G.R. No.

195247 June 29, 2015

1. ANASTACIO TINGALAN, substituted by his heirs, namely: ROMEO L. TINGALAN, ELPEDIO L. TINGALAN,
JOHNNY L. TINGALAN and LAURETA T. DELA CERNA, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES RONALDO and WINONA MELLIZA, Respondents.

2. DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. SARMIENTO

3. DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. REYES

4. HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:
the property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite,
more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998,
applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land
registration covering the property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the
property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for
more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title. 1

To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan presented during
trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)

fter trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanan’s application for land registration,
disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the operation of Act
141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-
0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324)
Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to
other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence
at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite

On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for
registration of Malabanan

Issue: WON applicant is entitled to registration only when the land subject of the application had been declared
alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Held:

Classifications of public lands

according to alienability

Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the classification of public
lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution,18 lands of the public domain were classified into
three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral.19 Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of
the public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral,
timber or forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law might provide other classifications. The 1987
Constitution adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but
added national parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be
devoted.21 The identification of lands according to their legal classification is done exclusively by and through a
positive act of the Executive Department.22

Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be alienated. Under
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated; all other
natural resources may not be.

Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those
classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code, 23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the
public domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be
agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of
alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural. 24 A positive act of the Government is necessary
to enable such reclassification,25 and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in
the Executive Department, not in the courts.26 If, however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest
or timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer intended for public service or for the development
of the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such
conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases
where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect. 27 Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its
prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President declares that the State no longer intends
the land to be used for public service or for the development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.

Disposition of alienable public lands

Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:

Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:

(1) For homestead settlement;

(2) By sale;

(3) By lease; and

(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;

(a) By judicial legalization; or

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent)

The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at which prescription may run
against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title
that is acquired by reason of the applicant’s possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural
land of the public domain. Where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with
through actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant
by the Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that such a grant be
sanctioned by the courts.

To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period
of possession - possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or
earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration
of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained
ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be
ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth.1

5. G.R. No. L-37435 November 28, 1934

NUMERIANO PADILLA, applicant-appellee,

vs.
PABLO REYES and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositors-appellants.

Attorney-General Jaranilla and Jose Nava for appellants.

Sison and Siguion for appellee.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Appellee applied for the registration in his name of a parcel of land containing a little over 161 hectares located in
Bongabong, Nueva Ecija. The application was opposed by the Director of Lands and by nine homesteaders, on the
ground that the property sought to be registered was public land. One Pablo Reyes, who claimed to be the exclusive
owner of the land, also filed an opposition. After due hearing, the court below dismissed all the oppositions and
decreed the registration of the land in the name of the appellee. From this judgment all the parties who opposed the
application appealed, although Pablo Reyes' appeal was dismissed for failure to file his brief on time.

In support of this appeal the following errors have been assigned: (1) That the lower court erred in holding that the
appellee has established his title to the property sought to be registered, and (2) that the lower court erred in
decreeing the registration of the property in the name of the appellee.

Appellee presented no valid and sufficient title deed showing his ownership of the land in question. He, however, tried
to prove that he inherited the same from his ancestors, who had been in possession of the land for many years dating
back to the Spanish regime; that he as well as his predecessors in interest had party cultivated the land and partly
used it as a pasture; that various improvements had been made on the land ever since the Spanish regime; and that
upon the death of their father, Pablo Padilla, he and his sister Alejandra took possession of the land. On the other
hand, the appellants introduced evidence tending to show that the land in question was never occupied by Pablo
Padilla during the Spanish regime; that when the several homesteaders settled upon the land during the 1912 to
1918, the same was unoccupied, unclaimed, and without any sign of previous cultivation or occupation; that the
homesteaders were not molested in their possession of portions of the land in question until 1927, after they had
cleared their holdings and put the same in cultivation.

In Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa vs. Municipality of Taal (38 Phil., 367, 376), this court said: " . . . In order, however,
that the petitioner for registration of his land under the Torrens system shall be permitted to have the same registered
and to have the benefit resulting from the certificate of title finally issued, the burden is upon him to show that he is
the real and absolute owner, in fee simple, of the lands which he is attempting to have registered. The petitioner is
not entitled to have his lands registered under the torrens system simply because no one appears to oppose his title
and to oppose the registration of his lands. In order that land may be registered under the torrens system, the
petitioner must show, even though there is no opposition, that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple, of the same. . .
."1awphil.net

On the other hand, it is well-settled that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express
or implied, from the government. A grant is conclusively presumed by law when the claimant, by himself or through
his predecessors in interest, has occupied the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and under a claim of title since
July 26, 1894, or prior thereto. (Ongsiaco vs. Magsilang, 50 Phil., 380.) In the case before us, appellee has failed to
prove any express grant from the government; neither has he succeeded in proving possession from which a
constructive grant can be predicated.
It results that the judgment appealed from must be reversed, and it is hereby decreed and adjudged that the property
sought to be registered in this case is public land. Without any special pronouncement as to costs in this instance. So
ordered.

6. G. R. No. 42276, January 02, 1936 ]

VALERIANO REYES ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. MATIAS RODRIGUEZ ET AL., DEFENDANTS
AND APPELLANTS

Facts:

The plaintiffs, half brothers of the defendants, brought this action to compel the latter to partition various parcels of
land situated in the Province of Misamis as well as the cattle and carabaos, and to render an accounting of their
administration and of the products of said properties from the year 1910

Clodualdo Rodriguez and Encarnacion de Lara lived as husband and wife for many years and had children, the
defendants Rita, Matias, Romualdo and Romulo. Clodualdo Rodriguez died in 1886. On January 3, 1888, the widow
Encarnacion de Lara contracted a second marriage with Jose Reyes in the town of Butuan, Misamis. The plaintiffs
Valeriano, Jose and Tomas were born of this union. During the marriage of Jose Reyes and Encarnacion de Lara they
acquired parcel No. 1, the portion of 8 hectares, 12 ares and 50 centiares of parcel No. 2, parcel No. 12 and parcel
No. 31. Parcel No. 38 was acquired during the marriage of Encarnacion de Lara to Clodualdo Rodriguez. The portion
of 65 hectares, 40 ares and 38 centiares of parcel No. 2, as well as all the other remaining parcels which are the
subject matter of the complaint, was acquired by the defendants for the community property which then existed, with
money from the products of the other lands administered by them. Jose Reyes died on June 8, 1901, and
Encarnacion de Lara, on May 30, 1910. After the latter's death and while the plaintiffs were under age, Matias
Rodriguez and his other brothers of the same family name took over the administration of all the properties acquired
during both marriages of their mother, without having delivered to the plaintiffs their participations in the fruits from
said year 1910, except that they defrayed the expense for the education and studies of the plaintiffs.

The appellants contend that the lands composing parcel No. 1, known as Hacienda Minlagas, had been
under cultivation many years prior to the registration thereof in the name of the spouses Reyes and De Lara, by
Clodualdo Rodriguez and Gaspar de la Cruz who had formed a partnership engaged in agricultural development, as
shown by Exhibits 1 and 1-A, and that at least from the year 1883, the lands in question had been in the possession
of said partners who had dedicated them later in the cultivation of sugar cane. The evidence which we have carefully
reviewed does not justify the contention of the appellants. While Exhibits 1 and 1-A refer to uncultivated lands of the
State situated in Minlagas, they contain no description of any land. In view of this and of the absence of other
convincing evidence, it cannot be concluded that said exhibits refer to the lands in question, real properties Nos. 15,
26 and 27 of Exhibits E-1, E-2 and E-3. If Clodualdo Rodriguez and Gaspar de la Cruz really cultivated and
possessed parcel No. 1 of the complaint, as claimed by the appellants, there is no doubt that the State would not have
permitted other persons to apply for it or issued free composition titles thereto, in accordance with the provisions of
the Royal Decree of August 31, 1888, then in force. Lastly, granting that they were lands already cultivated
and possessed by said persons, as they have not obtained any title thereto from the State, it is clear that they
cannot invoke any right of ownership or question the titles legally issued. It is held, therefore, that the
first assignment of error, in so far as it refers to parcel No. 1, is not well taken. Sometime later, upon considering
the third assignment of error, we shall discuss the validity of the gratuitous composition titles.

Parcel No. 12 of the complaint was likewise acquired during the marriage of Jose Reyes to Encarnacion de Lara.
According to Exhibit K, this land was not registered in the name of anybody prior to the year 1897, but on April 17th
of said year it was registered for the first time as real property No. 61 in the name of Jose Reyes, and in the record it
was stated that it formed a part of the lands seized from said owner by virtue of a writ of execution issued by the
judge of First Instance of Cagayan de Misamis. This evidence, together with the oral evidence presented, sufficiently
shows that it is one of the properties acquired during the marriage of Jose Reyes to Encarnacion de Lara.

Parcel No. 31 of the complaint was also acquired during the marriage of Jose Reyes to Encarnacion de Lara as
evidenced by Exhibit S which shows that the land was adjudicated to said Jose Reyes by virtue of a gratuitous
adjustment with the State on May 13, 1893, by Governor Juan Zanon as Deputy of the Director General of Civil
Administration of the Philippines, in accordance with the provisions of the Royal Decree of August 31, 1888, the title
so issued having been registered in the registry of deeds of the Province of Misamis on June 28, 1893. The portion
of 8 hectares, 12 ares and 50 centiares of parcel No. 2 is another real property acquired by the spouses
Jose Reyea and Encarnacion de Lara during their marriage, as evi- denced by Exhibit F-1 which shows that on May
13, 1893, Governor Juan Zanon, as Deputy of the Director General of Civil Administration of the Philippines, issued
a gratuitous composition title to the land in favor of Jose Reyes Santa Maria, in accordance with the provisions of the
Royal Decree of August 31, 1888, the title having been registered on July 1, 1893.

In the face of so clear and convincing evidence, as that stated in the foregoing paragraphs, this court cannot agree
with the appellants that said parcels of land had been acquired during the first marriage of Encarnacion de Lara to
Clodualdo Rodriguez, and therefore, the first assignment of error is overruled.

The portion of 65 hectares, 40 ares and 38 centiares of parcel No. 2, and the rest of the parcels of the complaint, are
the subject matter of the second assignment of error. We cannot but agree with the court that, according to the
documentary and oral evidence, all these lands, with the exception of parcel No. 38, were acquired by the sort of
partnership formed by all the brothers and sisters and that Matias Rodriguez, as manager thereof, purchased the
lands with funds from the other lands which were in his charge and under his administration, as the plaintiffs
were then under age and studying. This court finds no error in the judgment providing for the division of these real
properties equally among all the brothers and sisters, the plaintiffs and the defendants. With respect to parcel No.
38, it appears that it had been acquired during the marriage of Encarnacion de Lara to Clodualdo Rodriguez and it
should be distributed in the manner provided in the judgment. The second assignment of error is likewise
declared unfounded.

When the appellees offered Exhibits E-1, E-2, E-3, F-1, K and S as part of their evidence, the appellants objected
vigorously on the ground that they were irrelevant and impertinent. The court overruled the objection and correctly
admitted the documents. This resolution gave rise to the third assignment of error. The appellants contend that the
documents are inadmissible as evidence because they are mere copies of the records, and the original titles
themselves were not presented. As already seen, the documents in question, with the exception of Exhibit K which
will be discussed separately, are duly certified copies of records appearing in the books of the registry of deeds of the
Province of Misamis, authenticated by the register of deeds. As certified copies of entries or records of public and
official nature, they are also public and official documents and, as such, are admissible as evidence in accordance with
the express provisions of sections 299, 313 (6) and 315 of the Code of Civil Procedure. They are prima facie evidence
that the originals of the gratuitous composition titles with the State, covering the lands in litigation, were really
issued by the competent authorities in favor of Jose Reyes' and his wife Encarnacion de Lara, in conformity with the
provisions of the Royal Decree of August 31, 1888, and that they were presented for registration and
actually registered in accordance with the law. As the appellants failed to prove that said originals never existed,
the legal presumption subsists and this court is bound to declare that the titles existed and were issued by the
competent authorities in compliance with the laws then in force (sec. 334 [14, 31] of the Code of Civil Procedure).

The appellants invoke the doctrine laid down by this court in the cases of E. Michael & Co. vs. Enriquez (33 Phil.,
87), Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Martinez and Martinez (44 Phil., 817), and Rodriguez vs. Tan Yeo Sing
(G. R. No. 25972, promulgated Dec. 14, 1926, not reported), holding that the original documents must always be
presented and that secondary evidence thereof are inadmissible until after their existence and loss have been
proven. The facts disputed in said cases completely differ from those involved in the present case. In those cases the
existence of the documents evidencing the contracts had been denied and naturally the originals or the duplicates
thereof had to be presented in accordance with section 321 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and as this requirement
had not been complied with it was held that before secondary evidence of the contents of the documents may be
admitted, it is necessary to prove the existence and loss thereof and that the entries of such private documents in the
public or official registries do not cure the defect or convert them into admissible evidence. The doctrine
so established is not applicable to the case under consideration not only because of the foregoing reasons but also
because in the case of composition titles, they necessarily had to exist and be acted upon in accordance with the
Royal Decree of August 31, 1888 and, under article 15 thereof, their entry in the registry of deeds was inevitable and
obligatory.

Referring to Exhibit K, this court is constrained to admit that it is not an entry of any title of ownership. However, it
is clearly stated therein that the land described, which is parcel No. 12 of the complaint, had been judicially
attached as the exclusive property of Jose Reyes Santa Maria and that it was finally registered as real property No.
61 in the books of the registry of deeds. In the absence of other evidence to the contrary, this authenticated copy of
said entry stated and corroborated by the other oral evidence presented by the appellees sufficiently shows that this
real property is one of those acquired during the marriage of Jose Reyes to Encarnacion de Lara and should be
considered as conjugal property. This" court concludes, therefore, that the third assignment of error is not well
founded and is likewise untenable.

The fourth and last assignment of error is a corollary of the former ones and the appellants offer no new arguments in
support thereof. This court deems it unnecessary to dwell upon said assignment.

The appellants insinuate in their brief that they are entitled to credit for the improvements made .by them,
consisting in the planting of from 4,500 to 6,000 coconut trees 5, 15 and 20 years old. Inasmuch as the parties have
agreed to suspend, until a later date, the claim upon fruits of all the lands during the time they were administered by
the defendants-appellants, and believing that the credit for improvements may properly be included in the action for
rendition of accounts, this court decides that this question should likewise be reserved to the appellants for them to
allege and claim when all the questions relative to the rendition of accounts will be determined. In view of all the
foregoing considerations, the appealed judgment is affirmed, with the costs of this instance to the appellants.

So ordered.

RESOLUTION OP THE APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

December 29, 1936

IMPERIAL, J.:

In their motion for reconsideration, the appellants seek to set aside the decision promulgated in the case, with
respect to parcels Nos. 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 18, 22, 27, 29, 33, 35, 36, 38, 40, 46 and 47 (page 1 of the motion).

I. The appellants contend that a portion of parcel No. 1, having an area of 28 hectares and described in Exhibit E-1 as
real property No. 15, should be adjudicated and divided equally among the seven (7) brothers and sisters, not into
two (2) equal parts, one to be distributed among the appellees and the other among the appellants, as provided for
in the decision. The reason alleged therefor is that, according to Exhibit E-1, said portion was acquired by
Encarnacion de Lara. The contention is untenable because, as the property had been acquired during Encarnacion
de Lara's marriage to her second husband, Jose Beyes, it is the conjugal partnership property of said spouses
according to articles 1401 and 1407 of the Civil Code, and it should be distributed in the manner provided in the
decision pursuant to the provisions of articles 930 and 931 of said Code.

II. The appellants contend that a portion of 43 hectares of parcel No. 2, covered by Exhibits 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 19, 20
and 25; parcel No. 5; parcel No. 8; parcels Nos. 18 and 22; parcel No. 27 and parcels Nos. 33 and 35 should be
distributed exclusively among them, the four (4) brothers and sisters of the first marriage, because they have proven
that the phrase "y hermawos" appearing in the documents of acquisition refers to them alone, excluding the three
(3) brothers of the second marriage surnamed Reyes. The evidence referred to consists in the statements of Rita
Rodriguez and Romualdo Rodriguez (not Romualdo Reyes as alleged on page 3 of the motion) who testified that the
phrase in question refers to them, the four (4) brothers and sisters of the first marriage, without including their half
brothers. These statements, however, are of no probatory value and cannot prevail against the contents of the
documents of acquisition because the witnesses were not parties to the contracts entered into by Matias
Rodriguez and the vendors. It does not even appear that they were present during the transactions and, therefore,
their testimony is not competent or convincing evidence to establish the intention of the contracting
parties. Therefore, this court concludes, as already stated in the decision, that all these parcels of
land were acquired by Matias Rodriguez for himself and his brothers and sisters of both marriages inasmuch as he
had the administration of the common property of both marriages and it is presumed that he acquired them with
the common fund for the benefit of all the brothers and sisters (Aliasas vs. Alcantara, 16 Phil., 489; Cortes vs. Oliva,
33 Phil., 480; Dimagiba vs. Dimagiba, 34 Phil., 357; Cabello vs. Cabello, 37 Phil., 328; and Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40
Phil., 857).

It is claimed that the doctrine laid down establishes a bad precedent because a co-owner, who administers
community property, is thereby deprived of his inevitable right to acquire exclusive property with his
own money. This court's answer thereto is that the resolution should not extend or be applied to cases different from
the one under consideration where it appears clearly established by the documents of acquisition that the
properties have really been purchased for all the brothers and sisters with funds presumed to have come from the
income of the common properties. Under the assumption advanced by the appellants, every doubt would vanish if
the co-owner administrator had made an inventory of the common undivided properties and had made a liquidation
of the income and products thereof, with the knowledge and approval of the other co-owners, which precaution has
not been taken in the case under consideration.

III. On page 1 of the motion for reconsideration, parcel No. 7 is included, but this is erroneous because it had been
excluded, from the complaint, the latter having been dis- missed with respect to said parcel, as stated in the decision,
page 31 of the bill of exceptions, and on page 28 of the transcript.

Instead of parcel No. 7, the appellants must refer to parcel No. 6 which they claim should be adjudicated exclusively to
Matias Rodriguez because it appears from Exhibit 7 that it was bought by him from Serapion Borromeo. The
contention is unfounded because it appears from Exhibit 7 that parcel No. 6 was acquired by barter for another
parcel of land belonging to the inheritance left by Encarnacion de Lara, common mother of the appellants and
appellees, and, therefore, the land forms a part of the community property of which Matias L. Rodriguez was
administrator. Furthermore, Matias L. Rodriguez himself stated in the tax declaration No. 9743, Exhibit H-1, that
the land in question belongs to him and his brothers and sisters.

IV. The appellants maintain that parcel No. 24 should be distributed only among Matias Rodriguez and his three
brothers and sisters of the first marriage because according to Exhibit 14, the translation of which is Exhibit 14-A, it
was acquired by their father Clodualdo Rodriguez on March 31, 1875. This document, however, has nothing to do
with parcel No. 24, because it refers simply to the sale of a house 6 1/2 brazas long by 3 1/2 brazas wide, without
including any land. The documentary evidence referring to parcel No. 24 is tax declaration No. 8517, Exhibit M
wherein Matias Rodriguez stated that the land belonged to him and his brothers and sisters.

V. The appellants maintain that parcel No. 29 should be adjudicated exclusively to Romualdo Rodriguez because he
testified that he is in possession thereof from the year 1913. This oral evidence does not detract from the
documentary evidence offered by the appellees, consisting in tax declaration No. 7103, Exhibit Q, wherein Matias
Rodriguez declared that the land belongs to him and his brothers and sisters. Romualdo Rodriguez's possession
must be understood to be exercised in the name of all the co-owners.

VI. The appellants pray that parcels Nos. 46 and 47 be adjudicated exclusively to them because they were acquired by
them alone as shown by Exhibits 25 and 26. This court holds that the claim of the appellants with respect to parcel
No. 46 is untenable, because according to Exhibit 25 this parcel of land was purchased by Matias Rodriguez from
Paulino Donoso for him and his brothers and sisters, without excluding the appellees.

The motion relative to parcel No. 47 is well founded. According to Exhibit 31, not Exhibit 26 as stated in the motion,
the land was mortgaged by Marcelino Vasquez to Romualdo Rodriguez on June 12, 1920, for the sum of P100. It
is stated in tax declaration Exhibit DD, filed by Romualdo Rodriguez on May 3, 1929, wherein the portion of Land so
acquired appears included, that the entire land therein described exclusively belongs to him. He did not declare that
the land belonged to him and his brothers and sisters. For this reason, parcel No. 47 should be excluded from the
partition and declared the exclusive property of Romualdo Rodriguez, not belonging to him and his brothers and
sisters of the same family name, as prayed by the appellants in this motion for reconsideration.

VII. The appellants pray that this court limit to three (3) months the time within which the appellees should
prosecute, in this case or in a separate action, the rendition of accounts which was one of their causes of action but
reserved by them for a later date, and that, in case of their failure to do anything within said period, the appellants
be entitled to plead in this case their cross-complaint to recover the value of the improvements which they made on
the lands to be distributed among all of them. This court is of the opinion that the amendment of the decision to this
effect is justified and in order.

For all the foregoing considerations, the decision promulgated in this case on January 2, 1936, is amended so as to
exclude from the partition parcel No. 47, which is declared to be the absolute and exclusive property of Romualdo
Rodriguez, and it is ordered that the appellees should prosecute their action for rendition of accounts in this case
within three (3) months from the time they receive notice of the decision rendered in this case from the Court of
First Instance of Oriental Misamis, the appellants being entitled to do what they deem proper in connection with
their cross-complaint for the recovery of the value of the improvements made by them on the lands to be distributed
in accordance with the terms of the decision of this court. In all other respects, the motion for reconsideration is
denied.
7. ATUN v. NUÑEZ
GR No.L-8018, October 26, 1955
87 PHIL 762

FACTS: Estefania Atun died without any issue leaving in the possession of the plaintiffs, her neices and
nephews, a parcel of land. Such land was delivered by plaintiff Gil Atun to Silvestra Nuñez (sister of
defendant-appellee Eusebio Nuñez) for cultivation, for which Silvestra paid the Atuns a part of the
harvest as rental. In 1940, Silvestra turned over the land to defendant Eusebio Nuñez, who thereafter
refused to recognize plaintiffs' ownership or to deliver their share of the produce. The defendant turn
sold the land to his co-defendant Diego Belga, who took the property with the knowledge that it
belonged, not to Nuñez, but to plaintiffs. There was no prior judicial declaration, however, that the
plaintiffs were the legal heirs of the decedent.

ISSUE: Has plaintiffs the right to recover the property as a successor of the decedent?

