the orderly administration of justice. 26 As such, he can be
disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, which renders him unfit to continue
to be an officer of the court.27cralawred

In Enriquez v. De Vera,28 the Court discussed the purpose and nature of a violation of BP 22 in relation
to an administrative case against a lawyer, as in this case, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[BP] 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate
public checking account users. The gravamen of the offense defined and punished by [BP] 22 [x x x] is
the act of making and issuing a worthless check, or any check that is dishonored upon its presentment
for payment and putting it in circulation; the law is designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the
deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing checks with insufficient funds, or with no credit, because
the practice is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated.

x x x x

Being a lawyer, respondent was well aware of the objectives and coverage of [BP] 22. If he did not, he
was nonetheless presumed to know them, for the law was penal in character and application. His
issuance of the unfunded check involved herein knowingly violated [BP] 22, and exhibited his
indifference towards the pernicious effect of his illegal act to public interest and public order. He thereby
swept aside his Lawyer's Oath that enjoined him to support the Constitution and obey the
laws.29ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Clearly, the issuance of worthless checks in violation of BP Blg. 22 indicates a lawyer's unfitness for
the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral
character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary
action.30

In this case, respondent's conviction for violation of BP 22, a crime involving moral turpitude, had been
indubitably established. Such conviction has, in fact, already become final. Consequently, respondent
violated the lawyer's oath, as well as Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, as aptly found by the IBP and,
thus, must be subjected to disciplinary action.

In Heenan v. Espejo,31 the Court suspended therein respondent from the practice of law for a period of
two (2) years when the latter issued checks which were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. In A-
1 Financial Services, Inc. v. Valerio,32 the same penalty was imposed by the Court to respondent who
issued worthless checks to pay off her loan. Likewise, in Dizon v. De Taza,33 the Court meted the
penalty of suspension for a period of two (2) years to respondent for having issued bouncing checks,
among other infractions. Finally, in Wong v. Moya II,34 respondent was ordered suspended from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years, because aside from issuing worthless checks and failure
to pay his debts, respondent also breached his client's trust and confidence to his personal advantage
and had shown a wanton disregard of the IBP's Orders in the course of its proceedings. Accordingly,
and in view of the foregoing instances when the erring lawyer was suspended for a period of two (2)
years for the same violation, the Court finds it appropriate to mete the same penalty to respondent in
this case.

As a final word, it should be emphasized that membership in the legal profession is a privilege burdened
with conditions.35 A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his or her actions whether
acting in a public or private capacity.36 Any transgression of this duty on his part would not only diminish
his reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the public's faith in the legal profession as a whole.37 In
this case, respondent's conduct fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a member of
the bar, for which he must suffer the necessary consequences.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Orlando S. Paulma is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of two (2) years, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution. He is warned that a repetition
of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in Atty. Paulma's personal record with the Office of the Bar
Confidant, and copies be served to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10483, March 18, 2016
THE CHRISTIAN SPIRITISTS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., PICO LOCAL CENTER, REPRESENTED
BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, EDWIN A. PANTE, Complainant, v. ATTY. DANIEL D.
MANGALLAY, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This administrative case against the respondent attorney did not arise from any attorney-client
relationship gone wrong between the parties but from the ejectment action in which the respondent
attorney, as the plaintiff, successfully defeated the local congregation of the Christian Spiritists in the
Philippines, Inc., Pico Local Center (CSP-PLC), whose church building and other structures were the
objects of the action. After the defendants filed their notice of appeal, the parties agreed to settle among
themselves, with the defendants withdrawing the notice of appeal and agreeing to voluntarily vacate
and remove their structures by August 31, 2013 in consideration of the respondent's financial
assistance of P300,000.00. But, despite receiving the respondent's financial assistance, the defendants
reneged on their end of the agreement; hence, at the respondent's instance, the trial court issued the
writ of execution and the writ of demolition, by virtue of which the structures of the defendants were
ultimately demolished.

