Arigo v.
Swift
Class Topic: Standing
G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014
FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/sep2014/gr_206510_2014.html
DECISION:
“The present petition under the Rules is not the proper remedy to assail the constitutionality of
its provisions. WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan
is hereby DENIED.”
FACTS:
PETITIONER: MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, Vicar Apostolic (bishop) of Puerto Princesa D.D. ;
- In 1988, Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by virtue of Proclamation No. 306 issued
by President Corazon C. Aquino on August 11, 1988. Located in the middle of Central Sulu Sea, 150
kilometers southeast of Puerto Princesa City, Tubbataha lies at the heart of the Coral Triangle, the
global center of marine biodiversity.
- In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) as a World Heritage Site. It was recognized as one of the Philippines' oldest
ecosystems, containing excellent examples of pristine reefs and a high diversity of marine life.
- On April 6, 2010, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067,3 otherwise known as the
"Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009" "to ensure the protection and conservation of
the globally significant economic, biological, sociocultural, educational and scientific values of the
Tubbataha Reefs into perpetuity for the enjoyment of present and future generations."
RESPONDENT: SWIFT in his capacity as Commander of the US. 7th Fleet, respondent
- WRIT OF KALIKASAN against violations of environmental laws and regulations in relation
to the grounding of the US military ship USS Guardian over the Tubbataha Reefs.
- Accused that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS
Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to
affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental,
Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events
violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.
- On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in
Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea,
the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs,
about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No cine was injured in the incident, and
there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
- On January 20, 2013, U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift, expressed
regret for the incident in a press statement.5 Likewise, US Ambassador to the
Philippines Harry K. Thomas, Jr., in a meeting at the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) on February 4, "reiterated his regrets over the grounding incident and assured
Foreign Affairs Secretazy Albert F. del Rosario that the United States will provide
appropriate compensation for damage to the reef caused by the ship."6
- By March 30, 2013, the US Navy-led salvage team had finished removing the last piece
of the grounded ship from the coral reef.
RATIO DECIDENDI: #immunity
1. He explained that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the
UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State
regarding passage through the latter's internal waters and the territorial sea.
1. In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although the said treaty upholds the
immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the.latter's territorial sea, the flag States shall be required
to leave the territorial '::;ea immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages
caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated for non-commercial purposes under Article 31
1. As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the
present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case
against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately
2. In any case, it is our considered view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VF A
to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of
a petition for a writ of Kalikasan. We also find it unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed
absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows
the recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed
instituted with the criminal action charging the same violation of an environmental law.
3. We agree with respondents (Philippine officials) in asserting that this petition has become moot in the sense that the salvage
operation sought to be enjoined or restrained had already been accomplised, xxxxx the completion of the removal of the USS Guardian
from the coral reef.
4. In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive Branch on the matter of compensation and rehabilitation measures
through diplomatic channels. Resolution of these issues impinges on our relations with another State in the context of common security
interests under the VFA. It is settled that "[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to
the executive and legislative-"the political" --departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of
this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision."
RATIO DECIDENDI: #standing
CITIZEN SUIT based on environmental concern OPOSA doctrine
1. In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,13 we recognized the "public right" of citizens
to "a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is
solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law." We declared that the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and
polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is
an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.1âwphi1 Such right
carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.14
2. The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it refers to minors and
generations yet unborn, is now enshrined in the Rules which allows the filing of a citizen suit in
environmental cases. The provision on citizen suits in the Rules "collapses the traditional rule on
personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature."16
Ocampo v. Enriquez LEFT
Class Topic: Standing
G.R. No. 225973 November 8, 2016
FULL TEXT: http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2016novemberdecisions.php?id=930
FACTS: Interment of the late Former President Ferdinand Marcos at LNMB
P ETI TI ONER: Saturnino Ocampo (online: President of Bayan Muna)
- Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition3 filed by Saturnino Ocampo and several others,4
in their capacities as human rights advocates or human rights violations victims as
defined under Section 3 (c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10368 (Human Rights Victims
Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013).
- RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, SR., RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, JR., RENE A.C. SAGUISAG III,
Intervenors.
RESP ONDENT: REAR ADM I RAL ERNESTO C. ENRI QUEZ (I N HI S CAP ACI TY AS THE
DEP UTY CHI EF OF STAFF FOR RESERVI ST AND RETI REE AFFAI RS, ARM ED FORCES OF
THE P HI LI P P I NES), THE GRAVE SERVI CES UNI T (P HI LI P P I NE ARM Y ), AND GENERAL
RI CARDO R. VI SAY A (I N HI S CAP ACI TY AS THE CHI EF OF STAFF, ARM ED FORCES OF
THE P HI LI P P I NES), DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFI N LORENZANA, AND HEI RS OF
FERDI NAND E. M ARCOS, REP RESENTED BY HI S SURVI VI NG SP OUSE I M ELDA
ROM UALDEZ M ARCOS, Respondents.
-
1. During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate Rodrigo R.
Duterte (Duterte) publicly announced that he would allow the burial of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani (LNMB). He won the May 9, 2016
election, garnering 16,601,997 votes. At noon of June 30, 2016, he formally assumed his office
at the Rizal Hall in the Malacañan Palace.
2. "On August 7, 2016, public respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana
issued a Memorandum to the public respondent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Subject: Interment of the late Former President Ferdinand
Marcos at LNMB Reference: Verbal Order of President Rodrigo Duterte on July 11, 2016. "
3. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition3 filed by Saturnino Ocampo and several others,4 in their
capacities as human rights advocates or human rights violations victims as defined under
Section 3 (c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10368 (Human Rights Victims Reparation and
Recognition Act of 2013).
ISSUES:
Procedural
1. Whether President Duterte's determination to have the remains of Marcos interred at the
LNMB poses a justiciable controversy.
2. Whether petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petitions.
3. Whether petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and
hierarchy of courts.
Substantive
1. Whether the respondents Secretary of National Defense and AFP Rear Admiral committed
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when they issued the
assailed memorandum and directive in compliance with the verbal order of President Duterte to
implement his election campaign promise to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB.
2. Whether the Issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and directive violate
the Constitution, domestic and international laws, particularly:
(a) Sections 2, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27 and 28 of Article II, Section 1 of Article III, Section 17 of
Article VII, Section 1 of Article XI, Section 3(2) of Article XIV, and Section 26 of Article XVIII of
the 1987 Constitution;
(b) R.A. No. 289; AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A NATIONAL PANTHEON
FOR PRESIDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL HEROES AND PATRIOTS OF THE COUNTRY
(c) R.A. No. 10368; Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013
(e) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
(f) The "Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law" of the United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly; and cralawlawlibrary
(g) The "Updated Set of Principles for Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action
to Combat Impunity" of the U.N. Economic and Social Council;
3. Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth from the Marcoses and
their cronies, and the pronouncements of the Court on the Marcos regime have nullified his
entitlement as a soldier and former President to interment at the LNMB.
4. Whether the Marcos family is deemed to have waived the burial of the remains of former
President Marcos at the LNMB after they entered into an agreement with the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines as to the conditions and procedures by which his remains shall be
brought back to and interred in the Philippines.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
1. In sum, there is no clear constitutional or legal basis to hold that there was a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which would justify the Court to interpose
its authority to check and override an act entrusted to the judgment of another branch. Truly,
the President's discretion is not totally unfettered. "Discretion is not a free spirited stallion that
runs and roams wherever it pleases but is reined in to keep it from straying. In its classic
