HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PH VS MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA

FACTS:

On December 31, 1963, the Mayor and the Municipal Board of the City of Manila passed
Municipal Ordinance No. 4841, to take effect on January 1, 1964, declaring a state of
emergency in view of the prevailing scarcity of lands and buildings for residential purposes in
the City of Manila which shall provide housing accommodations especially for the poor at
reasonable rates. An action was brought by the Homeowners' Association of the Philippines,
Inc. and its President, Vicente A. Rufino, to nullify Municipal Ordinance No. 4841 of the City of
Manila.

ISSUE

WON MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE NO. 4841 IS CONSTITUTIONAL

RULING:

NO, IT IS NOT CONSTITUTIONAL. The COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE struck down the
questioned ordinance upon the ground that the power to "declare a state of emergency . . .
exclusively pertains to Congress"; that "there is no longer any state of emergency" which may
justify the regulation of house rentals; that said ordinance "constitutes an unreasonable and
unjustified limitation on the use of private properties and arbitrarily encroaches on the
constitutional rights of property owners"; that the power of the City of Manila to "regulate the
business of . . . letting or subletting of lands and buildings" does not include the authority to
prohibit what is forbidden in said ordinance; and that the same cannot be deemed sanctioned by
the general welfare clause in the City Charter.

TOLENTINO VS SECRETARY OF FINANCE

FACTS:

Petitioner Arturo Tolentino is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 known as the

“Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT), alleging that the Congress violated the Constitution
because, although H. No. 11197 had originated in the House of Representatives and that it passed
the 3 readings, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the first reading it
was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee. Thereafter, Senate passed its own version
known as Senate Bill 1630. Petitioner contends that it was not passed by the Senate but was
simply consolidated with the Senate version (S. No. 1630) in the Conference Committee to
produce the bill which the President signed into law.
.
That because Republic Act No. 7716 was passed in this manner, Petitioners contend that
the R.A. did not “originate exclusively” in the HoR as
required by Article 6, Section 24 of the Constitution and it has not thereby become a
law

ISSUE

WON RA 7716 IS PROCEDURALLY INFIRM

RULING

NO. The enactment of the Senate bill has not been the first instance where the
Senate, in the exercise of its power to propose amendments to bills (required to
originate in the House), passed its own version. An amendment by substitution
(striking out the text and substituting it), as urged by petitioners, concerns a mere
matter of form, and considering the petitioner has not shown what substantial
difference it would make if Senate applied such substitution in the case, it cannot
be applied to the case at bar. While the aforementioned Constitutional provision
states that bills must “originate exclusively in the HoR,” it also adds, “but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments.” The Senate may
then propose an entirely new bill as a substitute measure. Petitioners erred in
assuming the Senate version to be an independent and distinct bill. Without the
House bill, Senate could not have enacted the Senate bill, as the latter was a mere
amendment of the former. As such, it did not have to pass the Senate on second
and third readings

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION VS ENRIQUEZ

FACTS
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and
approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions
and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted
by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the
"pork barrels" allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets. Congress
presented the said bill to the President for consideration and approval.

On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have
become Republic Act No. 7663.

Philippine Constitution Association prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare as unconstitutional

and void: (a) Article XLI on the Countrywide Development Fund, the special provision in
Article I entitled Realignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses, and Article XLVIII on the
Appropriation for Debt Service or the amount appropriated under said Article XLVIII in excess
of the P37.9 Billion allocated for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports; and (b) the
veto of the President of the Special Provision of Article XLVIII of the GAA of 1994

ISSUE

WON the President’s veto is valid

RULING

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ZAMORA

FACTS

The President of the Philippines, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP
and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and
suppression. Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with
each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in
preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services
of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable
period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines filed the instant petition to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and
void and unconstitutional. arguing that the deployment of marines in Metro Manila is violative of
the Constitution because no emergency situation obtains in Metro Manila as would justify the
deployment of soldiers for law enforcement work; hence, said deployment in derogation of
Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution.

ISSUE

WON THE CALLING OF AFP TO ASSIST THE PNP IN JOINT VISIBILITY PATROLS
VIOLATES ARTICLE II, SECTION 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION

RULING

No. The Supreme Court found no merit in the petition. In view of the constitutional intent to give
the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces,
it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President's decision is totally bereft of factual
basis. The petition failed to discharge such heavy burden as there was no evidence to support the
assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces nor was grave abuse
committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the
constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. he Court also ruled that the
calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement.