The demolition impelled the CSP-PLC, represented by its local Minister, Edwin A. Pante (Pante), to
bring the disbarment complaint against the respondent based on his allegedly gross misconduct and
deceit in causing the demolition of the structures without the demolition order from the court, violation
of the Lawyer's Oath, and disobedience to a lawful order of the court, positing that he thereby abused
his legal knowledge.
Antecedents

Pante avers that the CSP-PLC constructed its church building on the land located in JE 176 Pico, La
Trinidad, Benguet, which was owned by Maria Omiles who had bought it from Larry Ogas; 1 that on
June 11, 2012, Omiles and Pastor Elvis Maliked received the summons issued by the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet requiring them to answer the complaint for unlawful detainer filed
against them by the respondent; that based on the allegations of the complaint (docketed as Civil Case
No. R-1256 entitled Daniel Dazon Mangallay v. Maria Tomino Omiles and all persons staying with
and/or acting on her behalf, including all Officers and/or patrons of the Church of the Christian Spiritists
in the Philippines, represented by Pastor Elvis S. Maliked), the respondent claimed ownership of the
land where the church of the CSP-PLC had been erected, attaching the copy of Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 45241 issued by the Register of Deeds of Benguet, and the deed of absolute sale
executed between him and one Pedro Loy;2 that the MTC later on decided the case by declaring the
respondent to have the better right of possession; and that the MTC further declared that the CSP-PLC
was a builder in good faith, without prejudice to the respondent exercising his option to appropriate the
building in accordance with Article 448 of the Civil Code.3

As earlier mentioned, the respondent sought and obtained the writ of execution from the MTC after the
defendants, including the complainant, reneged on the promise to voluntarily vacate and surrender the
premises by August 31, 2013 in consideration of the respondent's financial assistance of P300,000.00.
The writ of execution was issued on December 13, 2013 and the writ of demolition on December 19,
2013. Sheriffs Joselito S. Tumbaga and John Marie O. Ocasla, accompanied by the respondent and
elements of the Philippine National Police, implemented the writ of execution and writ of demolition on
January 22 and January 23, 2014 by demolishing the church building and the pastoral house of the
CSP-PLC.4

Pante now insists that the demolition was done without a demolition order from the MTC; that the
dismantled materials worth P462,236.00 were forcibly taken away by the respondent, who had taken
advantage of his legal knowledge to cause the premature demolition of the structures sans the
demolition order; that such taking away of the dismantled materials constituted robbery and malicious
mischief; and that his act warranted his disbarment.

In response, the respondent denies any wrong doing. He counters that the demolition was backed up
by a court order;5 that after receiving the decision of the MTC, the parties entered into a compromise
agreement by virtue of which the CSP-PLC withdrew its appeal and promised to voluntarily vacate and
surrender the disputed premises in consideration of P300,000.00 to be paid by him;6 that despite his
having paid the same, the CSP-PLC did not vacate the premises even within the grace period given to
them;7 that he then moved for the execution of the judgment, and his motion was granted by the
MTC;8that the sheriffs report dated November 21, 20139 stated that after the CSP-PLC did not comply
with the writ of execution to remove or demolish its structures on the premises; that he consequently
sought from the MTC the writ of demolition; and that the MTC issued the writ of demolition.10

The respondent avers that it was not he but the sheriffs who implemented the writ of demolition; that
the sheriffs report dated January 30, 2014 stated that the conduct of the implementation was peaceful,
and that Pante and the other members of the church personally observed the conduct of the demolition;
and that the sheriffs report further stated that Pante showed no defiance of the lawful order of the
court.11

The respondent submits that there was nothing wrong in his appropriating the dismantled materials to
ensure compensation for the expenses incurred in the demolition; and that the complaint for his
disbarment should be dismissed.
Ruling of the Court

The complaint for disbarment is absolutely devoid of merit and substance.

Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, provides as follows:

Section 1. How Instituted. — Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys
may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts
complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts
therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.

The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter
Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges against erring
attorneys including those in the government service. Provided, however, That all charges against
Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, and Judges of the Court of Tax Appeals and
lower courts, even if lawyers are jointly charged with them, shall be filed with the Supreme
Court; Provided, further,That charges filed against Justices and Judges before the IBP, including those
filed prior to their appointment in the Judiciary, shall immediately be forwarded to the Supreme Court
for disposition and adjudication

Six (6) copies of the verified complaint shall be filed with the Secretary of the IBP or the Secretary of
any of its chapter who shall forthwith transmit the same to the IBP Board of Governors for assignment
to an investigator. (As amended, Bar Matter No. 1960, May 1, 2000.)

Under the foregoing rule, the proceedings for the disbarment, suspension or discipline of an attorney
may be taken by the Court, motu proprio, or by the IBP itself upon the verified complaint of any person.

Should the disciplinary complaint against the attorney be filed directly with the Court, the complaint is
referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. The reference to the IBP is resorted
to whenever the factual basis for the charge may be contested or disputed, or may require the reception
of the evidence of the complainant and the respondent attorney. After the referral and hearings, the
IBP renders its findings and recommendations on the complaint, subject to the review by the
Court.12 Yet, the Court may dispense with the referral to the IBP and resolve the charge without delay.
This happens particularly when the charge is patently frivolous, or insincere, or unwarranted, or
intended only to harass and spite the respondent attorney.

The Court has not enunciated any rule that prohibits the direct filing with it of administrative complaints
against attorneys in order to emphasize its role as the guardian of the legal profession with the ultimate
disciplinary power over attorneys. The disciplinary power of the Court is both a right and a duty.13 Quite
recently, however, the Court has revised Rule 139-B14 to eliminate any ambiguity about the authority
of the Court to directly receive administrative complaints against attorneys, thus:
Section 1. How Instituted. - Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may
be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or upon the filing of a verified complaint of any
person before the Supreme Court or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The complaint shall
state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons
having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate
said facts.

The IBP shall forward to the Supreme Court for appropriate disposition all complaints for disbarment,
suspension and discipline filed against incumbent Justices of the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan,
Court of Tax Appeals and judges of lower courts, or against lawyers in the government service, whether
or not they are charged singly or jointly with other respondents, and whether or not such complaint
deals with acts unrelated to the discharge of their official functions. If the complaint is filed before the
IBP. six (6) copies of the verified complaint shall be filed with the Secretary of the IBP or the Secretary
of any of its chapter who shall forthwith transmit the same to the IBP Board of Governors for assignment
to an investigator.

x x x x

B. PROCEEDINGS IN THE SUPREME COURT

Section 13. Investigation of complaints. - In proceedings initiated by the Supreme Court, or in other
proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case for
investigation to the Office of the Bar Confidant, or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge
of a lower court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided in sections
6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report of investigation shall be conducted directly by the
Supreme Court.

The complaint may also be referred to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation,
[bold emphasis supplied to indicate the revisions]

Under the foregoing revisions of Rule 139-B, the administrative complaints against attorneys are
generally not dismissed outright but are instead referred for investigation, report and recommendation
either to the IBP, or the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), or any office of the Court or even a judge of
a lower court. Such referral ensures that the parties' right to due process is respected as to matters that
require further inquiry and which cannot be resolved by the mere evaluation of the documents attached
to the pleadings.15 Consequently, whenever the referral is made by the Court, the IBP, the OBC or
other authorized office or individual must conduct the formal investigation of the administrative
complaint, and this investigation is a mandatory requirement that cannot be dispensed with except for
valid and compelling reasons because it serves the purpose of threshing out all the factual issues that
no cursory evaluation of the pleadings can determine. 16

However, the referral to the IBP is not compulsory when the administrative case can be decided on the
basis of the pleadings filed with the Court, or when the referral to the IBP for the conduct of formal
investigation would be redundant or unnecessary, such as when the protraction of the investigation
equates to undue delay. Dismissal of the case may even be directed at the outset should the Court find
the complaint to be clearly wanting in merit.17 Indeed, the Rules of Court should not be read as
preventing the giving of speedy relief whenever such speedy relief is warranted.