formulation, 'discretion is not unconfined and vagrant' but 'canalized within banks that keep it
from overflowing.'"
1. At bar, President Duterte, through the public respondents, acted within the bounds of the law
and jurisprudence. Notwithstanding the call of human rights advocates, the Court must uphold
what is legal and just. And that is not to deny Marcos of his rightful place at the LNMB. For even
the Framers of our Constitution intend that full respect for human rights is available at any stage
of a person's development, from the time he or she becomes a person to the time he or she
leaves this earth.
2. Aside from being eligible for burial at the LNMB, Marcos possessed none of the
disqualifications stated in AFP Regulations G 161-375. He was neither convicted by final
judgment of the offense involving moral turpitude nor dishonorably
separated/reverted/discharged from active military service.
3. None of the disqualifications can apply to the late President Marcos. He had not been
dishonorably separated or discharged from military service, or convicted by final judgment of
any offense involving moral turpitude. The contention that he had been ousted from the
Presidency by the 1986 People Power revolution was not the same as being dishonorably
discharged because the discharge must be from the military service. In contrast, and at the risk
of being redundant, I remind that he had been a two-term President of the Philippines, a Medal
of Valor awardee, a veteran of World War II, a former Senator and Senate President, and a
former Congressman, by any of which he was qualified to have his remains be interred in the
LNMB.
RATIO DECIDENDI: LOCUS STANDI
1. Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds
are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.30 In this case, what is
essentially being assailed is the wisdom behind the decision of the President to proceed with the
interment of Marcos at the LNMB. As taxpayers, petitioners merely claim illegal disbursement of
public funds, without showing that Marcos is disqualified to be interred at the LNMB by either
express or implied provision of the Constitution, the laws or jurisprudence.
2. BAR MEMBERS: Petitioners Saguisag, et al., as members of the Bar, are required to allege
any direct or potential injury which the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as an institution, or its
members may suffer as a consequence of the act complained of.32 Suffice it to state that the
averments in their petition-in-intervention failed to disclose such injury, and that their interest in
this case is too general and shared by other groups, such that their duty to uphold the rule of
law, without more, is inadequate to clothe them with requisite legal standing.33chanrobleslaw
3. CITIZEN: As concerned citizens, petitioners are also required to substantiate that the issues
raised are of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount
public interest.34 In cases involving such issues, the imminence and clarity of the threat to
fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for prudence.35 In Marcos v.
Manglapus,36 the majority opinion observed that the subject controversy was of grave national
importance, and that the Court's decision would have a profound effect on the political,
economic, and other aspects of national life. The ponencia explained that the case was in a class
by itself, unique and could not create precedent because it involved a dictator forced out of
office and into exile after causing twenty years of political, economic and social havoc in the
country and who, within the short space of three years (from 1986), sought to return to the
Philippines to die. At this point in time, the interment of Marcos at a cemetery originally
established as a national military cemetery and declared a national shrine would have no
profound effect on the political, economic, and other aspects of our national life considering that
more than twenty-seven (27) years since his death and thirty (30) years after his ouster have
already passed. Significantly, petitioners failed to demonstrate a clear and imminent threat to
their fundamental constitutional rights.
3. LEGISLATOR’S SUIT: Apart from being concerned citizens and taxpayers, petitioners Senator
De Lima, and Congressman Lagman, et al.37 come before the Court as legislators suing to
defend the Constitution and to protect appropriated public funds from being used unlawfully. In
the absence of a clear showing of any direct injury to their person or the institution to which
they belong, their standing as members of the Congress cannot be upheld.38 They do not
specifically claim that the official actions complained of, i.e., the memorandum of the Secretary
of National Defense and the directive of the AFP Chief of Staff regarding the interment of Marcos
at the LNMB, encroach on their prerogatives as legislators.
DUENAS v. HRET LEFT  - Not  conceding  defeat,  private  respondent  filed  an  election  protest  ad  cautelam,...  He 
prayed  for  a  revision/recount  in  170[7]  of  the  732  precincts  in  the  2nd  legislative  district  of 
Class Topic: Standing (waley standing)  Taguig City so that the true and real mandate of the electorate may be ascertained. 
- he  alleged  that  he  was  cheated  in  the  protested  precincts  through  insidious  and 
G.R. No. 185401 July 21, 2009  well-orchestrated...  electoral  frauds  and  anomalies  which  resulted  in  the  systematic 
FULL TEXT: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_185401_2009.html 
reduction  of  his  votes  and  the  corresponding  increase  in  petitioner's  votes.[9]...  he  HRET 
 
