Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-38161 March 29, 1974

JUAN BELLO, FILOMENA C. BELLO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, * HON. FRANCISCO LLAMAS, as Judge of Pasay City Court, and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Martinez and Martinez for petitioners.

Office of the Solicitor General, Dept. of Justice, for respondent.

TEEHANKEE, J.:p

The Court holds that the court of first instance of Pasay City in an appeal erroneously taken to it from the city court's
judgment convicting petitioners-accused of the charge of estafa within the concurrent original jurisdiction of said courts
should grant petitioners-accused's timely petition for certifying their appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper court
rather than peremptorily grant the prosecution's motion for dismissal of the appeal and order the remand of the case to the
city court for execution of judgment. The appellate court's decision denying the relief sought by petitioners of compelling
the elevation of their appeal to it as the proper court simply because of the non-impleader of the court of first instance as a
nominal party notwithstanding that it was duly represented by the respondent People as the real party in interest through
the Solicitor General who expressed no objection to the setting aside of the court of first instance's dismissal order is set
aside as sacrificing substance to form and subordinating substantial justice to a mere matter of procedural technicality.

Petitioners spouses were charged on August 25, 1970 for estafa before the City Court of Pasay1 for allegedly having
misappropriated a lady's ring with a value of P1,000.00 received by them from Atty. Prudencio de Guzman for sale on
commission basis. After trial, they were convicted and sentenced under respondent city court's decision of February 26,
1971 to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional and to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P1,000.00
with costs of suit.

Petitioners filed their notice of appeal of the adverse judgment to the Court of First Instance of Pasay City, but the
prosecution filed a "petition to dismiss appeal" on the ground that since the case was within the concurrent jurisdiction of
the city court and the court of first instance and the trial in the city court had been duly recorded, the appeal should have
been taken directly to the Court of Appeals as provided by section 87 of the Judiciary Act, Republic Act 296, as
amended.2

Petitioners opposed the prosecution's dismissal motion and invoking the analogous provision of Rule 50, section 3
directing that the Court of Appeals in cases erroneously brought to it "shall not dismiss the appeal, but shall certify the
case to the proper court, with a specific and clear statement of the grounds therefor," prayed of the court of first instance if
it should find the appeal to have been wrongly brought before it, to certify the same "to either the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court."3

The court of first instance per its order of October 29, 1971 did find that the appeal should have been taken directly to the
Court of Appeals but ordered the dismissal of the appeal and remand of the records to the city court "for execution of
judgment."4

Petitioners aver that they were not notified of the order of dismissal of their appeal and learned of it only when they were
called by the Pasay city court for execution of the judgment of conviction. Hence, they filed with the city court their "motion
to elevate appeal to Court of Appeals" of December 7, 1971 stating that "through inadvertence and/or excusable neglect"
they had erroneously filed a notice of appeal to the court of first instance instead of to the Court of Appeals as the proper
court and prayed that the city court, following precedents of this Court remanding appeals before it to the proper court
instead of dismissing appeals, "elevate the records ... to the Court of Appeals for proper review."5

Respondent city court per its order of December 11, 1971 denied petitioners' motion "for having been erroneously
addressed to this court" instead of to the court of first instance6 ignoring petitioners' predicament that the court of first
instance had already turned them down and ordered the dismissal of their appeal without notice to them and that as a
consequence it was poised to execute its judgment of conviction against them.

Petitioners spouses then filed on January 14, 1972 their petition for prohibition and mandamus against the People and
respondent city court to prohibit the execution of the judgment and to compel respondent city court to elevate their appeal
to the Court of Appeals.7

The Solicitor General filed respondents' answer to the petition manifesting that "we shall not interpose any objection
whichever view point is adopted by this Honorable Court in resolving the two apparently conflicting or clashing principles
of law — finality of judicial decision or equity in judicial decision," after observing that "(F)rom the view point of equity
considering that petitioners' right to appeal lapsed or was lost through the fault, though not excusable, of their counsel,
and compounded by the alleged error of judgment committed by the Court of First Instance to which the appeal was
erroneously brought, we sympathize with petitioners' plight."
The Court of Appeals, however, per its decision of December 17, 1973 dismissed the petition, after finding that the city
court's judgment was directly appealable to it. Although recognizing that the "CFI instead of dismissing appeal, could have
in the exercise of its inherent powers directed appeal to be endorsed to this Court of Appeals" it held that since petitioners
did not implead the court of first instance as "principal party respondent" it could not "grant any relief at all even on the
assumption that petitioners can be said to deserve some equities," as follows:

... therefore, when they appealed to CFI, that was procedurally wrong; of course, CFI instead of
dismissing appeal, could have in the exercise of its inherent powers, directed appeal to be endorsed to
this Court of Appeals, but when instead of doing so, it dismissed, it also had power to do so, and
correction of it is difficult to see to be remediable by mandamus, but ignoring this altogether, what this
Court finds is that since it was CFI that dismissed the appeal and according to petitioners, wrongly, it must
follow that if CFI was wrong, this plea for mandamus to compel it to act "correctly" should have been
directed against said CFI, it should have been the CFI, Hon. Francisco de la Rosa, who should have been
made under Rule 65 Sec. 3, herein principal party respondent, but he was not, this being the situation,
this Court can not see how it can grant any relief at all even on the assumption that petitioners can be
said to deserve some equities.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration on January 2, 19748 and for elevation of their appeal to the Court of Appeals,
stressing the merits of their appeal and of their defense to the charge, viz, that the offended party Atty. de Guzman had
represented their son who was a suspect with two others for robbery before the Pasay city fiscal's office and upon
dismissal of the charge demanded payment from them as parents the sum of P1,000.00 as attorney's fees, and since they
had no money to pay him required them to sign the receipt dated June 25, 1970 in his favor for an imaginary lady's ring to
sell "on commission basis" for P1,000.00 (their "commission" to be any overprice) to assure payment of the sum by the
stated deadline of July 9, 1970 under penalty, of criminal prosecution for estafa; and that they had then newly met Atty. de
Guzman, whose services had been secured not by them but by the family of one of the other suspects, implying the
incredibility of his entrusting a lady's ring to both of them (husband and wife) for sale on commission basis when his only
association with them was his demand of payment of his P1,000-attorney's fee for having represented their son-suspect.

Reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court "for lack of sufficient merit," petitioners filed the present
petition for review.9 The Court required the Solicitor General's comment on behalf of the People of the Philippines, and
upon receipt thereof resolved to consider the case as a special civil action with such comment as answer and the case
submitted for decision in the interest of justice and speedy adjudication.

The Court finds merits in the petition and holds that the court of first instance acted with grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing petitioners-accused's appeal which was erroneously brought to it and ordering remand of the records to the
city court for execution of judgment instead of certifying and endorsing the appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper
court as timely prayed for by petitioners-accused in their opposition to the prosecution's motion to dismiss appeal. We find
that the Court of Appeals also acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their petition instead of setting aside the
challenged order of the court of first instance peremptorily dismissing the appeal pursuant to which respondent city court
was poised to execute its judgment of conviction simply because the court of first instance which is but a nominal party
had not been impleaded as party respondent in disregard of the substantive fact that the People as plaintiff and the real
party in interest was duly impleaded as principal party respondent and was represented in the proceedings by the Solicitor
General.

The appellate court while recognizing that petitioners' appeal taken to the court of first instance was "procedurally wrong"
and that the court of first instance "in the exercise of its inherent powers could have certified the appeal to it as the proper
court instead of dismissing the appeal, gravely erred in holding that it could not "correct" the court of first instance's
"wrong action" and grant the relief sought of having the appeal elevated to it since said court's presiding judge "who
should have been-made under Rule 65, sec. 3 10 herein principal party respondent, but he was not." The Court has always
stressed as in Torre vs. Ericta 11 that a respondent judge is "merely a nominal party" in special civil actions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus and that he "is not a person "in interest" within the purview (of Rule 65, section 5 12)" and
"accordingly, he has no standing or authority to appeal from or seek a review on certiorari" of an adverse decision of the
appellate court setting aside his dismissal of a party's appeal and issuing the writ of mandamus for him to allow the
appeal.

It is readily seen from the cited Rule that the court of first instance or presiding judge who issued the challenged order or
decision is but a nominal party, the real parties in interest being "the person or persons interested in sustaining the
proceedings in the court" and who are charged with the duty of appearing and defending the challenged act both "in their
own behalf and in behalf of the court or judge affected by the proceedings." Hence, theformal impleading of the court of
first instance which issued the challenged order of dismissal was not indispensable and could be "overlooked in the
interest of speedy adjudication." 13

Since the real party in interest, the People as plaintiff in the criminal proceeding against petitioners-accused was duly
impleaded and represented by the Solicitor General to defend the proceedings in the court of first instance and had
expressed no objection to the appellate court's setting aside of the court of first instance's dismissal order, in the interest
of justice and equity the appellate court's act of dismissing the petition and denying the relief sought of endorsing the
appeal to the proper court simply because of the non impleader of the court of first instance as a nominal party was
tantamount to sacrificing substance to form and to subordinating substantial justice to a mere matter of procedural
technicality. The procedural infirmity of petitioners mis-directing their appeal to the court of first instance rather than to the
Court of Appeals, which they had timely sought to correct in the court of first instance itself by asking that court to certify
the appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper court, should not be over-magnified as to totally deprive them of their
substantial right of appeal and leave them without any remedy.

The Court therefore grants herein the relief denied by respondent appellate court of mandamus to compel respondent city
court to elevate petitioners' appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper court as being within the context and spirit of
Rule 50, section 3, providing for certification to the proper court by the Court of Appeals of appealed cases erroneously
brought to it, 14 particularly where petitioners-accused have shown prima facie (and without this Court prejudging the
merits of their appeal) that they have a valid cause for pursuing in good faith their appeal (as against a manifestly dilatory
or frivolous appeal) and to have a higher court appreciate their evidence in support of their defense that they were
prosecuted and sentenced to imprisonment (for estafa) for failure to pay a purely civil indebtedness (the attorney's fee
owed by their son to the complainant).

Here, petitioners-accused's counsel, misdirected their appeal to the court of first instance, confronted with the thorny
question (which has confused many a practitioner) 15 of concurrent criminal jurisdiction of city courts and municipal
courts of provincial and sub-provincial capitals with courts of first instance under sections 44 (f) and 87 (c) of the Judiciary
Act where the appeal from the municipal or city court's judgment should be taken directly to the Court of Appeals as held
in Esperat vs. Avila 16 as distinguished however from judgments of ordinary municipal courts in similar cases within the
concurrent jurisdiction of the courts of first instance where as held by this Court in People vs. Valencia 17 the appeal
should nevertheless be brought to the court of first instance which retains its appellate jurisdiction under section 45 of the
Judiciary Act.

It certainly was within the inherent power of the court of first instance in exercise of its power to "control its process and
orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice" 18 to grant petitioners-accused's timely plea to endorse their
appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper court and within the context and spirit of Rule 50, section 3. In a mis-directed
appeal to the Court of Appeals of a case that pertains to the court of first instance's jurisdiction, the said Rule expressly
provides that the Court of Appeals "shall not dismiss the appeal but shall certify the case to the proper court" viz, the court
of first instance in the given example. There is no logical reason why in all fairness and justice the court of first instance in
a misdirected appeal to it should not be likewise bound by the same rule and therefore enjoined not to dismiss the appeal
but to certify the case to the Court of Appeals as the proper court. The paucity of the language of the Rule and its failure
to expressly provide for such cases of misdirected appeals to the court of first instance (owing possibly to the fact that at
the time of the revision of the Rules of Court in 1963 section 87 (c) had been newly amended under Republic Act 2613
approved on June 22, 1963 to enlarge the jurisdiction of city courts and municipal courts of provincial capitals and provide
for their concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of first instance and direct appeal from their judgments in such cases to the
Court of Appeals) should not be a cause for unjustly depriving petitioners of their substantial right of appeal.

This Court has in many cases involving the construction of statutes always cautioned against "narrowly" interpreting a
statute "as to defeat the purpose of the legislator" " 19 and stressed that "it is of the essence of judicial duty to construe
statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result (of injustice or absurdity)" 20 and that therefore "a literal interpretation is to
be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results". 21 In the construction of its own Rules of Court, this Court is all
the more so bound to liberally construe them to avoid injustice, discrimination and unfairness and to supply the void —
that is certainly within the spirit and purpose of the Rule to eliminate repugnancy and inconsistency — by holding as it
does now that courts of first instance are equally bound as the higher courts not to dismiss misdirected appeals timely
made but to certify them to the proper appellate court.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition is hereby set aside and in lieu thereof,
judgment is hereby rendered granting the petition for prohibition against respondent city court which is hereby enjoined
from executing its judgment of conviction against petitioners-accused and further commanding said city court to elevate
petitioners' appeal from its judgment to the Court of Appeals for the latter's disposition on the merits. No costs.

Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Fernandez, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ.,
concur.

Separate Opinions

ESGUERRA, J., dissenting:

I beg to dissent from the opinion that Section 3 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court may be applied by analogy to this case,
considering that the dispositive portion of the draft decision commands the City Court to elevate the case to the Court of
Appeals. Under Section 31 of the Judiciary Act (Republic Act No. 296), "all cases erroneously brought to the Supreme
Court or to the Court of Appeals shall be sent to the proper court, which shall hear the same, as if it had originally been
brought before it." Section 3 of Rule 50 provides that "when the appealed case has been erroneously brought to the Court
of Appeals, it shall not dismiss the appeal but shall certify the case to the proper court, with a specific and clear statement
of the grounds therefor." These are the only legal provisions governing the handling and disposition of erroneous appeals.
Neither the Legislature nor the Rules of Court has provided the rules for erroneous appeal to the Court of First Instance
from the judgment of a City Court or the Municipal Court of a provincial or sub-provincial capital in cases falling within their
concurrent jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act, as amended. I do not think the Supreme Court, by judicial fiat, can supply
the deficiency unless it formally promulgates a rule governing transfer or certification of cases erroneously appealed to the
Court of First Instance from judgments of inferior courts in cases directly appealable to the Court of Appeals. The void in
the law is in the certification by the Court of First Instance to the Court of Appeals in such cases.

We cannot apply Section 31 of the Judiciary Act and Section 3 of Rule 50 by analogy because We have to compel the
Court of First Instance to certify the case to the Court of Appeals. We cannot also compel the City Court of Pasay City to
do the same because the case was not appealed to it as it was its decision which was erroneously appealed to the Court
of First Instance. The proper court to certify and to be commanded to do so by mandamus is the Court of First Instance,
but this Court is not a party to this case and cannot be bound by any judgment rendered herein.

That the People of the Philippines was impleaded as a party and represented by the Solicitor General is of no significance
to me. The People is not the one to be compelled to perform the act but the Judge of First Instance that dismissed the
appeal; and neither said Court nor the Judge thereof is a party respondent in these proceedings.

The petitioners here should have known, through their counsel, that the People of the Philippines and the Court of First
Instance of Pasay City are not one and the same entity, and that the former may not be compelled to perform the act of
certifying the case to the Court of Appeals while the latter can be. The respondent-appellate Court was right in dismissing
the petition to prohibit the execution of the judgment and to compel the City Court to elevate the case to the Court of
Appeals. Petitioners should have known that the Court of First Instance is an indispensable party to these proceedings.
For their counsel's fatal error, they should pay the price of having the judgment of conviction become final.

Separate Opinions

ESGUERRA, J., dissenting:

I beg to dissent from the opinion that Section 3 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court may be applied by analogy to this case,
considering that the dispositive portion of the draft decision commands the City Court to elevate the case to the Court of
Appeals. Under Section 31 of the Judiciary Act (Republic Act No. 296), "all cases erroneously brought to the Supreme
Court or to the Court of Appeals shall be sent to the proper court, which shall hear the same, as if it had originally been
brought before it." Section 3 of Rule 50 provides that "when the appealed case has been erroneously brought to the Court
of Appeals, it shall not dismiss the appeal but shall certify the case to the proper court, with a specific and clear statement
of the grounds therefor." These are the only legal provisions governing the handling and disposition of erroneous appeals.
Neither the Legislature nor the Rules of Court has provided the rules for erroneous appeal to the Court of First Instance
from the judgment of a City Court or the Municipal Court of a provincial or sub-provincial capital in cases falling within their
concurrent jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act, as amended. I do not think the Supreme Court, by judicial fiat, can supply
the deficiency unless it formally promulgates a rule governing transfer or certification of cases erroneously appealed to the
Court of First Instance from judgments of inferior courts in cases directly appealable to the Court of Appeals. The void in
the law is in the certification by the Court of First Instance to the Court of Appeals in such cases.

We cannot apply Section 31 of the Judiciary Act and Section 3 of Rule 50 by analogy because We have to compel the
Court of First Instance to certify the case to the Court of Appeals. We cannot also compel the City Court of Pasay City to
do the same because the case was not appealed to it as it was its decision which was erroneously appealed to the Court
of First Instance. The proper court to certify and to be commanded to do so by mandamus is the Court of First Instance,
but this Court is not a party to this case and cannot be bound by any judgment rendered herein.

That the People of the Philippines was impleaded as a party and represented by the Solicitor General is of no significance
to me. The People is not the one to be compelled to perform the act but the Judge of First Instance that dismissed the
appeal; and neither said Court nor the Judge thereof is a party respondent in these proceedings.

The petitioners here should have known, through their counsel, that the People of the Philippines and the Court of First
Instance of Pasay City are not one and the same entity, and that the former may not be compelled to perform the act of
certifying the case to the Court of Appeals while the latter can be. The respondent-appellate Court was right in dismissing
the petition to prohibit the execution of the judgment and to compel the City Court to elevate the case to the Court of
Appeals. Petitioners should have known that the Court of First Instance is an indispensable party to these proceedings.
For their counsel's fatal error, they should pay the price of having the judgment of conviction become final.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.

Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.

Camus and Delgado for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.

The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased,
opposed it. The court, however, approved it.

The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:

(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion
for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the
deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are
impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the
deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.

The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G.
Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in
violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other things, provides the following:

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the amount
of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it
may be situated.

But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish
laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence
of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of
Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)

It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he desires to
be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of the court in not
having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the
Turkish laws on the matter.

The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error. It is discretionary
with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity to introduce competent
evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the
record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question
which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed. lawphil.net

Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.

In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as
he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into consideration that such exclusion is based on the
last part of the second clause of the will, which says:

Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been conferred
upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand, having resided for a
considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now
possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, my will, be made
and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to
respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the
person or persons who fail to comply with this request.

The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the
testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws
of the Philippines.

If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the herein oppositor
who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is prevented from
receiving his legacy.

The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code provides the
following:

Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not
prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide.

And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to article 10
of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.

Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees
in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor.

It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the condition
imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.

All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective it not
appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.

Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made in such a
manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by
the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without any pronouncement as to costs.

So ordered.

Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor and Ostrand, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,

vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD
GEILING, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be followed by a
criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what
hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard
Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the
Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in
Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1

Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto
between them.

After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a
divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that
there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. 2

Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3

On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of
divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The
records show that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and
that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign
jurisdiction. 4

On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two
complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had
an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983".
Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the
cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal approved a
resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The
complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The
case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435,
was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs.
Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz,
Branch XXV, of the same court. 7

On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of
respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her
co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due
course to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have
already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of
both cases to his office for review. 9

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings
thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the
other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987.
Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of
proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending before the
Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which
motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the
arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the
petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct contempt,
she and her counsel were fined and the former was ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later,
private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14

On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. The petition is
anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a
private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as
an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal
complaint." 15

On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from implementing the
aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on
March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding
petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the
complaints against the petitioner. 16

We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.

Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot
be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established,
with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal,
requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law,
the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the
prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.

Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the
complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents,
grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first
four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens
patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a
deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in
default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and
concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such
initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is
a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil
cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.

The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the same requirement
and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since criminal actions are generally
and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the
complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio,
and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since
the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.

This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence
rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal
action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where
the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal
case. 21

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action be
definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he
initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by his
status beforeor subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased
before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have
the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.

To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when precisely the
status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one
who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the
inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds
between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the
former against the latter.

American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields the rule
that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the
offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for
adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no
legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22

In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —

'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.' Section
4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have been committed,
he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his status was not
such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense is against the
unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the reason for this provision in the statute; and we
are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must be such when the prosecution is commenced.
(Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering our
statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant
vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the
adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time
of the filing of the complaint.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private
respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.

Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United States court
between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that
her business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff
be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error
of such stance, thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ...

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. ...

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. ... 25

Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal
standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of
knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the
divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a
dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which
is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no
spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from
each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.

The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private respondent. In applying
Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished
adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to
declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear that
she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial
declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the
declaration of nullity because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never
existed. There being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would
no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the decision
in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed beforethe termination of the marriage by a
judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the
marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.

Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the same fate of
inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a
complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the
complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the
controversy herein.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one
entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order
issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PARAS, J., concurring:

It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce as valid also in the
Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his obtaining an absolute divorce in
Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party in case his former wife actually has carnal knowledge with
another, because in divorcing her, he already implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with others. A
contrary ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman of the same
privilege.

In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute divorce between the
American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the theory that their status and
capacity are governed by their National law, namely, American law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court
regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2)
different nationalities would be involved.

In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely because of the National
law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American husband is concerned but void insofar as
the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman is still
married to a man who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned that very likely the opposite
expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the husband the absolute divorce will be valid, still one of the
exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work
an injustice or injury to the people or residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid
on the part of the husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid under
her national law, it would seem that under our law existing before the new Family Code (which took effect on August 3,
1988) the divorce should be considered void both with respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife.

The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the husband was an
American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned
was NEVER put in issue.

Separate Opinions

PARAS, J., concurring:

It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce as valid also in the
Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his obtaining an absolute divorce in
Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party in case his former wife actually has carnal knowledge with
another, because in divorcing her, he already implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with others. A
contrary ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman of the same
privilege.

In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute divorce between the
American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the theory that their status and
capacity are governed by their National law, namely, American law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court
regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2)
different nationalities would be involved.

In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely because of the National
law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American husband is concerned but void insofar as
the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman is still
married to a man who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned that very likely the opposite
expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the husband the absolute divorce will be valid, still one of the
exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work
an injustice or injury to the people or residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid
on the part of the husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid under
her national law, it would seem that under our law existing before the new Family Code (which took effect on August 3,
1988) the divorce should be considered void both with respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife.

The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the husband was an
American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned
was NEVER put in issue.

G.R. No. 142820 June 20, 2003

WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner,

vs.
MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC,
Branch 149, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

At the core of the present controversy are issues of (a) grave abuse of discretion allegedly committed by public
respondent and (b) lack of jurisdiction of the regional trial court, in matters that spring from a divorce decree obtained
abroad by petitioner.

In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner assails (a) the order 1 dated September 30, 1999 of public respondent
Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga, Presiding Judge of Makati Regional Trial Court,2 Branch 149, in Civil Case No. 96-
1389 for declaration of nullity of marriage, and (b) the order3 dated March 31, 2000 denying his motion for reconsideration.
The assailed orders partially set aside the trial court’s order dismissing Civil Case No. 96-1389, for the purpose of
resolving issues relating to the property settlement of the spouses and the custody of their children.

Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez,
a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981
in Tayasan, Negros Oriental.4 Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine on November 18, 1981 and
October 25, 1987, respectively.

On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition5 for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City. On February 6, 1997, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, 6 but it was denied by the trial court
in its order7 dated May 28, 1997.

On June 5, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was also denied in an order 8 dated August 13, 1997. On
September 5, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On November 27, 1998, the appellate
court denied the petition and remanded the case to the RTC.

Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated
on December 16, 1997.

The decree provides in part:

[T]he Court of First Instance, Hamburg-Blankenese, Branch 513, has ruled through Judge van Buiren of the Court
of First Instance on the basis of the oral proceedings held on 4 Nov. 1997:

The marriage of the Parties contracted on 11 December 1980 before the Civil Registrar of Hamburg-Altona is
hereby dissolved.

The parental custody for the children

Carolynne Roehr, born 18 November 1981

Alexandra Kristine Roehr, born on 25 October 1987

is granted to the father.

The litigation expenses shall be assumed by the Parties.9

In view of said decree, petitioner filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 1999 on the ground that the trial court had
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or suit as a decree of divorce had already been promulgated dissolving
the marriage of petitioner and private respondent.

On July 14, 1999, Judge Guevara-Salonga issued an order granting petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Private respondent
filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of
custody of children and the distribution of the properties between petitioner and private respondent.

On August 18, 1999, an Opposition to the Motion for Partial Reconsideration was filed by the petitioner on the ground that
there is nothing to be done anymore in the instant case as the marital tie between petitioner Wolfgang Roehr and
respondent Ma. Carmen D. Rodriguez had already been severed by the decree of divorce promulgated by the Court of
First Instance of Hamburg, Germany on December 16, 1997 and in view of the fact that said decree of divorce had
already been recognized by the RTC in its order of July 14, 1999, through the implementation of the mandate of Article 26
of the Family Code,10 endowing the petitioner with the capacity to remarry under the Philippine law.

On September 30, 1999, respondent judge issued the assailed order partially setting aside her order dated July 14, 1999
for the purpose of tackling the issues of property relations of the spouses as well as support and custody of their children.
The pertinent portion of said order provides:

Acting on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Order dated July 14, 1999 filed by petitioner thru counsel
which was opposed by respondent and considering that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
was included as an amendment thru Executive Order 227, to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as being still
married to his or her alien spouse though the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he/she
had obtained a divorce abroad which is recognized by his/her national law, and considering further the effects of
the termination of the marriage under Article 43 in relation to Article 50 and 52 of the same Code, which include
the dissolution of the property relations of the spouses, and the support and custody of their children, the Order
dismissing this case is partially set aside with respect to these matterswhich may be ventilated in this Court.

SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration on October 19, 1999, which was denied by respondent judge in an
order dated March 31, 2000.12

Petitioner ascribes lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent judge. He
cites as grounds for his petition the following:

1. Partially setting aside the order dated July 14, 1999 dismissing the instant case is not allowed by 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.13
 2. Respondent Maria Carmen Rodriguez by her motion for Partial Reconsideration had recognized and admitted
the Divorce Decision obtained by her ex-husband in Hamburg, Germany.14

3. There is nothing left to be tackled by the Honorable Court as there are no conjugal assets alleged in the
Petition for Annulment of Marriage and in the Divorce petition, and the custody of the children had already been
awarded to Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr.15

Pertinent in this case before us are the following issues:

1. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing her order dated September 30, 1999,
which partially modified her order dated July 14, 1999; and

2. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she assumed and retained jurisdiction
over the present case despite the fact that petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from a German court.

On the first issue, petitioner asserts that the assailed order of respondent judge is completely inconsistent with her
previous order and is contrary to Section 3, Rule 16, Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:

Sec. 3. Resolution of motion - After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion, or
order the amendment of the pleading.

The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground relied upon is not indubitable.

In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner avers that a court’s action on a motion is limited to dismissing the action or claim, denying the motion, or
ordering the amendment of the pleading.

Private respondent, on her part, argues that the RTC can validly reconsider its order dated July 14, 1999 because it had
not yet attained finality, given the timely filing of respondent’s motion for reconsideration.

Pertinent to this issue is Section 3 in relation to Section 7, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:

Sec. 3. Action upon motion for new trial or reconsideration.—The trial court may set aside the judgment or final
order and grant a new trial, upon such terms as may be just, or may deny the motion. If the court finds that
excessive damages have been awarded or that the judgment or final order is contrary to the evidence or law, it
may amend such judgment or final order accordingly.

Sec. 7. Partial new trial or reconsideration.—If the grounds for a motion under this Rule appear to the court to
affect the issues as to only a part, or less than all of the matters in controversy, or only one, or less than all, of the
parties to it, the court may order a new trial or grant reconsideration as to such issues if severable without
interfering with the judgment or final order upon the rest. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is clear from the foregoing rules that a judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet attained
finality. Considering that private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the trial
court's decision of July 14, 1999 can still be modified. Moreover, in Sañado v. Court of Appeals,16 we held that the court
could modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering
its decision unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or
alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and executory17 and when it becomes imperative in the higher
interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.18 In our view, there are even more compelling reasons to do so
when, as in this case, judgment has not yet attained finality.

Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when she partially
set aside her order dated July 14, 1999, despite the fact that petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from the
Court of First Instance of Hamburg, Germany.

In Garcia v. Recio,19 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,20 and Llorente v. Court of Appeals,21 we consistently held that a divorce
obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national
law of the foreigner. Relevant to the present case is Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,22 where this Court specifically recognized the
validity of a divorce obtained by a German citizen in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. We held in Pilapil that
a foreign divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of
the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.

In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16, 1997 has not been challenged by either
of the parties. In fact, save for the issue of parental custody, even the trial court recognized said decree to be valid and
binding, thereby endowing private respondent the capacity to remarry. Thus, the present controversy mainly relates to the
award of the custody of their two children, Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner.

As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the
legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our courts. 23Before our
courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German
court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds
allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:

SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
 (a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this
jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to
actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facieevidence of
the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary. 24

In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the
German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner to
have parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what was the
extent of private respondent’s participation in the proceedings in the German court, the records remain unclear. The
divorce decree itself states that neither has she commented on the proceedings 25 nor has she given her opinion to the
Social Services Office.26 Unlike petitioner who was represented by two lawyers, private respondent had no counsel to
assist her in said proceedings.27 More importantly, the divorce judgment was issued to petitioner by virtue of the German
Civil Code provision to the effect that when a couple lived separately for three years, the marriage is deemed irrefutably
dissolved. The decree did not touch on the issue as to who the offending spouse was. Absent any finding that private
respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine
the issue of parental custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the children. This is in
consonance with the provision in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that the child’s welfare is always the paramount
consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody. 28

On the matter of property relations, petitioner asserts that public respondent exceeded the bounds of her jurisdiction when
she claimed cognizance of the issue concerning property relations between petitioner and private respondent. Private
respondent herself has admitted in Par. 14 of her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage dated August 26, 1996 filed
with the RTC of Makati, subject of this case, that: "[p]etitioner and respondent have not acquired any conjugal or
community property nor have they incurred any debts during their marriage." 29 Herein petitioner did not contest this
averment. Basic is the rule that a court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof. 30Given the factual
admission by the parties in their pleadings that there is no property to be accounted for, respondent judge has no basis to
assert jurisdiction in this case to resolve a matter no longer deemed in controversy.

In sum, we find that respondent judge may proceed to determine the issue regarding the custody of the two children born
of the union between petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent erred, however, in claiming cognizance to
settle the matter of property relations of the parties, which is not at issue.

WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued on September 30, 1999 and March
31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue
between the parties as to who has parental custody, including the care, support and education of the children, namely
Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for
continuation of appropriate proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

Austria-Martinez, J., on official leave.

[G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001]

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national
law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be
proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and
the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision [1] and the
March 24, 1999 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026AF. The assailed Decision
disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at
Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties. [3]

The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.

 The Facts

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.[4] They
lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, [5] a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was
issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a Certificate of Australian Citizenship issued by the
Australian government.[6] Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help
Church in Cabanatuan City.[7] In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino. [8]
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While
the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations
secured in Australia.[9]
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage[10] in the court a quo, on the ground of
bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she
learned of respondents marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent
dissolution.[11] He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in
Australia in 1989;[12] thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending --
respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken
down.[13]
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of action. [14] The Office of
the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.[15] The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties. [16] After they
submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution. [17]
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the
Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondents
alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian
divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.
Hence, this Petition.[18]

Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

1

The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso facto terminated his first
marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.

The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes
absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioners marriage to the respondent

The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.

The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable
provisions in this case.

The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the
parties to remarry, without first securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts. [19]

The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce
between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry
petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.

The Courts Ruling

 The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson

Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng
Gee,[20] petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only
upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that
respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are governed by
the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign
law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law does not provide
for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. [21] A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce
obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 [22] and 17[23] of the Civil Code.[24] In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner,
Article 26[25] of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.[26] A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.[27]
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo
Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law.[28] Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. [29] Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the registration requirements
under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles read as follows:

ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn application for such license
with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:

xxxxxxxxx

(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;

xxxxxxxxx

ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required to

ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the
birth or baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of
the absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.

ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of
property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons.

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document -- a written official act of an
Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first
be presented and admitted in evidence.[30] A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of
a judgment is the judgment itself.[31] The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign
country.[32]
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a
foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested [33] by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic
or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
the seal of his office. [34]
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family
court.[35] However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner
objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.[36] The
trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioners qualification. [37] Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight
by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court
of Sydney, Australia.[38]
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by
Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. [39]Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and
clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.[40] Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their
former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines
and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
 Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the
validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the
marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is
allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action.[41] In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when
those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce
new matters.[42] Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it
falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.[43] Like any other facts, they must be
alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function.[44] The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved
in the negative.

Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to Remarry

Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to marry her in
1994. Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence, adequately established his legal
capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause
arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2)
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full
force.[45] There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the
same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which
no reconciliation is effected.[46]
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under
some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of
adultery may be prohibited from marrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior. [47]
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the
offence of bigamy.[48]
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely
establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which
erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondents capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on
this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to his
civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39[49] of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal
effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted together with
the application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned. The
certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he
duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of
the alien applicant for a marriage license.[50]
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the records
before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit A
Complaint;[51] (b) Exhibit B Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on
January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija; [52] (c) Exhibit C Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and
Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila; [53] (d) Exhibit D Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan
City Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson was in its records;[54] and (e)
Exhibit E Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio; [55] (2) for respondent: (a) Exhibit 1 -- Amended Answer;[56] (b)
Exhibit 2 Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;[57] (c) Exhibit 3 Certificate of
Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[58] (d) Exhibit 4 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia
Certificate;[59] and Exhibit 5 -- Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio
since October 22, 1995.[60]
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioners contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the
divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to
show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it
may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we
believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners legal
capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on the ground of bigamy,
there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro
Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
 WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the
purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring
the parties marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 154259. February 28, 2005]

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. AMAY
BISAYA, respondent.

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila Garden (Hotel Nikko) [1] and Ruby Lim assail the
Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 reversing the Decision [3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 104, as well as the Resolution[4] of the Court of Appeals dated 09 July 2002 which denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages brought under the human relations provisions of the
New Civil Code. Plaintiff thereat (respondent herein) Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the screen name Amay
Bisaya, alleged that at around 6:00 oclock in the evening of 13 October 1994, while he was having coffee at the lobby of
Hotel Nikko,[5] he was spotted by his friend of several years, Dr. Violeta Filart, who then approached him. [6] Mrs. Filart invited
him to join her in a party at the hotels penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotels manager, Mr. Masakazu
Tsuruoka.[7] Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for him for which she replied: of course. [8] Mr. Reyes then went up with the
party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket of fruits which was the latters present for the celebrant. [9] At the penthouse, they first
had their picture taken with the celebrant after which Mr. Reyes sat with the party of Dr. Filart. [10]After a couple of hours,
when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment,
he was stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary thereof. [11] In
a loud voice and within the presence and hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at the buffet table, Ruby
Lim told him to leave the party (huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang).[12] Mr. Reyes tried to explain
that he was invited by Dr. Filart.[13] Dr. Filart, who was within hearing distance, however, completely ignored him thus adding
to his shame and humiliation.[14] Not long after, while he was still recovering from the traumatic experience, a Makati
policeman approached and asked him to step out of the hotel.[15] Like a common criminal, he was escorted out of the party
by the policeman.[16] Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes asked for One Million Pesos actual damages, One Million Pesos moral
and/or exemplary damages and Two Hundred Thousand Pesos attorneys fees. [17]
Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not under the ignominious circumstance
painted by the latter. Ms. Lim narrated that she was the Hotels Executive Secretary for the past twenty (20) years. [18] One
of her functions included organizing the birthday party of the hotels former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. [19] The year
1994 was no different. For Mr. Tsuruokas party, Ms. Lim generated an exclusive guest list and extended invitations
accordingly.[20] The guest list was limited to approximately sixty (60) of Mr. Tsuruokas closest friends and some hotel
employees and that Mr. Reyes was not one of those invited.[21] At the party, Ms. Lim first noticed Mr. Reyes at the bar
counter ordering a drink.[22]Mindful of Mr. Tsuruokas wishes to keep the party intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr. Boy Miller,
the captain waiter, to inquire as to the presence of Mr. Reyes who was not invited.[23] Mr. Miller replied that he saw Mr.
Reyes with the group of Dr. Filart.[24] As Dr. Filart was engaged in conversation with another guest and as Ms. Lim did not
want to interrupt, she inquired instead from the sister of Dr. Filart, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, who told her that Dr. Filart did not
invite Mr. Reyes.[25] Ms. Lim then requested Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited. [26] Mr.
Reyes, however, lingered prompting Ms. Lim to inquire from Ms. Fruto who said that Mr. Reyes did not want to
leave.[27] When Ms. Lim turned around, she saw Mr. Reyes conversing with a Captain Batung whom she later
approached.[28] Believing that Captain Batung and Mr. Reyes knew each other, Ms. Lim requested from him the same favor
from Ms. Fruto, i.e., for Captain Batung to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited.[29] Still, Mr. Reyes lingered.
When Ms. Lim spotted Mr. Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to speak to him herself as there were no other guests in
the immediate vicinity.[30] However, as Mr. Reyes was already helping himself to the food, she decided to wait. [31] When Mr.
Reyes went to a corner and started to eat, Ms. Lim approached him and said: alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat nandito.
Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo.[32] She
then turned around trusting that Mr. Reyes would show enough decency to leave, but to her surprise, he began screaming
and making a big scene, and even threatened to dump food on her.[33]
Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before the lower court, also gave her version of the story to the
effect that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the party.[34] According to her, it was Mr. Reyes who volunteered to carry the
basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as he was likewise going to take the elevator, not to the penthouse but to Altitude
49.[35] When they reached the penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes to go down as he was not properly dressed and was not
invited.[36] All the while, she thought that Mr. Reyes already left the place, but she later saw him at the bar talking to Col.
Batung.[37] Then there was a commotion and she saw Mr. Reyes shouting. [38] She ignored Mr. Reyes.[39] She was
embarrassed and did not want the celebrant to think that she invited him. [40]
After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint,[41] giving more credence to the testimony of Ms. Lim
that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial court likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes assumed
the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was uninvited:

Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he was not a guest of Mr. Tsuruoka, the birthday celebrant. He assumed the risk of
being asked to leave for attending a party to which he was not invited by the host. Damages are pecuniary consequences which the law
imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of some right. Thus, no recovery can be had against defendants Nikko Hotel and
Ruby Lim because he himself was at fault (Garciano v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 436). He knew that it was not the party of
defendant Violeta Filart even if she allowed him to join her and took responsibility for his attendance at the party. His action against
defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim must therefore fail. [42]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found more commanding of belief the
testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave in a loud voice within hearing distance of several guests:

In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation, telling him that he should not finish his food and to leave the place within the
hearing distance of other guests is an act which is contrary to morals, good customs . . ., for which appellees should compensate the
appellant for the damage suffered by the latter as a consequence therefore (Art. 21, New Civil Code). The liability arises from the acts
which are in themselves legal or not prohibited, but contrary to morals or good customs. Conversely, even in the exercise of a formal
right, [one] cannot with impunity intentionally cause damage to another in a manner contrary to morals or good customs. [43]

The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the actuation of Ms. Lim in approaching several people to inquire into the presence
of Mr. Reyes exposed the latter to ridicule and was uncalled for as she should have approached Dr. Filart first and both of
them should have talked to Mr. Reyes in private:

Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What should have been done by appellee Lim was to approach appellee Mrs. Filart and
together they should have told appellant Reyes in private that the latter should leave the party as the celebrant only wanted close
friends around. It is necessary that Mrs. Filart be the one to approach appellant because it was she who invited appellant in that
occasion. Were it not for Mrs. Filarts invitation, appellant could not have suffered such humiliation. For that, appellee Filart is equally
liable.

...

The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which are predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which
calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity. Under Article 20 of the Civil Code, every person who violates
this duty becomes liable for damages, especially if said acts were attended by malice or bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote
bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach
of a known duty to some motive or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud (Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA, et al., 309 SCRA
603).[44]

Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel Nikko, Ruby Lim and Dr. Violeta Filart the solidary obligation
to pay Mr. Reyes (1) exemplary damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); (2) moral damages
in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); and (3) attorneys fees in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000).[45] On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its earlier decision as the argument raised in the
motion had been amply discussed and passed upon in the decision sought to be reconsidered. [46]
Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim contend that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in
I.

NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA CONSIDERING THAT BY ITS OWN FINDINGS, AMAY
BISAYA WAS A GATE-CRASHER

II.

HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH DR. FILART FOR DAMAGES
SINCE BY ITS OWN RULING, AMAY BISAYA COULD NOT HAVE SUFFERED SUCH HUMILIATION, WERE IT NOT FOR
DR. FILARTS INVITATION

III.

DEPARTING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT
ALLEGEDLY CAUSED THE HUMILIATION OF AMAY BISAYA

IV.

IN CONCLUDING THAT AMAY BISAYA WAS TREATED UNJUSTLY BECAUSE OF HIS POVERTY, CONSIDERING THAT
THIS WAS NEVER AN ISSUE AND NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED IN THIS REGARD

V.

IN FAILING TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE ON THE DEFECTS OF THE APPELLANTS BRIEF, THEREBY DEPARTING FROM
THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made
liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated
in the process) as he was a gate-crasher.
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury[47]) refers to self-
inflicted injury[48] or to the consent to injury[49] which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and
voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so. [50] As formulated by petitioners, however, this
doctrine does not find application to the case at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to
leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in
order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.
Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. Amay Bisaya, to
leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant thereof thereby becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the
Civil Code. Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim were so liable, whether or not Hotel Nikko, as her employer, is solidarily liable
with her.
As the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent and irreconcilable conclusions concerning the same facts
and evidence of the case, this Court is left without choice but to use its latent power to review such findings of facts. Indeed,
the general rule is that we are not a trier of facts as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors of law.[51] One
of the exceptions to this general rule, however, obtains herein as the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those
of the trial court.[52] The lower court ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party as she
talked to him politely and discreetly. The appellate court, on the other hand, held that Ms. Lim is liable for damages as she
needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling him not to finish his food and to leave the place within hearing distance of the
other guests. Both courts, however, were in agreement that it was Dr. Filarts invitation that brought Mr. Reyes to the party.
The consequential question then is: Which version is credible?
From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the lower courts findings of fact.
First, let us put things in the proper perspective.
We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-star hotel,[53] for-invitation-only, thrown for the hotels former Manager,
a Japanese national. Then came a person who was clearly uninvited (by the celebrant) [54] and who could not just disappear
into the crowd as his face is known by many, being an actor. While he was already spotted by the organizer of the party,
Ms. Lim, the very person who generated the guest list, it did not yet appear that the celebrant was aware of his presence.
Ms. Lim, mindful of the celebrants instruction to keep the party intimate, would naturally want to get rid of the gate-crasher
in the most hush-hush manner in order not to call attention to a glitch in an otherwise seamless affair and, in the process,
risk the displeasure of the celebrant, her former boss. To unnecessarily call attention to the presence of Mr. Reyes would
certainly reflect badly on Ms. Lims ability to follow the instructions of the celebrant to invite only his close friends and some
of the hotels personnel. Mr. Reyes, upon whom the burden rests to prove that indeed Ms. Lim loudly and rudely ordered
him to leave, could not offer any satisfactory explanation why Ms. Lim would do that and risk ruining a formal and intimate
affair. On the contrary, Mr. Reyes, on cross-examination, had unwittingly sealed his fate by admitting that when Ms. Lim
talked to him, she was very close. Close enough for him to kiss:
Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that Miss Lim approached you while you were at the buffet table? How close
was she when she approached you?
A: Very close because we nearly kissed each other.
Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go down? She was that close and she shouted?
A: Yes. She said, wag kang kumain, hindi ka imbitado dito, bumaba ka na lang.
Q: So, you are testifying that she did this in a loud voice?

...

A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be heard by many.[55]

In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame,
it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for
twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the
contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was correct in observing that

Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the party was made such that they
nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause
embarrassment to him. It was plaintiffs reaction to the request that must have made the other guests aware of what transpired between
them. . .

Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take him out. [56]

Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyess version of the story is that it is unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil cases
that he who alleges proves. Mr. Reyes, however, had not presented any witness to back his story up. All his witnesses
Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva - proved only that it was Dr. Filart who invited him to the party.[57]
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be made
liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko,
be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employee.[58]
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, [59] is not a panacea for all
human hurts and social grievances. Article 19 states:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.

Elsewhere, we explained that when a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
responsible.[60] The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the
exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties. [61] These standards are the following: act with justice,
give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. [62] Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or
intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the
sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.[63] When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles
20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law [64] which does not obtain herein as
Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on the other hand, states:

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 21[65] refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but
which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.[66]
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, [67] and that is, the act complained of must be intentional.[68]
As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity
against him. These two people did not know each other personally before the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes
had nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lims alleged abusive conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim, being single
at 44 years old, had a very strong bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her associates in her work
at the hotel with foreign businessmen.[69] The lameness of this argument need not be belabored. Suffice it to say that a
complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend it but innuendos
and conjectures.
Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable and humane under
the circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on the appellate courts declaration that Ms. Lims act of
personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying from Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a
cause of action predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of
human dignity but respect of such dignity. [70] Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lims act of by-passing Mrs.
Filart cannot amount to abusive conduct especially because she did inquire from Mrs. Filarts companion who told her that
Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes.[71] If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment which, if done with good intentions,
cannot amount to bad faith.
Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko be made answerable
for exemplary damages[72] especially for the reason stated by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held

Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt because of the latters lowly station in life. This has to be limited somewhere.
In a democracy, such a limit must be established. Social equality is not sought by the legal provisions under consideration, but due
regard for decency and propriety (Code Commission, pp. 33-34). And by way of example or correction for public good and to avert
further commission of such acts, exemplary damages should be imposed upon appellees. [73]

The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted findings is that it runs counter with the very facts of the case and the evidence
on hand. It is not disputed that at the time of the incident in question, Mr. Reyes was an actor of long standing; a co-host of
a radio program over DZRH; a Board Member of the Music Singer Composer (MUSICO) chaired by popular singer Imelda
Papin; a showbiz Coordinator of Citizen Crime Watch; and 1992 official candidate of the KBL Party for Governor of Bohol;
and an awardee of a number of humanitarian organizations of the Philippines. [74] During his direct examination on rebuttal,
Mr. Reyes stressed that he had income[75] and nowhere did he say otherwise. On the other hand, the records are bereft of
any information as to the social and economic standing of petitioner Ruby Lim. Consequently, the conclusion reached by
the appellate court cannot withstand scrutiny as it is without basis.
All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered
through Ms. Lims exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and its Resolution dated 09 July 2002 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, dated 26 April 1999 is hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 142943. April 3, 2002]

Spouses ANTONIO and LORNA QUISUMBING, petitioners, vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY
(MERALCO), respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Under the law, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) may immediately disconnect electric service on the ground of
alleged meter tampering, but only if the discovery of the cause is personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the
law or by a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the February 1, 2000 Decision [1] and
the April 10, 2000 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 49022. The decretal portion of the said
Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision in Civil Case No. Q-95-23219 is hereby SET ASIDE and the complaint against defendant-
appellant MERALCO is hereby DISMISSED. Plaintiffs-appellees are hereby ORDERED to pay defendant-appellant MERALCO the
differential billing of P193,332.00 representing the value of used but unregistered electrical consumption. [3]

The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

 The Facts

The facts of the case are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:

Defendant-appellant Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a private corporation, authorized by law to charge all persons,
including the government, for the consumption of electric power at rates duly authorized and approved by the Board of Energy (now
the Energy Regulatory Board).

Plaintiffs-appellees Spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are owners of a house and lot located at No. 94 Greenmeadows Avenue,
Quezon City, which they bought on April 7, 1994 from Ms. Carmina Serapio Santos. They alleged to be business entrepreneurs
engaged in the export of furnitures under the business name Loran Industries and recipient of the 1993 Agora Award and 1994 Golden
Shell Award.Mrs. Quisumbing is a member of the Innerwheel Club while Mr. Quisumbing is a member of the Rotary Club, Chairman
of Cebu Chamber of Commerce, and Director of Chamber of Furniture.

On March 3, 1995 at around 9:00 a.m., defendant-appellants inspectors headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a
routine-on-the-spot inspection of all single phase meters at Greenmeadows Avenue. House no. 94 of Block 8, Lot 19 Greenmeadows
Avenue owned by plaintiffs-appellees was inspected after observing a standard operating procedure of asking permission from
plaintiffs-appellees, through their secretary which was granted. The secretary witnessed the inspection. After the inspection,
defendant-appellants inspectors discovered that the terminal seal of the meter was missing; the meter cover seal was deformed; the
meter dials of the meter was mis-aligned and there were scratches on the meter base plate. Defendant-appellants inspectors relayed the
matter to plaintiffs-appellees secretary, who in turn relayed the same to plaintiff-appellee, Lorna Quisumbing, who was outraged of
the result of the inspection and denied liability as to the tampering of the meter. Plaintiffs-appellees were advised by defendant-
appellants inspectors that they had to detach the meter and bring it to their laboratory for verification/confirmation of their findings. In
the event the meter turned out to be tampered, defendant-appellant had to temporarily disconnect the electric services of plaintiffs-
appellees. The laboratory testing conducted on the meter has the following findings to wit:

1. Terminal seal was missing.

2. Lead cover seals (90 ERB 1-Meralco 21) were tampered by forcibly pulling out from the sealing wire.

3. The 1000th, 100th and 10th dial pointers of the register were found out of alignment and with circular scratches at
the face of the register which indicates that the meter had been opened to manipulate the said dial pointers and set
manually to the desired reading. In addition to this, the meter terminal blades were found full of scratches.

After an hour, defendant-appellants head inspector, E. Orlina returned to the residence of plaintiffs-appellees and informed them that
the meter had been tampered and unless they pay the amount of P178,875.01 representing the differential billing, their electric supply
would be disconnected. Orlina informed plaintiffs-appellees that they were just following their standard operating
procedure. Plaintiffs-appellees were further advised that questions relative to the results of the inspection as well as the disconnection
of her electrical services for Violation of Contract (VOC) may be settled with Mr. M. Manuson of the Special Accounts, Legal Service
Department. However, on the same day at around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon defendant-appellants officer through a two-way radio
instructed its service inspector headed by Mr. Orlino to reconnect plaintiffs-appellees electric service which the latter faithfully
complied.

On March 6, 1995, plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, despite the immediate reconnection, to order defendant-appellant to furnish electricity to the plaintiffs-appellees alleging
that defendant-appellant acted with wanton, capricious, malicious and malevolent manner in disconnecting their power supply which
was done without due process, and without due regard for their rights, feelings, peace of mind, social and business reputation.

In its Answer, defendant-appellant admitted disconnecting the electric service at the plaintiffs-appellees house but denied liability
citing the Terms and Conditions of Service, and Republic Act No. 7832 otherwise known as Anti-Electricity and Electric
Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994.

After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment, ruling in favor of plaintiffs-appellees.[4] (Citations omitted)

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court held that Meralco (herein respondent) should have given the Quisumbing spouses (herein petitioners)
ample opportunity to dispute the alleged meter tampering.
It held that respondent had acted summarily and without procedural due process in immediately disconnecting the
electric service of petitioners. Respondents action, ruled the RTC, constituted a quasi delict.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals overturned the trial courts ruling and dismissed the Complaint. It held that respondents
representatives had acted in good faith when they disconnected petitioners electric service. Citing testimonial and
documentary evidence, it ruled that the disconnection was made only after observing due process. Further, it noted that
petitioners had not been able to prove their claim for damages. The appellate court likewise upheld respondents
counterclaim for the billing differential in the amount of P193,332[5] representing the value of petitioners used but
unregistered electrical consumption, which had been established without being controverted.
Hence, this Petition.[6]
 The Issues

In their Memorandum,[7] petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:

4.1 Whether a prima facie presumption of tampering of electrical meter enumerated under Sec. 4 (a) iv of RA 7832 (Anti-Electricity
and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994) may be had despite the absence of an ERB representative or an
officer of the law?

4.2 Whether the enumeration of instances to establish a prima facie presumption of tampering of electrical meter enumerated under
Sec. 4 (a) iv of RA 7832 (Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994) is exclusive?

4.3 What constitutes notice prior to disconnection of electricity service? Corollarily, whether the definition of notice under Meralco v.
Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 243) applies to the case at bar?

4.4 Whether a prima facie presumption may contradict logic?

4.5 Whether documentary proof is pre-requisite for award of damages?[8]

In sum, this Petition raises three (3) main issues which this Court will address: (1) whether respondent observed the
requisites of law when it disconnected the electrical supply of petitioners, (2) whether such disconnection entitled petitioners
to damages, and (3) whether petitioners are liable for the billing differential computed by respondent.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:
Compliance with Requisites of Law

Petitioners contend that the immediate disconnection of electrical service was not validly effected because of
respondents noncompliance with the relevant provisions of RA 7832, the Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission
Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994. They insist that the immediate disconnection of electrical supply may only be validly
effected only when there is prima facie evidence of its illegal use. To constitute prima facie evidence, the discovery of the
illegal use must be personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the
Energy Regulatory Board (ERB).
Respondent, on the other hand, points out that the issue raised by petitioners is a question of fact which this Court
cannot pass upon. It argues further that this issue, which was not raised in the court below, can no longer be taken up for
the first time on appeal. Assuming arguendo that the issue was raised below, it also contends that petitioners were not able
to specifically prove the absence of an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the ERB when the discovery
was made.

Prima facie Evidence of Illegal Use of Electricity

We agree with petitioners. Section 4 of RA 7832 states:

(a) The presence of any of the following circumstances shall constitute prima facie evidence of illegal use of
electricity, as defined in this Act, by the person benefited thereby, and shall be the basis for: (1) the immediate
disconnection by the electric utility to such person after due notice, x x x
xxxxxxxxx

(viii) x x x Provided, however, That the discovery of any of the foregoing circumstances, in order to constitute prima
facie evidence, must be personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB).[9] (Italics supplied)

Under the above provision, the prima facie presumption that will authorize immediate disconnection will arise only upon
the satisfaction of certain requisites. One of these requisites is the personal witnessing and attestation by an officer of the
law or by an authorized ERB representative when the discovery was made.
As a rule, this Court reviews only questions of law, not of facts. However, it may pass upon the evidence when the
factual findings of the trial court are different from those of the Court of Appeals, as in this case. [10]
A careful review of the evidence on record negates the appellate courts holding that the actions of defendant-appellants
service inspectors were all in accord with the requirement of the law.[11]
Respondents own witnesses provided the evidence on who were actually present when the inspection was
made. Emmanuel C. Orlino, the head of the Meralco team, testified:
Q When you were conducting this inspection, and you discovered these findings you testified earlier, who was
present?
A The secretary, sir.[12]
 ATTY. REYES - Who else were the members of your team that conducted this inspection at Greenmeadows
Avenue on that day, March 3, 1995?
A The composition of the team, sir?
Q Yes.
A Including me, we are about four (4) inspectors, sir.
Q You were four (4)?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who is the head of this team?
A I was the head of the team, sir.[13]
Further, Catalino A. Macaraig, the area head of the Orlino team, stated that only Meralco personnel had been present
during the inspection:
Q By the way you were not there at Green Meadows on that day, right?
A Yes, sir.
Q Only Mr. Orlino and who else were there?
A Two or three of his men.
Q All members of the inspection team?
A Yes, sir.[14]
These testimonies clearly show that at the time the alleged meter tampering was discovered, only the Meralco
inspection team and petitioners secretary were present. Plainly, there was no officer of the law or ERB representative at
that time. Because of the absence of government representatives, the prima facie authority to disconnect, granted to
Meralco by RA 7832, cannot apply.
Neither can respondent find solace in the fact that petitioners secretary was present at the time the inspection was
made. The law clearly states that for the prima facie evidence to apply, the discovery must be personally witnessed and
attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB). [15] Had the
law intended the presence of the owner or his/her representative to suffice, then it should have said so. Embedded in our
jurisprudence is the rule that courts may not construe a statute that is free from doubt. [16] Where the law is clear and
unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts have no choice but to see to it that the mandate is
obeyed.[17]
In fact, during the Senate deliberations on RA 7832, Senator John H. Osmea, its author, stressed the need for the
presence of government officers during inspections of electric meters.He said:

Mr. President, if a utility like MERALCO finds certain circumstances or situations which are listed in Section 2 of this bill to be prima
facie evidence, I think they should be prudent enough to bring in competent authority, either the police or the NBI, to verify or
substantiate their finding. If they were to summarily proceed to disconnect on the basis of their findings and later on there would be a
court case and the customer or the user would deny the existence of what is listed in Section 2, then they could be in a lot of
trouble.[18] (Italics supplied)

Neither can we accept respondents argument that when the alleged tampered meter was brought to Meralcos
laboratory for testing, there was already an ERB representative present.
The law says that before immediate disconnection may be allowed, the discovery of the illegal use of electricity must
have been personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or by an authorized ERB representative. In this
case, the disconnection was effected immediately after the discovery of the alleged meter tampering, which was witnessed
only by Meralcos employees. That the ERB representative was allegedly present when the meter was examined in the
Meralco laboratory will not cure the defect.
It is undisputed that after members of the Meralco team conducted their inspection and found alleged meter tampering,
they immediately disconnected petitioners electrical supply.Again, this verity is culled from the testimony of Meralcos Orlina:
A When she went inside then she came out together with Mrs. Lourdes Quis[u]mbing at that time. We did tell our
findings regarding the meter and the consequence with it. And she was very angry with me.
Q When you say consequence of your findings, what exactly did you tell Mrs. Quisumbing?
A We told her that the service will be temporarily disconnected and that we are referring to our Legal Department
so could know the violation, sir.[19]
A Yes, sir. At that time, I referred her to Mr. Macaraig, sir.
Q What is the first name of this supervisor?
A Mr. Catalino Macara[i]g, sir.
Q Then after talking to Mr. Catalino Macara[i]g, this is over the telephone, what happened?
A The supervisor advised her that the service will be temporarily disconnected and she has to go to our Legal
Department where she could settle the VOC, sir.
Q You are talking of VOC, what is this all about Mr. Orlino?
A VOC is violation of contract, sir.[20]
As to respondents argument that the presence of an authorized ERB representative had not been raised below, it is
clear, however, that the issue of due process was brought up by petitioners as a valid issue in the CA. The presence of
government agents who may authorize immediate disconnections go into the essence of due process. Indeed, we cannot
allow respondent to act virtually as prosecutor and judge in imposing the penalty of disconnection due to alleged meter
tampering. That would not sit well in a democratic country. After all, Meralco is a monopoly that derives its power from the
government. Clothing it with unilateral authority to disconnect would be equivalent to giving it a license to tyrannize its
hapless customers.
Besides, even if not specifically raised, this Court has already ruled that [w]here the issues already raised also rest on
other issues not specifically presented, as long as the latter issues bear relevance and close relation to the former and as
long as they arise from matters on record, the Court has the authority to include them in its discussion of the controversy
as well as to pass upon them.[21]

Contractual Right to Disconnect

Electrical Service

Neither may respondent rely on its alleged contractual right to disconnect electrical service based on Exhibits 10 [22] and
11,[23]
or on Decisions of the Board of Energy (now the Energy Regulatory Board). The relevant portion of these documents
concerns discontinuance of service. It provides:

The Company reserves the right to discontinue service in case the Customer is in arrears in the payment of bills or for failure to pay
the adjusted bills in those cases where the meter stopped or failed to register the correct amount of energy consumed, or for failure to
comply with any of these terms and conditions, or in case of or to prevent fraud upon the Company. Before disconnection is made in
case of or to prevent fraud, the Company may adjust the bill of said Customer accordingly and if the adjusted bill is not paid, the
Company may disconnect the same. In case of disconnection, the provisions of Revised Order No. 1 of the former Public Service
Commission (now the Board of Energy) shall be observed. Any such suspension of service shall not terminate the contract between
the Company and the Customer.[24]

Petitioners situation can fall under disconnection only in case of or to prevent fraud upon the Company. However, this
too has requisites before a disconnection may be made. An adjusted bill shall be prepared, and only upon failure to pay it
may the company discontinue service. This is also true in regard to the provisions of Revised Order No. 1 of the former
Public Service Commission, which requires a 48-hour written notice before a disconnection may be justified. In the instant
case, these requisites were obviously not complied with.

Second Issue
Damages

Having ruled that the immediate disconnection effected by Meralco lacks legal, factual or contractual basis, we will now
pass upon on the right of petitioners to recover damages for the improper disconnection.
Petitioners are asking for the reinstatement of the RTC Decision, which awarded them actual, moral and exemplary
damages as well as attorneys fees. All these were overturned by the CA.
As to actual damages, we agree with the CA that competent proof is necessary before our award may be made. The
appellate court ruled as follows:

Considering further, it is a settled rule that in order for damages to be recovered, the best evidence obtainable by the injured party
must be presented. Actual and compensatory damages cannot be presumed but must be duly proved and proved with reasonable
degree and certainty. A court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guess work as to the fact and amount of damages, but must
depend upon competent proof that they have been suffered and on evidence of actual amount thereof. If the proof is flimsy and
unsubstantial, no damages will be awarded.[25]

Actual damages are compensation for an injury that will put the injured party in the position where it was before it was
injured.[26] They pertain to such injuries or losses that are actually sustained and susceptible of measurement. [27] Except as
provided by law or by stipulation, a party is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss as it has duly
proven.[28]
Basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, not only must the amount of loss be capable of proof; it must also be
actually proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or the best evidence obtainable.[29]
Petitioners claim for actual damages was premised only upon Lorna Quisumbings bare testimony as follows:
A Actually that da[y] I was really scheduled to go to that furniture exhibit. That furniture exhibit is only once a year.
Q What is this furniture exhibit?
A The SITEM, that is a government agency that takes care of exporters and exclusive marketing of our products
around the world. We always have that once a year and thats the time when all our buyers are here for us to
show what we had that was exhibited to go around. So, my husband had to [fly] from Cebu to Manila just for
this occasion. So we have an appointment with our people and our buyers with SITEM and also that evening
we will have to treat them [to] dinner.
Q Whereat?
A At our residence, we were supposed to have a dinner at our residence.
Q What happened to this occasion?
A So when they disconnected our electric power we had to get in touch with them and change the venue.
Q Which venue did you transfer your dinner for your buyers?
 A We brought them in a restaurant in Makati at Seasons Restaurant. But it was very embar[r]assing for us because
we faxed them ahead of time before they came to Manila.
Q Now as a result of this change of your schedule because of the disconnection of the electric power on that day,
Friday, what damage did you suffer?
A I cancelled the catering service and that is so much of a h[a]ssle it was so embarras[s]ing for us.
Q Can you tell us how much amount?
A Approximately P50,000.00.[30]
No other evidence has been proffered to substantiate her bare statements. She has not shown how she arrived at the
amount of P50,000; it is, at best, speculative. Her self-serving testimonial evidence, if it may be called such, is insufficient
to support alleged actual damages.
While respondent does not rebut this testimony on the expenses incurred by the spouses in moving the dinner out of
their residence due to the disconnection, no receipts covering such expenditures have been adduced in evidence. Neither
is the testimony corroborated. To reiterate, actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly proved
with a reasonable degree of certainty. It is dependent upon competent proof of damages that petitioners have suffered and
of the actual amount thereof.[31] The award must be based on the evidence presented, not on the personal knowledge of
the court; and certainly not on flimsy, remote, speculative and unsubstantial proof. [32] Consequently, we uphold the CA ruling
denying the grant of actual damages.
Having said that, we agree with the trial court, however, that petitioners are entitled to moral damages, albeit in a
reduced amount.
The RTC opined as follows:

This Court agrees with the defendant regarding [its] right by law and equity to protect itself from any fraud. However, such right
should not be exercised arbitrarily but with great caution and with due regard to the rights of the consumers. Meralco having a virtual
monopoly of the supply of electric power should refrain from taking drastic actions against the consumers without observing due
process. Even assuming that the subject meter has had history of meter tampering, defendant cannot simply assume that the present
occupants are the ones responsible for such tampering. Neither does it serve as a license to deprive the plaintiffs of their right to due
process. Defendant should have given the plaintiffs simple opportunity to dispute the electric charges brought about by the alleged
meter-tampering, which were not included in the bill rendered them. Procedural due process requires reasonable notice to pay the bill
and reasonable notice to discontinue supply. Absent due process the defendant may be held liable for damages. While this Court is
aware of the practice of unscrupulous individuals of stealing electric curre[n]t which causes thousands if not millions of pesos in lost
revenue to electric companies, this does not give the defendant the right to trample upon the rights of the consumers by denying them
due process.[33]

Article 2219 of the Civil Code lists the instances when moral damages may be recovered. One such case[34] is when
the rights of individuals, including the right against deprivation of property without due process of law, are violated. [35]
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.[36]Although incapable of pecuniary computation, such damages
may be recovered if they are the proximate results of the defendants wrongful act or omission.[37]
Case law establishes the following requisites for the award of moral damages: (1) there is an injury -- whether physical,
mental or psychological -- clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) there is a culpable act or omission factually established; (3)
the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the
award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.[38]
To reiterate, respondent had no legal right to immediately disconnect petitioners electrical supply without observing the
requisites of law which, in turn, are akin to due process. Had respondent been more circumspect and prudent, petitioners
could have been given the opportunity to controvert the initial finding of alleged meter tampering. Said the RTC:

More seriously, the action of the defendant in maliciously disconnecting the electric service constitutes a breach of public policy. For
public utilities, broad as their powers are, have a clear duty to see to it that they do not violate nor transgress the rights of the
consumers. Any act on their part that militates against the ordinary norms of justice and fair play is considered an infraction that gives
rise to an action for damages. Such is the case at bar.[39]

Indeed, the Supreme Court has ruled in Meralco v. CA[40] that respondent is required to give notice of disconnection to
an alleged delinquent customer. The Court said:

x x x One can not deny the vital role which a public utility such as MERALCO, having a monopoly of the supply of electrical power
in Metro Manila and some nearby municipalities, plays in the life of people living in such areas. Electricity has become a necessity to
most people in these areas, justifying the exercise by the State of its regulatory power over the business of supplying electrical service
to the public, in which petitioner MERALCO is engaged. Thus, the state may regulate, as it has done through Section 97 of the
Revised Order No. 1 of the Public Service Commission, the conditions under which and the manner by which a public utility such as
MERALCO may effect a disconnection of service to a delinquent customer. Among others, a prior written notice to the customer is
required before disconnection of the service. Failure to give such prior notice amounts to a tort. [41]

Observance of the rights of our people is sacred in our society. We cannot allow such rights to be trifled with or
trivialized. Although the Court sympathizes with respondents efforts to stamp out the illegal use of electricity, such action
must be done only with strict observance of the rights of our people. As has been we succinctly said: there is a right way to
do the right thing at the right time for the right reason.[42]
However, the amount of moral damages, which is left largely to the sound discretion of the courts, should be granted
in reasonable amounts, considering the attendant facts and circumstances. [43] Moral damages, though incapable of
pecuniary estimation, are designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a
penalty.[44] Moral damages are not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. [45] They are awarded only
to obtain a means, a diversion or an amusement that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering the injured party has
undergone by reason of the defendants culpable action.[46] They must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.[47]
 It is clear from the records that respondent was able to restore the electrical supply of petitioners on the same
day. Verily, the inconvenience and anxiety they suffered as a result of the disconnection was thereafter corrected. Thus, we
reduce the RTCs grant of moral damages to the more equitable amount of P100,000.
Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good in addition
to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.[48] It is not given to enrich one party and impoverish another, but
to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to socially deleterious actions. [49] In this case, to serve an example
-- that before a disconnection of electrical supply can be effected by a public utility like Meralco, the requisites of law must
be faithfully complied with -- we award the amount of P50,000 to petitioners.
Finally, with the award of exemplary damages, the award of attorneys fees is likewise granted. [50] It is readily apparent
that petitioners needed the services of a lawyer to argue their cause, even to the extent of elevating the matter to this
Court;[51] thus, an award of P50,000 is considered sufficient.

Final Issue:
Billing Differential

Finally, this Court holds that despite the basis for the award of damages -- the lack of due process in immediately
disconnecting petitioners electrical supply -- respondents counterclaim for the billing differential is still proper. We agree
with the CA that respondent should be given what it rightfully deserves. The evidence it presented, both documentary and
testimonial, sufficiently proved the amount of the differential.
Not only did respondent show how the meter examination had been conducted by its experts, but it also established
the amount of P193,332.96 that petitioners owed respondent. The procedure through which this amount was arrived at was
testified to by Meralcos Senior Billing Computer Enrique Katipunan. His testimony was corroborated by documentary
evidence showing the accounts billing history and the corresponding computations. Neither do we doubt the documents of
inspections and examinations presented by respondent to prove that, indeed there had been meter tampering that resulted
in unrecorded and unpaid electrical consumption.
The mere presentation by petitioners of a Contract to Sell with Assumption of Mortgage [52] does not necessarily mean
that they are no longer liable for the billing differential. There was no sufficient evidence to show that they had not been
actually residing in the house before the date of the said document. Lorna Quisumbing herself admitted[53] that they did not
have any contract for electrical service in their own name. Hence, petitioners effectively assumed the bills of the former
occupants of the premises.
Finally, the CA was correct in ruling that the convincing documentary and testimonial evidence presented by
respondent, was not controverted by petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed CA Decision is MODIFIED as
follows: petitioners are ORDERED to pay respondent the billing differential of P193,332.96; while respondent is ordered to
pay petitioners P100,000 as moral damages, P50,000 as exemplary damages, and P50,000 as attorneys fees. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., abroad on official business.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.

Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.

Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set aside the Decision1 of the
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of Branch 38
(Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or
not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.

The antecedents of this case are not complicated:

On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a
complaint2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in
said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and
reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano
Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern
Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on
the condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which
was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to
secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano
Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's
attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she
sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of
the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the
petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the
petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting
to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The
complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.

In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as averred in the
complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that
he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent; he neither sought the consent and
approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to
his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no
confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is
baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur
expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for
miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.

After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order4 embodying the stipulated facts
which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:

1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the defendant is
single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1,
1987 up to the present;

2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan City, College of Medicine,
second year medicine proper;

3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City
since July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school graduate;

4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the Mabuhay Luncheonette,
Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3, 1986.

After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a
decision5 favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees;
the dispositive portion of the decision reads:

IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant.

1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as
moral damages.

2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as
atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.

3. All other claims are denied.6

The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private respondent were
lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual
advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d)
because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that
deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made
some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens,
inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such
acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality,
good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony because, inter
alia, she would not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public
scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.7

The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the evidence for the private respondent in
the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows:

According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she never had a boyfriend
before, defendant started courting her just a few days after they first met. He later proposed marriage to
her several times and she accepted his love as well as his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987, on
 which same day he went with her to her hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to
meet her parents and inform them of their relationship and their intention to get married. The photographs
Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of defendant with members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff,
were taken that day. Also on that occasion, defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that
he intended to marry her during the semestral break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents
thought he was good and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for him to marry their daughter, and
they likewise allowed him to stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during the few days that they were
in Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live together
in defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's
hands and feet while he went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that
made her sleep the whole day and night until the following day. As a result of this live-in relationship,
plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff
continued to live with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her that
he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff
left defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the
barangay captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the
barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still convince him to marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted
that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as
stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.

Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed them of his desire to
marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the reception by
looking for pigs and chickens, and even already invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming
wedding. 8

Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV
No. 24256. In his Brief,9 he contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal
basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.

On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of
16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the following analysis:

First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was already 29 years old at the
time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her
unfortunate experience with defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower court,
a barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of modern urban life", and certainly would (sic) not have
allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise made by the defendant to
marry her." In fact, we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and defendant must have been sweethearts
or so the plaintiff must have thought because of the deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would not
have allowed herself to be photographed with defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as
those depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore, defendant's pretense that
plaintiff was a nobody to him except a waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact
admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the
town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party together with the
manager and employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1,
1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to marry her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.).
Would defendant have left Dagupan City where he was involved in the serious study of medicine to go to
plaintiff's hometown in Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of special relationship
between them? And this special relationship must indeed have led to defendant's insincere proposal of
marriage to plaintiff, communicated not only to her but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the
owner of the restaurant where plaintiff was working and where defendant first proposed marriage to her,
also knew of this love affair and defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the
reason why plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant's proposal
(pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).

Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral character and must think so
low and have so little respect and regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted that when he studied
in Bacolod City for several years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he came to Dagupan City to
study medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other words, he also lived with another
woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising,
then, that he felt so little compunction or remorse in pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff, a
young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her. 11

and then concluded:

In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood
to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was
likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their
daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as these acts of appellant are
palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and
deeply derogatory and insulting to our women, coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying
the hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our institutions of
learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
to compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered
him to do in its decision in this case. 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises therein the single issue of
whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13

It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral wrong or injury or
violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private respondent; and
he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and
ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an
Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a promise to
marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then
alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis
thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not posses good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common
law life" is now his legal wife as their marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his
unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for
the live-in relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally,
petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private
respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of
the case. The mere breach of promise is not actionable. 14

On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and the petitioner had filed his
Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda,
which they subsequently complied with.

As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear that
questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this
jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court
having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner of testifying,
unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might affect the result of the
case. 15

Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact of
substance or values which could alter the result of the case.

Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the
parties before the lower court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina
vs.Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin
v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurb or
impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v.
People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v.
Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30,
1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and
Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals,
33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents
(Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).

Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted exceptions in this case.
Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts must be respected.

And now to the legal issue.

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately
eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth
in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:

The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been
definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise suits in the
United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by
designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of rights of
action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the American states. . . . 19

This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts
or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20

As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:

But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive
law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral
 wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has
deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:

Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.

An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old daughter
of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes
pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age. Neither
can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral
wrong has been committed, and though the girl and family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she
and her parents cannot bring action for damages. But under the proposed article, she and her parents
would have such a right of action.

Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal
remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for
specifically in the statutes. 21

Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in
Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law
concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international
criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the
Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and
malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or
omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums are
injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that
vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly
broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-
American law on torts. 23

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to
marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in
reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or
inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to
Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her
honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for
and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the
honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's
part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In
short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of
lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The
petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised
Penal Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.

Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry where the
woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,25 this Court denied recovery of
damages to the woman because:

. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is
approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant — who was around thirty-six (36) years of
age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed
to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because the
court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed
by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had
the benefit of clergy.

In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if there had been moral
seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not convinced that such seduction existed. The following
enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case:

The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission's
memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had been seduced. The essential feature is seduction,
that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes
essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the
seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil.
595).
 It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —

To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or

inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If
she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is
no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56) She must be induced to depart from
the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are
calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in her person to ultimately
submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).

And in American Jurisprudence we find:

On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is
the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a
recovery.

Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire of
curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for
the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such
cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a reward for
unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)

xxx xxx xxx

Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959,
the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain intimate sexual relations with appellant, with
repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is
here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered
exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have
again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged
promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not
intend to fulfill his defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is made
under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by
the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint. 27

In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from this Court, opined
that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be recovered:

. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima
vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56
(sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE
be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there
was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be the other way
around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, because here mutual lust has intervened). . . .

together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the wedding presentations (See
Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).

Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:

It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists, notwithstanding the incorporation of the
present article31 in the Code. The example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there
was seduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But when the
sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or
influence, but the woman, already of age, has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said that
there is an injury which can be the basis for indemnity.

But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the action lies. The court,
however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the woman under the circumstances,
because an act which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as to an
experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful act and a resulting injury, there
should be civil liability, even if the act is not punishable under the criminal law and there should have
been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.

We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for argument's sake, that he
did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both parties are
in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the
private respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as stating that if the private
respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her own doing, 33 for:

. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor sooner or later. Take notice
that she is a plain high school graduate and a mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51,
January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can give her economic
security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this
predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may have been offered by the petitioner. 34
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a condescending, if not
sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational background,
poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all
moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not have even remotely
occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe,
entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life's
partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his
proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated
the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be
said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs
every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his obligations.

No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.

The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not have been impelled by
the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral
seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out
that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the
petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35At most, it could
be conceded that she is merely in delicto.

Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his transgression has been
brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong
principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by
fraud. 36

In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:

Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no action by one against the
other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been interpreted as applicable only where the
fault on both sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is literate or intelligent
and the other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).

We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that this Court condones the
deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in their house after
giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon
them the higher values of morality and dignity.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, with costs
against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 88694 January 11, 1993

ALBENSON ENTERPRISES CORP., JESSE YAP, AND BENJAMIN MENDIONA, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND EUGENIO S. BALTAO, respondents.

Puruganan, Chato, Chato & Tan for petitioners.

Lino M. Patajo, Francisco Ma. Chanco, Ananiano Desierto and Segundo Mangohig for private respondent.

BIDIN, J.:

This petition assails the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in

CA-GR CV No. 14948 entitled "Eugenio S. Baltao, plaintiff-appellee vs. Albenson Enterprises Corporation, et al,
defendants-appellants", which modified the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch XCVIII in Civil
Case No. Q-40920 and ordered petitioner to pay private respondent, among others, the sum of P500,000.00 as moral
damages and attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00.
The facts are not disputed.

In September, October, and November 1980, petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation (Albenson for short) delivered
to Guaranteed Industries, Inc. (Guaranteed for short) located at 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, the mild steel
plates which the latter ordered. As part payment thereof, Albenson was given Pacific Banking Corporation Check No.
136361 in the amount of P2,575.00 and drawn against the account of E.L. Woodworks (Rollo, p. 148).

When presented for payment, the check was dishonored for the reason "Account Closed." Thereafter, petitioner
Albenson, through counsel, traced the origin of the dishonored check. From the records of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), Albenson discovered that the president of Guaranteed, the recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates,
was one "Eugenio S. Baltao." Upon further inquiry, Albenson was informed by the Ministry of Trade and Industry that E.L.
Woodworks, a single proprietorship business, was registered in the name of one "Eugenio Baltao". In addition, upon
verification with the drawee bank, Pacific Banking Corporation, Albenson was advised that the signature appearing on the
subject check belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao."

After obtaining the foregoing information, Albenson, through counsel, made an extrajudicial demand upon private
respondent Eugenio S. Baltao, president of Guaranteed, to replace and/or make good the dishonored check.

Respondent Baltao, through counsel, denied that he issued the check, or that the signature appearing thereon is his. He
further alleged that Guaranteed was a defunct entity and hence, could not have transacted business with Albenson.

On February 14, 1983, Albenson filed with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a complaint against Eugenio S.
Baltao for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Submitted to support said charges was an affidavit of petitioner
Benjamin Mendiona, an employee of Albenson. In said affidavit, the above-mentioned circumstances were stated.

It appears, however, that private respondent has a namesake, his son Eugenio Baltao III, who manages a business
establishment, E.L. Woodworks, on the ground floor of the Baltao Building, 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, the
very same business address of Guaranteed.

On September 5, 1983, Assistant Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an information against Eugenio S. Baltao for Violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. In filing said information, Fiscal Sumaway claimed that he had given Eugenio S. Baltao
opportunity to submit controverting evidence, but the latter failed to do so and therefore, was deemed to have waived his
right.

Respondent Baltao, claiming ignorance of the complaint against him, immediately filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a
motion for reinvestigation, alleging that it was not true that he had been given an opportunity to be heard in the preliminary
investigation conducted by Fiscal Sumaway, and that he never had any dealings with Albenson or Benjamin Mendiona,
consequently, the check for which he has been accused of having issued without funds was not issued by him and the
signature in said check was not his.

On January 30, 1984, Provincial Fiscal Mauro M. Castro of Rizal reversed the finding of Fiscal Sumaway and exonerated
respondent Baltao. He also instructed the Trial Fiscal to move for dismissal of the information filed against Eugenio S.
Baltao. Fiscal Castro found that the signature in PBC Check No. 136361 is not the signature of Eugenio S. Baltao. He
also found that there is no showing in the records of the preliminary investigation that Eugenio S. Baltao actually received
notice of the said investigation. Fiscal Castro then castigated Fiscal Sumaway for failing to exercise care and prudence in
the performance of his duties, thereby causing injustice to respondent who was not properly notified of the complaint
against him and of the requirement to submit his counter evidence.

Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him for allegedly issuing a check which bounced in violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 for a measly amount of P2,575.00, respondent Baltao filed before the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City a complaint for damages against herein petitioners Albenson Enterprises, Jesse Yap, its owner, and
Benjamin Mendiona, its employee.

In its decision, the lower court observed that "the check is drawn against the account of "E.L. Woodworks," not of
Guaranteed Industries of which plaintiff used to be President. Guaranteed Industries had been inactive and had ceased to
exist as a corporation since 1975. . . . . The possibility is that it was with Gene Baltao or Eugenio Baltao III, a son of
plaintiff who had a business on the ground floor of Baltao Building located on V. Mapa Street, that the defendants may
have been dealing with . . . ." (Rollo, pp. 41-42).

The dispositive portion of the trial court 's decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendants ordering the latter
to pay plaintiff jointly and severally:

1. actual or compensatory damages of P133,350.00;

2. moral damages of P1,000,000.00 (1 million pesos);

3. exemplary damages of P200,000.00;

4. attorney's fees of P100,000.00;

5 costs.

Defendants' counterclaim against plaintiff and claim for damages against Mercantile Insurance Co. on the
bond for the issuance of the writ of attachment at the instance of plaintiff are hereby dismissed for lack of
merit. (Rollo, pp. 38-39).
On appeal, respondent court modified the trial court's decision as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED by reducing the moral damages awarded
therein from P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00 and the attorney's fees from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00, said
decision being hereby affirmed in all its other aspects. With costs against appellants. (Rollo, pp. 50-51)

Dissatisfied with the above ruling, petitioners Albenson Enterprises Corp., Jesse Yap, and Benjamin Mendiona filed the
instant Petition, alleging that the appellate court erred in:

1. Concluding that private respondent's cause of action is not one based on malicious prosecution but
one for abuse of rights under Article 21 of the Civil Code notwithstanding the fact that the basis of a civil
action for malicious prosecution is Article 2219 in relation to Article 21 or Article 2176 of the Civil Code . . .
.

2. Concluding that "hitting at and in effect maligning (private respondent) with an unjust criminal case
was, without more, a plain case of abuse of rights by misdirection" and "was therefore, actionable by
itself," and which "became inordinately blatant and grossly aggravated when . . . (private respondent) was
deprived of his basic right to notice and a fair hearing in the so-called preliminary investigation . . . . "

3. Concluding that petitioner's "actuations in this case were coldly deliberate and calculated", no evidence
having been adduced to support such a sweeping statement.

4. Holding the petitioner corporation, petitioner Yap and petitioner Mendiona jointly and severally liable
without sufficient basis in law and in fact.

5. Awarding respondents —

5.1. P133,350.00 as actual or compensatory damages, even in the absence of sufficient

evidence to show that such was actually suffered.

5.2. P500,000.00 as moral damages considering that the evidence in this connection
merely involved private respondent's alleged celebrated status as a businessman, there
being no showing that the act complained of adversely affected private respondent's
reputation or that it resulted to material loss.

5.3. P200,000.00 as exemplary damages despite the fact that petitioners were duly
advised by counsel of their legal recourse.

5.4. P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, no evidence having been adduced to justify such an
award (Rollo, pp. 4-6).

Petitioners contend that the civil case filed in the lower court was one for malicious prosecution. Citing the case of Madera
vs. Lopez (102 SCRA 700 [1981]), they assert that the absence of malice on their part absolves them from any liability for
malicious prosecution. Private respondent, on the other hand, anchored his complaint for Damages on Articles 19, 20,
and 21 ** of the Civil Code.

Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which
may be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are
the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore,
recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19
must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless
become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer
must be held responsible. Although the requirements of each provision is different, these three (3) articles are all related
to each other. As the eminent Civilist Senator Arturo Tolentino puts it: "With this article (Article 21), combined with articles
19 and 20, the scope of our law on civil wrongs has been very greatly broadened; it has become much more supple and
adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. It is now difficult to conceive of any malevolent exercise of a right which
could not be checked by the application of these articles" (Tolentino, 1 Civil Code of the Philippines 72).

There is however, no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine whether or not the principle of abuse of rights
may be invoked. The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated, resulting in damages
under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. (Globe Mackay
Cable and Radio Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 778 [1989]).

The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for
all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own sanction (Tolentino, supra, p. 71). Thus, anyone
who, whether willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, causes damage to another, shall indemnify
his victim for injuries suffered thereby. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements: 1)
There is an act which is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and it is
done with intent to injure.

Thus, under any of these three (3) provisions of law, an act which causes injury to another may be made the basis for an
award of damages.

There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act must be intentional. However, Article 20 does
not distinguish: the act may be done either "willfully", or "negligently". The trial court as well as the respondent appellate
court mistakenly lumped these three (3) articles together, and cited the same as the bases for the award of damages in
the civil complaint filed against petitioners, thus:

With the foregoing legal provisions (Articles 19, 20, and 21) in focus, there is not much difficulty in
ascertaining the means by which appellants' first assigned error should be resolved, given the admitted
fact that when there was an attempt to collect the amount of P2,575.00, the defendants were explicitly
warned that plaintiff Eugenio S. Baltao is not the Eugenio Baltao defendants had been dealing with
(supra, p. 5). When the defendants nevertheless insisted and persisted in filing a case — a criminal case
no less — against plaintiff, said defendants ran afoul of the legal provisions (Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the
Civil Code) cited by the lower court and heretofore quoted (supra).

Defendants, not having been paid the amount of P2,575.00, certainly had the right to complain. But that
right is limited by certain constraints. Beyond that limit is the area of excess, of abuse of rights. (Rollo, pp.
44-45).

Assuming, arguendo, that all the three (3) articles, together and not independently of each one, could be validly made the
bases for an award of damages based on the principle of "abuse of right", under the circumstances, We see no cogent
reason for such an award of damages to be made in favor of private respondent.

Certainly, petitioners could not be said to have violated the aforestated principle of abuse of right. What prompted
petitioners to file the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against private respondent was their failure to collect
the amount of P2,575.00 due on a bounced check which they honestly believed was issued to them by private
respondent. Petitioners had conducted inquiries regarding the origin of the check, and yielded the following results: from
the records of the Securities and Exchange Commission, it was discovered that the President of Guaranteed (the recipient
of the unpaid mild steel plates), was one "Eugenio S. Baltao"; an inquiry with the Ministry of Trade and Industry revealed
that E.L. Woodworks, against whose account the check was drawn, was registered in the name of one "Eugenio Baltao";
verification with the drawee bank, the Pacific Banking Corporation, revealed that the signature appearing on the check
belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao".

In a letter dated December 16, 1983, counsel for petitioners wrote private respondent demanding that he make good the
amount of the check. Counsel for private respondent wrote back and denied, among others, that private respondent ever
transacted business with Albenson Enterprises Corporation; that he ever issued the check in question. Private
respondent's counsel even went further: he made a warning to defendants to check the veracity of their claim. It is pivotal
to note at this juncture that in this same letter, if indeed private respondent wanted to clear himself from the baseless
accusation made against his person, he should have made mention of the fact that there are three (3) persons with the
same name, i.e.: Eugenio Baltao, Sr., Eugenio S. Baltao, Jr. (private respondent), and Eugenio Baltao III (private
respondent's son, who as it turned out later, was the issuer of the check). He, however, failed to do this. The last two
Baltaos were doing business in the same building — Baltao Building — located at 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa,
Manila. The mild steel plates were ordered in the name of Guaranteed of which respondent Eugenio S. Baltao is the
president and delivered to Guaranteed at Baltao building. Thus, petitioners had every reason to believe that the Eugenio
Baltao who issued the bouncing check is respondent Eugenio S. Baltao when their counsel wrote respondent to make
good the amount of the check and upon refusal, filed the complaint for violation of BP Blg. 22.

Private respondent, however, did nothing to clarify the case of mistaken identity at first hand. Instead, private respondent
waited in ambush and thereafter pounced on the hapless petitioners at a time he thought was propitious by filing an action
for damages. The Court will not countenance this devious scheme.

The criminal complaint filed against private respondent after the latter refused to make good the amount of the bouncing
check despite demand was a sincere attempt on the part of petitioners to find the best possible means by which they
could collect the sum of money due them. A person who has not been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally seek
ways to compel the debtor to pay him. It was normal for petitioners to find means to make the issuer of the check pay the
amount thereof. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded
and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of
damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate (Rubio vs. Court of Appeals, 141
SCRA 488 [1986]).

In the case at bar, private respondent does not deny that the mild steel plates were ordered by and delivered to
Guaranteed at Baltao building and as part payment thereof, the bouncing check was issued by one Eugenio Baltao.
Neither had private respondent conveyed to petitioner that there are two Eugenio Baltaos conducting business in the
same building — he and his son Eugenio Baltao III. Considering that Guaranteed, which received the goods in payment of
which the bouncing check was issued is owned by respondent, petitioner acted in good faith and probable cause in filing
the complaint before the provincial fiscal.

To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex
and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and
groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for
malicious prosecution. (Manila Gas Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 602 [1980]). Still, private respondent
argues that liability under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code is so encompassing that it likewise includes liability for
damages for malicious prosecution under Article 2219 (8). True, a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution is
allowed under the New Civil Code, more specifically Articles 19, 20, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, and 2219 (8) thereof. In order that
such a case can prosper, however, the following three (3) elements must be present, to wit: (1) The fact of the prosecution
and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the action was finally terminated with an
acquittal; (2) That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; (3) The prosecutor was actuated or
impelled by legal malice (Lao vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 58, [1991]).

Thus, a party injured by the filing of a court case against him, even if he is later on absolved, may file a case for damages
grounded either on the principle of abuse of rights, or on malicious prosecution. As earlier stated, a complaint for
damages based on malicious prosecution will prosper only if the three (3) elements aforecited are shown to exist. In the
case at bar, the second and third elements were not shown to exist. It is well-settled that one cannot be held liable for
maliciously instituting a prosecution where one has acted with probable cause. "Probable cause is the existence of such
facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. In other words, a suit will lie only
in cases where a legal prosecution has been carried on without probable cause. The reason for this rule is that it would be
a very great discouragement to public justice, if prosecutors, who had tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable to be
sued at law when their indictment miscarried" (Que vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 169 SCRA 137 [1989]).

The presence of probable cause signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice. In the instant case, it is evident
that petitioners were not motivated by malicious intent or by sinister design to unduly harass private respondent, but only
by a well-founded anxiety to protect their rights when they filed the criminal complaint against private respondent.

To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister
design to vex and humiliate a person, that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his
charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for
prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. Proof and motive that the institution of
the action was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person must be clearly and
preponderantly established to entitle the victims to damages (Ibid.).

In the case at bar, there is no proof of a sinister design on the part of petitioners to vex or humiliate private respondent by
instituting the criminal case against him. While petitioners may have been negligent to some extent in determining the
liability of private respondent for the dishonored check, the same is not so gross or reckless as to amount to bad faith
warranting an award of damages.

The root of the controversy in this case is founded on a case of mistaken identity. It is possible that with a more assiduous
investigation, petitioners would have eventually discovered that private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao is not the "Eugenio
Baltao" responsible for the dishonored check. However, the record shows that petitioners did exert considerable effort in
order to determine the liability of private respondent. Their investigation pointed to private respondent as the "Eugenio
Baltao" who issued and signed the dishonored check as the president of the debtor-corporation Guaranteed Enterprises.
Their error in proceeding against the wrong individual was obviously in the nature of an innocent mistake, and cannot be
characterized as having been committed in bad faith. This error could have been discovered if respondent had submitted
his counter-affidavit before investigating fiscal Sumaway and was immediately rectified by Provincial Fiscal Mauro Castro
upon discovery thereof, i.e., during the reinvestigation resulting in the dismissal of the complaint.

Furthermore, the adverse result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful and subject the actor to the payment
of moral damages. The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate, such right is so precious that
moral damages may not be charged on those who may even exercise it erroneously. And an adverse decision does
not ipso facto justify the award of attorney's fees to the winning party (Garcia vs. Gonzales, 183 SCRA 72 [1990]).

Thus, an award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action was filed in good faith. If damage results
from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria (Ilocos Norte Electric Company vs. Court of
Appeals, 179 SCRA 5 [1989]).

Coming now to the claim of private respondent for actual or compensatory damages, the records show that the same was
based solely on his allegations without proof to substantiate the same. He did not present proof of the cost of the medical
treatment which he claimed to have undergone as a result of the nervous breakdown he suffered, nor did he present proof
of the actual loss to his business caused by the unjust litigation against him. In determining actual damages, the court
cannot rely on speculation, conjectures or guesswork as to the amount. Without the actual proof of loss, the award of
actual damages becomes erroneous (Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan, 171 SCRA 382 [1989]).

Actual and compensatory damages are those recoverable because of pecuniary loss — in business, trade, property,
profession, job or occupation — and the same must be proved, otherwise, if the proof is flimsy and unsubstantiated, no
damages will be given (Rubio vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 [1986]). For these reasons, it was gravely erroneous
for respondent court to have affirmed the award of actual damages in favor of private respondent in the absence of proof
thereof.

Where there is no evidence of the other party having acted in wanton, fraudulent or reckless, or oppressive manner,
neither may exemplary damages be awarded (Dee Hua Liong Electrical Equipment Corporation vs. Reyes, 145 SCRA
488 [1986]).

As to the award of attorney's fees, it is well-settled that the same is the exception rather than the general rule. Needless to
say, the award of attorney's fees must be disallowed where the award of exemplary damages is eliminated (Article 2208,
Civil Code; Agustin vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 375 [1990]). Moreover, in view of the fact that there was no malicious
prosecution against private respondent, attorney's fees cannot be awarded him on that ground.

In the final analysis, there is no proof or showing that petitioners acted maliciously or in bad faith in the filing of the case
against private respondent. Consequently, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith committed by petitioners, they
cannot be held liable for damages (Escritor, Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 577 [1987]). No damages can
be awarded in the instant case, whether based on the principle of abuse of rights, or for malicious prosecution. The
questioned judgment in the instant case attests to the propensity of trial judges to award damages without basis. Lower
courts are hereby cautioned anew against awarding unconscionable sums as damages without bases therefor.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 14948 dated May
13, 1989, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent Baltao.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

# Footnotes

** "Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

"Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.

"Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

IRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 132344 February 17, 2000

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner,

vs.
ROMEO A. JADER, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

May an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading a student into believing that the latter had
satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case? This is the issue in the instant petition for review
premised on the following undisputed facts as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals
(CA),1 to wit:

Plaintiff was enrolled in the defendants' College of Law from 1984 up to 1988. In the first semester of his last year
(School year 1987-1988), he failed to take the regular final examination in Practice Court I for which he was given
an incomplete grade (Exhibits "2", also Exhibit "H"). He enrolled for the second semester as fourth year law
student (Exhibit "A") and on February 1, 1988 he filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade
given him by Professor Carlos Ortega (Exhibits "H-2", also Exhibit "2") which was approved by Dean Celedonio
Tiongson after payment of the required fee. He took the examination on March 28, 1988. On May 30, 1988,
Professor Carlos Ortega submitted his grade. It was a grade of five (5). (Exhibits "H-4", also Exhibits "2-L", "2-
N").1âwphi1.nêt

In the meantime, the Dean and the Faculty Members of the College of Law met to deliberate on who among the
fourth year students should be allowed to graduate. The plaintiff's name appeared in the Tentative List of
Candidates for graduation for the Degree of Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) as of Second Semester (1987-1988) with the
following annotation:

JADER ROMEO A.

Def. Conflict of Laws — x-1-87-88, Practice Court I Inc., 1-87-88 C-1 to submit transcript with S.O. (Exhibits "3",
"3-C-1", "3-C-2").

The 35th Investitures & Commencement Ceremonies for the candidates of Bachelor of Laws was scheduled on
the 16th of April 1988 at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, and in the invitation for that occasion the name of the
plaintiff appeared as one of the candidates. (Exhibits "B", "B-6", "B-6-A"). At the foot of the list of the names of the
candidates there appeared however the following annotation:

This is a tentative list Degrees will be conferred upon these candidates who satisfactorily complete
requirements as stated in the University Bulletin and as approved of the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports (Exhibit "B-7-A").

The plaintiff attended the investiture ceremonies at F. dela Cruz Quadrangle, U.E., Recto Campus, during the
program of which he went up the stage when his name was called, escorted by her (sic) mother and his eldest
brother who assisted in placing the Hood, and his Tassel was turned from left to right, and he was thereafter
handed by Dean Celedonio a rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of the Law Diploma. His relatives took
pictures of the occasion (Exhibits "C" to "C-6", "D-3" to "D-11").

He tendered a blow-out that evening which was attended by neighbors, friends and relatives who wished him
good luck in the forthcoming bar examination. There were pictures taken too during the blow-out (Exhibits "D" to
"D-1").

He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. He took a leave of absence without pay from his job from
April 20, 1988 to September 30, 1988 (Exhibit "G") and enrolled at the pre-bar review class in Far Eastern
University. (Exhibits "F" to "F-2"). Having learned of the deficiency he dropped his review class and was not able
to take the bar examination.2

Consequently, respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered moral shock, mental anguish, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights when he was not able to take the 1988 bar
examinations arising from the latter's negligence. He prayed for an award of moral and exemplary damages, unrealized
income, attorney's fees, and costs of suit.
In its answer with counterclaim, petitioner denied liability arguing mainly that it never led respondent to believe that he
completed the requirements for a Bachelor of Laws degree when his name was included in the tentative list of graduating
students. After trial, the lower court rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant ordering the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY
PESOS (P35,470.00) with legal rate of interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid, the amount of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees and the cost of suit.

Defendant's counterclaim is, for lack of merit, hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.3

which on appeal by both parties was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) with modification. The dispositive portion of
the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the lower Court's Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that defendant-appellee, in addition to the sum adjudged by the lower court in favor of plaintiff-
appellant, is also ORDERED to pay plaintiff-appellant the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS for
moral damages. Costs against defendant-appellee.

SO ORDERED.4

Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner UE elevated the case to this Court on a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, arguing that it has no liability to respondent Romeo A. Jader, considering that the
proximate and immediate cause of the alleged damages incurred by the latter arose out of his own negligence in not
verifying from the professor concerned the result of his removal exam.

The petition lacks merit.

When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning institution, a contract of education is entered into between said
institution and the student. The professors, teachers or instructors hired by the school are considered merely as agents
and administrators tasked to perform the school's commitment under the contract. Since the contracting parties are the
school and the student, the latter is not duty-bound to deal with the former's agents, such as the professors with respect to
the status or result of his grades, although nothing prevents either professors or students from sharing with each other
such information. The Court takes judicial notice of the traditional practice in educational institutions wherein the professor
directly furnishes his/her students their grades. It is the contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish
sufficient notice and information to each and every student as to whether he or she had already complied with all the
requirements for the conferment of a degree or whether they would be included among those who will graduate. Although
commencement exercises are but a formal ceremony, it nonetheless is not an ordinary occasion, since such ceremony is
the educational institution's way of announcing to the whole world that the students included in the list of those who will be
conferred a degree during the baccalaureate ceremony have satisfied all the requirements for such degree. Prior or
subsequent to the ceremony, the school has the obligation to promptly inform the student of any problem involving the
latter's grades and performance and also most importantly, of the procedures for remedying the same.

Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal examination, particularly at a time when he had
already commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must
be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19
of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even
though the forms and technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render
the transaction unconscientious.5 It is the school that has access to those information and it is only the school that can
compel its professors to act and comply with its rules, regulations and policies with respect to the computation and the
prompt submission of grades. Students do not exercise control, much less influence, over the way an educational
institution should run its affairs, particularly in disciplining its professors and teachers and ensuring their compliance with
the school's rules and orders. Being the party that hired them, it is the school that exercises general supervision and
exclusive control over the professors with respect to the submission of reports involving the students' standing. Exclusive
control means that no other person or entity had any control over the instrumentality which caused the damage or injury. 6

The college dean is the senior officer responsible for the operation of an academic program, enforcement of rules and
regulations, and the supervision of faculty and student services.7 He must see to it that his own professors and teachers,
regardless of their status or position outside of the university, must comply with the rules set by the latter. The negligent
act of a professor who fails to observe the rules of the school, for instance by not promptly submitting a student's grade, is
not only imputable to the professor but is an act of the school, being his employer.

Considering further, that the institution of learning involved herein is a university which is engaged in legal education, it
should have practiced what it inculcates in its students, more specifically the principle of good dealings enshrined in
Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code which states:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the
latter for the same.

Art. 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral
wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law. 8 In civilized society, men must be
able to assume that others will do them no intended injury — that others will commit no internal aggressions upon them;
that their fellowmen, when they act affirmatively will do so with due care which the ordinary understanding and moral
sense of the community exacts and that those with whom they deal in the general course of society will act in good faith.
The ultimate thing in the theory of liability is justifiable reliance under conditions of civilized society. 9 Schools and
professors cannot just take students for granted and be indifferent to them, for without the latter, the former are useless.

Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire
from the former. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the person/persons who may be
affected by his act or omission can support a claim for damages. 10 Want of care to the conscious disregard of civil
obligations coupled with a conscious knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to produce them would make the erring
party liable.11 Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the essence in the performance of its obligation to inform
respondent of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance that respondent will not prepare himself for the bar exams since that is
precisely the immediate concern after graduation of an LL.B. graduate. It failed to act seasonably. Petitioner cannot just
give out its student's grades at any time because a student has to comply with certain deadlines set by the Supreme Court
on the submission of requirements for taking the bar. Petitioner's liability arose from its failure to promptly inform
respondent of the result of an examination and in misleading the latter into believing that he had satisfied all requirements
for the course. Worth quoting is the following disquisition of the respondent court:

It is apparent from the testimony of Dean Tiongson that defendant-appellee University had been informed during
the deliberation that the professor in Practice Court I gave plaintiff-appellant a failing grade. Yet, defendant-
appellee still did not inform plaintiff-appellant of his failure to complete the requirements for the degree nor did
they remove his name from the tentative list of candidates for graduation. Worse, defendant-appellee university,
despite the knowledge that plaintiff-appellant failed in Practice Court I, again included plaintiff-appellant's name in
the "tentative list of candidates for graduation which was prepared after the deliberation and which became the
basis for the commencement rites program. Dean Tiongson reasons out that plaintiff-appellant's name was
allowed to remain in the tentative list of candidates for graduation in the hope that the latter would still be able to
remedy the situation in the remaining few days before graduation day. Dean Tiongson, however, did not explain
how plaintiff appellant Jader could have done something to complete his deficiency if defendant-appellee
university did not exert any effort to inform plaintiff-appellant of his failing grade in Practice Court I. 12

Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its own negligence that led to the delayed relay of
information to respondent. When one of two innocent parties must suffer, he through whose agency the loss occurred
must bear it.13 The modern tendency is to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is abuse of right, even when
the act is not illicit.14 If mere fault or negligence in one's acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby,
with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. A person should be protected only when he acts in the
legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts with negligence
or abuse.15

However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to respondent for the latter's actual damages, we hold
that respondent should not have been awarded moral damages. We do not agree with the Court of Appeals' findings that
respondent suffered shock, trauma and pain when he was informed that he could not graduate and will not be allowed to
take the bar examinations. At the very least, it behooved on respondent to verify for himself whether he has completed all
necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. As a senior law student, respondent should have been
responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, specifically those pertaining to his academic achievement, are in order.
Given these considerations, we fail to see how respondent could have suffered untold embarrassment in attending the
graduation rites, enrolling in the bar review classes and not being able to take the bar exams. If respondent was indeed
humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the
requirements including his school records, before preparing himself for the bar examination. Certainly, taking the bar
examinations does not only entail a mental preparation on the subjects thereof; there are also prerequisites of
documentation and submission of requirements which the prospective examinee must meet.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ORDERED
to PAY respondent the sum of Thirty-five Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal interest of
6% per annum computed from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid; the amount of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) as attorney's fees; and the costs of the suit. The award of moral damages is DELEIED.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Puno, J., took no part.

epublic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.

Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in its Civil Case
No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal separation and one million pesos in
damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,1 all surnamed
"Escaño," respectively.2

The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:

Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City, where she was then
enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially
prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor
Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her
parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage
was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local civil register.

Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply in love. Together with
a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they had planned out their marital future whereby Pacita would
be the governess of their first-born; they started saving money in a piggy bank. A few weeks before their secret marriage,
their engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the engagement ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love
for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This time they planned to get married and then
elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall,
which was their usual trysting place.

Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, however, materialize because when
Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who got wind of the intended nuptials, was already
waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that she had already married Pastor. Mamerto
and Mena Escaño were surprised, because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because of
the great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The following morning, the
Escaño spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be an
invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for
the officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did not take place, because on 26 February 1948
Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid, whose name he claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly coming from
San Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta
translated the letter to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day in
the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his job
in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her husband's welfare, was not as endearing as
her previous letters when their love was aflame.

Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor knew it. She fondly accepted her being
called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her parents from communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escaño"), but her
letters became less frequent as the days passed. As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2-
Escaño"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu
society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did
not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed without prejudice because of her non-appearance at the
hearing (Exh. "B-4").

On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her application that she was
single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she intended to return after two years.
The application was approved, and she left for the United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for
divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of
Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final
and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.

In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter's marriage to
Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).

On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in
California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958.

But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño, whom he charged
with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the
Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for
legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid
marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they had in any way influenced their
daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.

The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife and to acquire
property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño for moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted
directly to this Court.

The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:

1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escaño liable for damages and in
dismissing the complaint;.

2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doña Mena Escaño liable for damages;.

3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the defendant parents on their
counterclaims; and.
 4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.

That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escaño, were
validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly established by the record before us. Both
parties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise qualified; and both consented to the marriage, which was
performed by a Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that
said priest was not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.

The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary, as required by Canon
law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the separation of Church and State but also because Act 3613 of the
Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at the time) expressly provided that —

SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting parties and
consent. (Emphasis supplied)

The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and, therefore, not essential to give the
marriage civil effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage act, which provided the following:

SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be declared invalid because of the
absence of one or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it was performed, the spouses or one of
them believed in good faith that the person who solemnized the marriage was actually empowered to do so, and
that the marriage was perfectly legal.

The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be presumed until the
contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note
here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage, when
Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in abandoning
her original action for annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that her marriage to plaintiff
was valid and binding.

Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under the undue influence of Pacita
Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for argument's sake, the
truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did not
render her marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and the marriage remained valid until annulled by a competent
civil court. This was never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis was
dismissed for non-prosecution.

It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño remained
subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought and
obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of
"extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her
husband, was still a Filipino citizen.4 She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided:

Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact
does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding
legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710).
Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even
in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).

For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce betiveen
Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, specially in view of the third
paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order,
policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to an
irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of our polity whose
means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.

From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the Nevada divorce court.
Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and
additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the court originally
had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).

From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in this jurisdiction Vicenta
Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez
must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her
denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the
husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit
nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse.
Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her
husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation
under our law, on the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).

The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce are in accord with the previous
doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly those that were rendered under our laws prior to the approval
of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal history, our statutes did not
recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective; and the present Civil Code of the Philippines,
in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the subject prevailing before Act 2710. The
rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to the Act above-mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these, the
decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of particular interest. Said this Court in that case:

As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the marriage of Dr. Mory and Leona
Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations; and the circumstance that they afterwards
passed for husband and wife in Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal significance. The claims of the
very children to participate in the estate of Samuel Bishop must therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited
to legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural children. The children of adulterous relations are wholly
excluded. The word "descendants" as used in Article 941 of the Civil Code cannot be interpreted to include
illegitimates born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis supplied)

Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage to Leo Moran after the
invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is authority for the proposition that such union is
adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal separation on the part of the innocent consort of
the first marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial court committed error.

True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person (whether divorced or not) would
depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind are not new in the Philippines, and the answer to
them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:

The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known to the members of the
Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by Legislature if they are
constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)

The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.

However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and his wife, the late Doña Mena
Escaño, alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct toward her husband are not supported by
credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the Escaño's animosity toward him strikes us to be merely
conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's own letters written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2-Escaño"
and "Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized to the defendants for "misjudging
them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery and audacity"
[sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escaño house to visit and court Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove that he
would not have been accepted to marry Vicente had he openly asked for her hand, as good manners and breeding
demanded. Even after learning of the clandestine marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected event, the
parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in strict conformity with the canons of their
religion upon advice that the previous one was canonically defective. If no recelebration of the marriage ceremony was
had it was not due to defendants Mamerto Escaño and his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the
spouses Escaño did not seek to compel or induce their daughter to assent to the recelebration but respected her decision,
or that they abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation of affections. Neither does the fact that
Vicenta's parents sent her money while she was in the United States; for it was natural that they should not wish their
daughter to live in penury even if they did not concur in her decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).

There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her original suit for
annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled to
judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be
charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good
faith being always presumed until the contrary is proved.

SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. — The law distinguishes between the right of a parent to interest
himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a stranger to intermeddle in such affairs.
However, such distinction between the liability of parents and that of strangers is only in regard to what will justify
interference. A parent isliable for alienation of affections resulting from his own malicious conduct, as where he
wrongfully entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless he acts maliciously,
without justification and from unworthy motives. He is not liable where he acts and advises his child in good faith
with respect to his child's marital relations in the interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not
terminating his right and liberty to interest himself in, and be extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and
happiness, even where his conduct and advice suggest or result in the separation of the spouses or the obtaining
of a divorce or annulment, or where he acts under mistake or misinformation, or where his advice or interference
are indiscreet or unfortunate, although it has been held that the parent is liable for consequences resulting from
recklessness. He may in good faith take his child into his home and afford him or her protection and support, so
long as he has not maliciously enticed his child away, or does not maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay
away, from his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently been applied in the case of advice given to a married
daughter, but it is equally applicable in the case of advice given to a son.

Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and with having exerted
efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them
to recover damages. While this suit may not have been impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in
the face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give vent to their
prejudices or spleen.
In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant Vicente Escaño, it is
proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable claim for a million pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage
was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that
the parties never lived together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant had originally agreed to the annulment of the
marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid, being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant
is unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a consequence of the indissoluble character of the union that appellant
entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the
opinion that appellant should recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's fees.

With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño, by the court
below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the filing of this unfounded suit must have wounded said defendants'
feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise
prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been
correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that said defendants were not guilty of any improper conduct in
the whole deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only.

Summing up, the Court rules:

(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code
(Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another
party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country;

(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful husband entitle the latter
to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;

(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to recover damages;

(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of
malice or unworthy motives on their part.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F.
Escaño;

(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for
damages and attorneys' fees;

(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the deceased
Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

Neither party to recover costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 159218. March 30, 2004]

SALVADOR S. ABUNADO and ZENAIDA BIAS ABUNADO, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 26135 which affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, San Mateo, Rizal in Criminal
Case No. 2803 convicting petitioner Salvador S. Abunado of bigamy.
The records show that on September 18, 1967, Salvador married Narcisa Arceo at the Manila City Hall before Rev.
Pedro Tiangco.[2] In 1988 Narcisa left for Japan to work but returned to the Philippines in 1992, when she learned that her
husband was having an extra-marital affair and has left their conjugal home.
After earnest efforts, Narcisa found Salvador in Quezon City cohabiting with Fe Corazon Plato. She also discovered
that on January 10, 1989, Salvador contracted a second marriage with a certain Zenaida Bias before Judge Lilian Dinulos
Panontongan in San Mateo, Rizal.[3]
On January 19, 1995, an annulment case was filed by Salvador against Narcisa.[4] On May 18, 1995, a case for bigamy
was filed by Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida.[5]
 Salvador admitted that he first married Zenaida on December 24, 1955 before a municipal trial court judge
in Concepcion, Iloilo and has four children with her prior to their separation in 1966. It appeared however that there was no
evidence of their 1955 marriage so he and Zenaida remarried on January 10, 1989, upon the request of their son for the
purpose of complying with the requirements for his commission in the military.
On May 18, 2001, the trial court convicted petitioner Salvador Abunado of bigamy and sentenced him to suffer
imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day, as maximum. Petitioner
Zenaida Bias was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.[6]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED as to the penalty imposed but AFFIRMED in all other respects.
Appreciating the mitigating circumstance that accused is 76 years of age and applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional as Minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as Maximum. No costs.

SO ORDERED.[7]

Petitioner is now before us on petition for review.

First, he argues that the Information was defective as it stated that the bigamous marriage was contracted in 1995
when in fact it should have been 1989.
Indeed, an accused has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. [8] It is required
that the acts and omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be alleged in the Information. [9]
The real nature of the crime charged is determined by the facts alleged in the Information and not by the title or
designation of the offense contained in the caption of the Information. It is fundamental that every element of which the
offense is comprised must be alleged in the Information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be alleged in the
Information must be determined by reference to the definition and essential elements of the specific crimes. [10]
The question, therefore, is whether petitioner has been sufficiently informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, namely, that he contracted a subsequent marriage with another woman while his first marriage was subsisting.
The information against petitioner alleges:

That in or about and sometime in the month of January, 1995 at the Municipality of San Mateo, Rizal place (sic) within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, having been legally married to complainant Narcisa Abunado on
September 16, 1967 which has not been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
subsequent marriage to Zenaida Bias Abunado on January 10, 1989 which has all the essential requisites of a valid marriage.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[11]

The statement in the information that the crime was committed in or about and sometime in the month of January,
1995, was an obvious typographical error, for the same information clearly states that petitioner contracted a subsequent
marriage to Zenaida Bias Abunado on January 10, 1989. Petitioners submission, therefore, that the information was
defective is untenable.
The general rule is that a defective information cannot support a judgment of conviction unless the defect was cured
by evidence during the trial and no objection appears to have been raised. [12] It should be remembered that bigamy can be
successfully prosecuted provided all its elements concur two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage
which possesses all the requisites for validity.[13] All of these have been sufficiently established by the prosecution during
the trial. Notably, petitioner failed to object to the alleged defect in the Information during the trial and only raised the same
for the first time on appeal before the Court of Appeals.
Second, petitioner argues that Narcisa consented to his marriage to Zenaida, which had the effect of absolving him of
criminal liability.
In this regard, we agree with the Court of Appeals when it ruled, thus:

x x x, while he claims that there was condonation on the part of complainant when he entered into a bigamous marriage, the same was
likewise not established by clear and convincing evidence. But then, a pardon by the offended party does not extinguish criminal
action considering that a crime is committed against the State and the crime of Bigamy is a public offense which can be denounced not
only by the person affected thereby but even by a civic-spirited citizen who may come to know the same.[14]

Third, petitioner claims that his petition for annulment/declaration of nullity of marriage was a prejudicial question,
hence, the proceedings in the bigamy case should have been suspended during the pendency of the annulment case.
Petitioner, in fact, eventually obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Narcisa on October 29, 1999.[15]
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must
appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based
but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question
is to avoid two conflicting decisions.[16]
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration
of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioners assertion would only delay the prosecution of
bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the
pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.[17]
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to Narcisa had no bearing upon the determination
of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to
prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. [18]
 Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in
a judicial proceeding.[19] In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab
initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.
Finally, petitioner claims that the penalty imposed on him was improper.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor for bigamy. Under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum
term of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. The penalty
next lower would be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying
circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound
discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods
into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term
of the indeterminate sentence.[20]
In light of the fact that petitioner is more than 70 years of age, [21] which is a mitigating circumstance under Article 13,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence should be taken from prision
mayor in its minimum period which ranges from six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years, while the minimum term
should be taken from prision correccional in any of its periods which ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years.
Therefore, the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, i.e., two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is proper.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26135, finding
petitioner Salvador S. Abunado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy, and sentencing him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., see concurring opinion.

[G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000]

MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO
TUAZON, JR., being the Judge of the RTC, Branch 139, Makati City, respondents.

DECISION

BUENA, J.:

This petition for review, filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeks to review and set aside the Order
dated January 28, 1999 issued by Judge Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139
in Special Civil Case No. 98-3056, entitled "Meynardo Beltran vs. People of the Philippines and Hon. Judge Alden
Cervantes of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati city, Branch 61." The said Order denied petitioners prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Judge Cervantes from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No.
236176, a concubinage case against petitioner on the ground that the pending petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
filed by petitioner against his wife constitutes a prejudicial question.

The antecedent facts of the case are undisputed:

Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate Concepcion
Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City.[1]

On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four children,[2] petitioner filed a petition for nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code before Branch 87 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-30192.[3]

In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the
conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting.[4] Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal
complaint for concubinage[5] under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner and his paramour before the
City Prosecutor's Office of Makati who, in a Resolution dated September 16, 1997, found probable cause and ordered the
filing of an Information[6] against them. The case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 236176, was filed before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61.

On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer
Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of
the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal
case. Judge Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied the foregoing motion in the Order [7] dated August 31, 1998. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the said Order of denial was likewise denied in an Order dated December 9, 1998.

In view of the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings in the concubinage case, petitioner went to the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 139 on certiorari, questioning the Orders dated August 31, 1998 and December 9, 1998
issued by Judge Cervantes and praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. [8] In an Order[9] dated January
28, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Makati denied the petition for certiorari. Said Court subsequently issued another
Order[10] dated February 23, 1999, denying his motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition.
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.

Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage based on psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is a prejudicial question that should merit the suspension of the criminal
case for concubinage filed against him by his wife.

Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility that two conflicting decisions might result from the civil case for
annulment of marriage and the criminal case for concubinage. In the civil case, the trial court might declare the marriage
as valid by dismissing petitioner's complaint but in the criminal case, the trial court might acquit petitioner because the
evidence shows that his marriage is void on ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner submits that the possible
conflict of the courts' ruling regarding petitioner's marriage can be avoided, if the criminal case will be suspended, until the
court rules on the validity of marriage; that if petitioner's marriage is declared void by reason of psychological incapacity
then by reason of the arguments submitted in the subject petition, his marriage has never existed; and that, accordingly,
petitioner could not be convicted in the criminal case because he was never before a married man.

Petitioner's contentions are untenable.

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential
elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b)
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. [11]

The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage
case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the
final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil
action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.

Article 40 of the Family Code provides:

"The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."

In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals,[12] this Court ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes of remarriage,
the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. The pertinent
portions of said Decision read:

"xxx Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for
liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an
action for the custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive
legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These needs not be limited
solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void."

So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not present a final judgment declaring his
marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final
judgment declaring his marriage void.

With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be
declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from
the beginning is not a defense.

Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs. Reloval[13] cited in Donato vs. Luna[14] where this Court held that:

"xxx Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact
would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted
to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent
courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there
is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy."

Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves
its nullity, for the same must be submitted to judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is
so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists
for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity
of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in
affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage
does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

 [G.R. No. 126746. November 29, 2000]

ARTHUR TE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANA CHOA, respondents.

DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals Tenth
Division, dated 31 August 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 23971[1] and CA-G.R. SP No. 26178[2] and the Resolution dated October
18, 1996 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil rites on September 14, 1988. They did
not live together after the marriage although they would meet each other regularly. Not long after private respondent gave
birth to a girl on April 21, 1989, petitioner stopped visiting her. [3]
On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private respondent was subsisting, petitioner contracted a second marriage
with a certain Julieta Santella (Santella).[4]
On the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent sometime in June 1990, when she learned about
petitioners marriage to Santella, an information charging petitioner with bigamy was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City on August 9, 1990.[5] This case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409.[6]
Meanwhile, on July 20, 1990, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City an action for the annulment of his marriage to
private respondent on the ground that he was forced to marry her.He alleged that private respondent concealed her
pregnancy by another man at the time of their marriage and that she was psychologically incapacitated to perform her
essential marital obligations.[7]
On November 8, 1990, private respondent also filed with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) an
administrative case against petitioner and Santella for the revocation of their respective engineering licenses on the ground
that they committed acts of immorality by living together and subsequently marrying each other despite their knowledge that
at the time of their marriage, petitioner was already married to private respondent. With respect to petitioner, private
respondent added that he committed an act of falsification by stating in his marriage contract with Santella that he was still
single.[8]
After the prosecution rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence with leave
of court and motion to inhibit the trial court judge for showing antagonism and animosity towards petitioners counsel during
the hearings of said case.
The trial court denied petitioners demurrer to evidence in an Order dated November 28, 1990 which stated that the
same could not be granted because the prosecution had sufficiently established a prima facie case against the
accused.[9] The RTC also denied petitioners motion to inhibit for lack of legal basis. [10]
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court judge, Judge Cezar C. Peralejo, for (1) exhibiting antagonism and animosity towards petitioners counsel; (2)
violating the requirements of due process by denying petitioners [motion for reconsideration and] demurrer to evidence even
before the filing of the same; (3) disregarding and failing to comply with the appropriate guidelines for judges promulgated
by the Supreme Court; and (4) ruling that in a criminal case only prima facie evidence is sufficient for conviction of an
accused. This case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 23971.[11]
Petitioner also filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC (PRC Board), where the administrative case for the
revocation of his engineering license was pending, a motion to suspend the proceedings therein in view of the pendency of
the civil case for annulment of his marriage to private respondent and criminal case for bigamy in Branches 106 and 98,
respectively of the RTC of Quezon City.[12] When the Board denied the said motion in its Order dated July 16,
1991,[13] petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari, contending that the Board gravely abused
its discretion in: (1) failing to hold that the resolution of the annulment case is prejudicial to the outcome of the administrative
case pending before it; (2) not holding that the continuation of proceedings in the administrative case could render nugatory
petitioners right against self-incrimination in this criminal case for bigamy against him; and (3) making an overly-sweeping
interpretation that Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals does
not allow the suspension of the administrative proceeding before the PRC Board despite the pendency of criminal and/or
administrative proceedings against the same respondent involving the same set of facts in other courts or tribunals. This
petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 26178.[14]
The two petitions for certiorari were consolidated since they arose from the same set of facts.
On 31 August 1994, the Court of Appeals, Tenth Division, rendered the assailed decision in the consolidated
petitions. The appellate court upheld the RTCs denial of the motion to inhibit due to petitioners failure to show any concrete
evidence that the trial court judge exhibited partiality and had prejudged the case. It also ruled that the denial of petitioners
motion to suspend the proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question was in accord with law.[15] The Court of Appeals
likewise affirmed the RTCs denial of the demurrer to evidence filed by petitioner for his failure to set forth persuasive grounds
to support the same, considering that the prosecution was able to adduce evidence showing the existence of the elements
of bigamy.[16]
Neither did the appellate court find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Boards Order denying petitioners motion
to suspend proceedings in the administrative case on the ground of prejudicial question. Respondent court held that no
prejudicial question existed since the action sought to be suspended is administrative in nature, and the other action involved
is a civil case.[17]
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals but the same was
denied.[18]
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following issues:
 I

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN REFUSING TO SUSPEND THE LEGAL [CRIMINAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE] PROCEEDINGS DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF THE CIVIL CASE FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.

II

PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN DUE COURSE.

III

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS LEGAL ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE A
QUO SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED HIMSELF.[19]

The petition has no merit.

While the termination of Civil Case No. Q-90-6205 for annulment of petitioners marriage to private respondent has
rendered the issue of the propriety of suspending both the criminal case for bigamy before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch
98 and the administrative case for revocation of petitioners engineering license before the PRC Board moot and academic,
the Court shall discuss the issue of prejudicial question to emphasize the guarding and controlling precepts and rules.[20]
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must
appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based
but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined.[21] The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial
question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.[22]
The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of marriage filed by
petitioner against private respondent did not pose a prejudicial question which would necessitate that the criminal case for
bigamy be suspended until said civil case is terminated.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to private respondent had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of
bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. [23] Petitioners
argument that the nullity of his marriage to private respondent had to be resolved first in the civil case before the criminal
proceedings could continue, because a declaration that their marriage was void ab initio would necessarily absolve him
from criminal liability, is untenable. The ruling in People vs. Mendoza[24] and People vs. Aragon[25] cited by petitioner that no
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage which is void ab initio has been overturned. The
prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, which was already in effect at the time of petitioners marriage to
private respondent in September 1988. Said article states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked
for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus, under the law, a
marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding.[26] In Landicho vs. Relova,[27] we held that:

Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment
of competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is
no such declaration the presumption of marriage exists.[28]

It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to private
respondent did not give rise to a prejudicial question which warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal
case for bigamy since at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, their marriage was, under the law, still valid and
subsisting.
Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the administrative proceedings
before the PRC Board. As discussed above, the concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal case. We
have previously ruled that there is no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the other is civil. [29]
Furthermore, Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals of the
PRC Board expressly provides that the administrative proceedings before it shall not be suspended notwithstanding the
existence of a criminal and/or civil case against the respondent involving the same facts as the administrative case:

The filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil cases in the courts or an administrative case in another judicial body
against an examinee or registered professional involving the same facts as in the administrative case filed or to be filed
before the Board shall neither suspend nor bar the proceeding of the latter case. The Board shall proceed independently
with the investigation of the case and shall render therein its decision without awaiting for the final decision of the courts or
quasi-judicial body.

It must also be noted that the allegations in the administrative complaint before the PRC Board are not confined to the
issue of the alleged bigamous marriage contracted by petitioner and Santella. Petitioner is also charged with immoral
conduct for continued failure to perform his obligations as husband to private respondent and as father to their child, and
for cohabiting with Santella without the benefit of marriage.[30] The existence of these other charges justified the continuation
of the proceedings before the PRC Board.
Petitioner also contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial courts denial of his demurrer to evidence
in the criminal case for bigamy, arguing that the prosecution failed to establish the existence of both the first and second
marriages beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner claims that the original copy of marriage contract between him and private
respondent was not presented, the signatures therein were not properly identified and there was no showing that the
requisites of a valid marriage were complied with. He alleges further that the original copy of the marriage contract between
him and Santella was not presented, that no proof that he signed said contract was adduced, and that there was no witness
presented to show that a second marriage ceremony participated in by him ever took place.[31]
We are not persuaded. The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court,
and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion. [32] In this case, the
Court of Appeals did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, which based its denial of the
demurrer on two grounds: first, the prosecution established a prima facie case for bigamy against the petitioner; and second,
petitioners allegations in the demurrer were insufficient to justify the grant of the same. It has been held that the appellate
court will not review in a special civil action for certiorari the prosecutions evidence and decide in advance that such
evidence has or has not yet established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. [33] In view of the trial courts
finding that a prima facie case against petitioner exists, his proper recourse is to adduce evidence in his defense.[34]
The Court also finds it necessary to correct petitioners misimpression that by denying his demurrer to evidence in view
of the existence of a prima facie case against him, the trial court was already making a pronouncement that he is liable for
the offense charged. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the order of the RTC denying the demurrer was not an
adjudication on the merits but merely an evaluation of the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence to determine whether or
not a full-blown trial would be necessary to resolve the case.[35] The RTCs observation that there was a prima facie case
against petitioner only meant that the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to sustain its proposition that petitioner
had committed the offense of bigamy, and unless petitioner presents evidence to rebut the same, such would be the
conclusion.[36] Said declaration by the RTC should not be construed as a pronouncement of petitioners guilt. It was precisely
because of such finding that the trial court denied the demurrer, in order that petitioner may present evidence in his defense
and allow said court to resolve the case based on the evidence adduced by both parties.
Lastly, petitioner contends that his motion to inhibit Judge Peralejo in Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409 should have been
granted since said judge exhibited partiality and bias against him in several instances. First, when petitioner manifested that
he would file a motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to suspend the proceedings in said case, the judge
said such motion was dilatory and would be denied even though the motion for reconsideration had not yet been
filed. Second, when petitioners counsel manifested that he had just recovered from an accident and was not physically fit
for trial, the judge commented that counsel was merely trying to delay the case and required said counsel to produce a
medical certificate to support his statement. Third, when petitioner manifested that he was going to file a demurrer to
evidence, the judge characterized the same as dilatory and declared that he would deny the same.According to petitioner,
the judges hostile attitude towards petitioners counsel as shown in the foregoing instances justified the grant of his motion
to inhibit.
We agree with the appellate court that the grounds raised by petitioner against Judge Peralejo did not conclusively
show that the latter was biased and had prejudged the case. [37] In People of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,[38] this
Court held that while bias and prejudice have been recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of a judge under
Section 1, Rule 137, the rudimentary rule is that the mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be
clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality.[39]
Furthermore, since the grounds raised by petitioner in his motion to inhibit are not among those expressly mentioned
in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, the decision to inhibit himself lay within the sound discretion of Judge
Peralejo. Said provision of law states:

Section 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree
of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in
which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court
when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them
and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in the case, for just and valid reasons
other than those mentioned above.

Thus, it was not mandatory that the judge inhibit himself from hearing and deciding the case.
This Court does not find any abuse of discretion by respondent judge in denying petitioners motion to inhibit. The test
for determining the propriety of the denial of said motion is whether petitioner was deprived a fair and impartial trial.[40] The
instances when Judge Peralejo allegedly exhibited antagonism and partiality against petitioner and/or his counsel did not
deprive him of a fair and impartial trial. As discussed earlier, the denial by the judge of petitioners motion to suspend the
criminal proceeding and the demurrer to evidence are in accord with law and jurisprudence. Neither was there anything
unreasonable in the requirement that petitioners counsel submit a medical certificate to support his claim that he suffered
an accident which rendered him unprepared for trial. Such requirement was evidently imposed upon petitioners counsel to
ensure that the resolution of the case was not hampered by unnecessary and unjustified delays, in keeping with the judges
duty to disposing of the courts business promptly. [41]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.