STATCON

Socorro Ramirez vs C.A.

On Legislative Intent
Where the law does not distinguish, do not distinguish

First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where
the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its
express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation
would be either impossible 11 or absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or
cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-
talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether
the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different
from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all
persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier
"any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a
(person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another
without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of
R.A. 4200.

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-
quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view
held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the
private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The
substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200
penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private
communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that
an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape
recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the
Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in
the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of
the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed." 14

Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of

R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the
word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the
latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process
by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common
system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)"

GMCR vs NLRC

Verba legis non est recendendum- from the words of a statute there should be no
departure

Index animi Sermo est- speech is the index of intention

In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private respondent. In the first place the
wording of the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement. . . . and to his full
backwages. . . ." 25 Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clears
plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the
maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid
presumption that the words employed by, the legislature in a statute correctly express its
intent or will and preclude the court from construing it differently. 26 The legislature is
presumed to know the meaning of the words, to:have used words advisedly, and to have
expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute.27 Verba legis
non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure. Neither
does the provision admit of any qualification. If in the wisdom of the Court, there may be
a ground or grounds for non-application of the above-cited provision, this should be by
way of exception, such as when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing
strained relations between the employer and the employee.

JMM Promotions vs NLRC

Every part thereof be given effect

Ut res magis valeat quam pereat-

That the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed.

The sole issue submitted in this case is the validity of the order of respondent National
Labor Relations Commission dated October 30, 1992, dismissing the petitioner's appeal
from a decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration on the ground of
failure to post the required appeal bond.1

It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in

this case), care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory
that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting
provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. 2 Under the petitioner's interpretation, the
appeal bond required by Section 6 of the aforementioned POEA Rule should be
disregarded because of the earlier bonds and escrow money it has posted. The petitioner
would in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but we do not see any such redundancy;
on the contrary, we find that Section 6 complements Section 4 and Section 17. The rule
is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be
avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled
whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.

Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary obligations of the overseas recruiter
prescribed in Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules and the escrow agreement
under Section 17 of the same Rule, it is necessary to post the appeal bond required under
Section 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules, as a condition for perfecting an appeal
from a decision of the POEA.

Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in favor of the working class,
conformably to the mandate of the Constitution. By sustaining rather than annulling the
appeal bond as a further protection to the claimant employee, this Court affirms once
again its commitment to the interest of labor.

De Guia vs COMELEC

No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless, much less inutile.

Purpose of the Law- construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the
evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction
as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits
intended.

No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless, much less inutile.

We must therefore, as far as we can, define its meaning, its significance, its reason for
being. As it has oft been held, the key to open the door to what the legislature intended
which is vaguely expressed in the language of a statute is its purpose or the reason
which induced it to enact the statute. If the statute needs construction, as it does
in the present case, the most dominant in that process is the purpose of the act. Statutes
should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or
mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will
advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended .
A construction should be rejected that gives to the language used in a statute a meaning
that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted, and that tends
to defeat the ends which are sought to be attained by the enactment.

The reason for the Promulgation of R.A. 7166 is shown in the explanatory note of Senate
Bill No. 1861 which states in part:
"This bill proposes to set the national and local elections for May 11, 1992, and provide
for the necessary implementing details. It also endorses reforms and measures to ensure
the conduct of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. Specifically, it seeks
to: (1) Reduce the number of positions to be voted for by providing therein that the
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang
Bayan be elected not at large, but by district . . .

PP Vs. MANANTAN

casus omisus pro omisso habendus est- situation omitted from or not provided
for by statute or regulation and therefore governed by the common law.

The maxim "casus omisus" can operate and apply only if and when the
omission has been clearly established

Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the peace is not comprehended among the
officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. He submits the aforecited
section was taken from Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, which provided
the following:

SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. — No judge of the First
Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and
no officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee
 of the classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any
manner in any election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to
vote.

The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-
appellee. Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration
must be held to have been omitted intentionally. If that rule is applicable to the present,
then indeed, justices of the peace must be held to have been intentionally and deliberately
exempted from the operation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.

The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim "casus omisus" can operate
and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. In the case under
consideration, it has already been shown that the legislature did not exclude
or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from
engaging in partisan political activities. Rather, they were merely called by
another term. In the new law, or Section 54 of the Revised Election Code,
justices of the peace were just called "judges."

In insisting on the application of the rule of "casus omisus" to this case, defendant-
appellee cites authorities to the effect that the said rule, being restrictive in nature, has
more particular application to statutes that should be strictly construed. It is pointed out
that Section 54 must be strictly construed against the government since proceedings
under it are criminal in nature and the jurisprudence is settled that penal statutes should
be strictly interpreted against the state.

Amplifying on the above argument regarding strict interpretation of penal statutes,

defendant asserts that the spirit of fair play and due process demand such strict
construction in order to give "fair warning of what the law intends to do, if a certain line
is passed, in language that the common world will understand." (Justice Holmes, in
McBoyle v. U.S., 283 U.S. 25, L. Ed. 816).

The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed from the mere
fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty
that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative
enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons already mentioned, there has been
no such omission. There has only been a substitution of terms.

Tuason vs. Mariano

stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb
what has been settled)

Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litium- It is to the interest of the state that
there be a limit to litigation."

The ruling in the Benin, Alcantara and Pili cases was applied in Mara, Inc. vs. Estrella, L-
40511, July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 471. That ruling is simply a reiteration or confirmation of
the holding in the following cases directly or incidentally sustaining OCT No. 735: Bank
of the P. I. vs. Acuña, 59 Phil. 183; Tiburcio vs. PHHC, 106 Phil. 447; Galvez and Tiburcio
vs. Tuason y de la Paz, 119 Phil. 612; Alcantara vs. Tuason, 92 Phil. 796; Santiago vs. J.
M. Tuason & Co., Inc. 110 Phil. 16; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Bolaños, 95 Phil. 106; J.
M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Santiago, 99 Phil. 615; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. De Guzman,
99 Phil. 281; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Aguirre, 117 Phil. 110; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
vs. Macalindong, 116 Phil. 1227; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Magdangal, 114 Phil.
42; Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, L-30889, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 503,
and People's Homesite and Housing Corporation vs. Mencias, L-24114, August 16, 1967,
20 SCRA 1031.

Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past
precedents and do not disturb what has been settled) it becomes evident that
respondents Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their action in Civil Case No. 8943
without eroding the long settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no
longer open to attack.

It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated again
and again, consuming the court's time and energies at the expense of other
litigants: Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litium." (Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, supra).

Philippine British Assurance Co. Inc. vs HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT; SYCWIN COATING & WIRES, INC., and DOMINADOR
CACPAL, CHIEF DEPUTY SHERRIF OF MANILA,

Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguere debemos- It is well recognized rule
that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.

The rule, founded on logic, is a corollary of the principle that general words and phrases
in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance. 14 The
rule requires that a general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one part
distinguished from the other so as to justify its exclusion from the operation of the
law. 15 In other words, there should be no distinction in the application of a statute
where none is indicated.16 For courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law
makes no distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think it ought
to be but as they find it and without regard to consequences. 17

This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Resolution dated September 12, 1985 of
the Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. CR-05409 1 granting private
respondent's motion for execution pending appeal and ordering the issuance of the
corresponding writ of execution on the counterbond to lift attachment filed by petitioner.
The focal issue that emerges is whether an order of execution pending appeal of a
judgment maybe enforced on the said bond. In the Resolution of September 25,
1985 2 this Court as prayed for, without necessarily giving due course to the petition,
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing the order
complaint of.

The records disclose that private respondent Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc., filed a
complaint for collection of a sum of money against Varian Industrial Corporation before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. During the pendency of the suit, private
respondent succeeded in attaching some of the properties of Varian Industrial
Corporation upon the posting of a supersedeas bond. 3 The latter in turn posted a
counterbond in the sum of P1,400, 000.00 4 thru petitioner Philippine British Assurance
Co., Inc., so the attached properties were released.

It is well recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguere debemos. 13 "The rule, founded
on logic, is a corollary of the principle that general words and phrases in a statute should
ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance. 14 The rule requires that a
general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one part distinguished from
the other so as to justify its exclusion from the operation of the law. 15 In other words,
there should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is
indicated.16 For courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law makes no
distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think it ought to be but
as they find it and without regard to consequences. 17

A corollary of the principle is the rule that where the law does not make any exception,
courts may not except something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason apparent
in the law to justify it.18 Thus where a statute grants a person against whom possession
of "any land" is unlawfully withheld the right to bring an action for unlawful detainer, this
Court held that the phrase "any land" includes all kinds of land, whether agricultural,
residential, or mineral.19 Since the law in this case does not make any distinction nor
intended to make any exception, when it speaks of "any judgment" which maybe charged
against the counterbond, it should be interpreted to refer not only to a final and executory
judgment in the case but also a judgment pending appeal.

All that is required is that the conditions provided for by law are complied with, as outlined
in the case of Towers Assurance Corporation v. Ororama Supermart, 20

Under Section 17, in order that the judgment creditor might recover from
the surety on the counterbond, it is necessary (1) that the execution be first
issued against the principal debtor and that such execution was returned
unsatisfied in whole or in part; (2) that the creditor make a demand upon
the surety for the satisfaction of the judgment, and (3) that the surety be
given notice and a summary hearing on the same action as to his liability
for the judgment under his counterbond.

The rule therefore, is that the counterbond to lift attachment that is issued in accordance
with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 57, of the Rules of Court, shall be charged with the
payment of any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. It covers not only a final and
executory judgement but also the execution of a judgment pending appea