ordered  that  all  ballot  boxes  and  other  election  materials  involved  in  the  protest  and 
DECISION:  
counter-protest be collected and retrieved, and brought to its offices for custody. 
“WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and Resolution No. 08-353 dated November 27, 2008 
- The  HRET  thereafter  directed  the  revision  of  ballots  starting  September  18,  2007.[13] 
of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal AFFIRMED.” 
Reception  of  evidence  of  the  contending  parties  followed  after  the  revision  of  ballots  in 
 
100% of the protested precincts and 25% pilot of the counter-protested precincts. 
 
- The  case  was  then  submitted  for  resolution  upon  submission  by  the  parties  of  their 
FACTS: (from lawyerly) 
memoranda. 
PETITIONER: HENRY "JUN" DUEÑAS, JR., Petitioner, [winner by 1457] 
- In  an  order  dated  September  25,  2008,  the  HRET  directed  the  continuation  of  the  revision 
- Petitioner  Henry  "Jun"  Dueñas,  Jr.  and  private  respondent  Angelito  "Jett"  P.  Reyes  were  rival 
and  appreciation  of  the  remaining  75%  of  the  counter-protested  precincts  pursuant  to  Rule 
candidates for the position of congressman in the 2nd legislative district of Taguig City.  
88  of  the  HRET  Rules,  "[i]t  appearing  that  the  [HRET]  cannot  determine  the  true  will  of  the... 
- After  the...  canvass  of  the  votes,  petitioner  was  PROCLAIMED  the  winner,  having  garnered 
electorate  from  the  initial  revision  and  appreciation  of  the  100%  protested  precincts  and 
28,564 votes[4] as opposed to private respondent's 27,107 votes.[5] 
25%  counter-protested  precincts  and  in  view  of  the  discovery  of  fake/spurious  ballots  in 
- Petitioner  submits  that  there  was  no  point  in  continuing  with  the  revision  of  the  remaining 
some of the protested and counter-protested precincts."[14] 
75%  of  the  counter-protested  precincts  because,  notwithstanding  the  revision  of  100%  of  the 
- It  was  the  HRET's  position  that  the  mere  filing  of  a  motion  to  withdraw/abandon  the 
protested  precincts  and  25%  of  the  counter-protested  precincts,  petitioner's  margin  over... 
unrevised  precincts  did  not  automatically  divest  the  HRET  of  its  jurisdiction  over  the  same.  the 
private respondent was still more than a thousand votes. 
HRET  insists  in  its  comment[30]  that  it  did  not  commit  any  grave  abuse  of  discretion.  It 
- HRET denied and continued the recount. 
contends  that  there  was  a  sufficient  and  legitimate  reason  to  proceed  with  the  revision  of 
- Petitioner  moved  for  reconsideration  but  the  HRET  denied  his  motion  in  an  order  dated 
the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts. 
October  21,  2008.  On  the  same  day,  the  HRET  issued  another  order  directing  petitioner  to 
- In  issuing  Resolution  No.  08-353  dated  November  27,  2008,  the  HRET  invoked  Rule  88  of  the 
augment  his  cash  deposit  in  the  amount  of  ₱320,000  to  cover  the  expenses  of  the  revision  of 
HRET  Rules  and  settled  jurisprudence,  ruling  that  it  had  the  discretion  either  to  dismiss  the 
ballots  in  the  remaining  75%  counter-protested  precincts  within  a  non-extendible  period  of 
protest  or  counter-protest,  or  to  continue  with  the  revision  if  necessitated  by  reasonable  and 
ten days from notice. 
sufficient grounds affecting the validity of the election. 
- Instead  of  complying  with  the  order,  petitioner  filed  an  urgent  motion  to  withdraw/abandon 
- The  HRET  also  points  out  that  the  withdrawal  of  the  revision  of  ballots  was  not  a  vested  right 
the  remaining  75%  counter-protested  precincts  on  October  27,  2008.18  This  was  denied  by 
of  any  party  but  must  give  way  to  the  higher  dictates  of  public  interest,  that  of  determining 
the  HRET  in  Resolution  No.  08-353  dated  November  27,  2008,  reiterating  its  order  directing  the 
the true choice of the people. 
continuation  of  the  revision  of  ballots  in  the  remaining  75%  counter-protested  precincts  and 
 
recalling  its  order  requiring  petitioner  to  augment  his  cash  deposit.  The  Tribunal  instead 
 
ordered  the  use  of  its  own  funds  for  the  revision  of  the  remaining  75%  counter-protested 
ISSUES: 
precincts. 
1.  The  core  issue  for  our  determination  is  whether  the  HRET  committed  grave  abuse  of  discretion, 
- Aggrieved  by  the  HRET’s  Resolution  No.  08-353  dated  November  27,  2008,  petitioner 
amounting  to  lack  or  excess  of  jurisdiction,  in  issuing  Resolution  No.  08-353  dated  November  27,  2008, 
elevated the matter to this Court. 
denying. 
 
 
 
RATIO DECIDENDI: 
RESPONDENT: HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and ANGELITO "JETT" P. REYES, 
1.  JUDICIAL  RESTRAINT:  We  base  our  decision  not  only  on  the  constitutional  authority  of  the  HRET  as 
Respondents. 
the  "sole  judge  of  all  contests  relating  to  the  election,  returns  and  qualifications"[36]  of  its  members 
- The  Court  should  exercise  judicial  restraint  as  it  resolves  the  two  interesting  issues  that 
but  also  on  the  limitation  of  the  Court's  power  of  judicial...  review.  so  long  as  the  Constitution  grants 
confront  it  in  this  petition:  first,  whether  the  House  of  Representatives  Electoral  Tribunal  (HRET) 
the  HRET  the  power  to  be  the  sole  judge  of  all  contests  relating  to  the  election,  returns  and 
committed  grave  abuse  of  discretion  when  it  denied  petitioner  Henry  "Jun"  Dueñas,  Jr.’s 
qualifications  of  members  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  any  final  action  taken  by  the  HRET  on  a 
motion to withdraw or abandon his remaining 75% counter-protested precincts  
matter  within  its  jurisdiction...  shall,  as  a  rule,  not  be  reviewed  by  this  Court  ....  the  power  granted  to 
- and  second,  whether  the  HRET  committed  grave  abuse  of  discretion  when  it  ordered  that  its 
the  Electoral  Tribunal  x  x  x  excludes  the  exercise  of  any  authority  on  the  part  of  this  Court  that  would 
own funds be used for the revision of the ballots from said 75% counter-protested precincts. 
in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same.[37] 
1.  Guided  by  this  basic  principle,  the  Court  will  neither  assume  a  power  that  belongs  exclusively  to 
the HRET nor substitute its own judgment for that of the Tribunal.  TAGUIG CITY
1.  POSSIBLE  EXCEPTION  FOR  JUDICIAL  RESTRAINT:  But  in  the  exercise...  of  its  checking  function,  the  (14th Congress (Filed 07/01/2007 - 06/30/2010))
Court  should  merely  test  whether  or  not  the  governmental  branch  or  agency  has  gone  beyond  the 
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or had a different view.[49] 
2.  SEPARATION  OF  POWERS:  The  Court  does  not  venture  into  the  perilous  area  of  trying  to  correct  Legislative Period Legislator District Period
perceived  errors  of  independent  branches  of  the  Government.  It  comes  in  only  when  it  has  to 
vindicate  a  denial  of  due  process  or  correct  an  abuse  of  discretion  so  grave  or  glaring  that  no...  less 
than  the  Constitution  calls  for  remedial  action.[41]  (emphasis  supplied)...  the  Constitution  mandates 
that  the  HRET  "shall  be  the  sole  judge  of  all  contests  relating  to  the  election,  returns  and  14th Congress of the Reyes, Angelito 2nd 2010-2
qualifications"[42]  of  its  members.  By  employing  the  word  "sole,"  the  Constitution  is  emphatic  that  the 
Republic District 010
jurisdiction  of  the  HRET  in  the  adjudication  of  election  contests  involving  its  members  is  exclusive  and 
exhaustive.[43] Its exercise of power is intended to be its own -- full, complete and unimpaired.[44]  Won election protest over Henry M. Dueñas
2.  SEPARATION  OF  POWERS:  Petitioner's  position  disregards,  or  at  least  waters  down,  Rules  7  and  88  of 
the  HRET  Rules.  If  the  Court  will  dictate  to  the  HRET  on  how  to  proceed  with  these  election  protest 
Jr.; oath of office was on 5/24/2010
proceedings,  the  Tribunal  will  no  longer  have  "exclusive  control,  direction  and  supervision  of  all... 
matters  pertaining  to  its  own  functions  and  operation."  It  will  constitute  an  intrusion  into  the  HRET's 
domain  and  a  curtailment  of  the  HRET's  power  to  act  of  its  own  accord  on  its  own  evaluation  of  the 
14th Congress of the Dueñas, Henry Jr. M. 2nd
evidentiary weight and effect of the result of the initial... revision. 
3.  HRET  JURISDICTION:  Furthermore,  the  HRET  could  use  its  available  funds  to  shoulder  the  cost  of  Republic District
revision  as  this  was  merely  an  incident  to  its  discretion  under  Rule  88  and  of  its  plenary  powers  under 
the  Constitution.  To  hold  otherwise  would  render  its  mandated  functions  meaningless  and  Served the House but lost election protest to
nugatory.29  Angelito Reyes on 5/24/2010
 

AFTER CASE FACT:   

In a statement, Angelito “Jett” P. Reyes said the tribunal declared him the winner by 
a slim margin of 37 votes and ordered his rival, incumbent Taguig (2nd District) Rep. 
2nd legislative district of Taguig City for the 2007-2010 congressional term.
Henry M. Dueñas Jr., to vacate his post. 
 
PETITIONER: DUENAS and RESPONDENT REYES rival candidates
The younger Reyes said he would “use every minute of every day left in his term to 
immediately put into motion his legislative agenda” even though the 14th Congress 
has already adjourned and would not open until after the May 10 elections. 
 
However, House Speaker Prospero Nograles has yet to clarify whether the HRET 
decision was final and executory or if Dueñas has filed or would file a motion for 
reconsideration. 
 
 
 
KALIPUNAN NG DAMAY ANG MAHIBIRAP, INC v. ROBREDO LEFT 2. W/N the petitioners met the essential requisites for judicial review
3. W/N there is proof of grave abuse of discretion?
Class Topic: Standing 4. W/N the requisites for a grave abuse of discretion is met

G.R. No. 200903 July 22, 2014 RATIO DECIDENDI:

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/jul2014/gr_200903_2014.html
DECISION:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the petition for its serious procedural
defects. No costs.”
FACTS:
P ETI TI ONER : KALIPUNAN NG DAMAY ANG MAHIHIRAP, INC., represented by its
Vice-President, CARLITO BADION, CORAZON DE JESUS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
represented by its President, ARNOLD REPIQUE, FERNANDO SEVILLA as President of
Samahang Pamata sa Kapatirang Kr.istiyano, ESTRELIETA BAGASBAS, JOCY LOPEZ,
ELVIRA VIDOL, and DELIA FRA YRES, Petitioners,
1. This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus to enjoin the public respondents from evicting
the individual petitioners as well as the petitioner associations’ members from their dwellings in
the cities of San Juan, Navotas and Quezon without any court order, and to compel the
respondents to afford them judicial process prior to evictions and demolitions.
2. The petition primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 28 (a) and (b) of Republic
Act No. 7279 (RA 7279), otherwise known as Urban Development Housing Act which authorizes
evictions and demolitions under certain circumstances without any court order.
1. We dismiss the petition. The petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts when they
directly filed the petition before the Court. The petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy
of courts by coming directly to the Court withtheir petition for prohibition and mandamus. The
petitioners appear to have forgotten that the Supreme Court is a court of last resort, not a court
offirst instance.
2. The resolution of the constitutionality of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 is not the lis mota
of the case. Even if we treat the present petition as one for certiorari since it assails the
constitutionality of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279, the petition must necessarily fail for
failure to show the essential requisites that would warrant the Court’s exercise of judicial review.
3. Lastly, the petitioners failed to substantiate their allegations that the public respondents
gravely abused their discretion in implementing Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279. Instead,
theymerely imputed jurisdictional abuse to the public respondents through general averments in
their pleading, but without any basis to support their claim.
4. Since the petitioners failed to establish that the public respondents' alleged abuse of
discretion was so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, this petition must necessarily fail.

RESP ONDENT : JESSIE ROBREDO, in his capacity as Secretary, Department of Interior

and Local Government, Hon. GUIA GOMEZ, in her capacity as MAYOR OF THE CITY. OF
SAN JUAN, Hon. HERBERT BAUTISTA, in his capacity as the MAYOR OF QUEZON CITY,
Hon. JOHN REY TIANGCO, in his capacity as MAYOR OF NAVOTAS CITY, and the
GENERAL MANAGER of the NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, Respondents.
1. On March 23, 2012, the petitioners directly filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus
before the Court, seeking to compel the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, et al. (the
public respondents) to first secure an eviction and/or demolition order from the court prior to
their implementation of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279.
2. These LGUs sent the petitioners notices of eviction and demolition pursuant to Section 28 (a)
and (b) of RA 7279 in order to give way to the implementation and construction of infrastructure
projects2 in the areas illegally occupied by the petitioners.
2. Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 authorize evictions and demolitions without any court order
when:
(1) persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage
dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads,
parks, and playgrounds; and
(2) persons or entities occupy areas where government infrastructure projects with
available funding are about to be implemented.

ISSUES:
1. W/N the petitioners violated the hierarchy of courts
ASSOCIATION OF FLOOD VICTIMS v. COMELEC LEFT RATIO DECIDENDI:
1. [ASSOCIATION OF FLOOD VICTIMS] We dismiss the petition. Petitioners do not have legal
Class Topic: Standing, non-person not allowed to file a suit capacity to sue. Petitioner Association of Flood Victims is an unincorporated association not
endowed with a distinct personality of its own. An unincorporated association, in the absence of
G.R. No. 203775, August 05, 2014 an enabling law, has no juridical personality and thus, cannot sue in the name of the
FULL TEXT: http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2014augustdecisions.php?id=609
association.
2. [JAIME AGUILAR HERNANDEZ] Since petitioner Association of Flood Victims has no legal
DECISION:
capacity to sue, petitioner Hernandez, who is filing this petition as a representative of the
“In view of our holding that petitioners do not have legal capacity to sue and have no standing
Association of Flood Victims, is likewise devoid of legal personality to bring an action in court.
to file the present petition, we shall no longer discuss the issues raised in this petition.
Neither can petitioner Hernandez sue as a taxpayer because he failed to show that there was
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.”
illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation10 or that public funds are wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
3. Besides, petitioners have no locus standi or legal standing. Locus standi or legal standing is
FACTS:
defined as: personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has
P ETI TI ONER : ASSOCIATION OF FLOOD VICTIMS AND JAIME AGUILAR HERNANDEZ,
sustained or will sustain a direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
Petitioners,
being challenged. The term “interest” means a material interest, an interest in issue affected
1. This is a Petition for Certiorari and/or Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
assailing the Minute Resolution No. 12-0859 dated 2 October 2012 of the Commission on
interest. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in
Elections (COMELEC).
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
2. In their petition, it is stated that petitioner Association of Flood Victims “is a non-profit and presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
non-partisan organization in the process of formal incorporation, the primary purpose of which questions.
is for the benefit of the common or general interest of many flood victims who are so numerous 4. In this case, petitioners failed to allege personal or substantial interest in the questioned
that it is impracticable to join all as parties,” and that petitioner Hernandez “is a Tax Payer and governmental act which is the issuance of COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 12-0859, which
confirmed the re-computation of the allocation of seats of the Party-List System of
the Lead Convenor of the Association of Flood Victims.”3 Clearly, petitioner Association of Flood
Representation in the House of Representatives in the 10 May 2010 Automated National and
Victims, which is still in the process of incorporation, cannot be considered a juridical person or Local Elections. Petitioner Association of Flood Victims is not even a party-list candidate in
an entity authorized by law, which can be a party to a civil action.4cralawred the 10 May 2010 elections, and thus, could not have been directly affected by COMELEC
Minute Resolution No. 12-0859.
RESP ONDENT : COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ALAY BUHAY COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
FOUNDATION, INC., AND WESLIE TING GATCHALIAN,, Respondents.
1. The COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 12-0859, among others, (1) confirmed the
re-computation of the allocation of seats of the Party-List System of Representation in the House
of Representatives in the 10 May 2010 automated national and local elections,
2. (2) proclaimed Alay Buhay Community Development Foundation, Inc. (Alay-Buhay) Party-List
as a winning party-list group in the 10 May 2010 elections, and
3. (3) declared the first nominee [Weslie T. Gatchalian] of Alay Buhay Party-List as its Party-List
Representative in the House of Representatives.

ISSUES:
1. W/N an unincorporated association has legal capacity to sue
2. W/N Jaime Hernandez has legal standing as a taxpayer at least
3. W/N petitioner has locus standi in its definitive sense
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TANON
STRAIT v. REYES LEFT
Class Topic: Standing; exception to disallowance of a non-person suit?
G.R. No. 180771 April 21, 2015
FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/apr2015/gr_180771_2015.html
"Until one has loved an animal, a part of one 's soul remains unawakened."
- Anatole France
DECISION:
“BLANK”
FACTS:
- Cetacea is an infraorder that comprises the 89 species of whales, dolphins, and porpoises. It is
divided into toothed whales (Odontoceti) and baleen whales (Mysticeti), which diverged from
each other some time in the Eocene 26 to 17 million years ago (mya).
P ETI TI ONER : RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON
STRAIT, e.g., TOOTHED WHALES, DOLPHINS, PORPOISES, AND OTHER CETACEAN
SPECIES, Joined in and Represented herein by Human Beings Gloria Estenzo Ramos
and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio, In Their Capacity as Legal Guardians of the Lesser
Life-Forms and as Responsible Stewards of God's Creations, Petitioners,
1. The first petition was brought on behalf of resident marine mammals in the Tañon Strait by
two individuals acting as legal guardians and stewards of the marine mammals.
2. The second petition was filed by a non-governmental organization representing the interests
of fisherfolk, along with individual representatives from fishing communities impacted by the oil
exploration activities.
3. The petitioners filed their cases in 2007, shortly after JAPEX began drilling in the strait. In
2008, JAPEX and the government of the Philippines mutually terminated the service contract and
oil exploration activities ceased. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases for the purpose of
review.
4. It had been suggested by animal rights advocates and environmentalists that not only natural
and juridical persons should be given legal standing because of the difficulty for persons, who
cannot show that they by themselves are real parties-in-interests, to bring actions in
representation of these animals or inanimate objects. For this reason, many environmental
cases have been dismissed for failure of the petitioner to show that he/she would be directly
injured or affected by the outcome of the case.
RESP ONDENT : SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Energy (DOE), SECRETARY JOSE L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA, DENR Regional Director-Region VII and in his capacity as
Chairperson of the Tañon Strait Protected Seascape Management Board, Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), DIRECTOR MALCOLM J. SARMIENTO, JR.,
BFAR Regional Director for Region VII ANDRES M. BOJOS, JAPAN PETROLEUM
EXPLORATION CO., LTD. (JAPEX), as represented by its Philippine Agent, SUPPLY
OILFIELD SERVICES, INC. Respondents.
3. Two sets of petitioners filed separate cases challenging the legality of Service Contract No. 46
(SC-46) awarded to Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. (JAPEX). The service contract allowed
JAPEX to conduct oil exploration in the Tañon Strait during which it performed seismic surveys
and drilled one exploration well.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the case is already moot because the service contract had been terminated.
2. W/N, relative to the simplification of procedures and facilitating court access in environmental
cases from Oposa doctrine allowing to sue for the future generations, legal standing be also
extended beyond natural and juridical persons, that is, marine mammals.
3. W/N SC-46 service contract is constitutional
4. Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards also aver that this Court may lower the
benchmark in locus standi as an exercise of epistolary jurisdiction.44 In opposition, public
respondents argue that the Resident Marine Mammals have no standing because Section 1, Rule
3 of the Rules of Court requires parties to an action to be either natural or juridical persons, viz.:
RATIO DECIDENDI:
1. At the outset, this Court makes clear that the "'moot and academic principle' is not a magical
formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case." In this case, despite the
termination of SC-46, this Court deems it necessary to resolve these consolidated petitions as
almost all of the foregoing exceptions are present in this case. Both petitioners allege that SC-46
is violative of the Constitution, the environmental and livelihood issues raised undoubtedly affect
the public's interest, and the respondents' contested actions are capable of repetition.
2. In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has
been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a
suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as
real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species. The
Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible
violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore
declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition. [Resolved instead by A.M. No.
09-6-8-SC - SEC. 5. Citizen suit not by allowing non-person to sue]
3. The Court then held that while SC-46 was authorized Presidential Decree No. 87 on oil
extraction, the contract did not fulfill two additional constitutional requirements. Section 2 Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution requires a service contract for oil exploration and extraction to be
signed by the president and reported to congress. Because the JAPEX contract was executed
solely by the Energy Secretary, and not reported to the Philippine congress, the Court held that
it was unconstitutional. Id., pp. 24-25.
3. In addition, the Court also ruled that the contract violated the National Integrated Protected
Areas System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act), which generally prohibits exploitation of natural
resources in protected areas. In order to explore for resources in a protected area, the
exploration must be performed in accordance with an environmental impact assessment (EIA).
The Court noted that JAPEX started the seismic surveys before any EIA was performed;
therefore its activity was unlawful. Id., pp. 33-34.
3. Furthermore, the Tanon Strait is a NIPAS area, and exploration and utilization of energy
resources can only be authorized through a law passed by the Philippine Congress. Because
Congress had not specifically authorized the activity in Tañon Strait, the Court declared that no
energy exploration should be permitted in that area. Id., p. 34.
4. However, in our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more
liberalized approach. While developments in Philippine legal theory and jurisprudence have not
progressed as far as Justice Douglas's paradigm of legal standing for inanimate objects, the
current trend moves towards simplification of procedures and facilitating court access in
environmental cases.
4. Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases [A.M.
No. 09-6-8-SC - SEC. 5. Citizen suit.], which allow for a "citizen suit," and permit any Filipino
citizen (as stewards of nature) to file an action before our courts for violations of our
environmental laws:
4. Citizen suit. To further encourage the protection of the environment, the Rules enable
litigants enforcing environmental rights to file their cases as citizen suits. This provision
liberalizes standing for all cases filed enforcing environmental laws and collapses the
traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards
of nature. The terminology of the text reflects the doctrine first enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran,
insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn.