NOVICES MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019 Page |I

TEAM CODE : 10

NOVICES MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2019

BEFORE THE HON’BLE DISTRICT COURT OF MOHALI

Case No. _____/2019

MR. ARUNESH NANDA…………………………………………..PLAINTIFF

versus

MR. SAROBAR SINGH………………………………………………..DEFENDANT

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT

DRAWN AND FILED BY COUNSELS FOR THE DEFENDANT

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT

 NOVICES MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019 Page |I

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS II

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES III-IV

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION V

SUMMARY OF FACTS VI

ISSUES RAISED VII

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS VIII

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 1-8

CONTENTION 1: WHETHER THE ACCEPTANCE BY THE PLAINTIFF WAS COMPLETE OR NOT?

CONTENTION 2: WHETHER THE DEFENDANT HAD SUCCESSFULLY REVOKED HIS OFFER TO THE
PLAINTIFF OR NOT?

CONTENTION 3: WHETHER THE DEFENDANT IS LIABLE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT UNDER

SECTION 73 OF INDIAN CONTRACT ACT,1872 OR NOT?

PRAYER IX

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT

 NOVICES MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019 P a g e | II

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

& And
AIR All India Reporter
Art. Article
CPC Code of Civil Procedure
LR Law Reports
All. Allahabad
v. Versus
SCC Supreme Court Cases
u/s Under Section
Ltd. Limited
Ors. Others
Hon’ble Honourable
r/w Read with
Vol. Volume
Ed. Edition

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT

 NOVICES MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019 P a g e | III

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

TABLE OF CASES

1. Republic Medico Surgical Co v. Union of India AIR 1980 Kant 168

2. Kaluram Kesharvani v State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1986 MP 204, 206: 1986 Jab
LJ 372: (1986) 2 CCC 640 (DB)
3. Ram Das Chakarbarti v. Official Liquidator, Cotton Ginning Co. (1887) ILR 9 ALL
366, p 385
4. Karan Singh Chandan Singh v. Collector Chhatarpur, 1980 MPLJ 231 : AIR 1980
Madhya Pradesh 89
5. Bank of India v Rustom Fakirji Cowasjee AIR 1955 Bom 419
6. T Linga Gowder v State of Madras AIR 1971 Mad 28.
7. Brogden v Metropolitan Railway (1877) 2 App Cas 666.
8. Gajendra Singh v Nagarpalika Nigam Gwalior AIR 1996 MP 10
9. Kamalabai Jageshwar Joshi v State of Maharashtra (1996) 1 SCC 669.
10. Best’s Case (1865) 2 DJ & S 650
11. Gunn’s Case (1867) LR 3 Ch App 40.
12. Rani Huzur Ara Begum v Deputy Commr AIR 1941 Oudh 529
13. Central Bank Yeotmal Ltd v Vyankatesh Bapuji AIR 1949 Nag 286
14. Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. [1893] 1 QB 256
15. Eaglehill Ltd. v. J Needham(Builders) Ltd. [1973] AC 992 at 1011
16. NV Stoom y Maats ‘De Maas’ v Nippon Yusen Kaisha (The Pendrecht) [1980] 2
Lloyd’s Rep 56 at 66
17. Tenax Steamship Co Ltd v. Brimnes (Owners), The Brimnes [1975] 5 QB 929
18. Curtice v. London City & Midland Bank [1908] 1 KB 293, 300 (CA)
19. Henthorn v. Fraser [1892] 2 Ch 27
20. Schelde Delta Shipping B V v. Astarte Shipping Ltd., (The Panela) (1995) 2 Lloyd’s
Rep 249
21. National Coop Sugar Mills Ltd. v Albert & Co., AIR 1981 Mad 172

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT

 NOVICES MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019 P a g e | IV

STATUTES

1. The Indian Contract Act, 1872

2. The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
3. The Punjab Courts Act, 1918

BOOKS

1. Dr. RG Padia, Pollock & Mulla Indian Contract and Specific Relief Act, Vol. II
(LexisNexis Butterworths publication, 13th Ed., Fifth Reprint 2010)
2. Dr. RG Padia, Pollock & Mulla Indian Contract and Specific Relief Act, Vol. I
(LexisNexis Butterworths publication, 13th Ed., Fifth Reprint 2010)
3. Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (9th Ed. Thomas & West, U.S.A. 1990)
4. Sir Dinshaw Fardunji, Mulla The Code of Civil Procedure, Vol. I (Butterworths
Publication, 16th Ed.)
5. Avtar Singh, Contract and Specific Relief (Eastern Book Company publication, 10th Ed.)
6. Moitra A.C, Law of Contract & Specific Relief (Universal Law Publishing Co., 5th Ed.)
7. Dr. R.K. Bangia, Law of Contracts- I (Allahabad Law Agency, 7th Ed. 2017)

WEBSITES

1. http://www.scconline.com
2. http://www.manupatra.co.in/AdvancedLegalSearch.aspx
3. http://www.findlaw.com

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT

 NOVICES MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019 Page |V

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Counsel for Defendant has approached the Hon’ble District Court of Mohali under section
20 of The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Section 20: Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside or cause of action arises.
Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local
limits of whose jurisdiction

(a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of
the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business,
or personally works for gain; or

(b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the
commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or
personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the leave of the Court is
given, or the defendants who do not reside, or carry on business, or personally works
for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution; or

(c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT

 NOVICES MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019 P a g e | VI

SUMMARY OF FACTS

1. OFFER BY MR. SAROBAR SINGH :

Mr. Sarobar Singh is the Managing Director of an art gallery situated in Sector 68,
Mohali. It is a leading art gallery and has excellent clientele. On 15th June, 2019, at
10:00 am, Sarobar sent a Whatsup text to Mr. Arunesh Nanda, a customer, offering to
sell him a rare and antique painting for Rs. 4,50,000/-

2. ACCEPTANCE BY MR. ARUNESH NANDA :

On receiving the text, Arunesh Nanda was decided to write a letter to Sarobar Singh,
expressing his preference as well as acceptance. Arunesh Nanda posted the letter at
1:00 pm, in which he promises to pay the purchase amount by June 18th. However,
while penning the letter, Nanda puts an incomplete address, due to which the
acceptance letter never arrives. So, the next day, i.e., on June 16th, at 9:00 am, Nanda
gives a phone call to Sarobar Singh, to signify his acceptance of the latter’s offer.
However, that day, Sarobar, due to an honest mistake, had left his mobile phone at
home, so no conversation could take place. Meanwhile, Nanda started arranging for
the purchase amount. He borrows some money from his brother and signs a cheque for
Rs. 4,50,000/-

3. NEW OFFER BY MR. A. MALIK AND REVOCATION BY SAROBAR :

On June 17th, Sarobar Singh receives a new offer for the painting of Rs. 5,00,000/-
from Mr. A. Malik. Sarobar singh then sends a fax of revocation to Nanda at 5:30 pm,
knowing that Nanda’s office working hours are from 9:00 am to 5:00 pm. Nanda
receives the fax of revocation the next day, i.e., June 18th, at 9:00 am, and immediately
calls Sarobar Singh to hand over the signed cheque within an hour itself, but Sarobar
refuses to sell the painting.

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT

 NOVICES MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019 P a g e | VII

ISSUES RAISED

ISSUE 1:

WHETHER ACCEPTANCE BY THE PLAINTIFF WAS COMPLETE OR NOT?

ISSUE 2:

WHETHER THE DEFENDANT HAD SUCCESSFULLY REVOKED HIS OFFER TO THE PLAINTIFF OR NOT?

ISSUE 3:

WHETHER THE DEFENDANT IS LIABLE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT UNDER SECTION 73 OF INDIAN
CONTRACT ACT, 1872 OR NOT?

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT

 NOVICES MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019 P a g e | VIII

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1. WHETHER THE ACCEPTANCE BY THE PLAINTIFF WAS COMPLETE OR NOT?

It is submitted before the Hon’ble court that the acceptance given by the plaintiff was
not complete since the defendant wasn’t notified of the acceptance. Firstly, the
acceptance letter posted by the plaintiff was incorrectly addressed and hence, never
came to the knowledge of the defendant. Also, the phone call made by the plaintiff
never reached the defendant and hence, no conversation took place. Thus, the
acceptance by the plaintiff was not complete under section 4 of the Indian Contract
Act, 1872.

2. WHETHER THE DEFENDANT HAD SUCCESSFULLY REVOKED HIS OFFER TO THE

PLAINTIFF OR NOT?

In the present case, when the defendant had received a new offer by a third party, the
very same day, he sent a fax of revocation to the plaintiff , revoking the offer to sell the
painting to the plaintiff. Once he had sent the fax of revocation, it was no longer in his
control. As a result, the fact that the plaintiff read the fax the next morning, had nothing
to do with the defendant. Hence, it is submitted before the Hon’ble court that the
defendant had successfully revoked his offer to the plaintiff under section 6 of the
Indian Contract Act, 1872.

3. WHETHER THE DEFENDANT IS LIABLE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT UNDER SECTION 73

OF INDIAN CONTRACT ACT, 1872 OR NOT?

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that the defendant is not liable for
breach of contract since the contract never came into force in the first place. Though
there was proper communication of proposal by the defendant to the plaintiff, there was
no communication of acceptance by the plaintiff to the defendant. Since there was only
offer and no acceptance, a contract didn’t come into effect. Thus, the defendant is not
liable for breach of contract under section 73 of Indian Contract Act, 1872.

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT

 NOVICES MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019 Page |1

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

CONTENTION 1: THAT THE ACCEPTANCE BY THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT COMPLETE

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that according to section 4 of the Indian
Contract Act, 1872, the communication of acceptance by the plaintiff to the defendant was
never completed.

Black Law Dictionary defines acceptance as:

“An offeree’s assent, either by express act or by implication from conduct, to the terms
of an offer in a manner authorized or requested by the offeror, so that a binding contract
is formed.”1

Acceptance is defined under section 2(b) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 as follows :

“When the person to whom the proposal is made signifies his assent thereto, the
proposal is said to be accepted. A proposal, when accepted, becomes a promise.”

Section 4 of Indian Contract Act, 1872 states that communication of a proposal is complete
when it comes to the knowledge of the person to whom it is made. The communication of an
acceptance is complete,—

As against the proposer, when it is put in a course of transmission to him so as to be

out of the power of the acceptor;

As against the acceptor, when it comes to the knowledge of the proposer.

A contract is completed only when a proposal made is accepted; it is therefore the acceptance
that gives rise to the ‘cause of action’ and not merely the proposal.2 The general rule is that the
acceptance of the offer by the offeree and intimation of that acceptance to the offeror results in
a contract.3 The general rule is that the acceptance is not complete until the offeror receives the
communication of acceptance.

1
Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary 13 (9th edn.).
2
Republic Medico Surgical Co v. Union of India AIR 1980 Kant 168.
3
Kaluram Kesharvani v State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1986 MP 204, 206: 1986 Jab LJ 372: (1986) 2 CCC 640
(DB).

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT

 NOVICES MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019 Page |2

In this case, though the proposal made by the defendant to sell his rare and antique painting
was complete on being read by the plaintiff on Whatsup, the communication of acceptance, as
against the defendant (proposer), was never completed.

The Plaintiff’s first attempt to communicate acceptance was when he wrote a letter of
acceptance and posted it to the defendant on 15th June, 2019 at 1:00 pm. However, the letter
posted by him had incomplete address on it. For the same reason, it never reached nor came to
the knowledge of the defendant. In Ram Das Chakarbarti v. Official Liquidator, Cotton
Ginning Co.4, it was said that “the communication of an acceptance is complete as
against the proposer when it is put in a course of transmission to him,” etc., but a letter to the
proposer not correctly addressed cannot, although posted, be said to have been “put in a course
of transmission” to him.

The letter never reaching the defendant due to plaintiff’s fault of addressing it to an incomplete
address has major role to play here. In Kalluram Keshavani v. State of Madhya Pradesh5, it
was held that where the intimation of acceptance does not reach the offeror it has to be shown
that the letter or telegram of acceptance was correctly addressed to the offeror otherwise it
could not, although posted or dispatched, be said to have been put in a course of transmission
to him. It is well settled that the general rule is that it is the acceptance of offer by the offeree
and intimation of that acceptance to the offeror which result in a contract.6

Under the UNIDROIT Principles, acceptance is complete when it reaches the offeror; the
reason for adoption of the receipt principle being that the risk of transmission is better placed
on the offeree than on the offeror, since it is the former who chooses the means of
communication, who knows whether the chosen means of communication is subject to special
risks or delay, and who is therefore best able to take measures to ensure that the acceptance
reaches its destination.7

After realising that the letter he had posted might never reach the defendant, the plaintiff made
another attempt at communicating his acceptance. The plaintiff made a phone call to the
defendant on 16th June 2019 at 9:00 am. Incidentally, that day, due to an honest mistake, the
defendant had left his phone at his home and no conversation could thus have taken place that

4
Ram Das Chakarbarti v. Official Liquidator, Cotton Ginning Co. (1887) ILR 9 ALL 366, p 385.
5
Kalluram Keshavani v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1986 MP 204.
6
Karan Singh Chandan Singh v. Collector Chhatarpur, 1980 MPLJ 231 : AIR 1980 Madhya Pradesh 89.
7
UNIDROIT Principles, Comment Below Art. 2.6.

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT

 NOVICES MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019 Page |3

day. Although the communication of acceptance couldn’t take place, it showed plaintiff’s
intention to accept the offer. However, Mere will or intention of the offeree to accept the offer
isn’t sufficient to result into a contract. An unexpected intention to communicate something,
or even an unsuccessful attempt cannot be treated as amounting to communication; nor can a
mere mental act of assent.8

An acceptance must be communicated to the offeror. This is indicated by the use of the word
‘signifies’ in this section. Mere mental resolve9, or written acceptance on a piece of paper and
keeping it10, or inter departmental communication proposing acceptance11, or mere resolution
of acceptance by a company12 or other body13 or a corporation14 would not result into a contract,
unless these are communicated to the proposer. An acceptance is not complete unless and until
it is communicated to the proposer in some perceptible form which may be by speech, writing
or other acts or omissions.15 Acceptance is not effective unless it is communicated by the
offeree.

It is necessary for the making of a binding contract that not only is the proposal accepted, but
also that the acceptance is notified.16 The proposer is entitled to know if a contract has been
concluded by the acceptance, for it would be unfair to hold him bound by an acceptance of
which he has no knowledge.17

Hence, it is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that the communication of acceptance
was not complete as against the defendant.

8
Bank of India v Rustom Fakirji Cowasjee AIR 1955 Bom 419.
9
T Linga Gowder v State of Madras AIR 1971 Mad 28.
10
Brogden v Metropolitan Railway (1877) 2 App Cas 666.
11
Gajendra Singh v Nagarpalika Nigam Gwalior AIR 1996 MP 10; Kamalabai Jageshwar Joshi v State of
Maharashtra (1996) 1 SCC 669.
12
Best’s Case (1865) 2 DJ & S 650; Gunn’s Case (1867) LR 3 Ch App 40.
13
Rani Huzur Ara Begum v Deputy Commr AIR 1941 Oudh 529 (resolution by the Court of Wards to
compromise on terms arrived at after discussion); Central Bank Yeotmal Ltd v Vyankatesh Bapuji AIR 1949
Nag 286.
14
Gajendra Singh v Nagarpalika Nigam Gwalior AIR 1996 MP 10 (resolution and interdepartmental
communication).
15
1 Dr. RG Padia, Pollock & Mulla Indian Contract and Specific Relief Act 159 (13 th ed. 2010).
16
Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co [1893] 1 QB 256; S2 (b).
17
1 Dr. RG Padia, Pollock & Mulla Indian Contract and Specific Relief Act 159 (13 th ed. 2010).

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT

 NOVICES MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019 Page |4

CONTENTION 2: THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD SUCCESSFULLY REVOKED HIS OFFER TO THE

PLAINTIFF

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that under section 5 r/w section 4 and section
6 of The Indian Contract Act, 1872, the defendant had successfully revoked his offer to the
plaintiff before the acceptance came to his knowledge.

The Black’s Law Dictionary defines revocation as (in context of Contracts)—

1. Withdrawal of an offer by the offeror

Section 3 of the Indian Contract Act,1872 states that the revocation may be communicated by
any act or omission by which the proposer intends to communicate the revocation, or which
has the effect of communicating it.

Section 4 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 states that the communication of a revocation is
complete,—

As against the person who makes it, when it is put in a course of transmission to the
person to whom it is made, so as to be out of the power of the person who makes it;

As against the person to whom it is made, when it comes to his knowledge.

Section 5 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which deals with Revocation of Proposals and
acceptance, states that a proposal may be revoked at any time before the communication of its
acceptance is complete as against the proposer, but not afterwards.

Section 6 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, states that a proposal is revoked—

(1) By the communication of notice of revocation by the proposer to the other party;
(2) By the lapse of the time prescribed in such a proposal for its acceptance, or, if no
time is so prescribed, by the lapse of a reasonable time, without communication of
the acceptance;
(3) By the failure of the acceptor to fulfil a condition precedent to acceptance; or
(4) By the death or insanity of the proposer, if the fact of his fact or insanity comes to
the knowledge of the acceptor before acceptance.

In this case, under section 6(1) of Indian Contract Act, 1872, the proposal was revoked by the
communication of notice of revocation by the defendant to the plaintiff.

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT

 NOVICES MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019 Page |5

The offer had been revoked by the plaintiff in accordance to section 4 and section 5 of Indian
Contract Act, 1872 as well. The offer made at 10:00 am on 15th June, 2019 by the defendant
was revoked—

a. As against the defendant (the person who made the revocation) at 5:30 pm on 17th June,
2019 when the defendant sent a fax of revocation to the plaintiff, so as to be out of his
power.
b. As against the plaintiff (the person to whom the revocation is made) at 9:00 am on 18th
June, 2019 when he received the revocation fax, so it came to his knowledge.

Moreover, the proposal was revoked before the communication of its acceptance had been
completed as against the defendant (proposer), not afterwards since all the attempts of
communication of acceptance by the plaintiff, before the revocation was made, failed.

The rule that the revocation must be actually ‘brought to the mind of the offeree’ should be
subject to qualifications.18 When the revocation is sent by post or telegram or fax to a
commercial organisation, or at the address of business of the offeree, it is likely that the
communication may reach the address, but would be opened and read in the ordinary course of
business according to the usual practise. Communication received towards the end of the day
may be read the next day. Moreover, it is necessary that the communication be brought to the
notice of the responsible or authorised officer in the organisation. Where the offer has been
made to commercial organisation, it seems probable that the offer would be revoked when the
letter of revocation is opened in the ordinary course of business or would have been so opened
if the ordinary course of business were followed.19

It was laid down in Henthorn v. Fraser 20 that revocation is effective when it is brought to the
mind of the person to whom the offer is made. Where the question was whether the notice for
withdrawal of a ship under a charterer-party for default in payment of hire was effective when
it was recorded on the telex machine of the of the charterer or on the opening of the office on
the next working day when the message was actually read, the court upheld the decision of the
arbitral tribunal that the message was deemed to have been delivered when it was read on the

18
Chitty on Contracts, 28th edn., p 126-27, para 2-083.
19
Eaglehill Ltd. v J Needham(Builders) Ltd [1973] AC 992 at 1011; NV Stoom y Maats ‘De Maas’ v Nippon
Yusen Kaisha (The Pendrecht) [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 56 at 66; Tenax Steamship Co Ltd v Brimnes (Owners),
The Brimnes [1975] 5 QB 929 (notice withdrawing charterparty); Curtice v London City & Midland Bank
[1908] 1 KB 293, 300 (CA) (case relating to cheques).
20
Henthorn v Fraser [1892] 2 Ch 27.

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT

 NOVICES MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019 Page |6

machine on the next working day.21 The rule that the revocation of proposal is effective when
it reaches the offeree and not when it is posted or put into a course of transmission applies to
revocations sent through post or telegram or any other method. A revocation of offer must be
actually communicated.22

Hence, it is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that the revocation of the proposal to
sell the painting to the plaintiff, by the defendant, was complete.

21
Schelde Delta Shipping B V v. Astarte Shipping Ltd, (The Panela) (1995) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 249,
22
1 Dr. RG Padia, Pollock & Mulla Indian Contract and Specific Relief Act 167 (13th ed. 2010).

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT

 NOVICES MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019 Page |7

CONTENTION 3: THAT THE DEFENDANT IS NOT LIABLE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT UNDER

SECTION 73 OF INDIAN CONTRACT ACT, 1872

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that the defendant, under section 73 of the
Indian Contract Act, 1872, is not liable for breach of contract between the two parties.

Contract is defined u/s 2(h) of Indian Contract Act, 1872 as—

“An agreement enforceable by law is contract”

Compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of contract is defined under section 73 of
the Indian Contract Act, 1872 as follows –

“When a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to
receive, from the party who has broken the contract, compensation for any loss or
damage caused to him thereby, which naturally arose in the usual course of things from
such breach, or which the parties knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to
result from the breach of it.”

When we take the factual matrix of the case into consideration, it is evident that there was never
a contract between the two parties, i.e., the plaintiff and defendant, in the first place. For a
contract to come into effect, there has to be proper communication of both offer and acceptance.
However, in the present case, though there was proper communication of proposal by the
defendant to the plaintiff via a Whatsup text, the defendant was never notified of the acceptance
by the plaintiff, neither through the letter nor through the phone call. Although the plaintiff
possessed intention of acceptance, the contract cannot become legally binding on the defendant
until the acceptance is communicated to the offeror in some prescribed or usual mode of
communication which is applicable when the two parties are at a distance from one another.

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT

 NOVICES MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019 Page |8

Black’s Law Dictionary defines breach of contract as under –

“A breach may be one by non-performance, or by repudiation, or by both. Every breach

gives rise to a claim for damages, and may give rise to other remedies. Even if the
injured party sustains no pecuniary loss or is unable to show such loss with sufficient
certainty, he has at least a claim for nominal damages. If a court chooses to ignore a
trifling departure, there is no breach and no claim arises.”23

In the present case, when the defendant received a new offer from a third party, he was legally
not bound to his previous offer to the plaintiff, since he had no knowledge of the plaintiff’s
acceptance. He thus, promptly decided to revoke his offer to the plaintiff so as to not keep the
plaintiff legally bound by his offer. As soon as the fax of revocation, sent by the defendant,
reached the plaintiff and he read it, the offer was legally revoked. At that moment, the offer
made by the defendant to the plaintiff ceased to exist, resulting in no formation of a legal
contract. When the contract is not concluded, no action for its breach or for damages will lie.24

Hence, it is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that the defendant is not liable for
breach of contract and subsequently, is also not liable to pay damages of any sort to the plaintiff
which arise as a consequence to the breach of contract.

23
Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 236 cmt, a (1979).
24
National Coop Sugar Mills Ltd. v Albert & Co. AIR 1981 Mad 172.

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT

 NOVICES MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019 P a g e | IX

PRAYER

In the light of the facts of the case, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited,
the Counsels for the Defendant humbly pray before the Hon’ble Court to kindly adjudge and
declare that :

1. There never existed a contract between the plaintiff and the defendant and
hence, the defendant is not liable for breach of contract.
2. The defendant is not liable to pay any sort of compensation or damages or is
obliged to specifically perform the contract.

And/or pass any other order. Direction or relief that the Hon’ble Court deems fit in the light
of equity, justice and good conscience.

And for this act of kindness, the Counsel on behalf of the Defendant, as duty bound shall
forever pray.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

____________________________________________

SD/-

COUNSELS FOR THE DEFENDANT

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT