United Nations Security Council Resolution 47

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 47, adopted on 21 April

1948, concerns the resolution of the Kashmir conflict. After hearing arguments UN Security Council
from both India and Pakistan, the Council increased the size of the Commission Resolution 47
established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 39 to five members Date 21 April 1948
(with representatives of Argentina, Belgium, Colombia, Czechoslovakia and the
Meeting no. 286
United States[1]), instructed the Commission to go to the subcontinent and help
the governments of India and Pakistan restore peace and order to the region and
Code S/726 (Document (htt
prepare for a plebiscite to decide the fate of Kashmir.
ps://undocs.org/S/RE
S/47(1948)))
Secondly, the Resolution recommended a three-step process for the resolution of Subject The India-Pakistan
the dispute. In the first step, Pakistan was asked to withdraw all its nationals that Question
entered Kashmir for the sake of fighting. In the second step, India was asked to
Result Adopted
progressively reduce its forces to the minimum level required for law and order.
In the third step, India was asked to appoint a plebiscite administrator nominated by the United Nations who would conduct a free
and impartial plebiscite.

The resolution was adopted paragraph by paragraph; no vote on the resolution as a whole was taken.

Both India and Pakistan raised objections to the Resolution. However, they welcomed mediation by the UN Commission.
Through its mediation, the Commission amplified and amended the Security Council Resolution, adopting two resolutions of its
own, which were accepted by both India and Pakistan. Subsequently, a cease-fire was achieved by the Commission at the
beginning of 1949. However, a truce was not achieved due to disagreements over the process of demilitarisation. After
considerable efforts, the Commission declared its failure in December 1949.

Contents
Background
Resolution 47
The Resolution
Commentary
Reception
UN Commission
Ceasefire (1948)
Elusive truce (1949)
Aftermath
See also
Notes
References
Bibliography
External links
Background
Prior to 1947, Jammu and Kashmir (Kashmir) was a princely state under British
Paramountcy, ruled by a Hindu maharaja. With the impending independence of
India and Pakistan, the British announced that the British Paramountcy would
lapse and the rulers of princely states were given the option of joining one of the
two new countries (termed "accession") or staying independent. The Maharaja of
Jammu and Kashmir chose to stay independent, given the mixed ethnic and
religious composition of the state's population.[a]

Following an uprising in the western districts of the state and an armed invasion
by Pashtun tribes from Pakistan, the Maharaja acceded to India on 26 October
1947. India immediately air lifted troops into Kashmir the next day.
Considerable evidence cited by scholars since then has pointed to Pakistan's
Map of the former princely state of
complicity in instigating and supporting the invasion. A limited war ensued Jammu and Kashmir
between the Indian troops and the Pakistani raiders within the confines of the
princely state.

On 1 January 1948, India took the matter to the United Nations Security Council under Article 35 of the UN Charter, which
allows the member nations to bring to the attention of the UN matters endangering international peace. It claimed that Pakistani
nationals and tribesmen had attacked Jammu and Kashmir, which was Indian territory. It requested the Security Council to
prevent Pakistan from continuing its actions. India also stated that, despite holding the state's legal accession, it was prepared to
conduct a plebiscite to confirm the people's wishes and abide by its results. In response, Pakistan denied involvement in the
conflict and made counter-accusations claiming that India had acquired the state's accession by "fraud and violence" and that it
was conducting a "genocide" against Muslims.[3]

On 20 January 1948, the Security Council passed Resolution 39 establishing a three-member Commission to investigate the
complaints. However such a Commission did not come into fruition until May 1948. Meanwhile, the Security Council continued
its deliberations and the war too continued.

Resolution 47
On 18 March, the Republic of China tabled a new draft resolution in three parts. The first part dealt with the restoration of peace,
asking Pakistan to withdraw its nationals. The second part dealt with the conduct of plebiscite for the people of Kashmir to
choose between India and Pakistan. India was asked to create a "Plebiscite Administration" whose directors would be nominated
by the UN Secretary General but would function as the officials of the state. The third part dealt with creating an interim
administration for the state which would represent all major political groups in the state.[4]

During the subsequent discussion, the draft was modified considerably, with several concessions made to Pakistan at the
instigation of the British delegation. India expressed discomfort at the modifications.[5]

The Resolution
The final resolution adopted had two parts. The first part increased the Commission's strength to five members and asked it to
proceed to the Indian subcontinent at once to mediate between India and Pakistan. The second part dealt with the Security
council's recommendations for restoring peace and conducting a plebiscite. This involved three steps.[5][6]

In the first step, Pakistan was asked to use its "best endeavours" to secure the withdrawal of all tribesmen and
Pakistani nationals, putting an end to the fighting in the state.
 In the second step, India was asked to "progressively reduce" its forces to the minimum level required for
keeping law and order. It laid down principles that India should follow in administering law and order in
consultation with the Commission, using local personnel as far as possible.
In the third step, India was asked to ensure that all the major political parties were invited to participate in the
state government at the ministerial level, essentially forming a coalition cabinet. India should then appoint a
Plebiscite Administrator nominated by the United Nations, who would have a range of powers including powers to
deal with the two countries and ensure a free and impartial plebiscite. Measures were to be taken to ensure the
return of refugees, the release of all political prisoners, and for political freedom.
The resolution also called for measures be taken for return of refugees, for the release of political prisoners and for political
freedom.[7]

The resolution was approved by nine votes against none. The Soviet Union and Ukraine abstained.[8]

Commentary
The resolution was passed under the Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter (which is devoted to "peaceful settlement of
disputes"). It did not consist of directives to the parties, but rather "recommendations". Former UN diplomat Josef Korbel states
that this bound the parties only "morally" but not "juridicially". The final resolution of the conflict rested with the governments of
India and Pakistan and depended on their goodwill.[9]

The Security Council refrained from taking sides in the dispute. It did not condemn Pakistan as the aggressor, as India had
requested. Neither did it touch upon the legalities of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir. Korbel states that the Security Council
could have requested the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on the legal issues. Had that been done, the
Security Council would have been in a stronger position to declare one of the parties to be in the wrong, and the handling of the
dispute would have been easier.[9]

In the event, the approach of the Security Council was "timid" in Korbel's view. Its evaluation of the Kashmir dispute was not
realistic as discovered soon with prolonged debates, endless wrangling, and adjournment of the deliberations. With the passing of
time, the tensions and political cleavages in Kashmir grew and the plebiscite solution became increasingly difficult.[10]

The American ambassador to the UN Warren R. Austin also shared the view. He thought the resolution, as well as others that
followed, were unrealistic and ineffective. They depended on the goodwill of India and Pakistan cooperating with the Security
Council and failed to give it the authority to impose sanctions. The US embassies in India and Pakistan were equally
frustrated.[11]

It is apparent that the Security Council viewed the problem as primarily a political dispute rather than looking at its legal
underpinnings, in particular whether Kashmir's accession to India was valid.[12] It implicitly assumed that accession was valid but
incomplete, contingent upon the ratification by the people of the state. Thus it asked for the Pakistani nationals to withdraw in the
first instance but held that plebiscite was the ultimate solution.[13] Legal specialist Sumathi Subbiah contends that the way of
dealing with the situation as a political dispute rather than legal obligations proved too weak to compel India and Pakistan to
reach a final resolution.[14]

Reception
Both India and Pakistan raised objections to the Resolution 47.[b]

India objected first of all that the resolution placed India and Pakistan on an equal footing, ignoring the complaint of Pakistani
aggression and Kashmir's legal accession to India. Secondly, it objected to the absence of allowance for it to retain troops in the
state for its defence. It also felt the requirement of a coalition government would put Sheikh Abdullah, then Prime Minister of
Kashmir, in an impossible position. It said that the powers conferred on the Plebiscite Administrator were far too wide and
undermined the state's sovereignty. It felt that provision for the return of all refugees was unrealistic. Finally, India wanted
Pakistan to be excluded from the conduct of the plebiscite.[15]

Pakistan objected to the retention of the Indian forces in Kashmir, even at the minimum level allowed by the resolution. It wanted
an equal representation in the government of the state for the Muslim Conference, the dominant party of the Pakistani-held
Kashmir.[15] The Pakistani government circles felt that the Security Council deliberations had been favourable to Pakistan but the
final proposals were modified by the United States and Britain to "mollify" India. Britain came in for particular criticism.[16]

Both the sides however welcomed the UN Commission and agreed to work with it.[15]

UN Commission
The five member United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) consisted of the representatives from
Czechoslovakia (Josef Korbel), Argentina (Ricardo Siri), Belgium (Egbert Graeffe), Colombia (Alfredo Lozano) and the United
States (Jerome Klahr Huddle). It secretariat was headed by Erik Colban, the Norwegian ambassador to the UK, with the British
Quaker Richard Symonds acting as Colban's secretary.[17]

Sources state that the political atmosphere in both India and Pakistan was hostile to the Commission upon its arrival in the
subcontinent in July 1948.[18]

Ceasefire (1948)
Upon arriving in Karachi, the Commission was informed by Pakistan that three brigades of its regular troops had been fighting in
Kashmir since May, which was described as a "bombshell" by Josef Korbel.[19] In New Delhi, India asserted that it attached the
highest importance to a declaration of Pakistan's guilt.[20] The fighting in Kashmir went on unabated and the Commission
recognized that the Sheikh Abdullah government in Jammu and Kashmir and the Azad Kashmir government in Muzaffarabad
were engaged in an irreconcilable struggle.[21]

On 13 August 1948, after discussions with both the governments, the Commission unanimously adopted a three-part resolution,
amending and amplifying the UN Resolution 47.[22]

Part I dealt with ceasefire, calling for a complete cessation of hostilities.

Part II dealt with a truce agreement. It asked for a complete withdrawal of Pakistan's fighting forces, including the
army, tribes and other Pakistani nationals, and stated that the evacuated territory would be administered by local
authorities under the surveillance of the Commission. Following the Pakistani withdrawal, India was expected to
withdraw the "bulk of its forces" reducing them to the minimum level required for maintaining law and order.
Part III stated that, after the acceptance of the truce agreement, the two countries would enter into consultation
with the Commission for settling the future of the state in accordance with the will of the people.[23]
The structure of the resolution was of significance to India. The three-part structure implicitly recognized Pakistan's "aggression"
by making the truce agreement precede the consultation for the future of the state. Moreover, plebiscite was not mentioned, which
allowed for other possible avenues for determining the will of the people, such as electing a constituent assembly. India feared
that a plebiscite would incite religious passions and unleash "disruptive forces".[24]

While India accepted the Commission's resolution, Pakistan attached so many reservations and qualifications that the
Commission believed it was "tantamount to rejection".[23] The Commission surmised that Pakistan's main preoccupation was the
guarantee of a free and impartial plebiscite after the fighting stopped.[20] It then developed a supplement to its August resolution
outlining proposals for the administration of the plebiscite. It defined the functions of the Plebiscite Administrator who would,
among others, decide the final disposal of the Indian and Azad Kashmir forces.[25] India objected that it was being asked to make
further concessions even though Pakistan had not accepted the truce agreement. It sought and obtained several assurances,
including an agreement that it would not be bound by plebiscite if Pakistan did not implement the first two parts of the August
resolution;[26] and assurance that the Azad Kashmir forces would be disbanded before the plebiscite.[27][28]

Despite reservations, questions and dissents, the two governments finally accepted the proposals, leading to a ceasefire in
Kashmir on 1 January 1949.[29] The Commission incorporated the supplement into a new resolution approved on 5 January
1949.[30]

Elusive truce (1949)

The Commission returned to the subcontinent in February 1949 to implement the terms of the ceasefire, set up a truce agreement
and prepare for a plebiscite. Korbel states that the Commission faced "enormous difficulties".[31][c]

India insisted on the disbandment of the 'Azad forces' as an "essential condition" before the plebiscite, which, according to
Korbel, came as "jolt" to the Commission.[32] This was indeed agreed in the previous round.[27] However India appeared to have
advanced the timetable.[33] The so-called 'Azad forces' were made up of the demobilised soldiers of the British Indian Army
belonging to the Poonch and Mirpur districts. They rose in revolt against the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir prior to the tribal
invasion. Following the invasion, Pakistan organised the soldiers into 32 battalions of a serious military force and used them to
fight the Indian forces. During the truce discussions, Pakistan insisted on a balance between the Azad forces and the State forces,
and demanded that Pakistan be allowed to train the Azad forces to take the positions that the Pakistani forces would vacate. This
led the Indians to conclude that Pakistan was planning to resume hostilities as soon as the Indian withdrawal began. Thus they
demanded that the disbandment of Azad forces should occur during the truce stage itself. Pakistan rejected the demand for
disbandment and insisted on parity between the Azad and State forces. Pakistan also wished to see the detailed plans of the Indian
withdrawal and insisted that it should be "synchronized" with the Pakistani withdrawal.[33][34]

After multiple rounds of proposals for demilitarisation, which were rejected by both India and Pakistan, the Commission
proposed arbitration. Pakistan accepted the proposal for arbitration, but India rejected it, saying that it was not a matter for
arbitration but for "affirmative and immediate decision". India's position was that no distinction could be made between the
Pakistan Army and the Azad forces. The Commission conceded that the Azad forces now had a strength that changed the military
situation and made the Indian withdrawal as envisaged in the original resolution difficult.[33][34]

Another difficulty arose with regard to the "Northern Areas" (present day Gilgit-Baltistan). India demanded that, upon Pakistani
withdrawal, these areas should be restored to the government of Jammu and Kashmir and India should be allowed to defend its
borders. The Commission conceded the legal basis of the Indian demand but feared that it would cause renewed fighting between
the Indian forces and the local forces. It proposed that the areas should be governed by "local authorities" under the supervision of
the Commission and Indian forces would be sent only if the UN observers notified it of their necessity. This compromise was
rejected by both India and Pakistan.[35]

The Commission declared its failure and submitted its final report to the Security Council on 9 December 1949. It recommended
that the Commission be replaced by a single mediator; that the problem of demilitarisation be viewed as a whole without the
required sequentiality of the August resolution; that the UN representatives should have the authority to settle issues by
arbitration. The Czech delegate submitted a minority report contending that the Commission's declaration of failure was
premature, that the problem of Azad forces had been underrated, and that the Northern Areas did not receive adequate
attention.[36]

Aftermath
The Security Council asked its Canadian delegate, General A. G. L. McNaughton, to informally consult India and Pakistan
towards a demilitarisation plan. In the course of his discussion, on 22 December 1949, McNaughton proposed that both Pakistani
and Indian forces should be reduced to a minimum level, followed by the disbandment of both the Azad forces and the State
forces. India proposed two far-reaching amendments, in effect rejecting the McNaughton proposals. The McNaughton proposals
represented an important departure from those of the UNCIP resolutions in that they made no distinction between India and
Pakistan. India was averse to such an equation.[37][38]

Despite India's apparent objection, the Security Council adopted the McNaughton proposals in Resolution 80 and appointed a
mediator. The mediation also ended in failure.

In 1972, following the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, India and Pakistan signed the Simla Agreement, agreeing to resolve all their
differences through bilateral negotiations. The United States, United Kingdom and most Western governments have since
supported this approach.[39][40][41][42][43]

In 2001, the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan during his visit to India and Pakistan, clarified that
Kashmir resolutions are only advisory recommendations and they should not be compared to those on East Timor and Iraq.[44]

In 2003, the then Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf announced that Pakistan was willing to "leave aside" the demand for UN
resolutions and explore alternative bilateral options for resolving the dispute.[45]

See also
Kashmir conflict
Timeline of the Kashmir conflict
Indo-Pakistani relations
List of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1 to 100 (1946–1953)

Notes
a. According to the 1941 census, the state's population was 77 percent Muslim, 20 percent Hindu and 3 percent
others (Sikhs and Buddhists).[2] The Jammu province in the south was Hindu majority, related to the East Punjab
in India, Ladakh in the east was Buddhist majority, the Kashmir Valley in the centre was predominantly Muslim
and Kashmiri-speaking, the western districts were Sunni Muslim, related to the West Punjab in Pakistan, and the
northern areas were predominantly Muslim of Shia and Ismaili sects.
b. The reaction finds various descriptions in the sources:
Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India (2010, p. 132): "Both India and Pakistan rejected the resolution."
Korbel (1949, p. 279): "Both India and Pakistan raised voices against the April 1948 resolution."
Korbel, Danger in Kashmir (1966, pp. 112–113): "The Government of India sent a letter of protest to the
United Nations and refused cooperation in any implementation of the resolution...One month later, however,
the Indian representative was somehow more conciliatory... The Pakistani delegate was not wholly satisfied
with the proposal but his criticism did not imply outright rejection."
c. Josef Korbel left Czechoslovakia after the communist coup. He was replaced by another Czech delegate who,
according Korbel, "embarked upon the Soviet-Communist tactic of disrupting the structure of peace".[31]

References
1. "Text of 1949 UN Resolution Calling for Referendum on Kashmir" (http://middleeast.about.com/od/pakistan/qt/Ka
shmir-UN-Resolution.htm). Retrieved 19 September 2016.
2. Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace 2003, pp. 27–28.
3. Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India 2010, pp. 124–125.
 4. Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India 2010, pp. 130–131.
5. Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India 2010, p. 131.
6. Korbel, Danger in Kashmir 1966, pp. 113–114.
7. Korbel,Danger in Kashmir 1966, p. 113.
8. Korbel, Danger in Kashmir 1966, p. 112.
9. Korbel, Danger in Kashmir 1966, p. 114.
10. Korbel, Danger in Kashmir 1966, p. 117.
11. Schaffer, The Limits of Influence 2009, p. 18.
12. Subbiah, Security Council Mediation 2004, p. 180.
13. Subbiah, Security Council Mediation 2004, p. 181.
14. Subbiah, Security Council Mediation 2004, p. 182.
15. Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India 2010, p. 132.
16. Korbel, Danger in Kashmir 1966, p. 113.
17. Ankit, Rakesh (2014), Kashmir, 1945–66: From Empire to the Cold War (https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/370019/),
University of Southampton, p. 69
18. Blinkenberg, Lars (1998), India-Pakistan: The historical part (https://books.google.com/books?id=USowAQAAIAA
J&pg=PA106), Odense University Press, p. 106, ISBN 978-87-7838-286-3
19. Korbel, Danger in Kashmir 1966, p. 121.
20. Korbel, Danger in Kashmir 1966, p. 124.
21. Korbel, Kashmir dispute after six years 1953, pp. 501–502.
22. UNCIP 1948.
23. Korbel, Kashmir dispute after six years 1953, p. 502.
24. Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India 2010, p. 137, 144.
25. Korbel, Danger in Kashmir 1966, pp. 151–153.
26. UNCIP 1949, p. 23.
27. UNCIP 1949, p. 25.
28. Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India 2010, p. 145.
29. Korbel, Danger in Kashmir 1966, p. 153.
30. UNCIP Resolution of 5 January 1949 (S/1196) (http://www.humsafar.info/jkun490105.php), Jinnah of Pakistan
web site, retrieved September 2016.
31. Korbel, Danger in Kashmir 1966, p. 154.
32. Korbel, Danger in Kashmir 1966, p. 155.
33. Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India 2010, p. 146.
34. Das Gupta, Jammu and Kashmir 2012, p. 147-148.
35. Das Gupta, Jammu and Kashmir 2012, pp. 150–151.
36. Das Gupta, Jammu and Kashmir 2012, pp. 151–152.
37. Das Gupta, Jammu and Kashmir 2012, p. 153-154.
38. Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India 2010, p. 147.
39. Schaffer, The Limits of Influence 2009, pp. 122–123.
40. Roberts, Adam; Welsh, Jennifer (2010), The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought
and Practice Since 1945 (https://books.google.com/books?id=SiYUDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA340), Oxford University
Press, p. 340, ISBN 978-0-19-958330-0
41. Cheema, Zafar Iqbal (2009), "The strategic context of the Kargil conflict: A Pakistani perspective", in Peter René
Lavoy (ed.), Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict (https://bo
oks.google.com/books?id=-vifpWqV2WYC&pg=PA47), Cambridge University Press, p. 47, ISBN 978-0-521-
76721-7
42. Kux, Dennis (1992), India and the United States: Estranged Democracies, 1941-1991 (https://books.google.com/
books?id=zcylFXH9_z8C&pg=PA434), DIANE Publishing, p. 434, ISBN 978-0-7881-0279-0
43. Lyon, Peter (2008), Conflict Between India and Pakistan: An Encyclopedia (https://books.google.com/books?id=v
LwOck15eboC&pg=PA166), ABC-CLIO, p. 166, ISBN 978-1-57607-712-2
44. "Low expectations from Indo-Pak talks" (http://www.rediff.com/news/2004/jun/26pak1.htm). Rediff News. 26 June
2004.
45. "We have 'left aside' U.N. resolutions on Kashmir: Musharraf" (http://www.thehindu.com/2003/12/19/stories/2003
121908320100.htm). The Hindu. 18 December 2003.

Bibliography
Bose, Sumantra (2003), Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace (https://books.google.com/books?id=3ACMe
9WBdNAC), Harvard University Press, ISBN 0-674-01173-2
Das Gupta, Jyoti Bhusan (2012), Jammu and Kashmir (https://books.google.com/books?id=dpTpCAAAQBAJ&p
g), Springer, ISBN 978-94-011-9231-6
Korbel, Josef (May 1949), "The Kashmir Dispute and the United Nations", International Organization, 3 (2): 278–
287, doi:10.1017/s0020818300020610 (https://doi.org/10.1017%2Fs0020818300020610), JSTOR 2703744 (http
s://www.jstor.org/stable/2703744)
Korbel, Josef (1953), "The Kashmir dispute after six years", International Organization, 7 (4): 498–510,
doi:10.1017/s0020818300007256 (https://doi.org/10.1017%2Fs0020818300007256), JSTOR 2704850 (https://w
ww.jstor.org/stable/2704850)
Korbel, Josef (1966) [first published 1954], Danger in Kashmir (https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=7Q7WCgAA
QBAJ), Princeton University Press
Raghavan, Srinath (2010), War and Peace in Modern India: A Strategic History of the Nehru Years (https://books.
google.com/books?id=EbtBJb1bsHUC&pg=PA101), Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN 978-1-137-00737-7
Schaffer, Howard B. (2009), The Limits of Influence: America's Role in Kashmir (https://books.google.com/book
s?id=kyYOWdA5PNkC), Brookings Institution Press, ISBN 978-0-8157-0370-9
Subbiah, Sumathi (2004), "Security Council Mediation and the Kashmir Dispute: Reflections on Its Failures and
Possibilities for Renewal" (http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol27/iss1/8), Boston College International and
Comparative Law Review, 27 (1): 173–185
UNCIP (22 November 1948), First Interim Report of the UNCIP (S/1100) (https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4737
32/files/S_1100-EN.pdf) (PDF), United Nations Digital Library, retrieved 10 August 2019
UNCIP (10 January 1949), Second Interim Report of the UNCIP (S/1196) (https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/6331
89/files/S_1196-EN.pdf) (PDF), United Nations Digital Library, retrieved 10 August 2019
UNCIP (9 December 1949), Third Interim Report of the UNCIP (S/1430) (https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/47227
3/files/S_1430-EN.pdf) (PDF), United Nations Digital Library, retrieved 10 August 2019

External links
Text of Resolution at undocs.org (https://undocs.org/S/RES/47(1948))
S/995: UNCIP Resolution of 13 August 1948 (https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/471051/files/S_995-EN.pdf),
United Nations Digital Library, retrieved 10 August 2019.
The Secretary of State to the Embassy of India, 26 March 1949 (https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus
1949v06/d1171), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume
VI, US Department of State.
Pakistani perspective on the UN resolution (http://www.pakun.org/kashmir/history.php), Pakistan Mission to the
United Nations.

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