HELD: Yes. In the instant case, as the land in question still stands registered in the name of Estefania
Atun, now deceased, the present owners thereof would be her legal heirs. It is of record that Estefania
Atun died without any issue or ascendants and left as her only surviving heirs the children of her
brother Nicolas, plaintiffs herein; and the rule is settled that the legal heirs of a deceased may file an
action arising out of a right belonging to their ancestor, without a separate judicial declaration of their
status as such, provided there is no pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's
estate.

Fulltext

Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Albay dismissing the complaint for recovery of a
parcel of registered land upon a motion to dismiss filed by defendants after plaintiffs had closed their
evidence. The land in question is located in Legaspi City and registered in the name of Estefania Atun,
deceased aunt of plaintiffs, under Original Certificate of Title No. 11696 of the Registry of Property of
Albay. The complaint was filed on August 7, 1950.

The evidence for the plaintiffs-appellants shows that they inherited the land in question from their
widowed aunt Estefania Atun (sister of their deceased father Nicolas Atun), who died without any
issue; that they had possessed the land from 1927 to 1930, when plaintiff Gil Atun delivered the same
to Silvestra Nuñez (sister of defendant-appellee Eusebio Nuñez) for cultivation, for which Silvestra
paid the Atuns a part of the harvest as rental; that in 1940, Silvestra turned over the land to
defendant Eusebio Nuñez, who thereafter refused to recognize plaintiffs’ ownership or to deliver their
share of the produce; and that defendant Eusebio Nuñez in turn sold the land to his co-defendant
Diego Belga, who took the property with the knowledge that it belonged, not to Nuñez, but to
plaintiffs.

Upon a demurrer to the evidence, filed by defendants after plaintiffs had rested their case, the lower
Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the period of ten years within which plaintiffs could
have filed action for recovery thereof under section 40 of Act 190 (computed from the time plaintiffs
lost possession of the land in 1940), had already elapsed, hence their action had prescribed; and that
furthermore, plaintiffs failed to prove their alleged ownership of the land in question, so that the
presumption that defendants, being possessors, are the lawful owners thereof, had not been
overcome. Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal of the complaint having been
denied, they appealed to the Court of Appeals, which forwarded the case to us because the appeal
raises question of law.

The sole issue herein is whether the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs-appellants’ complaint on
the ground of prescription of action.

The dismissal is erroneous. The land in question is admittedly covered by a Torrens title in the name
of Estefania Atun, deceased aunt of plaintiffs. Section 40 of Act 496 expressly provides that no title to
registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession. And this Court has repeatedly held that the right of the registered owner to
recover possession of the registered property is equally imprescriptible, since possession is a mere
consequence of ownership. (Manlapas v. Llorente, 48 Phil., 298, 308; Eugenio v. Perdido, supra, p.
41; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Bolaños, 96 Phil., 106.)

"We are aware, of course, that title by adverse possession (acquisitive prescription) is distinct from
the statute of limitations (extinctive prescription) and the operation and effects of such distinction has
been explored during the discussions of this petition for review.

But we have finally agreed that, as to lands registered under the Torrens system, ten years’ adverse
possession may not be permitted to defeat the owners’ right to possession — which is the necessary
incident of ownership. Otherwise loss of the land by prescription would be indirectly approved, in
violation of sec. 46 of the Land Registration Act. This statute, being a later enactment, may be said to
have partially amended the Statute of Limitations established in Act No. 190 in so far as the registered
lands are concerned." (Juan Eugenio, Et. Al. v. Silvina Perdido, Et Al., L-7083, May 19, 1955.)

And if prescription is unavailing against the registered owner, it must be equally unavailing against the
latter’s hereditary successors, because they merely step into the shoes of the decedent by operation
of law (new Civil Code, Art. 777; Art. 657, old), the title or right undergoing no change by its
transmission mortis causa.

The lower Court also erred in ruling that plaintiffs-appellants have failed to show a better title than
that of defendants who are presumed to possess with just title. As the land in question still stands
registered in the name of Estefania Atun, now deceased, the present owners thereof would be her
legal heirs. It is of record that Estefania Atun died without any issue or ascendants and left as her only
surviving heirs the children of her brother Nicolas, plaintiffs herein; and the rule is settled that the
legal heirs of a deceased may file an action arising out of a right belonging to their ancestor, without a
separate judicial declaration of their status as such, provided there is no pending special proceeding
for the settlement of the descendant’s estate (Mendoza Vda. de Bonnevie v. Cecilia Vda. de Pardo, 59
Phil., 486; Govt. of P. I. v. Serafica, 61 Phil., 93; Uy Coque v. Sioca, 45 Phil., 430).

Pursuant to the rule that reversal on appeal of a ruling upholding a defendant’s demurrer to the
evidence imports in civil cases loss of his right to submit evidence in his behalf, in order to discourage
prolonged litigations (Arroyo v. Azur, 76 Phil., 493, and cases therein cited), judgment must be
rendered according to plaintiffs’ evidence, which supports their claim of ownership of the land in
question, and for damages in the amount of P500 (t. s. n., p. 21).

Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed; plaintiffs- appellants Gil Atun, Camila Atun, and
Dorotea Atun are declared the lawful owners in common of the lot in question; and defendants-
appellees Eusebio Nuñez and Diego Delga are ordered to surrender possession thereof to the plaintiffs,
and to indemnify the latter in the amount of P500 by way of damages. Costs against defendants-
appellees in both instances. So ordered.

8. Heirs of Segunda Maningding v. CA

FACTS:

This case involved 2 parcels of land: a riceland and sugarland in Pangasinan. The heirs of Segunda claim that they

own the disputed lands together with the Buazons.

The Buazons aver that:

1. Their father, Roque Buazon, acquired the land by virtue of a deed of donation propter nuptias.
2. Segunda Maningding, Maria Maningding, Juan Maningding and Roque Bauzon co-owned the lands as heirs of

Ramon Roque. Roque Buazon allegedly repudiated the co-ownership of the sugarland in 1965 and repudiated it to
himself… and later on, Juan and Maria Maningding renounced and quitclaimed their shares in the Riceland in favor of

R. Buazon.

3. Subsequently, Roque Bauzon transferred the riceland to his son Luis Bauzon and the sugarland to his daughter

Eriberta Bauzon (the respondents in this case), both transactions being evidenced by deeds of sale.

On 31 July 1979 Segunda Maningding died. Her heirs allegedly discovered the transfers made by Roque Bauzon in

favor of his children only in 1986. Consequently, the heirs sought the partition of the properties as well as the

accounting of the produce but were unsuccessful.

The trial court awarded both parcels to Segunda Maningding and Roque Bauzon as co-owners in equal shares after
finding that Juan Maningding and Maria Maningding had already executed an Affidavit of Quitclaim and Renunciation.

It rejected the deed of donation for failure to prove its due execution and authenticity and nullified the deed of sale by

Roque Buazon to his children. It concluded that Roque Bauzon could not have validly conveyed both parcels as one-

half (1/2) of each parcel rightfully belonged to Segunda Maningding and her heirs.

The CA reversed the ruling, declaring the donation and sales valid. Later on, the court reversed itself by declaring the

donation void for failure to comply with the necessary requirements. However, it ruled that the properties belonged to

Roque Bauzon by virtue of acquisitive prescription.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Roque Bauzon acquired ownership over the subject properties by acquisitive prescription

RULING:

Yes. While prescription among co-owners cannot take place when the acts of ownership exercised are vague and

uncertain, such prescription arises and produces all its effects when the acts of ownership do not evince any doubt as

to the ouster of the rights of the other co-owners.

In the instant case, Roque Bauzon possessed the subject parcels of land in the concept of owner by virtue of the

donation propter nuptias. The possession was public as it was Roque Bauzon who personally tilled and cultivated the

lots. The acts of reaping the benefits of ownership were manifest and visible to all. These acts were made more
pronounced and public considering that the parcels of land are located in a municipality wherein ownership and

possession are particularly and normally known to the community. Roque peacefully possessed the properties as he
was never ousted therefrom nor prevented from enjoying their fruits. His possession was uninterrupted and in good

faith because of his well-founded belief that the donation propter nuptias was properly executed and the grantors

were legally allowed to convey their respective shares in his favor. He likewise appropriated to himself the whole

produce of the parcels of land to the exclusion of all others.

As disclosed by the records, Roque Bauzon and his heirs possessed the property from 1948 to 1986 to the exclusion

of petitioners who were never given their shares of the fruits of the properties, for which reason they demanded an

accounting of the produce and the conveyance to them of their shares. Unfortunately they slept on their rights and

allowed almost thirty-six (36) years to lapse before attempting to assert their right. Perforce, they must suffer the

consequence of their inaction.

Note: The donation propter nuptias was effected as early as 21 April 1926. It was only in 1986 when the heirs of

Segunda Maningding demanded partition of the properties and conveyance of the produce. Sixty (60) years have

already elapsed. Even granting that Roque Bauzon possessed the properties only upon the death of his father in

1948, more than thirty (30) years have already passed. In either case, acquisitive prescription has already set in in

favor of Roque Bauzon

9. Nazareno v. ca 257 scra 589

Adies v. Garcia

Aug 22, 1960

G.R. No. L-30067 March 23, 1929

PAYATAS ESTATE IMPROVEMENT CO., petitioner-appellant,

vs.
MARIANO TUASON, AUGUSTO TUASON, ET AL., oppositors-appellees.

Maria de la Concepcion Martinez Canas was originally the owner of the so-called Payatas estate, the principal part of
which was bounded on the east by the Mariquina river. The so-called Mariquina estate adjoined the river on the other
side and belonged to the Tuasons.

In 1904, shortly after the initiation of the Torrens system of land registration, Maria de la Concepcion Canas had the
property surveyed and obtained the certificate of title to the sale. Later on, the land, consisting of 3 parcels, A, B and
C, was sold by her to the Payatas Estate Improvement Company. In 1920 another survey was made for subdivision
purposes, and on October 15, 1924, the subdivision plans were submitted to the Court of First Instance of Rizal for
approval. In the motion accompanying the plans, it was stated:
1. That as shown by the transfer certificate of title no. 8691 issued by the register of deeds of Rizal, Philippine
Islands, said company (the Payatas Estate Improvement Company) is the owner of the hacienda, known under the
name of "Payatas," situated in the municipality of San Mateo and Montalban of said province.

2. That in 1920 and 1921 said hacienda was surveyed by the surveyor Salvador N. Tolentino, dividing it in two
parcels, the first portion being subdivided in 124 lots according to plan P. S. U. 24733, and the second portion being
subdivided in 149 lots according to plan P.S.U. 32686. Both lands had already been approved by the Director of
Lands.

On October 25, 1924, the Payatas Estate Improvement Company filed another motion in which it asked that transfer
certificate of title no. 8691 be cancelled as to parcels A and C but not in regard to parcel B, the latter not being
included in the subdivision. Two days later, the Court of First Instance approved the subdivision and gave instructions
to the register of deeds in accordance with the Improvement Company's last motion.

The register of deeds compiled fully with order of the court, and certificates of title were issued accordingly, but on
March 18, 1925, the Payatas Estate Improvement Co., filed another motion alleging that the area of the subdivided
land parcels A and C together with parcel B did not include all the land to which the company was entitled and which
was included in the plan Exhibit A upon which the final decree was issued in 1905. The motion was accompanied by
a plan (P.S.U. 45292) of two strips of land situated along the eastern side of the Mariquina River and embracing a
little over 22 hectares, and the company asked that a certificate of title be issued in its favor in accordance with that
plan.

The motion was opposed by the Tuasons and after hearing, the court below denied it, principally on the ground that a
motion in the land registration record was not the proper action i a case such as this. From this order the Payatas
Estate Improvement Co. appealed.

The controversy in the present case seems to be due to the erroneous conception that Article 366 of the Civil Code
does not apply the Torrens registered land. That article provides that "any accretions which the banks of rivers may
gradually receive from the effect of the current belong to the owners of the estates bordering thereon." Accretions of
that character are natural incidents to land bordering on running streams and are not affected by the registration laws.
It follows that registration does not protect the riparian owner against diminution of the area of his land through
gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream.

At the points where the land now in question is situated, the Mariquina river separates the Payatas estate from the
Mariquina estate and constitutes the boundary bet. the two estates. According to plan P.S.U. 45292, the river has
changed its course to the prejudice of the Payatas estate on the western side of the stream and to the benefit of
Mariquina estate by increasing the latter's area, and the 22 hectares now in controversy which formerly were on the
Payatas side of the river are now on the Mariquina estate side. Assuming this to be true — and it will not be denied
by the appellant —

Issue:

whether the change in the course of the direction of the river was caused by erosion and accretion or whether it has
occurred through avulsion.

Held:

There is no direct evidence on this point, but according to the decision of this court in the case of Martinez Canas vs.
Tuason (5 Phil., 688), the presumption is that the change is gradual and caused by the erosion of the Payatas bank
of the river and consequent accretion to the Mariquina estate. It follows that the land in question is now a part of the
estate and no longer pertains to the Payatas estate.

We cannot quite agree with the court below that the manner before us may not be properly dealt with and determined
under section 112 of the Land Registration Act; that section covers a wide range and undoubtedly embraces
questions such as those raised in this case. That, however, does not necessarily mean that said questions might not
also have been ventilated in a separate action.
For the reasons stated, the motion in question is denied, and it is declared that the land in dispute is now an integral
part of the aforesaid Mariquina estate. The appellant will pay the costs of this instance. So ordered.

10. Korek v. iyat or IAC? June 30, 1962

11. Chavez v PEA and AMARI G.R. No. 133250. July 9, 2002.

FACTS:

From the time of Marcos until Estrada, portions of Manila Bay were being reclaimed. A law was passed creating the

Public Estate Authority which was granted with the power to transfer reclaimed lands. Now in this case, PEA entered

into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a private corporation. Under the Joint Venture Agreement between

AMARI and PEA, several hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands and several portions of

submerged areas of Manila Bay were going to be transferred to AMARI .

ISSUE:

Whether or not the stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed,

violate the Constitution

RULING: YES!

Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified as alienable and disposable lands

of the public domain Section 3 of the Constitution: Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural

lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease

The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the
name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may

not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine

citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws. Clearly, the Amended JVA

violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts

whose “object or purpose is contrary to law,” or whose “object is outside the commerce of men,” are “inexistent and

void from the beginning.” The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore

declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.

Facts: On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA.
PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve,
acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands." On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential
Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under the
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).

On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and
transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project
(MCCRRP) containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894)
square meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque issued
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands
known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Parañaque City.

PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. On April 28, 1995, the Board of
Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos,
through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.

The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated
September 16, 1997. Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to
AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and
therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and
(3) the JVA itself is illegal.

On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 creating a
Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The
members of the Legal Task Force were the Secretary of Justice, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, and the
Government Corporate Counsel. The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions
reached by the Senate Committees.

On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for
Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.
Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to
AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28,
Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern.

Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now prays that on
"constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void."

Issue: The issues raised by petitioner, PEA and AMARI are as follows:
1. Whether the reliefs prayed for are moot and academic because of subsequent events;
2. Whether the petition should be dismissed for failing to observe the principle of governing the heirarchy of
courts;
3. Whether the petition should be dismissed for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies;
4. Whether petitioner has locus standi;
5. Whether the constitutional right to information includes information on on-going neogtiations BEFORE a final
agreement;
6. Whether the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for the transfer to AMARI of certain lands,
reclaimed and still to be reclaimed violate the 1987 Constitution; and
7. Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the issue whether the amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the
government

Held: 1. We rule that the signing and of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its approval by the President
cannot operate to moot the petition and divest the Court of its jurisdiction.
 3. PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands.
The law obligated PEA make this public disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from anyone. PEA failed
to make this public disclosure because the original JVA, like the Amended JVA, was the result of a negotiated
contract, not of a public bidding. Considering that PEA had an affirmative statutory duty to make the public disclosure,
and was even in breach of this legal duty, petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial intervention.

6. Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as follows:
"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is —
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public use, is employed in some public
service, or in the development of the national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of the
territory, and mines, until granted to private individuals.

Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the public. In contrast, property devoted to
public service referred to property used for some specific public service and open only to those authorized to use the
property.Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public use, but also to property not so
used but employed to develop the national wealth. This class of property constituted property of public dominion
although employed for some economic or commercial activity to increase the national wealth.

"Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public use or to the defense of the territory,
shall become a part of the private property of the State." This provision, however, was not self-executing. The
legislature, or the executive department pursuant to law, must declare the property no longer needed for public use or
territorial defense before the government could lease or alienate the property to private parties.

Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature

Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land, shall be classified
as suitable for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural
purposes, and shall be open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter,
and not otherwise.

The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy public lands for
non-agricultural purposes retain their inherent potential as areas for public service. This is the reason the government
prohibited the sale, and only allowed the lease, of these lands to private parties. The State always reserved these
lands for some future public service.

However, government reclaimed and marshy lands, although subject to classification as disposable public
agricultural lands, could only be leased and not sold to private parties because of Act No. 2874.

The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows
private corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, the general law governing the lease to private corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
alienable lands of the public domain is still CA No. 141.

Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the public
domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as many
corporations as his means would allow him. An individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting
his nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the
constitutional limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.

PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom Islands,
is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. Being neither timber, mineral, nor national park lands, the reclaimed Freedom Islands necessarily fall under
the classification of agricultural lands of the public domain. Under the 1987 Constitution, agricultural lands of the
public domain are the only natural resources that the State may alienate to qualified private parties. All other natural
resources, such as the seas or bays, are "waters . . . owned by the State" forming part of the public domain, and are
inalienable pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas under water, while PEA is vested
with the power to undertake the physical reclamation of areas under water whether directly or through private
contractors. DENR is also empowered to classify lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable lands
subject to the approval of the President. On the other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain.

Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not make the
reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise,
the mere transfer by the National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA does not make the lands
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.

There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No.
1085 merely transferred "ownership and administration" of lands reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No.
525 declared that lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by PEA." PEA's charter, however, expressly
tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of
lands . . . owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the government." 87 (Emphasis supplied) There is,
therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether patrimonial or alienable lands of the public
domain. PEA may sell to private parties its patrimonial properties in accordance with the PEA charter free from
constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public
domain does not apply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial lands.

Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code, the government
is required to sell valuable government property through public bidding. Section 79 of PD No. 1445 mandates that:...
"In the event that the public auction fails, the property may be sold at a private sale at such price as may be fixed by
the same committee or body concerned and approved by the Commission."

However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom Islands and the additional 250
hectares still to be reclaimed, it also granted an option to AMARI to reclaim another 350 hectares. The original JVA, a
negotiated contract, enlarged the reclamation area to 750 hectares. The failure of public bidding on December 10,
1991, involving only 407.84 hectares, is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double
the area publicly auctioned.

Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of title the alienable land of the
public domain automatically becomes private land cannot apply to government units and entities like PEA.

The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section 60 of CA No. 141 does not
automatically convert alienable lands of the public domain into private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the
public domain must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to government entities not tasked to dispose of
public lands, before these lands can become private or patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban will
become illusory if Congress can declare lands of the public domain as private or patrimonial lands in the hands of a
government agency tasked to dispose of public lands.

To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction
a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain. This scheme can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of the public domain since PEA can
"acquire . . . any and all kinds of lands."
 The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the
name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may
not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations.

7. Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to rule on this last issue.
Besides, the Court is not the trier of facts, and this last issue involves a determination of factual matters.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint Venture
Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.

12. G.R. No. 133250 May 6, 2003

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,

vs.
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

Facts:

To recall, the Court’s decision of July 9, 2002 ("Decision" for brevity) on the instant case states in its summary:

We can now summarize our conclusions as follows:

1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of
title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private
corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell
these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing
laws.

2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public
domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed
for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has
reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public
domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15
hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.

3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares
of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.

4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public
domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed
lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the
transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain.

Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409
of the Civil Code, contracts whose "object or purpose is contrary to law," or whose "object is outside the commerce of
men," are "inexistent and void from the beginning." The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the
Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.

Issue:

WON the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the
Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

Held.

Yes .

he prevailing doctrine before, during and after the signing of the Amended JVA is that private corporations cannot
hold, except by lease, alienable lands of the public domain. This is one of the two main reasons why the Decision
annulled the Amended JVA. The other main reason is that submerged areas of Manila Bay, being part of the sea, are
inalienable and beyond the commerce of man, a doctrine that has remained immutable since the Spanish Law on
Waters of 1886. Clearly, the Decision merely reiterates, and does not overrule, any existing judicial doctrine.

Even on the characterization of foreshore lands reclaimed by the government, the Decision does not overrule existing
law or doctrine. Since the adoption of the Regalian doctrine in this jurisdiction, the sea and its foreshore areas have
always been part of the public domain. And since the enactment of Act No. 1654 on May 18, 1907 until the effectivity
of the 1973 Constitution, statutory law never allowed foreshore lands reclaimed by the government to be sold to
private corporations. The 1973 and 1987 Constitution enshrined and expanded the ban to include any alienable land
of the public domain.

There are, of course, decisions of the Court which, while recognizing a violation of the law or Constitution, hold that
the sale or transfer of the land may no longer be invalidated because of "weighty considerations of equity and social
justice."8 The invalidation of the sale or transfer may also be superfluous if the purpose of the statutory or
constitutional ban has been achieved. But none of these cases apply to Amari.

Thus, the Court has ruled consistently that where a Filipino citizen sells land to an alien who later sells the land to a
Filipino, the invalidity of the first transfer is corrected by the subsequent sale to a citizen.9 Similarly, where the alien
who buys the land subsequently acquires Philippine citizenship, the sale is validated since the purpose of the
constitutional ban to limit land ownership to Filipinos has been achieved.10 In short, the law disregards the
constitutional disqualification of the buyer to hold land if the land is subsequently transferred to a qualified party, or
the buyer himself becomes a qualified party. In the instant case, however, Amari has not transferred the Freedom
Islands, or any portion of it, to any qualified party. In fact, Amari admits that title to the Freedom Islands still remains
with PEA.11

Finally, the Office of the Solicitor General and PEA argue that the cost of reclaiming deeply submerged areas is
"enormous" and "it would be difficult for PEA to accomplish such project without the participation of private
corporations."19 The Decision does not bar private corporations from participating in reclamation projects and being
paid for their services in reclaiming lands. What the Decision prohibits, following the explicit constitutional mandate, is
for private corporations to acquire reclaimed lands of the public domain. There is no prohibition on the directors,
officers and stockholders of private corporations, if they are Filipino citizens, from acquiring at public auction
reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain. They can acquire not more than 12 hectares per individual, and the
land thus acquired becomes private land.

Despite the nullity of the Amended JVA, Amari is not precluded from recovering from PEA in the proper proceedings,
on a quantum meruit basis, whatever Amari may have incurred in implementing the Amended JVA prior to its
declaration of nullity.

WHEREFORE, finding the Motions for Reconsideration to be without merit, the same are hereby DENIED with
FINALITY. The Motion to Inhibit and for Re-Deliberation and the Motion to Set Case for Hearing on Oral Argument
are likewise DENIED.