Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics

When I first began writing this commentary I honestly thought it would be the shortest of my
works. As I began writing I soon realized that the lack of organization in Aristotle's treatise
however, would prevent me from being brief. I realized that the disjointed way of picking up
topics then dropping them only to pick them up again a few books later, would mean that I could
not write this commentary line-by-line but would have to approach the work by topic. Thus the
unique character of this commentary as a series of essays on the most important topics in
Aristotle's Metaphysics. If I inadvertedly wrote anything against the Catholic Faith or
unintelligible here, it was, as always, just an accident; for the depths of Aristotle's ontology and
the fact that I am but a single man, makes editing not just a stress but a hazard on the eyes.

(1) The motives and importance of Metaphysics

Aristotle says that "all men desire to know" but is this true? Do all men desire to know either in
the broad sense of "knowing enough not to be or thought ignorant" or in the restricted sense of
"knowing a special branch of thought"? It seems like the phrase "all men desire to know" is a
very classical assumption, which is not to say that is wrong or even naive, but is rather arbitrary,
though I suppose all assumptions are. That all men desire to know, seems for instance, to be
contradicted by the moderns as per Marx's dictum that "we desire not to know the world but to
change it" or per Voltaire "if we cannot know that "God" is, we should have to make "Him" up".
But men desire to know in that we do not desire to be ignorant at least, and in general it seems
that so much of what is claimed to be a norm for the intellect or rational nature (as per
Aristotle's use of the term "rational" and especially since Aristotle undoubtedly believed that "all
humans are rational" is true), is essentially a reductio ad absurdum: we don't like to lead a life of
pleasure -not because we hate pleasure or we like pain or non-pleasure -but because it would be
embarassing or pig-like. Also, at any rate, just as if one questioned whether he should desire to
eat, that would not stop him from eating, so too if one questioned whether he should desire to
know, that would not stop one from knowing; and in general, the very questioning of one's
desire for truth is a desire for truth; though one may harp about why we should want any one
particular truth or that truth which is proposed by ontology. So it at least seems that on some
arguments and from some motivations, people want to know in both ways and yet not.

But, if only all men did desire to know Aristotle's "Metaphysics" we should be safe from the
many misunderstandings which has accompanied this book especially regarding the superficial
and oversimplified concept of "hylomorphism". For Aristotle "hylomorphism" -a term he did not
use -is the necessity that matter be combined with form and consequently that form and matter
can never exist separately. Yet, as in all things Aristotle, it would be misleading to the student
and reader to call it this without qualification; for though all things require matter and form,
form and matter themselves do not, and also, for the sake of argument assuming that spiritual
substances like "Forms" or "angels" exist, these would not have matter but would be pure form,
as Aristotle shall make clear and as we shall note in further essays in this collection.

(2) Being and Becoming esp. with regard to Relations

Another vexing question in "Metaphysics" has to do, unsurprisingly, with the very object of his
work, Being. But related to Being is Becoming and though the latter was treated suitably enough
in Physics, still its relation to and rivalry with, Being and Metaphysics makes Aristotle treat of it
again in some length. Also what regard does Being and Becoming have with the category of
relation itself, is a problem that would occur to the student; for Aristotle's treatment of Relation
seems to commit him to throwing out his earlier Physical and Metaphysical committments and
we shall comment on this more later.

The beginning of our questions regarding relation, occurs by reflecting on whether relations
occur through time. On this Aristotle makes three statements: relations do not reciprocate
always, all have a relation to time, & the father begets a son through time (1021 a 20). This latter
statement is important because as we shall see, Aristotle will characterize the relation between
knowledge and known as without time that is, instantaneous. As we critique this conception we
must momentarily consider Aristotle's dissection of what "thinking" is, is it either relation or
something else?

At (1057a 35) Aristotle writes "what intermediate could there be between knowledge and the
knowable..." implying that knowledge is not a motion, since all motions have an intermediate
step. But whatever is a motion occurs instantly yet as we above noted, Aristotle claimed that
knowing occured through time.

At (1032b 15) he says still that knowledge "... proceeds from "the starting point" and "form" is
thinking; final step, making.". But how does this mesh with Aristotle's previous or later
characterization of thinking as having no intermediate? we must make several careful
distinctions (1) thinking is a motion in the sense that building is also a motion and as such it is an
expression of potentiality, (2) thinking and making are both habitual and continuous acts but one
is imminent and the latter is external and one is an operation whereas the latter is a production
(3) yet though the act of thinking is continuous and a motion it can still be regarded as a starting
point and as if it were a making, just as movement is regarded discretely as a last step; for the
last step is a change and movement is change too. (4) It would appear that Aristotle allows
contiuous motions to be discrete changes which should not bother us too much, since we
already know from my commentary on "Physics" and "Generation and Corruption" that Aristotle
allowed movements to change into changes/mutations and continua into discretes with
reference to different points of observation and action.

But, and this returns us to our original question, is the learner primarily a case of becoming or
motion in that the learner is intermediate between the ignorant and the learned? Or is this
becoming instant? Change it is definitely, but motion, as well? it may be compared to growth,
which is continuous but is esteemed a change and like growth perhaps per the mind there is
motion -a process of learning -but for the composite -the mind and the body - not motion but
change. Again this subject shows just how integral physical considerations were to Aristotle's
metaphysics and also how the relativity of substance, motion, and change abounds through it
(his physics). But though we consider thinking to be change and motion in different respects and
for different parts of the rational substance, may we not also consider thinking as instant from
the p.o.v. of the mind as it is an active, separate substance, and simply as the mind-as-
substance? For the mind moves to learn by the motion of the chemicals and phantasms which
supply the potential intellect while the active intellect instantly comes to knowledge after these
motions? In either of these ways it seems that thinking occurs but the second is probably closer
to Aristotle's true meaning in the book, since the origin of Aristotle's written distinction is not
one of distinguishing between whole and part, but of distinguishing between instants and
movements; nows and "-ings". For Aristotle always emphasizes how it is not the mind that
measures things but things that measure the mind, such that it is possible for things to be x but
the mind to affirm y. Therefore, the process of the mind moving from affirming x to affirming y
must be a motion.

Continuing to a different topic, (994a 30) according to Aristotle, alteration and growth is non-
reversible, since in alteration and generation and corruption, the destroyed makes way for the
created (and vice versa), and generation and corruption is circular, and so there cannot be
indefinite recursive change. But, isn't circular change a type of infinite change or recursive? And
did not Aristotle allow for circular change regarding the passage of seasons and the proof by
convertible terms? Let us note more on mathematics first, sure circular change is recursive and it
loops in on itself but it is not infinite in that it tends towards a limit and plenty of shapes tend
towards their limit about a circle (e.g. the limit of an inscribing-square about a circle is a
diamond). More interesting is the case of the lorenz attractor, which is indefinite as to it's
quantity of rotation but is finite according to the quality; which is circular and around two poles.
The problem rests on a general paradox of infinity for though the infinite cannot be known, to
the extent that it can be known, it is only under the form of the finite which introduces into it
notions of initiation/primariness and order and so like, and the same is true of an infinite specific
nature, line or function, wherein, we encounter like problems and contingencies; for if not, then
the whole graph of coordinates would be an infinite straight line and there could only be one
solution and function. A solution to the problem comes from Aristotle himself, for he clarifies in
the same place, that not all change is the same. There is change which achieves it;s result after a
process and then there is a change/result which is homogeneous with the process itself. An
instance of the first is man from boy or constructed from construction; for the process of
building has a definite end somewhere and and sometime, while an instance of the second
would be, the learned from the learner since one may only have knowledge at the moment that
one's mind abstracts the form of the known object; or as water comes from air; for Aristotle
does not see water as constructed from condensed air atoms or molecules but as a
transmutation, of air from water. And furthermore, these changes are directed; the adult cannot
return to childhood due to the very notion of the change that is "aging" or "maturing" (994 a 5).
Subsequently, as Aristotle makes clear, if all things are matter, then there must be change
according to alteration or motion but then, since infinite change is impossible, there must be a
first mover which is non-material. And this conclusion would be true regardless of whether the
world was a homogeneous soup that changed within itself, or one of differing substances acting
and reacting on each other.

(3) The distinction Between Element, Substance, Essence, and Accidents

Of "element":

From Aristotle's dictionary in Book V, Elements are (1) immannent and indivisible components
e.g. syllables or water -in the latter case, divisibility doesn't proceed into kinds but in the former,
the divisibility destroys the syllable qualitatively; in either case, per se, there is no true divisibility
(for "divided" water is just more water and a divided syllable is no longer a syllable). But what
does this mean? In general, divisibility of kind is impossible because kinds are qualities and
qualities cannot be divided, plus if something is indivisible either in degree or in kind, which it
seems they must be, then all things would be indivisible by the same argument that neither
water nor syllables are per se indivisible. However, just because something, and here I must
trouble the reader by confessing my own contradictions and confusions on the text, but I think
what Aristotle means, is that just because something is indivisible that does not make it
immaterial nor does divisibility in the subject mean anything about its nature. For water is
indivisible according to form, and when divided its "parts" are actually new waters -compare this
to Aristotle's description of the division of a worm, which results not in a worm plus a part, but
in two worms. Likewise in syllables there can be no divisibility without destroying the nature of
the syllable. Yet not everything is divided such that no parts -and I mean proper parts -are
produced, for we may do so with artifacts (chairs, pots, etc.) and with people (parts of eyes,
flakes of skin, etc.) because in the former there is no nature but in the latter there is; and to
distinguish between mechanical and natural motion, and part and true part; wherein motion
exists properly and only truly in the latter, is a tough job for both the student and the teacher,
since we do not today follow this subtlest of all of Aristotle's distinctions. But such was
Aristotle's meaning I suspect.

Is the soul an element? then is it a material cause? can this be resolved by a diagnonal
argument? This question I bring up in order to exploit an ambiguity in Aristotle's exposition of
element, form, and principle, and part/whole. A diagonal argument similar to Cantor's proof that
infinite numbers can fit within a finite line, and by analogy the infinite soul can fit within the
body, would not suffice for Aristotle as it would be (a) a mere analogy and (b) it would be a proof
from an alien genus; proving a psychological or metaphysical fact from numbers and math.
Suffice to say, that this question is answered by appealing to the distinction between "parts" and
proper parts: for the parts which are homogeneous with the elements or substance has the
nature of the substance (parts of water are water) but the parts which are heterogenous are not
of the substance -the hands, the mouth, the eyes, when separated are no longer properly hands,
eyes, etc. Therefore, it follows that the soul, can subsist of itself even when separated from the
whole substance, since it alone is truly the primary element of the whole, which latter is made
up of it in addition with the most important elements (water, earth, etc.) of the flesh, and the
rest of the body is just a conglomerate of lesser so-called parts although, some things being
elements (the bodily flesh) are necessary for the substance/mind/soul. This is what I would
imagine to be Aristotle's position.

This somewhat exotic distinction in Aristotle is hinted at in various places, but I will adduce a few
here. For instance in Aristotle Book V chapter 8 "Of "substance" ", he treats of "simple bodies"
which I call primary or proper parts: wherein he lists, "(1) simple bodies,(2) primary parts e.g.
mind in man (3) that which if destroyed", he says tellingly, "destroys the whole (4) essence"; as
an aside I ask here can elements be predicated of each other? Elements are not however forms
or substances, that is why elements can be predicated of each other, or even transform into each
other.

In this connection we should note that Aristotle mentioned, that in relation to "forms" physical
things are "not-beings"; which is more proof of the above subject of Aristotle's distinction
between the primary elements (form) and the body (not-being). It would be to the point of our
researches if we allowed Aristotle to speak for himself here, by quoting him at length at (1031 a
20),
"Now in the case of accidental unities the two would be generally thought to be
different, e.g. white man would be thought to be different from the essence of white
man. For if they are the same, the essence of man and that of white man are also the
same; for a man and a white man are the same thing, as people say, so that the essence
of white man and that of man would be also the same. But perhaps it does not follow
that the essence of accidental unities should be the same as that of the simple terms.
For the extreme terms are not in the same way identical with the middle term. But
perhaps this might be thought to follow, that the extreme terms, the accidents, should
turn out to be the same, e.g. the essence of white and that of musical; but this is not
actually thought to be the case."
So if something is an accidental unity, like the heterogeneous parts with the body or
substance, then it does not make up the essence-substance of the being. So no
accidental unity is substantial or essential and this is why there are such things as
female humans and male humans, and humans who have one leg and others who have
two; for these unities are accidental to human nature."

Also, note that in chapter 16 (1040a 5-10): some parts of things are "potencies" for oneness is
not substantial but is predicated of many things. And note: parts are those things which are the
"material elements" e.g. bones, nerves, hair, etc. which are not elements and so are not formal
parts of human nature, and it is precisely of these that Aristotle calls potencies which again
supports this commentator's earlier positions.

Of Genus:
Here perhaps the reader or student is wondering how Aristotle would classify "the universe"
-the whole genus of things -if it be a genus - for it contains no opposites, since then there would
be differentia of the universe and so different species of universe. Or it would contain opposites
but would not be a genus but a common notion or general idea like "being" or "truth" or "unity".
The universe is not one whole, for then it would have its own formal "act" and also we and all
things would be parts either proper or otherwise which would commit Aristotle to some physical
and metaphysical ideas, like monism, which he explicitly denied. However, the universe is
supposed by thinkers today, to be like the worm, in that it is made up of a basic stuff, like
"aether" or "space-time" or "quantum-whatever" or even "vibrating strings". Either way there is
postulated basic stuff, and if so, then the universe is basically divisible as to number but not as to
form. If this is true, then how can individual things exist in an Aristotelian framework? How
would Aristotle answer this question -how did he conceive the heavens from the p.o.v. of his
metaphysics? I think an answer begins by considering three options: a continuous plenum
cannot move except accidentally in itself, neither then can things in it, so that the motion of
planets is only accidental, they move only insofar as their orbits move, or (2) if it does move, this
motion is due to the impetus given by a first mover, or (3) that the universe is not of one basic
stuff but each part of it is as pliable and resistent as the body which naturally occupies it, so that
motion is natural to that body, yet the laws of that motion are restricted only to the local of that
body. The most Aristotelian answer, would be closer to #3, for as per Aristotle's physics, the
different parts of the world have their places, but the universe itself has no place, and so is not
one in the positive but only negative sense, as in, "without plurality" and not "this one thing". So
if all things have unique places that have unique aptitudes for the things in place, then the
universe is heterogeneous can contain individuals, and some parts contain different ratios of
matter than other places. It follows then, that for Aristotle, the universe could not be made up of
a single undifferentiated stuff, however, and Aristotle is murky on this point but says things
which could agree with this interpretation. Granted all this, it is this commentator's opinion, that
if Aristotle were to answer these questions then he would say that the universe itself is just
either a common notion or an analogous description based solely on our experience of this part
of the universe. As such then, the universe would not be a Genus.

Of Substances:

Aristotle's questions, which he ponders in Book III and which he will try to answer in the rest of
Metaphysics express his entire philosophy of substance. I shall list his questions: Questions:
Whether the investigation of causes per se belongs to one science? Whether such a science
should investigate just these causes or also the indemonstrable first principles? Whether there
are multiple sciences of substance? Are there non-physical substances? Should there be inquiry
into only substance or its primary attributes too? We should here disregard his questions on
axioms and first principles, yet we shall take them up later. Our main interest here is substance.

At (997a 15) Aristotle asks, that if substance is treated of in one science, then how can this be,
since all substances are different and for one type of being there is one science? But at (997 a 30)
Aristotle realizes, that even if you could treat of substance in one science, in anycase, to
demonstrate substance is to reason in a circle. For no one can prove what substance is as is clear
from Posterior Analytics, rather one must assume either the name or the meaning or some fact
but if all things were provable, then there would be an infinite number of sciences and then
nothing would be provable. Likewise if all things were provable, then there would be no simply-
grasped particles of speech like verbs or nouns; for verbs and nouns do not require copulas or
extended syllogisms to be known but are understood by intellectual "sensation".

Continuing on, and focusing on what this means for substance, at (1001 a 5) Aristotle critiques the
notion of substances-as-unity/being. Are unity and being, taken as abstract ideas, substances? If
not, then neither will number, which is derived from unity, be a substance, but if so, then a
substance being both being and unity would be the only substance in existence, for it would be
both superlatively one and superlatively existing, and there would be no non-being. He sums up
his critique at (1001b 5) by saying that numbers, planes, and points, etc. are not substances, for
they are more intelligible than bodies, but indivisible and/or intellectual and so cannot explain
the physical world.

What then is substance? This question Aristotle will not finish answering until the entirety of
Metaphysics is complete. But it seems a constant assumption of Aristotle's, that substance must
be a concrete individual or share all the criteria of one, and consequently, can be either pure
actuality or a mix of act and potency. Consequently as well, being can never be an abstract thing
like "Unity" or "Being" nor a universal idea.

Of universals:

It appears that, universals are more extensive than principles or forms or elements yet, based on
other works, seem only to exist in the mind. Now the highest universals are especially
problematic from this point of view, since these "transcendentals" we will opine later, are
understood by a particular mode of inference. Therefore, we must do the best we can to deliver
an Aristotelian answer to the question of whether so-called transcendentals (abstract ideas like
goodness or existence) exist in the mind or outside of it. I believe it would be too much to expect
that Aristotle conceived of these "transcendentals" as something like the Platonic "Ideas". For, it
seems extravagant to say the least, that Aristotle believed that man has a direct intuitition into
the nature of supposed substances which are above sense, yet while being ignorant even of
substances which are perceptible . However, someone could reply, that though we have an
intuition of this nature we only have it according to our own power and the mode of its
propagation in an opaque "atmosphere", just like we experience sun-light. For perhaps the
"ideas" could only be present to us in the form of an echo and only by our power to hear it, for
otherwise we should have a faculty of innate and all-seeing understanding within us, with which
to immediately know any essence. But this goes against the peripatetic description of science as
well as common experience. Even so it seems absurd to believe that we understand by the light
of some higher substance, whether spiritual or not, whether intelligent or not, yet only so far as
this act is intelligible to us, since this would imply that this light is somehow refractable or
impeded, which goes against the idea of an immediate contact of a higher, more actualized
being with the mind; or it implies that a more potent act affects things only-so-far-as-they-can-
be-affected in which case, how could it proceed a higher actuality? For the notion of higher
being implies higher actuality, and means that all things lower are more passible in relation to it.
For these reasons then, I opine that Aristotle would come down closer to the position that the
"transcendentals" exist only in the mind and proceed from the soul's power of understanding.

(4) Perishable vs Imperishable Principles

What did Aristotle mean by this quote: "if principles are differentiated between perishable and
non-perishable, then if they are non-perishable, the original problem will occur", at (1000 b 25)?
Aristotle means that if elements are perishable then, must they not dissolve into elements or
spin out into an infinite regress? Because, if not that, then must they be perishable things which
are made of imperishables? but how and why; since a thing must be homogeneous with its
principle? that is his meaning.

Significant problems arise from this interpretation however. Note: Aristotle says that perishable
things must have perishable principles, yet then, only the perishable will exist if only the
perishable principle exists, for then it will be impossible for anything but the perishable to exist,
for in my opinion, if the imperishable exists in this case, then it will have to be the principle of
the perishable and the imperishable being as it is supposed by Aristotle, a sign of a higher type
of being, nothing would perish or therefore be perishable. So Aristotle's argument leads him to a
cul-de-sac, either all things are temporary or they are never-ending. But there are many
unexplored (by me) intricasies to this objection. For we can conceive of a universe where
nothing perishes actually but potentially could perish as it has the nature to do so, just as we can
conceive of a universe where only one planet exists, but for that, the nature of that single world
would not be the essence of "planet"/all thinkable planets per se, anymore than the nature of
this one "perishable", which-happens -to-not-perish, would be the essence of perishability. And
also, this would be quite supported by Aristotle's descriptions of the world so far, as a complex
unity of diverse and essentially different things -for the animal is both matter and form, the
universe is the result of a simple and uncomplicated principle, and etc. Yet these observations
seem to cut against Aristotle's ideas on modal logic namely, that the future is always contingent.

I believe we must solve this problem by appealing to the existence of nested acts and potencies.
For Aristotle, potencies are things that either could act, or they could-could act, and the
perishable then, are things which are primarily the former but secondly the latter, and that is
why the perishable cannot have an imperishable principle, except perhaps in the second-order
sense which is expressed by the latter expression of "could-could act".

(5) The Being of "Forms"

What are "Forms"? To the student this question is readily answered in the case of Plato, but
what should he answer in Aristotle's case? For Plato his "forms" were just general ideas which
seemed to have a sort of, general existence which individual things participated in, as all things
participate in light. Aristotle, as any philosophy undergraduate could tell you, denied these forms
but how and why? And to complicate matters, even Aristotle affirmed the existence of forms,
again, even a green student could list to you Aristotle's four causes amongst which we find the
"formal cause". But obviously, Aristotle's forms could not be Plato's there must have been some
qualification. What exactly this qualification consists of is the subject of this essay. We find first, a
clue in ch15 (1039b 20) where Aristotle says that "ideas" are either unknowable by being singular
or are multiple and so then, not "ideas". That is, if Platonic "forms" are substances, then either
Platonic "forms" are singular individuals, and so they cannot truly be those universal and general
concepts which Plato described, or they must be multiple/plural, and in that case they are no
longer "forms", for multiplicity is of individual things and so again, not of Platonic "forms".
Furthermore, we see implied here that if Aristotle believed in forms, then these would definitely
be concrete individual substances.

We would learn much about form from Aristotle's critique of "substance" and "principle".

For at (999a 10) Aristotle takes up this critique and he poses some questions. What is substance?
And also, what is a principle? Perhaps through being a concrete unity species is a principle? But
no concrete individual is either prior or posterior to another and so cannot be a source of
inference; but what of principles instantaneous with their effects? Aristotle doesn't ask this
question though it is implied by his physics and his logic while also showing how risky it can be to
burden metaphysics with physics -in my opinion. But this objection about simultaneous things:
relatives, correlatives, etc. can be answered in a peripatetic way. For Aristotle, relatives are the
least substantial things; this is perhaps due to them being derivative, whereas substance is
subsistent; relatives are directed out whereas substance is directed in; and relatives need the
other term for their being; whereas substance, while it exists, does not require anything for its
being. Also, individuals fall short of the concept of principle, since they are not universal and
because they are separated.

(999a 30) But wait, how can there be knowledge of individuals? For individuals are infinite, but
Aristotle is not following his own rules; they are potentially infinite. The reason Aristotle doesn't
follow his rules here is that he takes a surprisingly platonic look at the situtation. For Aristotle
seems to accept, with no explanation and as an enthymeme, that matter is infinite and the
principle of individuation. Certainly prime matter is infinite in its unknowability, as are, for
Aristotle, individuals and accidents -per their individuality and accidentality. In this way perhaps
we can salvage Aristotle's consistency, as long as we remember that Aristotle never before did
hold to the actual infinity of individuals. No genera can exist separately, & if genera were
principles, then how could it exist separately since then there would be genus separated from
species?

At (999b 30) Aristotle reiterates that if things were one in kind (quality) only, then there could be
no knowledge, and if all answering to one form, then there could not be plurality. For if all was
one then science, which proceeds from a higher truth to a lower truth could not exist since all
truths about being would be simple and reduced to one. But there is a difficulty, that I detect
about science. If it provides a knowledge of all genera and the species under them, and
knowledge is always non-contingent, then how can there be contingency in the universe at all?
However, some of the things which are contingent are so in a non-contingent way, so that even
these can be known e.g. the phases of the moon or the cycles of the seasons and the eclipses.
Also the knowledge which is locally necessary, need not be globally necessary etc.

At ch 4: on genera and contraries, a bit of a digression. (981 a 5) Aristotle, discusses experience

versus wisdom and art, and generally says that experience and memory eventually lead to true
wisdom, which is above either -and by wisdom he means ontology. Perhaps then, we could say
that those people who are weighed down by experience cannot progress to wisdom, for wisdom
is accompanied by a certain cessation of experience and memory since we have experienced and
remembered all that we need.

All this talk of substances, now reaches its head at ch6 (987 b 20). Here Aristotle objects to Plato's
distinctions of plurality vs individuality; for Plato said that "form" created singularity but
"matter" created plurality. However as Aristotle objects, nature does not work this way; for the
cock impregnates many hens and the builder makes many tables. Note however the ambiguous
relation of form to matter: it is singular regarding itself but multiple in its effects, and from the
p.o.v. of matter and passion it is form which individuizes but from the statical p.o.v and of form it
is matter which individualizes passively and by reception.

Again, Aristotle brings up a contradiction about Plato's philosophy. At (997 b 30) he says, that if
form is to matter as measure to measured, as Plato insisted it was, then if the plurality of things
and matter disappeared then so too would form as they are related as antecedent to consequent
& so this refutes Plato's concepts of forms while indirectly portraying Aristotle's.

For Aristotle then Form must be individual, and concrete, and surprisingly, inert -it is unable to
be a principle of anything either as to cause or to knowledge.

Finally we must recognize against Plato and Pythagoras what Aristotle said about their system,
that the "one" and "dyad" cannot explain plurality since these latter are plural/have the nature
of plurality; the gist of Aristotle's objection being "what caused these to become plural then?".
But further discussion on these systems will be reserved till the later essays.

Therefore, to sum-up, Aristotle's forms were such as to not be universal; a form must be
particular, concrete, individual, and unique. But this is a negative treatment of the question, and
the reader must wait for the positive treatment which is developed through the rest of these
essays.

(6) The Dyanmics of Form and Matter

Though we have been, paying attention to the "statics" of metaphysics; investigating the nature
and definitions of form and matter, we have yet to understand with Aristotle, the interactions of
form and matter.

We begin in chapter 3. Aristotle says here that, material causes can neither corrupt nor begin,
but rather serve as a substratum for alteration and generation. The reason for this is that if
matter and form were generable and did produce themselves, then form would be matter for
form and matter form of another matter, which is absurd. And also, assuming that matter and
form are real beings, then they would be substances and so, just as there cannot be substance
predicated of substance, so too can there be no form of form or matter of matter.

Consequently, Aristotle says that "forms", in the Platonic sense, are useless in that they must be
individuals and so nothing can participate in them, and they cannot be in other individuals.

So because (991a 20) form does not generate (for then there might even be form of form),
Aristotle then concludes that, on Plato's "Theory of Forms" there cannot be motion or
generation, though there obviously is. As a further attack on Plato, Aristotle continues by saying
that (1031b 5) if "forms" are separated from things then no science can exist. But if what Aristotle
is claiming is true, how did Aristotle solve this problem, "if forms must consequently be concrete
things, then how can qualities, which are forms and subjects of science, not exist
independently?" For Aristotle the answer would be simple, qualities are not being/substance in
the fullest sense of the term. As we have seen above, Aristotle held to a distinction between
parts and elements with only the latter being deeply connected to being. In my Aristotelian
solution to the problem, quality here stands-in as part, and exists as a substance only relatively
to the sciences of quality.

Additionally, Aristotle says, that if things differ from their forms, then there would be an infinite
regress. (1033a 25): And if there is an infinite regress then form and matter cannot be produced,
since one cannot reach the terminus of an infinite series.

(1037b 20): Here I ask, what is Aristotle's point in saying that genera don't share in differences?
Perhaps this: if not, then assume that if animal, is divided into hairy and scaley, then the concept
of animal-that-is-hairy must be equal with that of animal-that-is-scaley; because we assume the
genus of animal would share in its own differences. This parallels the problems of accidental
predication e.g. when white-musical-man is supposed to imply a white music, and we must
recognize disunity in the genus. But we want unity of being (for ontological reasons; that there
be a simple element within the substance/definition) and unity of concept (for logical reasons)
and so the genus must not share in differentia. Also if we accept that the animal can share in its
differentiating or any other quality, then we must accept both circular reasoning and that
substances -in this case genus -can be proved.

It follows then, that for Aristotle, form and matter could neither be generated nor corrupted, nor
act, but only on each other.
(7) Definition and the Parts of Definitions

If genera are not known by genus and species, since genus cannot be a species of another genus,
for then even different genus's would be part of each other, which is against Aristotle's words,
then neither would they have definitions, yet the genus of animal can be defined can it not? In
response to this Aristotle would answer that not every term in a definition can be defined or else
it would proceed infinitely. Instead we must be confined to simple terms at the bottom of any
definition and these simple terms are themselves not known by science but by the intuition of
dividing and composing eluded to earlier and which is called "understanding".

At ch4 (1029b 20) Aristotle brings up some problems. Definitions should leave out the term to be
defined. But then, are species defined by something outside? All things will be defined by some
opposite or alien essence? But this is a purely subjective/mental consideration, "human" cannot
be defined using the term "human" since obviously human is not a species of human, but we
know only according to us not according to ontology, which is why we are allowed to vary things
in the mind which are not varied in life, that we may understand things clearly. That is, things are
defined by other outside things according to mind and logical schema but not according to
reality. Note how this treatment parallels our treatment of the distinction between elements and
parts. Element is different from substance and form in that element is more closely connected
to form as opposed to mere "material elements" therefore, there is no need for every term to be
defined, only the least important ones. And so the definition has some solitidity on the part of
the formal elements but the material elements are open to description, and same reality is thus
both infinite/indefinite and definite and confined by concrete, contextual, individuality. But
indeed this does not imply therefore that there are terms within terms, except accidentally nor
does it imply that the material and indefinite parts of a definition are anything but accidental as
far as ontology is concerned.

Aristotle asks an important question at ch10 (1034 b 20): if formulae describes things, then do the
parts of a formula need a formula themselves? One can immediately see that this is a parallel
question with the questions above, and will therefore have parallel answers. In general, Aristotle
will commit himself to the position that there is a basic idea or substance, which is the core and
support of all the other ideas or formulae within a definition and therefore a definition does not
go on infinitely.

Further, at (1030a 5) Aristotle makes a distinction between definition and description, saying that
definition & essence is not the same as description: for the latter is not of a primary substance
and if not, then even books would have essences.

Aristotle also asks about descriptions and their significations, "why do some descriptions mean 1
thing, e.g. man is a rational animal, while others are two e.g. pale man?" The answer is that each
definition is only one if it is per se and of a form/matter complex. At (1039 a 25) Aristotle brings
up a parallel question as if to round out his treatments of parts and wholes: how can there be a
definition of substance without there being many substances in one substance or many
definitions included in one? Simple, the answer here is alluded to above, namely that a
substance is composed of an essential and basic substance which has no other cause within its
genus and is so far then the limit to the being of the complex.

Aristotle later notes also that of all complexes all essential-parts of the definition is the essence
(man is animal and rational) but for abstracts, only the formal parts are essential. For take an
abstract idea like "circle". A circle is essentially a shape with points equidistant from the center,
but the definition of semi-circle, or square-inscribed-in-a-circle are not part of the circular
essence, nor is the matter of the paper which the circle is drawn upon, part of this essence.
Therefore these are not included in the definition of circle.

Lastly, Aristotle states that as the parts of the definition so to the parts of the defined, yet he
also holds that one form can be present in many matters -so evidently some parts of a definition
will only apply partially or maybe the whole definition will only be partial. That is, assume a bowl
can be both gold or wood. On Aristotle's system how can we define bowl? For in the two cases
the matters are different? It seems that no one definition would be true. But we can make a
distinction as usual, about accidental parts and essential parts, and say that the bowl-defined
ignores the accidental (gold or such), and maintains the essential (a basin made of some matter,
designed for containing liquid). Also, if the essential-parts of a definition are prior to the
definition, since they are simpler, then it follows (1) that substances are made of many
substances and (2) that forms are made of forms and (3) that form is prior as to intelligibility and
nobility yet, matter is prior as to generation and tangibility, yet, the whole substance being one
whole, is prior to both as to existence and to the parts as to final causation, and as to the form in
terms of order and perfection. All this seems extravagant and maybe even openly contradictory!
But the things enuciated above are true of all things which experience generation, even of time.
But just as time is not contradictory to time, so too a being-in-becoming is not contradictory to a
being-generated. Positively speaking, we must recognize that there is something in Aristotle,
implicit within his utterances called the plurality of modes of knowledge but which we must
treat of in a different essay.

(8) Axiomatics in Relation of Metaphysics and Vice-Versa

Aristotle's questions, which included questions about logic and axioms, should now be tackled in
this essay. These questions, as a reminder were: Whether the investigation of causes per se
belongs to one science? Whether such a science should investigate just these causes or also the
indemonstrable first principles? Whether there are multiple sciences of substance? Are there
non-physical substances? Should there be inquiry into only substance or its primary attributes
too?

Before we begin note: how does Aristotle get over the problem that for him, since, the fact of
existence is required for science but since facts are singulars and singulars are unprovable it
follows that science is not provable? But science is not provable -it proceeds from unprovable
axioms -and facts are known by a different power than science.

To the question of whether all the causes are investigated by one science Aristotle answers No
(but he will qualify this later), because the causes in one science are not comparable or
subaltern with/to the causes of another science, and each science uses one of the 4 causes and
so all separately does its part in understanding the causes.

(996b 25) To the question, can a science treat of both substance and axioms (indemonstrable
principles) Aristotle is undecided (but will later say yes). But here he writes that if there is a
science of axioms then either some of the axioms are axioms or some of the axioms have a
matter (and so are not axioms). The question requires more consideration.

ch3 (1005b 5) : That axiomatics is part of metaphysics, is a point on which Aristotle finally decides
here. Though in Book III he had determined that knowledge of first principles was not treated in
one science, still, the chief reason for revising this idea is his discovery that Metaphysics studies
the chief cause and being-in-abstract from all its particularities (motion, change, rationality, etc.)
and so it studies logic in a way, abstracted from all its particularities and appropriate to
ontological subject matter.

This allows Aristotle to announce, in ch4 (1006 a 5), his metaphysical principle of non-
contradictory attributes. For here Aristotle shows that the principle of non-contradiction holds
not just as the chief axiom of all thought and logic but also the chief principle of metaphysical
and physical existence. For it is obvious that things cannot be both one and two in the same way,
and even in the field of quantum theory, quantum numbers are conserved.

Concluding this essay, let us tackle an ambiguity which troubled Aristotle and see how he solved
it. At (1044b 30) Aristotle asks, what is the relation between a corpse and a human vis-a-vis
actuality and potentiality for not any relation will be reasonable e.g. "a corpse is just a potential
human", for said this way then, it would be in the nature of a corpse to come to life at some
time. A corpse is potentially a man on account of matter, then, but is so only analogically on
account of privation of form. And further the wine is potentially vineagar on account of it's
matter which vis-a-vis it's total composite is the nature of an accident on account of it's potential
self (potential water) from which p.o.v. it, then essentially produces vinegar.

(9) The Being of "Unity" and The Being of Numbers

At last we take up Aristotle's critique of the ontology of numbers and by extension of Platonic
"forms". At (1053b 20) Aristotle makes a very charateristic remark about the status of unity/the
unit/the singular as a substance; for just as substance is not universal so too is not unity a
substance. And by unity he means the abstract concept of number as being is the abstract
concept of existence.

He later remarks that everything has a "one" which defines it, and so too does substance. For
instance, in number "1" is the measure/that which defines, in language "syllable"; philosophy of
justice, "the good", and so on. It was this pattern which persuaded some thinkers to say that
"Unity" was the substance of the universe, as being it's measure.

(1080a 15) Contains Aristotle's refutation of the Pythagoreans, and the Pythagorean-Platonists
who claimed that number was the substance of all things. Now, either number is specifically the
substance of all things and so is either totally or partially incommutable/inassociable; since
numbers then must constitute the form and the nature of things; or they are totally
commutable/associable for every number, being as it were, merely as their matter. The first
option makes it impossible to conceive how there could be sums of numbers nor how the "dyad"
works in creating number, and the second option makes it impossible to conceive of how
number could be substance at all, for the essences would always change by addition or
subtraction of a unit. He concludes his critique on numbers at (1083 b)

But I would like to take up a challenge. Although Aristotle says at, (1060 b 5 &30 ) that, if form is
one in number, then all will be the same, what could prevent Aristotle from saying, that there
could be different manifestations of form just as there are different shapes in one water or
better yet according to a sort of Spinozan Idealism where individuals are just manifetations of a
single ideal "Being"? Here I would respond that Aristotle did not take this view into account
because here the different manifestations would be fully homogeneous with being, and not the
obviously different individuals that corrupt and generate. Therefore since Aristotle would've
seen this alternative as just another type of monism, and since he rejected monism, Aristotle
would've rejected this too.

(10) The Dynamics of Genus, Differentia, and Species (with Privation/Possession included).

I would like to spend some time on an essay explaining Genus, Differentia, and etc. simply
because it makes no sense to not cross the t's and overlook details which never lack value for a
full understanding of Aristotle.

Genera are divided from each other by privatives and by negation (998 b 20) but not by scientific
knowing, for then the genera would be predicated of its differentia and this never happens as
Aristotle said. And these negations and privations are from another point of view positives and
are the great supra-categories of Being, Unity, and etc. But genera are not contraries, for then
they would have intermediates, so they could be contradictories, though I don't know if Animal
and Plant are necessarily contradictory as A and -A are. Now things are contradictory in two
ways; either as A or not-A, and in that sense we have "unit" and "all the rest of the numbers"
(since these are just complementary sets). But we also have essential contradictories where the
definitions themselves are opposed: so plant and rock would be these kinds since in no way do
they share in each other.

But let us answer an ambiguity. It seems that the combination of contraries and the other
supposed conceptions of genera like corruption through privation, and etc. are mere logical
effects that don't have to do necessarily anything at all with reality. For instance, at (1013 b 10)
Aristotle says that the presense or privation of a cause, causes the presence or privation of an
effect. But is this true? Here I would like to stop and comment on this statement. The dynamics
of contaries and contradictories appears quite messy: it would appear that the dynamical laws of
contraries and genera are paralogisms; that unlikes have a tendency to combine seems to be
only supposing their movement, and indeed, their perpendicular movement, but of themselves
why should not, these unlikes have a tendency to separation, as hot air rises and cold air sinks?
In real life though we do see that contraries combine, yet what metaphysical relevance does this
have? It seems to overcomplicate metaphysics by taking up an idea of physics. The same
questions should be asked of similars and of the heavy and the rare -do similars have a nature to
combine or per the magnet, or sexual attraction, to repel? Or do heavy and light things combine
to form something heavier, or does the heavy merely obliterate the light and retain its
weight/mass, or does the heavy lose its heaviness by dilution with the light? All these seem to
be overly empirical considerations for metaphysics and in no place does Aristotle prove that this
is how contraries act -in either physics or metaphysics he merely assumes such.

But here we must back-track and recall the teachings in Aristotle's logic. For Aristotle the division
of genus into species, and the concommitant laws of oppositition and reciprocation between
contraries, is not primarily ontological but rather rests on logical considerations. For if contraries
do not merge, then they either diverge or they are static. Now if they are static then it is
impossible to ennuciate or describe change in a way that is anything but rhetorical or poetic. If
they diverge or separate then they must merge still, since species of a genus are not all
subaltern/nested; horse must merge into man. But we never see this happening and so, the
norm of logical speech, which is truth, is no longer present. Therefore, we must conclude that
contraries do infact and in speech, tend to combine and intermingle.

The following just offers some insight into Aristotle's views on the dynamics of genus: At (998 b
10) He asks are the principles generic or specific: if we look at concrete examples and experience
it seems that the principles must be specific, but if we look at how things are known the genus
seems to be the starting point and prior to species, of knowledge. Here Aristotle is questioning
whether genus or species is a principle of being and he seems to be impressed by genus's
intelligibility. Along the same vein he inquires at (998 b 20) whether the most abstract, and thus
most intelligible, genus is a principle? If so however, then it would be predicated of its
differentia which is impossible.

The reader or student might be confused at (1054 a 25) where Aristotle says that divisible and
indivisible are contraries. Yet are these not contradictories and have no intermediate? But this
difficulty dissolves upon realizing that Aristotle is using the terms continuously; for the divisible
has many points whereas the indivisible is just one point and between many and few there is
"medium".

As to genus and its relation with definition, Aristotle asks at (1045 a 30) why does genus share in
the species without itself becoming many? The answer Aristotle gives to this question is that,
genus is matter and only exists with form in the complex.

So concludes our essay on genus and its relations.

(11) The properties of the "First Movers" and Formal Substances in General

In this essay, we now at last can reach the summit of Aristotle's philosophy -his treatment of the
first mover and of formal substance. What is the nature of the first mover and what is its value to
ontology?

Well Aristotle, beginning at (1071b 5) makes an argument parallel to that in Physics, namely that
the first mover must exist because without it, there could be no necessary motion.

Secondly, Aristotle discusses the existence of the first mover, who must be outside the moved
universe, and so must be non-corporeal and therefore only form without matter. Likewise
Aristotle determines the numbers of the first mover to be as many as the spheres which move
the planets, determining the number at 47, owing to the observations of ancient astronomers
(1074a 10).

But what does the first mover think about? Only about the, according to Aristotle, highest thing
namely itself (1074b 30).

Evidently the first mover is non-material, as Aristotle made clear in the Physics. It follows that it
will be a substance that is form only, and not matter. For if it had matter it would have to be
intelligible matter, yet as we will show later, this type of matter only exists in a thinking mind. At
(1045b) therefore, Aristotle says that a being that is pure form is a truly independent and unique
individual thing with its species/form wholly to itself.

Thus ends our essay on this most interesting topic of Aristotle.

(12) On the Equal the Unequal

I would also like to append a treatise on Aristotle's discussion in Book VIII (I think) about the
equal and the unequal. It is an exceedingly confusing and jumbled discourse, but I will clear
things up for the reader.

Firstly at (1056a25) Aristotle talks about how the equal is the intermediate of the great and the
small; he gives a similar argument on the "one" at (1056 b 5). It proceeds in a kind of awkward
way, first by Aristotle recognizing that the equal is neither especially contrary to the great nor to
the small. From this he then concludes that it is equally the privation of both and a medium
between the two. The same he says holds for the one.

This explains what he meant at (1055 b 10) when he said that "everything either equal or not
equal but not everything equal or unequal" For though equal and unequal at first seem to be
two contradictories they are actually the media between respective contraries. Therefore though
things can be disjunctively equal or unequal they are not both equal and not-equal at the same
time, as being in different series. However, the not-equal and the equal are definitely
contradictory.

Hopefully, this essay has thrown some light on these passages.

(13) Miscellaneous subjects

1. At this point I would like to clear up, for the reader and student's benefits, a few points
in Aristotle that are confusing but only make up a small portion of the text. First, what
did Aristotle mean by intelligible matter? He did not mean to say that ideas were
material or that matter could somehow become intellect, but rather that some ideas are
concretely understood along with a substrate. Materially this might be the paper an idea
is drawn upon and mentally it might be the accidents imagined with a thing, but
intellectual matter is not a substance or a thing. For instance, in the mind, one may
understand the circle, but also the semi-circle; and this latter is the intelligible matter of
the full circle. Aristotle is rather clear on the existence of intelligible matter for he says at
(1035a 5), that there is intellectual matter and he repeats himself on the point at chapter
six of book eight.

2. Additionally, what ontic status do common terms have? Common notions for instance,
like all-grey men, or all the red stones for these may not express either a
species/essence nor a genus nor a universal (like being or unity). So what is the being of
these things and what is the being of intentional objects? It seems that they are mere
affections of the mind, and exist in the mind, as the minor parts of the body exist. But
though they predicate general ideas, so too does the method of division, and yet for
division, that does not hinder the crossing of genera nor the circuitousness of reason.
And for parallel reasons the same can be concluded about common notions. At least
that is my opinion. So common notions seem rather unimportant.

3. There is a bit of a mix-up in ( 994a 5): for despite saying the opposite in his treatise on
generation, Aristotle here says that the material cause is not infinite, why? The material
cause is not infinite in that it doesn't cause matter efficiently, but as to its
possibility/power it is in an infinite relation to possible substances/becomings.(994 b 20)
In any case, essences cannot be infinite for then there would be no definitions and so no
science.

4. Aristotle, in critiquing Plato I believe in Book III, also treats of qualitative and
quantitative infinities, and seemingly makes category mistakes with them e.g. calling
essences "infinite" as if spatially so, but this he does as he deals with the sophistical
objections of other philosophic positions and not as if he held that those infinities were
real or coherent himself.

5. It would be good to return to the topic of the divide between the mental representation
 of reality, and reality itself in Aristotle. In treating of his Logic I viewed Aristotle as
holding necessarily to the position that being-in-thought and being-as-being were
different and need not overlap. Yet starting from his Physics and now in his Metaphysics
I see that this view is becoming less and less defensible or at least that the emphasis has
changed to the more realist focus. For Aristotle, as I implied before in this work, and as
implied in his digressions, seemed to hold both that accidents/parts are real and also
that they are a form of non-being. But yet, accident can be both being and non-being
from different aspects. But is this not precisely a problem? For if the ontology of
something changes due to our point-of-view -how we think about it -it follows that our
mind and reality are in a 1-to-1 proportion and totally overlapping. Is this really possible
for Aristotle? I think not, since he frequently attacks the saying of Protagoras that "Man
is the measure of all things". Therefore, we must distinguish three ways of knowing in
Aristotle, just as there are three modes of being which are known. The first mode of
knowing and the being for this mode, is the calculative mode which sees thoughts and
imaginings as well as perceptions and sensations which feel accidents and affectations,
the second mode of knowning is the rational mode of science and it sees objects but
only physical objects, while the third mode of knowing sees being and even formal being
and it does so by apriori intuition and by understanding. All these modes have external,
ontological objects (though I am not claiming that these are distinct powers in the
mind); the first to the accidental properties, the second to the elements, and the third to
substance. Error only comes about, when the powers of one mode are applied to a
different one.

6. At the start of book XI, Aristotle again confuses the reader, by saying at (1059 a 20) that
since sciences deal with contraries but there is nothing contrary to being, how can
metaphysics be a science? Here Aristotle deals with this question expertly, by saying that
though being has no contrary, it has the study of all contraries-in-the-abstract as it's
special field. As an analogy, the medical art deals with health and the contraries in
health, hot and cold. So likewise the metaphysician deals with being as well as the few
and the many or better yet, with contrary-ness itself and sameness.

7. Aristotle also makes an eye-raising statement at (1051 b 5) namely, that it is not possible
to err on what a thing is. What he means, is that the mind per se understands the true,
just as the will per se desires the good, and so it is not possible to err on the
understanding and intuition of the essence of things; for essences cannot be proven only
directly intuited. But just as the will per se desires the good, but there may be error in
the application and specifics and so vice, so too can the intellect misunderstand or
misdirect its understanding of specifics and so there is ignorance.

Such then is the conclusion to this essay and this whole collection of essays which I hope, has
shed light on the reader.