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Marissa A. Mossesgeld vs.

CA

G.R. No. 111455, Dec 23, 1998

Facts:

On December 2, 1989, petitioner Marissa Alfaro Mossesgeld , single, single 31 years of age, gave
birth to a baby boy at Medical City General Hospital Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. The presumed father,
Eleazar Siriban, 42 years old, a lawyer, married, signed the birth certificate of the child as informant,
indicating the child's first name as Jonathan, middle name of Mossesgeld, and last name as Calasan.
Both stated that the information is true and correct. In addition lawyer Calasan executed an affidavit
admitting paternity to a child.

The local civil registrar of Mandaluyong denied the registration of the birth certificate of
petitioner's illegitimate child using father's surname, for it is contrary to law. The petitioner filed a
petition for mandamus to compel the civil registrar of Mandaluyong to register the birth certificate of
his alleged son using his surname. The lower court denied the motion for reconsideration. The petitioner
appealed to Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not mandamus lies to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register a certificate of live
birth of an illegitimate child using the alleged father's surname where the latter admitted paternity?

RULING:

In this case, the court ruled that mandamus will not lie to compel the local civil registrar to
register the certificate of live birth of an illegitimate child using the father's surname even with the
consent of the latter. Mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of an act prohibited by law.

The Court of Appeals denied the petition and based its decision on Art. 176 of the Family code
which provided that “ illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled support and conformity with the Family Code,” such is
the rule regardless of whether or not the father admits paternity. The putative father, through a much
married man, may legally adopt his own illegitimate child and in such case, the child shall be considered
a legitimate child of the adopter entitled to use his surname.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Abadilla

G.R. No. 133054, January 28, 1999

FACTS

Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino have been living together as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage. During their cohabitation, Luzviminda begot two children, Emerson and Rafael.
In the certificates of birth of these two children, they were registered with the surname of “ Abadilla “
and the name of their father was entered as “ Herson Abadilla “. Thereafter, an amended petition for
correction or cancellation were filed to the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City.

The trial court granted the petition and ordered the civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte to
issue an amended birth certificate. The solicitor general interposed and filed a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE
Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the corresponding corrections in the birth
certificate?

RULING

In this case, the court ruled based on Article 176 of the Family Code which states that, “
illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of the mother and
shall be entitled to support in conformity with of this code. Thus, an illegitimate children, Emerson and
Rafael should bear the surname of their mother. The decision of the trial court is MODIFIED. The civil
registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte is hereby ordered to change the entry in the amended birth
certificates of Emerson and Rafael Abadilla to Celestino.
August us Caesar R. Gan vs. Hon. Antonio Reyes

G.R. No. 145527, May 28, 2002

FACTS

Quite apprehensive that she would not be able to send to school her three year old daughter
Francheska Joy S. Pondevida, Bernadette S. Pondevida wrote the petitioner Augustus Caezar R. Gan
demanding support for their loved child. The petioner denied the paternity of the child and move to
dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. He argued that since
Frencheska's certificate of birth indicated her father as “ UNKNOWN “, there was no legal or factual
basis for claim for support. His motion was denied by the trial court. The petitioner failed to file his
answer within the reglamentary period. The trial court rendered its decision to recognize Frencheska Joy
S. Pondevida as his illegitimate child and support her. The private respondent moved for execution of the
judgment of support, which the trial court granted by issuing a writ if execution citing as a reason that
private respondent's immediate need for schooling. The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with
Court of Appeals imputing that there is a abuse of discretion on the trial court ordering the immediate
execution of the judgment.

ISSUE

Whether or not there is a abuse of discretion in the trial court in rendering the writ of execution?

RULING

In this case, the court ruled based in Sec. 4, rule 39 is the rules of court, clearly states that “ unless
ordered by the trial court, judgments in action for support are immediately executory and cannot be
stated an appeal. “ The money and property determined for support and education should and must be
given presently and without delay because if it had to wait the final judgment, the children in the
meantime have suffered because of lack of food or have missed and lost years in school because of lack
of funds. The petition of the respondent is DENIED upholding the writ of execution issued by the RTC.
Dinah B. Tong v. Court of Appeals and Edgar V. Daguimol

G.R. No. 122906, February 7, 2002.

