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Governance in an
interconnected world
The dynamics of governance do not play out solely 2008–09 global financial crisis.4 Global interactions
within the boundaries of nation-states. Countries can undermine domestic social and economic devel-
today face an interconnected, globalized world char- opment by exerting power in ways that prevent the
acterized by a high velocity and magnitude of flows adoption of policies fit for the domestic or local con-
of capital, trade, ideas, technology, and people. From text or by reinforcing preexisting conditions that sus-
1960 to 2011, global trade’s share of the global gross tain socially undesirable outcomes. The resurgence
domestic product (GDP) more than doubled, from 25 today of populist politics and its rejection of trade and
percent to over 60 percent.1 The share of foreign direct migration in several Western countries can be seen as
investment (FDI) increased from less than 10 percent a reaction to these negative effects.
to over 40 percent from 1992 to 2010.2 Meanwhile,
foreign debt’s share of the global GDP grew from Transnationalism and the
only 11 percent in 1970 to 90 percent in 2010.3 Today,
the world is very different from the one in which the domestic policy arena
current developed countries emerged: cross-border The policy bargaining framework discussed in this
flows were low; they received no aid; and they were Report provides a lens for discerning how to maxi-
not subject to a proliferation of transnational treaties, mize the positive impacts of transnational flows and
norms, and regulatory mechanisms. For developing international actors to achieve security, growth, and For developing
countries, the era of globalization and “global gover- equity. These flows can be critical instruments for countries, the era
nance” presents both opportunities and challenges. enhancing the ability of domestic actors to commit, of globalization
Globalization can greatly benefit countries in coordinate, and cooperate to advance development and “global
search of sustained and inclusive development. The outcomes. But they also can disrupt these functions governance”
rapid diffusion of technology and greater access by confusing expectations, competing with social presents both
to capital and world markets have enabled annual norms, and undermining citizen-state accountability. opportunities and
growth rates of over 7 percent for a subset of devel- Understanding these effects requires in turn under- challenges.
oping countries—a previously unfathomable rate of standing how transnational factors shape the incen-
growth that helped lift over 1 billion people out of tives of domestic actors, influence their preferences
poverty from 1981 to 2012 (Spence 2011). to change outcomes, and affect contestability in the
Globalization can, however, also present great policy arena.
challenges. By making it possible for domestic actors At times, international actors enter directly into
to send money and resources abroad, transnational the policy arena (figure 9.1, panel a). Foreign states,
flows increase the capacity for them to opt out of local multinational corporations, development agencies,
bargains. These flows have also been associated with a or transnational nongovernmental organizations
marked rise in inequality within countries and with a (NGOs) can gain a seat at the domestic bargain-
greater vulnerability of countries to global economic ing table as they pursue specific goals or support
crises, such as the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the domestic efforts that are aligned with their interests.
c. International actors can empower or shape the d. International actors can shift the preferences
incentives of citizens and elites by providing resources of citizens and elites
However, international actors and mechanisms Court of Human Rights can bring claims against their
largely affect the policy arena indirectly. In doing so, home state. Several international human rights trea-
they may change incentives and preferences toward ties require states to report and answer to an interna-
enabling or constraining institutional functions for tional expert body. And a vast number of international
development and open or foreclose the possibilities and transnational forums exist for the development
for contestation. of industry-specific rules, monitoring their applica-
International actors can shape the arena in which tion and sanctioning violations to various degrees.
policy making and contestation occur by creating The proliferation of these forums raises unresolved
alternative spaces in which actors can bargain (figure questions about their functional design, political
9.1, panel b). For example, foreign investors can bring legitimacy, and accountability. For example, as states
states to the International Centre for Settlement of increasingly subcontract government functions such
Investment Disputes (ICSID) for independent arbitra- as public infrastructure and service delivery, the tools
tion rather than rely on the legal mechanisms of the of commercial arbitration may undercut the role of
host state. Citizens of countries party to the European citizens in accountability. This challenge is reflected
0.4
Capital account openness index
200
Number of treaties
0.2
150
0
100
−0.2
50
−0.4
0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
05
05
25
35
45
55
65
75
85
95
20
15
15
19
20
20
20
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
Human rights Environment Other
Sources: Panel a: WDR 2017 team, based on updated database from Chinn and Ito 2006; panel b: WDR 2017 team, based on United Nations 2016.
Note: The category “human rights” in panel b refers to treaties related to human rights, human trafficking, refugees and displaced persons, and the status of women.
of each regime are a product of contestation among improve coordination to overcome collective action
multiple actors with varying incentives, preferences, challenges.
and relative power. Transnational rules are institu-
tionalized in some form of instrument, from author- International cooperation: Changing
itative/binding legal instruments to nonbinding incentives to prevent races to the bottom
declarations of norms and voluntary standards and In the same way that firms in competitive markets
regulatory regimes.6 These instruments perform the lower prices to attract consumers, when goods, ser-
functions of commitment, coordination, or coopera- vices, and capital are freely exchanged and move
tion through various mechanisms, from coercion to internationally countries have an incentive to adopt
socialization (table 9.1). They may directly target state competitive strategies to gain market share or attract
governments, as do the European Union’s (EU’s) fiscal investment. To attract productive investments,
and monetary rules or labor and tax standards aimed countries may lower taxes on corporate income for
at avoiding a race to the bottom. They may bypass foreign companies. Competition among countries
state governments to directly regulate private actors, on these forms of taxation has the effect of depleting
as do voluntary industry regimes such as the Round- the domestic tax base and considerably decreasing
table on Sustainable Palm Oil. Or they may reach out revenue. It also tends to shift taxation onto less
directly to citizens by legitimating local grievances mobile factors such as labor. In turn, lower revenue
through international rights and norms (Braithwaite means that countries have to shrink spending, with
and Drahos 2000; Shaffer 2013). detrimental effects on the well-being of the poorest
What follows is a closer look at how transnational and least powerful in society. Moreover, competition
rules interact with the policy arena—specifically, to boost exports may result in lax labor and environ-
(1) the rules that seek to achieve international coop- mental standards (Chau and Kanbur 2005). These are
eration on global goods by changing incentives; examples of races to the bottom.
(2) the rules that help induce a credible commitment Once competition pushes countries to a low equi-
to domestic reform through trade and regional inte- librium, they have no incentive to change policy. An
gration incentives; and (3) the rules that serve as focal attempt by one country to raise taxes on goods and
points for domestic actors to shift preferences and services, capital, or corporate income would result in
Domestic actors
• Government officials
• Political actors
• Private sector actors
• Local civil society groups
• Grassroots organizations
Sources: WDR 2017 team, drawing on Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Hale and Held 2011; and Shaffer 2013.
Note: ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
a loss of sales or investments. Any intervention that investment or environmental standards, labor stan-
could enhance employees’ welfare or the sustain- dards, or tax coordination. If all countries coordinate
ability of production would also raise costs and thus and adopt the same policy, such as international labor
reduce exports and output. Because of the sensitivity standards (Basu and others 2003), they will all be bet-
of global capital to domestic adjustments and per- ter off. For example, in parallel with the creation of
ceptions of investment risk, policy makers seeking a common market, the EU set up a Code of Conduct
global investment may become largely accountable to prevent countries from engaging in harmful tax
to external actors rather than to domestic constitu- competition and to harmonize value added taxes on
ents. For example, policy makers seeking to increase goods and services and, less successfully, corporate
domestic debt levels to finance an expanded educa- taxes and capital income taxes.
tion budget may be prevented from doing so by the Such agreements can strengthen the commitment
fear that international ratings agencies will down- of countries to specific minimum standards that
grade their country’s sovereign bond rating, leading prevent the occurrence or perpetuation of an undesir-
to capital flight. able equilibrium. However, in the absence of credible
Global coordination is needed to prevent races to sanctions, incentives to defect are very high. Prevent-
the bottom, underprovision of global public goods, ing defection requires recognition that achieving a
and negative cross-border externalities. International sustainable agreement is a two-level game, involving
actors can strengthen the commitment capacity of both an international bargaining process and a
states through agreements on specific issues such as domestic bargaining process (box 9.1). Ultimately, the
Climate change is a global public goods problem. Solving damage, financial flows and financing instruments, and
it requires universal participation (all countries need to processes for the monitoring and revision of commitments.
reduce emissions), but there is an incentive to free-ride in The pledge-and-review scheme has two obvious lim-
any agreement. An obvious solution is a global governance itations. First, there is no reason to expect that the sum of
body that ensures the participation of all countries and a fair the unilateral commitments will meet the global target of
distribution of efforts. From the United Nations Framework maximum temperature change, and indeed they currently
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992 through do not meet the goal of the Paris Agreement (limit warm-
the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 and the Copenhagen negoti- ing to 2 degrees and try to achieve 1.5 degrees). The hope
ations in 2009, international negotiations have tried to is that commitment revisions will lead to a gradual increase
create such a framework to decide on a global target for in ambition (van Asselt 2016). By providing a “ratcheting
temperature change, country-specific emission targets, mechanism” that encourages countries to follow the lead of
and a set of processes to ensure flexibility and compliance. others in increasing commitments, the Paris Agreement is
The Kyoto Protocol failed to achieve universal participa- an important coordination mechanism (Keohane and Victor
tion. Developing countries were reluctant to take on com- 2016). But if the problem is one of cooperation—that is, some
mitments that could slow their economic growth, and many countries care more about climate change than others—then
countries were reluctant to expose themselves to possible such a cycle of revisions could lead to a stagnation of ambi-
sanctions from a supranational body (Stewart and Wiener tion, or even to a race to the bottom (Nordhaus 2015).
2003). As predicted by economic theory, in the absence of The second limitation is the lack of a compliance mech-
a supranational governance body a credible commitment anism beyond monitoring that enables “naming and sham-
was impossible to achieve (Carraro and Siniscalco 1992; ing” of countries that do not deliver on their commitment
Barrett 1994). The 2015 Copenhagen conference, however, (Aldy 2014). However, climate negotiations are part of a
was a paradigm shift, moving away from the first-best broader network of agreements. Thus failing to deliver on
option of sanctions to a system of “pledge-and-review,” climate commitments may not lead to direct sanctions, but
by which countries make unilateral commitments that are it could have a cost in other areas such as trade or techno-
reviewed and monitored by the international community logical cooperation. Nordhaus (2015) suggests that even a
(Barrett, Carraro, and de Melo 2015). minimum trade-related cost for noncompliance would lead
These developments led to universal participation in to much greater participation and ambition.
the Paris Agreement, underpinned by 162 unilateral com- Even though the Paris Agreement is far from an optimal
mitments to contribute to reductions in global emissions. mechanism to govern global public goods (Stiglitz 2015), it
The agreement, which went into effect in November 2016, is an attractive second-best option, building on countries’
also includes provisions to facilitate the adaptation to cli- self-interest in implementing climate policy actions at the
mate change, support to cope with unavoidable loss and country level (Busby 2016; Keohane and Victor 2016).
Source: Prepared for WDR 2017 by Stéphane Hallegatte.
preferences and relative power of the relevant domes- will make credible commitments to follow through
tic actors determine the credibility of commitment on economic reforms. The success of the EU integra-
and the effectiveness of international sanctions. tion process, for example, demonstrates the power of
inducements. Prospective member countries have to
Transnational rules that provide incentives change their domestic rules to abide by the 80,000
for a credible commitment to domestic pages of regulations in the acquis communautaire.
reform: Trade agreements For those countries that have joined the EU, the
The desire to attract investment and expand trade can potential economic benefits of joining outweighed
also provide incentives for improvements in domes- any loss of domestic autonomy in specific areas, and
tic governance. Indeed, international agreements on the benefits of accession were used by elites to over-
economic integration can mean that domestic actors come domestic resistance to the required reforms.
a. Use of “rights” terms in English-language b. Countries with policies helping ethnic minorities
books, 1945–2008 or discriminating against them, 1950–2003
100 80
Proportion of books (% of 2008 level)
80
60
Share of countries (%)
60
40
40
20
20
0 0
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
00
05
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
Source: WDR 2017 team, using data from Google Books Ngram Viewer, based Source: WDR 2017 team, using data from Asal and Pate (2005).
on Pinker 2011.
Note: Policies include economic and political policies that discriminate
or favor any ethnic group in a given country-year.
80
Number of countries
70 40
Percent
60
50
20
40
30
76
80
84
88
92
96
00
04
08
12
16
0
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
labor rights, women’s rights, and civil rights, and, more their capacity to influence constitutional reforms
recently, indigenous and environmental movements— and lobby for the adoption of gender-sensitive poli-
have all explicitly adopted the language and instru- cies. Many countries, however, still face important
ments of international rights (Heller 2013). challenges in closing their implementation gap
Over the last 25 years, different forms of gender and achieving the level of political participation for
quotas for representation in national legislatures— women defined in the quota laws. The gap is larger
including legislated quotas, reserved seats, and volun- for legislative quotas. Although these gaps may reflect
tary party quotas—have spread to more than 100 coun- in part overly ambitious targets, the short time since
tries (figure 9.5).7 These new provisions have helped adoption of the quota, and the weakness of mecha-
double the percentage of women in the lower house of nisms to sanction noncompliance, evidence suggests
national legislatures from approximately 10 percent in that social norms also play a role. In Spain, for exam-
1995 to 22 percent in 2015 (Norris and Dahlerup 2015). ple, a recent study found that political parties nomi-
Quotas for women in local government positions, nate female candidates for seats in areas where they
as in India, are also increasingly common.8 In early have little chance of being elected in order to reduce
adopters—mainly European countries that introduced the risk of losing decision-making power within the
voluntary party quotas in the 1980s—domestic social party (Esteve-Volart and Bagues 2012). It is yet to be
movements and left-leaning political parties were seen how more recent reform efforts by some parties,
especially influential (Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan such as the adoption of “zipper systems” in which
1997). By contrast, international nongovernmental male and female candidates are alternated on ballot
organizations and multilateral organizations have lists, will influence these dynamics within Spain.
become increasingly influential for late adopters Major shocks—such as conflict—can speed up the
among developing countries, especially postconflict process of changing norms and create new windows
countries largely dependent on international assis- of opportunity for disadvantaged groups. A process of
tance (Krook 2006; Celis, Krook, and Meier 2011). “policy learning” can also occur; initially ineffective
These processes of international norm diffusion quota laws have been revised to improve their effect
interact with domestic factors to strengthen the bar- on the de facto political representation of women
gaining power of women’s organizations and improve (Norris and Dahlerup 2015).
Development actors, especially the international financial Ex post conditionality. In the 1990s, ex ante conditional-
institutions, have been among the most influential gen- ity was largely replaced by aid modalities based on princi-
erators of transnational rules, norms, and ideas, using aid ples of partnership and ownership, assuming that aid would
as a diffusion mechanism. Just as economic orthodoxy has be more effective in good policy environments (World Bank
evolved over time—from an emphasis on the role of the 1998; Dollar and Burnside 2000). Many donors adopted a
state in planning and investment in the 1960s and 1970s, to form of ex post conditionality under which aid in the form
the macroeconomic discipline and market liberalization of of budget support (mostly unconditional funds) would be
the Washington Consensus in the 1980s, to poverty allevia- directed to countries that themselves adopted good eco-
tion and market institutions in the 1990s, to achievement of nomic and governance policies. Although aid still served as
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and improve- an incentive, its primary role was to amplify reform efforts
ment of governance institutions in the 2000s—so, too, have and maximize poverty reduction in those places most likely
aid modalities evolved in search of more effective means of to achieve results. Yet another feature was an emphasis
translating these norms into development outcomes. on social participation in the development of policies, as
Ex ante conditionality. Structural adjustment lending introduced in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)
policies in the 1980s marked the high point of ex ante con- process adopted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
ditionality—that is, aid transfers depended on the recipi- and the World Bank as a means of enhancing the contest-
ent’s adoption of preset conditions. Today, however, this ability of the policy arena. These developments were also
approach has been largely regarded as a failure because subject to criticism, most notably around the imperfect
conditional loans proved ineffective as a commitment science of measuring institutional performance for pur-
device. In theory, the threat of nondisbursement, or reward poses of aid allocation and the questionable concept of
of disbursement, was an incentive to government actors to “ownership” in view of the power imbalance both between
overcome obstacles to reform because of either opposing donors and recipients and between government elites and
objectives or domestic political economy factors. Although other domestic constituencies (Wilhelm and Krause 2008).
ex ante conditionality could sometimes strengthen the At worst, such an approach can give rise to enhanced
hand of reformist governments that needed to swing legitimacy for governments that go through the motions
domestic opinion behind these changes, it proved ineffec- of “ownership,” while in fact reducing the space for local
tive in changing incentives and the preferences of opposing contestation and innovation. Some observers questioned
elites (Collier and others 1997). This outcome was due in the extent to which this method was an answer to the flaws
large part to the lack of a credible threat and the time con- of ex ante conditionality.a
sistency problem: more often than not, donors submitted Outcome-based conditionality. The most recent genera-
to pressures to disburse despite the failure of recipients to tion of aid instruments seeks to overcome the difficulty of
meet the prescribed conditions (Killick 1997; Kanbur 2000). influencing the bargaining arena to yield “good” policies by
More fundamentally, the prescribed conditions were often focusing instead on outcomes. Donors have introduced a
politically infeasible because they sought to disable the range of results-based approaches, such as the World Bank’s
systems of patronage needed to hold coalitions together Performance for Results (PforR) instrument, which disburses
(Mbembe 2001). In short, the diffusion of norms through upon achievement of results according to agreed-on perfor-
coercion was incapable of changing the much stronger mance indicators. This outcome-based conditionality is par-
dynamics of the domestic bargaining arena (Temple 2010). ticularly suited to social sector outcomes such as those set out
in the MDGs. In theory, by setting clearly defined objectives, Fragile States, which established a mutual compact between
indicators, and verification protocols for programs initiated Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
by a government, this method seeks to enhance govern- donors and a group of fragile states known as the g7+ to
ment accountability to its own goals (Temple 2010). Another support country-led strategies based on a set of overarching
noteworthy development is the New Deal for Engagement in peace-building and state-building goals.
Development (OECD) that are also members of the amounted to over US$161 billion (map 9.1). Although
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) provided aid has ebbed and flowed over time, its significant
some US$3.5 trillion (constant 2009 dollars) in aid. increase over the last two decades coincides with the
Non-OECD economies are an increasingly important establishment of the Millennium Development Goals,
source of aid: in 2014 the flow of aid to developing as well as with the surge in flows toward conflict-
countries from both DAC and non-DAC contributors affected countries in the aftermath of the cold war.10
Map 9.1 Aid flows amounted to over US$161 billion from donor countries (purple) to recipient
countries (orange and green) in 2014
Aid flows (US$)
600
100
25
10
0
–10
–25
–100
–1,000
Recipient countries with
negative balance
–50.792
–1.526
–0.704
No data
% of government revenue
14 70
12 60
% of GDP
10 50
8 40
6 30
4 20
2 10
0 0
I
L
ZW GO
MD ETH
BE OD
IN
FA
MB
A
MO WI
DI
F
LE
D
LV
B
A
Y
GD
BO KR
MM WZ
MA NM
RM
GH MR
ND
C
GE AO
EN
MR MB
MD SO
EN
GZ
TLS
S
ME RA
KM
I
R
R
OM
CO ZE
US
A
AB
B
MK AM
UN
BIH G
R
ER
CR
NP
CA
PE
BL
JO
MY
UZ
SR
EG
IN
TZ
I RW
LK
W
NI
N
R S
Z B
L S
N G
F A
K U
I B
L M
Y G
R M
O K
A S
V K
T L
R A
V C
B G
Z
G B
X T
A H
D T
A C
G L
N N
B M
L S
T
R V
O D
M B
D
M
E
G
M
A
N
TJK
IRN
A
U
Y
IRQ
ML
HT
R
PH
ZA
NE
LB
GN
AL
PR
LB
PA
CI
KS
TC
SS
EC
UG
NG
DZ
AF
CO
PN
SD
LB
SY
AG
KH
GT
YE
JA
ODA (% of GDP, left axis) ODA (% of government revenue, right axis)
Sources: WDR 2017 team. Official development assistance (ODA) data: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; government revenue data: IMF, World Economic
Outlook, various years.
Note: The graphs show ODA from all donors to all recipients in low- and middle-income countries with a population of at least 1 million. Figures for ODA (percent of GDP) are capped at
20 percent of GDP for the sake of visualization. The underlying uncapped data are Afghanistan, 24.1 percent; Central African Republic, 35.4 percent; Liberia, 37.0 percent; and Malawi, 21.8
percent. Figures for ODA (percent of government revenue) are capped at 100 percent for the sake of visualization. The underlying uncapped data are Afghanistan, 105.2 percent; Central
African Republic, 260.6 percent; Liberia, 126.0 percent; and Sierra Leone, 143.2 percent.
Still, few donors have met the ODA target of 0.7 per- Figure 9.7 Low- and lower-middle-
cent of gross national income (GNI), which they first income countries vary greatly in
agreed to in 1970. the amount of aid received and
Although the volume of aid is increasing, its share improvement in GDP per capita
relative to flows of private capital and other sources
80
total, 1960–2014 (constant 2005 US$, millions)
There is a growing consensus that increasing the mobiliza- tested and isolated in experimental settings (Martin 2014;
tion of domestic resources can enhance accountability, par- Paler 2014), in reality the relationship is more complex
ticularly if such efforts are explicitly linked to the provision and seems to depend on three factors: (1) the type of aid
of public goods. If policy makers need to depend on broad- (for example, grant or debt, budget support, or project-
based taxation—or indebtedness, which implies more taxa- specific); (2) the contemporaneous effects of policies
tion in the future—they are more likely to include citizens and associated with the aid; and (3) more important, the gover-
elites in policy discussions. The need for revenue to finance nance setting specific to each country.
wars led European states to bargain with subject populations The effects of domestic resource mobilization also
for greater taxation (Tilly 1990). Once taxed, citizens demand depend on the nature of taxation. Some taxes do not
a greater say in state affairs. As 18th-century American col- enhance accountability (resource taxation) or have distor-
onists claimed, “Taxation without representation is tyranny.” tionary effects (trade taxes). International corporate tax
More recently, in Sub-Saharan Africa paying taxes has been competition has diminished states’ capacity for domestic
shown to increase political interest (Broms 2015). resource mobilization (see earlier discussion on races to
Does foreign aid undermine domestic resource mobili- the bottom). In environments with low savings rates or the
zation and thus accountability to citizens? Studies testing potential for capital flight and tax evasion, consumption
that hypothesis initially showed a negative correlation taxes are most likely to be effective, but also likely to be
between the two (most notably, Gupta and others 2004). regressive. In 9 out of 25 countries with household survey
More recently, these studies have been refuted by the data available for circa 2010, the net effect of all govern-
adoption of different data sets (Morrissey and Torrance ment taxing and spending was to leave the poor worse
2015) or econometric techniques.a Although the behavioral off in terms of actual consumption of private goods and
effect of aid flows in undermining accountability has been services (Lustig 2016).
Source: WDR 2017 team.
a. Clist and Morrissey (2011) invalidate the contemporaneous negative correlation found in Gupta and others (2004) by introducing a lagged effect of aid
on taxation, concluding that the relationship is negligible.
systems, may succeed in the immediate effort (and, legitimacy gains, while evading more fundamental
indeed, this can be a worthy result), but they may have reforms to make the functioning of institutions more
little to no effect on the quality of governance. Some effective. Not only does this approach leave recipients
community-driven development initiatives fall into with unsustainable and dysfunctional institutions, but
this category.18 it also may reduce the space for local innovation and
Projects that aim to directly improve gover- collective action (Pritchett, Woolcock, and Andrews
nance arrangements, such as public sector reform or 2010; Andrews, Pritchett, and Woolcock 2013).
demand-side initiatives, may end up creating negative Positive effects are also possible when donor
dynamics by providing incentives that reinforce the engagement supports the emergence of more account-
preexisting power imbalances. The tendency of donors able and equitable governing arrangements embedded
to introduce reforms based on best-practice solutions in the domestic context. Certainly, many projects do
that worked elsewhere (with the expectation that tight succeed in doing so, but when and how generative
monitoring of top-down implementation will yield effects take place are difficult to predict in advance
similar results) has been called an example of isomorphic because of the web of intersecting and evolving fac-
mimicry, a term drawn from organizational sociology tors that determine how donor initiatives engage with
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983). These reforms focus on local spaces, including the vagaries of internal politics,
forms—such as laws, systems, and procedures—with- shocks of various sizes and effects, and a range of con-
out paying attention to how they change the nature textual factors. Indeed, many people have been trying
of the policy arena. This practice can create “capabil- to think “politically” about aid in order to overcome
ity traps” when recipient governments adopt these challenges to its effectiveness (box 9.4). A burgeoning
forms to ensure flows of donor financing and to reap literature on ways to increase the chances of generative
The last 10 years have seen a striking rise in discussions of The recently launched Global Partnership on Collaborative
politics and power in development policy circles. This new Leadership for Development seeks to put leadership and
focus reflects a reaction against technocratic approaches coalitions at the center of development, and the Global
that rely on the provision of capital and injections of tech- Delivery Initiative is developing an evidence base for using
nical know-how to overcome development challenges. It principles of the science of delivery. At the U.K. Department
grows out of the evolution of governance programming, for International Development, serious attention to how
which, after emerging in the 1990s, encountered serious political settlements are established and sustained in frag-
limits when well-intended efforts to strengthen governance ile states is a central element of politically smart develop-
institutions in poor countries faced entrenched resistance ment work. An informal coalition of practitioners organized
to reform and other structural obstacles. under the rubric of “Thinking and Working Politically” aims
One result has been the progressive incorporation of to advance innovative efforts to move politics and power
political economy analysis by many development organi- from the margins to the core of development thinking and
zations and practitioners as a basic tool of program design. action. This approach entails ensuring that attention to
Debates over how much the growing use of political econ- these issues extends well beyond their original home in
omy analysis is actually resulting in more effective devel- governance work to all major areas of development prac-
opment programs remain heated, but most organizations tice, from health and education to transportation and food,
are now willing to concede that attempting to operate in among other things.
complex, challenging, and diverse national contexts does A strong sense of “At last!” accompanies this push to
require at least some concerted efforts to understand the take politics in development seriously—relief that out-
local political economy of reform—that is, who are the win- dated, artificial walls created in the early days of develop-
ners and the losers and who holds the balance of power in ment assistance are finally being dismantled. Yet, changing
such processes. development practices is hard. Many of the operational
Potentially, much deeper change involves establishing imperatives that arise from greater attention to politics
new types of development programming that embody rec- and power—such as the need to increase the flexibility of
ognition of development as an inherently political process— implementation, to tolerate greater risk and ambiguity, to
one that consists, in the words of the late Adrian Leftwich devolve power from aid providers to aid partners, and to
(2004, 115), of “conflict, cooperation and negotiation in the avoid simplistic linear schemes for measuring results—run
way we use, produce, and distribute resources.” Adherents up against long-established bureaucratic structures, prac-
of the “Doing Development Differently” manifesto empha- tices, and habits. In addition, taking politics seriously in
size the importance of focusing on local solutions advanced development points directly to the need to challenge the
by local conveners in processes legitimized at all levels, interests of the power holders that control institutions—
while proceeding through rapid cycles of planning, action, something that many development organizations have not
and reflection, and managing risks by making small bets. yet decided they are willing to do, especially in the current
The Developmental Leadership Program stresses the environment of heightened sensitivity in many countries
importance of leadership in development, defining leader- about national sovereignty. The development community is
ship as a political process involving authority and a capacity talking the talk of politics. How much it will walk the walk
to mobilize people and resources and to forge coalitions. is not yet clear.
Source: Prepared for WDR 2017 by Thomas Carothers, Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
outcomes points to a common set of principles, which and social norms is not new. Hirschman documented
are discussed in the next section. this observation most eloquently using World Bank
projects in his 1967 classic, Development Projects
Using aid to foster positive governance Observed. Building on the literature and knowledge
dynamics for development base that have emerged over the last few decades,
Recognition that development is an inherently con- the framework explored in this Report points to the
tentious process that implicates power imbalances following four principles to guide efforts to use aid