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Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

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Countering Female Terrorism

a
Karla J. Cunningham
a
RAND Corporation , Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA
Published online: 24 Feb 2007.

To cite this article: Karla J. Cunningham (2007) Countering Female Terrorism, Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism, 30:2, 113-129, DOI: 10.1080/10576100601101067

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 Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30:113–129, 2007
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1057-610X print / 1521-0731 online
DOI: 10.1080/10576100601101067

Countering Female Terrorism

KARLA J. CUNNINGHAM
RAND Corporation
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA
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This analysis examines female terrorist activity in three cases (the United States,
Israel, and Russia) and identifies six counterterrorism deficiencies (exploitation,
organizational, technological, denial and deception, tactical, and cultural/ideological)
that help to explain why observers failed to anticipate the emergence and scope of
female militancy. Drawing from these lessons, two potential scenarios for significant
and/or surprising female terrorism are examined with respect to left-wing terrorism in
the United States and global Islamism.

Women represent a growing, if not already established, presence in myriad terrorist

organizations officially identified as national security threats to their respective states
(e. g., Russia, India, Colombia, Israel, Britain). Importantly, the study of female terrorists is
rarely acknowledged as a subject that can add to our understanding of terrorism. Similarly,
the study of female terrorists is rarely, if ever, acknowledged as a subject that can add to
our understanding of how to counter terrorism. At the simplest level, much in the way
gender has been theoretically explored in the field of International Relations, “. . . ‘a gender
analysis of women’s lives and experiences does not simply ‘add something’ about women
but transforms what we know about men and the activities they undertake’ (O’Gorman and
Jabri 1999, 7–8).
By studying these women, scholars and analysts may move toward a better
understanding of terrorism by considering the influence of gender on the theoretical and
methodological approaches of the field and how these approaches may influence outcomes.
Gender is a variable that is “in play” within the field, but it is extremely difficult to ascertain
how officials are coming to terms with its impact. The success of female terrorists, combined
with official reactions, indicates that analysts and leaders failed to anticipate the emergence
and range of female militant actors. This failure must be acknowledged, examined, and
rectified given the operational success of female militants.
This analysis will briefly explore three cases involving high levels of female
involvement in organizations that are officially viewed as pressing terrorist threats:
right-wing organizations in the United States, Palestinian militants confronting Israel, and
Chechen separatists targeting Russia. The cases were chosen for the following reasons:
first, all involve female participation levels that are either growing and/or diversifying;
second, in all instances officials failed to anticipate increasing and/or altering female
roles; third, in all cases officials have responded to female participation in a limited, and

Received 29 November 2005; accepted 8 February 2006.

Adress correspondence to Karla J. Cunningham, Ph.D., Political Scientist, RAND Corporation,
4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA, 15213, USA. E-mail: Karla-Cunningham@rand.org

113
 114 K. J. Cunningham

arguably predictable, manner; and finally, all three cases involve conservative/traditional
socio-ideological settings or organizations that observers often view as especially hostile
to female participation and activism.
From these cases six general counterterrorism deficiencies become apparent that
influence how counterterrorism specialists anticipate, respond to, and interact with
female militants: (1) exploiting female terrorists in custody; (2) organizational structures;
(3) technology; (4) denial and deception; (5) tactical advantages; and (6) culture and
ideology. To date, the cases of Palestine, Chechnya, and to a lesser extent right-wing
organizations in the United States have challenged their respective states with often high
levels of violence that was unforeseen and forced security elements into a reactive and
defensive posture. Utilizing some of the counterterrorism lessons of these cases, this analysis
will briefly explore how addressing these deficiencies may improve counterterrorism efforts
by examining two cases that have considerable potential for female militancy and violence
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in the future—left-wing terrorism in the United States and global Islamist terrorism1 by
groups like Al Qaeda.

Selective Cases Involving Female Terrorism

Right-Wing Organizations in the United States: Expanding Female Participation

Right-wing organizations have increasingly targeted women for recruitment in the past
several years, especially with the advent of the Internet, and women’s roles within the
organizations are expanding (Blee 2001, 2002, 2005). Groups such as Stormfront and the
World Church of the Creator (WCOTC) often include women’s pages (“Women on the Web”
1999), and one of the more traditionally prolific writers within this movement has been
Elisha Strom, otherwise known as the “Angry White Female” (Beirich and Potok 2003).
Women such as Lisa Turner (WCOTC) and Rachel Pendergraft (Ku Klux Klan, KKK) have
risen to positions of power and influence within their respective organizations, and women
overall have become important agents for recruiting other members, especially women,
through the Internet (Nesbitt 1999; Schabner 2002). Additionally, several women have
become prominent over time for their activism within the movement, achieving “martyr”
status, including Kathy Ainsworth who was killed when she tried to bomb a Jewish home
in 1968, and Vicki Weaver who was killed at the standoff on Ruby Ridge in 1992.
Although women have tended to refrain from high levels of violence within the larger
right-wing movement, and significant segments of the right-wing movement have exhibited
a tactical shift toward less violent behavior overall, this should not be construed as a
proclivity toward nonviolence by women associated with rightist organizations. Blee (2005)
notes two areas of racial terrorism in which female violence is growing: strategic terrorism
against the state and narrative terrorism against racial minorities (430). However, women’s
roles in strategic terrorism remains largely centered around lending legitimacy to this form
of terrorism, whereas women engage in more overt acts of violence in narrative racial
terrorism (Blee 2005, 428).
Anti-abortion groups share important similarities with the larger right-wing movement
and one of the most politically violent organizations is the Army of God (AOG).2 Although
accurate dating of the AOG’s origins is unclear, the organization has published three
manuals that advocate escalating forms of violence to end abortion in the United States.
The organization promotes loose structuring and lone-wolf actions to deter law enforcement
intelligence gathering and interdiction. Women have been active members of the anti-choice
movement, including within the Army of God. Of the eighteen listed “heroes” of the
 Countering Female Terrorism 115

anti-abortion movement, five are women.3 One of the most prominent female heroes is
Shelley Shannon who is serving a thirty-one year prison sentence for the 1993 attempted
murder of an abortion provider in Wichita, Kansas and a spate of arsons and bombings
she committed in 1992. Shannon also committed two acid attacks against women’s health
centers in 1992.
Officials view right-wing organizations as a pressing threat to United States security
(Terrorism 2000/2001; Gilmore Commission 2002), but the rising numbers of female
participants within these organizations has not appeared to have attracted official interest.
Reports by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) overwhelmingly focus on male leaders
and perpetrators and official scenarios are devoid of female operatives (Cordesman 2001,
“Countering Terrorism: Integration of Practice and Theory: An Invitational Conference”
2002). Furthermore, the FBI does not provide statistical data on the gender of hate crime
offenders, leading one to conclude that of the reported 7649 incidents reported in 2004, all
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7145 known offenders were male (Hate Crime Statistics 2004). Yet Blee’s (2005) account
of women involved in several hate crimes linked to racial terrorism suggests that this
conclusion is likely false. Finally, officials do not generally publicize female actors within
the right-wing movement and information regarding strategies and/or operational proce-
dures for identifying, searching, interrogating, and/or exploiting female militant members
of domestic organizations for counterintelligence purposes is not publicly available.
With respect to right-wing terrorism in the United States, all six counterterrorism defi-
ciencies are apparent. Although female militants have been apprehended and successfully
prosecuted by the federal government, it is not clear that officials have sought, much less
successfully obtained, insight into the organizations with which the women were affiliated.
It is also not clear how women are influencing, and being influenced by, organizational
structures. As with Islamic terrorism and some left-wing groups, hierarchies are increasingly
giving way to flatter structures and “leaderless resistance” frameworks and women’s
roles within these two differential organizational approaches, and women’s influence on
moving organizations structurally, is unknown. Interestingly, women’s participation in
racial terrorism in earlier historical periods increased as organizational structures became
more rigid (Blee 2005, 424), and there have been “. . . at least fledgling attempts to organize
all-women racist skinhead groups under the banner of ‘White power/women power’, . . .
efforts that would be unimaginable in other parts of the White supremacist movement”
(Blee 2005, 429).
Technology is one of the most notable areas of activity with respect to female militancy
in the right-wing movements, including anti-abortion groups. The Internet has become a
critical arena for recruitment, propaganda dissemination, and intra-group participation for
women. Further, the Internet creates transnational opportunities for women as exemplified
by Melissa Guille who runs the Canadian Heritage Alliance website in Canada from her
London home (Richmond 2005). Women’s use of, and influence over, technology has the
potential to affect female standing within groups and their overall operational roles.
Male leaders of various White supremacist groups have recognized that women attract
publicity for their groups, and generate fear and discomfort in observers. Don Black, former
leader of the Alabama KKK and creator of Stormfront in 1995, estimated that one-third
of his members were female and one-third to one half of chat room participants were
women by 1999 (Nesbitt 1999). This observation was reinforced by the Southern Poverty
Law Center (SPLC) who estimated that women comprised at least 25 percent of many
groups and up to half of new recruits (“All in the Family” n. d.). More interestingly is
that women’s participation is increasingly associated with strategic advantages, especially
recruiting additional female and male members. What merits greater scrutiny is whether
 116 K. J. Cunningham

women’s participation is being over or under reported for denial and deception purposes.
Counterterrorism and counterintelligence elements need to investigate female activity
through the use of female operatives and observe and compare public announcements
by group leaders regarding female participation with data drawn from operatives within
groups and arrest and incarceration statistics.
Right-wing White power movements in the United States have seen the success of
female militancy in cases such as Palestine and Chechnya, as well as historical cases such
as the Weather Underground and Black Panther party, which may result in growing female
involvement in strategic and narrative violence (Blee 2005, 431). Stormfront chatrooms
confirm that White supremacist groups are watching developments related to female
militancy.4 To date, for most observers, women are ignored in right-wing movements
because they have had little to no role in violent organizations and/or actions, although this
perception is increasingly being shown to be incorrect (Cunningham 2003; Blee 2005).
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Intensifying this factor is that most of the highly violent organizations that preoccupy U.S.
counterterrorism specialists are also ideologically conservative, which is viewed as making
these organizations uniquely hostile to female participation and operationalization. This is
true of right-wing movements in the United States and it is true in settings such as Palestine,
Chechnya, and global Islamism (Al Qaeda).

Palestinian Organizations and the Emergence of Female Suicide Attackers

Women’s involvement with politically violent organizations is not unheard of in the Middle
East, including the use of female suicide bombers, contrary to popular perceptions that this
is a new phenomenon. During the 1980 s in Southern Lebanon, female suicide bombers
were utilized, mainly by the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP) and two-thirds
of the attacks undertaken by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) were by women in
the mid- to late-1990s. There is some evidence that the last female suicide bomber in
Lebanon acted on behalf of Hezbollah and in 2002 Sheik Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah
publicly approved of female suicide bombers.5 Since 2002, both secular and Islamist
Palestinian groups have utilized women in eight successful suicide attacks against Israel
including the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (an off-shoot of Fatah), the Palestinian Islamic
Jihad, and Hamas. Reportedly there are at least a dozen incarcerated women whose suicide
missions failed (Beyler 2005), and since 2000 ninety-six Palestinian women have been
involved in violence against Israel (Daraghmeh 2005), with forty-one women (including
the eight suicide attackers) having been recruited between 2002 and 2004 (Dudkevitch
2004). Further, Israel publicized the capture of the first Hamas female bombmaker in
October 2005 (Daraghmeh 2005).
Israeli security sources claimed to have been aware of women’s roles in terrorism from
the beginning of the second intifada, however Wafa Idris’s suicide bombing in January
2002 surprised the Israeli security apparatus (Gilmore 2002). Despite clear indicators,
Israeli officials missed the signals that women’s terrorist violence was possible, much less
impending. Between 1998 and 2002, at least 18 Palestinian women were arrested for a
variety of attacks that included stabbings of soldiers and police officers (8), attempted
murder of a soldier (method unknown) (1), the murder of an Israeli boy (1), planting
bombs (2), planned suicide bombings in 2002 (2), and a car bomb (1).6 Palestinian males
often escalated violence (e. g., stabbings and shootings) before turning to suicide bombings
(Karmon 2000). Nevertheless, despite a pattern of escalating violence by Palestinian women
 Countering Female Terrorism 117

during the second intifada, and earlier events in Lebanon (Beyler 2003), Israeli security
forces failed to anticipate that they would face female suicide attacks.
The effects of female suicide bombers on Israeli officials should not be underestimated.
In addition to the expanded field of possible threats that must now be addressed at border
crossings, the psychological impact of female suicide bombers has been significant as
these women challenge traditional Israeli assumptions regarding Palestinian women and
society. Some of this effect is visible in Israeli efforts to downplay social fears associated
with female militants. For example, the Israeli Ministry of Information has distributed
information regarding female militants that portrays them as unwitting victims and/or
desperate social failures. It is not unusual for male suicide attackers to be described as
“sentient missiles” (Ucko and Langston 2002) as opposed to “real terrorists” who plan and
organize attacks. Similarly, female suicide attackers are portrayed in both the Palestinian
and Chechnyan cases as weapons-delivery-systems (WDS)7 in the sense that they are little
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more than bombs with a brain. The danger is that women will be viewed as limited to the
role of suicide attackers, raising the likelihood that observers will underestimate the actual
recruitment and operational depth and range for female operatives, such as the emergence
of Hamas’s female bombmaker. The lessons of Hamas are particularly noteworthy because
most observers were skeptical that Hamas would ever operationalize women. This was
despite the fact that Islamic and Hamas leaders, including Hamas’s spiritual leader Sheikh
Ahmad Yassin, never ruled out the possibility and were intellectually setting the stage for
several years (Cook 2005).
In the Palestinian setting, all of the counterterrorism deficiencies are identifiable,
although there are important areas of convergence and divergence from U.S. right-wing
movements. As of June 2005 Israel was holding at least twelve failed female suicide
attackers (Beyler 2005) but Israeli attitudes toward these women will affect if and how they
will be exploited as a meaningful source of intelligence. If women are simply WDS, then
captured women have little usefulness aside from publicity for the Israeli state.
One of the reasons why Israeli officials were surprised by the emergence of female
suicide bombers was the hierarchical nature of Palestinian groups. This factor also explains
why Israelis tend to dismiss women as WDS rather than view them as meaningful
members of their respective organizations. However, as the Palestinian setting demonstrates,
operational success trumps hierarchy. Further, women’s success in suicide attacks has
precipitated a reaction by both women and men in the Palestinian setting that may have
longer-term organizational implications for expanding women’s roles and participation
(Cunningham 2005). Here the role of technology may have future meaning. Although the
Internet has not become a meaningful means to recruit and operationalize women in the
Palestinian setting, the Internet and other media outlets such as satellite television and
newspapers have been applied toward disseminating information about female militants
to expatriates and regional audiences (Israeli 2004). Fund-raising activities by women in
other Middle Eastern–based groups such as the PKK and the Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK)
in North America (Cunningham 2003) suggest that women’s roles have the potential to be
more expansive both within and outside of the Palestinian setting. Counterterrorism officials
need to consider how technology may play a role in fostering women’s participation both
inside and outside the region with respect to the Palestinian uprising.
Three of the most clearly discernable and overlapping areas regarding counterterrorism
deficiencies concern denial and deception, tactical advantages, and culture/ideology. Arafat
initiated calls for female participation in the secular uprising in early 2002 (Victor 2003),
while Islamist acceptance had been slower but emerging. Hamas’s spiritual leader Sheikh
Ahmed Yassin described the use of its first female suicide attacker as an “evolution”
 118 K. J. Cunningham

(Zaanoun 2004) and a “new beginning” (Barzak 2004). Idris’s success, which related more
to the public response than to the tactical nature of her attack, sent a clear and compelling
message to all Palestinian organizations that women enjoy tactical advantages that their
male counterparts do not. In the Israeli case, this success has had as much to do with being
able to get close to intended targets as with undermining public confidence in Israeli security
forces, jarring entrenched public attitudes regarding Palestinian society, and invigorating
Arab publics. In the wake of successful female suicide attacks, Israel began to post female
soldiers at security checkpoints but not until 2004 (Barzak 2004). However, even in secure
settings female guards are limited, allowing women to detonate their explosives before they
can be screened, as was the case with Reem Saleh Riyashi, Hamas’s first female suicide
attacker, in January 2004 (Moore 2004).
Significantly, Israeli officials and most Western observers not only had difficulty
anticipating the emergence of female suicide attackers in Palestine, but they have continued
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to resist their presence by attempting to diminish them and explain them away. Entrenched
attitudes regarding Islamic and Arab cultures have reinforced this process as culture is seen
to trump operational success. Although this assumption has been shown to be incorrect, it
is entrenched and highly resistant to change, thereby explaining counterterrorism failures
in the Chechen case and the dangers facing an emergent case such as global Islamism.

Chechnya’s “Black Widows”: Fear + Sympathy + Publicity = The Perfect Terrorist

To date, the literature on Chechnya is limited, and most accounts regarding female suicide
bombers are journalistic and often sensationalist. Female suicide bombers have been used
in a number of high profile attacks against Russian targets since 2002 including a Moscow
rock concert in July 2003, the Moscow theater hostage-taking in October 2002, the Beslan
elementary school attack in September 2004, and the downing of two planes in August 2004.
Women were first used in suicide attacks beginning in June 2000 (Meier 2004) but since
October 2002 the majority of suicide attacks have been undertaken by women (Abdullaev
2004). Nivat (2005) argues “. . . more Chechen women seem to be participating actively
in the separatist-turned-jihadist struggle than in the larger and longer-running Palestinian
conflict” (419). Given the limitations of the literature on Chechnya to date, it is difficult to
form a complete picture of the true operational range of female Chechen rebels; however,
there is reason to believe that it may be wider than the “Black Widow” phenomenon
suggests.
Women have been participating in greater numbers, in more frequent attacks, and in
more complex missions over the past three years. Forty-six percent (19/41) of the Moscow
theater hostage takers were women and two to four of the roughly thirty hostage takers
in Beslan were women. Their operational success is impressive with Chechen suicide
bombers beating the world’s average by more than double the number killed (Abdullaev
2004). Russian officials have been shocked and alarmed by the frequency and success
of female suicide attacks, but as with the Palestinian case, officials should have at least
anticipated this innovation by Chechen separatists given reports of female combatants in
the first Chechen war from 1994 to 1996.
Nivat (2001) met two women, both of whom she refers to as “Larissa,” who were
female combatants years before women escalated into more substantial acts of violence.
The first Larissa clearly served in combat roles but was sent home to attend to her daughter
with the death of her husband. Once home she fulfilled a variety of roles, becoming a
liaison officer in charge of counter-espionage, an intelligence agent, a sniper, a cook, and
 Countering Female Terrorism 119

a nurse. The second Larissa, a female combatant in uniform, was able to join the rebellion
after marrying a rebel. She told Nivat, “‘[s]ince I was little . . . I wanted to make the gazovat
[holy war]. And now, here I am’” (199). Unfortunately, there are few accounts such as
Nivat’s that provide any insight into women’s roles within the Chechen uprising outside of
the sensationalist “Black Widows” phenomenon.
Despite evidence that women were involved in a range of operational roles within the
Chechen uprising including more generalized combat in Grozny, there has been little official
acknowledgment of this operational range, or indications of Russian responses to women’s
roles. Until women became something the state could not ignore, officials dismissed early
female suicide attacks as a “fiction” (Paukov and Svistunov 2003). Most official attention
toward female suicide bombers has focused on their status as widows suggesting, much as in
the Israeli case, that the women are naı̈ve and irrelevant throwaways whose presence merits
no additional explanation and/or understanding. Russian officials arguably have sought to
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arouse public sympathy for these women as victims of Chechen leaders to distract the
public from focusing on how bad things must be to drive Chechen women to suicide
attacks (Groskop 2004; Page 2004; Meier 2004). In general, Russian officials have sought
to explain Chechen female militants using three techniques: the “Black Fatima” legend; the
“zombification” of Chechen women; and foreign influence, especially the Islamicization
of the conflict.
Harkening back to the Baba Yoga folklore (Meier 2004), the “Black Fatima” legend is
furthered by Russian officials through the state-owned media, and was reinforced by the lone
failed female suicide attacker, Zarema Muzhakhoyeva. “Black Fatima” is characterized as
an older woman in black furs with a “hook nose” who recruits, trains, drugs, and then tasks
young Chechen women for suicide attacks (Page 2004; Meier 2004). Others point to the
“zombification” of Chechen women caused by grief and sorrow (Groskop 2004), whereas
still others see them as evidence of the Islamicization of the conflict (Myers 2004) who are
led by Arabs (Mainville 2003) or bankrolled by mercenaries (Page 2004). Russian officials
prefer to utilize a “profile” of Chechen female terrorists as young, widowed, desperate
for revenge, or hapless victims forced into attacks through blackmail or rape. However,
this profile is not supported by observers who note that female suicide attackers are not
necessarily young, religious, poor, widowed, grieving, or raped (Abdullaev 2004; Myers
2004). Instead of a profile what exists is an organization willing to apply this “high value
franchise” (Abdullaev 2004).
The counterterrorism failure in the Chechen case conforms to the two earlier cases,
especially that of Palestine. Several female Chechen combatants are in custody but it
is not clear how Russian officials have exploited their presence for counterterrorism
and counterintelligence purposes. Russian officials have been fairly aggressive in their
physical responses to Chechen attacks, killing most perpetrators, and women’s participation
in suicide attacks negates the issue of capture and interrogation. Nevertheless, the
potential for interrogating militant Chechen women exists, but Russian official statements
peripheralizing and trivializing women’s roles suggests that these intelligence avenues are
likely underutilized.
The limits of information are telling in the Chechen case with respect to organization,
technology, and denial and deception. Like the Palestinian and right-wing movements in
the United States, Chechen groups remain hierarchical, which generally limits women’s
roles. Earlier accounts, while admittedly sparse, highlighted a range of operational roles
for women including combatant, espionage, sniper, and support activities. Reportedly,
women were being trained in explosives and Islam by Wahhabi Chechens several years
before the first suicide attacks occurred (Meier 2004). Currently Chechen women are
 120 K. J. Cunningham

almost exclusively considered as suicide attackers. Importantly, women’s success as suicide

attackers has prompted their inclusion into larger and more complex missions such as Beslan
in 2004 (Abdullaev 2004). It is clear that even within suicide attacks observers must move
toward a more nuanced understanding of the roles women are filling.
The tactical advantage of females in suicide attacks has been readily apparent, yet
women’s potential role in other types of violence and technology-assisted recruitment,
fund-raising, and propaganda activities is unknown. There is evidence that the Chechens
are mobilizing women differently in the past year, pulling them straight from their homes
into an attack rather than pulling them out of society and putting them in the mountains
for training for attacks weeks later (Myers 2004). This shift will complicate Russian
counterterrorism efforts and is muddying Chechen public attitudes toward attacks such as
the plane bombings because the idea that women were in society one day and carrying out
an attack the next is unsettling. It also weakens Russian perceptions, and to some extent
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that of the Chechen public, that Chechen female suicide attackers must be brainwashed
to carry out their attacks. Finally, women’s tactical advantage in the Russian context is
reinforced by a unique feature with this case for the purposes of this study—corruption.
The pervasiveness and depth of Russian corruption is well known, but the 2004 plane
crashes highlights that this problem is exploitable by female militants who were able to
bribe an airline official and by-pass police security to obtain access to the planes.
As in both the Palestinian and right-wing movement cases discussed earlier, much of
what has limited counterterrorism success against female militants is centered in cultural and
ideological assumptions. Chechen women were not on the counter-terrorism radar screen
because of entrenched beliefs that cultural norms would prohibit their being included and
operationalized in any militant setting. Despite evidence that women were participating
in militant activities such as espionage and combat roles, and being trained in militarist
activities by Wahhabis, the prospect of female suicide attacks seemed unthinkable because
Islam and larger cultural mores were believed to be opposed to this possibility. Finally, in
the face of women dying while undertaking suicide attacks, Russian leaders’ willingness
to peripheralize and diminish female activity has allowed cultural assumptions to remain
unchanged and strategic perceptions of women’s limited roles to go unchallenged.

Two Possible Future Scenarios

The dangers of the counterterrorism failures highlighted by the preceding cases become
more apparent when we look to the future and consider where terrorism has the potential to
go and how women’s participation in that future might look. Each of the counterterrorism
failures examined earlier has resonance for two possible terrorism futures with the potential
for significant female participation, whether in terms of overall numbers or with respect to
operational success and effect. These cases are global Islamism and left-wing terrorism in
the United States.

Global Islamism
Global Islamism fostered by groups such as Al Qaeda have frequently been considered the
most uniquely hostile organizations to women because of their extreme religiously grounded
ideological conservatism. Yet Cook (2005) observes that religious legal discussions do not
severely impede the ideological use of women in jihad, but rather the absence of women
 Countering Female Terrorism 121

in groups like Al Qaeda results from social conservatism in Muslim societies (383), or
Arabism.
Information is scattered and difficult to obtain regarding global Islamist organizations
but even a brief examination provides evidence of widening and deepening female
participation and mobilization as of late 2005. Women have been supporters and family
members of global Islamist groups like Al Qaeda for many years, but they have also
reportedly been used to train women (“Mother of Usama”), run women’s organizations
and groups, participate as girls in Islamist summer camps, run Internet magazines,
distribute Qur’ans in prisons and schools, create Islamist nongovernmental organizations
and charities, participate in Muslim Student Associations (MSAs), and engage in illegal
activities such as fund-raising (Ozment 2004; Scroggins 2004, 2005). Although these
activities are nonviolent, they are also frequent pathways to militancy for male members of
global Islamist groups and are critical sources for propaganda, recruitment, and fund-raising.
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Since 2003, women have also participated in suicide attacks, and several failed efforts, in
Iraq and as of 2005 these attacks were claimed by Iraq’s Al Qaeda. Overall, women have
been associated with Islamist militancy, largely linked to Al-Qaeda, in Pakistan, Great
Britain, the United States, Jordan, Iraq, the Philippines, and Uzbekistan since 2001.
Despite the operational success of women in Palestine and Chechnya, however, the
presence of “Al Qaeda women” is hard for most Western observers to comprehend, much
less prepare for, because culture is seen to trump operational considerations. Although
Islamic scholarly discourse has clearly been coming to terms with the potential, if not
probability, of female militancy for years (Cook 2005), Western observers remain resistant
to this possibility, preferring to maintain cultural assumptions much in the way Israeli
and Russian officials have done. The hierarchical features of the larger globalist Islamic
movement will not preclude women’s participation in the same way that these organizational
features have not in Palestine and Chechnya. In an excellent move toward denial and
deception, while Islamic scholars make way for the possibility of female terrorists, global
Islamist leaders may continue to espouse rhetoric hostile to women in an effort to reinforce
Western cultural assumptions while preparing to take advantage of the lack of Western
preparedness for an attack involving women. Complicating this case is that, to date, few
women have been visibly involved with global Islamist groups, preventing officials from
exploiting captured females for counterterrorism and counterintelligence purposes.

Left-Wing Terrorism in the United States

The 1960s and 1970s were characterized by high levels of female participation in
violent left-wing groups, including female leadership in developed states within North
America, Europe, and Japan. Currently, ecoterrorism, especially from groups like the
Earth Liberation Front (ELF) and Animal Liberation Front (ALF) is considered by the
FBI to be one of the most significant domestic terrorist threats within the United States
(Terrorism 2000/2001; Cunningham 2003). Yet most official observers are preoccupied with
ideologically conservative, and particularly religiously grounded, terrorist organizations,
especially those based in Islam.
Ecoterrorists in the United States have been seeking to link their movement with
other “social justice” movements, providing an opportunity to broaden their ideological
and geographic reach. Ideologically, antiwar, anarchist, antiglobalist, anticapitalist, and
rights-focused (animals, women, racial, developing world) movements are logical targets for
this effort. Ecoterrorists have engaged in transnational efforts to train like-minded activists
 122 K. J. Cunningham

that included animal rights advocates and anarchists in Kent in September 2004 (Taylor
2004; Nugent 2004). These linkages are not surprising considering leftist movements have
a historical record of creating ties with one another (Zwerman 1995) and ecoterrorism
originated in the 1970s.
Women have been active participants in the ELF and ALF although their overall
levels are unknown (Cunningham 2003) and visible leadership is overwhelmingly male.
Nevertheless women are clearly evident in training, violent actions such as arson, publicity
especially on the Internet, and directing violent operations. The ALF’s “Arson Guide”
features a woman burning down a McDonalds entitled “Arson-Around with Auntie ALF”
(“Ecoterrorism” n. d.). Significantly, women have undertaken many of these roles without
attracting publicity. For both women and men in the ALF and ELF violence has become
an acceptable and effective means to an end and this conviction is gaining cross-national
currency. ALF activists who attended the Kent training event highlighted the fact that
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“direct action” has been the only thing that has raised the group’s profile and attracted
media attention (Taylor 2004). Although there is no established socioeconomic profile of
female participants in the ecoterrorist movement, what is evident is that their age range is
wide.
Ecoterrorist aspirations to link their movement to other “social justice” movements have
the potential to extend the influence and organizational range of violent members. Leftist
organizations have historically witnessed significant female participation and leadership
and ecoterrorists seem to share this feature of leftist groups. One possible area for emergent
female violence lies in the growing tension between conservatives and liberals in the United
States. If the conservative agenda gains juridical success in limiting certain freedoms
for women, especially with respect to abortion, then there is a possibility women could
radicalize in the United States in similar ways to anti-abortion groups. Through over-lapping
membership and ideological linkages, violent actions—and the training to do them—may
potentially target conservative leaders (official, religious, and nongovernmental), judges,
and media figures. The “women’s liberation” association of many leftist groups in the 1970s
and ongoing women’s participation on leftist organizations such as the ELF/ALF contain
both organizational and ideological features that facilitate high female participation levels
and leadership roles in this type of scenario.

Summary
One of the most significant advantages held by female terrorists is that their potential is
denied, ignored, and diminished and as a result they are almost always unanticipated,
underestimated, and highly effective. Their effectiveness results from an important
nexus: the ingenuity and capabilities of female attackers, the rational calculations and
organizational capabilities of terrorist organization leaders, and the shortsightedness and
denial of officials in the targets. The cases examined in this study demonstrate the
importance of all three features but the only area that officials truly have the power to
correct is their own. Counterterrorism efforts need to be directed toward learning from the
past to anticipate possible futures and if these efforts fail to prevent female terrorism then a
rapid effort needs to be made to effectively and neutrally respond to the innovation of female
actors in violent settings. Initial steps can be taken in the six counterterrorism deficiency
areas that emerged from existing cases of female militancy: exploitation, organization,
technology, denial and deception, tactical advantages, and culture and ideology.
 Countering Female Terrorism 123

Because women are often not viewed as significant and meaningful actors in
most organizations, women currently held in detention are unlikely to be seen as
exploitable resources for intelligence on organizations, their leaders, and for developing
scenarios. Observers must be willing to exploit the range of female participants in violent
organizations, from female combatants to supporters because of their ability to provide fuller
pictures of organizations and participants. Finally, observer preoccupation with violent
actors runs the risk of overlooking participation trajectories that move from nonviolent
to violent behavior. Men follow these trajectories and so do women; it is imperative
that observers remain open-minded when observing female participation and capable of
discerning when that participation is moving along a trajectory that may favor violent
action.
Hierarchical organizations are often viewed as hostile to women’s participation in
terrorist organizations but not only has this assumption not held up, it has limited observers
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from anticipating other options including the formation of women’s organizations and
women’s roles in less hierarchical settings. Similarly, observers are preoccupied by
conservative/religious terrorist organizations and suicide attacks, two features that have
heretofore been viewed as inhospitable to female participation despite historical precedents
with the PKK and Sri Lanka. There is precedence for female participation in both secular
and religious terrorism and both forms of terrorism remain ongoing threats to various states,
including the United States.
Two areas where women have some of their greatest impact are actually nonviolent
and include technology and denial and deception. Women’s use of, and responsiveness to,
technology has been significant in settings such as the right-wing movement in the United
States, and there is precedence for women’s effective use of technology for fund-raising,
recruitment, and propaganda in other organizations including those from the Middle East.
Additionally, technology gives women, and their organizations, transnational influence and
access, creating an avenue to link expatriates with localized conflicts. Finally, the role and
participation of women in terrorist settings has profound denial and deception potential,
as terrorist organizations can use the cultural assumptions of their opponents to obscure
meaningful assessments of female participation. To date, terrorist leaders in a variety of
settings have sought to downplay and/or amplify female participation levels and roles in an
effort to disrupt, disorient, and/or distract their opponents.

Five Proposals to Overcome These Deficiencies

The challenge of overcoming the deficiencies discussed in this analysis may appear
daunting; however, there are five immediate proposals that can be taken to address them
and, more importantly, the issue that underlies them all. Perhaps the most significant
lesson for counterterrorism scholars and officials of the three cases discussed in this
analysis (United States, Israel, and Russia) is that women’s emergence and participation
in terrorist settings is not the “surprise” it often appears to be. Rather, all three cases
demonstrate that if counterterrorism experts had looked, they would have seen women’s
entry into the respective terrorist settings years before violence occurred and, with respect
to the right-wing groups in the United States, this pathway is arguably still emerging.
Further, counterterrorism “surprise” has not been limited to women’s entry into terrorist
settings, but also the types of tactics they have been tasked with (e.g., violent versus
nonviolent action), and ultimately the “promotional” opportunities for women within their
respective organizations (e.g., becoming a suicide attacker versus not being limited to
 124 K. J. Cunningham

suicide attacks). These three areas of surprise are directly caused, and exacerbated, by the
six counterterrorism deficiencies highlighted throughout this analysis.
Given limited resources and a seemingly endless list of emergent and ongoing
threats, counterterrorism experts have downplayed both the possibility and probability
of female terrorism. As a result, responses have been overwhelmingly inadequate and
defensive despite the high operational success of female terrorist attacks. Yet there are
five counterterrorism steps that officials and other experts can take to place their security
apparatuses in a more responsive and anticipatory posture. Although this may not prevent
the emergence and/or expansion of female participation in terrorist settings, it may very well
deprive terrorist organizations and their leaders of two of the most important advantages
associated with female terrorism: surprise and tactical access. Each of these suggestions,
presented in no particular order of importance, should be relatively easy for states to
implement as part of their overarching counterterrorism program and the implementation of
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all five would provide some of the best remediation for the six counterterrorism deficiencies
discussed earlier.
Intelligence Communication between local, state, federal, and international elements
is absolutely critical to identify, analyze, and respond to female participation in diverse
violent settings. Particularly useful would be intelligence efforts directed toward identifying
potentially emergent cases of female participation in violent, or potentially violent, settings
and how this participation transforms over time. Further, official efforts must be reinforced
with scholarly efforts by academics and researchers. Intelligence professional organizations
and seminars would be useful settings for this type of information sharing. However,
individual streams of information have little broad utility if they are not analyzed within
larger frameworks.
As a result, an International Database of Female Terrorism, containing classified and
unclassified information, should be considered. Ideally it would include a wide range
of information on female participation in violent organizations, or with the potential
for violence. Official information generated from incarceration interviews, statistics, and
surveillance can be combined with broader trends identified from the media, scholarly
research and interviews, and terrorist propaganda to provide cross-national data on the
range, levels, and trends of female participation in violent settings. Additionally, earlier
data sources should be reviewed to identify any overlooked information, such as the FBI’s
Hate Crime Statistics, and assess its implications. Established databases such as RAND’s
MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Database and the University of St. Andrew’s Centre for the
Study of Terrorism and Political Violence Database Project are two good models, and it is
possible that a database of women’s terrorist activity could be included in one or both of
these established databases.
As communication and data expand, it is imperative that official and scholarly
counterterrorism experts engage in Scenario Development that involves both “never” and
“what if” components. First, experts must address the ongoing challenge of the impossible
scenarios, or “nevers,” such as the early reluctance noted by Shultz and Vogt (2002)
to believe that Shi’a and Sunni groups would overcome their sectarian differences to
cooperate with each other (376–377). This same tendency has been readily apparent in
counterterrorism efforts, or the lack thereof, with respect to female terrorism, especially
with ideologically conservative groups. Secondly, experts must engage in “what if”
scenarios they develop with male actors to include women. For example, “what if” an
attack by Al Qaeda included women? What would the impact be, how would this affect
the operation’s success, and would the psychological impact of the attack be amplified?
How would the inclusion of a woman influence the response to the attack, the ability to
 Countering Female Terrorism 125

prevent the attack, and/or the effect of the attack for the public, officials, and responders?
Importantly, individuals developing scenarios must not only create scenarios that involve
female perpetrators, they must also compare the same scenarios but where the only divergent
variable is the gender of the perpetrator to assess how gender affects their larger security
assessments, planning, and responses.
Counterterrorism efforts must also be made in two applied fields. First, Security
Protocols must be evaluated and, where necessary, revised before an attack by a female
perpetrator ever occurs. The case from Hamas is illustrative, in that Israeli officials were
aware of female suicide attackers and had female security personnel available but not
on hand. This allowed enough time for a female to detonate an explosive at a security
checkpoint in a manner that a male would have been unable to achieve. In areas where
female security personnel are necessary to inspect women for social proprietary and other
reasons, those personnel must be trained and deployed in advance of attacks. Conversely,
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if this deployment is impossible, security precautions need to be taken to prevent females

