Fam Code, Exemptions from Marriage License, Page 1
FIRST DIVISION institution."[10] Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as
[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000]
ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the
minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL &
PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA
BAYADOG, respondent. Ncmmis
DECISION
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26,
1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa
was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One
year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito
and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an
affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus
exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997,
Pepito died in a car accident. After their fathers death, petitioners
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to
Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a
marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that
the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect
petitioners successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are
not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of
marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo
City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that the
Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the
following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of
action against defendant in asking for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their
deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her
specially so when at the time of the filing of
this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is
already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of
plaintiffs deceased father with defendant is
null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped
from assailing the validity of the second
marriage after it was dissolved due to their
fathers death.[1]
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the
action to declare null and void their fathers marriage to
respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the
Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who
could initiate an action for annulment of marriage.[2] Hence, this
petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure question of
law. Scnc m
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with
Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and
because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioners
averment that the allegations in the petition are true and correct."
It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no
legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules.[3]However,
upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal
and reinstated the petition for review.[4]
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior
to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to
determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in
effect at the time of their celebration.[5] A valid marriage license is
a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, [6] the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab initiopursuant to
Article 80(3)[7] in relation to Article 58.[8] The requirement and
issuance of marriage license is the States demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested.[9] This
interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State
recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to
the family as a basic "autonomous social
an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life
which shall be protected by the State.[11] This is why the Family
Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent
union"[12] and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a
lifetime commitment."[13]
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil
Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which
is that provided in Article 76,[14] referring to the marriage of a man
and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each
other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period
of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no
license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due
to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license.
The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such
persons from legitimizing their status.[15] To preserve peace in the
family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure
and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of
their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and
exempt them from that requirement. Sdaa miso
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father to
respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage license.
In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have
attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we
now desire to marry each other."[16] The only issue that needs to
be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is
contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the
counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future
spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a
cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each
other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be
a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire
five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may
have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the
cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived
together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of
marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis
of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing
factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In
other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which
is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should
be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately
before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party
was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is
unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then
the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties
to have common law relationships and placing them on the same
footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage
being a special relationship must be respected as such and its
requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is
based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The
parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with
every single requirement and later use the same missing element
as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There
should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless
the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It
should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the
public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and
that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to
the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil
registrar.[17] The Civil Code provides:
Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all
persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advice the
local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 64: "Upon being advised of any
alleged impediment to the marriage, the local
civil registrar shall forthwith make an
investigation, examining persons under oath.
x x x"Sdaad
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Fam Code, Exemptions from Marriage License, Page 2
Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice
shall request all persons having knowledge of
any impediment to the marriage to advise the
local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any
impediment known to the local civil registrar
or brought to his attention, he shall note down
the particulars thereof and his findings
thereon in the application for a marriage
license. x x x."
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present,
absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by the
same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage
subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse
shall be illegal and void,[18] subject only to the exception in cases
of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled.
The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the
contracting of two or more marriages and the having of
extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and
concubinage and adultery.[19] The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it
cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband
and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From
the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed.
Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact,
and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with
each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains
that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union
that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the
absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting
marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent.
It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had
already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The
subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual
severance of the filial companionship between the spouses
cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third
party as being one as "husband and wife". Scs daad
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case
is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage
license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such
element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the
personality to file a petition to declare their fathers marriage void
after his death?
Contrary to respondent judges ruling, Article 47 of the Family
Code[20] cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for
annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows
"the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at any time before the
death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the
grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not
a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as
to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is
annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a
marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to
have taken place[21] and cannot be the source of rights. The first
can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or
prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable
marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct
proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally.
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the
death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only
during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in
which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid.[22] That is why the action or
defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages
where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable
marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack
a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except
those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged
spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual
joint contribution,[23] and its effect on the children born to such void
marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44
as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the
contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is
generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before
its annulment are legitimate. Sup rema
Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of petitioners father
extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and
respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a
wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved
between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void
hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of
either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree
is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.[24] "A
void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the
parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but
though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as
well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind
of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage
should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction."[25] "Under ordinary circumstances, the
effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of
legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever
taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its
invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of
marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil
court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the
death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere
proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be
disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like
a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except
in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so
that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached,
and is made good ab initio.[26] But Article 40 of the Family Code
expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the
nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can
enter into a second marriage[27] and such absolute nullity can be
based only on a final judgment to that effect.[28] For the same
reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible.[29] Corollarily, if the death of either party would
extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the
same cannot be considered imprescriptible. Juris
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action
is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter,
the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to
the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any
issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose
is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of
the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of
the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The said case is ordered REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Puno, and Kapunan, JJ., concur. Sc juris
Pardo, J., on official business abroad.
FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001]
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE R.
SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties
who were both bound by a prior existing marriage is the bone of
contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R.
Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act,
complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with
gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the
Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Fam Code, Exemptions from Marriage License, Page 3
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David
Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel
Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. [1] Four children were
born out of that marriage.[2] On 22 March 1993, however, her husband
contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before
respondent Judge.[3] When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he
knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the
marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were
separated.
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that
when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not
know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two
had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already
without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint
affidavit.[4] According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was
married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise,
he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to
harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court
Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of
gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with
more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest
whether they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of
the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his
plea for the dismissal of the complaint and setting aside his earlier
Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two separate
affidavits[5] of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly
unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction. In those
affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated
that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos,
respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been marked
by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had never
cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent
Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize
the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman
who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting
parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also
state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting
parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to
apply, the following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each
other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the
parties must be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they
have lived together for at least five years [and are
without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement
that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties
and that he had found no legal impediment to their
marriage.[6]
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is
significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March
1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing
marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were
separated.
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting
previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the
subsequent marriage null and void.[7] In fact, in his Comment, he stated
that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have
discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And respondent
Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting
previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate
affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their
respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of
the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal
separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the
marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does
not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to
remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de
facto, as in the case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of
David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been
cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free
and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does
not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation
for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally
capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from
marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge
to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior
existing marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law
when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim ignorance
of the law excuses no one has special application to judges,[8] who, under
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that
judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles.[9] And when
the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[10]
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court
Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that the
amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is
increased to P20,000.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992
MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JACINTO MARIATEGUI, JULIAN
MARIATEGUI and PAULINA MARIATEGUI, respondents.
Montesa, Albon & Associates for petitioners.
Parmenio B. Patacsil, Patacsil Twins Law Office for the heirs of
the late Maria del Rosario Mariategui.
Tinga, Fuentes & Tagle Firm for private respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the
Court of Appeals dated December 24, 1980 in CA-G.R. No.
61841, entitled "Jacinto Mariategui, et al. v. Maria del Rosario
Mariategui, et al.," reversing the judgment of the then Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII ** at Pasig, Metro Manila.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 (Brief for
respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 8). During his lifetime, Lupo
Mariategui contracted three (3) marriages. With his first wife,
Eusebia Montellano, who died on November 8, 1904, he begot
four (4) children, namely: Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana
and Ireneo. Baldomera died and was survived by her children
named Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and
Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo also died and left a son
named Ruperto. With his second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he
begot a daughter named Cresenciana who was born on May 8,
1910 (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 36).
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's third wife) got
married sometime in 1930. They had three children, namely:
Fam Code, Exemptions from Marriage License, Page 4
Jacinto, born on July 3, 1929, Julian, born on February 16, 1931
and Paulina, born on April 19, 1938. Felipa Velasco Mariategui
died in 1941 (Rollo, Ibid).
At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain properties
which he acquired when he was still unmarried (Brief for
respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 4). These properties are described in
the complaint as Lots Nos. 163, 66, 1346 and 156 of the
Muntinglupa Estate (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 39).
On December 2, 1967, Lupo's descendants by his first and
second marriages, namely, Maria del Rosario, Urbana, Ruperto,
Cresencia, all surnamed Mariategui and Antero, Rufina, Catalino,
Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina,
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they
adjudicated unto themselves Lot No. 163 of the Muntinglupa
Estate. Thereafter, Lot No. 163 was the subject of a voluntary
registration proceedings filed by the adjudicatees under Act No.
496, and the land registration court issued a decree ordering the
registration of the lot. Thus, on April 1, 1971, OCT No. 8828 was
issued in the name of the above-mentioned heirs. Subsequently,
the registered owners caused the subdivision of the said lot into
Lots Nos. 163-A to 163-H, for which separate transfer certificates
of title were issued to the respective parties (Rollo, ibid).
On April 23, 1973, Lupo's children by his third marriage with
Felipa Velasco (Jacinto, Julian and Paulina) filed with the lower
court an amended complaint claiming that Lot No. 163 together
with Lots Nos. 669, 1346 and 154 were owned by their common
father, Lupo Mariategui, and that, with the adjudication of Lot No.
163 to their co-heirs, they (children of the third marriage) were
deprived of their respective shares in the lots. Plaintiffs pray for
partition of the estate of their deceased father and annulment of
the deed of extrajudicial partition dated December 2, 1967
(Petition, Rollo, p. 10). Cresencia Mariategui Abas, Flaviana
Mariategui Cabrera and Isabel Santos were impleaded in the
complaint as unwilling defendants as they would not like to join
the suit as plaintiffs although they acknowledged the status and
rights of the plaintiffs and agreed to the partition of the parcels of
land as well as the accounting of their fruits (Ibid., Rollo, p. 8;
Record on Appeal, p. 4).
The defendants (now petitioners) filed an answer with
counterclaim (Amended Record on Appeal, p. 13). Thereafter,
they filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of
action and prescription. They specifically contended that the
complaint was one for recognition of natural children. On August
14, 1974, the motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court, in
an order the dispositive portion of which reads:
It is therefore the opinion of the Court that
Articles 278 and 285 of the Civil Code cited
by counsel for the defendants are of
erroneous application to this case. The
motion to dismiss is therefore denied for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED. (Ibid, p. 37).
However, on February 16, 1977, the complaint as well as
petitioners' counterclaim were dismissed by the trial court, in its
decision stating thus:
The plaintiffs' right to inherit depends upon
the acknowledgment or recognition of their
continuous enjoyment and possession of
status of children of their supposed father.
The evidence fails to sustain either premise,
and it is clear that this action cannot be
sustained. (Ibid, Rollo, pp. 67-68)
The plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on the
ground that the trial court committed an error ". . . in not finding
that the parents of the appellants, Lupo Mariategui and Felipa
Velasco (were) lawfully married, and in holding (that) they
(appellants) are not legitimate children of their said parents,
thereby divesting them of their inheritance . . . " (Rollo, pp. 14-15).
On December 24, 1980, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
declaring all the children and descendants of Lupo Mariategui,
including appellants Jacinto, Julian and Paulina (children of the
third marriage) as entitled to equal shares in the estate of Lupo
Mariategui; directing the adjudicatees in the extrajudicial partition
of real properties who eventually acquired transfer certificates of
title thereto, to execute deeds of reconveyance in favor, and for
the shares, of Jacinto, Julian and Paulina provided rights of
innocent third persons are not prejudiced otherwise the said
adjudicatees shall reimburse the said heirs the fair market value
of their shares; and directing all the parties to submit to the lower
court a project of partition in the net estate of Lupo Mariategui
after payment of taxes, other government charges and
outstanding legal obligations.
The defendants-appellees filed a motion for reconsideration of
said decision but it was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this
petition which was given due course by the court on December 7,
1981.
The petitioners submit to the Court the following issues: (a)
whether or not prescription barred private respondents' right to
demand the partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui, and (b)
whether or not the private respondents, who belatedly filed the
action for recognition, were able to prove their successional rights
over said estate. The resolution of these issues hinges, however,
on the resolution of the preliminary matter, i.e., the nature of the
complaint filed by the private respondents.
The complaint alleged, among other things, that "plaintiffs are the
children of the deceased spouses Lupo Mariategui . . . and Felipa
Velasco"; that "during his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui had repeatedly
acknowledged and confirmed plaintiffs as his children and the
latter, in turn, have continuously enjoyed such status since their
birth"; and "on the basis of their relationship to the deceased Lupo
Mariategui and in accordance with the law on intestate
succession, plaintiffs are entitled to inherit shares in the foregoing
estate (Record on Appeal, pp. 5 & 6). It prayed, among others,
that plaintiffs be declared as children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui
and adjudication in favor of plaintiffs their lawful shares in the
estate of the decedent (Ibid, p. 10).
A perusal of the entire allegations of the complaint, however,
shows that the action is principally one of partition. The allegation
with respect to the status of the private respondents was raised
only collaterally to assert their rights in the estate of the
deceased. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly adopted the
settled rule that the nature of an action filed in court is determined
by the facts alleged in the complaint constituting the cause of
action (Republic vs. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]).
It has been held that, if the relief demanded is not the proper one
which may be granted under the law, it does not characterize or
determine the nature of plaintiffs' action, and the relief to which
plaintiff is entitled based on the facts alleged by him in his
complaint, although it is not the relief demanded, is what
determines the nature of the action (1 Moran, p. 127, 1979 ed.,
citing Baguioro vs. Barrios, et al., 77 Phil. 120).
With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand for
partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui, the Court of Appeals
aptly held that the private respondents are legitimate children of
the deceased.
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been
lawfully married in or about 1930. This fact is based on the
declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who
testified that "when (his) father was still living, he was able to
mention to (him) that he and (his) mother were able to get married
before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal." The spouses
deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in
the community to be such. Although no marriage certificate was
introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to
controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of
the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all
requisites for its validity are present (People vs. Borromeo, 133
SCRA 106 [1984]).
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to
have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume
that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and
wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child
born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from
bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened
according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits
of life (Section 5 (z), (bb), (cc), Rule 131, Rules of Court; Corpus
v. Corpus, 85 SCRA 567 [1978]; Saurnaba v. Workmen's
Compensation, 85 SCRA 502 [1978]; Alavado v. City Gov't. of
Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 135
SCRA 439 [1985]).
Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as
it is founded on the following rationale:
The basis of human society throughout the
civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in
this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but
it is a new relation, an institution in the
Fam Code, Exemptions from Marriage License, Page 5

maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment
of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony.
Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of
any counterpresumption or evidence special
to that case, to be in fact married. The reason
is that such is the common order of society
and if the parties were not what they thus
hold themselves out as being, they would be
living in the constant violation of decency and
of
law . . . (Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43
Phil. 43, 56 [1922] quoted in Alavado vs. City
Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230
[1985]).
So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband
and wife and such relationship is not denied nor contradicted, the
presumption of their being married must be admitted as a fact
(Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban,supra).
The Civil Code provides for the manner under which legitimate
filiation may be proven. However, considering the effectivity of the
Family Code of the Philippines, the case at bar must be decided
under a new if not entirely dissimilar set of rules because the
parties have been overtaken by events, to use the popular phrase
(Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76873, October 26,
1989). Thus, under Title VI of the Family Code, there are only two
classes of children — legitimate and illegitimate. The fine
distinctions among various types of illegitimate children have
been eliminated (Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 656
[1989]).
Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate
children may be established by the record of birth appearing in
the civil register or a final judgment or by the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child.
Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private
respondents. Jacinto's birth certificate is a record of birth referred
to in the said article. Again, no evidence which tends to disprove
facts contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In the
case of the two other private respondents, Julian and Paulina,
they may not have presented in evidence any of the documents
required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of
children of Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as their brother
Jacinto.
While the trial court found Jacinto's testimonies to be
inconsequential and lacking in substance as to certain dates and
names of relatives with whom their family resided, these are but
minor details. The nagging fact is that for a considerable length of
time and despite the death of Felipa in 1941, the private
respondents and Lupo lived together until Lupo's death in 1953. It
should be noted that even the trial court mentioned in its decision
the admission made in the affidavit of Cresenciana Mariategui
Abas, one of the petitioners herein, that " . . . Jacinto, Julian and
Paulina Mariategui ay pawang mga kapatid ko sa
ama . . ." (Exh. M, Record on Appeal, pp. 65-66).
In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than
that private respondents are legitimate children and heirs of Lupo
Mariategui and therefore, the time limitation prescribed in Article
285 for filing an action for recognition is inapplicable to this case.
Corollarily, prescription does not run against private respondents
with respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the
heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly
or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In other words,
prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the
co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing
Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).
repudiation was made by petitioners to the prejudice of private
respondents. Assuming petitioners' registration of the subject lot
in 1971 was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership,
prescription had not yet set in when private respondents filed in
1973 the present action for partition (Ceniza vs. C.A., 181 SCRA
552 [1990]).
In their complaint, private respondents averred that in spite of
their demands, petitioners, except the unwilling defendants in the
lower court, failed and refused to acknowledge and convey their
lawful shares in the estate of their father (Record on Appeal, p. 6).
This allegation, though denied by the petitioners in their answer
(Ibid, p. 14), was never successfully refuted by them. Put
differently, in spite of petitioners' undisputed knowledge of their
relationship to private respondents who are therefore their co-
heirs, petitioners fraudulently withheld private respondent's share
in the estate of Lupo Mariategui. According to respondent Jacinto,
since 1962, he had been inquiring from petitioner Maria del
Rosario about their (respondents) share in the property left by
their deceased father and had been assured by the latter (Maria
del Rosario) not to worry because they will get some shares. As a
matter of fact, sometime in 1969, Jacinto constructed a house
where he now resides on Lot No. 163 without any complaint from
petitioners.
Petitioners' registration of the properties in their names in 1971
did not operate as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership.
In Adille vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 455, 461-462 [1988]),
the Court held:
Prescription, as a mode of terminating a
relation of co-ownership, must have been
preceded by repudiation (of the co-
ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is
subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner
repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act
of repudiation is clearly made known to the
other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is
clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in
possession through open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the
property for the period required by law.
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that registration under the Torrens
system is constructive notice of title, but it has
likewise been our holding that the Torrens
title does not furnish shield for fraud. It is
therefore no argument to say that the act of
registration is equivalent to notice of
repudiation, assuming there was one,
notwithstanding the long-standing rule that
registration operates as a universal notice of
title.
Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names
in fraud of their co-heirs prescription can only be deemed to have
commenced from the time private respondents discovered the
petitioners' act of defraudation (Adille vs. Court of
Appeals, supra). Hence, prescription definitely may not be
invoked by petitioners because private respondents commenced
the instant action barely two months after learning that petitioners
had registered in their names the lots involved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision
of the Court of Appeals dated December 24, 1980 is Affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the THIRD DIVISION

share of the other co-owners absent a clear repudiation of co-
ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano
vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to
demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by
laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 [1987]). On the other
hand, an action for partition may be seen to be at once an action
for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and
conveyance of a determinate portion of the property involved
(Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).

Petitioners contend that they have repudiated the co-ownership

when they executed the extrajudicial partition excluding the
private respondents and registered the properties in their own
names (Petition, p. 16; Rollo, p. 20). However, no valid
Fam Code, Exemptions from Marriage License, Page 6

REPUBLIC OF THE G.R. No. 175581 In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Joses allegations and
PHILIPPINES, defended the validity of their marriage. She declared that they had
Petitioner, maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality of
marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting
- versus - marriage with him on account of their age difference.[5] In her pre-trial
brief, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the
JOSE A. DAYOT, latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31
Respondent. August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against
x------------------x Jose. Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose
FELISA TECSON- G.R. No. 179474 with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both
DAYOT, employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board.[6] The
Petitioner, Present: Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and
immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from
AUSTRIA- service for one year without emolument.[7]
MARTINEZ, J.,
Acting Chairperson, On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision [8] dismissing
TINGA,* the Complaint. It disposed:
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO,** and WHEREFORE, after a careful
REYES, JJ. evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented
by both parties, this Court finds and so holds that
the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable
Promulgated: consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled
JOSE A. DAYOT, case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs
Respondent. March 28, 2008 against [Jose].[9]

The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence

presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24
November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Joses version of the story as
implausible, and rationalized that:

Any person in his right frame of mind

would easily suspect any attempt to make him or
her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have
already detected that something was amiss,
unusual, as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a
package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made
to sign the pieces of paper for the release of the said
package. Another indirect suggestion that could
have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own
admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it
x took him, more or less, three months to discover
that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic]
purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does not
DECISION seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court,
to be taken in for a ride by [Felisa.]

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: [Joses] claim that he did not consent to

the marriage was belied by the fact that he
acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and
wrote [Felisas] name in the duly notarized
G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on
Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot
May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the
(Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision [1] of the
marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham
Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759,
and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote
which declared the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab
the name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted
initio.
in case of emergency. This Court does not believe
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and
that the only reason why her name was written in
Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized
his company I.D. was because he was residing
by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.[2] In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa
there then. This is just but a lame excuse because if
executed a sworn affidavit,[3] also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that
he really considers her not his lawfully wedded
both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried,
wife, he would have written instead the name of his
they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
sister.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint[4] for Annulment
When [Joses] sister was put into the
and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court
witness stand, under oath, she testified that she
(RTC), Bian, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage with
signed her name voluntarily as a witness to the
Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the
marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page
parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and
25, November 29, 1996) and she further testified
Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his
that the signature appearing over the name of Jose
consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.
Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he
voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract (page
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led
26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and
to his filing of the same. According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa
when she was asked by the Honorable Court if
in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in Felisas
indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really
house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa
chosen by her brother she answered yes.The
requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she
testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim
could claim a package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At
that his consent was procured through fraud.[10]
the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man
bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that
Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package could be released to
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Joses
Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told
action had prescribed. It cited Article 87[11] of the New Civil Code which
him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had
requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by
learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of
the injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:
paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left. It was in February
1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He
That granting even for the sake of
alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of
argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa]
Felisas house. When he perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy
through fraud, trickery and machinations, he could
of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter
have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of
feigned ignorance.
marriage at the earliest possible opportunity, the
time when he discovered the alleged sham and false
Fam Code, Exemptions from Marriage License, Page 7
marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action to
void the marriage at the earliest instance. x x x.[12]
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC
Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August 2005, the
Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The dispositive
portion of the appellate courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.[13]
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage
between Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code. The appellate court observed that the circumstances
constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article
86[14] of the Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the
parties.Further, it ruled that the action for annulment of marriage on the
ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided by
law. The Court of Appeals struck down Joses appeal in the following
manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or
intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his
consent to the marriage, the action for the
annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article
87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the
action for annulment of marriage on the ground that
the consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force
or intimidation must be commenced by said party
within four (4) years after the discovery of the
fraud and within four (4) years from the time the
force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud
was allegedly discovered by Jose in February, 1987
then he had only until February, 1991 within which
to file an action for annulment of
marriage. However, it was only on July 7,
1993 that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of
his marriage to Felisa.[15]
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Joses assertion
that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage
license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article 76 [16] of
the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing
an affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years. The Court of Appeals
concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa
had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article
76 did not affect the validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing
officer was misled by the statements contained therein. In this manner, the
Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the
solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court
further noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev.
Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and
found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals
dismissed Joses argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the
sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court
of Appeals, Article 56[17] of the Civil Code did not require that either one
of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the solemnizing
officers church or religious sect. The prescription was established only in
Article 7[18] of the Family Code which does not govern the parties
marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for
Reconsideration thereof. His central opposition was that the requisites for
the proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under
Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In
particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must
have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before
the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital
cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and
reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7
November 2006, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11,
2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another
one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A.
Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil
Registrar of Pasay City.[19]
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the
ruling of this Court in Nial v. Bayadog,[20] and reasoned that:
In Nial v. Bayadog, where the
contracting parties to a marriage solemnized
without a marriage license on the basis of their
affidavit that they had attained the age of majority,
that being unmarried, they had lived together for at
least five (5) years and that they desired to marry
each other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
x x x In other words, the five-year
common-law cohabitation period, which is counted
back from the date of celebration of marriage,
should be a period of legal union had it not been for
the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period
should be the years immediately before the day of
the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning
no third party was involved at any time within the
5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise,
if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed
without any distinction as to whether the parties
were capacitated to marry each other during the
entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning
immorality and encouraging parties to have
common law relationships and placing them on the
same footing with those who lived faithfully with
their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship
must be respected as such and its requirements
must be strictly observed. The presumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife is based on the approximation of
the requirements of the law. The parties should not
be afforded any excuse to not comply with every
single requirement and later use the same missing
element as a pre-conceived escape ground to
nullify their marriage. There should be no
exemption from securing a marriage license unless
the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of
the exception. It should be noted that a license is
required in order to notify the public that two
persons are about to be united in matrimony and
that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any
impediment to the union of the two shall make it
known to the local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides
that a marriage solemnized without a marriage
license, save marriages of exceptional character,
shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the
marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered by
the exception to the requirement of a marriage
license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the
absence of a marriage license.[21]
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to
no avail. The appellate court rendered a Resolution[22] dated 10 May 2007,
denying Felisas motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review before this
Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals Amended
Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of
merit, and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and
subsisting. Felisa filed a separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R.
No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate courts Amended
Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two
Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases
brought before it for resolution.[23]
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following
arguments for the allowance of its Petition, to wit:
I
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW
THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF
HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE
COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD
NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS
OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM
ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS
MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE
LICEN[S]E.[24]
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of
Appeals misapplied Nial.[25] She differentiates the case at bar
from Nial by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing prior
marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with
Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their
Fam Code, Exemptions from Marriage License, Page 8
marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and an administrative case had
been filed against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the
declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any
liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose
and Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly
tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of
the Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several
circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage exists
between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing
this Courts ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.[26] To buttress its
assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa,
dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a
marriage license. It is the Republics position that the falsity of the
statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of the marriage, as
the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the
solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said
affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines that as a marriage
under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was
wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that
the parties incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they
cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the
Republic posits that the parties marriage contract states that their marriage
was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the
signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a
primary evidence of marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic
adduces the following documents: (1) Joses notarized Statement of Assets
and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisas name as his
wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay
Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and
Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3)
Joses company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisas name as his
wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the
issue of the effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A
survey of the prevailing rules is in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was
celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of the
Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless
all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the
contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing
the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a
marriage of exceptional
character. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 58[27] makes explicit that no marriage shall be
solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar
of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save
marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but
not those under Article 75.[28] Article 80(3)[29] of the Civil Code makes it
clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage
license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence
flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage
contract.[30] This is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law,[31] whereby
the absence of a marriage license did not make the marriage void. The
rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the
Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting
parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their
capacity to contract marriage.[32]
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are
covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these
marriages are: (1) marriages inarticulo mortis or at the point of death
during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular
marriages,[33] (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious
ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and
(6) mixed marriages.[34]
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital
cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary
when a man and a woman who have attained the
age of majority and who, being unmarried, have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years, desire to marry each other. The contracting
parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit
before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths. The official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an
affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and
other qualifications of the contracting parties and
that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
The reason for the law,[35] as espoused by the Code
Commission, is that the publicity attending a marriage license may
discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from
legalizing their status.[36]
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa
was performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed
an affidavit declaring that they have attained the age of maturity; that
being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each
other.[37] One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether
the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have
in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively
renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the
exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a
marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as
a general rule, should be strictly[38] but reasonably construed.[39] They
extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should
be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the
exception.[40] Where a general rule is established by statute with
exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by
implication.[41] For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua
non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age of
majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us
with no other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. The
exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire
to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a
minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other
reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is
precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an
indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a marriage
celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be
dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement,
but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention
that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the
requisite facts[42] in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized
the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain
the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he
found no legal impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived
together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and
contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started
living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the
celebration of their marriage.[43] The Court of Appeals also noted Felisas
testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita
Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA
Revolution.[44] The appellate court also cited Felisas own testimony that it
was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house.[45]
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they
satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A question
of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of
the alleged facts.[46] Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not
subject to this Courts review.[47] It is already well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the
Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A
recognized exception to this rule is when the Court
of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the
administrative body, make contradictory findings.
However, the exception does not apply in every
instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial
court or administrative body disagree. The factual
findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive
on this Court if such findings are supported by the
record or based on substantial evidence.[48]
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986,
executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of a
marriage license, is beyond question.
Fam Code, Exemptions from Marriage License, Page 9

We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-
of the statements in the parties affidavit will not affect the validity of Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal
marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were complied liability, if any. No costs.
with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that
the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal SO ORDERED.
requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the
explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted
from the requirement of a marriage license.

Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption of marriage, this

Court holds that the same finds no applicability to the case at
bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with
reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.[49] Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married.[50] The present case does not involve an apparent marriage to
which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no question that
Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24
November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for
Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the
instant consolidated Petitions.

In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code[51] that

every intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage will
not salvage the parties marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a
violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into
without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent
requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. The
solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of
the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of
fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that
the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a
valid marriage.[52] The protection of marriage as a sacred institution
requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure
of an invalid one as well.[53] To permit a false affidavit to take the place of
a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this
Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be
wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our
laws.

Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the

Republic that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact
that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be
invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at
least five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is
with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the
absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the
falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose
and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an
exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere
irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely
required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the
essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap
of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit
at all.

In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the

argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied relief because he
perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his
wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity
finds no room for application where there is a law. [54] There is a law on
the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under
Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent
that the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage is without prejudice
to their criminal liability.[55]

The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that

Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for
lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived
together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Joses subsequent marriage
to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years
before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.

This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is

imprescriptible.[56] Jose and Felisas marriage was celebrated sans a
marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is
void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not
prescribe, and may be raised any time.

Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule
that the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76
means a five-year period computed back from the date of celebration of
marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of a marriage.[57] It covers the years immediately preceding the
day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party
was involved at any time within the five years - and continuity that is
unbroken.[58]

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended

Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R.