FIRST DIVISION

August 7, 2017

G.R. No. 211966

JOSE AUDIE ABAGATNAN, JOSEPHINE A. PARCE, JIMMY ABAGATNAN, JOHN

ABAGATNAN, JENALYN A.DELEON, JOEY ABAGATNAN, JOJIE ABAGATNAN, and JOY
ABAGATNAN, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES JONATHAN CLARITO and ELSA CLARITO, Respondents,

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the June 20, 2013 Decision1 and the February 3, 2014 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 03283 which dismissed, albeit without prejudice, the Complaint for Unlawful
Detainer and Damages3 filed by petitioners Jose Audie Abagatnan, Josephine A. Paree, Jimmy
Abagatnan, John Abagatnan, Jenalyn A. De Leon, Joey Abagatnan, Jojie Abagatnan and Joy
Abagatnan against respondents spouses Jonathan Clarito and Elsa Clarito, for failure to comply
with the mandatory requirement of resorting to prior barangay conciliation, as required under
Section 412 of Republic Act No. 7160, or the Local Government Code (LGC).

The Antecedent Facts

Wenceslao Abagatnan (Wenceslao) and his late wife, Lydia Capote (Lydia), acquired a parcel
ofland designated as Lot 1472-B, with a total land of 5,046 square meters, and located
at Barangay Cogon, Roxas City from Mateo Ambrad (Mateo) and Soterafia Clarito (Soterafia),
by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale4 executed on August 1, 1967.5

On October 4, 1999, Lydia died, leaving her children, who are copetitioners in this case, to
succeed into the ownership of her conjugal share of said property.6

In 1990, respondents allegedly approached Wenceslao and asked for permission to construct a
residential house made oflight materials on a 480-square meter portion of Lot 1472-B (subject
property). Because respondent Jonathan Clarito (Jonathan) is a distant relative, Wenceslao
allowed them to do so subject to the condition that respondents will vacate the subject property
should he need the same for his own use.7

In September 2006, petitioners decided to sell portions of Lot 14 72-B, including the subject
property which was then still being occupied by respondents. They offered to sell said portion to
respondents, but the latter declined.8
Consequently, petitioners sent respondents a Demand Letter9 dated October 2, 2006 requiring
the latter to vacate the subject property within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the letter. The
respondents, however, refused to heed such demand.10

On November 10, 2006, petitioners filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and
Damages11 against respondents before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2,
Roxas City, where they claimed to have been unlawfully deprived of the use and possession of
a portion of their land.

Notably, the Complaint alleged that prior barangay conciliation proceedings are not required as
a pre-condition for the filing of the case in court, given that not all petitioners are residents of
Roxas City. Specifically, petitioner Jimmy C. Abagatnan (Jimmy) resided in Laguna, while
petitioner Jenalyn A. De Leon (Jenalyn) resided in Pasig City.12

In their Answer with Counterclaim,13 respondents argued that prior barangay conciliation is a
mandatory requirement that cannot be dispensed with, considering that Jimmy and J enalyn had
already executed a Special Power of Attomey14 (SPA) in favor of their co-petitioner and sister,
Josephine A. Paree (Josephine), who is a resident of Roxas City.15

Respondents also insisted that Lot 14 72-B is only a portion of Lot 1472 which is covered by its
mother title, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 9882, under the name of Nicolas Clarita, et
al., Jonathan's predecessors-in-interest. Unfortunately, said title was lost or destroyed during
the war, but a copy of the owner's duplicate copy was presented before the trial court and made
part of the records.16

The Municipal Trial Court in Cities Ruling

In its Decision17 dated August 17, 2007, the MTCC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners
and ordered respondents to remove the structures they erected on the subject property and to
vacate the same. It also directed respondents to pay petitioners the amount of ₱500.00 per
month as reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the subject property from the
date of the filing of the action up to and until the structures on the property have been removed,
as well as the cost of suit.18

The MTCC ruled that by preponderance of evidence, petitioners have a better right of material
possession over the subject property.1âwphi1 It gave merit to petitioners' proof of purchase of
Lot 1472-B from Mateo and Soterafia, the Demand Letter dated October 2, 2006 that they sent
to respondents, and respondents' refusal to vacate the property.19

Respondents thereafter appealed the MTCC Decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
19, Roxas City.1âwphi1

The Regional Trial Court Ruling

In its Decision20 dated January 15, 2008, the RTC denied the appeal for lack of merit. It ruled
that since the parties raised the issue of ownership to justify their claims of possession, and the
evidence of ownership is preponderant on petitioners, the MTCC was justified in ruling the case
in the latter's favor.21

The RTC, too, held that the lack of barangay conciliation proceedings cannot be brought on
appeal because it was not made an issue in the Pre-Trial Order.22

Following the denial, respondents filed a Petition for Review23 before the CA, assailing the
RTC's January 15, 2008 Decision.
 The Court of Appeals Ruling

In its Decision dated June 20, 2013, the CA ruled that the findings of fact of both the MTCC and
the RTC are supported by the evidence on record. It gave more probative value to the tax
declarations and the Deed of Absolute Sale submitted by petitioners, considering that only a
copy of OCT No. 9882 was presented by respondents in court and said copy contained clouded
and blurred characters. The name of the alleged registered owner, Francisco Clarito
(Jonathan's father), is also not decipherable on the title.24

Nevertheless, the CA granted the Petition and dismissed the petitioners' Complaint, albeit
without prejudice, for lack of prior referral to the Katarungang Pambarangay.25 It pointed out that
majority of petitioners actually resided in Barangay Cogon, Roxas City, while the two non-
residents of Roxas City already executed an SP A in favor of Josephine, whom they authorized,
among others, to enter into an amicable settlement with respondents. Since respondents also
reside in the same barangay, the dispute between the parties is clearly within the ambit of
the Lupon Tagapamayapa's (Lupon) authority.26

The CA thus concluded that petitioners' Complaint had been prematurely filed with the MTCC,
as it should have been first brought before the Lupon for mandatory conciliation to accord the
parties the chance for amicable settlement.27

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution dated
February 3, 2014. As a consequence, petitioners filed the present Petition for Review
on Certiorari before the Court on April 14, 2014, assailing the CA's June 20, 2013 Decision and
February 3, 2014 Resolution.

The Issue

Petitioners raise the sole issue of whether the CA correctly dismissed the Complaint for failure
to comply with the prior barangay conciliation requirement under Section 412 of the LGC,
despite the fact that not all real parties in interest resided in the same city or municipality.28

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is impressed with merit.

x x x Section 412(a) of the LGC requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process before
the LuponChairman or the Pangkat as a pre-condition to the filing of a complaint in court, thus:

SECTION 412. Conciliation - (a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court. No

complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the
authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other
government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation
between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no
conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by
the lupon or pangkat secretary and attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman
[or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto. x x
x]29 (Emphasis supplied)

The LGC further provides that "the lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together
the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all
disputes," subject to certain exceptions enumerated in the law.30
One such exception is in cases where the dispute involves parties who actually reside in
barangays of different cities or municipalities, unless said barangay units adjoin each other
and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an
appropriate lupon.31

Thus, parties who do not actually reside in the same city or municipality or
adjoining barangays are not required to submit their dispute to the lupon as a pre-condition to
the filing of a complaint in court.

In Pascual v. Pascual,32 the Court ruled that the express statutory requirement of actual
residency in the LGC pertains specifically to the real parties in interest in the case. It further
explained that said requirement cannot be construed to apply to the attorney-in-fact of the party-
plaintiff, as doing so would abrogate the meaning of a "real party in interest" as defined in
Section 2,33 in relation to Section 3, of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.

The same ruling was reiterated in Banting v. Spouses Maglapuz34 where the Court held that "the
requirement under Section 412 of the [LGC] that a case be referred for conciliation before
the Lupon as a precondition to its filing in court applies only to those cases where the real
parties-in-interest actually reside in the same city or municipality."

In the present case, the Complaint filed before the MTCC specifically alleged that not all the real
parties in interest in the case actually reside in Roxas City:35 Jimmy resided in Poblacion,
Siniloan, Laguna, while Jenalyn resided in Brgy. de La Paz, Pasig City.36 As
such, the lupon has no jurisdiction over their dispute, and prior referral of the case for
barangay conciliation is not a precondition to its filing in court.

This is true regardless of the fact that Jimmy and Jenalyn had already authorized their sister
and co-petitioner, Josephine, to act as their attorney-in-fact in the ejectment proceedings before
the MTCC. As previously explained, the residence of the attorney-in-fact of a real party in
interest is irrelevant in so far as the "actual residence" requirement under the LGC for
prior barangay conciliation is concerned.

Besides, as the RTC correctly pointed out, the lack of barangay conciliation proceedings
cannot be brought on appeal because it was not included in the Pre-Trial Order, which
only enumerates the following issues to be resolved during the trial:

The following issues to be resolved by plaintiffs:

1. Whether or not the defendants have unlawfully withheld the portion of Lot 1472
over which were occupied by them, particularly Lot 1472-B;

2. Whether or not the defendants can be lawfully ejected from that portion of Lot
1472-B which are occupied by them.

3. Whether or not the prevailing parties can recover damages.

For the defendants, the issues to be resolved are as follows:

1. Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action for unlawful detainer
against the defendants; and,

2. Whether or not the prevailing parties are entitled to an award of damages.37

On this point, it is important to stress that the issues to be tried between parties in a case
is limited to those defined in the pre-trial order38 as well as those which may be implied from
those written in the order or inferred from those listed by necessary implication.39

In this case, a cursory reading of the issues listed in the Pre-Trial Order easily shows that the
parties never agreed, whether expressly or impliedly, to include the lack of
prior barangay conciliation proceedings in the list of issues to be resolved before the MTCC.

In effect, the non-inclusion of this issue in the Pre-Trial Order barred its consideration
during the trial. This is but consistent with the rule that parties are bound by the delimitation of
issues that they agreed upon during the pre-trial proceedings.40

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Decision dated June 20,
2013 and the Resolution dated February 3, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
03283 are REVERSED and SETASIDE. The Decision dated January 15, 2008 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 19, Roxas City in Civil Case No. V-47-07 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 234499, June 06, 2018

RUDY L. RACPAN, Petitioner, v. SHARON BARROGA-HAIGH, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO JR., J.:

Nature of the Case

This treats of the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the February 13, 2017 Decision1 and August 17, 2017 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA G.R. CV No. 04034-MIN. Said rulings affirmed the dismissal of the petitioner's complaint
for improper venue and failure to comply with a condition precedent to its filing.

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner Rudy Racpan filed a Complaint "For Declaration For Nullity of Deed of Sale with Right
to Repurchase & Attorney's Fees"3 before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 11
(RTC-Davao). In his Complaint, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 34, 742-2012, petitioner
alleged that after his wife's death on November 12, 2011, he instructed their daughter to
arrange his wife's important documents. In so doing, their daughter discovered a Deed of Sale
with Right to Purchase dated March 29, 2011. The Deed of Sale was purportedly signed by him
and his late wife and appeared to convey to respondent Sharon Barroga-Haigh a real property
registered in his name under TCT No. T-142-2011009374 and located in Bo. Tuganay,
Municipality of Carmen, Province of Davao del Norte.4 Petitioner maintained that the Deed of
Sale was falsified and fictitious as he never signed any contract, not even any special power of
attorney, for the sale or conveyance of the property which is still in his possession. Thus, he
prayed for the declaration of the Deed of Sale's nullity.

In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,5 respondent contended, by way of affirmative

defense, that the venue of the Complaint was improperly laid and that the filing of the case lacks
the mandatory requirement of Barangay Clearance. Subsequently, respondent filed a motion for
preliminary hearing on her affirmative defenses.

Acting on the motion, the RTC-Davao set the case for preliminary hearing and thereafter issued
an Order dated September 18, 20136 dismissing the petitioner's Complaint as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the present case is hereby ORDERED DISMISSED for
being improperly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and for failure to comply
with a condition precedent prior to its filing.

SO ORDERED.7
Petitioner moved for the RTC-Davao to reconsider8 its Order dismissing the complaint but the
trial court remained steadfast and denied his motion in its June 19, 2004 Order.9 Hence, the
petitioner came to the CA on appeal.10

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

As stated at the outset hereof, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the petitioner's
Complaint as follows:
WHEREFORE, the order dated September 18, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11,
Davao City in Civil Case No. 34,742-12 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.11
The CA explained that petitioner's Complaint is a real action as it wants the court to abrogate
and nullify. whatever right or claim the respondent might have on the property subject of the
Deed of Sale. Hence, for the appellate court, Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court is
applicable. Under this Rule, real actions shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which
has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved is situated. As the property
involved is located in Bo. Tuganay, Municipality of Cannen, Province of Davao del Norte, the
appellate court held that the Complaint should have been lodged with the RTC of Davao del
Norte and not the RTC-Davao.

Further, the CA found that the petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction is a mere ploy to avoid the requirement of a barangay conciliation, as a mere
annotation of a notice of lis pendens would achieve the same effect without having to undergo
trial or post a bond.

In a Resolution dated August 17, 201712 the CA stood its ground by denying the petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration.13

Hence, the petitioner's present recourse, it being his contention that the Complaint he
interposed with the RTC-Davao is a personal action. He maintains that his Complaint is not
concerned with title to or possession of real property, as in fact, no transfer of possession or title
of the real property to the respondent has occurred.14 For the petitioner, the Complaint's venue
was properly laid in Davao City where both he and the respondent reside.

Petitioner likewise reiterated that, as his Complaint was coupled with a prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction, it is exempt from barangay conciliation proceedings.

Issue
The main and decisive issue for resolution is whether the CA erred in affirming the dismissal of
the petitioner's Complaint.

Our Ruling

The petition is impressed with merit.

The venue was properly laid as the complaint was a personal action.

By weight of jurisprudence, the nature of an action is determined by the allegations in the

complaint. In turn, the nature of the action determines its proper venue. Rule 4 of the Rules of
Court provides the rules on the situs for bringing real and personal actions, viz:
Rule 4

VENUE OF ACTIONS

Section 1. Venue of real actions. - Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or
interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the
area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.

Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the municipal trial court of
the municipality or city wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.

Section 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried where
the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found,
at the election of the plaintiff.
Expounding on the foregoing provisions, the Court delineated the basic distinction between a
real and a personal action and their respective venues in Bank of the Philippine Islands v.
Hontanosas, Jr.,15 stating that:
The determinants of whether an action is of a real or a personal nature have been fixed by
the Rules of Court and relevant jurisprudence. According to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of
Court, a real action is one that affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest
therein. Such action is to be commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over
the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated, which explains why
the action is also referred to as a local action. In contrast, the Rules of Court declares all other
actions as personal actions. Such actions may include those brought for the recovery of
personal property, or for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its
breach, or for the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or
property. The venue of a personal action is the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the
case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff, for
which reason the action is considered a transitory one.
Otherwise stated, what determines the venue of a case is the primary objective for the filing of
the case.16 On one hand, if the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the
enforcement of a contract or the recovery of damages, his complaint is a personal action that
may be filed in the place of residence of either party. On the other hand, if the plaintiff seeks the
recovery of real property, or if the action affects title to real property or for the recovery of
possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property,
then the complaint is a real action that must be brought before the court where the real property
is located. Thus, in Chua v. Total Office Products and Services, Inc.,17 this Court ruled that
where the action is not intended for the recovery of real property but solely for the annulment of
a contract, it is a personal action that may be filed in the court where the plaintiff or the
respondent resides. It held:
Well-settled is the rule that an action to annul a contract of loan and its accessory real estate
mortgage is a personal action. In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal
property, the enforcement of a contract or the recovery of damages. In contrast, in a real action,
the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or, as indicated in Section 2 (a), Rule 4 of the
then Rules of Court, a real action is an action affecting title to real property or for the recovery of
possession, or for partition, or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property.

In the Pascual case, relied upon by petitioner, the contract of sale of the fishpond was assailed
as fictitious for lack of consideration. We held that there being no contract to begin with, there is
nothing to annul. Hence, we deemed the action for annulment of the said fictitious contract
therein as one constituting a real action for the recovery of the fishpond subject thereof

We cannot, however, apply the foregoing doctrine to the instant case. Note that in Pascual, title
to and possession of the subject fishpond had already passed to the vendee. There was,
therefore, a need to recover the said fishpond. But in the instant case, ownership of the
parcels of land subject of the questioned real estate mortgage was never transferred to
petitioner, but remained with TOPROS. Thus, no real action for the recovery of real
property is involved. This being the case, TOPROS' action for annulment of the contracts
of loan and real estate mortgage remains a personal action. (emphasis supplied)
In the Complaint filed with the court a quo, petitioner sought the nullification of the Deed of Sale
with Right to Repurchase on the strength of this claim: he did not sign the same nor did he
execute any special power of attorney in favor of his late wife to do so in his behalf. 18 But, as
there was no allegation that the possession and title to the property have been
transferred to respondent, nowhere in the Complaint did petitioner allege or pray for the
recovery or reconveyance of the real property. Pertinent parts of the Complaint read thus:
4. Plaintiff was married to Ma. Lucila B. Racpan on 20 December 1978. The latter died on 13
November 2011 at Oroville, California...

5. Plaintiff Racpan purchased a property from his brother Lorezo L. Racpan formerly covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-189893 and located at Carmen, Davao del Norte and the said
property is now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-142-2011009374. Hereto
attached and marked as Annex "B" is a copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-142-
2011009374 registered under the name of plaintiff Rudy L. Racpan. Also attached and
marked as Annex "C'" is the tax declaration of the subject property to prove that plaintiff is the
owner of the same.

6. Plaintiff's wife died at Oroville, California on 12 November 2011. However, her remains were
returned to Davao City, Philippines. Nonetheless, it was the daughter of the plaintiff in the
person of Lani Racpan who arrived first in Davao City.

xxxx

8. On 12 December 2011, plaintiff's daughter showed to him the subject deed of sale with right
to repurchase dated 29 March 2011. Plaintiff was surprised because he did not know or has NO
knowledge of the said deed of sale with right to repurchase. When plaintiff navigated the
Deed of Sale, he was surprised because his signature appearing on the same is
COMPLETELY FALSIFIED....

8.a Moreover, plaintiff did not also execute any special power of attorney in favour of his
deceased wife authoring the latter to [sell] the subject property to the defendant.

8.b On the other hand, the subject property is registered under the name of plaintiff Rudy
Racpan and NOT TO SPOUSES Racpan. The words "married to Ma. Lucila B. Racpan" only
signified the civil status of plaintiff to the latter.
xxxx

9.d Evidently, from the foregoing the (alleged) subject deed of sale with right to repurchase
is NULL AND VOID as the same contains the falsified signature of the herein plaintiff.

xxxx

11. Plaintiff before and during the time of the execution of the subject Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase dated 29 March 2011 NEVER MET defendant Saigh. It was only sometime in
December 7 or 8, 2011 that he met defendant Saigh during the wake of his wife wherein he was
introduced to the former by Orly Gabriel.

12. To date, plaintiff is in possession of the subject property. However, his daughter has
been receiving text message from defendant requiring him to settle the said alleged obligation of
his deceased wife to her.19
Evidently, as the Complaint was not concerned with the title to or recovery of the real property, it
was a personal action. Thus, Davao City, where both the petitioner and the respondent reside
is the proper venue for the complaint. The appellate court therefore committed a reversible error
in affirming the trial court's dismissal of the case for improper venue.

The Complaint was exempted from Barangay Conciliation Proceedings

As for petitioner's failure to resort to barangay conciliation, Section 412 of the Local Government
Code (LGC) provides that parties may go directly to court where the action is coupled with
provisional remedies:
SEC. 412. Conciliation. - (a) Pre-condition to filing of complaint in court. - No complaint,
petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed
or instituted directly in court or any other government office for adjudication, unless there has
been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no
conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat
secretary as attested to by the lupon chairman or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement
has been repudiated by the parties thereto.

(b) Where parties may go directly to court. - The parties may go directly to court in the following
instances:

(1) Where the accused is under detention;

(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus
proceedings;

(3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction,
attachment, delivery of personal property, and support pendente lite; and

(4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations.

(c) Conciliation among members of indigenous cultural communities. - The customs and
traditions of indigenous cultural communities shall be applied in settling disputes between
members of the cultural communities.
While there is no dispute herein that the present case was never referred to the Barangay
Lupon for conciliation before petitioner instituted Civil Case No. 34, 742-2012, there is likewise
no quibbling that his Complaint was coupled with a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction.20 Hence, it falls among the exceptions to the rule requiring the referral to baranggay
conciliation.
As good faith is always presumed,21 in the absence of proof of improper motive on the part of
the petitioner, the Court cannot countenance the appellate court's assumption that petitioner
was solely intent on evading the requirements of the LGC in applying for a preliminary
injunction. This Court cannot sustain a dismissal of an action on account of an unproven
assertion of bad faith.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 13, 2017 Decision and August 17,
2017 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 04034-MIN, as well as
the Orders dated September 18, 2013 and June 19, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City, Branch 11, in Civil Case No. 34, 742-2012 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case
No. 34, 742-2012 is hereby ordered REINSTATED. The RTC is ordered to proceed with
dispatch in the disposition of the mentioned case.

SO ORDERED.