Paulmitan v. C.A.

215 SCRA 866

DOCTRINE: Even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the
other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. This is because under the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or
other disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the
partition of the thing owned in common.

FACTS:
Agatona Sagario Paulmitan, who died sometime in 1953, left the two parcels of land located in the Province of Negros
Occidental. From her marriage with Ciriaco Paulmitan, who is also now deceased, Agatona begot two legitimate children,
namely: Pascual Paulmitan, who also died in 1953, apparently shortly after his mother passed away, and Donato
Paulmitan, who is one of the petitioners. Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa is Donato's daughter while the third petitioner,
Rodolfo Fanes, is Juliana's husband. Pascual Paulmitan, the other son of Agatona Sagario, is survived by the
respondents, who are his children, name: Alicio, Elena, Abelino, Adelina, Anita, Baking and Anito, all surnamed Paulmitan.

Donato Paulmitan executed an Affidavit of Declaration of Heirship, extrajudicially adjudicating unto himself Lot No. 757
based on the claim that he is the only surviving heir of Agatona Sagario. As regards Lot No. 1091, Donato executed on
May 28, 1974 a Deed of Sale over the same in favor of petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, his daughter.

For non-payment of taxes, Lot No. 1091 was forfeited and sold at a public auction, with the Provincial Government of
Negros Occidental being the buyer. Juliana P. Fanesa redeemed the property. On learning of these transactions,
respondents children of the late Pascual Paulmitan filed on with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a
Complaint against petitioners to partition the properties plus damages.

Petitioners set up the defense of prescription with respect to Lot No. 757 contending that the Complaint was filed more
than eleven years after the issuance of a transfer certificate of title to Donato Paulmitan over the land as consequence of
the registration with the Register of Deeds, of Donato's affidavit extrajudicially adjudicating unto himself Lot No. 757. As
regards Lot No. 1091, petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa claimed in her Answer to the Complaint that she acquired exclusive
ownership thereof not only by means of a deed of sale executed in her favor by her father, petitioner Donato Paulmitan,
but also by way of redemption from the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental.

ISSUE:
1. W/N Donato and Pascual (through his heirs) are co-owners of the land.
2. W/N Juliana has acquired ownership of the property due to the same being forfeited and subsequently
redeemed.

HELD:
1st Issue: YES, they are co-owners.

When Agatona Sagario Paulmitan died intestate in 1952, her two (2) sons Donato and Pascual were still alive. From the
time of the death of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan to the subsequent passing away of her son Pascual in 1953, the estate
remained unpartitioned. Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides: "Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of
the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the deceased."
Donato and Pascual Paulmitan were, therefore, co-owners of the estate left by their mother as no partition was ever made.

When Pascual Paulmitan died intestate in 1953, his children, the respondents, succeeded him in the co-ownership of the
disputed property. Pascual Paulmitan's right of ownership over an undivided portion of the property passed on to his
children, who, from the time of Pascual's death, became co-owners with their uncle Donato over the disputed decedent
estate.
When Donato Paulmitan sold on May 28, 1974 Lot No. 1091 to his daughter Juliana P. Fanesa, he was only a co-owner
with respondents and as such, he could only sell that portion which may be allotted to him upon termination of the co-
ownership. The sale did not prejudice the rights of respondents to one half (1/2) undivided share of the land which they
inherited from their father. It did not vest ownership in the entire land with the buyer but transferred only the seller's pro-
indiviso share in the property 14 and consequently made the buyer a co-owner of the land until it is partitioned.

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto,
and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it and even substitute another person its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to
the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-
owners who did not consent to the sale. This is because under the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or other
disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the
partition of the thing owned in common.

From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire
property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the
co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.

2nd Issue: NO, she is only entitle to the spiritual share of Donato.

The redemption of the land made by Fanesa did not terminate the co-ownership nor give her title to the entire land subject
of the co-ownership.

The right of repurchase may be exercised by co-owner with respect to his share alone. While the records show that
petitioner redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses therefor, that did not make him the owner of all
of it. In other words, it did not put to end the existing state of co-ownership. There is no doubt that redemption of property
entails a necessary expense. Under the Civil Code:

Art. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners to contribute to the expenses of
preservation of the thing or right owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt himself from this
obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share of the expenses and taxes.
No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the co-ownership.

Although petitioner Fanesa did not acquire ownership over the entire lot by virtue of the redemption she made,
nevertheless, she did acquire the right to reimbursed for half of the redemption price she paid to the Provincial
Government of Negros Occidental on behalf of her co-owners. Until reimbursed, Fanesa hold a lien upon the subject
property for the amount due her.

Gesmundo, et.al., vs. CA
 321 SCRA 487


 Facts: Petitioner herein, filed on 4 March 1983 a complaint against the spouses Maximina Briz and Santiago Reyes and
the City Assessor of San Pablo City before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City for annulment of certain falsified

affidavits and tax declarations over a parcel

of land located at Brgy. Dolores, San Pablo City.
 Petitioners alleged that the aforementioned property was originally

declared in the name of their father Anastacio Gesmundo who died on 20 June 1974 and submitted in evidence Tax

Declarations. To substantiate their claim of ownership, they further claimed that Crispin Briz, uncle of respondent

Maximina Briz, was the administrator of their father, whereas Lucio Brion, cousin of respondents Brion, was subsequently

designated caretaker thereon. Still further, they asserted that on account of a series of record tampering in the City

Assessor's Office, Tax Declaration No. 11296 was cancelled.

Respondent Maximina Briz presented the same Tax Declaration number but declared in the name of her grandmother

Anastacia Gesmundo who died on 21 September 1909 leaving five (5) children. Her uncle Crispin Briz, who died in 1949,

was the administrator of the property. She inherited one-fifth (1/5) portion thereof from her father in 1940 and

subsequently acquired the rest by way of sale transactions. She paid the real estate taxes thereon from 1945 to 1991.

Respondents Brion asserted that their property is in the name of their grandfather Esteban Maranan, and when their

grandfather died, the property was transferred in the name of their mother Francisca Maranan who paid real estate taxes

thereon from 1972 to 1984 and upon the

death of their mother and of their father Gervacio Brion, respondents Brion possessed the property.

As to who of them possessed the subject property and gathering the fruits therefrom, the trial court conducted an ocular

inspection of the premises. As it turned out, the land being claimed by petitioners was located outside of the property, on

the west thereof, being claimed and possessed by respondent Briz and with visible natural boundaries separating the

properties.

The trial court rendered judgment declaring that respondent Maximina Briz are the lawful owners of the property with an

area of 7,091 square meters and respondents Rodrigo, Lope and Casimira Brion the lawful owners of the property with an

area of 11,094 square meters.

Issue: Who owns the property by presentation of evidence of Tax Declarations, Deed of Sale, and prescription

Ruling: The testimonial and documentary evidence of respondent Briz adequately establish that the 7,091-square meter

property formerly belonged to Anastacia Gesmundo, thereafter transferred to her children by inheritance until ownership

thereof was consolidated in respondent Maximina Briz both as a consequence of inheritance and by sale.
The name "Anastacio" in several tax declarations appears to be a typographical error by the City Assessor's Office, and

find plausible the explanation of respondent Briz that she understood "Anastacio" in subsequent tax declarations to be

Anastacia because she did not know Anastacio Gesmundo.

Respondent Briz has been in possession of the 7,091-square meter property since 1956 through Crispulo Exconde as

caretaker. Her possession was in the concept of owner. Her acts of harvesting coconuts

therefrom were manifest and visible to all. She possessed the property peacefully as she was never ousted therefrom nor

prevented from enjoying the fruits thereof. Her possession was uninterrupted and in good faith.

There is failure on petitioners to prove their ownership of the 7,091-square meter property, and they were uncertain as to

the identity thereof. A person who claims ownership of real property is duty bound to clearly identify the land being

claimed in accordance with the document on which he anchors his right of ownership.

Supreme Court did not sustain the ownership of respondents Brion since it relied merely on the tax declarations and tax

receipts in the name of their predecessors-in-interest. They were only able to prove their own possession which began in

1984 up to the time respondent Casimira testified on 25 May 1992, which is less than the requisite period of 10 years.

They failed to establish the possession of their predecessors-in-interest.

Garcia v. Court of Appeals
 G.R. No. 133140, August 10, 1999, 312 SCRA 180 Puno, J.

FACTS: Petitioner Atty. Pedro Garcia, with the consent of his wife Remedios Garcia, sold a parcel of land situated at Bel
Air II Village, Makati to his daughter Maria Luisa Magpayo and her husband Luisito Magpayo. The Magpayos mortgaged
the land to the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) to secure a loan. The Magpayos failed to pay their loan upon
its maturity, hence, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and at the public auction sale in which PBCom bought the
land. The redemption period of the foreclosed mortgage expired without the Magpayos redeeming the same, hence, title
over the land was consolidated in favor of PBCom.

PBCom subsequently filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession over the land with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati. The RTC granted the petition. Upon service of the writ of possession, Maria Luisa Magpayo’s brother,
Jose Ma. T. Garcia, who was in possession of the land, refused to honor it. Jose Garcia thereupon filed against PBCom,
the Magpayos, and the RTC Sheriff the instant suit for recovery of realty and damages wherein he contended, inter alia,
that at the time of the alleged sale to the Magpayo spouses, he was in possession of the property; that, when his mother
Remedios Tablan Garcia died, sometime in October, 1980, he became, by operation of law, a co-owner of the property;
and that, Atty. Pedro V. Garcia, at the time of the execution of the instrument in favor of the Magpayo spouses was not in
possession of the subject property.

21

ISSUE: Whether or not Jose Magpayo was a co-owner of the parcel of the land in dispute.

HELD: No. Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Ownership exists when a thing pertaining to one
person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others.
Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is the right to dispose of the thing by way of sale. Atty. Pedro
Garcia and his wife Remedios exercised their right to dispose of what they owned when they sold the subject property to
the Magpayo spouses. On the other hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right.
Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may be had in one
of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. “A possessor in the concept of an owner
may be the owner himself or one who claims to be so.” On the other hand, “one who possesses as a mere holder
acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong.” The
records show that petitioner Jose Garcia occupied the property not in the concept of an owner for his stay was merely
tolerated by his parents. An owner’s act of allowing another to occupy his house, rent-free does not create a permanent
and indefeasible right of possession in the latter’s favor. Consequently, it is of no moment that petitioner was in
possession of the property at the time of the sale to the Magpayo spouses. It was not a hindrance to a valid transfer of
ownership. All said, the Magpayo spouses were already the owners when they mortgaged the property to PBCom.

HEMEDES vs CA
316 SCRA 347

FACTS: Jose Hemedes executed a document entitled “Donation Inter Vivos With Resolutory Conditions” conveying
ownership a parcel of land, together with all its improvements, in favor of his third wife, Justa Kauapin, subject to the
resolutory condition that upon the latter’s death or remarriage, the title to the property donated shall revert to any of the
children, or heirs, of the DONOR expressly designated by the DONEE.
Pursuant to said condition, Justa Kausapin executed a “Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property by Reversion”
conveying to Maxima Hemedes the subject property.

Maxima Hemedes and her husband Raul Rodriguez constituted a real estate mortgage over the subject property in favor
of R & B Insurance to serve as security for a loan which they obtained.

R & B Insurance extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage since Maxima Hemedes failed to pay the loan even. The land
was sold at a public auction with R & B Insurance as the highest bidder. A new title was subsequently issued in favor the
R&B. The annotation of usufruct in favor of Justa Kausapin was maintained in the new title.

Despite the earlier conveyance of the subject land in favor of Maxima Hemedes, Justa Kausapin executed a “Kasunduan”
whereby she transferred the same land to her stepson Enrique D. Hemedes, pursuant to the resolutory condition in the
deed of donation executed in her favor by her late husband Jose Hemedes. Enrique D. Hemedes obtained two
declarations of real property, when the assessed value of the property was raised. Also, he has been paying the realty
taxes on the property from the time Justa Kausapin conveyed the property to him. In the cadastral survey, the property
was assigned in the name of Enrique Hemedes. Enrique Hemedes is also the named owner of the property in the records
of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform office at Calamba, Laguna.Enriques D. Hemedes sold the property to Dominium Realty
and Construction Corporation (Dominium).

Dominium leased the property to its sister corporation Asia Brewery, Inc. (Asia Brewery) who made constructions
therein. Upon learning of Asia Brewery’s constructions, R & B Insurance sent it a letter informing the former of its
ownership of the property. A conference was held between R & B Insurance and Asia Brewery but they failed to arrive at
an amicable settlement.

Maxima Hemedes also wrote a letter addressed to Asia Brewery asserting that she is the rightful owner of the subject
property and denying the execution of any real estate mortgage in favor of R&B.

Dominium and Enrique D. Hemedes filed a complaint with the CFI for the annulment of TCT issued in favor of R & B
Insurance and/or the reconveyance to Dominium of the subject property alleging that Dominion was the absolute owner of
the land.

The trial court ruled in favor of Dominium and Enrique Hemedes.

ISSUE: W/N the donation in favor of Enrique Hemedes was valid?

HELD: NO. Enrique D. Hemedes and his transferee, Dominium, did not acquire any rights over the subject
property. Justa Kausapin sought to transfer to her stepson exactly what she had earlier transferred to Maxima Hemedes
– the ownership of the subject property pursuant to the first condition stipulated in the deed of donation executed by her
husband. Thus, the donation in favor of Enrique D. Hemedes is null and void for the purported object thereof did not exist
at the time of the transfer, having already been transferred to his sister. Similarly, the sale of the subject property by
Enrique D. Hemedes to Dominium is also a nullity for the latter cannot acquire more rights than its predecessor-in-interest
and is definitely not an innocent purchaser for value since Enrique D. Hemedes did not present any certificate of title upon
which it relied.
The declarations of real property by Enrique D. Hemedes, his payment of realty taxes, and his being designated as owner
of the subject property in the cadastral survey of Cabuyao, Laguna and in the records of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform
office in Calamba, Laguna cannot defeat a certificate of title, which is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership
of the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. Particularly, with regard to tax declarations and tax
receipts, this Court has held on several occasions that the same do not by themselves conclusively prove title to land.