Criminal Procedure BAIL
EN BANC charge is a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is found to be strong. At the hearing of the
G.R. No. L-439 August 20, 1946
EDUARDO OCAMPO, Petitioner, vs. JOSE BERNABE, EMILIO RILLORAZA, and ANGEL GAMBOA,
Judges of People's Court (Fourth Division), Respondents.
Felicisimo S. Ocampo and Alberto V. J. Francisco for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Assistant Solicitor Gianzon for respondents.
MORAN, C.J.: chanrobles virtual law library
This is a petition for certiorari filed by Eduardo Ocampo to set aside an order issued by the Fourth
Division of the People's court denying his application for
bail.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioner was arrested by the Counter Intelligence Coprs of the Armed Forces of the United
States and confined in Muntinglupa Prisons since July 30, 1945, and pursuant to Executive Order
No. 6555 he was turned over to the Commonwealth of the Philippines and later on filed with the
Peoples Court his application for bail under Act No. 682. At the hearing of the application, the
special prosecutor stated that petitioner with having pointed out Placido Trinidad as a guerilla to
the Japanese and for that reason Placido Trinidad was shot to death. No evidence, however, was
presented by the special prosecutor and all that he did at the hearing was to recite the contents
of an affidavit which has no referrence to count No. 4, and to state further that he had 27 more
affidavits. Petitioner made an objection stating that a mere recital is not a evidence and that
evidence cannot be considered strong which has not been subjected to the test of cross-
examination. He testified in his own behalf in denying all the charges preferred against him and
stated that said charges are mere intrigues of his political enemy Marcelo Trinidad. He presented
two affidavits, one of Leoncia Nario and the other of Eugenio Trinidad, mother and uncle,
respectively, of Placido Trinidad, wherein it is stated that Placido Trinidad was killed by the
Japanese because of his having attempted to wrest a revolver from a foreman in charge of a detail
at work under orders of the Japanese and that petitioner had nothing to do with such killing.ch
bles virtual law library
Under all these circumstances, the Fourth division of the People's Court composed of Judges Jose
Bernabe, Emilio Rilloraza and Angel Gamboa, issued an order dated February 23, 1946, denying
the application for bail. Hence, this petition for certiorari, predicated upon the theory that no
proof having been presented by the special prosecutor to show that the evidence of guilt is
strong, the People's Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the application for
bail.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We have held in Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons (76 Phil., 756), that all persons shall
before conviction be bailable except when charge is a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is
strong. the general rule, therefore, is that all persons, whether charged or not yet charges, are,
before their conviction, entitled to provisional release on bail, the only exception being where the
application for bail, the burden of showing that the case falls within the exception is on the
prosecution, according to Rule 110, section 7. The determination of whether or not the evidence
of guilt is strong is, as stated in Herras Teehankee case, a matter of judicial discretion. This
discretion, by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercise only after the evidence is
submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of evidence
cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court (Ramos vs. Ramos,
45 Phil., 362), it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence
of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross-examination and to
introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. Mere affidavits or recital of their contents are not
sufficient since they are mere hearsay evidence, unless the petitioner fails to object
thereto.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
And this is the prevailing doctrine in the United States according to authorities to be quoted later.
In some states of the American union, the burden of showing that proof is evident or the
presumption great, lies on the prosecution while in others on the petitioner, but the rule seems to
be uniform to the effect that no matter which side bears the burden of proof, the evidence of
guilt should be adduced before the court for a proper determination of its probative force. In
American Jurisprudence the following appears:
. . . The English rule is, however, by no means uniformly followed in the United States. In some
jurisdictions the case is heard de novo, the solicitor and prosecutor are notified to attend, and
witnesses are subpoenaed both for the state and for the defendant and are examined before the
court. This practice seems generally to be followed, and it may be laid down as abroad principle
that where bail is not a matter of right, the burden is upon the petitioner to produce facts
sufficient to entitle him to bail at the hearing. He is therefore both required and permitted to
introduce evidence doing to the merits of the case against him. Ordinarily, the presumption is
with the state, and it is proper to require the prisoner to introduce evidence in the first instance,
although it imposes upon him the necessity of producing evidence upon which the state intends
to rely for his conviction on the final trial. the accused will not, by this procedure, be denied the
opportunity of cross-examining the people's witnesses. However, in some jurisdictions, the courts
have gone so far as to hold that the duty is upon the prosecuting attorney, in resisting an
application, to begin the proceedings by the introduction of evidence showing that the applicant
is not entitled to bail. (6 Am. Jur., section 47, p. 70.).
xxx xxx xxx
The general rule followed in the United States is more liberal than that of the common law, and
the mere fact that a grand jury has found an indictment for murder will not generally preclude the
court from inquiry into the facts of the case. On this inquiry the witnesses for the prosecution may
be called, and the accused is not required to produce the testimony of any other witnesses.
Furthermore, the accused is entitled to go behind the indictment and introduce evidence going to
the merits of the case. The inquiry should not be limited to determining the probable degree of
the homicide, but should include the determination of the character of the proof or the strength
of the presumption respecting whether or not the defendant did the killing or was connected with
it as a guilty agent. A case for the allowance of bail after indictment may also be presented where

the public prosecutor admits that under the evidence obtainable no conviction of a capital offense
can be had, or where there has been a failure to convict, or where a verdict of guilty has been
reversed by reason of the insufficiency of the evidence. (6 Am. Jur., section 50, p. 71.)
In corpus Juris Secundum the rule is summarized as follows:
Unless the presumption from an indictment for a capital offense is conclusive against accused
which has been considered in section 34 b(2) (b)the determination as to whether the proof is
evident or the presumption great must, on an original application, be determined from the
evidence adduced on the application no matter which side bears the burden of proof. Where
accused under a capital indictment bears the burden of proof he should offer the witnesses
whose names are endorsed on the indictment, although he is not imited to such
witnesses.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The court should hear all material and relevant evidence offered by either party, such as the
grand jury minutes, and should consider the evidence as a whole. (8 C.J.S., section 46 [b], p. 94.).
See also the following authorities:
Under the 17th section of the Alabama Bill of Rights, which declares that "all persons shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient securities, except for capital offenses where the proof is
evident or the presumption great," and under the Alabama statutes upon the hearing of
applications for bail, either before or after indictment, the court is not, as according to the
practice in England, confined to the written evidence taken down before the committing
magistrate; but the case is heard de novo the solicitor and prosecutor are notified to attend, and
witnesses are subpoenaed both for the state and for the defendant, and examined before the
court, which is to decide the application upon the evidence produced. Code sections 3721,
3722,3732, 3733, 3745, 3746, 3669, 3673. Ex parte Bryant, 34 Ala., 270. ( Re Thomas, 20 Okla.,
167; 93 Pac., 980; 39 L. R. A., New Series, pp. 752, 775.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
In capital case, application for bail calls for exercise of judicial discretion in determining
probability of defendant's guilt which requires submission of evidence. (Shaw vs. State, 47 S.W.
[2d], 92; 164 Tenn., 192; 8 C.J.S., p. 94, fn. 80.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Applicant for bail under Burns' St. Annot. (1914), section 2025, seeking to overcome presumption
of truth of indictment, must introduce the evidence of witnesses as indicated by indictment, and
also such witnesses as state indicates it relies on. (McAdams vs. State, 147 N.E., 764; 196 Ind.,
184; 8 C.J.S., p. 94, fn. 80.)chanrobles virtual law library
When names of state witnesses are placed upon the indictment the presumption is that all should
not be required to produce the testimony of any other witnesses on behalf of the state. Where no
witnesses are placed on the indictment, it is incumbent on the state attorneys, on application for
bail, to furnish the accused with a list of the witnesses relied on by the state in due time to secure
Criminal Procedure BAIL
their presence or testimony; otherwise he could not know what was the testimony upon which
the state relied. In case no witnesses are placed upon the indictment and a list is duly furnished by
the prosecuting officer, the accused should produce the witnesses for the state in connection with
his own, if he had any, in order that the judge may determine from all the testimony in the case
whether the proof was not evident or the presumption not great.
xxx xxx x x xchanrobles virtual law library
Upon the hearing it is proper to require the prisoner to begin the evidence, although it imposes
upon him the necessity of producing evidence upon which the state intended to rely for his
conviction on the final trial. But the accused will not by this procedure be denied the opportunity
of cross-examining the people's witnesses. ( Ex parte Heffren, 27 Ind., 87. To the same effect,
Rigdon vs. State, 41 Fla., 308; 26 So., 711; ex parteNathan[Fla.]; 50 so., 38." (39 L. R. A., New
Series, pp. 752, 774, 775.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The evidence for the state, as well as that for the accused, should be presented (1) by the
petitioner in an application for bail. ( Ex parte Tully [Fla.], 66 S., 296; Rigdon vs. State, 41 Fla., 308;
26 S., 711; Ex parte Heffren, 27 Ind., 87. (2) But the petitioner, by proper procedure, may test the
probative force of the testimony for the state in order to fully present his case for the purposes of
the hearing. Ex parte Tully, supra; Ex parte Heffren,supra. (6 C.J., p. 984, fn. 50 [a], section
214.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Where on a motion to admit to bail after the indictment, the evidence of the witnesses who
testified before the grand jury does not make a prima facie case against the accused, he is entitled
to bail, and it is an error to refuse bail upon the statement of the district attorney that he has
other evidence which he will not disclose for fear of weakening the state's case. (In ex
parte Reynald, 37 Texas, 1.)
And this is in conformity with the former rulings of this Court. In Marcos vs. Cruz (67 Phil., 82), we
said:
Se arguye que el Juez recurrido, antes de expedir el mandamiente de arresto de los acusados,
examino a los dos testigos de cargo que presento el fiscal y que estas pruebas establecieron
asimismo la presuncion de culpabilidad de los acusados y el requerimiento adicional de que las
pruebas de culpabilidad deben ser evidentes. No podemos prestar nuestro asentimiento a esta
pretension. No debe olvidarse que tales pruebas se recibieron en ausencia de los acusados y estos
no tuvieron oportunidad de verles declarar ni de repreguntarles. . . . Otras razones que impiden el
que tales pruebas puedan tener en cuenta contra los acusados son; que el fiscal no las produjo ni
ofrecio en la vista de las peticiones de libertad bajo fianza. . .. En tales circunstancias era deber del
Juez recurrido requerir al fiscal que presente sus pruebas para demostrar que el delito imputado
era capital, que las pruebas eran evidentes y que la presuncion de culpabilidad era fuerte.
In Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, supra, we said:

