1. Lito Corpus v. People, GR No.

180016, April 29, 2014

IS THE legality of a legal provision subject to the passage of time? In Corpuz v. People (G.R. No.
180016, April 29, 2014), the Supreme Court delved into the constitutionality of Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), which pertains to the definition of the crime of estafa and the penalty
associated to it.
The obsolete legal provision was challenged vis-à-vis the equal protection clause and the prohibition
against cruel and excessive punishment, both guaranteed under the Constitution. The Court affirmed the
decision of the lower courts to convict Lito Corpuz of the crime of estafa and sentenced him to
imprisonment for a period of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years
of prision mayor as maximum, plus 1 year additional for every PhP 10,000 for a total of 18 years of
imprisonment.
The case
The complainant, Tangcoy, entrusted certain jewelries amounting to PhP 98,000 to Corpuz for the
purpose of selling them. Tangcoy waited for Corpuz to remit the sale proceeds or return of the jewelry but
Corpuz failed to do so. The trial court convicted Corpuz, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. On
appeal to the Supreme Court, Corpuz contended that the penalty imposed upon him by the court a
quo violates the equal protection clause and the prohibition against oppressive and cruel punishment.
Thus, he asked the Court to suspend the execution of the sentence or amend the same to accord respect to
his constitutional rights.
Incremental penalty
The last sentence of Article 315 states that “if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in
this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional PhP 10,000,
but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years.”The last sentence is called
an incremental penalty, where the punishment to be meted out to a convict increases as the amount
involved in estafa gets higher. In the case at bar, given that the value of the property taken amounted to a
total of PhP 98,000, Corpuz was convicted to serve imprisonment to a total of 18 years, in addition to the
fines imposed.
Beyond the numbers
In ruling for the constitutionality of the assailed RPC provision, the Court explained that it has no
authority to modify the range of penalties, as such would constitute judicial legislation. What the
legislature’s perceived failure in amending the penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be
remedied through the Court’s decision.

The question of constitutionality raised by the petitioner is one of first impression. Hence, the case was
referred to the court en banc for resolution. Amici curiae were invited to give comments on the said
question.
Dean Jose Manuel Diokno of the De La Salle College of Law shared that the provision imposing an
incremental penalty for the crime of estafa is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause. He
provided a table outlining the rate of inflation from the 1932, the year the RPC was enacted, up to the
present time. Diokno interposed that at the current rate of inflation, the fair rate for the incremental
penalty would be at 1:100—meaning that the fair rate for an additional year of imprisonment at the
current time should be pegged at PhP 100,000.
Meanwhile, Dean Sedfrey Candelaria of the Ateneo Law School stated that the assailed provision is
partially constitutional, citing the case involving some Citibank employees, wherein the Supreme Court
decided to void a provision in a law which would lead to oppression towards the workers.

It must be noted that estafa is categorized as a crime against property. This implies that the gravity of the
crime is determined by the value of the object or money swindled. At the time when the RPC was enacted
in 1932, the value of the peso was considerably higher compared to its present value, wherein
devaluations may have been caused by inflation. Thus during that period, an additional year of
imprisonment for every PhP 10,000 that exceeded the price of PhP 22,000 could be considered as fair
punishment for the crime of estafa.

Transposing this to the prevailing currency levels, Corpuz would then serve a sentence similar to a person
who swindles several millions of pesos. The provision for an incremental penalty for every Php10,000
creates absurdity. Further, the aggregate length of Corpuz’ sentence, which is 18 years, is almost equal to
the penalty imposed for the crime of homicide. This leads to a somewhat unreasonable situations wherein
a crime against property is on equal footing with penalties for crimes against persons.

It is undeniable that the law should be dynamic and reflective of the societal context it operates in. The
question raised by Corpuz is not only novel, but one that has a wide range of implications. For instance,
Article 311 of the RPC, which deals with theft, also provides the same rates for incremental penalties
when deciding a convict’s period of imprisonment. Hence the same arguments may arise.
Ultimately, these provisions do not need to be voided or declared unconstitutional, as people who
transgress the law must be meted out with penalities. However, the issues raised in Corpuz reveal the
necessity to revise the RPC in order for the penal code to truly reflect the current conditions and avoid
penalties shocking to conscience. While our justices may be great mathematicians and social scientists, it
is not for the Court to quantify the wisdom of our laws, lest this result to judicial activism.

2. Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, GR 102858, July 28, 1997

15AUG
Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS:

Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land
under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. The land registration court in its decision dated June 13,
1989 dismissed the petition “for want of jurisdiction”, in compliance with the mandatory provision
requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation. The case
was elevated to respondent Court of Appeals which, set aside the decision of the trial court and
ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado. The Court of Appeals ruled that
it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court
of its authority to grant the application. The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General
thus elevated this recourse to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Director of Lands is correct that newspaper publication of the notice of initial
hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory.

HELD:

YES. Petition was granted.

RATIO:

The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requires publication of the notice of
initial hearing. It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. Being in rem,
 such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state,
who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through
publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied with.

The Supreme Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is
unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law
speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or
equivocation; there is room only for application. There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land
registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the
future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.

Pascual v. Pascual
G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992

FACTS:

Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late
Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual. Don Andres
Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted
or spurious children and was survived by Adela Soldevilla de Pascual assurviving spouse, children of
Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the deceased, children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of
the half blood of the deceased, acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood
of the deceased and te intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased and
represented by his heirs. Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres
Pascual, filed for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband. all the above-mentioned
heirs entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of the herein
petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized
natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.

RULING:

No. Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized
by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family there is
presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is
disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by the
illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it
is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin,
palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by
avoiding further grounds of resentment. Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his
illegitimate children. Clearly the term “illegitimate” refers to both natural and spurious.
Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally
placed under one category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or not
acknowledged natural children should be treated differently, in the negative. It may be said that the law
may be harsh but that is the law. DUREX LEX SED LEX

People of the Philippines vs. M. Mapa

G.R. No. L-22301
August 30, 1967

Facts:

The accused was convicted in violation of Sec. 878 in connection to Sec. 2692 of the Revised
Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and further amended by R.A. 4. On
August 13, 1962, the accused was discovered to have in its possession and control a home-made revolver
cal. 22 with no license permit. In the court proceeding, the accused admitted that he owns the gun and
affirmed that it has no license. The accused further stated that he is a secret agent appointed by Gov.
Leviste of Batangas and showed evidences of appointment. In his defense, the accused presented the case
of People vs. Macarandang, stating that he must acquitted because he is a secret agent and which may
qualify into peace officers equivalent to municipal police which is covered by Art. 879.

Issue:

Whether or not holding a position of secret agent of the Governor is a proper defense to illegal possession
of firearms.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court in its decision affirmed the lower court’s decision. It stated that the law is explicit that
except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm,
detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be
used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." The next section provides that
"firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau
of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal
treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such
firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official
duties.
The Court construed that there is no provision for the secret agent; including it in the list therefore the
accused is not exempted.

The People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee Vs. Patricio Amigo alias "Bebot," Accused-
Appellant G.R. No. 116719, January 18, 1996

Facts:

On December 29, 1989 at around 1:00 Pm, Benito Ng Suy was driving their gray Ford Fiera back home,
with his daughters, Jocelyn Ng Suy and a younger one together with his two year old son. An accidental
head on collision occurred between the Fiera and the Tamaraw being driven by one Virgillio Abogado,
with Abogado was the accused, Patricio Amigo alias "Bebot". The collision caused slight damage to the
right bumper of the Tamaraw.

While Abogado and Benito were having a verbal confrontation, Patricio approached Benito asking the
latter to leave the incident as it was only a minor incident. However, Benito said that Patricio should not
interfere, which made Patricio irritated and caused the latter to stab Benito, rendering the victim into a
critical condition which later caused his death due to a sepsis infection that has already circulated in his
body.

Patricio Amigo was charged initially with Frustrated murder, but was modified to the crime of murder to
which he was convicted with a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Accused-Appellant claims that the penalty
of reclusion perpetua is too cruel and harch as a penalty and pleads for sympathy.

Issue:

Whether or Not the penalty imposed upon the accused "Reclusion Perpetua" be modified or reduced by
virtue of Section 19 (1) of Article III of the Constitution which prohibits the imposition of death penalty.

Held:

No. The Supreme Court hold that Article III, Section 19 (1) does not change the penalty periods
prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only in so far as it prohibits the imposition of
death penalty. The range of the medium and minimum penalties remain the same.

Thus, a person originally subject to death penalty and another who committed the murder without the
attendance of any modifying circumstances will now be both punishable with the same medium period
although the former is conceitedly more guilty than the latter. But that is the will of the constitution and
the duty of the court is to apply the law, disregarding the sympathy or pity for an accused. Dura Lex Sed
Lex.

Soccoro D. Ramirez, Petitioner Vs. Honorable Court of Appeals and Ester S. Garcia, Respondents
G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995

Facts:

The Petitioner Soccoro Ramirez, filed a civil case for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
against Private respondent Ester Garcia who, in a confrontation in the latter's office allegedly vexed,
insulted, and humiliated her in a "Hostile and Futile" mood and in a manner offensive to her dignity and
personality contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.

Petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of their argument and sought moral damages, attorney's fee and
other expenses of litigation, all amounting to Php 610,000.00 exclusive of the costs, interests and other
reliefs awardable by the court. Thus, Ester Garcia, Private respondent filed a criminal case before RTC -
Pasay City for a violation of Republic Act 4200 "An act to prohibit and penalize wiretapping and other
related violations of private communication and other purposes."
Petitioner then filed a motion to Quash the information since the facts charged do not constitute an
offense punishable by RA 4200. The trial court granted the motion to quash agreeing with petitioner that
(1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under RA 4200 and (2) the violation punished by RA
4200 refers to taping of a communication by a person other than a participant to the communication.

Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which declared the RTC's decision null and void and
holding that the allegations are punishable by RA 4200.

Issue:

Whether or Not RA 4200 applies to a taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to a
conversation.

Held:

Positive. Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute. When the language
of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms.

Section 1 of RA 4200 states that it shall be unlawful for any person, not be authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement to secretly overhear, intercept or record such communication or spoken word. The aforesaid
provision clearly makes it illegal for any person not authorized by the parties to record secretly by means
of recorder. The law makes no distinction as to who are the parties which can be a party other than those
involved in the private communication. The statute's intent is to penalize all persons unauthorized to make
such recording is underscored by the use of qualifier "any".

Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GMRC), Petitioner Vs. National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) and Imelda Salazar, Respondents G.R. No. 82511, March 3, 1992

Facts:
Private Respondent, "Imelda Salazar" was employed as general systems analyst of Globe-Mackay Cable
and Radio Corp. (GMRC) While Delfin Saldivar, her close friend, was employed as technical operations'
support manager in May 1982.

Petitioner GMRC investigated Saldivar's activities due to the reports indicating that the company
equipment and spare parts were in custody of Saldivar. The internal audit report also indicated that
Saldivar entered into a partnership with Richard A. Yambao, owner and manager of Eledon Engineering
Services (Elecon), a supplier often recommended by Saldivar to the petitioner. It also appeared in the
course of Maramara's investigation that Imelda Salazar violated company regulations by involving herself
in transactions with conflict of interest with the company. Evidence showed that she signed as a witness
to the articles of partnership between Yambao and Saldivar, and that she had full knowledge of the loss
and whereabouts of the missing air conditioner but she failed to inform her employer.

The Company placed Salazar under 1 month preventive suspension, allowing her 30 days within which to
explain her side. However, Salazar instead filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal suspension,
which was later modified to illegal dismissal.

The Labor arbiter ordered the company to reinstate Salazar to her former and equivalent position and to
pay her full back wages and benefits, plus moral damages. National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) affirmed the labor arbiter's decision but limited back wages for only two years and deleted the
award of moral damages.

Issue:
Whether or Not the action of dismissal would constitute a violation of Art. 279 of the Labor Code, which
protects the security of tenure of an employee.

Held:
Positive. The Court did not agree on the petitioner's action of suspension and eventual dismissal of
Salazar due to lack of evidence to show that Salazar was involved with the malicious activities of
Saldivar.

The wordings of the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous "An employee who is unjustly dismissed from
work shall be entitled to reinstatement and full back wages." Under the principle of Statutory
Construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. The plain meaning rule or Verba Legis derived from the maxim
"Speech is the index of intention" should be applied in this case.

Since there is no evidence to show an authorized or legal dismissal, and GMRC only relied to an internal
audit findings, Salazar, according to the Labor Code, is entitled to reinstatement and full back wages
allowed by the Court.

Felicito Basbacio, Petitioner Vs. Office of the Secretary, Department of Justice, Franklin Drilon in
his capacity as Secretary of Justice, Respondent G.R. No. 109445, November 7, 1994

Facts:

Felicito Basbacio, with his son in law Wilfredo Balderrama, was convicted of the crome of murder and of
two counts of frustrated murder for the killing of Federico Boyon and the wounding of his wife and son,
due to an apparent land dispute between the Boyon's and the petitioner.

Petitioner appealed the matter and he was acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy
between him and his son in law. His mere presence was insufficient to show conspiracy.

Petitioner then filed a claim under RA 7309 section 3(a) which provides for the payment of compensation
to any person who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a
judgment of acquittal. However, his claim was not sufficient to find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt,
there was nevertheless bad blood between him and the Boyons. There was a basis in finding that he was
"probably guilty."
Issue:

Whether or Not the provision of RA 7309 Section 3(a) using the term "unjustly accused" applies to the
petitioner?

Held:

No. Section 3(a) requires that the claimant be unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned. Through his
conviction was reversed, it is not a proof that his previous conviction was unjust. Section 3(a) does not
refer solely to an unjust conviction as a result of which the accused is unjustly imprisoned, but the
accused must have been also unjustly accused.

There is the presence of "probable guilt" which does not make the petitioner unjustly accused because
there is a reason to believe that he was a part of the crime. The court explained that the term "unjustly
convicted or accused" has something to do with the manner of conviction, that there is malice in the
judgment rendered, that from the start of the prosecution, it must have been wrongful.

An accusation based on "probable guilt" is not an unjust accusation and unjust judgment, but only an
erroneous one correctable by appeal.

JMM Promotions and Management Inc. vs. NLRC and Delos Santos [G.R. No. 109835. November
22, 1993]

15AUG

Ponente: CRUZ, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed by the respondent National Labor Relations Commission citing the
second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code as amended and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules
of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended. The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in applying these rules to decisions rendered by the POEA. It insists that the appeal bond is not
necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for overseas employment because they are already required
under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules not only to pay a license fee of P30,000 but also to
post a cash bond of P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000. In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed
in escrow the sum of P200,000 with the Philippine National Bank in compliance with Section 17, Rule II,
Book II of the same Rule, “to primarily answer for valid and legal claims of recruited workers as a result
of recruitment violations or money claims.” The Solicitor General sustained the appeal bond and
commented that appeals from decisions of the POEA were governed by Section 5 and 6, Rule V, Book
VII of the POEA Rules.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal from a decision
of the POEA to the NLRC?

HELD:
YES. Petitioner’s contention has no merit.

RATIO:

Statutes should be read as a whole. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat – that the thing may rather have
effect than be destroyed.

It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this case), care
should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated
measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Under the petitioner’s interpretation, the
appeal bond required by Section 6 of the POEA Rule should be disregarded because of the earlier bonds
and escrow money it has posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but there
is no such redundancy. On the contrary, Section 6 complements Section 4 and Section 17. The rule is that
a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided. Instead, apparently
inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious
whole.

Radiola Toshiba Philippines Inc. vs. The Intermediate Apellate Court

G.R. No. 75222, July 18, 1991

Facts:

The petitioner obtained a levy on the attachment against the properties of Carlos Gatmaytan and
Teresita Gatmaytan un Civil case o. 35946 for collection of sum of money before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Metro Manila. A few months later three creditors filed another
petition against Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan for involuntary insolvency, docketed as special
proceedings No. 1548 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga and Angeles city.

A favorable judgment was obtained of by the petitioner in Civil case No. 35946. The court ordered
for the consolidation of ownership of petitioner over said property but respondent sheriff of Angeles City
refused to issue a final ceritificate of sale because of the pending insolvency proceedings.

Court of First Instance of Angeles City and Intermediate Appellate Court rules against petitioner

Issue:

Whether or not the levy on attachment in favor of petitioner in dissolved by the insolvency
proceedings against respondents commenced for months after the said attachment.

Held:

Section 32 (of the Insolvency Law). As soon as an assignee is elected or appointed and qualified,
the clerk of court shall, by an instrument under his hand and seal of the court, assign and convey to the
assignee all the real and personal property, estate and effects of the debtor with all his deeds, books and
papers relating thereto, and such assignment shall relate back to the commencement of the proceedings in
insolvency, and shall relate back to the acts upon the adjudication was founded, and by operation of law
shall vest the title to all such property, estate and effects in the assignee, although the same is then
attached in mesne process, as the property of debtor. Such assignment shall operate to vest in the assignee
all of the estate of the insolvent debtor not exempt by law from execution. It shall dissolved any
attachment levied within one month next preceding the commencement of the insolvency proceedings and
vacate and set aside any judgment entered in any action commenced within thirty days immediately prior
to the commencement of insolvency proceedings and shall set aside any judgment entered by default or
consent of the debtor within thirty days immediately prior to the commencement of insolvency
proceedings.

Section 79. When an attachment has been made and is not dissolved before the commencement of
proceedings in insolvency, or is dissolved by an undertaking given by the defendant, if the claim upon
which attachment suit was commenced is proved against the estate of the debtor, the plaintiff may prove
the legal costs and disbursements of the suit, and in keeping of the property, and the amount thereof shall
be a preferred debt.

There is no conflicts between the two provisions.

Statutory Construction; where a statute is susceptible of more than one interpretation, court should adopt
such reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof operative and effective
and harmonious with each other. – but even granting that such conflicts exists, it may be stated that in
construing a statute, courts should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of the statute, if
at all possible. This rule is expressed in the maxim, ut magis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to
be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute – its every word, hence when a statute is
susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial
construction as will render the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each
other.

Manuel T. De Guia, in his capacity as councilor of the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila,
Petitioner Vs. Hon. Commission on Elections, Respondent G.R. No. 104712, May 6, 1992

Facts:
On November 18, 1991, Congress passed RA 7166 "An Act providing for Synchronized National and
Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations therefor, and for other purposes."
On November 20, 1991, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2313 and the subsequent resolutions in
question.

On February 20, 1992, Petitioner De Guia, an incumbent member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the
Municipality of Parañaque filed with COMELEC a motion for clarification of its Resolution No. 2313
inquiring whether the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Parañaque and other municipalities of Metro
Manila enumerated therein, which are all single-district municipalities would be elected by district in the
May 11, 1992 or in the 1995 regular elections.
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2379 stating that its purpose in recommending to Congress the
apportionment of Sangguniang Panglungsod and Bayan seats to reduce the number of candidates to be
voted for.

Petitioner De Guia received the copy of the Resolution to mean that the election of elective members of
Sangguniang Bayan, by district of the 13 Municipalities in Metro Manila shall apply in the May 11, 1992
election. Not satisfied, De Guia filed the instant petition for reversal of the position of the respondent.
Petitioner insisted that the Sangguniang Bayan of Parañaque should fall under category (d) in which they
will still be elected at large until the 1995 elections.

Issue:
Whether or Not the Members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Parañaque and other municipalities of Metro
Manila enumerated therein, would be elected by district in the May 11, 1992 regular elections?

Held:
Yes. As stated in Paragraph (c) Section 3, Cities with 2 or more legislative districts ( Manila, Cebu,
Davao ) shall continue to be elected by district, as well as the 13 Municipalities of Metro Manila which
have already been apportioned into 2 districts

Paragraph (d) Section 3 of RA 7166 refers only to elective officials of the Sangguniang Panglungsod
which are single district cities and Sangguniang Bayan for Municipalities outside Metro Manila, which
will remain to be elected at large in the May 11, 1992 election. Paragraph (d) should be interpreted in line
with the rest of the statute and to follow the interpretation of the petitioner would make the act of the
statute in singling out the single district provinces as useless or meaningless. The key to open the door to
what the legislature intended in the language of a statute is its purpose or reason which induced it to enact
the statute.

Statutes should be construed in light of the object to be achieved. A Construction should be rejected that
gives the language used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish its purpose for which it is
enacted.

G.R. No. 78687 January 31, 1989

ELENA SALENILLAS AND BERNARDINO SALENILLAS vs.Court of Appeals

FACTS:

The petitioner Elena Salenillas acquired properties after purchasing them from her parents, the Enciso
spouses. The petitioners mortgaged the property twice, the latest done on December4, 1975 in favor of
the Philippine National Bank Branch, Daet, Camarines Norte as security for a loan of P2,500.00.
Petitioners failed to pay and so the property was extrajudicially foreclosed and was then sold in the public
auction on February 27, 1981. A “Sheriff’s Final Deed” was issued on July 12, 1983.

RTC of Camarines Norte issued motions for writ of possession, which the petitioners opposed.

Petitioners sought for reconsideration, which was later on denied. The Court of appeals made a similar
decision.
On November 17, 1983 and on on August 31, 1984,Petitioners wished to repurchase the property and
maintained that they had the right to do so as provided for under Section 119 of the Public Land Act, as
amended, which states that,

Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper,
shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within a period of five years from
the date of the conveyance.

The Respondent state argued that the Petitioners were disqualified from being legal heirs of the subject
property since petitioners acquired the said property through inheritance but by sale.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners had the right to repurchase the contested property under Section 119 of the
Public Land Act.

HELD:

Petitioner Elena Salenillas, being a child of the Encisos, is a "legal heir" of the latter. As such, and even
on this score alone, she may therefore validly repurchase. This must be so because Section 119 of the
Public Land Act, in speaking of "legal heirs," makes no distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos.

Invoking the provision made under Section 119 of the Public Land Act, the petitioners, being legal heirs,
had the right to repurchase the said property as long as the 5-year period had not yet proscribed. The
Court held that when the petitioners expressed their desire to repurchase the property in 1984, it was
evident that the 5-year period had not yet proscribed, the public auction having been in 1981 and the
issuance of the Final deed in 1983.

Comendador v. de Villa (B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR v. GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, (G)

G.R. No. 93177, August 2, 1991)

FACTS:

The petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged
participation in the failed coup d' etat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989.

January 14, 1990, a Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel had been constituted pursuant to Office Order No.
16 to investigate the petitioners.

January 30, 1990, the PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena individually addressed to the petitioners. The
petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge sheet, sworn statements of witnesses, and death
and medical certificates of victims of the rebellion. At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners
challenged the proceedings on various grounds, prompting the PTI Panel to grant them 10 days to file
their objections in writing through a Motion for Summary Dismissal.

February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5 days to submit their
respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses.
May 15, 1990, the petitioners manifested that they were exercising their right to raise peremptory
challenges against the president and members of GCM No.14 by invoking Article 18 of Com. Act No.
408. GCM No. 14 ruled, however, that peremptory challenges had been discontinued under P.D. No.39.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners can manifest the right to peremptory challenge.

HELD:

Yes, the petitioners have the right to peremptory challenge. The right to peremptory challenge was
originally provided under Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War).

November 7,1972, when President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the Creation,
Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other matters relevant to military Tribunals). This decree
disallowed the peremptory challenge.

January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the termination of the state of
martial law throughout the Philippines. With the termination of martial law and the dissolution of the
military tribunals created there under, the reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.

It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases.
Cessante rationelegis, cessat ipsa lex. Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to
peremptory challenge in P.D. No. 39 became ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was
dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation No.2045, As a result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of
Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now again allows the right to peremptory challenge.

Chua vs. CSC and NIA [G.R. No. 88979. February 07, 1992]

15AUG

Ponente: PADILLA, J.

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the
government service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail
of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act. Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is
qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application with respondent National Irrigation
Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same; instead, she was offered separation benefits
equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service commencing from 1980, or almost
fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects. A recourse by petitioner to the Civil
Service Commission yielded negative results, citing that her position is co-terminous with the NIA project
which is contractual in nature and thus excluded by the enumerations under Sec.3.1 of Joint DBM-CSC
Circular Letter No. 89-1, i.e. casual, emergency, temporary or regular employment. Petitioner appealed to
the Supreme Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act No. 6683.

HELD:

YES. Petition was granted.

RATIO:

Petitioner was established to be a co-terminous employee, a non-career civil servant,

like casual and emergency employees. The Supreme Court sees no solid reason why the latter are
extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the former are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act
No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early retirement to regular, temporary,
casual and emergency employees. But specifically excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of
the AFP including those of the PC-INP. It can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius but the
applicable maxim in this case is the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that “what is implied in
a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed”.

[T]he Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioner’s
application for early retirement benefits under R.A. No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive,
as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is
entitled to the benefits of said law. In the interest of substantial justice, her application must be granted;
after all she served the government not only for two (2) years — the minimum requirement under the law
but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects.

City of Manila and Treasurer vs. Judge Gomez [G.R. No. L-37251. August 31, 1981]

15AUG

Ponente: AQUINO, J.

FACTS:

Section 64 of the Revised Charter of Manila, Republic Act No. 409, which took effect on June 18, 1949,
fixed the annual realty tax at one and one-half percent. On the other hand, Section 4 of the Special
Education Fund Law, Republic Act No. 5447, which took effect on January 1, 1969, imposed “an annual
additional tax of one per centum on the assessed value of real property in addition to the real property tax
regularly levied thereon under existing laws” but “the total real property tax shall not exceed a maximum
of three per centrum. That maximum limit gave the municipal board of Manila the Idea of fixing the
realty tax at three percent. [B]y means of Ordinance No. 7125, approved by the city mayor on December
26, 1971 and effective beginning the third quarter of 1972, the board imposed an additional one-half
percent realty tax.

Esso Philippines, Inc. paid under protest and later filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Manila for the recovery of it. It contended that the additional one-half percent tax is void because it is not
authorized by the city charter nor by any law (Civil Case No. 88827). After hearing, the trial court
declared the tax ordinance void and ordered the city treasurer of Manila to refund to Esso the said tax.
The City of Manila and its treasurer appealed under Republic Act No. 5440 (which superseded Rule 42 of
the Rules of Court) with the ruling of Judge Gomez brought about the jurisdiction to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the additional one-half percent realty tax is legal and valid.

HELD:

YES. By necessary implication.

RATIO:

The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of implications in statutory construction and sustained the City
of Manila’s contention that the additional one-half percent realty tax was sanctioned by the provision in
Section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law. The doctrine of implications means that “that which is
plainly implied in the language of a statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed”. The obvious
implication is that an additional one-half percent tax could be imposed by municipal corporations.
Inferentially, that law (the ordinance) fixed at two percent the realty tax that would accrue to a city or
municipality. Section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law, as confirmed by the Real Property Tax Code
(later), in prescribing a total realty tax of three percent impliedly authorized the augmentation by one-half
percent of the pre-existing one and one- half percent realty tax.

People vs. Guillermo Manantan [G.R. No L-14129. July 31, 1962]

15AUG

Ponente: REGALA, J.

FACTS:

[D]efendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of the Revised Election Code
in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground
that as justice of the peace the defendant is one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code. The lower court denied the said motion. A second motion was filed by defense counsel
who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg applying the
rule of “expressio unius, est exclusion alterius”. The lower court dismissed the information against the
accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. The issue was raised to the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a justice of the peace was included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code.

HELD:

YES. The order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and this case was remanded for
trial on the merits.
RATIO:

The application of the rule of casus omissus does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in
nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted
from a legislative enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons already mentioned, there has been no
such omission. There has only been a substitution of terms. On law reason and public policy, defendant-
appellee’s contention that justices of the peace are not covered by the injunction of Section 54 must be
rejected. To accept it is to render ineffective a policy so clearly and emphatically laid down by the
legislature.

Although it was observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the rule of “expressio
unius, est exclusion alterius” in arriving at the conclusion that justices of the peace are not covered by
Section 54, the rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to exclude a justice of the peace
from the purview of Section 54, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals has given the reason for
the exclusion. Indeed, there appears no reason for the alleged change. Hence, the rule of expressio unius
est exclusion alterius has been erroneously applied.

JM Tuason and Co. Inc. et. al. vs. Mariano et. al. [G.R. No. L-33140. October 23, 1978]

15AUG

Ponente: AQUINO, J.

FACTS:

The case began when Manuela Aquial and Maria Aquial filed a complaint in forma pauperis in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal Pasig Branch X, wherein they prayed that they be declared the owners of a
parcel of land located at Balara, Marikina, Rizal, docketed as Civil Case No. 8943. They alleged that
sometime in 1960, or after J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had illegally entered upon that land, they discovered
that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal.
They further alleged that transfer certificates of title, derived from OCT No. 735, were issued to J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc., et.al. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction, improper venue, prescription, laches and prior judgment. The plaintiffs opposed that motion.
The lower court denied it. The grounds of the motion to dismiss were pleaded as affirmative defenses in
the answer of Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. They insisted that a preliminary hearing be held on
those defenses. The Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed the instant civil actions of certiorari and
prohibition praying, inter alia, that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the complaint and enjoined from
proceeding in the said case, and a writ of preliminary injunction was issued.

ISSUE:

Whether or not OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom can be questioned at this late hour by
respondents Aquial and Cordova.

HELD:

NO. The trial court was directed to dismiss Civil Case 8943 with prejudice and without costs.
RATIO:

Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents and do
not disturb what has been settled), respondents Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their action in Civil
Case No. 8943 without eroding the long settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no
longer open to attack.It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated
again and again, consuming the court’s time and energies at the expense of other litigants.