PASIGAN VS ANGELES [G.R. No. 64279. April 30, 1984.]

FACTS

Anselmo L. Pesigan and Marcelo L. Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in an Isuzu ten-
wheeler truck in the evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Sipocot,
Camarines Sur with Padre Garcia, Batangas, as the destination. They were provided with (1) a
health certificate from the provincial veterinarian of Camarines Sur; (2) a permit to transport
large cattle issued under the authority of the provincial commander; and (3) three certificates of
inspection from the Constabulary command, livestock inspector, Bureau of Animal Industry of
Libmanan, Camarines Sur and, mayor of Sipocot. In spite of the permit to transport and the said
four certificates, the carabaos, while passing at Basud, Camarines Norte, were confiscared by
Lieutenant Arnulfo V. Zenarosa, the town's police station commander, and by Doctor Bella S.
Miranda, provincial veterinarian based on Executive Order No. 626-A which prohibited the
transfer of carabaos from one province to another. Doctor Miranda distributed the carabaos
among twenty-five farmers of Basud. The Pesigans filed for the recovery of the carabaos and
damages to Judge Domingo Angeles, who heard the case at Daet and later transferred to
Caloocan City, and dismissed the case due to lack of action.

ISSUE

WON EO 626-A BE ENFORCED BEFORE ITS PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL

GAZETTE

RULING

No. The Supreme Court held that said executive order should not be enforced against the
Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is a penal regulation published more than
two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen
days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised
Administrative Code. The word “laws in Art. 2 includes circulars and regulations which
prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulation
and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.

OPLE VS TORRES [G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998.]

FACTS

Administrative Order No. 308 was issued by the President on December 12, 1996, providing for
a national computerized identification system with the goal of providing convenient way to
transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government
instrumentalities. Petitioner and Senator Ople challenges the constitutionality of said
Administrative Order on two important constitutional grounds; one, it is a usurpation of the
power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected
zone of privacy.

ISSUE

WON the issuance of the President of Administrative Order No. 308 is an unconstitutional
usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress

RULING

Yes. Supreme Court held that the Administrative Order involves a subject that is not appropriate
to be covered by said administrative order. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the
President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. A.O.
No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the
President to issue. Moreover, it violates the right to privacy. The act of promulgating A.O. No.
308 is an act of legislation rather than enforcement of a law, thus, should be struck down as
unconstitutional exercise of legislative power.

CEMCO HOLDINGS, INC., VS NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE

PHILIPPINES, INC., [G.R. No. 171815. August 7, 2007.]

FACTS

Union Cement Corporation (UCC), a publicly-listed company, has two principal stockholders —
Union Cement Holdings Corporation (UCHC), a non-listed company, with shares amounting to
60.51%, and petitioner Cemco Holdings, Inc. (Cemco) with 17.03%. Majority of UCHC's stocks
were owned by Bacnotan Consolidated Industries, Inc. (BCI) with 21.31% and Atlas Cement
Corporation (ACC) with 29.69%. Cemco, on the other hand, owned 9% of UCHC stocks. In a
disclosure letter dated 5 July 2004, BCI informed the PSE that it and its subsidiary ACC had
passed resolutions to sell to Cemco BCI's stocks in UCHC equivalent to 21.31% and ACC's
stocks in UCHC equivalent to 29.69%. As a consequence of this disclosure, the PSE, in a letter
to the SEC dated 15 July 2004, inquired as to whether the Tender Offer Rule under Rule 19 of
the Implementing Rules of the Securities Regulation Code is not applicable to the purchase by
petitioner of the majority of shares of UCC.

On 19 August 2004, respondent National Life Insurance Company of the Philippines, Inc.,
feeling aggrieved by the transaction, filed a complaint with the SEC to declare the purchase void
and thereafter filed a petition with the Court of Appeals challenging the SEC's jurisdiction to
take cognizance of respondent's complaint and arguing that the tender offer rule does not apply.

ISSUE

WON the SEC has jurisdiction over respondent's complaint in the absence of any specific grant
of jurisdiction by Congress

RULING

Yes. In taking cognizance of respondent’s claim against petitioner and eventually rendering
judgment which ordered the latter to make a tender offer, the SEC was acting pursuant to Rule
19(13) of the Amended Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Securities Regulation Code.
Moreover, the implementing rules and regulations of the Code are sufficient to inform and guide
the parties on how to proceed with the mandatory tender offer.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY VS SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES INC

FACTS

On December 12, 2002, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued EO 156, which prohibits the
importation into the country, inclusive of the Special Economic and Freeport Zone or the Subic
Bay Freeport (SBF or Freeport), of used motor vehicles, subject to a few exceptions.

On January 16, 2004, respondents Southwing, United Auctioneers, and Microvan instituted a
declaratory relief against the Executive Secretary, Secretary of Transportation and
Communication. Respondent prayed that judgment be rendered declaring Article 2, Section 3.1
of EO 156 unconstitutional and illegal and to allow the unimpeded entry and importation of used
motor vehicles subject only to the payment of the required customs duties. Upon filing of
petitioners' answer, respondents SOUTHWING filed a motion for summary judgment which was
granted by the trial court. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals which denied the petition on February 14, 2005. Petitioners contends that Article 2,
Section 3.1 of EO 156 is valid and applicable to the entire country, including the Freeport.

ISSUE

WON Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is reasonable and within the scope provided by law

RULING

No. In the instant case, the subject matter of the laws authorizing the President to regulate or
forbid importation of used motor vehicles, is the domestic industry. EO 156, however, exceeded
the scope of its application by extending the prohibition on the importation of used cars to the
Freeport, which RA 7227, considers to some extent, a foreign territory. The domestic industry
which the EO seeks to protect is actually the "customs territory" which is defined under the
Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7227. The proscription in the importation of used
motor vehicles should be operative only outside the Freeport and the inclusion of said zone
within the ambit of the prohibition is an invalid modification of RA 7227. Indeed, when the
application of an administrative issuance modified existing laws or exceeds the intended scope,
as in the instant case, the issuance becomes void for being unreasonable.

LAGCAO VS LABRA

FACTS

In 1964, the province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu. One of these lots was Lot
1029, situated in Capitol Hills, Cebu City. In 1965, petitioner Lagcao purchased Lot 1029 on
installment basis. But then, in late 1965, the 210 slots, including Lot 1029, reverted to the
province of Cebu. Consequently, the province tried to annul the sale of Lot 1029 by the City of
Cebu to the petitioners. The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the petitioner,
thus, TCT No. 129306 was issued in the name of petitioners and Crispina Lagcao. After
acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to discover that it was already
occupied by squatters. Thus, a demolition order was issued. However, Cebu City Mayor Alvin
Garcia wrote two letters to the MTCC, requesting the deferment of the demolition on the ground
that the City was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters. The MTCC then issued two
orders suspending the demolition for a period of 120 days. Unfortunately for Petitioners, during
the suspension period, the Sangguniang Panlunsod (SP) of Cebu passed a resolution which
identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing pursuant to RA 7279.
ISSUE

WON Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional and contravenes the Constitution and applicable
laws on expropriation of their property

RULING

Yes. Said Ordinance sought to expropriate petitioners’ property without any attempt first to
acquire the lands listed in (a) to (e) of Sec. 9 of RA 7279. Moreover, prior to the passage of
Ordinance No. 1843, there was no evidence of a valid and definite offer to buy petitioner’s
property as required by Sec. 19 of RA 7160. The Supreme Court therefore find Ordinance No.
1843 to be constitutionally infirm for violative of the petitioner’s right to due process.

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION VS COMMISSION ON

AUDIT

FACTS

On October 19, 1988, PITC Board of Directors approved a Car Plan Program for qualified PITC
officers. Under that program, an eligible officer is entitled to purchase a vehicle, fifty percent of
the value of which shall be shouldered by PITC while the remaining fifty percent will be
shouldered by the officer through salary deduction over a period of five years. However, in
implementing Republic Act No. 6758, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
issued DBM- CCC No. 10 which discontinued effective November 1, 1989 all allowances and
fringe benefits granted on top of basic salary. Pursuant thereto, the resident auditor of the
Commission on Audit in the PITC disallowed the payment/reimbursement of fifty percent of the
costs of registration of the chattel mortgage over the car and the yearly car registration and
insurance premiums made after November 1, 1989. The PITC appealed the disallowance to the
Commission on Audit, but it was denied.

ISSUE

WON RA 6758 revokes the existing benefits being received by said incumbent government
employees

RULING

No. The Court ruled that as correctly pointed out by petitioner, there was no intention on the part
of the legislature to revoke existing benefits being enjoyed by incumbents of government
positions at the time of the passage of RA 6758 by virtue of Sections 12 and 17 thereof. There is
no dispute that the PITC officials who availed of the subject car plan benefits were incumbents
of their positions as of July 1, 1989. Thus, it was legal and proper for them to continue enjoying
said benefits within the five-year period from date of purchase of the vehicle allowed by their
Car Loan Agreements with PITC. The disallowance of the subject car plan benefits would
hamper the officials in the performance of their functions to promote and develop trade which
requires mobility in the performance of official business. DBM-CCC No. 10 was a nullity due to
its non-publication.
PNB VS COURT OF APPEALS

FATCS

Epifanio dela Cruz, his brother and his sister mortgaged two (2) parcels of land to the Philippine
National Bank. The lots were mortgaged to guarantee three promissory notes. The first two
promissory notes were not paid and the third was disputed by respondent who claims that the
correct date is June 30, 1961. However, in the bank records, the note was really executed on June
30, 1958.

PNB presented under Act No. 3135 a foreclosure petition of the two mortgaged lots. The two lots
were sold or auctioned off on with the defendant PNB as the highest bidder. PNB then
consolidated ownership unto itself, and subsequently sold the parcels to third parties. Respondent
brought a complaint for reconveyance of the land, which the petitioner unlawfully foreclosed.
The CFI rendered the complaint against the petitioner be dismissed. Unsatisfied with the
judgment, respondent interposed an appeal that the lower court erred in holding that there was a
valid compliance of the required publication under Sec. 3 of Art. 3135. Respondent court
construed the publication of the notices on March 28, April 11 and 12, 1969 as a fatal
announcement and reversed the judgment appealed from by declaring void, inter alia, the auction
sale of the foreclosed pieces of realty.

ISSUE

WON the required publication of The Notice of Sale on the foreclosed properties under Sec. 3 of
Act No. 3135 was complied

RULING

No. The Notices of Sale of appellant's foreclosed properties were published on March 28, April
11 and April 12, 1969. The date March 28, 1969 falls on a Friday while the dates April 11 and
12, 1969 are on a Friday and Saturday, respectively. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the
notice of auction sale shall be "published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks".
Evidently, defendant-appellee bank failed to comply with this legal requirement. Supreme Court
held that "The rule is that statutory provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage
foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with, and that even slight deviations therefrom will
invalidate the notice and render the sale at least voidable
GARVIDA VS SALES, JR

FACTS

On March 16, 1996, petitioner applied for registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The Board of Election Tellers,
however, denied her application since she exceeded the age limit. Then on April 2, 1996, she
filed a "Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataang Member and Voter" with the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court. In a decision dated April 18, 1996, the said court found petitioner qualified.
On April 23, 1996, petitioner filed her certicate of candidacy for the position of Chairman,
Sangguniang Kabataan, Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Province of Ilocos
Norte. In a letter dated April 23, 1996, respondent Election Officer Dionisio F. Rios, per advice
of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli Pipo, disapproved petitioner's certifcate of candidacy
again due to her age. Petitioner, however, appealed to COMELEC Regional Director Filemon A.
Asperin who set aside the order of respondents and allowed petitioner to run. On May 2, 1996,
respondent Rios issued a memorandum to petitioner informing her of her ineligibility and giving
her 24 hours to explain why her certificate of candidacy should not be disapproved. Earlier and
without the knowledge of the COMELEC officials, private respondent Florencio G. Sales, Jr., a
rival candidate for Chairman of the SK, filed with the COMELEC en banc a "Petition of Denial
and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy" via facsimile and registered mail on April 29,
1996. On May 6,1996

ISSUE

WON Garvida met the age requirement

RULING

No. In the case at bar, petitioner was born on June 11, 1974. On March 16, 1996, the day she
registered as voter for the May 6, 1996 SK elections, petitioner was twenty-one (21) years and
nine (9) months old. On the day of the elections, she was 21 years, 11 months and 5 days old.
When she assumed office on June 1, 1996, she was 21 years, 11 months and 20 days old and was
merely ten (10) days away from turning 22 years old. Petitioner may have qualified as a member
of the Katipunan ng Kabataan but definitely, petitioner was over the age limit for elective SK
officials set by Section 428 of the Local Government Code and Sections 3 [b] and 6 of Comelec
Resolution No. 2824. She was ineligible to run as candidate for the May 6, 1996 Sangguniang
Kabataan elections.
CALTEX INC VS PALOMAR

FACTS

In the year 1960, the Caltex Philippines conceived and laid the groundwork for a promotional
scheme called "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest. It calls for participants therein to estimate the
actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station. For the privilege to
participate, no fee or consideration is required to be paid. Entry forms are to be made available
upon request at each Caltex station where a sealed can will be provided for the deposit of
accomplished entry stubs.

Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the
contest but also for the transmission of communications relative thereto, representations were
made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing
to make sure that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery provision of the Revised
Administrative Code. Respondent Postmaster General Enrico Palomar however denied the
mailing of such contest rules as it violates the said provision. He contends that the contest can
be subject to fraud order if pursued because it falls under “any lottery, gift enterprise, or
scheme for the distribution od money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or
drawing of any kind” which is not allowed by the Postal Law.

ISSUE

WON construction should be employed in this case

RULING

Yes. While countless definitions of lottery have been attempted, the authoritative one for this
jurisdiction is that of the United States Supreme Court. The term "lottery" extends to all
schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize
concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential elements of a
lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance.

Construction of a law is in order if what is in issue is an inquiry into the intended meaning of the
words used in a certain law. As defined in Black’s Law Dictionary: Construction is the art or
process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the author’s of the law
with respect to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by
reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law. In the present
case, the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably require an inquiry into the
intended meaning of the words therein. This is as much as question of construction or
interpretation as any other. The Court is tasked to look beyond the fair exterior, to the
substance, in order to unmask the real element and pernicious tendencies hat the law is
seeking to prevent.
PEOPLE VS MAPA

FACTS

ON or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, accused MARIO MAPA Y
MAPULONG wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control one home-made
revolver, Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the
necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities.

Counsel for the accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the
Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of Batangas, dated June 2, 1962; another document likewise issued by Gov.
Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City on a confidential
mission; the oath of office of the accused as such secret agent, a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effect that
the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov. Leviste.

on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the crime of illegal
possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two years and to
pay the costs.”

ISSUE

whether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would
constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition

RULING

NO. The law is explicit that it is unlawful for any person to possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or
ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms,
parts of firearms, or ammunition, except when such firearms are regularly and lawfully in possession of officers,
soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the
employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial
treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails, for use in the
performance of their official duties.

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. The first and
fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them." The conviction of the accused must stand.
It cannot be set aside.
RCBC VS IAC

FACTS

On September 28, 1984, BF Homes filed a "Petition for Rehabilitation and for Declaration of
Suspension of Payments" with the SEC. One of the creditors listed in its inventory of creditors
and liabilities was RCBC. Consequently, RCBC requested the sheriff of Rizal to extra-judicially
foreclose its real estate mortgage on some properties of respondent BF Homes, and obtained
thereof a favorable judgment. BF Homes opposed the auction sale and the SEC ordered the
issuance of writ of preliminary injunction upon filing of a bond. Presumably, unaware of the
filing of the bond, the sheriffs proceeded with the public auction sale in which RCBC was the
highest bidder for the properties auctioned. BF Homes filed in the SEC a consolidated motion to
annul the auction sale and to cite RCBC and the sheriff for contempt. Because of the
proceedings in the SEC, the sheriff withheld the delivery to RCBC of a certificate of sale covering
the auctioned properties.

On March 13, 1985, despite SEC Case, RCBC filed with the RTC an action for mandamus against
the provincial sheriff of Rizal to compel them to execute in its favor a certificate of sale of the
auctioned properties, which said RTC granted. On March 18, 1985, the SEC appointed a
Management Committee for BF Homes. BF Homes then filed an original complaint with the IAC
praying for the annulment of the judgment. IAC rendered a decision suspending issuance to
RCBC of new land titles.

ISSUE

whether or not preferred creditors of distressed corporations stand on equal footing with all
other creditors gains relevance and materiality only upon the appointment of a management
committee

RULING

YES. It is thus adequately clear under Sec. 6, par. (c) of PD 902- A that suspension of claims
against a corporation under rehabilitation is counted or figured up only upon the appointment
of a management committee or a rehabilitation receiver. The holding that suspension of actions
for claims against a corporation under rehabilitation takes effect as soon as the application or a
petition for rehabilitation is filed with the SEC — may, to some, be more logical and wise but
unfortunately, such is incongruent with the clear language of the law. To insist on such ruling,
no matter how practical and noble, would be to encroach upon legislative prerogative to define
the wisdom of the law — plainly judicial legislation.

When the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction
or interpretation. Once a management committee is appointed, all actions for claims against a
distress corporation pending before any court, tribunal or board or body shall be suspended
accordingly.
DEL MAR VS PAGCOR

FACTS

Respondent PAGCOR requested for legal advice from the Secretary of Justice as to whether or not it is authorized
by its Charter to operate and manage jai-alai frontons in the country. The Secretary of Justice said that PAGCOR
has the authority. Thus, PAGCOR started the operation of jai-alai frontons. Petitioner Raoul B. del Mar a filed
Petition for Prohibition to prevent respondent PAGCOR from managing and/or operating the jai-alai or Basque
pelota games on the ground that the controverted act is patently illegal and devoid of any basis either from the
Constitution or PAGCOR’s own Charter.

However, respondent PAGCOR still entered into an Agreement with private respondents BELLE and FILGAME
wherein it was agreed that BELLE will make available to PAGCOR the required infrastructure facilities including the
main frontoz. Del Mar filed a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari questioning the validity of said Agreement on
the ground that PAGCOR is without jurisdiction, legislative franchise, authority or power to enter into such
Agreement for the establishment and operation of jai-alai games. Members of the House of Representatives also
filed a petition stating that the operation of PAGCOR of jai-alai is illegal because it is not included in its scope.
Respondent then questioned that locus standi or legal standing of petitioners to file the petitions at bar as
taxpayers and legislators.

ISSUE

WON petitioners have a locus standi or legal standing to file the petition

RULING

YES. Respondents' stance is not without oven ready legal support. A party suing as a taxpayer must specifically
prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. In essence,
taxpayers are allowed to sue where there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds, or that public money is
being deflected to any improper purpose, or where petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public
funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.

It is stressed that the case at bar does not involve a franchise to operate a public utility (such as water,
transportation, communication or electricity) – the operation of which undoubtedly redounds to the benefit of the
general public. What is claimed is an alleged legislative grant of a gambling franchise – a franchise to operate jai-
alai. A statute which legalizes a gambling activity or business should be strictly construed and every reasonable
doubt must be resolved to limit the powers and rights claimed under its authority.
RADIOLA-TOSHIBA VS IAC

FACTS

On March 4, 1980, Petitioner obtained a levy of attachment against the properties of spouses Carlos and Teresita
Gatmaytan for a collection of sum of money before the RTC of Pasig. A few months later three creditors filed
another petition against spouses Gatmaytan in for involuntary insolvency before the Pampanga and Angeles RTC.

Petitioner obtained a favorable judgment as the writ of execution was issued in its favor. On September 21, 1981,
the court ordered the consolidation of ownership of petitioner over said properties. However, the sheriff of
Angeles City refused to issue a final certificate of sale in favor of the petitioner in view of the insolvency
proceedings before the Pampanga and Angeles RTC.

ISSUE

whether or not the levy on attachment in favor of the petitioner is dissolved by the insolvency proceedings against
respondent spouses commenced four months after said attachment.

RULING

NO. The provision of the above-quoted Section 32, of the Insolvency Law is very clear — that attachments dissolved
are those levied within one (1) month next preceding the commencement of the insolvency proceedings and
judgments vacated and set aside are judgments entered in any action, including judgment entered by default or
consent of the debtor, where the action was filed within thirty (30) days immediately prior to the commencement of
the insolvency proceedings. In short, there is a cut off period — one (1) month in attachment cases and thirty (30)
days in judgments entered in actions commenced prior to the insolvency proceedings. Section 79, on the other hand,
relied upon by private respondents, provides for the right of the plaintiff if the attachment is not dissolved before the
commencement of proceedings in insolvency, or is dissolved by an undertaking given by the defendant, if the claim
upon which the attachment suit was commenced is proved against the estate of the debtor. Therefore, there is no
conflict between the two provisions.

But even granting that such conflict exists, it may be stated that in construing a statute, courts should adopt a
construction that will give effect to every part of a statute, if at all possible. This rule is expressed in the maxim, ut
maqis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute — its
every word. Hence, where a statute is susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court should adopt such
reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious
with each other
PEOPLE VS MUÑOZ

FACTS
TORRES VS LIMJAP

FACTS

In this case, plaintiffs alleged that Jose B. Henson, in his lifetime, executed in their favor a
chattel mortgage on his drug store at Nos. 101-103 Calle Rosario to secure a loan of P7,000,
although it was made to appear in the instrument that the loan was for P20,000. The defendants
denied the plaintiff’s allegation’s and set up the defense that the chattel mortgages are null and
void for lack of sufficient particularity in the description of the property mortgaged. A judgment
was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. Defendant appealed from the
judgment that the lower court erred in failing to make a finding on the question of the sufficiency
of the description of the chattels mortgaged. Defendant also insists that a stipulation authorizing
the disposal and substitution of chattels mortgage does not operate to extend the mortgage to
after-acquired party, and is in contravention of the express provision of the express provision of
the last par. of section 7 Act No. 1508, which provides that “A chattel mortgage shall be deemed
to cover only the property described therein and not like or substituted property thereafter
acquired by the mortgagor and placed in the same depository as the property originally
mortgaged, anything in the mortgage to the contrary withstanding

ISSUE

WON THE PROVISION IN THE CHATTEL MORTGAGE LAW THAT EXTENDS

COVERAGE TO AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY IS VALID AND BINDING

RULING

Yes. A stipulation in the mortgage, extending its scope and effect to after-acquired property, is
valid and binding “where the after-acquired property is in renewal of, or in substitution for,
goods on hand when the mortgage was executed, or is purchased with the proceeds of the sale of
such goods, etc." Cobbey, a well-known authority on Chattel Mortgages, recognizes the validity
of stipulations relating to after-acquired and substituted chattels. In the interpretation and
construction of a statute the intent of the law-maker should always be ascertained and given
effect, and courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent
and purpose of the Legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the spirit of the Act.
GARCIA VS SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION

FACTS
PAAT VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS

Respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose,
Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR, for brevity) personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not
produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Four
days later, Petitioner Jovito Layugan, CENRO, issued an order of confiscation and asked the
owners to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited within 15 days. Private
respondent, however, failed to do so. R.E.D. Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained Layugan’s
action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck. De Guzman filed a letter of
reconsideration but was subsequently denied. The letter was forwarded to the Secretary of
DENR pursuant to the respondent’s wishes. During the pendency of the resolution, the
respondent filed a suit for replevin. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but was later denied by
the RTC. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise denied and the petition for certiorari
filed before the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE

WON the Secretary of DENR and his representatives have no authority to confiscate and forfeit
conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest products

RULING
Yes. SEC. 68-A of P.D. 705 states that in all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws,
the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any
forest products illegally cut and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws,
regulations and policies on the matter." The phrase "to dispose of the same" is broad enough to
cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation is that it
should be made "in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter."

In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose
projected in the statute. Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and
the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance
the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.
PEOPLE VS MAPA

ON or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, accused MARIO MAPA Y
MAPULONG wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control one home-made
revolver, Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the
necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities.

Counsel for the accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the
Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of Batangas, dated June 2, 1962; another document likewise issued by Gov.
Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City on a confidential
mission; the oath of office of the accused as such secret agent, a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effect that
the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov. Leviste.

on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the crime of illegal
possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two years and to
pay the costs.”

ISSUE

whether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would
constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition

RULING

NO. The law is explicit that it is unlawful for any person to possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or
ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms,
parts of firearms, or ammunition, except when such firearms are regularly and lawfully in possession of officers,
soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the
employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial
treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails, for use in the
performance of their official duties.

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. The first and
fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them." The conviction of the accused must stand.
It cannot be set aside.
B.E. SAN DIEGO VS COURT OF APPEALS