from obtaining sustained access to areas prior to security screenings.
Second, HUMINT efforts need to be implemented, deepened, and/or widened to
include not only established threats to respective states but emergent threats as well.
Further, female assets must be utilized to gain entry into various organizations to obtain
information regarding female access, range, and internal mobilization potential. Intelligence
gathered through these channels will provide a fuller picture of female participation in
violent settings, especially when considered in tandem with information gathered through
intelligence sharing, scholarly analysis, and other information sources such as terrorist
propaganda and media reports.
Counterterrorism experts, and the state leaders who rely on them, should work
together to implement the five counterterrorism proposals briefly discussed earlier
because they will address the two most important issues related to female terrorism and
counterterrorism: surprise and tactical advantage. By generating, sharing, and refining
intelligence information, analytical efforts will be improved and threats (or potential threats)
will become more visible and thereby less surprising. Through applied counterterrorism
steps including more robust security protocols and the use of HUMINT, officials and
analysts will have an infrastructure in place to respond to emergent and impending threats.
Although none of these suggestions will deter violent organizations, or the women who
participate in them, they will impact the ability of terrorist leaders to surprise officials and
analysts with an unanticipated terrorist actor and will ensure that states are better able to
handle this possible innovation in terrorist strategy.

Notes
1. Because the nature of Al Qaeda and its offshoots is unclear, this author prefers to utilize this
term to capture groups such as Al Qaeda led by Osama bin Laden and/or his successor(s) and Iraq’s
Al Qaeda. These types of organizations are interested in the projection of global Islamist influence
and control, as well as the replacement of their respective governments with an Islamic regime.
2. Overall, there have been more than 80,000 incidents of violence and/or disruption at United
States and Canadian clinics since 1977 including: 7 murders, 17 attempted murders, 41 bombings,
166 arsons, 82 failed bombings and/or arson attempts, 100 butryric acid attacks, 654 anthrax
threats, and 3 kidnappings (see “NAF Violence and Disruption Statistics: Incidents of Violence
& Disruption Against Abortion Providers in the US & Canada,” 2003, National Abortion Foundation
(30 September), available at (http://www.prochoice.org/Violence/Statistics/default.htm), accessed 10
December 2003, p.1).
 126 K. J. Cunningham

3. They include: Shelley Shannon, Betsy McDonald, Loretta Marra (Malvasi), Linda Wolfe, and
Mary Stachowicz. Criteria for inclusion on the list are somewhat questionable. For example, although
McDonald is best known as an avid supporter of James Kopp, who was convicted of murdering Dr.
Barnett Slepian of Amherst, New York in 1998, Stachowicz was the victim of a “homosexual hate
crime” because she was allegedly murdered by a homosexual man. Finally, Wolfe’s entry appears to
be mistaken and should refer to a woman named Brenda Phillips.
4. A post by “Dr. A. Jurievich” in February 2004 under the discussion “Chechen soldiers for
Kids” about female Chechen snipers included references to earlier female militancy of the legendary
“White Stockings” snipers (http://www.stormfront.org/forum/showthread.php?t=158429&page=
2&pp=10), accessed 22 November 2005.
5. See Cronin (2003), 12–14; Sprinzak (2000), 9; and Beyler (2003), 3, 7. For additional
information see “Female Separatist Rebel Captured in Southeastern Turkey,” 1998, BBC (15 August)
Lexis/Nexis accessed 31 January 2002, pp. 1–2; “Turkey: Female ‘Terrorist’ Reportedly Carries
Out Suicide Bombing,” 1998, BBC (24 December) Lexis/Nexis accessed 31 January 2002, pp. 1–2;
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“Suicide Bombings Increase in South,” 1985, Facts on File (16 August) Lexis/Nexis accessed 2
August 2002, pp. 1–2; and “Brazilian-Born Girl Carries Out Suicide Bombing, Report Says,” 1985,
The Associated Press (26 November) Lexis/Nexis accessed 2 August 2002, pp. 1–2.
6. See “Palestinian and Arab Women Political Prisoners,” n. d., Addameer Prisoners’
Support and Human Rights Association, Khalid Daromar, trans., available at (http://www.
addameer.org/women), accessed 3 June 2002, pp. 1–5; “Deteriorating Conditions of Pales-
tinian Female Prisoners Reach Dangerous Levels,” 2001, Mandela Institute for Human Rights
(30 September), available at (http://www.blythe.org), accessed 3 June 2002, pp. 1–3; “Palestinian
Female Political Prisoners and Detainees in Israeli Jails,” 2001, Democratic Palestine No.
98–99 (October), available at (http://www.democraticpalestine.net/article.php?article=7&issue=98),
accessed 3 June 2002, pp. 1–3; and “LAW Report: 11 Female Palestinian Detainees in Israel, Three
Under 15, Suffer Appalling . . .,” 2001, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs 20, 9 (December),
availabl at (http://www.britannica.com), accessed 3 June 2002, pp. 1–6.
7. This terminology was used in a discussion with a confidential counterterrorism source
in January 2004 describing official interpretation of female suicide bombing in Chechnya and
Palestine.

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