FACTS

On September 23, 1989, petitioner Dinah B. Tong gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her
illegitimate daughter with private respondent Edgar V. Daguimol. They cohabited for a time and lived
with the private respondent's parents and sister in the latter's house in Quezon,City where the infant,
Gardin Faith, was welcome addition to the family. A year after the birth of Gadin Faith, petitioner left for
the United States of America where she found work. Gardin Faith was left in the care of the father and
paternal grandparents. On January 10, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for guardianship over
Gardin Faith. The trial court rendered the judgement appointing private respondent as the legal
guardian of the minor, Gardin Faith. Petitioner learned of the judgment of the trial court and filed a
petition for relief from judgment. The court sets aside it’s original judgment and allowed petitioner to
file her position to private respondent's petition. The private respondent filed a petition for
reconsideration in Court of Appeals and it granted the petition of the private respondent to the custody
of the child. Petitioner interposed instant appeal after the appellate court ( C.A ) denied her motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUE

Whether or not the appellate court erred in allowing the father to retain guardianship to the child?

RULING

In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that the appellate court did not err in allowing the private
respondent to retain in the meantime parental custody over the child. Meanwhile, the child should be
wrenched from her familiar surroundings and thrust into a strange environment away from the people
and places to which she had apparently formed an attachment. If the child is older than seven years old,
a child is allowed to state his preference, but the court is not bound by that choice. The court may
exercise its discretion by disregarding a child's preference should the parent chosen be found to be
unfit, in which instance, custody may be given to the other parent, or even to the third person. It shall
be understood that, for the present and until finally determined, temporarytemporary of the subject
minor should remain with his father.
Intestate Estate of the deceased Antonio Escobar, THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS,
administrator. ESTATE OF THE DECEASED Luciana delis Santos, represented by the executor Jose Santos,
claimant appealed vs Maria Luciano, claimant appeal and, G.R. no. 40958, August 11, 1934.

FACTS

On January 1, 1837, a girl four days old alleged to be a natural daughter of Leon Escobar and Josefa
Esguerra, was baptized in Ermita church and given the name Tomasa Escobar. Leon Escobar and Josefa
Esguerra were married on August 2, 1838 and subsequently had a legitimate children named Antonio
and Fortunate Escobar. With said spouses and their two legitimate children lived Tomasa, Guia and
Nicolas Escobar. All of them called the spouses father and mother. Tomasa Escobar grew up and lived
under the care of the spouses Leon and Josefa until she married. Said spouses supported her treated
and presented her as their daughter. When Tomasa Escobar became a widow, she went back to lived
with the said spouses together with her only daughter the claimant appeallant Maria Luciano. When
Tomasa Escobar died, Leon Escobar took Maria into his home until she was married. Apparently, Leon
Escobar died. When Fortunato Escobar became ill and eventually died, Antonio Escobar took Maria
Luciano into his home where she lived Antonio’s death. The claimant appellant Maria Luciano claims to
be the legitimate niece of the deceased Antonio Escobar, and therefore the only heir to the estate of her
said uncle.

ISSUE

Whether or not Maria Luciano is the only heir of Antonio Escobar?

RULING

In this case, the court ruled that the usufructuary ( legitimate ) right of the widow Luciana delos
Santos was extinguished upon her death. In the view of the foregoing considerations, the court sets
guidelines: 1. That the continuous possession of the status of a natural child, justified by direct acts of its
parents and their family under the legislation prior to the civil code, constitutes a tacit recognition of
paternity 2. That a child who has enjoyed the continuous possession of the child 3. That the legitimate
daughter of a daughter legitimate by subsequent marriage, now deceased, is entitled to inherit from a
brother of her mother who is legitimate son of same parents who legitimate her mother by subsequent
marriage and who died after the civil code took effect 4. That the word “ legitimated “ employed in
Section 3, Chapter 4 of Book Three of the civil code, refers to children legitimated by royal concession
and not those legitimated by subsequent marriage. Thus, Maria Luciano I’d declared to be the sole heir
of Antonio Escobar
Republic of the Philippines vs Hon. Rodolfo Toledano in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 69, Iba Zambales and Spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn
Clouse, respondents. G.R. No. 94147, June 8, 1994.

FACTS

Private respondents Clouse sought to adopt minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of
the private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse. The principal evidence disclose that the private respondent
Alvin A. Clouse is a natural born citizen of the United States of America. He married Evelyn, a Filipino,
but became a naturalized citizen of the United States of America in Guam. Finding that the private
respondents have all the qualifications and none disqualifications provided provided by the law and that
the adoption will benefit to the best interest and welfare of the minor, respondent judge rendered
decision on June 20, 1990 granting the petition for adoption filed by the spouses Clouse. The Solicitor
General appealed for relief of judgment.

ISSUE

Whether or not the lower court erred in granting the petition for adoption of Alvin and Evelyn
Clouse?

RULING

In this case the lower court erred in granting the petition for adoption. The court based its
judgment on Article 185 of the Family code which states that “ husband and wife must jointly adopt,
except in the following cases:” 1. When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child, or 2. When
one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the
husband and wife. Evidently, Presidential Decree No. 603 had made it mandatory for both the spouses
to jointly adopt when one of them was an alien. The law was silent when both spouses were the same
nationality. These considerations despite the records of the case do not justify the court in allowing the
adoption of the minor, Solomon Alcala by private respondents who are aliens. The decision of the lower
court is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Claude A. Miller and Jumrus S. Miller

G.R. No. 125932, April 21, 1999

FACTS

On July 29, 1988, the spouses Claude Miller and Jumrus Miller filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Angeles City. A verified petition for adopt the minor Michael Magno Magdayag. Both spouses are
American Citizen. The trial court rendered decision granting the petition for adoption. The Solicitor
General appeal to the Court of Appels.

ISSUE

Whether the court may allow aliens to adopt a Filipino child despite the prohibition under the
family code, effective on August 3, 1988 when the petition for adoption was filed on July 29, 1988 under
the provisions of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which allowed aliens to adopt?

RULING

In this case, the court has ruled that an alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Welfare Code,
which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be
affected by the subsequent enactment of the new law. The family code which took effect on August 3,
1988 will not impair the right by aliens to adopt the said minor. The court AFFIRMED the appealed
decision of the RTC.
Herbert Cang vs. C.A and spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Clavano

G.R. No. 105308, September 25, 1998

FACTS

Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married, begot three children, namely:
Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony. During the early years of marriage, the relationship was
satisfactory, however, Anna Marie learned that husband's alleged extra marital with a family friend of
Clavanos. Upon learning the illicit relation of the husband, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal
separation to the domestic relations court of Cebu which rendered in affirmation of the petition.
Petitioner left for United States where he sought divorce decree and granted by the court of Nevada.
Petitioner worked in Tablante Medical Clinic where he earned P18,000 to P20,000 a month and a
portion which was remitted to the Philippines for his children’s expenses, deposited in the bank in the
name of his children. The petitioner also argued that he had a conversation with Anna Marie and with
the children. Meanwhile, on September 25, 1987, private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano
filed an adoption for the three minors Cang with the signature of then 14 year old keith signifying his
consent to his adoption. Anna Marie filed an affidavit of consent alleging that the husband had evaded
his legal obligation to support, her husband had divorced her and left the Philippines to be an illegal
alien in US and transferring from one place to another. Upon learning of the petitioner for adoption, he
immediately returned to the Philippines. The trial court rendered its decision affirming Ronald and Maria
Clavano acquiring custody to the children.

ISSUE

Whether or not the decree of adoption is valid?

RULING

In this case, the court based its decision on Article 188 of the family code which requires the
written consent of the natural parents of the child to be adopted. It has been held however that the
consent of the the parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary. The question therefore is
whether or not opposition may be considered as having abandoned the children. In adoption cases,
abandonment means any conduct on the part of the parent to forego parental duties and give parental
claims to the child or neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations which parents owe
their children. The petitioner did not abandoned the children by providing them support and their was
emotional exchange of sentiments between petition and his family. Wherefore, the decision of the trial
court is SET ASIDE thereby denying the petition for adoption.
Republic of the Philippines vs Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, respondents.

G.R. No. 97906, May 22, 1992

FACTS

Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala Sr. and Segundina Y. Alcala. He is adopted by
spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong ( now deceased ). Both were naturalized Filipino. Upon
reaching the age of 22, the private respondent by then married, filed a petition to change his name to
Maximo Alcala Jr. because the use of surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives
and friends, as the same Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in
Muslim community. He wanted to erase any implication of alien nationality because he was ridiculed for
carrying a Chinese name. It also hinder his business and social life, and that his adoptive mother does
not oppose his desire to revert to his former surname. The trial court rendered the judgment and
affirmed to change the respondent Maximo Wong to Maximo Alcala Jr. The solicitor general petition for
review of certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether or not the reasons given by private respondent in his petition for change of name are
valid, sufficient and proper warrant the granting of said petition?

RULING

The Solicitor General contends that private respondent's allegations of ridicule or isolation from
family and friends were non valid and cannot justify for petition for change if name. He claims that for
private respondent to cast aside the name of his father is to provide lack of proper appreciation. It also
stated that it violates art 341 and 365 of the civil code, which requires an adopted child to use the
surname of the adopter. The court ruled based on Sec. 103 of rules of court which gives a person in
opportunity to improve his personality and provide his best interest. The adoptive mother also stated
that the change of name does not affect the legal adoption granted by the court making the petitioner
as one and only heir. The court stated that a change of name does not define or effect a change in one's
existing family relations or in rights and duties following therefrom. It does not alter ones legal capacity,
civil status or citizenship; what is altered only is the name. The petition of the Solicitor General is
DENIED.