It is upon this that we dispense with the need to refer the complaint against the respondent to the IBP
for the conduct of the formal investigation. The documents he submitted to substantiate his denial of
professional wrongdoing are part of the records of the trial court, and, as such, are sufficient to establish
the unworthiness of the complaint as well as his lawful entitlement to the demolition of the structures of
the defendants in Civil Case No. R-1256.

Specifically, the demolition was authorized by the order issued by the MTC on December 19, 2013. 18 In
the execution of the final and executory decision in Civil Case No. R-1256, the sheriffs dutifully
discharged their functions. The presence of the respondent during the execution proceedings was by
no means irregular or improper, for he was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. R-1256. The complainant was
then represented by Pante and some other members of the congregation, who did not manifest any
resistance' or objection to any irregularity in the conduct of the execution. After all, elements of the
Philippine National Police were also present to ensure the peaceful implementation of the writ of
execution.

Neither do we find anything wrong, least of all criminal, in the act of the respondent of taking away the
materials of the demolished structures. The parties put an end to their dispute by the defendants,
including the complainant and Pante, opting to withdraw their notice of appeal and undertaking to
voluntarily vacate and to peacefully turn over the premises to the respondent by August 31, 2013 in
exchange for the latter's financial assistance of the P300,000.00. The respondent paid the amount in
the MTC on March 20, 2013, and the amount was later on received by Maria Omiles, Feliciano Omiles,
Jr., and Noralyn T. Abad as the representatives of the CSP-PLC on the same day.19 But the latter
reneged on their part of the agreement without returning the P300,000.00 to the respondent, who was
left to exhaust his legal remedies to enforce the judgment against them. It is notable that the judgment
expressly directed him "to exercise his option pursuant to the provisions of Article 448 of the New Civil
Code of the Philippines within thirty (30) days from the finality of this judgment insofar as the
improvements introduced by the defendants on the subject property."20 Article 448 of the Civil Code
granted to him as the owner of the premises, among others, "the right to appropriate as his own the
works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548." His act
of taking the materials of the demolished structures was undoubtedly the exercise of the right of
appropriating them in light of the fact that the P300,000.00 earlier delivered as financial assistance was
most likely meant to indemnify the supposed builders in good faith.

The respondent has called attention to the letter of the Christian Spiritists in the Philippines, Inc., 21 the
mother organization to which the CSP-PLC belonged, to the effect that it was disavowing knowledge
of or participation in the disbarment complaint, and that it was categorically declaring that the complaint
had been filed by Pante only for his personal interest at the expense of the congregation. The
sentiments expressed in the letter manifested the inanity of the complaint, and the ill motives behind
Pante's filing of the complaint against the respondent. The proper outcome for such a complaint is its
immediate dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the complaint for disbarment against Atty. Daniel Dazon
Mangallay for its utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 9834, August 26, 2015
SAMUEL B. ARNADO, Complainant, v. ATTY. HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case

This is an administrative case against Atty. Homobono A. Adaza (respondent) for his failure to comply
with the requirements of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) under Bar Matter No. 850.
The Antecedent Facts

In a letter, dated 15 March 2013, Atty. Samuel B. Arnado (complainant) called the attention of this Court
to the practice of respondent of indicating "MCLE application for exemption under process" in his
pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012, and "MCLE Application for Exemption for
Reconsideration" in a pleading filed in 2012. Complainant informed the Court that he inquired from the
MCLE Office about the status of respondent's compliance and received the following Certification,
dated 2 January 2013, from Prof. Myrna S. Feliciano (Prof. Feliciano), MCLE's Executive
Director:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
This is to certify that per our records, ATTY. HOMOBONO A. ADAZA with Roll Number 14118 of IBP
MIS AMIS ORIENTAL Chapter did not comply with the requirements of Bar Matter [No.] 850 for the
following compliance periods:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
a. First Compliance Period (April 15, 2001 -April 14, 2004)
b. Second Compliance Period (April 15, 2004 -April 14, 2007)
c. Third Compliance Period (April 15, 2007 -April 14, 2010)
This is to further certify that Arty. Adaza filed an Application for Exemption from the MCLE requirement
on (sic) January 2009 but was DENIED by the MCLE Governing Board on (sic) its January 14, 2009
meeting.1

In its Resolution dated 17 June 2013, the Court referred this case to he MCLE Committee for evaluation,
report and recommendation.

In a letter, dated 5 August 2013, Atty. Jesusa Jean D. Reyes (Atty. Reyes), Assistant Executive Officer
of the MCLE Office, forwarded to the Court the rollo of the case together with the MCLE Governing
Board's Evaluation, Report and Recommendation.2 In its Evaluation, Report and
Recommendation3 dated 14 August 2013,4 the MCLE Governing Board, through retired Supreme Court
Associate Justice Bernardo P. Pardo (Justice Pardo), MCLE Chairman, informed the Court that
respondent applied for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods covering 15 April 2001
to 14 April 2004 and 15 April 2004 to 14 April 2007, respectively, on the ground of "expertise in law"
under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850. The MCLE Governing Board denied the request on 14
January 2009. In the same letter, the MCLE Governing Board noted that respondent neither applied for
exemption nor complied with the Third Compliance period from 15 April 2007 to 14 April 2010.

In its 9 December 2013 Resolution, the Court directed the Second Division Clerk of Court to furnish
respondent with complainant's letter of 15 March 2013. The Court likewise required respondent to file
his comment within ten days from notice.

In his Compliance and Comment5 dated 3 February 2014, respondent alleged that he did not receive a
copy of the 5 August 2013 letter of Atty. Reyes. He stated that he was wondering why his application
for exemption could not be granted. He further alleged that he did not receive a formal denial of his
application for exemption by the MCLE Governing Board, and that the notice sent by Prof. Feliciano
was based on the letter of complainant who belonged to Romualdo and Arnado Law Office, the law
office of his political opponents, the Romualdo family. Respondent alleged that the Romualdo family
controlled Camiguin and had total control of the judges and prosecutors in the province. He further
alleged that the law firm had control of the lawyers in Camiguin except for himself.

Respondent enumerated his achievements as a lawyer and claimed that he had been practicing law
for about 50 years. He stated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
x x x x

Fifth, with a great degree of immodesty, I was the first outsider of the Supreme Court WHOM
PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, offered, immediately after she took over government in February
1986, a seat as Justice of the Supreme Court but I refused the intended appointment because I did not
like some members of the Cory crowd to get me to the SC in an effort to buy my silence;

Sixth, I almost single-handedly handled the case of CORAZON C. AQUINO in the canvassing of the
results of the 1986 snap elections, DISCUSSING CONSTITUTIONAL and legal issues which finally
resulted to the EDSAI revolution;

xxxx

Eighth; I was one of the two lead counsels of now SENATOR MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO in the
national canvassing before the National Canvassing Board when she ran for President against then
GENERAL FIDEL RAMOS. The other counsel was former Justice of the Supreme Court SERAFIN
CUEVAS;

Ninth, I handled the 1987 and 1989 as well as the 2003 COUP CASES for leading generals like
ABENINA and COMMENDAOR and COLONELS like GREGORIO HONASAN as well as the SIX
OAKWOOD CAPTAINS, including now SENATOR ANTONIO TRILL ANES;

Tenth, I filed a case with the Supreme Court contesting the constitutionality and validity of the 2010
national elections, still undecided up to this day;

Eleventh, I filed together with another lawyer, a case in the Supreme Court on the constitutionality and
legality of the Corona impeachment which the SC only decided after the Senate decided his case and
former SC Chief Justice Corona conceding to the decision, thus the SC declaring the case moot and
academic;
Twelfth, I have been implementing and interpreting the Constitution and other laws as GOVERNOR OF
MISAMIS ORIENTAL, COMMISSION OF IMMIGRATION and the senior member of the Opposition in
the regular Parliament in the Committee on Revision of Laws and Constitutional Amendments;

Thirteenth, I was the leading Opposition member of Parliament that drafted the Omnibus Election Law;

Fourteenth, I was the leading member of the Opposition in Parliament that prepared and orchestrated
the debate in the complaint for impeachment against PRESIDENT FERDINAND MARCOS;

Fifteenth, I have been practicing law for about fifty years now with appearances before the Supreme
Court when Justices were like Concepcion, Barrera and JBL REYES; in the Court of Appeals; and
numerous courts all over the country;

Sixteenth, I have been engaged as lawyer for a number of lawyers who have exemptions from the
MCLE;

x x x x6

Respondent further claimed that he had written five books: (1) Leaders From Marcos to Arroyo; (2)
Presidentiables and Emerging Upheavals; (3) Beginning, Hope and Change; (4) Ideas, Principles and
Lost Opportunities; and (5) Corona Impeachment. Thus, he asked for a reconsideration of the notice
for him to undergo MCLE. He asked for an exemption from MCLE compliance, or in the alternative, for
him to be allowed to practice law while complying with the MCLE requirements.

In its 2 June 2014 Resolution, the Court referred respondent's Compliance and Comment to the Office
of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
The Report and Recommendation of the OBC

In its Report and Recommendation dated 25 November 2014, the OBC reported that respondent
applied for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods on the ground of expertise in law.
The MCLE Governing Board denied the request on 14 January 2009. Prof. Feliciano informed
respondent of the denial of his application in a letter dated 1 October 2012. The OBC reported that
according to the MCLE Governing Board, "in order to be exempted (from compliance) pursuant to
expertise in lp.w under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850, the applicant must submit sufficient,
satisfactory and convincing proof to establish his expertise in a certain area of law." The OBC reported
that respondent failed to meet the requirements necessary for the exemption.

The OBC reported that this Court requires practicing members of the Bar to indicate in all their pleadings
filed with the courts the counsel's MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption pursuant
to 6ar Matter No. 1922. The OBC further reported that the MCLE Office has no record that respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration; and thus, his representation in a pleading that his "MCLE Application
for Exemption [is] for Reconsideration" in 2012 is baseless.

The OBC further reported that under Rule 12 of Bar Matter No. 850 and Section 12 of the MCLE
Implementing Regulations, non-compliance with the MCLE requirements shall result to the dismissal
of the case and the striking out of the pleadings from the records. 7 The OBC also reported that under
Section 12(d) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, a member of the Bar who failed to comply with
the MCLE requirements is given 60 days from receipt of notification to explain his deficiency or to show
his compliance with the requirements. Section 12(e) also provides that a member who fails to comply
within the given period shall pay a non-compliance fee of PI,000 and shall be listed as a delinquent
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the recommendation of the MCLE
Governing Board. The OBC reported that the Notice of Non-Compliance was sent to respondent on 13
August 2013. The OBC also reported that on 14 August 2013, the MCLE Governing Board
recommended that cases be filed against respondent in connection with the pleadings he filed without
the MCLE compliance/exemption number for the immediately preceding compliance period and that
the pleadings he filed be expunged from the records.

The OBC found that respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities as a lawyer. The OBC stated
that respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements jeopardized the causes of his clients
because the pleadings he filed could be stricken off from the records and considered invalid.

The OBC recommended that respondent be declared a delinquent member of the Bar and guilty of
non-compliance with the MCLE requirements. The OBC further recommended respondent's
suspension from the practice of law for six months with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely. The OBC also recommended that respondent
be directed to comply with the requirements set forth by the MCLE Governing Board.
The Issue

The only issue here is whether respondent is administratively liable for his failure to comply with the
MCLE requirements.
The Ruling of this Court

Bar Matter No. 850 requires members of the IBP to undergo continuing legal education "to ensure that
throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the
profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law." 8 The First Compliance Period was from
15 April 2001 to 14 April 2004; the Second Compliance Period was from 15 April 2004 to 14 April 2007;
and the Third Compliance Period was from 15 April 2007 to 14 April 2010. Complainant's letter covered
respondent's pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 which means respondent also failed to
comply with the MCLE requirements for the Fourth Compliance Period from 15 April 2010 to 14 April
2013.

The records of the MCLE Office showed that respondent failed to comply with the four compliance
periods. The records also showed that respondent filed an application for exemption only on 5 January
2009. According to the MCLE Governing Board, respondent's application for exemption covered the
First and Second Compliance Periods. Respondent did not apply for exemption for the Third
Compliance Period. The MCLE Governing Board denied respondent's application for exemption on 14
January 2009 on the ground that the application did not meet the requirements of expertise in law under
Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850. However, the MCLE Office failed to convey the denial of the
application for exemption to respondent. The MCLE Office only informed respondent, through its letter
dated 1 October 2012 signed by Prof. Feliciano, when it received inquiries from complainant, Judge
Sinfroso Tabamo, and Camiguin Deputy Provincial Prosecutor Renato A. Abbu on the status of
respondent's MCLE compliance. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration after one year, or on
23 October 2013, which the MCLE Governing Board denied with finality on 28 November 2013. The
denial of the motion for reconsideration was sent to respondent in a letter 9 dated 29 November 2013,
signed by Justice Pardo.

Clearly, respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities by failing to comply with Bar Matter No. 850.
His application for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods was filed after the
compliance periods had ended. He did not follow-up the status of his application for exemption. He
furnished the Court with his letter dated 7 February 201210 to the MCLE Office asking the office to act
on his application for exemption but alleged that his secretary failed to send it to the MCLE Office. 11 He
did not comply with the Fourth Compliance Period.

In its 1 October 2012 letter to respondent, the MCLE Office enjoined him to comply with the
requirements for the First to Third Compliance periods. It was reiterated in the 29 November 2013 letter
denying respondent's motion for reconsideration of his application for exemption. The OBC also
reported that a Notice of Non-Compliance was sent to respondent on 13 August 2013. Under Section
12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, respondent has 60 days from receipt of the notification
to comply. However, in his Compliance and Comment before this Court, respondent stated that
because of his involvement in public interest issues in the country, the earliest that he could comply
with Bar Matter No. 850 would be on 10-14 February 2014 and that he already registered with the
MCLE Program of the University of the Philippines (UP) Diliman on those dates.

Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Section 12. Compliance Procedures

x x x x

(5) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to circumvent or evade
compliance with the MCLE requirements.

A member failing to comply with the continuing legal education requirement will receive a Non-
Compliance Notice stating his specific deficiency and will be given sixty (60) days from the receipt of
the notification to explain the deficiency or otherwise show compliance with the requirements. Such
notice shall be written in capital letters as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-COMPLIANCE OR PROOF

OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE REQUIREMENT WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF THIS
NOTICE SHALL BE A CAUSE FOR LISTING YOU AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER AND SHALL NOT
BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE
IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE.

The Member may use the 60-day period to complete his compliance with the MCLE requirement. Credit
units earned during this period may only be counted toward compliance with the prior period
requirement unless units in excess of the requirement are earned in which case the excess may be
counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement.

A member who is in non-compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay a non-compliance
fee of PI,000.00 and shall be listed as a delinquent member of the IBP by the IBP Board of Governors
upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee, in which case Rule 13 9-A of the Rules of Court
shall apply.

Even if respondent attended the 10-14 February 2014 MCLE Program of UP Diliman, it would only
cover his deficiencies for the First Compliance Period. He is still delinquent for the Second, Third, and
Fourth Compliance Periods. The Court has not been furnished proof of compliance for the First
Compliance Period.

The Court notes the lackadaisical attitude of respondent towards Complying with the requirements of
Bar Matter No. 850. He assumed that his application for exemption, filed after the compliance periods,
would be granted. He purportedly wrote the MCLE Office to follow-up the status of his application but
claimed that his secretary forgot to send the letter. He now wants the Court to again reconsider the
MCLE Office's denial of his application for exemption when his motion for reconsideration was already
denied with finality by the MCLE Governing Board on 28 November 2013. He had the temerity to inform
the Court that the earliest that he could comply was on 10-14 February 2014, which was beyond the
60-day period required under Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, and without even
indicating when he intended to comply with his deficiencies br the Second, Third, and Fourth
Compliance Periods. Instead, he asked the Court to allow him to continue practicing law while
complying with the MCLE requirements.

The MCLE Office is not without fault in this case. While it acted on respondent's application for
exemption on 14 January 2009, it took the office three years to inform respondent of the denial of his
application. The MCLE Office only informed respondent on 1 October 2012 and after it received
inquiries regarding the status of respondent's compliance. Hence, during the period when respondent
indicated "MCLE application for exemption under process" in his pleadings, he was not aware of the
action of the MCLE Governing Board on his application for exemption. However, after he had been
informed of the denial of his application for exemption, it still took respondent one year to file a motion
for reconsideration. After the denial of his motion for reconsideration, respondent still took, and is still
aking, his time to satisfy the requirements of the MCLE. In addition, when respondent indicated "MCLE
Application for Exemption for Reconsideration" in a pleading, he had not filed any motion for
reconsideration before the MCLE Office.

Respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements and disregard of the directives of the
MCLE Office warrant his declaration as a delinquent member of the IBP. While the MCLE Implementing
Regulations state that the MCLE Committee should recommend to the IBP Board of Governors the
listing of a lawyer as a delinquent member, there is nothing that prevents the Court from using its
administrative power and supervision to discipline erring lawyers and from directing the IBP Board of
Governors o declare such lawyers as delinquent members of the IBP.

The OBC recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of aw for six months. We agree. In
addition, his listing as a delinquent member pf the IBP is also akin to suspension because he shall not
be permitted to practice law until such time as he submits proof of full compliance to the IBP Board of
Governors, and the IBP Board of Governors has notified the MCLE Committee of his reinstatement,
under Section 14 of the MCLE Implementing Regulations. Hence, we deem it proper to declare
respondent as a delinquent member of the IBP and to suspend him from the practice of law for six
months or until he has fully complied with the requirements of the MCLE for the First, Second, Third,
and Fourth Compliance Periods, whichever is later, and he has fully paid the required non-compliance
and reinstatement fees.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

(1) REMIND the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Office to promptly act on matters that require
its immediate attention, such as but not limited to applications for exemptions, and to communicate its
action to the interested parties within a reasonable period;

(2) DENY the prayer of Atty. Homobono A. Adaza to be exempted from MCLE compliance as the matter
had already been denied with finality by the MCLE Governing Board on 28 November 2013;

(3) DECLARE Atty. Homobono A. Adaza as a delinquent member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and SUSPEND him from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS, or until he has fully complied
with the MCLE requirements for the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods, whichever
is later, and he has fully paid the required non-compliance and reinstatement fees.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Homobono A. Adaza's personal record in the Office of
the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
to all courts in the land. Let copies be also furnished the MCLE Office and the IBP Governing Board for
their appropriate actions.

SO ORDERED.