When the first proviso of section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 and Article III, section 1,
paragraph 16, of the Constitution, refer to the case where the court finds that there is strong
'evidence' of the commission of a capital offense, they necessarily mean evidence properly
adduced by the parties or any of them before it, in the manner and from prescribed by the laws
and rules of judicial procedure. . . .
True that in the same case of Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, supra, we said that the
hearing of an application for bail should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court.
By "summary hearing" we meant such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the
evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely
to determine the weight of the evidence for purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court "does
not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed
to the evidence for or against accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what
further evidence may be therein offered and admitted." (8 C. J. S., 93,94.) The course of the
inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such
evidence as has reference to substantial matters avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the
examination and cross-examination of witnesses and reducing to a reasonable minimum the
amount of corroboration particularly on details that are not essential to the purpose of the
hearing.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Objection has been made long ago to this method of hearing wherein the regular trial is
anticipated though to a limited extent at least. but the objection was dismissed as follows:
The second objection is more serious, and, if the courts possessed entire freedom of action in
regard to the matter, would be very persuasive. The regular trial is, to a limited extent at least,
anticipated. While the guilt or innocence of the accused is not to be determined, the quantity and
character of the proofs on this point are, for the special purpose in hand, necessarily considered.
Occasionally much time is thus consumed, and the court's attention is correspondingly diverted
from other business. But these objections cannot avail against a positive constitutional command;
if the Constitutional requires the court to determine for itself whether or not the proof is evident
or presumption great in a given case, all considerations of expediency or convenience, however
potent they might be at the common law, must give way. (Re Losasso, 10 L.R.A. [1890], 847, 850.)
It appearing in the instant case that on the hearing of the application for bail filed by the
petitioner no proof was offered by the prosecution to show that the evidence of guilt is strong,
the Fourth Division of the People's Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the
bail applied for.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In view of the foregoing, the order of the fourth Division of the People's court dated February 23,
1946, denying the application for bail filed by the petitioner, is hereby set aside, and if appearing
that said order is but a misconception of the procedure to be followed in this kind of cases, the
respondent court is hereby ordered to hold another hearing in the manner herein described and
within seven days from notice for the purpose of determining whether petitioner may be released
on bail. Without costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Criminal Procedure BAIL
Paras, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Pablo M., conforme con la parte dispositiva.
Separate Opinionschanrobles virtual law library
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:chanrobles virtual law library
There should not be any disagreement that at the hearing of the application for bail in capital
offenses "the burden of showing that the case falls within the exception is on the prosecution";
that the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of judicial
discretion; that this discretion may rightly be exercised "only if the evidence is submitted to the
court at the hearing"; that petitioner had the "right of cross-examination and to introduce his own
evidence in rebuttal"; that contrary to the wrong doctrine set up in Duran vs. Abad Santos (74
Phil., 410), "mere affidavits or recital of their contents are not sufficient since they are mere
hearsay evidence," which, in our opinion, even if not objected to, are inadmissible, because the
omission can not turn a bad evidence into a good one.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Upon the facts of this case, we fully concur in the following pronouncement in the majority
opinion:
It appearing in the instant case that on the hearing of the application for bail filed by the
petitioner no proof was offered by the prosecution to show that the evidence of guilt is strong,
the Fourth Division of the People's court committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the bail
applied for.
The natural and logical consequence of the above pronouncement, to any one's mind, will be that
the "grave abuse" of denial should be corrected by a reverse action, that is, ordering the People's
court to grant the bail applied for, by following the short-cut procedure adopted by this Court
in Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons (76 Phil., 630), that of directly granting the bail, a
prompt procedure wholly justified in view of the fact that petitioner Ocampo has already been
deprived of his liberty for more than one year (since July 30, 1945), and the delay in granting him
bail, notwithstanding that he is entitled to it, is in great measure, due to the lower court's "grave
abuse."chanrobles virtual law library
We can not but be painfully surprised by the fact that the majority add more delay in the granting
of bail, in giving the prosecution further chance to correct its error and the lower court additional
opportunity, in an unnecessary procedure, to commit more errors and grave abuses as those four
ones committed by the same People's Court in the two Herras Teehankee cases (75 Phil., 634 and
76 Phil., 630), by disposing of the case as follows:
 Criminal Procedure BAIL
In view of the foregoing, the order of the Fourth Division of the People's Court dated February 23, identical to the one in Herras Teehankee, but petitioner volunteered evidence showing, without
1946, denying the application for bail filed by the petitioner, is hereby set aside, and it appearing any contradiction, that he is innocent of the charges against him. In the Herras Teehankee case,
that said order is but a misconception of the procedure to be followed in this kind of cases, the there was only an absence of evidence of guilt; whereas in the present case, there is the presence
respondent court is hereby ordered to hold another hearing in the manner herein-described and of evidence of innocence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
within seven days from notice for the purpose of determining whether the evidence of guilt is
strong and, therefore, whether petitioner may be released on bail. Without costs. In view of all the foregoing, and because the dispositive part of the majority decision is
irreconcilably inconsistent with the premises of fact and law in the same decision, we dissent and
It was since October 5, 1945, more than ten months ago, when petitioner filed his original vote that petitioner should be released on bail upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P10,000.
application for bail. It was denied on October 18. On October 30, petitioner prayed for its
reconsideration and at the same time asked the People's Court to set the case for hearing and to
require the prosecution to show that there was strong evidence of petitioner guilt. On November
10 the motion for reconsideration was denied, the People's Court stating that it granted an ex
parte hearing to the special prosecutor. On November 26 petitioner filed a pleading alleging that,
contrary to what was stated in the lower court's order of November 10, neither the Solicitor
General nor any of the special prosecutors appeared at the hearing of the motion for
reconsideration in spite of the fact that their office had been notified beforehand of the hearing.
On December 28 petitioner moved that a day be set for the hearing of this petition dated October
30, in which both parties should be present and the prosecution should adduce evidence, with the
corresponding right of the petitioner to prove that he was entitled to be released on bail, in
accordance with the ruling in Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira (75 Phil., 634). The inaction of the
People's Court upon the motion of December 28, compelled petitioner to file another motion on
January 18, 1946, reiterating his request that hearing be granted. The People's Court set the
petition for hearing, which took place on February 18, and which the prosecution, instead of
proving the existence of strong evidence of petitioner's guilt, merely informed the court, over
petitioner's objection, that it was in possession of a number of affidavits against the petitioner
and gave an idea of the contents thereof. None of said affidavits was, however, presented. In
order to counteract whatever influence the statements of the prosecution might bring to bear
upon the court, petitioner took the witness stand and denied under oath all the charges imputed
against him by the prosecution. To rebut the reputation that he caused the death of guerrilla,
Placido Trinidad, he presented affidavits of the mother and uncle of the alleged victim showing
that petitioner had nothing to do with his death, because the deceased was killed by the Japanese
for his attempt to wrest a revolver from a foreman in charge of a work under orders of the
Japanese. On February 23, 1946, more than four months after the original petition for bail was
filed, the lower court denied petitioner's prayer to be
bailed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In April, 1946, the petition was filed before this Supreme Court. It is regrettable that on so urgent
a matter as the present one, affecting as it does the personal freedom of a citizen, the Supreme
Court had to need more than four months to render a decision. The situation is aggravated by the
fact that, delaying further the granting of petitioner's bail, the People's court is ordered to hold
another hearing.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

If in the Herras Teehankee case ( supra), the Supreme Court, losing patience for the errors, grave
abuses and dillydallying of the People's Court, ordered directly the granting of bail to Mrs.
Teehankee, the petitioner in the present case has a better claim to a similar relief, not only
because the prosecution did not present any evidence to show petitioner's guilt, a situation
 Criminal Procedure BAIL
Republic of the Philippines Department of Justice (DOJ), upon review, recommended the dismissal of the
Supreme Court complaints in a Joint Resolution dated 13 June 2002.
Manila
On 21 June 2002, the City Prosecutor of Paraaque City, acting on the DOJ
Joint Resolution, moved for the withdrawal of the Information against
THIRD DIVISION complainants. It was granted by the trial court in an Order dated 5 July
2001. The Court of Appeals, acting on the Petition filed by Prosecutor Orda in
CA GR SP 72962, nullified the order of withdrawal. As a consequence, the
LIGAYA V. SANTOS, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1946 accused were arrested on the basis of the previous warrants of arrest issued
EDNA CORTEZ, [Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-2181-RTJ] GIRLIE CASTILLO and by the trial court. This Honorable Court, on review, in GR No. 158236,
CHRISTOPHER CASTILLO, Present: sustained the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
Complainants,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, Chairperson, Upon receipt of the Supreme Court Resolution, the trial court directed the
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, resumption of the proceedings on the subject criminal cases.However,
CALLEJO, SR., and Prosecutor Orda filed a motion to inhibit Presiding Judge Raul E. de Leon for
JUDGE ROLANDO G. HOW, CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. partiality in the issuance of the previous order granting the withdrawal of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch Information. Judge de Leon inhibited himself, and the cases were re-raffled and
257, Paraaque City, Promulgated: eventually assigned to respondent judge before whose court complainants filed
Respondent. January 26, 2007 their petition for bail.
x--------------------------------------------------x
On 14 December 2004, the prosecution presented as its first witness, SABINO
FRIAS, the same star witness who previously surfaced with an affidavit after
RESOLUTION erstwhile 'star witness' GINA AZARCON repudiated her prior
declarations. Frias re-affirmed his affidavit and positively identified all the
alleged malefactors, including herein complainants.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Before us is an administrative complaint[1] dated January 31, 2005 filed by Ligaya V. Santos, Edna
Cortez, Girlie Castillo and Christopher Castillo (complainants) against Judge Rolando G. How
(respondent), Regional Trial Court, Branch 257, Paraaque City, for Gross Ignorance of the Law,
Manifest Partiality and Serious Misconduct, relative to Criminal Case Nos. 01-0921, entitled
People of the Philippines v. Ligaya V. Santos, and 01-0425, entitled People of the Philippines
v. Rolly Tonion, Jhunrey Soriano, Christopher Castillo, Girlie Castillo, Robert Bunda and Pedro
Jimenez.
The facts of the case as found by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) are as follows:
Complainant Ligaya V. Santos is the Chairwoman of Barangay 659-
A, Arroceros, Manila, while the other complainants are BarangayCouncilors
and Barangay Policemen, respectively. They are presently detained without
bail in Paraaque City Jail as accused in the aforementioned criminal cases
involving the successive 'ambush' incidents during the second quarter of
2001 against two sons of Manila Assistant City Prosecutor Domingo I. Orda,
Jr. On the second 'ambush' incident, the Paraaque City Prosecutor's Office
found probable cause against the accused (complainants herein) but the
On 16 December 2004, the prosecution presented its second witness, JONAS
AGNOTE, a Lawton jeepney dispatcher and alleged co-conspirator, who
volunteered to testify only the day before. Agnote directly
implicated Ligaya Santos as the mastermind who instructed him to look for
gun-for-hire, which he provided in the person of 'Dagul' who was eventually
hired for a price of P100,000.00 to kill Prosecutor Orda.
Respondent Judge held that he would resolve the petition for bail on the
basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution. When complainants
manifested that they would present one witness to identify the documents
on record, respondent branded the request as 'misplaced.' He even rejected
outright the request of the defense counsel to make a tender of proof and
instead declared the petition deemed submitted for resolution, subject to
the filing of memorandum by the parties within five (5) days.
On 29 December 2004, respondent issued an Order denying bail to the
accused. Complainants assail the order for being based on a one-sentence
conclusion that the evidence of guilt is strong, without any supporting
evaluation or consideration of the issues raised.[2]

In his Comment,[3] respondent professes impartiality in handling the subject criminal cases. He
asserts that he had explained to the parties that, for purposes of bail hearing, only the
prosecution is required to present evidence since it is not yet a trial of the main case and the
court is only preliminarily tasked to determine if the evidence of guilt is strong.
Respondent argues that, even granting the accused may be allowed to present their evidence but
the Judge did not allow it, the disallowance cannot be considered partiality or misconduct. He
claims that he believed in good faith that he would fairly and correctly resolve the petition for bail
by evaluating it based solely on the evidence of the prosecution; and that allowing both parties to
present their evidence would mean resolving the merits of the case itself. He contends that if ever
he committed any error, it was an error of judgment committed in good faith for which
complainants have remedies under the Rules.
Respondent further contends that it is inaccurate and unfair to claim that his Order denying bail
was without supporting evaluation of the evidence and only made a one-sentence conclusion that
the evidence of guilt is strong. He stresses that the questioned Order contains a summary of the
testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution and it is only after the summary that he made a
conclusion that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. He explains that he did not
elaborate each and every point in support of the conclusion since they are already contained in
the summary. He avers that he intentionally made the conclusion terse because an outright
conclusion of everything might be considered a prejudgment of the case.
In the Agenda Report dated July 13, 2005,[4] the OCA made the following evaluation and
recommendation, to wit:
EVALUATION:
xxxx
Respondent Judge insists that, for purposes of bail hearing, only the
prosecution is required to present evidence since it is not yet a trial of the
main case and the court is only preliminarily tasked to determine if the
evidence of guilt is strong. He claims that in decreeing such position he
merely exercised his discretion, bail being discretionary in the
subject cases, and that if ever he erred in his ruling it is merely an error of
judgment.
The Constitution guarantees to every person under legal custody the right to
bail, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong. The rules likewise
mandate that before ruling on an application for bail, a hearing should first
be conducted to determine the existence of a strong evidence against the
accused.
A hearing for bail is summary in nature or otherwise in the discretion of the
court. Summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of receiving
and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the
Criminal Procedure BAIL
purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the weight of the
evidence for purposes of bail. The course of the inquiry may be left to the
discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as
has reference to substantial matters avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in
the examination and cross-examination of witnesses and reducing to a
reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration particularly on details that
are not essential to the purpose of the hearing.
It is true that the weight of the evidence adduced is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. However, such discretion may be exercised only after
the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the
purpose of determining whether or not he should be granted provisional
liberty. At the hearing, the court should assure that the prosecution is
afforded the opportunity to adduce evidence relevant to the factual issue,
with the applicant having the right of cross-examination and to introduce his
own evidence in rebuttal. Both the prosecution and the defense must be
given reasonable opportunity to prove, in the case of the prosecution, that
evidence of guilt of the applicant is strong; and, in the case of the defense,
that such evidence of guilt is not strong. The accused has the right to cross-
examine the witnesses presented by the prosecution and to introduce his
evidence in rebuttal to establish his right to bail.
In fine, the hearing is for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise sound
discretion as to whether or not under the Constitution and laws in force the
accused is entitled to provisional release on bail. At the hearing, the
petitioner can rightfully cross examine the witnesses presented by the
prosecution and introduce his own evidence in rebuttal.
In the instant case, respondent cut short the hearing after the prosecution
presented its evidence and dispensed altogether with the defense's turn to
adduce evidence in rebuttal. Said denial of the request to present evidence
shows deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment on the part of
respondent Judge. The deficiency is magnified by respondent's outright
denial of complainants' request to make a tender of proof, which is allowed
under the Rules. It is not accurate to contend that hearing the prosecution
overcome its burden of proof would suffice. Dictates of fair play should have
at least reminded respondent to inquire first the nature of the evidence
proposed to be presented, determine whether or not they will be essential
for the purpose of ascertaining entitlement to bail, before discarding any
evidence outright.This is in keeping with procedural due process, given
established rules and jurisprudence on bail.
It is a pressing responsibility of judges to endeavor at all times to avoid such
actions as would impress upon litigants the disregard of due process. On this,
respondent had been remiss.

True, as a matter of public policy, a judge may not be disciplined for error of
judgment absent proof that such error was made with a conscious and
deliberate intent to cause injustice. This does not mean, however, that a
judge need not observe propriety, discreetness and due care in the
performance of his official functions. In every case, a judge shall endeavor
diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan
interests, public opinion or fear of criticism.
The records, however, fail to establish bad faith, corruption, dishonesty or
fraud on the part of respondent, thereby meriting for him a tempered
penalty. In fact, a finding of good faith is consistent with the fact that
respondent still granted both parties opportunity to submit their respective
memorandum after he disallowed the defense to present evidence.
Finally, the rest of the charges against respondent lack merit. Specifically, the
charge of bias and partiality was not substantiated. Moreover, that the
decision was based on a one-sentence conclusion that the evidence of guilt is
strong is inaccurate. The conclusion to that effect was actually preceded by a
thorough summary of the evidence. The fact that there was no categorical
discussion on how the conclusion was reached does not make it less a
reasonable conclusion. Obviously, respondent accorded the evidence
probative weight, which he deemed to be adequate for his inference. At any
rate, the inadequacy of expression of the questioned Order is outweighed by
its substantial compliance with the requirements for an Order granting or
denying bail.
RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for consideration of the
Honorable Court are our recommendations that:
1. The instant complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular
administrative case;
1. For deficiency in prudence, which borders on disregard
of due process, respondent be REPRIMANDED with
Stern Warning that subsequent infractions shall be dealt
with more severely;
The rest of the charges against respondent be DISMISSED for lack of merit.
We adopt the findings of facts and recommendation of the OCA.
On September 12, 2005, respondent manifested that there is a related case Administrative Case
No. 6701 entitled Judge Rolando G. How v. Atty. Roan I. Libarios. He avers that since the present
case and the latter case arose from the same incident, the two cases should be consolidated. [5] In
its Resolution of August 23, 2006, the Court denied consolidation and considered the matter
submitted for resolution based on the pleadings filed.
Criminal Procedure BAIL
On September 23, 2005, complainants manifested their willingness to submit the case for
resolution based on the pleadings filed.[6]
At issue is whether or not the acts committed by respondent judge constitute gross ignorance of
the law, manifest partiality and serious misconduct.
On gross ignorance of the law.
No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution.[7]
Stressing our ruling in Basco v. Rapatalo,[8] we held that when the grant of bail is
discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong. However, the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong,
being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge. This discretion, by the very nature of
things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing.
Since the discretion is directed to the weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot properly
be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise
of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner
having the right of cross examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal.[9]
The discretion of the trial court is not absolute nor beyond control. It must be sound, and
exercised within reasonable bounds.[10]Judicial discretion, by its very nature, involves the exercise
of the judge's individual opinion and the law has wisely provided that its exercise be guided by
well-known rules which, while allowing the judge rational latitude for the operation of his own
individual views, prevent them from getting out of control. [11] An uncontrolled or uncontrollable
discretion on the part of a judge is a misnomer. It is a fallacy. Lord Mansfield, speaking of the
discretion to be exercised in granting or denying bail, said: but discretion when applied to a court
of justice, means sound discretion guided by law. It must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful; but
legal and regular.[12]
Jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the right of petitioner in bail proceedings to introduce
his own evidence in rebuttal.[13]Respondent failed to observe and consider for his proper
determination and evaluation the weight of evidence presented by the prosecution. This, to our
mind, is a clear denial of complainants right to due process and equal protection of the law as
embodied in our Constitution.[14]
Records show that during the hearing of the application for bail, complainants' counsel insisted on
presenting their evidence to disprove the allegations of the prosecution. However, respondent
argued that the prosecution has to establish evidence against the accused because if he will go to
the defense evidence, there will be no way of stopping it, it will go through and through, as if, he
is already hearing the main case.[15] This line of argument by respondent is misplaced considering
that what the complainants were asking is for their evidence, which is already a part of the record,
to be presented and admitted as tender of proof.
The reasons given by respondent that for purposes of bail hearing, only the prosecution is
required to present evidence since it is not yet a trial of the main case; that the court is only

preliminarily tasked to determine if the evidence of guilt is strong; and that to allow complainants
to present their evidence would mean resolving the merits of the case itself, are not plausible.
Respondent, in effect, deprived the accused with their right to present rebuttal
evidence which to our mind is a clear violation of their right to due process and equal protection
of the law. As aptly observed by the OCA, dictates of fair play should have at least reminded
respondent to inquire first of the nature of the evidence proposed to be presented, determine
whether or not it will be essential for the purpose of ascertaining entitlement to bail, before
discarding any evidence outright. This is in keeping with procedural due process, given established
rules and jurisprudence on bail.[16]
It is clear from the foregoing that respondent is remiss in his responsibility to endeavor at all
times to avoid such actions as would impress upon litigants the disregard of due process.
It is settled that as a matter of policy, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to liability civil, criminal or administrative for any of his
official acts, no matter how erroneous, as along as he acts in good faith. [17] To hold otherwise
would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret
the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. [18]
However, although a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous
order or decision he renders, relative immunity is not a license to be negligent, abusive or
arbitrary in the performance of his adjudicatory prerogatives.[19]
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the subject decision,
order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law
and jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or
corruption.[20] Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations, are
sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge.[21]
However, good faith in situations of fallible discretion inhered only within the
parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply where the issues are so simple and the
applicable legal principles evident and basic as to be beyond possible margins of error.[22]
In this case, respondent's act of cutting short the hearing after the prosecution
presented its evidence, without affording the defense to adduce evidence in rebuttal together
with his outright denial of complainants request to offer proof, is a clear disregard of the right of
the accused to disprove that the evidence of guilt is strong. It is of no moment that respondent
required complainants to submit their memorandum. What is significant is
that complainants were deprived of their constitutional right to present evidence during the
hearing which the respondent may intelligently appreciate and evaluate in the light of the
circumstances then obtaining.
It must be stressed that occupying the exalted position of a judge entails a lot of responsibilities,
foremost of which is proficiency in the law. Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the laws and maintain professional competence. He is
mandated to be conversant with the law and to have more than a cursory acquaintance with the
Criminal Procedure BAIL
rules and authoritative doctrines. When the law is elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes
gross ignorance thereof. Judges are expected to have more than just a modicum of acquaintance
with the statutes and procedural rules.
On manifest partiality and serious misconduct.
Nothing in the records suggests that respondent was motivated by malice or corrupt motives to
deny the application for bail. Complainants failed to substantiate their other allegations with
competent proof besides their own bare allegations. Respondent did what he thought was right
under the law and established principles. Hence, respondent could not be held liable for manifest
partiality and serious misconduct. The Court cannot presume partiality based on the
circumstances alleged in the complaint.
Moreover, for serious misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be corrupt or
inspired by an intention to violate the law or a persistent disregard of well-known legal
rules.[23] The records are bereft of any evidence to this effect to warrant disciplinary action against
respondent.
On denying bail based on a one-sentence conclusion that the evidence of guilt is strong.
We agree with the OCA that although there was no categorical discussion on how the conclusion,
that the evidence of guilt is strong, was reached, the same does not make it less a reasonable
conclusion. The inadequacy of expression of the questioned Order is outweighed by its substantial
compliance with the requirements for an Order granting or denying bail.
In sum, the act of respondent in denying the complainants the right to present evidence
constitutes simple ignorance of the law; but in the absence of malice, corrupt motives or
improper considerations on the part of the respondent, the penalty of reprimand recommended
by the OCA is just and reasonable.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds Judge Rolando G. How guilty of simple ignorance of the law
and REPRIMANDS him with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will
be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Chairperson

THIRD DIVISION
[A.M. OCA No. 03-1800-RTJ. November 26, 2004]
Chief State Prosecutor JOVENCITO R. ZUO, complainant, vs. Judge ALEJADRINO C. CABEBE,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
The instant administrative case stemmed from the sworn complaint[1] dated January 15,
2003 of Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo of the Department of Justice, against Judge
Alejandrino C. Cabebe,[2] then Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos
Norte. The charges are knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, gross ignorance of the law and
partiality.
In his complaint, Chief State Prosecutor Zuo alleged that Criminal Case No. 3950-18 for
illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
18, Batac, Ilocos Norte against Rey Daquep Arcangel, Victorino Gamet Malabed, William Roxas
Villanueva, all police officers, Jocelyn Malabed Manuel and Pelagio Valencia Manuel. Upon
arraignment, all the accused, assisted by their counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. On March 14, 2001, the prosecution filed with this Court a petition for change of venue
but was denied in a Resolution dated August 13, 2001.[3] On October 8, 2001, the accused filed a
motion for reconsideration.[4] In the meantime, the proceedings before respondents court were
suspended.
On May 6, 2002, the accused filed a motion to dismiss invoking as ground the right of the
accused to a speedy trial. On November 5, 2002, respondent judge motu propio issued an
Order[5] granting bail to the accused, fixing the bail for each at P70,000.00 in cash or property
bond at P120,000.00, except for accused Evelyn Manuel whose bail was fixed at P20,000.00 in
cash. Respondent judge issued the Order without the accuseds application or motion for bail.
The prosecution then filed a motion for reconsideration. [6] Instead of acting thereon,
respondent judge issued an order inhibiting himself from further proceeding with the case,
realizing that what he did was patently irregular. Complainant thus prays that respondent judge
be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and be disbarred from the practice of
law.
In his comment,[7] respondent denied the charges. While admitting that he issued the Order
dated November 5, 2002 granting bail to the accused without any hearing, the same was
premised on the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial. There was delay in the
proceedings due to complainants frequent absences and failure of the witnesses for the
prosecution to appear in court, resulting in the cancellation of the hearings. The prosecution did
not object to the grant of bail to the accused.[8] He added that the administrative complaint filed
against him is purely harassment. It is not the appropriate remedy to question his alleged
erroneous Order. Accordingly, and considering his forty (40) years of government service, he
prays that the administrative complaint be dismissed.
Criminal Procedure BAIL
On March 26, 2003, respondent judge compulsorily retired.
In his Report dated July 7, 2003, Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez found
respondent judge liable for gross ignorance of the law and recommended that a fine
of P20,000.00 be imposed upon him, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.
In our Resolution[9] dated August 25, 2003, we directed that the complaint be re-docketed
as a regular administrative matter and required the parties to manifest whether they are
submitting the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed. Both parties submitted the
required manifestations that they are submitting the case for decision on the basis of the records.
In Docena-Caspe vs. Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas,[10] we held that jurisprudence is replete with
decisions on the procedural necessity of a hearing, whether summary or otherwise, relative to the
grant of bail, especially in cases involving offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, where bail is a matter of discretion. Under the present Rules, a hearing is
mandatory in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion.[11] It must be stressed that
the grant or the denial of bail in cases where bail is a matter of discretion, hinges on the issue of
whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, and the determination of whether
or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion which remains with the judge. In
order for the latter to properly exercise his discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to
determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong. [12] In fact, even in cases where there is no
petition for bail, a hearing should still be held.[13]
There is no question that respondent judge granted bail to the accused without conducting
a hearing, in violation of Sections 8 and 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
quoted as follows:
Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. At the hearing of an application for bail filed by a
person who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt
is strong. The evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically
reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for
additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or otherwise unable to
testify.
Sec. 18. Notice of application to prosecutor. In the application for bail under section 8 of this Rule,
the court must give reasonable notice of the hearing to the prosecutor or require him to submit
his recommendation. (18a)
In Cortes vs. Catral,[14] we laid down the following rules outlining the duties of the judge in
case an application for bail is filed:
1. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of
the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation
(Section 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show
that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion (Section 7 and 8, id.);
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of
the bail bond (Section 19, id.); otherwise the petition should be denied.
Based on the above-cited procedure, after the hearing, the courts order granting or refusing
bail must contain a summary of the evidence of the prosecution and based thereon, the judge
should formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough to
indicate the guilt of the accused.[15]
Respondent judge did not follow the above Rules and procedure enumerated
in Cortes.[16] He did not conduct a hearing before he granted bail to the accused, thus depriving
the prosecution of an opportunity to interpose objections to the grant of bail. Irrespective of his
opinion on the strength or weakness of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused, he should have
conducted a hearing and thereafter made a summary of the evidence of the prosecution. The
importance of a bail hearing and a summary of evidence cannot be downplayed, these are
considered aspects of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its
absence will invalidate the grant or denial of bail.[17]
Neither did respondent require the prosecution to submit its recommendation on whether
or not bail should be granted.
He maintains that the prosecution did not object to the grant of bail to the accused, hence,
he cannot be held administratively liable for not conducting a hearing.
In Santos vs. Ofilada,[18] we held that the failure to raise or the absence of an objection on
the part of the prosecution in an application for bail does not dispense with the requirement of a
bail hearing. Thus
Even the alleged failure of the prosecution to interpose an objection to the granting of bail to the
accused will not justify such grant without hearing. This Court has uniformly ruled that even if the
prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose any objection to the motion for bail,
it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching and clarificatory questions
from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or lack of it, against the accused.
Where the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix
bail, the court may ask the prosecution such questions as would ascertain the strength of the
States evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount of bail. Irrespective of respondent judges
opinion that the evidence of guilt against the accused is not strong, the law and settled
jurisprudence demand that a hearing be conducted before bail may be fixed for the temporary
release of the accused, if bail is at all justified.
Criminal Procedure BAIL
Thus, although the provincial prosecutor had interposed no objection to the grant of bail to the
accused, the respondent judge therein should nevertheless have set the petition for bail for
hearing and diligently ascertain from the prosecution whether the latter was not in fact contesting
the bail application. In addition, a hearing was also necessary for the court to take into
consideration the guidelines set forth in the then Section, 6, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure for the fixing of the amount of the bail, Only after respondent judge had
satisfied himself that these requirements have been met could he then proceed to rule on
whether or not to grant bail.
Clearly, therefore, respondent judge cannot seek refuge on the alleged absence of
objection on the part of the prosecution to the grant of bail to the accused.
Respondent judge contends that the accused were entitled to their right to a speedy trial,
hence, he granted bail without a hearing. He blames the prosecution for the delay.
Respondents contention is bereft of merit. There is no indication in the records of the
criminal case that the prosecution has intentionally delayed the trial of the case. Even assuming
there was delay, this does not justify the grant of bail without a hearing. This is utter disregard of
the Rules. The requirement of a bail hearing has been incessantly stressed by this Court. In the
same vein, the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be conversant with the law and the
Rules and maintain professional competence; and by the very nature of his office, should be
circumspect in the performance of his duties. He must render justice without resorting to
shortcuts clearly uncalled for. Obviously, respondent failed to live up to these standards.
It bears reiterating that respondent is being charged with knowingly rendering unjust
judgment, gross ignorance of the law and partiality. We ruled that in order to be held liable for
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order, respondent judge must have acted in bad faith,
with malice or in willful disregard of the right of a litigant. [19] A perusal of the records, specifically
the assailed Order, hardly shows that any of these incidents has been proven.
On the charge of gross ignorance of the law, suffice it to say that to constitute such
infraction, it is not enough that the subject decision, order or actuation of the judge in the
performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most
importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. [20] In Guillermo vs.
Judge Reyes, Jr.[21] we categorically held that good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives
or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of
the law can find refuge. In Villanueva-Fabella vs. Lee,[22] we ruled that a judge may not be held
administratively accountable for every erroneous order he renders. For liability to attach for
ignorance of the law, the assailed order of a judge must not only be erroneous; more important, it
must be motivated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other similar motive. Complainant,
having failed to present positive evidence to show that respondent judge was so motivated in
granting bail without hearing, can not be held guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
As to the charge of partiality, we find no evidence to sustain the same. It is merely based on
complainants speculation. Mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be
clear and convincing evidence to prove this charge. The only exception to the rule is when the
error is so gross and patent as to produce an ineluctable inference of bad faith and
malice,[23] which are not present here.
 Criminal Procedure BAIL
We thus find respondent judge guilty of violation of Supreme Court Rules, specifically Rule
114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the grant of bail. This administrative offense is
considered a less serious charge, punishable under Section 9(4) and Section 11(B-2), Rule 140 of
the same Rules, thus:

Sec. 9. Less Serious Charges. Less serious charges include:

xxx

4. Violation of Supreme Court Rules, directives, and circulars;

xxx

Sec. 11. Sanctions. x x x

B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be
imposed:

1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more
than three (3) months; or

2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Alejandrino C. Cabebe, now retired, is found guilty of

violation of Supreme Court Rules and is hereby fined in the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00), the same to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, (Chairman), Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Corona, J., on leave.

EN BANC
[A. M. No. MTJ-04-1529. December 16, 2004]
PROS. EDILBERTO L. JAMORA, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSE A. BERSALES, Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, Branch 2, General Santos City, respondent.
RESOLUTION
GARCIA, J.:
The instant administrative case stemmed from a verified complaint dated April 24, 2003
filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) by Prosecutor Edilberto L. Jamora, against
Presiding Judge Jose A. Bersales of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of General Santos
City, Branch 2, charging the latter with gross ignorance of the law in connection with his grant of
bail to all the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 44231-2 and 44232-2. entitled People vs. Alimora M.
Akmad, et al.
Complainant Jamora, assigned as the trial prosecutor of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
General Santos City, Branch 37 alleged that on August 8, 2002, Criminal Cases Nos. 44231-2 (for
violation of Sec. 11,[1] Art. II of RA 9165) and 44232-2 (for violation of Sec. 5[2] in relation to Sec.
26[3] of Art. II of RA 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002)
were filed against spouses Alimora M. Akmad and Reynalda L. Akmad. Alimoras brother, Abra M.
Akmad was co-accused in the second case. Respondent Judge Bersales of the MTCC of General
Santos City conducted the preliminary investigation based on the criminal complaints.[4]
After conducting the preliminary investigation, respondent judge issued an order dated
August 13, 2002, finding the existence of a probable cause against all the detained accused. He
also recommended bail of P120,000 for each accused in the same order.[5] On that very same day,
accused filed a motion for reduction of bail which respondent judge, without notice and hearing,
granted on August 15, 2002.[6]
On August 22, 2002, respondent judge issued an order in connection with Criminal Case No.
44232-2, finding that a violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165 may have been committed and not
Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165. The dispositive portion reads:
Evaluating the evidence of the complaint, the investigating judge finds that the offense of
violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165 otherwise known as Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002 may have been committed and the accused may be held for trial in the Regional Trial Court.
The transmittal of the records of the said cases to the Office of the City Prosecution of
General Santos City for review and further evaluation was likewise ordered.[7]
Upon review of the respondent judges report, Reviewing Prosecutor Ramon C. Alano issued
an order (and approved by 1st Assistant City Prosecutor Andres N. Lorenzo, Jr.) affirming
respondent judges findings on the existence of probable cause but took exception to the bail
granted. Prosecutor Alano pronounced that in Criminal Case No. 44232-2, bail should not have
been granted to the accused considering that the crime charged is a non-bailable offense, the
Criminal Procedure BAIL
imposable penalty being, life imprisonment to death and a fine of P500,000
to P10,000,000. Likewise, in Criminal Case No. 44231-2, the bail set should have been P200,000,
as the imposable penalty is twelve years and one day to twenty years and a fine ranging
from P300,000 to P400,000.[8]
On September 3, 2002, an information for violation of Section 5 in relation to Section 26 of
Article II of RA No. 9165 (for Criminal Case No. 44232-2) was filed before the RTC of General
Santos City and docketed as RTC Criminal Case No. 16334 which was raffled to Branch 35 presided
by Judge Eddie R. Rojas.
On September 24, 2002, bondsman Hadji Sarip Akmad filed a motion to substitute cash
bond to property bond.[9] Finding the motion to be without merit and considering that the crime
charged (under Crim. Case No. 44232-2) is a non-bailable offense, Judge Rojas ordered the
cancellation and forfeiture of the cash bond in favor of the government. A warrant of arrest was
issued against all the accused.[10]
Complainant then filed this complaint charging respondent judge with ignorance of the law
in reducing/changing the crime charged from violation of Sec. 5 of RA 9165 to violation of Sec. 11
of RA 9165 to justify the grant of bail. Likewise, no hearing was conducted before the grant of bail,
thus denying the prosecution an opportunity to be heard on the question of bail.
In his comment dated July 15, 2003,[11] respondent vehemently denied the accusation that
he is ignorant of the law and that the present administrative complaint was merely an offshoot of
a contempt order he issued against complainant.
He stated that upon receipt of the two criminal cases, he lost no time in conducting the
preliminary investigation of the complaints to find the existence of a probable cause. In Criminal
Case No. 44231-1, accused were charged of having in their possession and control one heat sealed
transparent plastic sachet of white crystalline substance believed to be shabu weighing more or
less .03 grams, one plastic tooter with suspected shabu residue, one strip aluminum foil with
suspected shabu residues and one disposable lighter confiscated at the leather pouch located at
the back of the drivers seat. In Criminal Case No. 44232-2, accused were charged of delivery of
one heat sealed transparent plastic sachet of white crystalline substance believe to be shabu,
weighing more of less 2 grams to be sold for P5,000 to a Narcotic Agents who acted as poseur-
buyer.[12]
He maintained that after scrutiny of the complaint, he found the evidence against all the
accused weak and not strong because it was based merely on the police officers belief that the
items are shabu. While he was informed that one of the cases is a non-bailable offense, however,
mindful of the constitutional guarantee on the right of the accused when the evidence of guilt is
not strong and the elementary principle that it is better to free a guilty man than to imprison an
innocent one, he granted bail to the three accused after availing of his judicial discretion.
As to the charge that the Office of the City Prosecutor was not given the opportunity to be
heard on the motion to reduce bail, respondent declared that due notice was given to the said
office as evidenced by the marginal notation on the motion by Assistant City Prosecutor Jose Jerry
Fulgar, thus:

For violation of Sec. 11, RA 9165 the prosecution submits to the sound discretion of the
Honorable Court.
For violation of Sec. [5] RA 9165, No bail is recommended. Hence, no motion for reduction can be
entertained.
Respondent likewise declared that an administrative complaint is not the appropriate
remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge. If the complainant is
not conformable with his order, he should have brought the issue to the appellate court. Thus, he
prays for the dismissal of the complaint.
Based on its evaluation, the OCA recommended that the instant case be re-docketed as a
regular administrative matter and that respondent judge be suspended from office for a period of
three months without pay, with a stern warning that a similar infraction in the future will be dealt
with a more severe penalty.
In a Resolution dated February 16, 2004, the Court required the parties to manifest
whether or not they are submitting the case on the basis of the pleadings filed. In separate
Manifestations, both dated March 17, 2004, complainant and respondent judge manifested their
conformity to the said Resolution.
We agree with the findings of the OCA, except as to the recommended penalty.
It is imperative that as an advocate of justice and a visible representation of the law, a judge
is expected to keep abreast with and be proficient in the interpretation of our laws. He should be
acquainted with legal norms and precepts as well as with statutes and procedural rules. He must
have the basic rules at the palm of his hands as he is expected to maintain professional
competence at all times.[13] Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, respondent judge
owes the public and the court he sits in proficiency in the law. Respondent judge failed to live up
to these standards. Not only did he change or reduce the crime charged so as to justify his grant,
but more so, he granted bail to all the accused without conducting any hearing, thus, denying the
prosecution the opportunity to present its side.
Rule 112, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines a preliminary investigation as an inquiry or
proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be
held for trial. For practical considerations and also as dictated by necessity considering the lack of
prosecutors in the provinces, judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts have been authorized to conduct preliminary investigations.[14] When a preliminary
investigation is conducted by a municipal trial court judge, he is obligated, upon conclusion of the
preliminary investigation, to transmit to the provincial or city fiscal, for appropriate action, the
resolution of the case which must contain a brief statement of findings of fact and of the law
supporting his action, together with the entire records of the case.[15]
In the present case, immediately after his determination of a probable cause, but before
the termination of the preliminary investigation, respondent judge granted the accused bail in the
amount of P120,000 each, later reducing this to P60,000 over the objection of the prosecution.
This pronouncement was stated not in a resolution, but in a separate order declaring the finding
Criminal Procedure BAIL
on the existence of a probable cause and without any summary of his findings of fact and law
supporting his action. The courts grant or refusal of bail must contain a summary of the evidence
of the prosecution on the basis of which should be formulated the judges own conclusion on
whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. The summary thereof
is considered an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its
absence will invalidate the grant or the denial of the application for bail.[16] Nowhere is such
summary to be found in the order of respondent judge.
While respondent judge alleged that a hearing was conducted, he failed to submit any
evidence in support thereof. He alleged that the prosecution was duly notified as evidenced by
Prosecutor Jose Jerry Fulgars marginal notation on the copy of the motion for reduction of bail.
However, said marginal notation stated that for violation of Sec. 11 of RA 9165, the prosecution
submits to the sound discretion of the court and in the other case, he recommended no bail and
that the motion for reduction of bail should not be entertained.
The crime for violation of Sec. 5 of RA 9165 carries a penalty of life imprisonment to death.
Rule 114, Sec. 7 of the Rules of Court states:
No person charged with the capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the
stage of the criminal prosecution.
This provision is based on Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence
of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital offense hinge on the
issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. The determination of
whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion that remains with the
judge. Stressing in Basco v. Rapatalo[17] that the judge had the duty to determine whether the
evidence of guilt was strong, the Court held:
When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the determination of whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge. This
discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is
submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of the
evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before
the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of
guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross examination and to
introduce his own evidence in rebuttal.
 Criminal Procedure BAIL
Since the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of judicial As to the amount of penalty, gross ignorance of the law is classified as a serious charge and
discretion, the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where the prosecution is now punishable with severe sanctions under the amendment of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court
chooses to just file a comment or leave the application of bail to the sound discretion of the court. by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC which took effect on October 1, 2001, to wit:

Also, in Santos vs. Ofilada,[18] we held:
xxx, while the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of
judicial discretion, this discretion, by the nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the
evidence is submitted to the court at such hearing. Whether the motion for bail of an accused
who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a
regular trial, the prosecution must always be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable
time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court may resolve the motion for
bail. If the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of
procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on
that ground.
Sec. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions
may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine,
and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits
shall in no case include accrued leave credits.
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

Hence, in the present case, respondent Judge clearly acted irregularly when he motu
proprio fixed and granted bail and subsequently reduced the amount thereof without hearing the
side of the prosecution. Irrespective of his opinion that the evidence of guilt against the accused is We take note that only last June 9, 2004, in our resolution in A.M. No. MTJ-04-1522,
not strong, the law and settled jurisprudence require that an actual hearing be conducted before entitled City Prosecution Office of General Santos City vs. Jose Bersales, respondent was previously
bail may be granted, if bail is at all justified.[19] held guilty of gross misconduct for which he was fined the amount of P20,000 with a warning that
a similar offense in the future would be dealt with severely.
Moreover, having conducted the preliminary investigation, respondent judge has no legal
authority to determine the character of the crime and, regardless of his belief as to the nature of WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Jose A. Bersales is hereby found guilty of gross ignorance of
the offense committed, his only duty after conducting the preliminary investigation is to transmit the law and is ORDERED to pay a fine in the amount of P30,000.00 with a warning of a most
to the provincial prosecutor his resolution of the case together with the entire records of the severe penalty for another infraction of him. SO ORDERED.
same.[20] The rationale for this is after the preliminary investigation by the municipal judge, it
could very well happen that the prosecution may have gathered such other evidence, in addition
to or in connection with that which he already has, which when taken together, are sufficiently
strong to prove the guilt of the accused of a capital offense.[21]

Lastly, respondent claimed that an administrative complaint is not a proper remedy for
every irregular or erroneous order or decision of a judge. We would like to reiterate that an
administrative matter is distinct from the courts power of appellate review. It involves the
exercise of the courts power to discipline judges. It is undertaken and prosecuted solely for the
public welfare, that is, to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in the government.

All told, where the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of conversance therewith
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them
properly in all good faith. Judicial competence requires no less. The mistake committed by
respondent judge is not a mere error of judgment that can be brushed aside for being minor.
Respondent should be imposed a stiffer penalty so that he would better grasp the importance of
being proficient in both substantive and procedural law, particularly on the subject of bail.

SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. RTJ-03-1817. June 8, 2005]
P/SR. SUPT. ORLANDO M. MABUTAS, Regional Director, Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency,
Metro Manila Regional Office, complainant, vs. JUDGE NORMA C. PERELLO, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 276, Muntinlupa City, respondent.
[A.M. No. RTJ-04-1820. June 8, 2005]
CITY PROSECUTOR EDWARD M. TOGONONON, complainant, vs. JUDGE NORMA C.
PERELLO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Subject matters of the present administrative cases are two complaints against respondent
Judge Norma C. Perello, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 276) of Muntinlupa
City.
Admin. Matter No. RTJ-03-1817
This case originated from a letter of Police Senior Supt. Orlando M. Mabutas, Regional
Director of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, Metro Manila Regional Office. P/Sr. Supt.
Mabutas complained of certain irregularities committed by respondent Judge in the grant of bail
to accused Aiza Chona Omadan in Criminal Case No. 03-265. Omadan was charged in an
Information, dated April 21, 2003, with Violation of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165, or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, for the possession, custody and control of 57.78
grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), with no bail recommended.
P/Sr. Supt. Mabutass complaint was based on the memorandum submitted by Police
Inspector Darwin S. Butuyan, who stated in his report, as follows:
In the evening of May 5, 2003, a colleague notified him of a scheduled preliminary
investigation of Omadans case on the following day (May 6). When P/Insp. Butuyan, together with
PO2 Saturnino Mayonte and PO2 Allan Lising, went to the Office of the City Prosecutor, Assistant
City Prosecutor (ACP) Florante E. Tuy merely asked them to sign the minutes of the preliminary
investigation. Omadan and her counsel were not around, and the police officers were not
furnished with a copy of Omadans counter-affidavit.
On May 8, 2003, someone handed P/Insp. Butuyan a subpoena for the arraignment of
Omadan on May 9, 2003. During the scheduled arraignment, they were surprised when ACP
Vicente Francisco called PO2 Mayonte to the witness stand. Apparently, Omadan filed a petition
for bail and it was being heard on the same day. PO2 Mayonte and PO2 Lising asked ACP Francisco
for a rescheduling of the hearing because they were not prepared to testify but the former
declined, saying that it is just a motion for bail. After PO2 Mayonte testified, PO2 Lising asked ACP
Francisco to present him as witness but again, the former declined since his testimony would only
be corroborative. ACP Francisco also presented two (2) barangay tanods.
Criminal Procedure BAIL
On May 12, 2003, P/Insp. Butuyan went to deliver a communiqu to ACP Francisco from
P/Sr. Supt. Mabutas requesting that in the event bail was granted, its implementation be held in
abeyance so that the police authorities may file the necessary motion, and in order to prevent
Omadan from escaping. Since ACP Francisco was not around, they went to Branch 276 to secure a
copy of the motion for bail. However, the police officers were shocked to learn that Omadan has
already been released on a P1,000,000.00 bail on May 9, 2003, which was a Friday. Court
personnel also informed them that they spent overtime work for the processing of the release
papers. They asked for a copy of the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing held on May
9, 2003, but it was not available.
Respondent Judges Order dated May 9, 2003, granting Omadans petition for bail, reads in
part:
Clearly, the evidence of guilt is not very strong for the denial of the bail. It was not proven that the
object that SPO1 Mayonte allegedly saw wrapped in a tissue paper was indeed
methamphetamine hydrochloride. He is not very sure if the specimen was in fact subjected to an
analysis to determine what it was. There is also no specifying the quantity of the item.
There also seem to be an irregularity in the service of the search warrant for it was NOT witnessed
by two disinterested persons. Admittedly two Barangay Tanods were brought to the residence of
accused, but they never witnessed the search because when they arrived the search had already
been completed. The wife of the owner of the residence was allegedly found in the house but she
was not made to go with the searching team to witness the search. An evaluation of the record of
the search, it appears also the search warrant, showed some material defect, because no witness
who appeared to have personal knowledge of the illegal activities of the accused and husband,
executed an Affidavit before the officer who issued the search warrant. In fact the searching
questions were conducted on the applicant but not on the confidential informant, who alone had
the personal knowledge of the alleged illegal activities in the vicinity. No deposition was taken of
the applicant. Only the applying officers executed an affidavit, yet had no personal knowledge of
the crime as they were only told by his confidential informant. No copy of the deposition is
attached to the application. Although this court has no jurisdiction to hear the MOTION TO
QUASH the search warrant however this fact are [sic] taken into consideration for the petition to
bail if only to show the strength or weakness of the prosecution evidence, to ascertain if
Prosecution have [sic] a witness who has personal knowledge of the alleged illegal activities of the
accused in her home. There is none. Even the Barangay policemen Arturo Villarin, cannot tell with
certainty if drugs were indeed found in the residence of the accused.
Bail is therefore allowed in the sum of ONE MILLION PESOS (Php 1,000,000.00) which accused
AIZA CHONA OMADAN may post in cash, by property or thru a reputable bonding company, and
under the additional condition that her counsel, Atty. GENE CASTILLO QUILAS guarantees her
appearance in court whenever so required.
It is SO ORDERED.[1]

Admin. Matter No. RTJ-04-1820
This case proceeded from a letter of Prosecutor Edward M. Togononon of Muntinlupa City,
accusing respondent Judge of partiality, serious misconduct in office and gross ignorance of the
law, concerning the latters grant of bail in four criminal cases for Violations of R.A. No. 9165
pending before her.
In Criminal Case No. 03-065, entitled, People of the Philippines vs. Rosemarie Pascual y
Mozo @ Rosema, for Violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, accused Pascual was charged with
selling, trading, delivering and giving away to another 0.20 grams of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (shabu), with no bail recommended.[2] Pascual filed, on February 5, 2003, a motion
for bail on the grounds that the quantity of shabu involved is minimal and the imposable penalty
is likewise minimal in degree; and that she is nine months pregnant and due to give birth
anytime.[3]
On the day of arraignment, February 7, 2003, respondent Judge issued an order granting
Pascuals motion for bail without hearing, which reads:
The MOTION FOR BAIL filed by Accused through counsel is granted on the reason cited thereat.
Accordingly, Accused ROSEMARIE PASCUAL Y MOZO may post her bail in the amount
of P200,000.00 in cash or thru a reputable bonding company, or by property bond for her
provisional liberty.
It is SO ORDERED.[4]
ACP Francisco filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that since the crime charged
against Pascual is a capital offense, bail is not allowed as a matter of right, and a hearing is
indispensable. Respondent Judge denied the motion in her Order dated March 12, 2003, which
reads, in part:
...
This Court is immediately appalled and shocked by the thirst for blood of these officials, were
selling shabu in the quantity of 0.20 gram, they would put the accused to DEATH. It seems that, to
these officials LIFE IMPRISONMENT and DEATH is the only solution to this problem, without
considering the intended provision of the law, and the possible dislocation that the death of the
accused will cause to his family and even to society itself. The prosecution and some City Officials
have distorted the provision of the law by considering shabu as a dangerous drug, in the category
of opium puppy (sic) or morphine. They cannot be more wrong!
In the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol,
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride is NEVER considered as dangerous drugs to come under the
provision of the first paragraph of Sec. 5, Republic Act No. 9165. The definition of dangerous drugs
Criminal Procedure BAIL
under Sec. 3, letter J of the said law, specifies those considered as dangerous drugs. Instead
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride is considered as a controlled precursor or essential chemical,
which is found and listed in No. 7, LIST OF SUBSTANCES in SCHEDULE NO. 111 of the 1971 United
Nations Single Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Therefore, Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride is a chemical substance or psychotropic substance and NOT a dangerous drug.!
Since the quantity is very much less than a gram of this essential chemical, is punishable with
imprisonment of only 12 years, as paragraph 2 of Sec. 5, R.A. 9165 provides. There is no law,
statute, or jurisprudence that classifies 12 years imprisonment as a capital punishment, and non-
bailable. Only bloodsuckers who thirst for blood will consider death for these offenders for this
kind of offense!
Prosecution will probably argue that this drug is considered dangerous under Sec. 11, R.A. 9165,
but this section does not define what are dangerous drugs, and the term is used generally to
encompass all drugs. Still, this section only shows that for possession of certain quantities of
shabu, is punishable with 12 years imprisonment only, NEVER DEATH!
This Court has no quarrel with the Prosecutors if the drugs accused is pushing or found in the
custody of accused are of large volume, for then they would really deserve to DIE! Then be richer
by several millions, and foster a society of drug abusers yet! But this Court cannot agree with
Prosecutors when the quantity that is peddled is not even enough to put body and soul together
of accused. Foisting death on these kind of offenders, is death itself to him who imposes such a
penalty! This court cannot be that unjust and unfeeling, specially as the law itself does not so
allow!
The prosecutors are also reminded that the grant of bail to all offenses is constitutionally
guaranteed. Even those punishable with death or capital offenses, only the EXCEPTIONS! It is
never the rule.
...
Perhaps if these questioning individuals will provide employment to their constituents, the latter
will not engage in this kind of trade to survive.[5]
In Criminal Case No. 03-082, entitled, People of the Philippines vs. Rolando Uy y Manata @
Nono, for Violation of Section 5, paragraph 1 of R.A. No. 9165, accused Uy was charged with
selling, trading, delivering and giving away to Philippine National Police (PNP) operatives after a
buy-bust operation 0.12 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu). ACP Romeo B.
Senson recommended no bail. Uy filed a petition for bail cum motion to suppress prosecution
evidence on February 18, 2003, alleging, among others, that the arrest was illegal as no buy-bust
operation happened, and the shabu confiscated was planted on him. Without hearing,
respondent Judge granted Uys petition for bail since the quantity of drug allegedly pushed is only
0.12 grams[6] Uy was released on a P200,000.00 bail. The motion for reconsideration filed by ACP
Francisco remains unresolved.

The antecedents of Criminal Case No. 03-265 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Aiza
Chona Omadan y Chua and John Doe, for Violation of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165, are set forth
and dealt with in Admin. Matter No. RTJ-03-1817.
In Criminal Case No. 03-288 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Mary Jane Regencia y
Mozo @ Grace, for Violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, accused Regencia was charged with
selling, delivering, trading and giving away to another 0.07 grams of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (shabu). Respondent Judge likewise granted Regencias motion for bail without
hearing, on the ground that the quantity of shabu involved is minimal and the imposable penalty
is also minimal.[7]
Respondent Judge was required to comment on these two complaints.
In Admin. Matter No. RTJ-03-1817, respondent Judge contends that P/Sr. Supt. Mabutass
charges against her are baseless; that the preliminary investigation conducted on Omadans case
was outside her jurisdiction; that she did not have any hand or influence in ACP Franciscos
handling of the hearing on the petition for bail as it is within the latters control and supervision;
that she denies that there was undue haste in the grant of bail in Omadans favor; and that bail
was granted because the prosecutions evidence of Omadans guilt was not strong. [8]
In Admin. Matter No. RTJ-04-1820, respondent Judge explains that she did not conduct any
hearings on the motions/petitions for bail filed in the criminal cases subject of the complaint
because the crimes charged are not capital offenses as the quantity of shabu involved therein was
minimal. Criminal Case Nos. 03-065, 03-082, and 03-288 all involve selling of less than 5 grams
of shabu. Respondent Judge believes that under R.A. No. 9165, shabu is not a dangerous drug but
merely a controlled precursor, in which the selling of less than 5 grams is punishable only with
imprisonment of 12 years to 20 years. Such being the case, respondent Judge maintains that bail
is a matter of right and a hearing is not required.[9]
The two complaints were consolidated and referred to Court of Appeals Associate Justice
Jose C. Reyes, Jr. for investigation, report, and recommendation.
After due proceedings, the Investigating Justice submitted his Report and
Recommendation, with the following findings and conclusion:
The charges arose out of the same set of facts and are interrelated and will be discussed together.
Before proceeding further, the investigating justice will first dispose respondent judges assertion
that the complaints should be dismissed outright claiming that where sufficient judicial remedy
exists, the filing of administrative complaint is not the proper remedy to correct actions of a judge
citing the case of Barbers vs. Laguio, Jr. (351 SCRA 606 [2001])
Anent the charge of partiality and serious misconduct, the investigating justice notes that these
particular charges were not touched upon in the testimony of any of the witnesses presented by
the complainants. Therefore, the investigating justice finds that no evidence as to partiality nor
serious misconduct exists and these charges should be dismissed for lack of evidence.
Criminal Procedure BAIL
The investigating justice will now therefore tackle only the charge of gross ignorance of the law
against respondent judge.
A close scrutiny of the said Barbers case shows that it is not applicable in the present
administrative complaints because in the said case it was clear that complainants-petitioners
were not merely concerned with the alleged act of the judge of rendering an unjust judgment but
was also seeking the reversal of the judgment of acquittal. They had even filed an appeal from the
judgment therein of respondent judge. Thus, the Supreme Court held:
It has been held that the pendency of an appeal from a questioned judgment renders the filing of
administrative charges premature. Where a sufficient judicial remedy exists, the filing of an
administrative complaint is not the proper remedy to correct the actions of a judge.
In the present administrative complaints, it was not shown that an appeal or any other
proceeding had been filed to reverse the respondent judges orders granting bail. It had not been
shown that the present administrative complaints had any purpose other then seeking
administrative sanctions against respondent judge.
Turning now to the merits of the administrative complaints, the primordial issue is: Whether or
not there is an ambiguity in the law as to the classification of methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Under Section 3(x) of the R.A. No. 9165 the substance was defined as:
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or commonly known as Shabu, Ice, Meth, or by its any other
name. Refers to the drug having such chemical composition, including any of its isomers or
derivatives in any form.
It can be noted that nothing in this provision indicates the classification of the substance either as
a dangerous or regulated drug.
It is respondent judges position that shabu is not expressly classified as a dangerous drug under
Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 and should therefore be considered merely as a chemical precursor, to
wit:
...
For clarity, the UN Single Convention was referred to in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9165 in relation to
the definitions of dangerous drugs and controlled precursors, to wit:
(h) Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. Include those listed in Tables I and
II of the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances as enumerated in the attached annex, which is an
integral part of this Act.

...
(j) Dangerous Drugs. Include those listed in the Schedules annexed to the 1961 Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, and in the
Schedules annexed to the 1971 Single Convention on Psychotropic Substances
as enumerated in the attached annex which is an integral part of this Act.
It should be noted, however, that by the plain wordings of R.A. No. 9165 dangerous drugs are not
limited to those substances listed in the schedules attached to the 1961 United Nations Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs because of the use of the word include. That is, there are other
substances which may be considered dangerous drugs even if not listed in the above-mentioned
schedules.
It is also worth noting that under Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165, Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
was specifically mentioned as a dangerous drug, to wit:
...
(5) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu;
...
It is clear, therefore, that the lawmakers intended to classify Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or
shabu as a dangerous drug. Moreover, it would be absurd to consider methamphetamine
hydrochloride a dangerous drug under Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165 and merely a precursor under
Section 5 of the same law.
In fine, there is no question that methamphetamine hydrochloride is classified as a dangerous
drug.
Having made the foregoing findings, the next issue that calls for resolution is the penalty
imposable to the criminal cases under consideration. This is necessary in order to determine if the
accused are entitled to bail. Under Section 13 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, an accused
shall be entitled to bail as a matter of right unless charged with an offense punishable with a
capital penalty.
The Court notes that the criminal cases under consideration can be grouped into two (2): A) Crim.
Case No. 03-065 (against Rosemarie Pascual, Crim. Case No. 03-082 (against Rolando Uy), and
Crim. Case No. 03-288 (against Mary Jane Regencia), which involve selling, trading, delivering or
giving away Methamphetamine Hydrochloride; and B) Crim. Case No. 03-265 (against Aiza Chona
Omadan) which involve possession of the said substance.
Criminal Procedure BAIL
The investigating justice would first discuss Crim. Case No. 03-265 where the accused was charged
with possession of 57.78 grams of Methemphetamine Hydrochloride. Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165
provides that the penalty imposable is life imprisonment to death. Therefore, in the Crim. Case
No. 03-265 accused therein is not entitled to bail as a matter of right. Rightly so, a hearing was
conducted before the bail was granted.
The investigating justice, after a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the
complainants, opines that there is insufficient evidence to support the allegation that bail was
hastily granted to accused Aiza Chona Omadan. Therefore, the charge of gross ignorance in
relation to this case should be dismissed for lack of factual basis.
The investigating justice will now tackle the other set of cases (Crim. Case No. 03-065; Crim. Case
No. 03-082; Crim. Case No. 03-288). Under the law, these are punishable with penalty ranging
from life imprisonment to death. Pertinent portions of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 reads:
...
As held in Managuelod vs. Paclibon, et al. (A.M. No. RTJ-02-1726, March 29, 2004).
It is imperative that judges be conversant with basic legal principles and possess sufficient
proficiency in the law. In offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death, the accused has no
right to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong. Respondent Judge Go should have known the
procedure to be followed when a motion for admission to bail is filed by the accused. Extreme
care, not to mention the highest sense of personal integrity, is required of him in granting bail,
specially in case where bail is not a matter of right. The fact that the provincial prosecutor
interposed no objection to the application for bail by the accused did not relieve respondent
judge of the duty to set the motion for bail for hearing. A hearing is of utmost necessity because
certain guidelines in fixing bail (the nature of the crime, character and reputation of the accused,
weight of evidence against him, the probability of the accused appearing at the trial, among other
things) call for the presentation of evidence. It was impossible for respondent judge to determine
the application of these guidelines in an ex-parte determination of the propriety of Palacols
motion for bail. Thus, for his failure to conduct any hearing on the application for bail, we hold
respondent Judge Go guilty of gross ignorance of the law justifying the imposition of the severest
disciplinary sanction on him. (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear, therefore, that as to said criminal cases the accused were likewise not entitled to bail as
a matter of right, hence, a hearing for the grant of bail should have been conducted. However, in
this last instance, no such hearing was conducted.
In fine, respondent judge erred in granting bail to the accused in Crim. Case No. 03-065, Crim.
Case No. 03-082, and Crim. Case No. 03-288 without hearing because the crime charge carries
with it capital penalty.

As to Crim. Case No. 03-065, Crim. Case No. 03-082, and Crim. Case No. 03-288, the next issue to
be resolved is: whether or not the mistake amounted to gross ignorance of the law which would
justify an administrative sanction against respondent judge.
Respondent judge, naturally, argued that she cannot be held liable asserting that to be held guilty
of gross ignorance, the error must have been gross, deliberate and malicious (Rollo, RTJ-04-1820,
p. 74) and in absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption that judge cannot be held liable (Rollo,
RTJ-04-1820, p. 75).
However, the Supreme Court does not always require the presence of malice to find erring judges
liable for gross ignorance.
In the above-cited Managuelod case the Supreme Court held that failure to hold a hearing before
granting bail in crimes involving capital punishment constitutes gross ignorance of the law, thus:
. . . Thus, for his failure to conduct any hearing on the application for bail, we hold respondent
Judge Go guilty of gross ignorance of the law justifying the imposition of the severest disciplinary
sanction on him.
The same should hold true in the present administrative cases considering that the criminal cases
involved drugs, a major problem of the country today.
In conclusion, the investigating justice finds respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law
in relation to the granting of bail without hearing in Crim. Case Nos. 03-065, 03-082 and 03-288
and exonerate her as to the charge in relation to Criminal Case No. 03-265.
...
The next issue then is the penalty imposable on respondent judge. In Mupas vs. Espanol (A.M. No.
RTJ-04-185014, July 14, 2004) the Supreme Court enumerated the proper penalty for gross
negligence (sic), thus:
Under Section 8 of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC amending Rule 140 of the Rules of Court on the Discipline
of Justices and Judges, which took effect on October 1, 2001, gross ignorance of the law is
classified as a serious charge which carries with it a penalty of either dismissal from service,
suspension or a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.[10]
Based on the foregoing, the Investigating Justice made the following recommendation:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Judge
Norma C. Perello be DISMISSED on the ground of gross ignorance of law in relation to the grant of
bail in Criminal Case No. 03-065, Criminal Case No. 03-082, Criminal Case No. 03-288.[11]
Criminal Procedure BAIL
The issue in these administrative cases is whether respondent Judge may be
administratively held liable for the grant of bail in the particular criminal cases subject of the
complaints. As earlier stated, the criminal cases subject of the present administrative complaints
all involve violations of R.A. No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Admin. Matter No. RTJ-03-1817 particularly relates to Criminal Case No. 03-265 (People of
the Philippines vs. Aiza Chona Omadan), involving the possession, custody, and control of 57.78
grams of shabu, punishable under Section 11 thereof, which reads:
SEC. 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs.-- The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00)
shall be imposed upon any person, who unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous
drug in the following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof:
...
(5) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu; (Emphasis
supplied)
...
Under the foregoing provision, possession of 50 grams or more of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu is punishable by life imprisonment to death; hence, a capital offense.[12] As
such, bail becomes a matter of discretion. In this regard, Rule 114, Sec. 7 of the Rules of Court
states:
No person charged with the capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the
stage of the criminal prosecution.
This provision is based on Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence
of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
The matter of determining whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial
discretion that remains with the judge.[13] Such discretion must be sound and exercised within
reasonable bounds.[14]
Under the present rules, a hearing on an application for bail is mandatory. [15] Whether bail
is a matter of right or of discretion, the prosecutor should be given reasonable notice of hearing,
or at least his recommendation on the matter must be sought. In case an application for bail is
filed, the judge is entrusted to observe the following duties:

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing
of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation;
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused
is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion;
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution; and
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail
bond. Otherwise the bail should be denied.[16]
Based on the above-cited procedure and requirements, after the hearing, the courts order
granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. A summary
is defined as a comprehensive and usually brief abstract or digest of a text or statement. Based on
the summary of evidence, the judge formulates his own conclusion on whether such evidence is
strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused.[17]
In this case, respondent Judge complied with the foregoing duties. A hearing was held on
the petition; the prosecution was given the opportunity to present its evidence in support of its
stance; respondent Judge based her findings on the prosecutions evidence, namely, the
testimonies of P02 Saturnino Mayonte and Arturo Villarin; respondent Judges Order dated May 9,
2003 granting the accuseds petition for bail contained a summary of the prosecutions evidence;
and since it was her conclusion that the evidence of accused Omadans guilt is not strong, the
petition for bail was granted.[18] Respondent Judge did not violate procedural requirements.
Records show that respondent Judge afforded the prosecution ample opportunity to present all
the evidence it had and there was no protest from the prosecution that it had been deprived of its
right to present against the accused. Thus, the Court does not find any irregularity in the grant of
bail in Criminal Case No. 03-265 that would render respondent Judge administratively liable.
It is noted that the other circumstances, complained of in this case, do not relate solely to
respondent Judges acts, but to the prosecutions conduct in handling the case. Thus, P/Insp.
Darwin S. Butuyan stated in his report that there is something wrong in the procedures and
circumstances adopted by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City and Branch 276,
RTC, Muntinlupa City in handling the case leading to the granting of bail to accused Aiza Chona
Omadan y Chua.[19]
The Court recognizes that the manner in which the strength of an accuseds guilt is proven
still primarily rests on the prosecution. The prosecutor has the right to control the quantum of
evidence and the order of presentation of the witnesses, in support of the denial of bail. After all,
all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. [20] It
was the prosecutions judgment to limit the presentation of evidence to two witnesses, as it felt
that the testimonies of the other witnesses would be merely corroborative. It is beyond
respondent Judges authority to compel the public prosecutor to exercise its discretion in a way
respondent Judge deems fit, so long as such exercise of discretion will not defeat the purpose for
Criminal Procedure BAIL
which the hearing was held, i.e., to determine whether strong evidence of guilt exists such that
the accused may not be entitled to bail.
In any event, the complainant in this case had also filed a letter-complaint with the
Department of Justice against the concerned public prosecutors. [21] Such matter is best left
handled by the Department, and the Court will not interfere on the matter.
Admin. Matter No. RTJ-04-1820, however, portrays an entirely different picture.
In this case, respondent Judge granted bail in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-065, 03-082, and 03-
288 without the requisite hearing. In so doing, it was respondent Judges defense that under R.A.
No. 9165, shabu is not a dangerous drug but merely a controlled precursor, in which the selling of
less than 5 grams is punishable only with imprisonment of 12 years to 20 years, and as such, bail is
a matter of right and a hearing is not required. Respondent Judge argued that:
In determining whether methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is indeed classified as a
dangerous drug under the said Republic Act, undersigned exhaustively studied the provision of
this law and found that in Letter H, Art. 1, Section 3: Definition of Terms, Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride is listed in Table II, No. 12 of the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, which list is attached annex, an integral part of this
Act, Methamphetamine and is listed as a CONTROLLED PRECURSOR or ESSENTIAL CHEMICAL. This
is more imperatively classified as a chemical, in Letter X of the Definition, Sec. 3, Art. 1, where
shabu is considered as such chemical. Therefore, under the definition by law itself, shabu or
methamphetamine hydrochloride is classified as a controlled precursor or essential chemical.
The definition of what are considered as DANGEROUS DRUGS, is (sic) those in Letter J, Sec. 3, Art.
1 of R.A. 9165, listed in 1961 Singled Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972
Protocol, which list is again an integral part of this Act. Methamphetamine is NOT one of the
enumerations of dangerous drugs. Therefore, the selling or trading of this substance in a quantity
less than a gram is punishable with an imprisonment of only twelve (12) years as provided by the
second paragraph of Section 5, Article II, is not on capital offense punishable with death or life
imprisonment, is bailable.
Section 11, Art. II, of the same Act, treats of POSSESSION NOT SELLING, where possession of this
substance is considered as a capital offense, punishable with death or life imprisonment, only if
the accused is in possession of it in the quantity of 50 GRAMS (50 grams), irrespective of the
purity of the substance. It becomes a capital offense only if it is in the quantity of fifty grams (50
GRAMS) under No. 5 of Section 11, Art. II. Corollarilly, if it is less than this quantity, possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride is NOT punishable with a capital penalty, hence, bailable! To
stress POSSESSION of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride is considered as capital offense
punishable with capital penalty if the quantity is 50 GRAMS (50 GRAMS), (Sec. 11, Art. II) while
PUSHING of methamphetamine hydrochloride (Paragraph 2, Sec. 5) to be punishable with capital
penalty must be in the quantity of FIVE GRAMS (5 GRAMS), (Guidelines for RA 9165).[22]
To justify her granting bail in the three criminal cases, respondent Judge insists that she did
so because of her belief that methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is merely a precursor and
therefore the sale thereof is not a capital offense. This opinion is blatantly erroneous. One need
 Criminal Procedure BAIL
not even go beyond the four corners of R.A. No. 9165 to see respondent Judges palpable error in On the other hand, under Section 3, paragraph (h) of R.A. No. 9165, controlled precursors
the application of the law. and essential chemicals, refer to those listed in Tables I and II of the 1988 UN Convention Against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, which were likewise made integral
Respondent Judge need not exhaustively study R.A. No. 9165, as she asserted, to determine part of R.A. No. 9165, to wit:
the nature of methamphetamine hydrochloride. A plain reading of the law would immediately
show that methamphetamine hydrochloride is a dangerous drug and not a controlled precursor. TABLE I TABLE II
If only respondent Judge prudently went over the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9165, 1. ACETIC ANHYDRIDE 1. ACETONE
particularly Section 3, items (h) and (j), and properly made the corresponding reference to the 2. N-ACETYLANTHRANILIC ACID 2. ANTHRANILIC ACID
schedules and tables annexed thereto, she would have easily ascertained that methamphetamine 3. EPHEDRIN 3. ETHYL ETHER
hydrochloride is listed in the 1971 UN Single Convention on Psychotropic Substances, which are
4. ERGOMETRINE 4. HYDROCHLORIC ACID
considered dangerous drugs. It is not listed in the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
5. ERGOTAMINE 5.
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, as respondent Judge stated. [23] METHYL ETHYL KETONE
Dangerous Drugs are defined by Section 3, paragraph (j) of R.A. No. 9165, as including those 6. ISOSAFROLE 6. PHENYLACETIC ACID
in the Schedules listed annexed to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by
7. LYSERGIC ACID 7. PIPERIDINE
the 1972 Protocol, and in the Schedules annexed to the 1971 UN Single Convention on
8. 8. SULPHURIC ACID
Psychotropic Substances, which were made an integral part of R.A. No. 9165. 3,4-METHYLENEDIOXYPHENYL-2
PROPANONE
Under the foregoing section, dangerous drugs are classified into: (1) narcotic drugs, as
listed in the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol; and 9. NOREPHEDRINE 9. TOLUENE
(2) psychotropic substances, as listed in the 1971 UN Single Convention on Psychotropic
10. 1-PHENYL-2-PROPANONE
Substances.

For purposes of this case, the list of substances in Schedule II of the 1971 UN Single
Convention of Psychotropic Substances is hereby reproduced, to wit: 11. PIPERONAL

LIST OF SUBSTANCES IN SCHEDULE II

12. POTASSIUM PERMANGANATE
1. AMFETAMINE (AMPHETAMINE)
2. DEXAMFETAMINE (DEXAMPHETAMINE)
3. FENETYLLINE DRONABINOL 13. PSEUDOEPHEDRINE
4. LEVAMFETAMINE
5. LEVOMETHAMPHETAMINE
14. SAFROLE
6. MECLOQUALONE
7. METAMFETAMINE

It readily reveals that methamphetamine is not one of those listed as controlled precursor or
(METHAMPHETAMINE)
essential chemical.
8. METAMFETAMINE RACEMATE
9. METHAQUALONE Given the foregoing, methamphetamine hydrochloride is a dangerous drug, and not a
10. METHYLPHE NIDATE controlled precursor or essential chemical. That methamphetamine and not methamphetamine
11. PHENCYCLIDINE (PCP) hydrochloride is the term specifically listed in Schedule II of the 1971 UN Single Convention of
12. PHENMETRAZINE Psychotropic Substances does not detract from the fact that it is a dangerous drug. Section 3,
13. SECOBARBITAL paragraph (x) of R.A. No. 9165, states that methamphetamine hydrochloride is a drug having such
14. DRONABINOL (delta-9-tetrahydro-cannabinol and its stereochemical variants) chemical composition, including any of its isomers or derivatives in any form.
15. ZIPEPROL This is further strongly manifest in Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165, wherein it is specifically
16. 2C-B (4-bromo-2,5-dimethoxyphenethylamine) provided that the possession of dangerous drugs, such as methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu, is punishable with life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred
It clearly shows that methamphetamine is a psychotropic substance, or a dangerous drug. Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00), if the quantity thereof is 50

grams or more. It would be absurd, to say the least, that Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165 would qualify
methamphetamine hydrochloride as a dangerous drug, while Section 5 of the same law,
penalizing the sale thereof, would treat it as a controlled precursor.
Had respondent Judge been more circumspect in going over the pertinent provisions of R.A.
No. 9165, she would certainly arrive at the same conclusion. It does not even take an
interpretation of the law but a plain and simple reading thereof. Furthermore, had respondent
judge kept herself abreast of jurisprudence and decisions of the Court, [24] she would have been
apprised that in all the hundreds and hundreds of cases [25] decided by the Court,
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu had always been considered as a dangerous drug.
Given that methamphetamine hydrochloride is a dangerous drug, the applicable provision
in Criminal Case Nos. 03-065, 03-082, and 03-288 subject of Admin. Matter No. RTJ-04-1820, is
Section 5, paragraph 1 of R.A. No. 9165, which reads:
SECTION 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation
of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten
million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law,
shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit
or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the
quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
Regardless of quantity, the sale, trade, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution
and transportation of shabu is punishable by life imprisonment to death. Being a capital offense, it
is incumbent upon respondent Judge to hold a hearing on the petitions/motions for bail filed by
the accused therein to determine whether evidence of guilt is strong. To grant an application for
bail and fix the amount thereof without a hearing duly called for the purpose of determining
whether the evidence of guilt is strong constitutes gross ignorance or incompetence whose
grossness cannot be excused by a claim of good faith or excusable negligence. [26]
In Gallardo vs. Tabamo,[27] the Court rejected the defense that the judges failure to apply
the clear provisions of the law is merely an error of judgment, and the judge was held
administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law where the applicable legal provisions are
crystal clear and need no interpretation.
Moreover, such gross ignorance of law is in violation of Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, which states that a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence.
The indispensable nature of a bail hearing in petitions for bail has always been ardently and
indefatigably stressed by the Court. The Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be faithful to
the law and maintain professional competence. A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant
with basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines. He should strive
for excellence exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the personification of
justice and the Rule of Law.[28]
Criminal Procedure BAIL
Although judges cannot be held to account or answer criminally, civilly or administratively
for every erroneous judgment or decision rendered by him in good faith, it is imperative that they
should have basic knowledge of the law.[29]
Even if a judge acted in good faith but his ignorance is so gross, he should be held
administratively liable.[30]
Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, which took
effect on October 1, 2001, gross ignorance of the law is classified as a serious charge and is now
punishable with severe sanctions, to wit:
Sec. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions
may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine,
and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits
shall in no case include accrued leave credits.
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
In this case, the Investigating Justice recommended that respondent Judge be dismissed
from the service. The Court finds such penalty to be too harsh. In similar cases, [31] the Court
imposed a fine on the respondents therein for gross ignorance of the law for having granted bail
to the accused without notice and hearing. However, the Court takes judicial notice that this is not
the first time that respondent Judge was administratively fined. In A.M. No. RTJ-02-1686,[32] a fine
of P5,000.00 and a reprimand was imposed on respondent Judge for dereliction of duty for her
failure to act on Civil Case No. 9-138 for three years. In A.M. No. RTJ-04-1846,[33] respondent
Judge was held administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and
oppression for the delay of almost nine (9) months in the transmittal of the records of Civil Case
No. 01-268 to the Court of Appeals, and was fined P20,000.00. Thus, the Court is imposing a
penalty more severe than a fine. Suspension from office for six (6) months in Admin. Matter No.
RTJ-04-1820, excluding Criminal Case No. 03-265 (People of the Philippines vs. Aiza Chona
Omadan), is sufficient and reasonable.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) also notes, in its Memorandum dated
November 22, 2002, that respondent Judge caused the release from the National Bilibid Prison of
several persons convicted of violation of the drugs law by granting the petitions for habeas
corpus filed in her court, i.e., Spl. Proc. Nos. 02-002, 02-008, 02-10, 98-023 and 98-048. The OCA
further stated that in Spl. Proc. Nos. 98-023 and 98-048, respondent Judge granted the petitions
without determining the veracity of the allegations therein; without any material evidence in
support of her findings and conclusion; and that at the time the petitions were granted, an appeal
from the convictions in these two cases is pending before the Court (G. R. Nos. 131622-23). Thus,
 Criminal Procedure BAIL
the OCA recommends that an investigation, report, and recommendation on these two cases be
made, and that it be authorized to conduct an audit on all the petitions for habeas corpus in all
the courts of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City from 1998 to the present. [34]

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

(1) In Admin. Matter No. RTJ-03-1817, DISMISSING the complaint against respondent
Judge; and,

(2) In Admin. Matter No. RTJ-04-1820, finding respondent Judge Norma C. Perello,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 276) of Muntinlupa City GUILTY of gross
ignorance of law, and she is hereby SUSPENDED for Six (6) Months, with warning that a repetition
of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

AS TO OTHER MATTERS:

(a) The Court ORDERS the Office of the Court Administrator to initiate the appropriate
complaint for grave misconduct and/or gross ignorance of the law against respondent Judge,
insofar as Spl. Proc. Nos. 02-002, 02-008, 02-10, 98-023 and 98-048 are concerned; and to conduct
preliminary investigation and submit report thereon within ninety (90) days from notice hereof.

(b) The Office of the Court Administrator is AUTHORIZED to conduct an audit and submit a
report within ninety (90) days from notice hereof, on all the petitions for habeas corpus in all the
courts of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City from 1998 to present.

SO ORDERED.

Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Puno, (Chairman), on official leave.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2508 October 27, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff -appellee, vs. MAMERTO ABNER, ET AL.,defendants.
ROBERTO SOLER AND DOMINGO ABELLA, bondsmen-appellants.
Reyes and Dy-Liacco for appellants.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Luis R. Feria for appellee.
PARAS, J.: chanrobles virtual law library
In a complaint signed by Lt. Fernando G. Regino, P. A., with the heading "In the Justice of the
Peace Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur," Mamerto Abner was charged, with others, with
robbery in band with rape committed in the municipality of Tinambac, Province of Camarines Sur.
Upon motion of the assistant provincial fiscal of September 6, 1946, alleging that the justice of the
peace of Tinambac was absent and the municipal mayor refused to receive the complaint, the
Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur directed the Justice of the Peace of Naga, the capital, to
conduct the necessary preliminary investigation. Mamerto Abner was thereafter admitted to bail
and the herein appellants, Roberto Soler and Domingo Abella, executed the necessary bail bond
for P15,000 dated October 4, 1946, and approved by the Justice of the Peace of Naga on the same
date. Notwithstanding notice, the accused Abner and his bondsmen failed to appear at the
preliminary investigation set for March 26, 1947. On April 2, 1947, Abner, through counsel, filed a
petition waiving the right to a preliminary investigation. By order of April 5, 1947, the Justice of
the Peace of Naga forwarded the case in respect to Abner to the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur. On May 8, 1947, the provincial fiscal filed the corresponding information in the
Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. The trial originally set for November 25, 1947, was
postponed to January 16, 1948, but upon motion of appellants, the trial was set for March 2,
1948. On February 28, 1948, the appellants filed a motion for another extension of thirty days
within which to produce the body of Abner, which was granted, and the trial was again postponed
to March 29, 1948. On this date, Abner and the appellants failed to appear. The provincial fiscal
accordingly filed a petition for the confiscation of the bail bond executed by the herein appellants,
and the same was granted by the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur in its order of March 31,
1948. From this order the bondsmen have appealed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Appellants contend that the court of first instance did not acquire jurisdiction, because no
complaint was filed in the Justice of Peace Court of Tinambac, and reliance is placed on the
allegation of the fiscal, in his motion of September 6, 1946, that the complaint signed by
Lieutenant Regino was not so filed in view of the absence of the justice of the peace and the
refusal of the municipal mayor of Tinambac to receive said complaint. It appears, however, that
the bond executed by the appellants on October 4, 1946, contained the following recital: "A
complaint having been filed on September 17, 1946 in the justice of the Peace Court of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur .." This admission, which is subsequent to the motion of the fiscal of September 6,
1946, is inconsistent with appellants' contention. Moreover, the proceedings had before the
Criminal Procedure BAIL
Justice of the Peace of Naga and the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, in relation to the
measures taken by the appellants prior to the confiscation of their bond, carry the implication
that the complaint was duly filed. The presumption that official duty was performed has not been
destroyed. Although the Justice of the peace has jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigations
only of offenses committed within his municipality, the justice of the peace of the provincial
capital, when, as in the case at bar, directed by the court of the first instance, may conduct such
preliminary investigation of any offense committed anywhere within his province. (Sec. 2, Rule
108, Rules of Court.)chanrobles virtual law library
It appears that the bond in question was not signed by the accused Abner as principal; and it is
contended by the appellants that it is accordingly void. Section 1, Rule 110, of the Rules Court,
provides that "bail is the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the
custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required
as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance." Under this, there are two methods of taking bail:
(1) by bail bond and (2) by recognizance. A bail bond is an obligation given by the accused with
one or more sureties, with the condition to be void upon the performance by the accused of such
acts as he may legally be required to perform. A recognizance is an obligation of record, entered
into before some court or magistrate duly authorized to take it, with the condition to do some
particular act, the most usual condition in criminal cases being the appearance of the accused for
trial. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 2d ed., Vol. II, page 592.) In U. S. vs. Sunico et al.,
48 Phil., 826, 834, this court, citing Lamphire vs. State, 73 N. H., 462; 62 Atl., 786; 6 Am. & Eng.
Ann. Cas., 615, defined a recognizance as "a contract between the sureties and the State for the
production of the principal at the required time." The bail bond executed by the appellants,
though so denominated, is essentially a recognizance, an "obligation" contracted with the State
by the appellants, not requiring as an indispensable condition for its validity, the signature of the
accused. In addition, under the circumstances of this case, the appellants were estopped from
assailing the effectiveness of their bail contract. If, as contended by appellants, it would be
difficult, without the accused Abner having signed as principal, for them to obtain indemnity from
or to have power and control over him, They are solely to blame. Neither is there merit in the
argument that the obligation of appellants under the bond is merely to pay P15,000 in case the
accused should fail to pay that amount, because the latter, who has not signed it, is of course not
bound thereby.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Appellants allege that the Government had launched a campaign for the capture of Abner, dead
or alive, as a result of which he is forced to remain in hiding. Thus the appellants are allegedly
unable to produce him in court, due to an act of the Government. In the order of the trial court
denying appellants' motion for reconsideration, however, it is recited that "if the government
launched the campaign against Abner and his followers in Tinambac and Partido during the
months of July up to, December, 1947, it was because Mamerto Abner and his gang have turned
out brigands who threatened to disturb the peace and tranquillity of the people in that part of the
Province of Camarines Sur." Hence the alleged search for Abner was motivated by his own
voluntary act and cannot, therefore, be invoked by appellants. (U. S. vs. Sunico, supra.)chanrobles
virtual law library
The appealed order is affirmed with costs against the appellants. So
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
 Criminal Procedure BAIL
Moran, Bengzon, C. J., Pablo, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur. chanrobles virtual law
library

chanrobles virtual law library

chanrobles virtual law library

Separate Opinions chanrobles virtual law library

chanrobles virtual law library

FERIA, J., concurring:chanrobles virtual law library

I concur in the decision with the following modification in connection with the necessity of
defendant's signature in his bail bond.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

A bail bond in criminal cases is an obligation subscribed, not by the accused, but by two or more
sureties for the release of the defendant who is in the custody of the law, conditioned upon that
the latter will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required. It is not different
from recognizance, and for that reason Rule 110 of the Rules of Court uses the word bail bond and
recognizance interchangeably. That the law does not require that the bail be subscribed or signed
by the accused is shown by the provisions of section 9 which require that, "in case there are only
two sureties, each must be worth the amount specified in the undertaking over and above all just
debts etc."; by section 15 which provides that, when the appearance of the defendant is required
by the court, his sureties, and not the accused, shall be notified to produce him or a given date in
compliance with their obligation stipulated in the bail bond. And if the defendant fails to appear
as required, the bond is declared forfeited and the bondsmen are given thirty days within which
to produce the accused, and to show cause why a judgment shall not be rendered against them
for the amount of their bond; and "failing in these two requisites, a judgement shall be rendered
against the bondsmen" (not against the accused); by section 17 which provides that, "for the
purpose of surrendering the defendant, that bailors may arrest him, or on a written authority
endorsed on a certified copy of the undertaking may cause him to be arrested" and specially by
the form or bail bond found in General Order No. 58, which has not been modified or repealed by
the Rules of Court. (Bandoy vs. Judge of First Instance of Laguna 14 Phil., 620, 625.)