BELLIS v BELLIS
GR L-23678
FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the
State of Texas and of the United States."
By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he
divorced, he had five legitimate children:
1. Edward A. Bellis,
2. George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in
infancy),
3. Henry A. Bellis,
4. Alexander Bellis and
5. Anna Bellis Allsman;
By his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived
him, he had three legitimate children:
1. Edwin G. Bellis.
2. Walter S. Bellis and
3. Dorothy Bellis; and
finally, he had three illegitimate children:
1. Amos Bellis, Jr.,
2. Maria Cristina Bellis and
3. Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will
in the Philippines, in which he directed that after
all taxes, obligations, and expenses of
administration are paid f or, his distributable
estate should be divided, in trust, in the following
order and manner:
a. $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E.
Mallen;
b. P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate
children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, or
P40,000.00 each and
c. after the foregoing two items have been
satisfied, the remainder shall go to his
seven surviving children by his first and
second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis,
Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis, and Anna
Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S.
Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal
shares.
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis
died, a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His
will was admitted to probate in the Court of First
Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as
executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein
including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form
of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the
three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis,
various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in
satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of
P120,000.00.
In the project of partition, the executor—pursuant
to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will
and Testament—divided the residuary estate into
seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's
seven legitimate children by his first and second
marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions to the project of partition on the
ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as
illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory
heirs of the deceased.
The lower court issued an order overruling the
oppositions and approving the executor's final
account, report and administration and project of
partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it
applied the national law of the decedent, which in
this case is Texas law, which did not provide for
legitimes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law on legitimes
applies in the case at bar.
RULING: NO.
The doctrine of renvoi is usually pertinent where
the decedent is a national of one country and is
domiciled in another. It does not apply to a case
where the decedent was a citizen of Texas and was
domiciled therein at the time of his death. So that,
even assuming that Texas has a conflicts rule
providing that the domiciliary law should govern
successional rights, the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but it
would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas
has a conflicts rule, adopting the rule of lex rei
sitae, which calls for the application of the law of
the place where the properties are
situated, renvoi would arise, where the properties
involved are found in the Philippines.
In the absence of proof as to the conflicts rule of
Texas, it would be presumed to be the same as our
local conflicts rule.
The decedent's national law governs the order of
succession, the amount of successional rights, the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and
capacity to succeed.
Appellants' argue that their case falls under the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
However, the third paragraph of article 17 of the
New Civil Code is not an exception to the second
paragraph of article 16. Precisely, Congress deleted
the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this
and the next preceding article," when it
incorporated article 11 of the old Civil Code as
article 17, while reproducing without substantial
change the second paragraph of article 10 of the
old Civil Code, as article 16. The legislative intent
must have been to make the second paragraph of
article 176 a specific provision in itself which must
be applied in testate and intestate succession. As a
further indication of this legislative intent,
Congress added a new provision, under article
1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is
governed by the decedent's national law,
Whatever public policy and good customs may be
involved in our system of legitimes, Congres has
not intended to extend the same to the succession
of foreign nationals. It has specifically chosen the
decedent's national law to govern, inter alia, the
amount of successional rights. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones.
A provision in a foreigner's will that his properties
should be distributed in accordance with
Philippine law and not in accordance with his
national law is void, being contrary to article 16 of
the New Civil Code.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G.
Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A.,
and that under the laws of Texas, there are no
forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the
intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the
amount of successional rights are to be determined
under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes
cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF
EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN
GR L-16749
FACTS:
It is in accordance with the provisions of the will of
the decedent, the executor in his final account and
project of partition ratified the payment of only
P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed
that the residue of the estate be transferred to his
daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of
partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia,
insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as
an acknowledged natural child. The legal grounds
of opposition are:
a) that the distribution should be governed by
the laws of the Philippines, and
b) that said order of distribution is contrary
thereto insofar as it denies to Helen
Christensen, one of two acknowledged
natural children, one-half of the estate in
full ownership.
It was alleged that the law that should govern the
estate of the deceased Christensen should not be
the internal law of California alone, but the entire
law thereof because several foreign elements are
involved, that the forum is the Philippines and
even if the case were decided in California, Section
946 of the California Civil Code, which requires
that the domicile of the decedent should apply,
should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria
Helen Christensen having been declared an
acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is
deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of
her birth.
The trial court ruled that as Edward E.
Christensen was a citizen of the United States and
of the State of California at the time of his death,
the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the
provisions in his will are to be governed by the law
of California.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Philippine Laws apply.
RULING: YES.
The citizenship that the deceased acquired in
California when he resided there from 1904 to
1913 was never lost by his stay in the Philippines,
for the latter was a territory of the United States
until 1946, and the deceased appears to have
considered himself as a citizen of California by the
fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he
declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that
he appears never to have intended to abandon his
California citizenship by acquiring another.
The “national law” indicated in Article 16 of the
Civil Code cannot possibly apply to any general
American Law, because there is no such law
governing the validity of testamentary provisions in
the United States, each state of the union having
its own private law applicable to its citizens only
and in force only within the state. It can therefore
refer to no other than the private law of the state of
which the decedent was a citizen. In the case at
bar, the State of California prescribes two sets of
laws for its citizens, an internal law for its citizens
residing therein and a conflict of law rules for its
citizens domiciled in other jurisdictions. Hence,
reason demands that the California conflict of law
rules should be applied in this jurisdiction in the
case at bar.
An American citizen who was born in New York,
migrated to California, resided there for nine years,
came to the Philippines in 1913, and very rarely re-
turned to California and only for short visits, and
who appears to have never owned or acquired a
home or properties in that state, shall be
considered to have his domicile in the Philippines.

The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the

domicile in the determination of matters with
foreign element involved is in accord with the
general principle of American law that the
domiciliary law should govern in most matters or
rights which follow the person of the owner.

The conflict of law rule in California, Article 946

Civil Code, refers back the case, when a decedent
is not domiciled in California, to the law of his
domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The
court of domicile cannot and should not refer the
case back to California, as such action would leave
the issue incapable of determination, because the
case will then be tossed back and forth between
the two states. If the question has to be decided,
the Philippine court must apply its own law as the
Philippines was the domicile of the decedent, as
directed in the conflict of law rule of the state of
the decedent, California, and especially because
the internal law of California provides no legitime
for natural children, while the Philippine law
(Articles 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the
Philippines makes natural children legally
acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recog-
nizing them).

As the domicile of the deceased, who was a

citizen of California, was the Philippines, the
validity of the provisions of his will depriving
his acknowledged natural child of the latter’s
legacy, should be governed by the Philippine
law, pursuant to Article 946 of the Civil Code of
California, not by the internal law of California.