G.R. NO.
160619 Doubtless, in finding [Castillo] guilty of simple misconduct and penalizing him therefor, the respondent Office of the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), JESSIE CASTILLO, MELENCIO ARCIAGA and EMERENCIANO
ARCIAGA, Respondent.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
The purpose of an Information is to afford an accused his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. It is in pursuit of this purpose that the Rules of Court require that the Information allege the ultimate facts
constituting the elements of the crime charged. Details that do not go into the core of the crime need not be included in
the Information, but may be presented during trial. The rule that evidence must be presented to establish the ex.istence
of the elements of a crime to the point of moral certainty is only for purposes of conviction. It finds no application in the
determination of whether or not an Information is sufficient to warrant the trial of an accused.
The Case
Before us is a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the People of the Philippines ("the People") through the
Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the Ombudsman. The petition seeks the reversal of the Resolutions
dated January 9, 20021 and November 3, 20032 issued by public respondent Sandiganbayan, granting private respondent
Jessie B. Castillo's Supplemental Motion to Dismiss the Infonnation filed against him and denying the People's subsequent
Motion for Reconsideration, respectively.
The Facts
Jessie B. Castillo (Castillo) was elected mayor of the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite in the May 1998 elections. On
September 19, 2000, an Information was filed against Castillo charging him with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
(RA) No. 3019,3 in relation to the alleged illegal operation of the Villa Esperanza dumpsite located in Molino, Bacoor,
Cavite. According to the Information, Castillo, while in the performance of his official functions as Mayor of Bacoor, gave
unwarranted benefits to his coaccused Melencio and Emerenciano Arciaga by allowing the latter to operate the Villa
Esperanza dumpsite without the requisite Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) and permit from the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB).4
An administrative complaint for Simple Misconduct had previously been filed against Castillo also in relation to the illegal
operation of the dumpsite. The Office of the Ombudsman found Castillo guilty of the administrative charge and imposed
the penalty of one (1) month and one (1) day suspension. On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the
Office of the Ombudsman and ordered the dismissal of the administrative complaint against Castillo.5 The Court of
Appeals held:
xxx [Castillo] did not violate the DENR notice which was issued way back in 1998 yet, or before his actual assumption of
office. Quite the contrary, while already a mayor, [Castillo], upon being informed of the notice, immediately took steps in
resolving the municipality's aged-long garbage problem. True, the solution was a longterm one, but the end results were
just the same, i.e., what was once a mountainous pile of trash covering a 2-hectare piece of property has been
remarkably reduced and what was left was a considerable area used as a segregation and transfer station of garbage prior
to their eventual dumping at the San Mateo landfill.
Ombudsman, in clear abuse of discretion, ignored and did not take into account the foregoing reports, including no less
the letter of commendation of [DENR] Secretary Cerilles.
It is thus unfortunate that even as [Castillo] had taken concrete steps to address a problem that was not of his own doing
or tolerance but merely inherited by him, he was instead rewarded by an administrative penalty even as the very
government agency (DENR) which issued the Notice of Violation commended him for his efforts. If this is not a travesty of
justice, then We know not what it is.6
After arraignment and pre-trial, Castillo, on August 21, 2001, filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Dismiss or
Terminate Proceedings.7 He argued that the case against him had been decriminalized by Section 37 of Republic Act No.
90038 and invoked the decision of the Court of Appeals absolving him of administrative liability. His motion was initially
denied by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated September 6, 2001.9
On September 21, 2001, Castillo filed a Supplemental Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the same does
not charge an offense.10He claimed that a public officer may only be held liable for violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019
if he caused undue injury to the government or any private person. Thus, Castillo argued that the undue injury must not
only be mentioned in the Information, its extent must be specified. Invoking the ruling of this Court in Llorente, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan,11 Castillo asserted that the claim of undue injury must be "specified, quantified and proven to the point of
moral certainty."
The Sandiganbayan Fourth Division failed to decide unanimously on the Supplemental Motion. Thus, a special division
(composed of five Justices of the Sandiganbayan) was constituted.12 Voting 3 to 2,13 this
Special Division, in its challenged Resolution dated January 9, 2002, granted Castillo's Supplemental Motion:
Going over the elements of the crime vis-a-vis the allegations of the information, the court agrees with the contention of
movant that the allegations of the information fail to measure up to the requirements of the law. While the information
charges Castillo with violation of Section 3 [e] of R.A. 3019 for "giving unwarranted benefits to his coaccused Melencio
and Emerenciano Arciaga, by allowing the operation of the dumpsite at Villa Esperanza, Molino, Bacoor, Cavite" and
"thereby causing undue injury to the residents and students in the area who had to endure the stench, flies, rats and
mosquitoes emanating from the dumpsite" the court notes the failure of the information to quantify the alleged
unwarranted benefits supposedly given by movant to his co-accused as well as the undue injury caused to the residents
and students of the area affected by the dumpsite.
In the case of Alejandro vs. People, the Supreme Court had ruled that undue injury requires proof of actual injury or
damage. Thus, in Llorente, it was held that "undue injury in Sec. 3 [e] cannot be presumed even after a wrong or a
violation of a right has been established. Its existence must be proven as one of the elements of the crime. In fact, the
causing of undue injury or the giving of unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence constitutes the very act punished under this section. Thus, it is required
that the undue injury be specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty.
Anent the allegation of unwarranted benefits given to the Arciagas, the court likewise notes the failure of the information
to specify and quantify the same. Whereas the Ombudsman's resolution finding prima facie evidence against the herein
accused made mention of the amount of P250.00 to P300.00 allegedly collected from each garbage truck from companies
and factories allowed to dump garbage at the Villa Esperanza dumpsite, the same was not alleged in the information
which charged Castillo with having given unwarranted benefits to his co-accused.14
(Emphasis supplied.)
The Special Division15 also resolved, on November 3, 2003, to deny the motion for reconsideration subsequently filed by
the People.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The case before us raises the question of what ultimate facts are required to be stated in an Information charging an
accused with violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. Specifically, we are called to resolve whether an Information
alleging the grant of unwarranted benefits and existence of undue injury must state the precise amount of the alleged
benefit unduly granted as well as identify, specify, and prove the alleged injury to the point of moral certainty.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
The main purpose of an Information is to ensure that an accused is formally informed of the facts and the acts
constituting the offense charged.16 Where insufficient, an accused in a criminal case can file a motion to have the
Information against him quashed and/or dismissed before he enters his plea.17 A motion to quash challenges the efficacy
of an Information18 and compels the court to determine whether the Information suffices to require an accused to endure
the rigors of a trial. Where the Information is insufficient and thus cannot be the basis of any valid conviction, the court
must drop the case immediately and save an accused from the anxiety and convenience of a useless trial.19
A motion to quash an Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense should be resolved
on the basis of the allegations in the Information whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted.20 The question
that must be answered is whether such allegations are sufficient to establish the elements of the crime charged without
considering matters aliunde.21 In proceeding to resolve this issue, courts must look into three matters: (1) what must be
alleged in a valid Information; (2) what the elements of the crime charged are; and (3) whether these elements are
sufficiently stated in the Information.
Sufficiency of Complaint or
Information
Sections 6 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court are relevant. They state-
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where
the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information.
xxx
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in
the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as
well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
(Emphasis supplied.)
This Court, in Lazarte v. Sandiganbayan,22 explained the two important purposes underlying the rule. First, it enables the
accused to suitably prepare his defense.23 Second, it allows the accused, if found guilty, to plead his conviction in a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense.24 Thus, this Court held that the true test in ascertaining the validity and
sufficiency of an Information is "whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise
the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged."25
Castillo is charged with violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019, the elements of which are as follows:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and
3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.26
The subject Information filed against Castillo, on the other hand, reads to wit:
That in or about 1998, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Bacoor, Province of Cavite,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Jessie B. Castillo, a public officer, being the
incumbent Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite, while in the performance of his official and administrative function, acting in evident
bad faith and manifest partiality, conspiring and confederating with accused Melencio A. Arciaga and Emerenciano A.
Arciaga, caretakers of Villa Esperanza, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefits to
his co-accused Melencio A. Arciaga and Emerenciano A. Arciaga, by allowing the operation of the dump site located at
Villa Esperanza, Molino, Bacoor, Cavite, notwithstanding the fact that no Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) or
any permit has been issued by the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB), Department of Environment and Natural
Resources to any person or entity for such purpose., and despite cease and desist orders issued by the DENR, thereby
causing undue injury to the residents and students in the area who had to endure the stench, flies, rats and mosquitoes
emanating from the dumpsite.27
(Emphasis supplied.)
Information filed against
Castillo and his co-accused is
Sufficient
We find that the foregoing Information sufficiently alleges the essential elements of a violation of Section 3(e) of RA No.
3019. The Information specifically alleged that Castillo is the Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite who, in such official capacity, with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality, and conspiring with the Arciagas, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally gave
unwarranted benefits to the latter, by allowing the illegal operation of the Villa Esperanza dumpsite, to the undue injury
·of the residents and students in the area who had to endure the ill-effects of the dumpsite's operation.
The Sandiganbayan, however, allowed the quashal of the Information due to the prosecution's failure to (1) allege, with
precision, the exact amount of benefits granted by Castillo to the Arciagas and (2) specify, quantify and prove "to the
point of moral certainty" the undue injury caused to the people of Molino. According to the Sandiganbayan:
to inform the accused of the quantity of injury caused by Castillo to the residents of Villa Esperanza and the amount of
unwarranted benefits given to the Arciagas as a result of the operation of the dumpsite. Such failure is fatal to the
prosecution's cause considering that the public prosecutor is barred from presenting evidence on a matter not alleged in
the information. Otherwise, if the prosecution would be allowed to present evidence to quantify the element of undue
injury or unwarranted benefits, the same would violate the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.28 (Emphasis supplied.)
We disagree.
For as long as the ultimate facts constituting the offense have been alleged, an Information charging a violation of Section
3(e) of RA No. 3019 need not state, to the point of specificity, the exact amount of unwarranted benefit granted nor
specify, quantify or prove, to the point of moral certainty, the undue injury caused. We have consistently and repeatedly
held in a number of cases that an Information need only state the ultimate facts constituting the offense and not the finer
details of why and how the crime was committed .29
As alleged in the Information, the unwarranted benefit was the privilege granted by Castillo to the Arciagas to operate the
dumpsite without the need to comply with the applicable laws, rules, and regulations; the undue injury being residents
and students were made to endure the ill-effects of the illegal operation. The details required by the Sandiganbayan (such
as the specific peso amount actually received by the Arciagas as a consequence of the illegal operation of the subject
dumpsite or the specific extent of damage caused to the residents and students) are matters of evidence best raised
during the trial; they need not be stated in the Information. For purposes of informing the accused of the crime charged,
the allegation on the existence of unwarranted benefits and undue injury under the Information suffices.
Moreover, the rationale for the ultimate facts requirement becomes clearer when one considers the period when a
motion to quash is filed, that is, before the accused's arraignment and the parties' presentation of their evidence. It
would be illogical, if not procedurally infirm, to require specific peso amount allegations of the unwarranted benefit and
proof of undue injury - to the point of moral certainty, no less - at this stage of the criminal proceedings.
Application of Llorente ruling is misplaced
The Sandiganbayan's application of the Llorente ruling in this case is misplaced.
Indeed, this Court held in Llorente that the "undue injury must be specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral
certainty."30 The validity and sufficiency of the Information, however, was not an issue in Llorente. The import of the
ruling therein is that proof of undue injury must be established by the prosecution during the trial and not when the
Information is filed. Nowhere in Llorente did we require that undue injury be specified, quantified and proved to the point
of moral certainty at the time of the filing of the Information. Such an interpretation would effectively require the
prosecution to include all the relevant evidence in the Information and to present such evidence of undue injury even
prior to arraignment. Moreover, under the Sandiganbayan 's interpretation of Llorente, the accused would be required to
face (and even rebut) the evidence as soon as the Information is filed and even before he pleads. This runs counter to the
function of a motion to quash as a remedy afforded an accused before he proceeds to trial.
Further, such an interpretation would undermine the value of the Information as a tool for an accused to understand the
crime for which he is being charged as it requires that the Information already contain a long and detailed list of other
matters not necessary in informing the accused of the charge. It will also be prejudicial to the prosecution who will then
be forced to present evidence even before the trial proper. This interpretation cannot be countenanced.
Outright quashal of the Information not proper Even assuming for the sake of argument that the Information was
defective on the ground that the facts charged therein do not constitute an offense, outright quashal of the Information is
not the proper course of action.
Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court gives clear guidance on this matter. It provides –
Sec. 4. Amendment of complaint or information. - If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or
information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made.
If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution shall be given by the court
an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the
amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers from the same defect despite the
amendment.1âwphi1 (Emphasis supplied.)
When a motion to quash is filed challenging the validity and sufficiency of an Information, and the defect may be cured by
amendment, courts must deny the motion to quash and order the prosecution to file an amended
Information.31 Generally, a defect pertaining to the failure of an Information to charge facts constituting an offense is one
that may be corrected by an amendment.32 In such instances, courts are mandated not to automatically quash the
Information; rather, it should grant the prosecution the opportunity to cure the defect through an amendment.33 This rule
allows a case to proceed without undue delay. By allowing the defect to be cured by simple amendment, unnecessary
appeals based on technical grounds, which only result to prolonging the proceedings, are avoided.
More than this practical consideration, however, is the due process underpinnings of this rule. As explained by this Court
in People v. Andrade,34 the State, just like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in court.
Thus, a court's refusal to grant the prosecution the opportunity to amend an Information, where such right is expressly
granted under the Rules of Court and affirmed time and again in a string of Supreme Court decisions, effectively curtails
the State's right to due process.
Hence, even assuming that the Information was defective, the Sandiganbayan should have first ordered its amendment
and not its quashal. Doing so would have saved the parties from resorting to an appeal to this Court and this case from
remaining in the docket of the Sandiganbayan for a long period.
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Sandiganbayan's Resolutions dated
January 9, 2002 and November 3, 2003 are REVERSED and the Information charging Castillo and the Arciagas with
violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 is ordered REINSTATED. As this case has been pending for almost fifteen years,
the Sandiganbayan is directed to resolve the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 197597, April 08, 2015
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, DATUKAN MALANG
SALIBO, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, QUEZON CITY JAIL ANNEX, BJMP BUILDING, CAMP BAGONG DIWA, TAGUIG CITY AND
ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING ON HIS BEHALF AND/OR HAVING CUSTODY OF DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken identity. In such cases, the person is
not under any lawful process and is continuously being illegally detained.
This is a Petition for Review1 on Certiorari of the Court of Appeals Decision2 reversing the Decision3 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 153, Pasig City (Taguig Hall of Justice) granting Datukan Malang Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus.
From November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009, Datukan Malang Salibo (Salibo) and other Filipinos were allegedly in Saudi
Arabia for the Hajj Pilgrimage.4 "While in Saudi Arabia, . . . Salibo visited and prayed in the cities of Medina, Mecca, Arpa,
Mina and Jeddah."5 He returned to the Philippines on December 20, 2009.6
On August 3, 2010, Salibo learned that police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in Maguindanao suspected him to be
Butukan S. Malang.7
Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder for allegedly participating in the November 23,
2009 Maguindanao Massacre. He had a pending warrant of arrest issued by the trial court in People of the Philippines v.
Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al.8
Salibo presented himself before the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his name. There, he explained that
he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he could not have participated in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre
because he was in Saudi Arabia at that time.9
To support his allegations, Salibo presented to the police "pertinent portions of his passport, boarding passes and other
documents"10 tending to prove that a certain Datukan Malang Salibo was in Saudi Arabia from November 7 to December
19, 2009.11
The police officers initially assured Salibo that they would not arrest him because he was not Butukan S. Malang.12
Afterwards, however, the police officers apprehended Salibo and tore off page two of his passport that evidenced his
departure for Saudi Arabia on November 7, 2009. They then detained Salibo at the Datu Hofer Police Station for about
three (3) days.13
The police officers transferred Salibo to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in Cotabato City, where he was
detained for another 10 days. While in Cotabato City, the Criminal Investigation and Detention Group allegedly made him
sign and affix his thumbprint on documents.14
On August 20, 2010, Salibo was finally transferred to the Quezon City Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology Building, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City, where he is currently detained.15
On September 17, 2010, Salibo filed before the Court of Appeals the Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus16 questioning the
legality of his detention and deprivation of his liberty.17 He maintained that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang.18
In the Resolution19 dated September 21, 2010, the Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making the Writ
returnable to the Second Vice Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City (Taguig Hall of Justice).20 The Court of
Appeals ordered the Warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex to file a Return of the Writ one day before the scheduled
hearing and produce the person of Salibo at the 10:00 a.m. hearing set on September 27, 2010.21
Proceedings before the trial court
On September 27, 2010, the jail guards of the Quezon City Jail Annex brought Salibo before the trial court. The Warden,
however, failed to file a Return one day before the hearing. He also appeared without counsel during the hearing.22
Thus, the trial court canceled the hearing and reset it to September 29, 2010 at 2:00 p.m.23
On September 28, 2010, the Warden filed the Return of the Writ. However, during the September 29, 2010 hearing on
the Return, the Warden appeared with Atty. Romeo L. Villante, Jr., Legal Officer/Administering Officer of the Bureau of
Jail Management and Penology.24
Salibo questioned the appearance of Atty. Romeo L. Villante, Jr. on behalf of the Warden and argued that only the Office
of the Solicitor General has the authority to appear on behalf of a respondent in a habeas corpus proceeding.25
The September 29, 2010 hearing, therefore, was canceled. The trial court reset the hearing on the Return to October 1,
2010 at 9:00 a.m.26
The Return was finally heard on October 1, 2010. Assistant Solicitors Noel Salo and Isar Pepito appeared on behalf of the
Warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex and argued that Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus should be dismissed. Since
Salibo was charged under a valid Information and Warrant of Arrest, a petition for habeas corpus was "no longer
availing."27
Salibo countered that the Information, Amended Information, Warrant of Arrest, and Alias Warrant of Arrest referred to
by the Warden all point to Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan Malang Salibo, as accused. Reiterating that he was not
Butukan S. Malang and that he was in Saudi Arabia on the day of the Maguindanao Massacre, Salibo pleaded the trial
court to order his release from detention.28
The trial court found that Salibo was not "judicially charged"29 under any resolution, information, or amended
information. The Resolution, Information, and Amended Information presented in court did not charge Datukan Malang
Salibo as an accused. He was also not validly arrested as there was no Warrant of Arrest or Alias Warrant of Arrest against
Datukan Malang Salibo. Salibo, the trial court ruled, was not restrained of his liberty under process issued by a court.30
The trial court was likewise convinced that Salibo was not the Butukan S. Malang charged with murder in connection with
the Maguindanao Massacre. The National Bureau of Investigation Clearance dated August 27, 2009 showed that Salibo
has not been charged of any crime as of the date of the certificate.31 A Philippine passport bearing Salibo's picture showed
the name "Datukan Malang Salibo."32
Moreover, the trial court said that Salibo "established that [he] was out of the country"33 from November 7, 2009 to
December 19, 2009. This fact was supported by a Certification34 from Saudi Arabian Airlines confirming Salibo's departure
from and arrival in Manila on board its flights.35 A Flight Manifest issued by the Bureau of Immigration and Saudi Arabian
Airlines Ticket No. 0652113 also showed this fact.36
Thus, in the Decision dated October 29, 2010, the trial court granted Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus and ordered his
immediate release from detention.
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
On appeal37 by the Warden, however, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court's Decision.38 Through its
Decision dated April 19, 2011, the Court of Appeals dismissed Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Contrary to the trial court's finding, the Court of Appeals found that Salibo's arrest and subsequent detention were made
under a valid Information and Warrant of Arrest.39 Even assuming that Salibo was not the Butukan S. Malang named in
the Alias Warrant of Arrest, the Court of Appeals said that "[t]he orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual
remedies exhausted before the writ [of habeas corpus] may be invoked[.]"40 According to the Court of Appeals, Salibo's
proper remedy was a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest.41
Salibo filed a Motion for Reconsideration,42 which the Court of Appeals denied in the Resolution43 dated July 6, 2011.
Proceedings before this court
On July 28, 2011,44 petitioner Salibo filed before this court the Petition for Review (With Urgent Application for a Writ of
Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction). Respondent Warden filed a Comment,45 after which petitioner Salibo filed a Reply.46

Petitioner Salibo maintains that he is not the Butukan S. Malang charged with 57 counts of murder before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 221, Quezon City. Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeals' finding, he, Datukan Malang Salibo, was not
duly charged in court. He is being illegally deprived of his liberty and, therefore, his proper remedy is a Petition for Habeas
Corpus.47
Petitioner Salibo adds that respondent Warden erred in appealing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153,
Pasig City before the Court of Appeals. Although the Court of Appeals delegated to the trial court the authority to hear
respondent Warden on the Return, the trial court's Decision should be deemed a Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Therefore, respondent Warden should have directly filed his appeal before this court.48
As for respondent Warden, he maintains that petitioner Salibo was duly charged in court. Even assuming that he is not
the Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, petitioner Salibo should have pursued the ordinary remedy
of a Motion to Quash Information, not a Petition for Habeas Corpus.49
The issues for our resolution are:
First, whether the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City on petitioner Salibo's Petition for Habeas
Corpus was appealable to the Court of Appeals; and Second, whether petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is to file a Petition
for Habeas Corpus.
We grant the Petition.cralawlawlibrary
I petitioner Salibo's Petition. The decision on the Petition for Habeas Corpus, therefore, was the decision of the trial court,
Contrary to petitioner Salibo's claim, respondent Warden correctly appealed before the Court of Appeals.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed before this court or any of its
members,50 the Court of Appeals or any of its members in instances authorized by law,51 or the Regional Trial Court or any
of its presiding judges.52 The court or judge grants the writ and requires the officer or person having custody of the person
allegedly restrained of liberty to file a return of the writ.53 A hearing on the return of the writ is then conducted.54
The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which issued the writ.55 Should the court issuing the writ
designate a lower court to which the writ is made returnable, the lower court shall proceed to decide the petition of
habeas corpus. By virtue of the designation, the lower court "acquire[s] the power and authority to determine the merits
of the [petition for habeas corpus.]"56 Therefore, the decision on the petition is a decision appealable to the court that has
appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court.57
In Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz, etc,58 "a petition for habeas corpus was filed before this Court . . . [o]n behalf of. . . Alfredo B.
Saulo [(Saulo)]."59 This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered respondent Commanding General of the
Philippine Constabulary to file a Return of the Writ. This court made the Writ returnable to the Court of First Instance of
Manila.60
After hearing the Commanding General on the Return, the Court of First Instance denied Saulo's Petition for Habeas
Corpus.61
Saulo appealed before this court, arguing that the Court of First Instance heard the Petition for Habeas Corpus "not by
virtue of its original jurisdiction but merely delegation[.]"62 Consequently, "this Court should have the final say regarding
the issues raised in the petition, and only [this court's decision] . . . should be regarded as operative."63
This court rejected Sciulo's argument and stated that his "logic is more apparent than real."64 It ruled that when a superior
court issues a writ of habeas corpus, the superior court only resolves whether the respondent should be ordered to show
cause why the petitioner or the person in whose behalf the petition was filed was being detained or deprived of his or her
liberty.65 However, once the superior court makes the writ returnable to a lower court as allowed by the Rules of Court,
the lower court designated "does not thereby become merely a recommendatory body, whose findings and conclusion[s]
are devoid of effect[.]"66 The decision on the petition for habeas corpus is a decision of the lower court, not of the
superior court.
In Medina v. Gen. Yan,67 Fortunato Medina (Medina) filed before this court a Petition for Habeas Corpus. This court issued
a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making it returnable to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City. After trial on the merits,
the Court of First Instance granted Medina's Petition for Habeas Corpus and ordered that Medina be released from
detention.68
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Notice of Appeal before the Court of Appeals.69
Atty. Amelito Mutuc, counsel for Medina, filed before the Court of Appeals a "Motion for Certification of Appeal to the
Supreme Court." The Court of Appeals, however, denied the Motion.70
This court ruled that the Court of Appeals correctly denied the "Motion for Certification of Appeal to the Supreme Court,"
citing Saulo as legal basis.71 The Court of First Instance of Rizal, in deciding Medina's Petition for Habeas Corpus, "acquired
the power and authority to determine the merits of the case[.]"72 Consequently, the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal on Medina's Petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable to the Court of Appeals.73
In this case, petitioner Salibo filed his Petition for Habeas Corpus before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals issued
a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making it returnable to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City. The trial court then
heard respondent Warden on his Return and decided the Petition on the merits.
Applying Saulo and Medina, we rule that the trial court "acquired the power and authority to determine the merits"74 of
not of the Court of Appeals. Since the Court of Appeals is the court with appellate jurisdiction over decisions of trial
courts,75 respondent Warden correctly filed the appeal before the Court of Appeals.cralawlawlibrary
II
Called the "great writ of liberty[,]"76 the writ of habeas corpus "was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy
to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom."77 The
remedy of habeas corpus is extraordinary78 and summary79 in nature, consistent with the law's "zealous regard for
personal liberty."80
Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus "shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement
or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld
from the person entitled thereto."81 The primary purpose of the writ "is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint
as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal."82 "Any restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient."83
The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any offense so as to entitle a person to the efficient remedy
of habeas corpus. It may be availed of as a post-conviction remedy84 or when there is an alleged violation of the liberty of
abode.85 In other words, habeas corpus effectively substantiates the implied autonomy of citizens constitutionally
protected in the right to liberty in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.86 Habeas corpus being a remedy for a
constitutional right, courts must apply a conscientious and deliberate level of scrutiny so that the substantive right to
liberty will not be further curtailed in the labyrinth of other processes.87
In Gumabon, et al. v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons,88 Mario Gumabon (Gumabon), Bias Bagolbagol (Bagolbagol),
Gaudencio Agapito (Agapito), Epifanio Padua (Padua), and Paterno Palmares (Palmares) were convicted of the complex
crime of rebellion with murder. They commenced serving their respective sentences of reclusion perpetua.89
While Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares were serving their sentences, this court promulgated People
v. Hernandez90 in 1956, ruling that the complex crime of rebellion with murder does not exist.91
Based on the Hernandez ruling, Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
They prayed for their release from incarceration and argued that the Hernandez doctrine must retroactively apply to
them.92
This court ruled that Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares properly availed of a petition for habeas
corpus.93 Citing Harris v. Nelson,94 this court said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[T]he writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and
lawless state action. . . . The scope and flexibility of the writ — its capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention — its
ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes — have always been emphasized and jealously guarded by
courts and lawmakers. The very nature of the writ demands that it be administered with the initiative and flexibility
essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected.95cralawlawlibrary
In Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro,96 the Provincial Board of Mindoro issued Resolution No. 25, Series of 1917. The
Resolution ordered the Mangyans removed from their native habitat and compelled them to permanently settle in an
800-hectare reservation in Tigbao. Under the Resolution, Mangyans who refused to establish themselves in the Tigbao
reservation were imprisoned.97
An application for habeas corpus was filed before this court on behalf of Rubi and all the other Mangyans being held in
the reservation.98 Since the application questioned the legality of deprivation of liberty of Rubi and the other Mangyans,
this court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered the Provincial Board of Mindoro to make a Return of the Writ.99
A Writ of Habeas Corpus was likewise issued in Villavicencio v. Lukban.100 "[T]o exterminate vice,"101 Mayor Justo Lukban
of Manila ordered the brothels in Manila closed. The female sex workers previously employed by these brothels were
rounded up and placed in ships bound for Davao. The women were expelled from Manila and deported to Davao without
their consent.102
On application by relatives and friends of some of the deported women, this court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and
ordered Mayor Justo Lukban, among others, to make a Return of the Writ. Mayor Justo Lukban, however, failed to make a
Return, arguing that he did not have custody of the women.103
This court cited Mayor Justo Lukban in contempt of court for failure to make a Return of the Writ.104 As to the legality of
his acts, this court ruled that Mayor Justo Lukban illegally deprived the women he had deported to Davao of their liberty,
specifically, of their privilege of domicile.105 It said that the women, "despite their being in a sense lepers of society[,] are
nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other
citizens[.]"106 The women had the right "to change their domicile from Manila to another locality."107
The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final decision on the petition for the issuance of the writ. It is the writ that
commands the production of the body of the person allegedly restrained of his or her liberty. On the other hand, it is in
the final decision where a court determines the legality of the restraint.
Between the issuance of the writ and the final decision on the petition for its issuance, it is the issuance of the writ that is
essential. The issuance of the writ sets in motion the speedy judicial inquiry on the legality of any deprivation of liberty.
Courts shall liberally issue writs of habeas corpus even if the petition for its issuance "on [its] face [is] devoid of
merit[.]"108 Although the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended in cases of invasion, rebellion, or when
the public safety requires it,109 the writ itself may not be suspended.110
III
It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained
under a lawful process or order of the court.111 The restraint then has become legal,112 and the remedy of habeas corpus
is rendered moot and academic.113 Rule 102, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a
court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order,
the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by
reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize
the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In Ilagan v. Hon. Ponce Enrile,114 elements of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police arrested Atty.
Laurente C. Ilagan (Atty. Ilagan) by virtue of a Mission Order allegedly issued by then Minister of National Defense, Juan
Ponce Enrile (Minister Enrile). On the day of Atty. Ilagan's arrest,115 from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Davao
Chapter visited Atty. Ilagan in Camp Catitipan, where he was detained.115
Among Atty. Ilagan's visitors was Atty. Antonio Arellano (Atty. Arellano). Atty. Arellano, however, no longer left Camp
Catitipan as the military detained and arrested him based on an unsigned Mission Order.116
Three (3) days after the arrest of Attys. Ilagan and Arellano, the military informed the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Davao Chapter of the impending arrest of Atty. Marcos Risonar (Atty. Risonar). To verify his arrest papers, Atty. Risonar
went to Camp Catitipan. Like Atty. Arellano, the military did not allow Atty. Risonar to leave. He was arrested based on a
Mission Order signed by General Echavarria, Regional Unified Commander.117
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Free Legal Assistance Group, and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood,
Integrity and Nationalism filed before this court a Petition for Habeas Corpus in behalf of Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and
Risonar.118
This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and required Minister Enrile, Armed Forces of the Philippines Acting Chief of
Staff Lieutenant General Fidel V. Ramos (General Ramos), and Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police Regional
Commander Brigadier General Dionisio Tan-Gatue (General Tan-Gatue) to make a Return of the Writ.119 This court set the
hearing on the Return on May 23, 1985.120
In their Return, Minister Enrile, General Ramos, and General Tan-Gatue contended that the privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus was suspended as to Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar by virtue of Proclamation No. 2045-A.121 The
lawyers, according to respondents, allegedly "played active roles in organizing mass actions of the Communist Party of the
Philippines and the National Democratic Front."122
After hearing respondents on their Return, this court ordered the temporary release of Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and
Risonar on the recognizance of their counsels, retired Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and retired Associate Justice Jose
B.L. Reyes.123
Instead of releasing Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar, however, Minister Enrile, General Ramos, and General Tan-Gatue
filed a Motion for Reconsideration.124 They filed an Urgent Manifestation/Motion stating that Informations for rebellion
were filed against Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar. They prayed that this court dismiss the Petition for Habeas Corpus
for being moot and academic.125
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Free Legal Assistance Group, and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood,
Integrity and Nationalism opposed the motion. According to them, no preliminary investigation was conducted before the
filing of the Information. Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar were deprived of their right to due process. Consequently,
the Information was void.126
This court dismissed the Petition for Habeas Corpus, ruling that it became moot and academic with the filing of the
Information against Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar in court:127ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As contended by respondents, the petition herein has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the filing of an
Information against them for Rebellion, a capital offense, before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and the issuance
of a Warrant of Arrest against them. The function of the special proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality
of one's detention. Now that the detained attorneys' incarceration is by virtue of a judicial order in relation to criminal
cases subsequently filed against them before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, the remedy of habeas corpus no
longer lies. The Writ had served its purpose.128 (Citations omitted)
This court likewise dismissed the Petitions for habeas corpus in Umil v. Ramos.129 Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, Renato
Villanueva, Amelia Roque, Wilfredo Buenaobra, Atty. Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, Vicky A. Ocaya, Deogracias
Espiritu, and Narciso B. Nazareno were all arrested without a warrant for their alleged membership in the Communist
Party of the Philippines/New People's Army.130
During the pendency of the habeas corpus proceedings, however, Informations against them were filed before this court.
The filing of the Informations, according to this court, rendered the Petitions for habeas corpus moot and academic,
thus:131ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed in the proper courts against the
petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, or if such
person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed.132 (Emphasis in the original)
In such cases, instead of availing themselves of the extraordinary remedy of a petition for habeas corpus, persons
restrained under a lawful process or order of the court must pursue the orderly course of trial and exhaust the usual
remedies.133 This ordinary remedy is to file a motion to quash the information or the warrant of arrest.134
At any time before a plea is entered,135 the accused may file a motion to quash complaint or information based on any of
the grounds enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of Court:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 3. Grounds.—The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following
grounds:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;.
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
In filing a motion to quash, the accused "assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against him [or
her] for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the information."136 If the
accused avails himself or herself of a motion to quash, the accused "hypothetical[ly] admits the facts alleged in the
information."137 "Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic from the information are not to be
considered."138ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
"If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment,
the court shall order [the] amendment [of the complaint or information]."139 If the motion to quash is based on the
ground that the facts alleged in the complaint or information do not constitute an offense, the trial court shall give the
prosecution "an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment."140 If after amendment, the complaint or information
still suffers from the same defect, the trial court shall quash the complaint or information.141
IV
However, Ilagan142 and Umil do not apply to this case. Petitioner Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging
him of an offense. He was not restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court. He was illegally deprived of his
liberty, and, therefore, correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 221, Quezon City in People of the
Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. charged and accused Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan Malang Salibo, of 57
counts of murder in connection with the Maguindanao Massacre.
Furthermore, petitioner Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant. Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court
enumerates the instances when a warrantless arrest may be made:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on- personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to
the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his name and to
prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in the presence of the police officers of
Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense. The police officers had no
personal knowledge of any offense that he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner.
The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo without a warrant. They deprived him of
his right to liberty without due process of law, for which a petition for habeas corpus may be issued.
The arrest of petitioner Salibo is similar to the arrest of Atty. Risonar in the "disturbing"143 case of Ilagan.144 Like petitioner
Salibo, Atty. Risonar went to Camp Catitipan to verify and contest any arrest papers against him. Then and there, Atty.
Risonar was arrested without a warrant. In his dissenting opinion in Ilagan,145 Justice Claudio Teehankee stated that the
lack of preliminary investigation deprived Atty. Risonar, together with Attys. Ilagan and Arellano, of his right to due
process of law — a ground for the grant of a petition for habeas corpus:146
The majority decision holds that the filing of the information without preliminary investigation falls within the exceptions
of Rule 112, sec. 7 and Rule 113, sec. 5 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Again, this is erroneous premise. The
fiscal misinvoked and misapplied the cited rules. The petitioners are not persons "lawfully arrested without a
warrant." The fiscal could not rely on the stale and inoperative PDA of January 25, 1985. Otherwise, the rules would be
rendered nugatory, if all that was needed was to get a PDA and then serve it at one's whim and caprice when the very
issuance of the PDA is premised on its imperative urgency and necessity as declared by the President himself. The
majority decision then relies on Rule 113, Sec. 5 which authorizes arrests without warrant by a citizen or by a police
officer who witnessed the arrestee in flagrante delicto, viz. in the act of committing the offense. Quite obviously, the
arrest was not a citizen's arrest nor were they caught in flagrante delicto violating the law. In fact, this Court in
promulgating the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure have tightened and made the rules more strict. Thus, the Rule now
requires that an offense "has in fact just been committed." This connotes immediacy in point of time and excludes cases
under the old rule where an offense "has in fact been committed" no matter how long ago. Similarly, the arrestor must
have "personal knowledge of facts indicating that the [arrestee] has committed it" (instead of just "reasonable ground to
believe that the [arrestee] has committed it" under the old rule). Clearly, then, an information could not just be filed
against the petitioners without due process and preliminary investigation.147 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
Petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. None of the grounds
for filing a Motion to Quash Information apply to him. Even if petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to Quash, the defect he
alleged could not have been cured by mere amendment of the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. Changing the name
of the accused appearing in the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest from "Butukan S. Malang" to "Datukan Malang
Salibo" will not cure the lack of preliminary investigation in this case.
A motion for reinvestigation will' not cure the defect of lack of preliminary investigation. The Information and Alias
Warrant of Arrest were issued on the premise that Butukan S. Malang and Datukan Malang Salibo are the same person.
There is evidence, however, that the person detained by virtue of these processes is not Butukan S. Malang but another
person named Datukan Malang Salibo.
Petitioner Salibo presented in evidence his Philippine passport,148 his identification card from the Office on Muslim
Affairs,149 his Tax Identification Number card,150 and clearance from the National Bureau of Investigation151 all bearing his
picture and indicating the name "Datukan Malang Salibo." None of these government-issued documents showed that
petitioner Salibo used the alias "Butukan S. Malang."
Moreover, there is evidence that petitioner Salibo was not in the country on November 23, 2009 when the Maguindanao
Massacre occurred.
A Certification152 from the Bureau of Immigration states that petitioner Salibo departed for Saudi Arabia on November 7,
2009 and arrived in the Philippines only on December 20, 2009. A Certification153 from Saudi Arabian Airlines attests that
petitioner Salibo departed for Saudi Arabia on board Saudi Arabian Airlines Flight SV869 on November 7, 2009 and that he
arrived in the Philippines on board Saudi Arabian Airlines SV870 on December 20, 2009.cralawlawlibrary
V Jagna-Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2904. The accusatory portion of the Information filed
People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. is probably the most complex case pending in our courts. The
case involves 57 victims154 and 197 accused, two (2) of which have become state witnesses.155 As of November 23, 2014,
111 of the accused have been arraigned, and 70 have filed petitions for bail of which 42 have already been resolved.156 To
require petitioner Salibo to undergo trial would be to further illegally deprive him of his liberty. Urgency dictates that we
resolve his Petition in his favor given the strong evidence that he is not Butukan S. Malang.
In ordering petitioner Salibo's release, we are prejudging neither his guilt nor his innocence. However, between a citizen
who has shown that he was illegally deprived of his liberty without due process of law and the government that has all
the "manpower and the resources at [its] command"157 to properly indict a citizen but failed to do so, we will rule in favor
of the citizen.
Should the government choose to prosecute petitioner Salibo, it must pursue the proper remedies against him as
provided in our Rules. Until then, we rule that petitioner Salibo is illegally deprived of his liberty. His Petition for Habeas
Corpus must be granted.cralawred
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated April 19, 2011
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Warden, Quezon City Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology
Building, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, is ORDERED to immediately RELEASE petitioner Datukan Maiang Salibo from
detention.
The Letter of the Court of Appeals elevating the records of the case to this court is hereby NOTED.
SO ORDERED.chanro
G.R. No. 182926, June 22, 2015
ANA LOU B. NAVAJA, Petitioner, v. HON. MANUEL A. DE CASTRO, OR THE ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE OF MCTC JAGNA-
GARCIA-HERNANDEZ, DKT PHILS., INC., REPRESENTED BY ATTY. EDGAR BORJE, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1 dated August 28, 2007
and the Resolution2 dated May 7, 2008 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 02353, which affirmed
the Order dated September 21, 2006 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Loay, Bohol, Branch 50, in SP Civil Action
No. 0356.
The factual antecedents are as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The instant case arose from a Complaint-Affidavit3 filed by private respondent DKT Philippines, Inc., represented by Atty.
Edgar Borje, against petitioner Ana Lou B. Navaja, alleging that while she was still its Regional Sales Manager, she falsified
a receipt by making it appear that she incurred meal expenses in the amount of P1,810.00, instead of the actual amount
of P810.00, at Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, and claimed reimbursement for it.
Navaja is charged with the crime of falsification of private document before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
against her reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about the 2nd day of October 2003, in the municipality of Jagna, province of Bohol, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to prejudice a juridical person, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial receipt No. 6729 of Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, by making
an alteration or intercalation in the said receipt No. 6729 from EIGHT HUNDRED TEN PESOS (P810.00) to ONE THOUSAND
EIGHT HUNDRED TEN PESOS (P1,810.00) and thereafter accused used the said receipt to claim reimbursement with DKT
Philippines, Inc. represented by Atty. Edgar Borje and accused as a result of which received the amount of P1,810.00 to
her own benefit; to the damage and prejudice of the offended party in the amount to be proved during trial. Acts
committed contrary to the provision of Article 172, No. 2, in relation to Article 171, No. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
Tagbilaran City, (for Jagna, Bohol) February 10, 2005.4
On August 1, 2005, Navaja filed a Motion to Quash and Defer Arraignment5 on the ground that none of the essential
elements of the crime of falsification of private document occurred in Jagna, Bohol, hence, the MCTC had no jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the case due to improper venue.
In the Order dated November 2, 2005, the MCTC denied the motion to quash and set the case for arraignment, the
decretal portion of the Order reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the motion is DENIED, but considering however that accused has already submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court by filing cash bond for their respective temporary liberty, set this case for ARRAIGNMENT on
November 22, 2005, at 10:00 o'clock in the morning at the Session Hall, 10th MCTC, Jagna, Bohol.
The previous Court Order setting these cases for arraignment on November 09, 2005, is hereby set aside.
SO ORDERED.6
Navaja filed a motion for reconsideration of the November 2, 2005 Order, but the MCTC denied it in a Resolution7 dated
January 24, 2006.
Navaja filed a petition for certiorari8 before the RTC, assailing the November 2, 2005 Order and January 24, 2006
Resolution of the MCTC for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
On September 21, 2006, the RTC issued an Order denying the petition for certiorari for lack of legal basis or merit.9 On
Navaja's contention that the case for falsification of private document against her was filed with the MCTC which has no
jurisdiction due to wrong venue, hence, the RTC ruled:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The contention of the petitioner is untenable. As correctly pointed out by the MCTC, the improper venue was already
resolved squarely by the Regional State Prosecutor when he held that “there are sufficient evidences (sic) indicating that
the falsification took place in Jagna”.
This court notes that in that particular resolution, reference was made to the sworn statement of Ms. Cherly Lavaro who
narrated that after she issued the receipt to Ms. Navaja, the latter borrowed her pen and in her presence wrote
something on the said receipt. The Regional State Prosecutor then concluded that Ms. Lavaro's statement “describes an
apparent scheme or pattern of altering receipts right after issuance. The borrowing of the cashier's pen and the use
thereof must have been intended to create an impression that the receipt was prepared by the cashier herself.”
In the same affidavit, Ms. Lavaro corroborated the affidavit of another witness, which categorically states that Ms. Navaja
was in Jagna when the questioned receipt was issued.
If the court were to follow the logic of the petition, her claim that her request for reimbursement was made in Cebu City
not in Jagna, Bohol, would likewise give no showing or indication that the falsification was done in Cebu City. In other
words, the said contention would necessarily result in a “neither here no there” situation.10
Navaja elevated the case on appeal with the CA.
In the Decision dated August 28, 2007, the CA dismissed Navaja's appeal and affirmed in toto the September 21, 2006 RTC
Order.
Navaja filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied it in the Resolution dated May 7, 2008. Aggrieved, she filed
the instant petition for review on certiorari, raising the following issues:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I. THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF JAGNA, BOHOL[,] DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT CRIMINAL CASE.
i. Not one of the essential elements of the alleged crime of falsification of a private document was committed in Jagna,
Bohol.
ii. Venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional and cannot be presumed or established from the alleged acts of the petitioner
on a totally different and unrelated time and occasion.
iii. The strict rules on venue in criminal cases were established for the protection of the rights of the accused and to
prevent undue harassment and oppression.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
II. HEREIN PETITIONER PROPERLY AVAILED OF THE REMEDY OF FILING A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IN QUESTIONING
IMPROPER VENUE IN THE INSTANT CASE.
III. SETTLED LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE CLEARLY PERMITS THE FILING OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI TO QUESTION THE
DENIAL OF A MOTION TO QUASH.11
The petition lacks merit.
On the substantive issue of whether the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol, has jurisdiction over her case for falsification of a private
document, Navaja argues that not one of the three (3) essential elements12 of such crime was shown to have been
committed in Jagna, Bohol. She insists that there is no showing in the Information, or even in the complaint-affidavit and
the annexes thereto that the crime of falsification of a private document was committed or consummated in Jagna,
Bohol. In particular, the allegation in the complaint-affidavit that the subject receipt was issued by Garden Cafe in Jagna,
Bohol, cannot determine the venue because the place of issuance of the receipt is not an element of the said crime. It was
also impossible for her to have committed the crime in Jagna, Bohol, because the alleged request for reimbursement
under the Weekly Travel Expense Report for September 29 to October 4, 2003, was prepared and submitted on October
6, 2003 in Cebu City, while the subject receipt was issued on October 2, 2003 by Garden Cafe in Jagna, Bohol. She further
insists that at the time of the issuance of the subject receipt on October 2, 2003, the element of damage was absent,
hence, there is no crime of falsification of private document to speak of. She explains that any damage that private
respondent could have suffered would only occur when it pays the request for reimbursement in the Travel Expense
Report submitted on October 6, 2003, but not before that date, much less at time of the issuance of the said receipt.
Navaja's arguments are misplaced.
Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction.13 This principle was explained by the Court in Foz, Jr. v.
People,14 thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been
committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense
allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense
allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take
cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.15
In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which has jurisdiction over it, Section
15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality or territory where
the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure pertinently states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Place of commission of the offense. – The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood from its allegations
that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the
court, unless the particular place where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or is
necessary for its identification.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In Union Bank of the Philippines v. People,16 the Court said that both provisions categorically place the venue and
jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the court where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential
ingredients took place. In other words, the venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the
Information states that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court.
In cases of falsification of private documents, the venue is the place where the document is actually falsified, to the
prejudice of or with the intent to prejudice a third person, regardless whether or not the falsified document is put to the
improper or illegal use for which it was intended.17chanrobleslaw
Contrary to Navaja's argument that the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol, has no jurisdiction over the case because not one of the
essential elements of falsification of private document was committed within its jurisdiction, the allegations in the
Information and the complaint-affidavit make out a prima facie case that such crime was committed in Jagna, Bohol. In
particular, the Information clearly alleged that she committed such crime thereat, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about the 2nd day of October 2003, in the municipality of Jagna, province of Bohol, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to prejudice a juridical person, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial receipt No. 6729 of Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, by making
an alteration or intercalation in the said receipt No. 6729 from EIGHT HUNDRED TEN PESOS (P810.00) to ONE THOUSAND
EIGHT HUNDRED TEN PESOS (P1,810.00) and thereafter accused used the said receipt to claim reimbursement with DKT
Philippines, Inc. represented by Atty. Edgar Borje and accused as a result of which received the amount of P1,810.00 to
her own benefit; to the damage and prejudice of the offended party in the amount to be proved during trial. xxx18
Likewise, the Complaint-Affidavit dated February 18, 2004 alleged that the she committed the said crime in Jagna,
Bohol, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
“4. Among the expenses she reimbursed from DKT is the amount of Php1,810.00 she supposedly incurred at Garden's
Cafe, Jagna branch. Photocopy of the receipt dated 02 October 2003 she sent to the DKT office in Metro Manila is hereto
attached as Annex “C”.
5. However, upon recent field investigation of Navaja's expenses in Bohol, it was found that the actual amount she
incurred at Garden's (sic) Cafe is only Php810.00 Photocopy of the duplicate original official receipt (pink copy) certified
true and correct by the cashier of Garden's Cafe, Jagna is hereto attached as Annex “D”.
6. Evidently, Navaja falsified the receipt in Bohol upon receiving it with the intent of causing damage to DKT.”19
Guided by the settled rule that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations of the complaint or (g) When the CA’s findings are contrary to those by the trial court;
information and not by the result of proof20, the Court holds that Navaja's case for falsification of private document falls
within the territorial jurisdiction of the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol. (h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

Meanwhile, Navaja's defense that it was impossible for her to have committed the crime in Jagna, Bohol, cannot be (i) When the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs, are not disputed by the
sustained at this point where the prosecution has yet to present evidence to prove the material allegations of the charge respondent;
against her, which include the place where the subject receipt was falsified. However, given that the defense of lack of
jurisdiction due to improper venue may be raised at any stage of the proceeding, the Court stresses that if the evidence (j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
adduced during the trial would show that the crime was indeed committed outside its territorial jurisdiction, the MCTC record; or
should dismiss the case based on such ground.
(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered,
On Navaja's claim that there is no crime of falsification of private document to speak of because at the time of the would justify a different conclusion.27
issuance of the subject receipt on October 2, 2003, the element of damage was absent, the Court sustains the RTC ruling
Navaja failed to show that any of these circumstances is present.
that such damage need not be present, as Article 172 (2)21 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that mere
intent to cause such damage is sufficient.22chanrobleslaw
It also bears emphasis that the factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even more
weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of
Navaja further contends that the CA's reliance on the findings of the Regional State Prosecutor as to the sworn statement
support in the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.28 In this case, the
of a certain Cheryl Labarro23 for purposes of determining venue was misplaced, as her sworn statement pertains to an
CA, the RTC and the MCTC all agree that the issue of improper venue was already resolved by the Regional State
incident in Miravilla Resort in Tagbilaran City, which was entirely separate and distinct from the facts material to the case.
Prosecutor when he held that “there are sufficient evidences (sic) indicating that the falsification took place in
She adds that the CA's reliance on the said statement in upholding the venue of the case clearly runs afoul with the
Jagna.”29 The Court perceives no compelling reason to disturb such factual finding.
provisions of Section 34, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.24 She submits that nowhere in the Rules of Court is it allowed that
the actions of the accused on a different occasion maybe used to confer venue in another case, since venue must be
Anent Navaja's claim that the MCTC simply made reference to the findings of the Regional State Prosecutor without
determined solely and exclusively on the facts obtaining in the instant case and cannot be inferred or presumed from
specifying the factual and legal bases of its resolution, the Court finds that the RTC had squarely addressed such issue as
other collateral allegations.
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
This court notes that in that particular resolution, reference was made to the sworn statement of Ms. Cherly Lavaro who
The Court finds no merit in Navaja's foregoing contentions which boil down to the factual issue of whether the crime of
narrated that after she issued the receipt to Ms. Navaja, the latter borrowed her pen and in her presence wrote
falsification of private document was committed in Jagna, Bohol or in Cebu City.
something on the said receipt. The Regional State Prosecutor then concluded that Ms. Lavaro's statement “describes an
apparent scheme or pattern of altering receipts right after issuance. The borrowing of the cashier's pen and the use
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court states that petitions for review on certiorari "shall raise only questions of law
thereof must have been intended to create an impression that the receipt was prepared by the cashier herself.”
which must be distinctly set forth." In Pagsibigan v. People, et al.,25 the Court held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only questions of law. Questions of fact are not
In the same affidavit, Ms. Lavaro corroborated the affidavit of another witness, which categorically states that Ms. Navaja
reviewable. A question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set of facts. A question of fact
was in Jagna when the questioned receipt was issued.
exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
If the court were to follow the logic of the petition, her claim that her request for reimbursement was made in Cebu City
There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of
not in Jagna, Bohol, would likewise give no showing or indication that the falsification was done in Cebu City. In other
the evidence. The issue to be resolved must be limited to determining what the law is on a certain set of facts. Once the
words, the said contention would necessarily result in a “neither here no there” situation.30
issue invites a review of the evidence, the question posed is one of fact.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On Navaja's argument that the CA's reliance on Labarro's31 aforesaid statement in upholding the venue of the case
Whether the crime of falsification of private document was committed in Jagna, Bohol or in Cebu City, is a question of
violates Section 34, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,32 the Court holds that such evidentiary rule has no bearing in
fact. Indeed, in the exercise of its power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and, subject to certain exceptions, it
determining the place where the crime was committed for purposes of filing a criminal information which merely requires
does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the parties during trial.26 In certain
the existence of probable cause. In Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr.,33 the Court expounded on the concept of probable cause in
exceptional cases, however, the Court may be urged to probe and resolve factual issues, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
this wise:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and
reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining
probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of
(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of
evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is determined is whether there is
both the appellant and the appellee;
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to
secure a conviction.34
Also, Navaja insists that the rule on venue should have been construed liberally in favor her favor as the accused, and
strictly against private respondent, given its purpose of preventing harassment and inconvenience by compelling the
accused to appear in a different court from that of the province where the crime was committed. Yet, private respondent
willfully chose to prosecute separately the other cases for falsification of private document against her in different
jurisdictions, namely, Cebu City, Bacolod City, Iloilo City and Tagbilaran, Bohol, to harass and drain her financial resources,
when all these criminal cases, involving minimal amounts of actual damages,35 should have been filed in one (1) criminal
jurisdiction to avoid multiplicity of actions.
The Court overrules Navaja's assertions, and upholds the RTC's sound ruling thereon:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The petitioner's insistence that all the criminal complaints filed against her should be filed in one jurisdiction would be a
blatant violation of the law on jurisdiction as one cannot file a criminal case other than where the offense was allegedly
committed.
In short, if it so happens that several offenses are alleged to have been committed in different venues, then it is just
unfortunate that whatever complaints have to be filed, will have to filed in those different venues. To do otherwise would
be procedurally fatal.36
To stress, in criminal proceedings, improper venue is lack of jurisdiction because venue in criminal cases is an essential
element of jurisdiction.37 Unlike in a civil case where venue may be waived, this could not be done in a criminal case
because it is an element of jurisdiction. Thus, one cannot be held to answer for any crime committed by him except in the
jurisdiction where it was committed. Be that as it may, Section 5 (4), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
Court has the power to order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Consequently, where
there are serious and weighty reasons present, which would prevent the court of original jurisdiction from conducting a
fair and impartial trial, the Court has been mandated to order a change of venue so as to prevent a miscarriage of
justice.38 That private respondent filed several criminal cases for falsification in different jurisdictions, which unduly forced
Navaja to spend scarce resources to defend herself in faraway places can hardly be considered as compelling reason
which would prevent the MCTC from conducting a fair and impartial trial.
Besides, it is erroneous for Navaja to argue that the separate filing of the falsification cases she allegedly committed in
different jurisdictions would result in multiplicity of actions. Such separate filing of cases is only consistent with the
principles that there are as many acts of falsification as there are documents falsified39 and that the venue of such cases is
where the document was actually falsified40.
The Court now resolves the second and third procedural issues.
On the second issue, Navaja states that she did not commit a grave procedural error in filing a petition for certiorari from
the denial of her motion to quash. She posits that venue is an element of the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter of a criminal proceeding, and that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be interposed at any stage of
the proceeding. Thus, even if a party fails to file a motion to quash, the accused may still question the jurisdiction of the
court later on, and such objection may be raised or considered motu propio by the court at any stage of the proceeding or
on appeal.
On the third issue, Navaja asserts that the Supreme Court has allowed the filing of a petition for certiorari to question the
denial of a motion to quash in cases where grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or when the lower court
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. She claims that not only did the lower court commit grave abuse of discretion
in denying the motion to quash, but there is likewise the issue of improper venue that need to be settled with finality and
dispatch. In support of her assertion, she cites a ruling41 that when the court has no jurisdiction at the time of the filing of
the complaint, the court should dismiss the case, instead of ordering its transfer.
Apropos to the second and third procedural issues is Querijero v. Palmes-Limitar42 where the Court reiterated the
fundamental principle that an order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory and, therefore, not appealable, nor can it
be the subject of a petition for certiorari, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In Zamoranos v. People, this Court emphasized that “a special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail
the denial of a motion to quash an information. The established rule is that, when such an adverse interlocutory order is
rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith to certiorari, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an
unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law.”
On a number of occasions, however, Court had sanctioned a writ of certiorari as an appropriate remedy to assail an
interlocutory order in the following circumstances:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) when the court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion;
(2) when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and
expeditious relief;
(3) in the interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice;
(4) to promote public welfare and public policy; and
(5) when the cases have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration
thereof.43
As can be gleaned from the Court's discussion on the substantive issue of the case, Navaja failed to prove that any of the
said special circumstances obtains in this case, let alone the grave abuse of discretion she imputed against the MCTC.
Hence, the CA did not err in affirming the RTC ruling that the MCTC correctly denied her motion to quash.
Finally, the remaining factual issues raised by the parties need not be discussed further, as they are properly resolved in
due course of the proceedings in the instant case before the MCTC and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to
take an appeal in the manner authorized by law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated August 28, 2007 and the Resolution
dated May 7, 2008 in CA G.R. SP No. 02353 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
People vs Garfin
G.R. No. 153176
PUNO, J.:
For determination in this petition is a question in procedural law - - - whether an information filed by a state prosecutor
without the prior written authority or approval of the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state prosecutor should be
dismissed after the accused has entered his plea under the information.
Petitioner comes before us with a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court,
seeking to declare as null and void the Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 19 dated February
26, 2002[1] and April 3, 2002[2] which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the case of People vs. Serafin Saballegue, Criminal
Case No. RTC 2001-0597, and denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are undisputed.
On June 22, 2001, private respondent was charged with violation of Section 22(a) in relation to Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of
Republic Act No. 8282, otherwise known as the "Social Security Act," in an information which reads:
The undersigned State Prosecutor of the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor, Legazpi City, accuses SERAFIN
SABALLEGUE, as proprietor of Saballegue Printing Press with business address at 16 San Mateo St., Peñafrancia Ave., Naga
City for Violation of Section 22(a) in relation to Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of R.A. 8282 otherwise known as the Social
Security Act of 1997, committed as follows:
That on or about February 1990 and up to the present, in the City of Naga, Philippines, within the functional jurisdiction of
SSS Naga Branch and the territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, while being the
proprietor of Saballegue Printing Press, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally refuse and fail and
continuously refuse and fail to remit the premiums due for his employee to the SSS in the amount of SIX THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE PESOS (P6,533.00), Philippine Currency, representing SSS and EC premiums for the period from
January 1990 to December 1999 (n.i.), and the 3% penalty per month for late remittance in the amount of ELEVEN
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY-THREE PESOS and 28/100 (P11,143.28) computed as of 15 March 2000, despite lawful
demands by letter in violation of the above-cited provisions of the law, to the damage and prejudice of the SSS and the
public in general.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Legazpi City for Naga City. 22 June 2001.
(sgd.) ROMULO SJ. TOLENTINO
State Prosecutor
Special Prosecutor on SSS Cases
in Region V[3]
The information contains a certification signed by State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino which states:
I hereby certify that the required investigation in this case has been conducted by the undersigned Special Prosecutor in
accordance with law and under oath as officer of the court, that there is reasonable ground to believe that the offense
has been committed, that the accused is probably guilty thereof and that the filing of the information is with the prior
authority and approval of the Regional State Prosecutor.[4]
The case was raffled to Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City presided by respondent judge Hon. Zeida
Aurora B. Garfin. On September 24, 2001, accused Serafin Saballegue pleaded not guilty to the charge and the case was
set for pre-trial.[5] Three days thereafter, the accused filed a motion to dismiss[6] on the ground that the information was
filed without the prior written authority or approval of the city prosecutor as required under Section 4, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Court.[7]
The People, through State Prosecutor Tolentino, filed an opposition,[8] against which the accused filed a rejoinder.[9] The
People filed a reply to the rejoinder[10] on December 21, 2001. A rejoinder to the reply[11] was filed by the accused on
January 21, 2002.
After considering the arguments raised, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss in its first questioned Order dated
February 26, 2002, to wit:
After considering the respective arguments raised by the parties, the Court believes and so resolves that the Information
has not been filed in accordance with Section 4, par. 3 of Rule 112 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, thus:
'Rule 112, Section 4 x x x x x x
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority
or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.'
Expresio unius est exclusio alterius.
The Information will readily show that it has not complied with this rule as it has not been approved by the City
Prosecutor.
This Court holds that the defendant's plea to the Information is not a waiver to file a motion to dismiss or to quash on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. By express provision of the rules and by a long line of decisions, questions of want of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings (People vs. Eduarte, 182 SCRA 750).
The Supreme Court in Villa vs. Ibañez (88 Phil 402) dwelt on lack of authority of the officer who filed the information and
on jurisdiction at the same time, pertinent portions run as follows:
The defendant had pleaded to the information before he filed a motion to quash, and it is contended that by his plea he
waived all objections to the information. The contention is correct as far as formal objections to the pleadings are
concerned. But by clear implication, if not by express provision of section 10 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, and by a
long line of uniform decisions, questions of want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Now, the
objection to the respondent's actuations goes to the very foundations of jurisdiction. It is a valid information signed by a
competent officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused and the
subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity of the nature noted in the information cannot
be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.
Prosecutor Tolentino also contends that having been duly designated to assist the City Prosecutor in the investigation and
prosecution of all SSS cases by the Regional State prosecutor as alter ego of the Secretary of Justice in Region V, then that
authority may be given to other than the City Prosecutor. The Court finds this contention to be devoid of merit. The
Regional State Prosecutor is not the alter ego of the Secretary of Justice but a mere subordinate official and if ever the
former files cases, it is by virtue of a delegated authority by the Secretary of Justice. Potestas delegada non potesta
delegare (sic) what has been delegated cannot be redelegated.
In his opposition, the state prosecutor also attached a memorandum dated June 22, 2001 by Regional State Prosecutor
Santiago M. Turingan addressed to Provincial Prosecutor and City Prosecutors of Region V directing them to inhibit and to
append the following NOTATION after the certification in the Information for filing.
NOTATION: The herein City/Provincial Prosecutor is inhibiting from this case and the Special Prosecution Team on SSS
Cases in Region V is authorized to dispose of the case without my approval in view of the request for inhibition of the SSS
Regional Manager as granted by the Regional State Prosecutor.
A perusal of the Information, however, would readily show that nowhere in the Information has the City Prosecutor of
Naga City appended the above-quoted notation/inhibition. At most, the authority of the special prosecutor is only for the
conduct of preliminary investigations and the prosecution of cases after they are filed. The Court, however, believes that
the filing of this Information must be in conformity with the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 4 of Rule
112.
WHEREFORE, premises considered and for lack of jurisdiction, the Court hereby resolves to DISMISS this case without
pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.[12]
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the People contending that as a special prosecutor designated by the regional
state prosecutor to handle SSS cases within Region V, State Prosecutor Tolentino is authorized to file the information
involving violations of the SSS law without need of prior approval from the city prosecutor. [13] Letters of commendation
from Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño[14] and Secretary Hernando Perez[15] were offered as proof to show that State
Prosecutor Tolentino's authority to file the information was recognized. In response, the defense pointed out in its
opposition that the motion for reconsideration lacked a notice of hearing, hence it is pro forma or a mere scrap of
paper. [16]
On April 3, 2002, respondent judge issued the second questioned Order which reads:
Acting upon the Motion for Reconsideration filed by State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino, Special Prosecutor on SSS
cases in Region V, and it appearing that the same has failed to comply with the requirement of notice prescribed in
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, the same is hereby DENIED for being a mere scrap of paper.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Hence, this petition by the People through Regional State Prosecutor Santiago Turingan and State Prosecutor Romulo SJ.
Tolentino. Petitioner attributes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
respondent judge, viz:[18]
 1. RESPONDENT JUDGE DISMISSED THE INFORMATION WITHOUT THE REQUIRED SUPPORTING FACTUAL AND
LEGAL BASES;
2. RESPONDENT JUDGE DELIBERATELY AND CAPRICIOUSLY IGNORED THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN
FAVOR OF THE PROSECUTION WITHOUT THE REQUIRED SUFFICIENCY OF REBUTTAL EVIDENCE. THE WORD
"MAY" IN SEC. 4, RULE 112 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS NOT MANDATORY;
3. RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN DELIBERATELY IGNORING THE JUDICIALLY KNOWN
INHIBITION OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR AND THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER;
4. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HER DISCRETION IN INTERFERING WITH THE PURELY EXECUTIVE
FUNCTION OF FILING AN INFORMATION BY RULING ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE FILING OFFICER TO FILE THE
INFORMATION.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its comment[19] in compliance with this Court's Resolution dated September
23, 2002.[20] It opines that the dismissal of the information is mandated under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
Private respondent contends that:[21] 1) the instant petition was filed out of time; 2) the special State Prosecutor is only
authorized to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecution of SSS cases and not to sign the information; and 3) the
City Prosecutor did not expressly inhibit himself from handling SSS cases nor signing the information.
We shall first resolve the procedural issues. Respondent contends that the motion for reconsideration filed on April 1,
2002 is late because it was filed eighteen days after March 14, 2002, the date when petitioner received the first
questioned order. Respondent has overlooked that the 15th day after March 14 is a Good Friday. Hence, petitioner's last
day to file the motion for reconsideration was on the next working day after Good Friday, April 1.[22]
Next, respondent argues that having been considered as a mere scrap of paper, the motion for reconsideration of the
petitioner did not toll the running of the reglementary period. Respondent, however, erroneously assumes that the
present case is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45. As stated at the outset, this is an original petition for certiorari and
mandamus under Rule 65.
Sec. 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court is clear. It provides that "(a) pro forma motion for new trial or reconsideration shall
not toll the reglementary period of appeal." (emphases supplied) Hence, the same provision has no application in the case
at bar.
The reckoning date is the receipt of the second questioned Order and not the receipt of the first. Section 4, Rule 65, as
amended by En Banc Resolution A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, September 1, 2000, provides, viz:
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed.-- The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is
required or not, the sixty (60)- day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
xxx xxx xxx
As shown by the records, petitioner received the first questioned order dated February 26, 2002 on March 14, 2002.[23] A
motion for reconsideration was timely filed on April 1, 2002[24] which was dismissed for lack of notice of hearing in an
Order dated April 3, 2002.[25] This second questioned order was received by petitioner on April 11, 2002.[26] A motion for
extension of time to file a petition for review on certiorari was filed on April 18, 2002.[27] A motion for leave to file and
admit the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed on May 29, 2002.[28] Having been filed within the
reglementary period, petitioner's motion for leave to file the instant petition was granted in this Court's Resolution dated
July 15, 2002.[29]
We now come to the other issue: whether the prior written authority and approval of the city or provincial prosecutor or
chief state prosecutor is necessary in filing the information at bar.
Petitioner takes the unbending view that the approval of the city or provincial prosecutor is no longer required. It is
contended that the Regional State Prosecutor has already directed the city or provincial prosecutor to inhibit from
handling SSS cases.[30] Petitioner cites the letter of Regional State Prosecutor Santiago M. Turingan to SSS Regional
Director in Naga City dated June 6, 1997[31] and copies of Regional Orders No. 97-024-A[32] and 2001-033[33] dated July 14,
1997 and September 28, 2001, respectively, showing the designation of State Prosecutor Tolentino as special prosecutor
for SSS cases in Region V. Petitioner relies on Galvez, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.[34] and Sanchez v. Demetriou, et
al.[35] to prop up its contention that given the designation of State Prosecutor Tolentino, the city prosecutor need not
participate in the filing and prosecution of the information in the case at bar.
We disagree. Under Presidential Decree No. 1275, the powers of a Regional State Prosecutor are as follows:
Sec. 8. The Regional State Prosecution Office: Functions of Regional State Prosecutor. - The Regional State Prosecutor
shall, under the control of the Secretary of Justice, have the following functions:
a) Implement policies, plans, programs, memoranda, orders, circulars and rules and regulations of the Department of
Justice relative to the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases in his region.
b) Exercise immediate administrative supervision over all provincial and city fiscals and other prosecuting officers of
provinces and cities comprised within his region.
c) Prosecute any case arising within the region.
d) With respect to his regional office and the offices of the provincial and city fiscals within his region, he shall:
1) Appoint such member of subordinate officers and employees as may be necessary; and approve transfers of
subordinate personnel within the jurisdiction of the regional office.
2) Investigate administrative complaints against fiscals and other prosecuting officers within his region and submit his
recommendation thereon to the Secretary of Justice who shall, after review thereof, submit the appropriate
recommendation to the Office of the President: Provided, that where the Secretary of Justice finds insufficient grounds
for the filing of charges, he may render a decision of dismissal thereof.
3) Investigate administrative complaints against subordinate personnel of the region and submit his recommendations
thereon to the Secretary of Justice who shall have the authority to render decision thereon. (emphases supplied)
The power of administrative supervision is limited to "the authority of the department or its equivalent to generally
oversee the operations of such agencies and to insure that they are managed effectively, efficiently and economically but
without interference with day-to-day activities; or require the submission of reports and cause the conduct of
management audit, performance evaluation and inspection to determine compliance with policies, standards and
guidelines of the department; to take such action as may be necessary for the proper performance of official functions,
including rectification of violations, abuses and other forms of maladministration; and to review and pass upon budget
proposals of such agencies but may not increase or add to them."[36] This is distinguished from the power of "supervision
and control" which includes the authority "to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to
a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts
and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs; and prescribe
standards, guidelines, plans and programs."[37]
The Regional State Prosecutor is clearly vested only with the power of administrative supervision. As administrative
supervisor, he has no power to direct the city and provincial prosecutors to inhibit from handling certain cases. At most,
he can request for their inhibition. Hence, the said directive of the regional state prosecutor to the city and provincial
prosecutors is questionable to say the least.
Petitioner cannot lean on the cases of Galvez and Sanchez. In those cases, the special prosecutors were acting under the
directive of the Secretary of Justice. They were appointed in accordance with law. Nowhere in P.D. No. 1275 is the
regional state prosecutor granted the power to appoint a special prosecutor armed with the authority to file an
information without the prior written authority or approval of the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state prosecutor.
P.D. No. 1275 provides the manner by which special prosecutors are appointed, to wit:
Sec. 15. Special Counsels. - Whenever the exigencies of the service require the creation of positions of additional counsel
to assist provincial and city fiscals in the discharge of their duties, positions of Special Counsels may be created by any
province or city, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, and with salaries chargeable against provincial or city
funds. The Secretary of Justice shall appoint said Special Counsels, upon recommendation of the provincial or city fiscal
and regional state prosecutors concerned, either on permanent or temporary basis.
Special Counsel shall be appointed from members of the bar and shall be allowed not more than the salary rate provided
in this Decree for the lowest rank or grade of assistant fiscal in the province or city where assigned. (emphases supplied)
Under Department Order No. 318,[38] "Defining the authority, duties and responsibilities of regional state prosecutors,"
then Acting Secretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III ordered the appointed regional state prosecutors (which included
Regional State Prosecutor Turingan for Region V) to, among others, "(i)nvestigate and/or prosecute, upon the directive of
the Secretary of Justice, specific criminal cases filed within the region." (emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, there is no pretense that a directive was issued by the Secretary of Justice to Regional State Prosecutor
Turingan to investigate and/or prosecute SSS cases filed within his territorial jurisdiction. A bare reading of the alleged
letter of commendation by then Secretary Hernando Perez would show that it does not amount to a directive or even a
recognition of this authority. In fact, while the letter of Secretary Perez commends the efforts of Regional State
Prosecutor Turingan in successfully prosecuting SSS cases, it also negates his authority to prosecute them. Secretary Perez
called the Regional State Prosecutor's attention to DOJ Circular No. 27, series of 2001, which states that all important
cases of the SSS should be referred to the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel.[39] Thus, Regional State
Prosecutor Turingan cannot be considered a special prosecutor within the meaning of the law.
Petitioner argues that the word "may" is permissive. Hence, there are cases when prior written approval is not required,
and this is one such instance. This is too simplistic an interpretation. Whether the word "may" is mandatory or directory
depends on the context of its use. We agree with the OSG that the use of the permissive word "may" should be read
together with the other provisions in the same section of the Rule. The paragraph immediately preceding the quoted
provision shows that the word "may" is mandatory. It states:
Sec. 4, Rule 112. x x x
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he (investigating prosecutor) shall forward the record of the case to the provincial
or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their
receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such action. (emphasis supplied)
Having settled that the prior authority and approval of the city, provincial or chief state prosecutor should have been
obtained, we shall now resolve the more important issue: whether the lack of prior written approval of the city, provincial
or chief state prosecutor in the filing of an information is a defect in the information that is waived if not raised as an
objection before arraignment.
We hold that it is not.
The provisions in the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that demand illumination are Sections 3 and 9 of Rule 117
in relation to paragraph 3, Section 4 of Rule 112, to wit:
Rule 117, Section 3. Grounds. The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following
grounds:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a
motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or
failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds
provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule. (emphasis supplied)
Rule 112, Section 4, paragraph 3 provides, viz:
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority
or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy. (emphasis
supplied)
Private respondent and the OSG take the position that the lack of prior authority or approval by the city or provincial
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor is an infirmity in the information that prevented the court from acquiring jurisdiction
over the case. Since lack of jurisdiction is a defect that may be raised as an objection anytime even after arraignment, the
respondent judge did not err in granting the motion to dismiss based on this ground. As basis, they cite the case of Villa v.
Ibañez, et al.[40] where we held, viz:
The defendant had pleaded to an information before he filed a motion to quash, and it is contended that by his plea he
waived all objections to the informations. The contention is correct as far as formal objections to the pleadings are
concerned. But by clear implication, if not by express provision of section 10 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court (now
Section 9 of Rule 117), and by a long line of uniform decisions, questions of want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage
of the proceeding. Now, the objection to the respondent's actuations goes to the very foundation of the jurisdiction. It
is a valid information signed by a competent officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court
over the person of the accused and the subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity in
the information cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.[41] (emphasis supplied)
The case of Villa is authority for the principle that lack of authority on the part of the filing officer prevents the court from
acquiring jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law while jurisdiction over the
case is invested by the act of plaintiff and attaches upon the filing of the complaint or information.[42] Hence, while a court
may have jurisdiction over the subject matter, like a violation of the SSS Law, it does not acquire jurisdiction over the case
itself until its jurisdiction is invoked with the filing of the information.
In the United States, an information has been held as a jurisdictional requirement upon which a defendant stands trial.
Thus, it has been ruled that in the absence of probable cause, the court lacks jurisdiction to try the criminal offense.[43] In
our jurisdiction, we have similarly held that:
While the choice of the court where to bring an action, where there are two or more courts having concurrent jurisdiction
thereon, is a matter of procedure and not jurisdiction, as suggested by appellant, the moment such choice has been
exercised, the matter becomes jurisdictional. Such choice is deemed made when the proper complaint or information is
filed with the court having jurisdiction over the crime, and said court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, from which time the right and power of the court to try the accused attaches. (citations omitted) It is not for
the defendant to exercise that choice, which is lodged upon those who may validly file or subscribe to the complaint or
information under sections 2 and 3 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court. [44] (emphasis supplied)
A closer look at Villa would be useful in resolving the issue at hand. In that case, Atty. Abelardo Subido, Chief of the
Division of Investigation in the Office of the Mayor of Manila, was appointed by the Secretary of Justice as special counsel
to assist the City Fiscal of Manila in the cases involving city government officials or employees. Pursuant to his
appointment, Atty. Subido filed an information against Pedro Villa for falsification of a payroll. Atty. Subido's authority to
file the information was challenged on the ground that he was disqualified for appointment under Section 1686 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 144, to wit:
SEC. 1686. Additional counsel to assist fiscal. The Secretary of Justice may appoint any lawyer, being either a subordinate
from his office or a competent person not in the public service, temporarily to assist a fiscal or prosecuting attorney in the
discharge of his duties, and with the same authority therein as might be exercised by the Attorney General or Solicitor
General.[45]
We held, viz:
Appointments by the Secretary of Justice in virtue of the foregoing provisions of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended, were upheld in Lo Cham vs. Ocampo et al., 44 Official Gazette, 458, and Go Cam et al., vs. Gatmaitan et al., (47
Official Gazette, 5092). But in those cases, the appointees were officials or employees in one or another of the bureaus or
offices under the Department of Justice, and were rightly considered subordinates in the office of the Secretary of Justice
within the meaning of section 1686, ante.
The case at bar does not come within the rationale of the above decisions. Attorney Subido is a regular officer or
employee in the Department of Interior, more particularly in the City Mayor's office. For this reason, he belongs to the
class of persons disqualified for appointment to the post of special counsel.
That to be eligible as special counsel to aid a fiscal the appointee must be either an employee or officer in the Department
of Justice is so manifest from a bare reading of section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code as to preclude
construction. And the limitation of the range of choice in the appointment or designation is not without reason.
The obvious reason is to have appointed only lawyers over whom the Secretary of Justice can exercise exclusive and
absolute power of supervision. An appointee from a branch of the government outside the Department of Justice would
owe obedience to, and be subject to orders by, mutually independent superiors having, possibly, antagonistic interests.
Referring particularly to the case at hand for illustration, Attorney Subido could be recalled or his time and attention be
required elsewhere by the Secretary of Interior or the City Mayor while he was discharging his duties as public prosecutor,
and the Secretary of Justice would be helpless to stop such recall or interference. An eventuality or state of affairs so
undesirable, not to say detrimental to the public service and specially the administration of justice, the Legislature wisely
intended to avoId.
The application of the 1951 Villa ruling is not confined to instances where the person who filed the information is
disqualified from being a special prosecutor under Section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, but has
been extended to various cases where the information was filed by an unauthorized officer as in the case at bar. In Cruz,
Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,[46] the Court held that it is a fundamental principle that when on its face the information is
null and void for lack of authority to file the same, it cannot be cured nor resurrected by amendment. In that case, the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) conducted an investigation and filed an information with the
Sandiganbayan against petitioner Roman Cruz, Jr. charging him with graft and corruption. The petitioner sought to quash
the information on the ground that the crime charged did not constitute a "Marcos crony related crime" over which the
PCGG had authority to investigate and file an information. The Court found that the crime alleged in the information was
not among those which PCGG was authorized to investigate under Executive Orders No. 1 and 14 of then President
Corazon Aquino and ruled that the information was null and void. Of similar import is Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, et
al.[47] where we ruled that the information having been filed by an unauthorized party (the PCGG), the information was
fatally flawed. We noted that this defect is not a mere remediable defect of form, but a defect that could not be cured.
In Cudia v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[48] we also reiterated the Villa ruling. The accused in that case was apprehended in
Mabalacat, Pampanga for illegal possession of firearms and was brought to Angeles City where the headquarters of the
arresting officers was located. The City Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an information in the Regional Trial Court of
Angeles City. We invalidated the information filed by the City Prosecutor because he had no territorial jurisdiction, as the
offense was committed in Mabalacat, Pampanga and his territorial jurisdiction was only in Angeles City. We held that an
information, when required by law to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another.[49] Otherwise,
the court does not acquire jurisdiction.[50] It is a valid information signed by a competent officer which, among other
requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused and the subject matter thereof. The accused's
plea to an information may be a waiver of all formal objections to the said information but not when there is want of
jurisdiction. Questions relating to lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. An infirmity in the
information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by
express consent.[51]
Despite modifications of the provisions on unauthorized filing of information contained in the 1940 Rules of Criminal
Procedure under which Villa was decided, the 1951 Villa ruling continues to be the prevailing case law on the matter.[52]
The 1940 Rules of Court provided in Rule 113, Section 10 that, if the defendant fails to move to quash the complaint or
information before he pleads thereto, he shall be taken to have waived all objections which are grounds for a motion to
quash except (1) "when the complaint or information does not charge an offense" or (2) "the court is without
jurisdiction of the same." (emphasis ours) Among the enumerated grounds for a motion to quash under Section 2 of the
same Rule was "(t)hat the fiscal has no authority to file the information." With only the above two exceptions provided by
the 1940 Rules, the Court nevertheless made the Villa ruling that if the filing officer lacks authority to file the information,
jurisdiction is not conferred on the court and this infirmity cannot be cured by silence or waiver, acquiescence, or even by
express consent.
The 1940 Rules of Court was amended in 1964. With only minimal changes introduced, the 1964 Rules of Court contained
provisions on unauthorized filing of information similar to the above provisions of the 1940 Rules.[53]
Then came the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Lack of authority of the officer who filed the information was also a
ground for a motion to quash under these rules. The 1985 Rules also provided for waiver of the grounds for a motion to
quash under Rule 117, Section 8, but enumerated the following exceptions to the waiver: (a) the facts charged do not
constitute an offense; (b) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the
accused; (c) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; and (d) the accused has been previously convicted or in
jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted of the offense charged. Apparently, the want of jurisdiction under the 1985
Rules refers to jurisdiction over the offense and the person, and not over the case as in Villa where the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case for lack of authority of the officer who filed the information. Still, despite the
enumeration, the Court continued to apply the Villa ruling as shown in the afore-cited Cruz and Cudia cases.
The 1985 Rules was amended in 2000. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure also provide for lack of authority of
the filing officer as among the grounds for a motion to quash and the waiver of these grounds. Similar to the 1985 Rules,
the Revised Rules enumerate the exceptions from the waiver, namely: (a) that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense; (b) that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) that the criminal action or
liability has been extinguished; and (d) that the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense
charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. Under the regime of
the 2000 Revised Rules, we reiterated the Villa ruling in the above-cited Romualdez case. With the enumeration of the
four exceptions, which was almost a replica of the enumeration in the 1985 Rules, the 2000 Rules did not intend to
abandon Villa. The Villa ruling subsisted alongside the enumerated exceptions under the 1985 Rules, and it remains to do
so under the enumerated exceptions under the 2000 Rules. Neither the Rationale of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure nor the Minutes of the Meeting of the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court evinces any intent to
abandon the doctrine enunciated in Villa.
In sum, we hold that, in the absence of a directive from the Secretary of Justice designating State Prosecutor Tolentino as
Special Prosecutor for SSS cases or a prior written approval of the information by the provincial or city prosecutor, the
information in Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0597 was filed by an officer without authority to file the same. As this infirmity
in the information constitutes a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured, the respondent judge did not err in dismissing
the case for lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The respondent court's orders dated February 26, 2002 and
April 3, 2002 are AFFIRMED. Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0597 is DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of a new
information by an authorized officer.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 153284 April 17, 2007
REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR SANTIAGO M. TURINGAN, as alter ego of the Secretary of Justice in Region V and STATE
PROSECUTOR and SPECIAL PROSECUTOR ON SSS 1 CASES IN REGION V ROMULO SJ. TOLENTINO, in their official
capacities and for and in representation of the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and MARITES C. DE LA TORRE, in her official
capacity as counsel for the complainant Social Security System Bicol Cluster, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. ZEIDA AURORA B. GARFIN, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 19,
and MURIEL C. APOLINAR, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for certiorari and mandamus2 seeks the nullification of the March 13, 2002 and April 12, 2002 orders of
respondent Judge Zeida Aurora B. Garfin3 in Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0582 entitled People of the Philippines v. Muriel
C. Apolinar. The orders granted private respondent Muriel C. Apolinar’s motion to quash and denied petitioner state
prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino’s motion for reconsideration.
Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0582 arose from an Information charging Apolinar for violation of Section 22(a) in relation to
Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of RA 82824 for non-remittance of social security and employees’ compensation5 premiums of his
workers for the period January 1997 to December 1998, and nonpayment of the 3% monthly penalty for late remittance.
The Information, signed by state prosecutor Tolentino, read:
The undersigned State Prosecutor of the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor, Legazpi City, accuses MURIEL C.
APOLINAR, as a registered trimobile operator with business address at 108-1 San Mateo Street, Peñafrancia Avenue, Naga
City, for Violation of Section 22(a) in relation to Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of R.A. 8282[,] otherwise known as the Social
Security Act of 1997, committed as follows:
That on or about February 1997 and up to the present, in the City of Naga, Camarines Sur, Philippines, within the
functional jurisdiction of SSS Naga Branch and the territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named
accused while being a registered trimobile operator, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and criminally refuse and fail
and continuously refuse and fail to remit the premiums due for (sic) his employee to the SSS in the amount of TWO
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY SIX PESOS (₱2,256.00), Philippine Currency, representing SSS and EC premiums, for the
period from January 1997 to December 1998, and the 3% penalty per month for late remittance in the amount of TWO
THOUSAND FORTY EIGHT PESOS and 26/100 (₱2,048.26) computed as of 30 July 2000, despite lawful demands by letter in
violation of the above-citied provisions of the law, to the damage and prejudice of the SSS and the public in general.
CONTRARY TO LAW.61ªvvphi1.nét
The accompanying certification, also signed by state prosecutor Tolentino, read:
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE REQUIRED INVESTIGATION IN THIS CASE HAS BEEN CONDUCTED BY THE UNDERSIGNED
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND UNDER OATH AS OFFICER OF THE COURT, THAT THERE IS
REASONABLE GROUND TO BELIEVE THAT THE OFFENSE HAS BEEN COMMITTED, THAT THE ACCUSED IS PROBABLY GUILTY
THEREOF AND THAT THE FILING OF THE INFORMATION IS WITH THE PRIOR AUTHORITY AND APPROVAL OF THE
REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR.7
Prior to his arraignment, Apolinar moved for the quashing of the Information on the ground that state prosecutor
Tolentino lacked the authority to sign it.
On February 13, 2002, Tolentino opposed Apolinar’s motion. He contended that he was clothed with the authority to
investigate, file the necessary Information and prosecute SSS cases in view of his designation as special prosecutor for SSS
cases in Region V under Regional Order No. 97-024-A dated July 14, 1997.
In an order dated March 13, 2002,8 respondent Judge Garfin dismissed Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0582 for lack of
jurisdiction. State prosecutor Tolentino moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied in an order dated April 12,
2002.9 Thus, this petition.
The petition must be dismissed.
The issue in this petition — whether or not state prosecutor Tolentino had the authority to file the Information for
violation of RA 8282 despite the absence of a written authority or approval of the provincial or state prosecutor — is
similar to that in People v. Garfin.10 In that case, the same state prosecutor Tolentino charged Serafin Saballegue also for
violation of Section 22(a) in relation to Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of RA 8282. The certification accompanying the
Information (which was identical to the certification in the Information against Apolinar) was also signed by Tolentino.
The case was also raffled to the sala of respondent Judge Garfin.
Three days after pleading not guilty to the charge, Saballegue filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
Information was filed without the written authority or approval of the city prosecutor. This was opposed by Tolentino.
After considering the arguments of the parties, respondent Judge Garfin granted Saballegue’s motion. She denied the
motion for reconsideration filed by Tolentino.
Tolentino filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in this Court assailing respondent Judge Garfin’s orders granting
Saballegue’s motion to dismiss and denying the motion for reconsideration. This Court, thru Mr. Justice (now Chief
Justice) Puno, dismissed the petition and declared:
[I]n the absence of a directive from the Secretary of Justice designating State Prosecutor Tolentino as Special Prosecutor
for SSS cases or a prior written approval of the information by the provincial or city prosecutor, the information in
Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0597 was filed by an officer without authority to file the same. As this infirmity in the
information constitutes a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured, the respondent judge did not err in dismissing the
case for lack of jurisdiction.11
In this case, state prosecutor Tolentino lacked the authority to file the Information in Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0582
because there was neither a directive from the Secretary of Justice designating him as special prosecutor for SSS cases nor
the written approval of the Information by the city prosecutor. In accordance with Garfin, the Information suffered from a
jurisdictional defect. Respondent Judge Garfin correctly dismissed the case against Apolinar for lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Costs against state prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino.

G.R. No. 188832 April 23, 2014
VIVENCIO B. VILLAGRACIA, Petitioner,
vs.
FIFTH (5th) SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT and ROLDAN E. MALA, represented by his father Hadji Kalam T.
Mala, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Shari' a District Courts have no jurisdiction over real actions where one of the parties is not a Muslim.
This is a petition for certiorari with application for issuance of temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction
to set aside the Fifth (5th) Shari'a District Court's decision1 dated June 11, 2008 and order2 dated May 29, 2009 in SDC
Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200.
The facts as established from the pleadings of the parties are as follows:
On February 15, 1996, Roldan E. Mala purchased a 300-square-meter parcel of land located in Poblacion, Parang,
Maguindanao, now Shariff Kabunsuan, from one Ceres Cañete. On March 3, 1996, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-15633
covering the parcel of land was issued in Roldan’s name.3 At the time of the purchase, Vivencio B. Villagracia occupied the
parcel of land.4
By 2002, Vivencio secured a Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg. P-60192 issued by the Land Registration Authority
allegedly covering the same parcel of land.5
On October 30, 2006, Roldan had the parcel of land surveyed. In a report, Geodetic Engineer Dennis P. Dacup found that
Vivencio occupied the parcel of land covered by Roldan’s certificate of title.6
To settle his conflicting claim with Vivencio, Roldan initiated barangay conciliation proceedings before the Office of the
Barangay Chairman of Poblacion II, Parang, Shariff Kabunsuan. Failing to settle with Vivencio at the barangay level, Roldan
filed an action to recover the possession of the parcel of land with respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court.7
In his petition, Roldan alleged that he is a Filipino Muslim; that he is the registered owner of the lot covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 15633; and that Vivencio occupied his property, depriving him of the right to use, possess, and
enjoy it. He prayed that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court order Vivencio to vacate his property.8
Respondent court took cognizance of the case and caused service of summons on Vivencio. However, despite service of
summons, Vivencio failed to file his answer. Thus, Roldan moved that he be allowed to present evidence ex parte, which
motion respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court granted in its order9 dated January 30, 2008.10
In its decision11 dated June 11, 2008, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court ruled that Roldan, as registered owner, had
the better right to possess the parcel of land. It ordered Vivencio to vacate the property, turn it over to Roldan, and pay
₱10,000.00 as moderate damages and ₱5,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
On December 15, 2008, respondent Fifth Shari’a Distict Court issued the notice of writ of execution12 to Vivencio, giving
him 30 days from receipt of the notice to comply with the decision. He received a copy of the notice on December 16,
2008.13
On January 13, 2009, Vivencio filed a petition for relief from judgment with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction.14 In his petition for relief from judgment, Vivencio cited Article 155, paragraph (2) of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines15 and argued that Shari’a District Courts may only hear civil actions and proceedings if
both parties are Muslims. Considering that he is a Christian, Vivencio argued that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court
had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of Roldan’s action for recovery of possession of a parcel of land. He prayed that
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court set aside the decision dated June 11, 2008 on the ground of mistake.16
Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court ruled that Vivencio "intentionally [waived] his right to defend himself."17 It noted
that he was duly served with summons and had notice of the following: Roldan’s motion to present evidence ex parte,
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court’s decision dated June 11, 2008, and the writ of execution. However, Vivencio only
went to court "when he lost his right to assail the decision via certiorari."18
According to respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court, Vivencio cited the wrong provision of law. Article 155, paragraph (2)
of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines refers to the jurisdiction of Shari’a Circuit Courts, not of Shari’a
District Courts.19 It ruled that it had jurisdiction over Roldan’s action for recovery of possession. Regardless of Vivencio
being a non-Muslim, his rights were not prejudiced since respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court decided the case applying
the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines.20
Thus, in its order21 dated May 29, 2009, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court denied Vivencio’s petition for relief from
judgment for lack of merit. It reiterated its order directing the issuance of a writ of execution of the decision dated June
11, 2008.
Vivencio received a copy of the order denying his petition for relief from judgment on June 17, 2009.22
On August 6, 2009, Vivencio filed the petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order with
this court.23
In his petition for certiorari, Vivencio argued that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court acted without jurisdiction in
rendering the decision dated June 11, 2008. Under Article 143, paragraph (2)(b) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of
the Philippines,24 Shari’a District Courts may only take cognizance of real actions where the parties involved are Muslims.
Reiterating that he is not a Muslim, Vivencio argued that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of Roldan’s action. Thus, all the proceedings before respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court, including
the decision dated June 11, 2008, are void.25
In the resolution26 dated August 19, 2009, this court ordered Roldan to comment on Vivencio’s petition for certiorari. This
court subsequently issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation of the writ of execution against
Vivencio.27
On September 21, 2011, Roldan filed his comment28 on the petition for certiorari. He allegedly filed the action for
recovery of possession with the Shari’a District Court where "a more speedy disposition of the case would be obtained":29
1. That SDC Spl. Case No. 07-200 (Quieting of Title…) was duly filed with the Fifth (5th) Shariah District Court,
Cotabato City at the option of herein private respondent (petitioner below) who believed that a more speedy
disposition of the case would be obtained when the action is filed with the Shariah District Court than in the
Regional Trial Courts considering the voluminous pending cases at the Regional Trial Courts[.]30
On Vivencio’s claim that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction to decide the action for
recovery of possession because he is a non-Muslim, Roldan argued that no provision in the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines prohibited non-Muslims from participating in Shari’a court proceedings,
especially in actions where the Shari’a court applied the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Thus,
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court validly took cognizance of his action:
2. That the Shariah District Court is not a court exclusively for muslim litigants. No provision in the Code on
Muslim Personal Laws which expressly prohibits non-muslim to participate in the proceedings in the Shariah
Courts, especially in actions which applies the civil code and not the Code on Muslim Personal Laws;
3. The Shariah District Courts has jurisdiction over action for quieting of title filed by a muslim litigant since the
nature of the action involved mere removal of cloud of doubt upon one’s Certificate of Title. The laws applied
in this case is the Civil Code and other related laws, and not the Code on Muslim Personal Laws[.]31
Since respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had jurisdiction to decide the action for recovery of possession,
Roldan argued that the proceedings before it were valid. Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of Vivencio upon service on him of summons. When Vivencio failed to file his
answer, he "effectively waived his right to participate in the proceedings [before the Fifth Shari’a District
Court]"32 and he cannot argue that his rights were prejudiced:
4. That it is not disputed that herein petitioner (respondent below) was properly served with summons,
notices and other court processes when the SDC Spl. Case No. 07-200 was filed and heard in the Fifth (5th)
Shariah District Court, Cotabato City, but petitioner (respondent below) intentionally or without known
reason, ignore the proceedings;
5. That the main issue in the instant action for certiorari is whether or not herein petitioner (respondent
below) has effectively waived his right to participate in the proceedings below and had lost his right to appeal
via Certiorari; and the issue on whether or not the Fifth (5th) Shariah District Court has jurisdiction over an
action where one of the parties is a non-muslim;
6. That the Fifth (5th) Shariah District Court, Cotabato City acquired jurisdiction over the case and that the
same Court had correctly ruled that herein petitioner (respondent) intentionally waived his right to defend
himself including his right to appeal via certiorari;
7. That it is humbly submitted that when the Shariah District Court took cognizance of an action under its
concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Court, the law rules applied is not the Code on Muslim Personal
Laws but the Civil Code of the Philippines and the Revised Rules of Procedure, hence the same would not
prejudice the right of herein petitioner (respondent below)[.]33
In the resolution dated November 21, 2011, this court ordered Vivencio to reply to Roldan’s comment. On February 3,
2012, Vivencio filed his manifestation,34 stating that he would no longer file a reply to the comment as he had
"exhaustively discussed the issue presented for resolution in [his petition for certiorari]."35
The principal issue for our resolution is whether a Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction over a real action where one of
the parties is not a Muslim.
We also resolve the following issues:
1. Whether a Shari’a District Court may validly hear, try, and decide a real action where one of the parties is a
non-Muslim if the District Court decides the action applying the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines;
and
2. Whether a Shari’a District Court may validly hear, try, and decide a real action filed by a Muslim against a
non-Muslim if the non-Muslim defendant was served with summons.
We rule for petitioner Vivencio.
I
Respondent Fifth Shari’a District
Court had no jurisdiction to hear, try,
and decide Roldan’s action for
recovery of possession
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is "the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the
proceedings in question belong."36 This power is conferred by law,37 which may either be the Constitution or a statute.
Since subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of law, parties cannot choose, consent to, or agree as to what court or
tribunal should decide their disputes.38 If a court hears, tries, and decides an action in which it has no jurisdiction, all its
proceedings, including the judgment rendered, are void.39
To determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, the material allegations of the
complaint and the character of the relief sought are examined.40
The law conferring the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts is the Code of the Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.
Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, Shari’a District Courts have concurrent original jurisdiction with "existing civil
courts" over real actions not arising from customary contracts41 wherein the parties involved are Muslims:
ART 143. Original jurisdiction. – x x x x
(2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari’a District Court shall have original jurisdiction over:
xxxx
(b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1(d)42 wherein the parties involved are Muslims except
those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which shall fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal
Circuit Court; and
xxxx
When ownership is acquired over a particular property, the owner has the right to possess and enjoy it.43 If the owner is
dispossessed of his or her property, he or she has a right of action to recover its possession from the dispossessor.44 When
the property involved is real,45 such as land, the action to recover it is a real action;46 otherwise, the action is a personal
action.47 In such actions, the parties involved must be Muslims for Shari’a District Courts to validly take cognizance of
them.
In this case, the allegations in Roldan’s petition for recovery of possession did not state that Vivencio is a Muslim. When
Vivencio stated in his petition for relief from judgment that he is not a Muslim, Roldan did not dispute this claim.
When it became apparent that Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court should have motu proprio
dismissed the case. Under Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, if it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action based on the pleadings or the evidence on record, the court shall dismiss the claim:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in
the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same
cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no authority under the law to decide Roldan’s action because not all of the
parties involved in the action are Muslims. Thus, it had no jurisdiction over Roldan’s action for recovery of possession. All
its proceedings in SDC Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200 are void.
Roldan chose to file his action with the Shari’a District Court, instead of filing the action with the regular courts, to obtain
"a more speedy disposition of the case."48 This would have been a valid argument had all the parties involved in this case
been Muslims. Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts over real actions not
arising from customary contracts is concurrent with that of existing civil courts. However, this concurrent jurisdiction over
real actions "is applicable solely when both parties are Muslims"49 as this court ruled in Tomawis v. Hon.
Balindong.50 When one of the parties is not a Muslim, the action must be filed before the regular courts.
The application of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines by respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court does not
validate the proceedings before the court. Under Article 175 of the Muslim Code, customary contracts are construed in
accordance with Muslim law.51 Hence, Shari’a District Courts apply Muslim law when resolving real actions arising from
customary contracts.
In real actions not arising from contracts customary to Muslims, there is no reason for Shari’a District Courts to apply
Muslim law. In such real actions, Shari’a District Courts will necessarily apply the laws of general application, which in this
case is the Civil Code of the Philippines, regardless of the court taking cognizance of the action. This is the reason why the
original jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts over real actions not arising from customary contracts is concurrent with that
of regular courts.
However, as discussed, this concurrent jurisdiction arises only if the parties involved are Muslims. Considering that
Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction over Roldan’s action for recovery of
possession of real property. The proceedings before it are void, regardless of the fact that it applied the provisions of the
Civil Code of the Philippines in resolving the action.
True, no provision in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines expressly prohibits non-Muslims from
participating in Shari’a court proceedings. In fact, there are instances when provisions in the Muslim Code apply to non-
Muslims. Under Article 13 of the Muslim Code,52 provisions of the Code on marriage and divorce apply to the female party
in a marriage solemnized according to Muslim law, even if the female is non-Muslim.53 Under Article 93, paragraph (c) of
the Muslim Code,54 a person of a different religion is disqualified from inheriting from a Muslim decedent.55 However, by
operation of law and regardless of Muslim law to the contrary, the decedent’s parent or spouse who is a non-Muslim
"shall be entitled to one-third of what he or she would have received without such disqualification."56 In these instances,
non-Muslims may participate in Shari’a court proceedings.57
Nonetheless, this case does not involve any of the previously cited instances. This case involves an action for recovery of
possession of real property. As a matter of law, Shari’a District Courts may only take cognizance of a real action "wherein
the parties involved are Muslims."58 Considering that one of the parties involved in this case is not a Muslim, respondent
Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide the action for recovery of possession of real
property. The judgment against Vivencio is void for respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court’s lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action.
That Vivencio raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter only after respondent Fifth Shari’a District
Court had rendered judgment is immaterial. A party may assail the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over a subject matter
at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal.59 The reason is that "jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects
the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action."60
In Figueroa v. People of the Philippines,61 Venancio Figueroa was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
before the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. The trial court convicted Figueroa as charged. On appeal with the Court of
Appeals, Figueroa raised for the first time the issue of jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court to decide the case. Ruling
that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the crime charged, this court dismissed the criminal case despite the
fact that Figueroa objected to the trial court’s jurisdiction only on appeal.
In Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin,62 Johnny Pastorin filed a complaint for constructive dismissal against
Metromedia Times Corporation. Metromedia Times Corporation actively participated in the proceedings before the Labor
Arbiter. When the Labor Arbiter ruled against Metromedia Times, it appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission, arguing for the first time that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the complaint. According to
Metromedia Times, the case involved a grievance issue "properly cognizable by the voluntary arbitrator."63 This court set
aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter despite the fact that
the issue of jurisdiction was raised only on appeal.
There are exceptional circumstances when a party may be barred from assailing the jurisdiction of the court to decide a
case. In the 1968 case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,64 the Spouses Tijam sued the Spouses Sibonghanoy on July 19, 1948
before the Court of First Instance of Cebu to recover ₱1,908.00. At that time, the court with exclusive original jurisdiction
to hear civil actions in which the amount demanded does not exceed ₱2,000.00 was the court of justices of the peace and
municipal courts in chartered cities under Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
As prayed for by the Spouses Tijam in their complaint, the Court of First Instance issued a writ of attachment against the
Spouses Sibonghanoy. However, the latter filed a counter-bond issued by Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. Thus, the
Court of First Instance dissolved the writ of attachment.
After trial, the Court of First Instance decided in favor of the Spouses Tijam. When the writ of execution returned
unsatisfied, the Spouses Tijam moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.’s
bond. The Court of First Instance granted the motion. Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. moved to quash the writ of
execution, which motion the Court of First Instance denied. Thus, the surety company appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals sustained the Court of First Instance’s decision. Five days after receiving the Court of Appeals’
decision, Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss, arguing for the first time that the Court of First
Instance had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The Court of Appeals forwarded the case to this court for
resolution.
This court ruled that the surety company could no longer assail the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance on the
ground of estoppel by laches. Parties may be barred from assailing the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of
the action if it took them an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to object to the court’s jurisdiction.65 This is to
discourage the deliberate practice of parties in invoking the jurisdiction of a court to seek affirmative relief, only to
repudiate the court’s jurisdiction after failing to obtain the relief sought.66 In such cases, the court’s lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter is overlooked in favor of the public policy of discouraging such inequitable and unfair conduct.67
In Tijam, it took Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. 15 years before assailing the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.
As early as 1948, the surety company became a party to the case when it issued the counter-bond to the writ of
attachment. During trial, it invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance by seeking several affirmative reliefs,
including a motion to quash the writ of execution. The surety company only assailed the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance in 1963 when the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision. This court said:
x x x x Were we to sanction such conduct on [Manila Surety and Fidelity, Co. Inc.’s] part, We would in effect be declaring
as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel [the spouses
Tijam] to go up their Calvary once more.
The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.68
After this court had rendered the decision in Tijam, this court observed that the "non-waivability of objection to
jurisdiction"69 has been ignored, and the Tijam doctrine has become more the general rule than the exception.
In Calimlim v. Ramirez,70 this court said:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the
jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or
agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on
appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the
cited case of [Tijam v. Sibonghanoy]. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to
situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. x x x.71
Thus, the court reiterated the "unquestionably accepted"72 rule that objections to a court’s jurisdiction over the subject
matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This is because jurisdiction over the subject matter
is a "matter of law"73 and "may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties."74
In Figueroa,75 this court ruled that the Tijam doctrine "must be applied with great care;"76 otherwise, the doctrine "may
be a most effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice":77
x x x estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be applied rarely — only from necessity,
and only in extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with great care and the equity must be strong in
its favor. When misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel may be a most effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice.
x x x a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void. x x x. No laches will even attach when the
judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction x x x.78
In this case, the exceptional circumstances similar to Tijam do not exist. Vivencio never invoked respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court’s jurisdiction to seek affirmative relief. He filed the petition for relief from judgment precisely to assail the
jurisdiction of respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court over Roldan’s petition for recovery of possession.
Thus, the general rule holds. Vivencio validly assailed the jurisdiction of respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court over the
action for recovery of possession for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of Roldan’s action.
II
That respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court served summons on
petitioner Vivencio did not vest it
with jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner Vivencio
Roldan argued that the proceedings before respondent Shari’a District Court were valid since the latter acquired
jurisdiction over the person of Vivencio. When Vivencio was served with summons, he failed to file his answer and waived
his right to participate in the proceedings before respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court. Since Vivencio waived his right to
participate in the proceedings, he cannot argue that his rights were prejudiced.
Jurisdiction over the person is "the power of [a] court to render a personal judgment or to subject the parties in a
particular action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the action."79 A court acquires jurisdiction over the person
of the plaintiff once he or she files the initiatory pleading.80 As for the defendant, the court acquires jurisdiction over his
or her person either by his or her voluntary appearance in court81 or a valid service on him or her of summons.82
Jurisdiction over the person is required in actions in personam83 or actions based on a party’s personal liability.84 Since
actions in personam "are directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments,"85 it is necessary that the parties
to the action "are properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard."86 With respect to the
defendant, he or she must have been duly served with summons to be considered properly impleaded; otherwise, the
proceedings in personam, including the judgment rendered, are void.87
On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person is not necessary for a court to validly try and decide actions in
rem.88 Actions in rem are "directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect
thereto as against the whole world."89 In actions in rem, the court trying the case must have jurisdiction over the res, or
the thing under litigation, to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either "by the seizure of
the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or as a result of the institution of
legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective."90 In actions in rem, summons must
still be served on the defendant but only to satisfy due process requirements.91
Unlike objections to jurisdiction over the subject matter which may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, objections
to jurisdiction over the person of the defendant must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; otherwise, the
objection to the court’s jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is deemed waived. Under Rule 9, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court, "defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived."
In this case, Roldan sought to enforce a personal obligation on Vivencio to vacate his property, restore to him the
possession of his property, and pay damages for the unauthorized use of his property.92 Thus, Roldan’s action for recovery
of possession is an action in personam. As this court explained in Ang Lam v. Rosillosa and Santiago,93 an action to recover
the title to or possession of a parcel of land "is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it
concerns the right to a tangible thing."94 Also, in Muñoz v. Yabut, Jr.,95 this court said that "a judgment directing a party to
deliver possession of a property to another is in personam. It is binding only against the parties and their successors-in-
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action."96
This action being in personam, service of summons on Vivencio was necessary for respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court
to acquire jurisdiction over Vivencio’s person.
However, as discussed, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action,
with Vivencio not being a Muslim. Therefore, all the proceedings before respondent Shari’a District Court, including the
service of summons on Vivencio, are void.
III
 The Shari’a Appellate Court and the
Office of the Jurisconsult in Islamic
law must now be organized to
effectively enforce the Muslim legal
system in the Philippines

We note that Vivencio filed directly with this court his petition for certiorari of respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court’s
decision. Under the judicial system in Republic Act No. 9054,97 the Shari’a Appellate Court has exclusive original
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari of decisions of the Shari’a District Courts. He should have filed his petition for
certiorari before the Shari’a Appellate Court.

However, the Shari’a Appellate Court is yet to be organized.1âwphi1 Thus, we call for the organization of the court system G.R. No. 138596 October 12, 2000
created under Republic Act No. 9054 to effectively enforce the Muslim legal system in our country. After all, the Muslim
legal system – a legal system complete with its own civil, criminal, commercial, political, international, and religious
SR. FIDELIS ARAMBULO, petitioner,
laws98 – is part of the law of the land,99 and Shari’a courts are part of the Philippine judicial system.100
vs.
HON. HILARION LAQUI, SR. HELEN OJARIO and SR. BERNADINE JUAREZ, respondents.
Shari’a Circuit Courts and Shari’a District Courts created under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines shall
continue to discharge their duties.101 All cases tried in Shari’a Circuit Courts shall be appealable to Shari’a District
DECISION
Courts.[[102]

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
The Shari’a Appellate Court created under Republic Act No. 9054 shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases tried in
the Shari’a District Courts.103 It shall also exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
habeas corpus, and other auxiliary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.104 The decisions of the Shari’a Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 47089
Appellate Court shall be final and executory, without prejudice to the original and appellate jurisdiction of this court.105 promulgated on March 01, 1999 and the subsequent Resolution3 dated May 11, 1999 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
This court held in Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong106 that "until such time that the Shari’a Appellate Court shall have been
organized,"107 decisions of the Shari’a District Court shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals and "shall be referred to a The facts of the case, as summarized by the appellate court, are as follows:
Special Division to be organized in any of the [Court of Appeals] stations preferably composed of Muslim [Court of
Appeals] Justices."108 However, considering that To m a w i s was not yet promulgated when Vivencio filed his petition for
"On February 2, 1994, private respondents filed a joint complaint-affidavit for libel against petitioners before the Office of
certiorari on August 6, 2009, we take cognizance of Vivencio’s petition for certiorari in the exercise of our original
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City alleging that the latter circulated on December 21, 1993 a letter containing malicious
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari.109
imputations against them.

Moreover, priority should be given in organizing the Office of the Jurisconsult in Islamic law. A Jurisconsult in Islamic law
or "Mufti" is an officer with authority to render legal opinions or "fatawa"110 on any questions relating to Muslim
law.111 These legal opinions should be based on recognized authorities112 and "must be rendered in precise accordance
with precedent."113 In the Philippines where only Muslim personal laws are codified, a legal officer learned in the Qur’an
and Hadiths is necessary to assist this court as well as Shari’a court judges in resolving disputes not involving Muslim
personal laws.
All told, Shari’a District Courts have jurisdiction over a real action only when the parties involved are Muslims.
Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of Roldan E. Mala’s action for
recovery of possession considering that Vivencio B. Villagracia is not a Muslim. Accordingly, the proceedings in SDC
Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200, including the judgment rendered, are void.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court’s decision dated June 11, 2008
and order dated May 29, 2009 in SDC Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200 are SET ASIDE without prejudice to the filing of
respondent Roldan E. Mala of an action with the proper court.
SO ORDERED.
An information for libel then was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City on May 18, 1994.
After the prosecution presented its evidence, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence. Without resolving the incident, the
Metropolitan Trial Court in its Order dated November 9, 1996 ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the case as the same
falls under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, and ordered that the case be forwarded to
the RTC for further proceedings.
On November 29, 1996, the case was forwarded to branch 215 Regional Trial Court of Quezon City docketed as Criminal
Case No. 96-6870.
On January 3, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and prescription of the
offense of Libel. The RTC dismissed the case in an Order dated April 2, 1997 but, stating that the offense had not yet
prescribed, ordered the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to re-file the Information for Libel with the RTC.
On April 27, 1997, the Information for Libel was re-filed with respondent court docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-97-
70948.
On June 17, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to quash on the ground of prescription. The motion was denied in the assailed
Resolution dated October 3, 1997.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was also denied in the other Assailed Order dated December 4, 1997."4
Not satisfied with the Resolution and Order of the trial court, herein petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals raising
the issue of "whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion or grossly erred in holding that the
offense of libel in the instant case has not yet prescribed."5 The Court of Appeals, in its decision dated March 01, 1999,
upheld the contention of the trial court that the offense of libel had not yet prescribed and consequently, dismissed the
said petition. The appellate court likewise denied herein petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution dated
May 11, 1999.6
Petitioner is now before this Court seeking a reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals and contending that -
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL HAS NOT YET PRESCRIBED.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT BEEN DENIED HER CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL.7
Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the crime of libel prescribes in one (1) year, to wit:
"ART. 90. Prescription of crime.- Crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in
twenty years.
Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.
Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in 10 years; with the exception of those punishable by arresto
mayor, which shall prescribe in five years.
The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year." (underscoring supplied)
The said prescriptive period is computed under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, as follows:
"Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing
of the complaint or information, and shall proceed to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused
being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago."
In the case at bench, the offense of libel allegedly occurred on December 21, 1993 when petitioner circulated a letter
containing allegedly malicious imputations against private respondents Srs. Helen Ojario and Bernadine Juarez. At this
point, the period of prescription for the alleged crime had already started to run.
The one-year period of prescription for the crime was interrupted on February 2, 1994 when respondents filed a joint
complaint-affidavit8 for libel against petitioner before the Office of the city Prosecutor in Quezon city. At this point, the
prescription period had already run for forty-two (42) days.
A preliminary investigation by the Office of the City prosecutor was thus conducted. On April 27, 1994, Asst. City
Prosecutor Ma. Aurora Escasa-Ramos issued a Resolution stating that probable cause exists against petitioner and
recommended the filing of an information for libel against her. Consequently, an information9 for libel was filed against
petitioner on May 18, 1994 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 3210
Despite the fact that the Metropolitan Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the crime of libel, the said court proceeded to
conduct trial on the merits. After the prosecution had rested, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence dated September
18, 1996. However, instead of acting on the said demurrer, the Metropolitan Trial court, on November 08, 1996, issued an
Order11 ruling that it had no jurisdiction over the crime of libel as the same falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court. Instead of dismissing the case outright, the MTC ordered the forwarding of the records of the case to
the Regional Trial Court for further proceedings. The case was eventually raffled off to Branch 215 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City12
On the basis of a Motion to Dismiss13 filed by petitioner, Branch 215 of the Regional Trial Court dismissed the case on April
2, 1997 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as the information against petitioner should have been re-filed anew. The
court ruled, however, that the crime had not yet prescribed and ordered the re-filling of the case14 . On April 27, 1997, the
Office of the City Prosecutor re-filed the case with the Regional Trial Court and eventually the same was raffled to Branch
218 of the said court15 . Petitioner tried to have this case dismissed on the ground of prescription but her motion to
quash16 the information was denied by Branch 218 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court in a Resolution 17 dated October
3, 1997. The denial by the Regional Trial Court of petitioner’s motion to quash was subsequently upheld by the Court of
Appeals.
It is the contention of petitioner that the prescription period for the crime of libel charged against her commenced to run
again when the Assistant City prosecutor recommended the filing of the information for libel. Petitioner further argues
that the prescriptive period could have been interrupted again had the information been filed with the Regional Trial
Court, the court with the proper jurisdiction to try the case for libel. Considering however that the case was filed before
the Metropolitan Trial Court, which under the law does not have jurisdiction over the crime of libel, the period of
prescription continued to run its course. Consequently, petitioner concludes that when the information for libel was
finally filed with the Regional Trial Court, the crime had already prescribed and the State can no longer pursue the case
against her.
In support of her arguments, petitioner questions the reliance made by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals
in the landmark case of People vs. Olarte18 Petitioner submits that the adherence to the Olarte case must be examined
considering that in the said case, the principal issue was whether or not the filing of a complaint in the Municipal Trial
Court for purposes of preliminary investigation, interrupts the period of prescription of a crime. Petitioner argues that the
cited case is inapplicable as it is not disputed in the case at bench that the period of prescription was interrupted during
the process of preliminary investigation.
We are not persuaded.
In the landmark case of People vs. Olarte, this Court speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, finally resolved the then
conflicting views as to whether or not the filing of a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court for purposes of preliminary
investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period for the crime. The Court restated the correct and prevailing
doctrine, as follows:
"In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for the Bench and Bar, this Court has reexamined
the question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the
one established by the decisions holding that the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for
purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the
criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on the merits.
Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal code, in declaring that the period
of prescription ‘shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information’ without distinguishing whether the
complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second ,
even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations
already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party
the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may
do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.
And it is no argument that Article 91 also expresses that the interrupted prescription ‘shall commence to run again when
such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted’, thereby indicating that the court in which
the complaint or information is filed must have the power to convict or acquit the accused. Precisely, the trial on the
merits usually terminates in conviction or acquittal, not otherwise. But it is in the court conducting a preliminary
investigation where the proceedings may terminate without conviction or acquittal, if the court should discharge the
accused because no prima facie case had been shown."
Subsequently, this Court, in Francisco vs. Court of Appeals19 , broadened the scope of Olarte by holding that the filing of
the complaint with the fiscal’s office also suspends the running of the prescriptive period.
Petitioner insists that the ruling in Olarte with respect to the interruption of the prescriptive period is not applicable. In
the case at bench, the fact that the period of prescription was interrupted by the filing of private respondents’ joint
affidavit with the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office is not disputed. The Olarte case, however, makes several other
pronouncements that are determinative of the issues raised by petitioner.
It is clear from the Olarte case that the filing of the complaint or information for purposes of preliminary investigation
represents the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. This is one of the reasons why such filing is deemed as
having interrupted the period of prescription for the prosecution of a crime. This period of prescription commences to run
again when the proceedings terminate without conviction or acquittal, "if the court (or prosecutor) should discharge the
accused because no prima facie case has been shown."20
It is thus evident that petitioner’s first premise that the period of prescription commenced to run again when the Quezon
City prosecutor’s Office recommended the filing of a criminal complaint against her is incorrect. When the City Prosecutor
recommended the filing of libel charges against petitioner, the proceedings against her were not terminated, precisely
because a prima facie case for libel was found against her. Instead of terminating the proceedings against petitioner, the
resolution of the city prosecutor actually directed the continuation of the proceedings against the petitioner by the filing
of the appropriate information against her and by the holding of trial on the merits. As such, when the information for
libel was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court, the period of prescription for the crime was still suspended.
Another important teaching in Olarte is that "it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on
account of delays that are not under his control." This is because in criminal prosecutions, the only thing that the victim of
the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.1âwphi1
In the case at bench, private respondents were not remiss in their right to seek grievance against respondent as they filed
their complaint before the city prosecutor forty-two days after the alleged crime of libel occurred. It was the Office of the
City Prosecutor that committed an error when it filed the complaint with the Metropolitan Trial Court.
The error was probably due to the confusion as to the proper venue for the crime of libel brought about by the passage of
R.A. 769121 which took effect on April 15, 1994. Under Section 2 of the said Republic Act, the jurisdiction of Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts was expanded to include all offenses punishable
with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years. However, libel, which is punishable by imprisonment ranging from six
months and one day to four years22 is not covered as the said law excludes from its coverage cases within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts23 . Under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, the information for libel should be
filed with the Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial Court. The confusion was cleared up when this Court issued
Administrative Order No. 104-96 dated October 21, 1996 which categorically stated that "LIBEL CASES SHALL BE TRIED BY
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THEM TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS." 24
Evidently, branch 215 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City was not spared the confusion brought about by R.A.
7691, as its dismissal of the case then pending before it was made only on November 8, 1996 or more than two years
after it had taken cognizance of the case. Notably, the dismissal by the Metropolitan Trial Court took place a mere
eighteen (18) days after the issuance of S.C. Administrative Order No. 104-96.
The mistake of the Office of the City Prosecutor in filing the complaint and of the Metropolitan Trial Court in taking
cognizance of the case was thus understandable. The error was immediately rectified by the said court upon realizing its
mistake when it ruled it was the Regional Trial Court which had the proper jurisdiction over the case. This mistake should
not operate to prejudice the interest of the state to prosecute criminal offenses and, more importantly, the right of the
offended party to obtain grievance.
Moreover, the doctrine in People vs. Olarte, as applied in later cases, was not meant to apply solely to cases where the
filing of the complaint with the municipal trial court or the prosecutor’s office operates to interrupt the prescription
period for the prosecution of a crime.
In People vs. Galano25 , an information was filed with the Batangas Regional Trial Court even though the evidence of both
the prosecution and defense shows that the crime was committed in Manila. This Court, applying People vs. Olarte, held
that it was only when the trial court dismissed the case due to lack of jurisdiction that "the proceedings therein
terminated without conviction and acquittal and it was only then that the prescriptive period (which was interrupted
during the during the pendency of the case in the Batangas Court) commenced to run again."
In People vs. Enrile26 , informations were filed against civilians before military tribunals which had no jurisdiction over the
persons of these civilians. These civilians questioned the re-filing of the cases against them before the civil courts raising,
among others, that the crimes for which they are being charged have already prescribed. This Court, applying by analogy
the ruling in the Olarte case, threw out the defense of prescription and held that "the filing of the first indictments
suspended the running of the prescriptive period, and the prosecutions under the informations to be filed should be
regarded as mere continuations of the previous proceedings." At the very least, the Court ruled, "the filing of the first
charges should be considered as having interrupted the prescriptive period notwithstanding the lack of jurisdiction of the
military tribunal in which they were filed."
More recently, in the case of Reodica vs. Court of Appeals27 , an information for reckless imprudence resulting in damage
to property with slight physical injuries was filed with the Regional Trial Court even though the offense was within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. The Court, even as it dismissed the cases pending before the Regional
Trial Court for lack of jurisdiction, disregarded the defense of prescription raised by the accused. The Court,
citing Olarte and the subsequent cases of Francisco vs. Court of Appeals28 and People vs. Cuaresma29 , ruled that "the
prescriptive period for the quasi offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal’s office
three days after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the termination of the case."
From these cases, it is clear that the Apellate Court committed no reversible error in ruling that the offense of libel
charged against petitioner had not yet prescribed. The period of prescription for the crime was interrupted when the
complaint was lodged with the Office of the City Prosecutor and remained tolled pending the termination of the case
against petitioner. Branch 218 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, therefore, correctly assumed jurisdiction over
the case of petitioner as the offense of libel for which she was being charged has not yet prescribed.
Petitioner’s other argument that she has been denied her right to a speedy trial deserves scant consideration. Well-
established is the doctrine that the right to a speedy trial is violated only where there is an unreasonable, vexatious and
oppressive delay without participation or fault of the accused, or when unjustified postponements are sought which
prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time30 . In the case at bench, besides the filing of the petitions before the
Court of Appeals and this Court, petitioner had likewise filed a Motion to Quash and a Motion for Reconsideration with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 218. As such, it is clear that petitioner is not without fault in the delay in
the prosecution of the case against her.
specifically the provision on Public Utility Revenues, as well as the assumption by the government of the liabilities of
PIATCO in the event of the latter's default under Article IV, Section 4.04 (b) and (c) in relation to Article 1.06 of the
Concession Agreement, which terms are more beneficial to PIATCO while manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government of the Republic of the Philippines.4
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090.

On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit:

Wherefore, the petition is hereby DENIED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 1, 1999 is hereby
AFFIRMED.
The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today within which to show cause why this case should not be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused considering that the accused is a private person and the
SO ORDERED.
public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an accused in this case.5

G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014

The prosecution complied with the above Order contending that the SB has already acquired jurisdiction over the person
of respondent by reason of his voluntary appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation and when he posted bail.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, The prosecution also argued that the SB has exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if he is a private person,
vs. because he was alleged to have conspired with a public officer.6
HENRY T. GO, Respondent.
On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash7 the Information filed against him on the ground that the operative
DECISION facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the show cause
order of the SB, also contended that, independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he
was alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated by any official authority as a
PERALTA, J.:
government agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution1 of the Third Division2 of the Sandiganbayan
The prosecution filed its Opposition.8
(SB) dated June 2, 2005 which quashed the Information filed against herein respondent for alleged violation of Section 3
(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution, pertinent portions of which read thus:
The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision3in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts awarded by the Government, through the Department of Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T. Go dated April 22, 2005, and it appearing that Henry T. Go, the
Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction, operation lone accused in this case is a private person and his alleged co-conspirator-public official was already deceased long
and maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). Subsequent before this case was filed in court, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the Court grants the Motion to
to the above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against several Quash and the Information filed in this case is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed.9
individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those charged was herein respondent, who was then the Chairman
and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:
entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.

I
On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict, among others,
herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was likewise a finding of probable cause against
Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AND IN DISMISSING
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090 ON THE GROUND THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO.
Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged before the SB as follows:

II
On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the late ARTURO ENRILE, then Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC), committing the offense in relation to his office and taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN
with accused, HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE, IN RULING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a Concession Agreement, after the project for the RESPONDENT GO DESPITE THE IRREFUTABLE FACT THAT HE HAS ALREADY POSTED BAIL FOR HIS PROVISIONAL LIBERTY
construction of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to
Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which Concession Agreement substantially amended the draft Concession Agreement III
covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957, as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT law),
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED WHEN, IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IT QUASHED THE INFORMATION AND DISMISSED CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2809010
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
The elements of the above provision are:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.11
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers,
may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance
with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting
graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.12 This is the controlling doctrine as enunciated by this Court in
previous cases, among which is a case involving herein private respondent.13
The only question that needs to be settled in the present petition is whether herein respondent, a private person, may be
indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have
conspired, has died prior to the filing of the Information.
Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no public officer who was charged in the
Information and, as such, prosecution against respondent may not prosper.
The Court is not persuaded.
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with whom respondent can be
charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no
longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of
Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of
conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that
there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019.14 Were it
not for his death, he should have been charged.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that
such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not require
that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the
public officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the
private person may be indicted alone.
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for conspiracy.15 If two or more persons
enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of
each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor.16 This means that everything said, written or done by any of the
conspirators in execution or furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or written by each
of them and it makes no difference whether the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at the time of trial.17 The
death of one of two or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or survivors.18 Thus, this Court
held that:
x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire alone. The crime depends upon the joint
act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one person cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So long as
the acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does not remove the bases of a charge for conspiracy, one defendant may be
found guilty of the offense.19
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as alleged in the Information filed against respondent, which is
deemed hypothetically admitted in the latter's Motion to Quash, he (respondent) conspired with Secretary Enrile in
violating Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 and that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Hence, the criminal liability
incurred by a co-conspirator is also incurred by the other co-conspirators.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed policy of the State and the legislative intent to repress "acts
of public officers and private persons alike, which constitute graft or corrupt practices,"20 would be frustrated if the death
of a public officer would bar the prosecution of a private person who conspired with such public officer in violating the
Anti-Graft Law.
In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early case of People v. Peralta21 as to the nature of and the principles
governing conspiracy, as construed under Philippine jurisdiction, is instructive, to wit:
x x x A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except when the law specifically provides a penalty therefor as in
treason, rebellion and sedition. The crime of conspiracy known to the common law is not an indictable offense in the
Philippines. An agreement to commit a crime is a reprehensible act from the view-point of morality, but as long as the
conspirators do not perform overt acts in furtherance of their malevolent design, the sovereignty of the State is not
outraged and the tranquility of the public remains undisturbed.
However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is committed by two or more malefactors, the
existence of a conspiracy assumes pivotal importance in the determination of the liability of the perpetrators. In stressing
the significance of conspiracy in criminal law, this Court in U.S. vs. Infante and Barreto opined that
While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of conspiring to commit a crime unless the statute
specifically prescribes a penalty therefor, nevertheless the existence of a conspiracy to commit a crime is in many cases a
fact of vital importance, when considered together with the other evidence of record, in establishing the existence, of the
consummated crime and its commission by the conspirators.
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent
and character of their respective active participation in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance
of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the
sound principle that "when two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical
volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contributes to the
wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by himself alone." Although it is axiomatic
that no one is liable for acts other than his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is
responsible for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of
collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one case where this Court held that x x x it is impossible to
graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into consideration the close and inseparable relation
of each of them with the criminal act, for the commission of which they all acted by common agreement x x x. The crime
must therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the x x x accused, be regarded as the
act of the band or party created by them, and they are all equally responsible x x x
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the commission of the felony
proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not
speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of
the crime. Of course, as to any conspirator who was remote from the situs of aggression, he could be drawn within the
enveloping ambit of the conspiracy if it be proved that through his moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators the
latter were moved or impelled to carry out the conspiracy.
In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming and execution of the crime amply justifies the
imputation to all of them the act of any one of them. It is in this light that conspiracy is generally viewed not as a separate
indictable offense, but a rule for collectivizing criminal liability.
xxxx
x x x A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators who
acted in furtherance of the common design are liable as co-principals. This rule of collective criminal liability emanates
from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted action of the conspirators in consummating their common
purpose is a patent display of their evil partnership, and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be
held solidarily liable.22
This is not to say, however, that private respondent should be found guilty of conspiring with Secretary Enrile. It is settled
that the absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature and involves evidentiary matters.23 Hence, the allegation of
conspiracy against respondent is better left ventilated before the trial court during trial, where respondent can adduce
evidence to prove or disprove its presence.
Respondent claims in his Manifestation and Motion24 as well as in his Urgent Motion to Resolve25 that in a different case,
he was likewise indicted before the SB for conspiracy with the late Secretary Enrile in violating the same Section 3 (g) of
R.A. 3019 by allegedly entering into another agreement (Side Agreement) which is separate from the Concession
Agreement subject of the present case. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28091. Here, the SB, through a
Resolution, granted respondent's motion to quash the Information on the ground that the SB has no jurisdiction over the
person of respondent. The prosecution questioned the said SB Resolution before this Court via a petition for review on
certiorari. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 168919. In a minute resolution dated August 31, 2005, this Court denied
the petition finding no reversible error on the part of the SB. This Resolution became final and executory on January 11,
2006. Respondent now argues that this Court's resolution in G.R. No. 168919 should be applied in the instant case.
The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded that prior to this Court's ruling in G.R. No. 168919, he already
posted bail for his provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for Consolidation26 in Criminal Case No. 28091. The
Court agrees with petitioner's contention that private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for
Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting
bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the
court.27
Thus, it has been held that:
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in
order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the court’s
jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory
plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs.
Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)
xxxx
As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]:
"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant
voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive
this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise,
he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction."
Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the
person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other
purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives
the court jurisdiction over the person."
Verily, petitioner’s participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not confined to his opposition to the
issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which called for respondent court’s exercise of its
jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now to deny said court’s jurisdiction over him. x x x.28
In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to question the jurisdiction of the SB over his person
prior to his posting of bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation. In fact, his Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal
Case No. 28090 only came after the SB issued an Order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the case should not
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over his person.
As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case involves a contract entered into by public
officers representing the government. More importantly, the SB is a special criminal court which has exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606
as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories
with the said public officers. In the instant case, respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in
conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been
charged before and tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter, this can no longer
be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not follow that the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction
over the person of and the case involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise would mean that the power of a court to
decide a case would no longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such as the death of one
of the alleged offenders.
Lastly, the issues raised in the present petition involve matters which are mere incidents in the main case and the main
case has already been pending for over nine (9) years. Thus, a referral of the case to the Regional Trial Court would
further delay the resolution of the main case and it would, by no means, promote respondent's right to a speedy trial and
a speedy disposition of his case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 2, 2005, granting respondent's
Motion to Quash, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is forthwith DIRECTED to proceed with
deliberate dispatch in the disposition of Criminal Case No. 28090.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 183824 : December 08, 2010]
MYRNA P. ANTONE, PETITIONER, VS. LEO R. BERONILLA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify and set aside the
issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 102834, to wit: (a) the Resolution[1] dated 29 April 2008 dismissing the
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which assailed the trial court's Orders[2] dated 20 September 2007 and 6 December
2007 in Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM for Bigamy; and (b) the Resolution[3] dated 18 July 2008 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the first resolution.
The trial court quashed the Information on the ground that the elements of Bigamy were rendered incomplete after
herein respondent presented documents to prove a fact, which the court believed would negate the allegation in the
Information that there was a first valid marriage. The evidence presented showed that respondent later obtained a
judicial declaration of nullity of the first union following the celebration of a subsequent marriage.
The Antecedents
On 12 March 2007, herein petitioner Myrna P. Antone executed an Affidavit-Complaint[4] for Bigamy against Leo R.
Beronilla before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City. She alleged that her marriage with respondent in 1978
had not yet been legally dissolved when the latter contracted a second marriage with one Cecile Maguillo in 1991.
On 21 June 2007, the prosecution filed the corresponding Information[5] before the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City. The
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM and raffled to Branch 115.
Pending the setting of the case for arraignment, herein respondent moved to quash the Information on the ground
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.[6] He informed the court that his marriage with petitioner was
declared null and void by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran on 26 April 2007;[7] that the decision became
final and executory on 15 May 200[7];[8] and that such decree has already been registered with the Municipal Civil Registrar
on 12 June 2007.[9] He argued that since the marriage had been declared null and void from the beginning, there was
actually no first marriage to speak of. Absent a first valid marriage, the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute
the crime of bigamy.[10]
In its comment/opposition to the motion,[11] the prosecution, through herein petitioner, maintained that the respondent
committed an act which has all the essential requisites of bigamy. The prosecution pointed out that the marriage of
petitioner and respondent on 18 November 1978 has not yet been severed when he contracted a second marriage on 16
February 1991, for which reason, bigamy has already been committed before the court declared the first marriage null
and void on 27 April 2007.[12] The prosecution also invoked the rulings of the Supreme Court holding that a motion to
quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information, and that facts contrary thereto are matters of
defense which may be raised only during the presentation of evidence.[13]
After a hearing on the motion,[14] the court quashed the Information.[15] Applying Morigo v. People,[16] it ruled:
Hence, contrary to what was stated in the Information, accused Beronilla was actually never legally married to Myrna
Antone. On this score alone, the first element appears to be missing. Furthermore, the statement in the definition of
Bigamy which reads "before the first marriage has been legally dissolved" clearly contemplates that the first marriage
must at least be annullable or voidable but definitely not void, as in this case. xxx [I]n a similar case, [the Supreme Court]
had the occasion to state:
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally
speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the
principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning."
xxx The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical
that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. xxx[17]
The prosecution, through herein petitioner, moved for reconsideration of the said Order[18] on the ground, among others,
that the facts and the attending circumstances in Morigo are not on all fours with the case at bar. It likewise pointed out
that, in Mercado v. Tan,[19] this Court has already settled that "(a) declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense."[20]
In its Order of 6 December 2007,[21] the court denied the motion for reconsideration stating that Mercado has already
been superseded by Morigo.
In the interim, in a Petition for Relief from Judgment[22] before the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran, petitioner
questioned the validity of the proceedings in the petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage in Civil Case No. B-1290
on 5 October 2007. On 24 March 2008, the court set aside its Decision of 26 April 2007 declaring the marriage of
petitioner with respondent null and void, and required herein petitioner (respondent in Civil Case No. B-1290) to file her
"answer to the complaint."[23] On 21 July 2008, the court DISMISSED the petition for nullity of marriage for failure of
herein respondent (plaintiff in Civil Case No. B-1290) to submit his pre-trial brief.[24] Respondent, however, challenged the
orders issued by the court before the Court of Appeals.[25] The matter is still pending resolution thereat.[26]
Meanwhile, in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed on 26 March 2008 before the Court of
Appeals,[27] herein petitioner alleged that the Pasay City trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case of bigamy and denied her
motion for reconsideration.
In its Resolution of 29 April 2008, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition stating that:
The present petition xxx is fatally infirm in form and substance for the following reasons:
1. The verification is defective as it does not include the assurance that the allegations in the petition are based on
authentic records.
2. Since the petition assails the trial court's dismissal of the criminal information for bigamy filed against private
respondent Leo Beronilla, the petition, if at all warranted, should be filed in behalf of the People of the Philippines by the
Office of the Solicitor General, being its statutory counsel in all appealed criminal cases.
3. There is a violation of the rule on double jeopardy as the dismissal of the subject criminal case is tantamount to an
acquittal based on the trial court's finding that the first essential element of bigamy, which is a first valid marriage
contracted by private respondent is wanting. There is no clear showing in the petition that the dismissal was tainted with
arbitrariness which violated petitioner's right to due process. Notably, petitioner filed her comment/opposition to private
respondent's motion to quash before the trial court issued its Order dated September 20, 2007 dismissing the
information. Hence, if there is no denial of due process, there can be no grave abuse of discretion that would merit the
application of the exception to the double jeopardy rule. [28]
On 18 July 2008, the Court of Appeals denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of the aforequoted Resolution for
lack of merit. [29]
Hence, this petition.[30]
Our Ruling
I Office of the Solicitor General to file a comment on the petition, this Court determined the merits of the case involving a
We are convinced that this petition should be given due course despite the defect in the pleading and the question of
legal standing to bring the action.
The Rules of Court provides that a pleading required to be verified which lacks a proper verification shall be treated as
unsigned pleading.[31]
This, notwithstanding, we have, in a number of cases, opted to relax the rule in order that the ends of justice may be
served.[32] The defect being merely formal and not jurisdictional, we ruled that the court may nevertheless order the
correction of the pleading, or even act on the pleading "if the attending circumstances are such that xxx strict compliance
with the rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice xxx may be served."[33] At any rate, a pleading is
required to be verified only to ensure that it was prepared in good faith, and that the allegations were true and correct
and not based on mere speculations.[34]
There is likewise no dispute that it is the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which has the authority to represent the
government in a judicial proceeding before the Court of Appeals. The Administrative Code specifically defined its powers
and functions to read, among others:
Sec. 35. Powers and Functions. - The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring
the services of lawyers. xxx It shall have the following specific powers and functions:
(1)Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the
Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions
and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.[35]
As an exception to this rule, the Solicitor General is allowed to:
(8) Deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus, agencies and offices to assist the Solicitor General and
appear or represent the Government in cases involving their respective offices, brought before the courts and exercise
supervision and control over such legal officers with respect to such cases.[36]
Thus, in Republic v. Partisala,[37] we held that the summary dismissal of an action in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines, when not initiated by the Solicitor General, is in order.[38] Not even the appearance of the conformity of the
public prosecutor in a petition for certiorari would suffice because the authority of the City Prosecutor or his assistant to
represent the People of the Philippines is limited to the proceedings in the trial court.[39]
We took exceptions, however, and gave due course to a number of actions even when the respective interests of the
government were not properly represented by the Office of the Solicitor General.
In Labaro v. Panay,[40] this Court dealt with a similar defect in the following manner:
It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is aggrieved by any order or ruling of the trial judge in a
criminal case, the OSG, and not the prosecutor, must be the one to question the order or ruling before us.[41] xxx
Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the State or the plaintiff People of the Philippines, we
opted not to dismiss the petition on this technical ground. Instead, we required the OSG to comment on the petition, as
we had done before in some cases.[42] In light of its Comment, we rule that the OSG has ratified and adopted as its own
the instant petition for the People of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Cooperative Development Authority v. Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc.,[43] without requiring the
novel issue on the nature and scope of jurisdiction of the Cooperative Development Authority to settle cooperative
disputes as well as the battle between two (2) factions concerning the management of the Dolefil Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc. (DARBCI) "that inevitably threatens the very existence of one of the country's major
cooperatives."[44]
And, lest we defeat the ends of justice, we opt to look into the merit of the instant petition even absent the imprimatur of
the Solicitor General. After all, "for justice to prevail, the scales must balance, for justice is not to be dispensed for the
accused alone."[45] To borrow the words of then Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario in another case where the dismissal of a
criminal case pending with the trial court was sought:
[T]he task of the pillars of the criminal justice system is to preserve our democratic society under the rule of law, ensuring
that all those who [come or are brought to court] are afforded a fair opportunity to present their side[s]. xxx The State,
like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in court, and to a reasonable opportunity to present its case.[46]
II
We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that the filing of this petition is in violation of the respondent's right against
double jeopardy on the theory that he has already been practically acquitted when the trial court quashed the
Information.
Well settled is the rule that for jeopardy to attach, the following requisites must concur:
(1) there is a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2)
the same is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4)
the accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express consent.[47]
The third and fourth requisites are clearly wanting in the instant case as (a) respondent has not yet entered his plea to the
charge when he filed the Motion to Quash the Information, and (2) the case was dismissed not merely with his consent
but, in fact, at his instance.[48]
We reiterate, time and again, that jeopardy does not attach in favor of the accused on account of an order sustaining a
motion to quash.[49] More specifically, the granting of a motion to quash anchored on the ground that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense is "not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense."[50] Thus:
It will be noted that the order sustaining the motion to quash the complaint against petitioner was based on Subsection
(a) of Section 2 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court - that the facts charged in the complaint do not constitute an offense. If
this is so then the dismissal of said complaint will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense, for it is
provided in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court [now Section 6 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure] that an
order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was
based on the grounds specified in Section 2, Subsection[s] (f) and (h) of this rule [now substantially reproduced in Section
3, Subsections (g) and (i) of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure] xxx.[51]
III
We now determine the merit of the petition Ë— did the trial court act without or in excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion when it sustained respondent's motion to quash on the basis of a fact contrary to those alleged in the
information?
Petitioner maintains that the trial court did so because the motion was a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the
information and any evidence contrary thereto can only be presented as a matter of defense during trial.
Consistent with existing jurisprudence, we agree with the petitioner.
We define a motion to quash an Information as Ë—
the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or Information filed against him for insufficiency
on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the Information.[52]
This motion is "a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the Information,"[53] for which reason, the court cannot
consider allegations contrary to those appearing on the face of the information.[54]
As further elucidated in Cruz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals:[55]
It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact necessary to constitute the offense charged;
otherwise, a motion to dismiss/quash on the ground that it charges no offense may be properly sustained. The
fundamental test in considering a motion to quash on this ground is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted,
will establish the essential elements of the offense as defined in the law.
Contrary to the petitioner's contention, a reading of the information will disclose that the essential elements of the
offense charged are sufficiently alleged. It is not proper therefore to resolve the charges at the very outset, in a
preliminary hearing only and without the benefit of a full-blown trial. The issues require a fuller examination. Given the
circumstances of this case, we feel it would be unfair to shut off the prosecution at this stage of the proceedings and to
dismiss the informations on the basis only of the petitioner's evidence, such as [this].[56]
As in the recent case of Los Baños v. Pedro,[57] where we found no merit in respondent's allegation that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense because "the Information duly charged a specific offense and provide[d] the details on how
the offense was committed,"[58] we see no apparent defect in the allegations in the Information in the case at
bar. Clearly, the facts alleged in its accusatory portion, which reads:
That on or about the 16th day of February, 1991, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, LEO R. BERONILLA, having been united in a lawful marriage with one MYRNA
A. BERONILLA, which marriage is still in force and subsisting and without having been legally dissolved, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with one Cecile Maguillo, which subsequent marriage of
the accused has all the essential requisites for validity.[59]
sufficiently constitute an offense. It contained all the elements of the crime of Bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code hereunder enumerated:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could
not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.[60]
The documents showing that: (1) the court has decreed that the marriage of petitioner and respondent is null and void
from the beginning; and (2) such judgment has already become final and executory and duly registered with the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Naval, Biliran are pieces of evidence that seek to establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the
Information Ë— that a first valid marriage was subsisting at the time the respondent contracted a subsequent marriage.
This should not have been considered at all because matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash.
Neither do we find a justifiable reason for sustaining the motion to quash even after taking into consideration the
established exceptions to the rule earlier recognized by this Court, among others: (1) when the new allegations are
admitted by the prosecution;[61] (2) when the Rules so permit, such as upon the grounds of extinction of criminal liability
and double jeopardy;[62] and (3) when facts have been established by evidence presented by both parties which
destroyed the prima facie truth of the allegations in the information during the hearing on a motion to quash based on
the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, and "it would be pure technicality for the court to close its
eyes to said facts and still give due course to the prosecution of the case already shown to be weak even to support
possible conviction xxx."[63]
For of what significance would the document showing the belated dissolution of the first marriage offer? Would it serve
to prevent the impracticability of proceeding with the trial in accordance with People v. dela Rosa thereby warranting the
non-observance of the settled rule that a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the
information? We quote:
[W]here in the hearing on a motion to quash predicated on the ground that the allegations of the information do not
charge an offense, facts have been brought out by evidence presented by both parties which destroy the prima
facie truth accorded to the allegations of the information on the hypothetical admission thereof, as is implicit in the
nature of the ground of the motion to quash, it would be pure technicality for the court to close its eyes to said facts
and still give due course to the prosecution of the case already shown to be weak even to support possible conviction,
and hold the accused to what would clearly appear to be a merely vexatious and expensive trial, on her part, and a
wasteful expense of precious time on the part of the court, as well as of the prosecution.[64] (Emphasis supplied.)
We find that there is none.
With the submission of the documents showing that the court has declared the first marriage void ab initio, respondent
heavily relied on the rulings[65] in People v. Mendoza and Morigo declaring that: (a) a case for bigamy based on a void ab
initio marriage will not prosper because there is no need for a judicial decree to establish that a void ab initio marriage is
invalid;[66] and (b) a marriage declared void ab initio has retroactive legal effect such that there would be no first valid
marriage to speak of after all, which renders the elements of bigamy incomplete.[67]
Both principles, however, run contrary to the new provision of the Family Code, which was promulgated by the late
President Corazon C. Aquino in 1987, a few years before respondent's subsequent marriage was celebrated in 1991.
The specific provision, which reads:
ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such marriage void.
was exhaustively discussed in Mercado,[68] where this Court settled the "conflicting" jurisprudence on "the need for a
judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage." After establishing that Article 40 is a new provision expressly
requiring a judicial declaration of nullity of a prior marriage and examining a long line of cases,[69] this Court, concluded, in
essence, that under the Family Code a subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage is immaterial in a
bigamy case because, by then, the crime had already been consummated. Otherwise stated, this Court declared that a
person, who contracts a subsequent marriage absent a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous one, is guilty of
bigamy.[70]

Notably, Morigo, was indeed promulgated years after Mercado. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the Order dated 6
December 2007 of the trial court, which maintained that Morigo has already superseded Mercado. In fact, in Morigo, this
Court clearly distinguished the two (2) cases from one another, and explained:

The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan. In the latter case, the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. xxx

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized xxx. Ostensibly, at least, the first
marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing
officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a G.R. No. 187000, November 24, 2014
marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act
alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. AQUILINO ANDRADE, ROMAN LACAP, YONG FUNG YUEN, RICKY YU, VICENTE
liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.[71] SY, ALVIN SO, ROMUALDO MIRANDA, SINDAO MELIBAS, SATURNINO LIWANAG, ROBERTO MEDINA AND RAMON
NAVARRO, Respondents.
The application of Mercado to the cases following Morigo even reinforces the position of this Court to give full meaning to
Article 40 of the Family Code. Thus, in 2004, this Court ruled in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:[72] DECISION

Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the
date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, xxx said marriage is
not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity
of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a
marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring
criminal liability for bigamy. xxx.[73] (Emphasis supplied.)
Finally, in Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel and Amelia Serafico,[74] this Court pronounced:
PERALTA, J.:
It is clearly provided by the Rules of Criminal Procedure that if the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect in the
information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order the amendment to be made.
For this Court's consideration is the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to
reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated May 29, 2008 and Resolution2 dated February 26, 2009 of the Court of Appeals
(CA).

In a catena of cases,[75] the Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid
subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral. xxx
To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent only after the
latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged
in the information for Bigamy does not constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such defense be
interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by way of exception to the established rule that facts contrary to the
allegations in the information are matters of defense which may be raised only during the presentation of evidence.
All considered, we find that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when, in so quashing the Information in
Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM, it considered an evidence introduced to prove a fact not alleged thereat disregarding the
settled rules that a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts stated in the information; and that facts not
alleged thereat may be appreciated only under exceptional circumstances, none of which is obtaining in the instant
petition.
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated 20 September 2007 and 6 December 2007 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 115, Pasay
City as well as the Resolutions dated 29 April 2008 and 18 July 2008 of the Court of Appeals are hereby SET
ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
The antecedent facts are the following:cralawlawlibrary
Pursuant to the instructions of then Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Dionisio R. Santiago, on June 30, 2003, a
random drug test was conducted in the National Bilibid Prison (NBP) wherein the urine samples of thirty-eight (38)
inmates were collected and subjected to drug testing by the Chief Medical Technologist and Assistant Medical
Technologist of the Alpha Polytechnic Laboratory in Quezon City, and out of that number, twenty-one (21) urine samples
tested positive.
After confirmatory tests done by the NBI Forensic Chemistry Division, those twenty-one (21) urine samples, which
included that of herein respondents, yielded positive results confirming the result of the initial screen test. Necessarily,
the twenty-one (21) inmates were charged with violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165)
under identical Informations,3 which read as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The undersigned State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, accuses AQUILINO ANDRADE for Violation of Section 15,
Article II of R.A. 9165, committed as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about June 30, 2003, in the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without having been authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously use or in any manner introduced into the physiological system of his body, Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, otherwise known as "shabu," a dangerous drug in violation of the aforecited
law.4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

All respondents pleaded "Not Guilty" to the crime charged during their arraignment on June 29, 2006. Thereafter, the
case was set for pre-trial and trial on August 11, 2006.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On August 29, 2006, respondents filed a Consolidated Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the facts alleged in the
Information do not constitute a violation of Section 15, RA 9165, which reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
6. A strict reading of the provisions of Section 15, Article II, RA 9165 reveals that the accused did not commit the offense
charged. Under RA 9165, the offense of Violation of Section 15 thereof is committed by a person apprehended or
arrested for using dangerous drug, and who is found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug after a confirmatory
test, to wit:cralawlawlibrary
xxxx
7. In the case at bar, the accused were never apprehended o r arrested for using a dangerous drug or for violating the
provisions of RA 9165, which would warrant drug testing and serve as basis for filing the proper information in court. In
fact, the accused were merely called to the Maximum Security Conference Hall in the morning of June 30, 2003 and with
seventeen (17) other inmates made to undergo drug testing, pursuant to the directive of then Sr. Usec. Santiago. It was
only after they were found positive for dangerous drugs that the information for Violation of Section 15, RA 9165 was
filed against each of them.
8. Section 36, Article III, RA 9165 further enumerates the persons subject to mandatory and random drug tests, who if
found positive after such drug test shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15. x x x
xxxx
National penitentiary inmates or inmates of the Bureau of Corrections are not included in the enumeration. Thus, even if
the accused have been found positive in the mandatory or random drug test conducted by BUCOR, they cannot be held
liable under Section 15.
9. Assuming for the sake of argument, but not admitting, that the accused were apprehended or arrested for using a
dangerous drug or for violating the provisions of RA 9165 which led to the June 30, 2003 screen test, or that the accused
are subject to mandatory or random drug testing, the drug test would be invalid absent a showing that the same was
conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after the apprehension or arrest of the offender through a confirmatory test
within fifteen (15) days receipt of the result in accordance with the provisions of Section 38, Article II of RA 9165 x x x.
xxxx
10. In the case, the accused were not informed of the results of the screening test, thus depriving them of the right to
challenge the same through a confirmatory drug test within the required fifteen (15)-day period after receipt of the
positive result.6ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Respondents' lawyer, on the date set for hearing, manifested that he intends to pursue the Motion to Dismiss filed by
respondents' previous counsel,7 hence, the pre-trial and trial were reset to September 29, 2006.
The pre-trial and trial were further reset to November 29, 20068 due to a typhoon that occurred on the earlier scheduled
date.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa, before the scheduled hearing date for pre-trial and trial, issued an
Order9 granting respondents' Consolidated Motion to Dismiss,10 ruling as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
To be liable under this Act the following essential requisites must be present:
1. The offender must have been arrested or apprehended for use of dangerous drugs; or apprehended
or arrested for violation of RA 9165 and the apprehending or arresting officer has reasonable
ground to believe that the person arrested or apprehended on account of physical signs or
symptoms or other visible or outward manifestation is under the influence of dangerous drugs; or
must have been one of those under Sec. 36 of Art. Ill of RA 9165 who should be subjected to
undergo drug testing;chanrobleslaw
2. The offender must have been found positive for use of dangerous drug after a screening and
confirmatory test;chanrobleslaw
3. The offender must not have been found in his/ or her possession such quantity of dangerous drug
provided for under Section 11 of this Act;chanrobleslaw
4. That if the offender arrested or apprehended has been found to be positive for use of dangerous
drugs after a screening laboratory examination, the results of the screening laboratory examination
of test shall be challenged within fifteen (15) days after receipt of the result through a confirmatory
test conducted in any accredited analytical laboratory equipment with a gas chromatograph/mass
spectrometry or some such modern method.
xxxx
It is clear from the foregoing facts that the inmates were not apprehended nor arrested for violation of any provision of
R.A. 9165. These inmates were in the National Bilibid Prisons (NBP) serving sentences for different crimes which may
include also drug offenses. They were subjected to drug tests only pursuant to the request made by then Director Dionisio
Santiago. Furthermore, they were not one of those persons enumerated in Section 36 of the said Act who may be
subjected to mandatory drug testing. Hence, the first essential requisite has not been complied with. If one essential
requisite is absent, the Court believes that these inmates cannot be held liable for the offense charged. They may be held
liable administratively for violation of the Bureau of Corrections or NBP rules and regulations governing demeanor of
inmates inside a penitentiary but not necessarily for violation of Sec. 15 of R.A. 9165. The court need not discuss the other
elements of the crime as the same has become moot and academic in view of the absence of the first essential element.
WHEREFORE, finding no probable cause for the offense charged in the Information these cases are ordered DISMISSED
with costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA after its Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
The CA, in its Decision dated May 29, 2008, affirmed the trial court's Order, the fallo of which
reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Orders of the public respondent Regional Trial
Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204, in Criminal Cases Nos. 06-224, 06-229, 06-231, 06-232, 06-234, 06-235, 06-237, 06-
238, 06-239 and 06-241, STAND.
SO ORDERED.12ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Consequently, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration, but was denied in a Resolution dated February 26, 2009.
Thus, the present petition.
Petitioner asserts the following argument:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS MAY NOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR VIOLATION
OF SECTION 15, ARTICLE II OF RA 9165.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
According to petitioner, the CA erred because respondents had lost the remedy under Section 3(a), Rule 117 of the Rules
of Court having been already arraigned before availing of the said remedy.
Respondents, however, insist that the CA is correct in upholding the RTC's decision dismissing the Informations filed
against them. They claim that since the ground they relied on is Section 3 (a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, their motion
to quash may be filed even after they have entered their plea.
Basically, the issue presented before this Court is not so much as the timeliness of the filing of the motion to quash, but
whether the CA erred in upholding the RTC's grant of respondents' motion and eventually dismissing the case based on
lack of probable cause.
This Court finds the present petition meritorious.
The ground relied upon by respondents in their "Motion to Dismiss," which is, that the facts alleged in the Information do
not constitute an offense, is actually one of the grounds provided under a Motion to Quash in Section 3 (a),14 Rule 117 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
It must be emphasized that respondents herein filed their Motion after they have been arraigned. Under ordinary
circumstances, such motion may no longer be allowed after arraignment because their failure to raise any ground of a
motion to quash before they plead is deemed a waiver of any of their objections. Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sec. 9. Failure to Move to Quash or to Allege Any Ground Therefor. - The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a
motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or
failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds
provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule.
However, since the ground asserted by respondents is one of the exceptions provided under the above-provision, the
timeliness of the filing is inconsequential. The mistake lies in the RTC's dismissal of the case.
The RTC judge went beyond her authority when she dismissed the cases based on lack of probable cause and not on the
ground raised by respondents, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, finding no probable cause for the offense charged in the Information these cases are ordered DISMISSED
with cost de offlcio.
SO ORDERED.15ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 2,16 Rule 117 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure plainly states that in a motion to quash, the court shall
not consider any ground other than those stated in the motion, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. In the
present case, what the respondents claim in their motion to quash is that the facts alleged in the Informations do not
constitute an offense and not lack of probable cause as ruled by the RTC judge.
The RTC judge's determination of probable cause should have been only limited prior to the issuance of a warrant of
arrest and not after the arraignment. Once the information has been filed, the judge shall then "personally evaluate the
resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence"17 to determine whether there is probable cause to issue a
warrant of arrest. At this stage, a judicial determination of probable cause exists.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In People v. Castillo and Mejia,19 this Court has stated:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause; executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable
cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is
given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have
committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-
judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has
been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the
existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass
upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant
of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted,
there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no
probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The difference is clear: The executive determination of probable cause concerns itself with whether there is enough
evidence to support an Information being filed. The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand,
determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. In People v. Inting:21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
x x x Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should
be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there
should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by
the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper - whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is
guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and
embarrassment of trial - is the function of the Prosecutor.22ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
While it is within the trial court's discretion to make an independent assessment of the evidence on hand, it is only for the
purpose of determining whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. The judge does not act as an appellate court of the
prosecutor and has no capacity to review the prosecutor's determination of probable cause; rather, the judge makes a
determination of probable cause independent of the prosecutor's finding.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In truth, the court's duty in an appropriate case is confined merely to the determination of whether the assailed executive
or judicial determination of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to want of jurisdiction.[24 In this particular case, by proceeding with the arraignment of respondents, there was
already an admittance that there is probable cause. Thus, the RTC should not have ruled on whether or not there is
probable cause to hold respondents liable for the crime committed since its duty is limited only to the determination of
whether the material averments in the complaint or information are sufficient to hold respondents for trial. In fact, in
their motion, respondents claimed that the facts alleged in the Informations do not constitute an offense.
Considering that the RTC has already found probable cause, it should have denied the motion to quash and allowed the
prosecution to present its evidence and wait for a demurrer to evidence to be filed by respondents, if they opt to, or
allowed the prosecution to amend the Information and in the meantime suspend the proceedings until the amendment
of the Information without dismissing the case.
Section 4, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly states that if the ground based upon is that "the
facts charged do not constitute an offense," the prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the
defect by amendment, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 4. Amendment of the complaint or information. - If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the
complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made.
If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution shall be given by the
court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make
the amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers from the same defect despite the
amendment.25cralawredChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
If the defect in the information is curable by amendment, the motion to quash shall be denied and the prosecution shall
be ordered to file an amended information.26 Generally, the fact that the allegations in the information do not constitute
an offense, or that the information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form, are defects curable by
amendment.27 Corollary to this rule, the court should give the prosecution an opportunity to amend the
information.28chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the present case, the RTC judge outrightly dismissed the cases without giving the prosecution an opportunity to amend
the defect in the Informations. In People v. Talao Perez,29 this Court ruled that, "...even granting that the information in
question is defective, as pointed out by the accused, it appearing that the defects thereof can be cured by amendment,
the lower court should not have dismissed the case but should have ordered the Fiscal to amend the information." When
there is any doubt about the sufficiency of the complaint or information, the court should direct its amendment or that a
new information be filed, and save the necessity of appealing the case on technical grounds when the complaint might
easily be amended.30chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Even the CA admitted that the RTC erred in that regard, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Indeed, Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, requires that the prosecution should first be given the opportunity to
correct the defects in the information before the courts may grant a motion to quash grounded on Section 3(a), and it
may only do so when the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the information suffers from the same defect
despite the amendment.
Pursuant to this rule, it would thus seem that the trial court did err in this regard.31
The CA, however, still upheld the ruling of the RTC, stating that "whatever perceived error the trial court may have
committed is inconsequential as any intended amendment to the informations filed surely cannot cure the defects,"32 and
to justify such conclusion, the CA proceeded to decide the merits of the case based merely on the allegations in the
Information. Such pronouncement, therefore, is speculative and premature without giving the prosecution the
opportunity to present its evidence or, to at least, amend the Informations. In People v. Leviste, 33 we stressed that the
State, like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in court; in criminal proceedings, the public prosecutor acts for and
represents the State, and carries the burden of diligently pursuing the criminal prosecution in a manner consistent with
public interest.34 The prosecutor's role in the administration of justice is to lay before the court, fairly and fully, every fact
and circumstance known to him or her to exist, without regard to whether such fact tends to establish the guilt or
innocence of the accused and without regard to any personal conviction or presumption on what the judge may or is
disposed to do.35 The prosecutor owes the State, the court and the accused the duty to lay before the court the pertinent
facts at his disposal with methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes
in his evidence to the end that the court's mind may not be tortured by doubts; that the innocent may not suffer; and
that the guilty may not escape unpunished.36 In the conduct of the criminal proceedings, the prosecutor has ample
discretionary power to control the conduct of the presentation of the prosecution evidence, part of which is the option to
choose what evidence to present or who to call as witness.37 Thus, the RTC and the CA, by not giving the State the
opportunity to present its evidence in court or to amend the Informations, have effectively curtailed the State's right to
due process.
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated May
29, 2008 and Resolution dated February 26, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100016 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 191566 July 17, 2013
PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
EDGARDO V. ODTUHAN, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner People of the Philippines,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, against respondent Edgardo V. Odtuhan assailing the Court of Appeals
Decision1 dated December 17, 2009 and Resolution2 dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108616. The assailed decision
granted the petition for certiorari filed by respondent, and ordered the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 27, to
give due course to and receive evidence on respondent's motion to quash and resolve the case with dispatch, while the
assailed resolution denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case follow:
On July 2, 1980, respondent married Jasmin Modina (Modina).3 On October 28, 1993, respondent married Eleanor A.
Alagon (Alagon).4 Sometime in August 1994, he filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina.5 On February
23, 1999, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 70 granted respondent’s petition and declared his marriage with Modina void ab
initio for lack of a valid marriage license.6 On November 10, 2003, Alagon died. In the meantime, in June 2003, private
complainant Evelyn Abesamis Alagon learned of respondent’s previous marriage with Modina.7 She thus filed a
Complaint-Affidavit8 charging respondent with Bigamy.
On April 15, 2005, respondent was indicted in an Information9 for Bigamy committed as follows:
That on or about October 28, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused being then legally married to
JASMIN MODINA and without such marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with ELEANOR A. ALAGON, which second/subsequent marriage has
all the essential requisites for validity.
Contrary to law.10
On February 5, 2008, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion11 praying that he be allowed to present evidence to support
his motion; that his motion to quash be granted; and that the case be dismissed. Respondent moved for the quashal of
the information on two grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy; and (2) that the criminal
action or liability has been extinguished.12
On September 4, 2008, the RTC13 issued an Order14 denying respondent’s Omnibus Motion. The RTC held that the facts
alleged in the information – that there was a valid marriage between respondent and Modina and without such marriage
having been dissolved, respondent contracted a second marriage with Alagon – constitute the crime of bigamy. The trial
court further held that neither can the information be quashed on the ground that criminal liability has been
extinguished, because the declaration of nullity of the first marriage is not one of the modes of extinguishing criminal
liability. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in an Order15 dated February 20, 2009.
Aggrieved, respondent instituted a special civil action on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court16 before the CA,
assailing the denial of his motion to quash the information despite the fact that his first marriage with Modina was
declared null and void ab initio prior to the filing of the bigamy case.17
On December 17, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The RTC, Branch 27, Manila is
hereby ordered to give due course to and receive evidence on the petitioner’s motion to quash and resolve the case with
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.18
The CA applied the conclusion made by the Court in Morigo v. People,19 and held that there is cogent basis in looking into
the motion to quash filed by respondent, for if the evidence would establish that his first marriage was indeed void ab
initio, one essential element of the crime of bigamy would be lacking.20 The appellate court further held that respondent
is even better off than Morigo which thus calls for the application of such doctrine, considering that respondent
contracted the second marriage after filing the petition for the declaration of nullity of his first marriage and he obtained
the favorable declaration before the complaint for bigamy was filed against him.21 The CA thus concluded that the RTC
gravely abused its discretion in denying respondent’s motion to quash the information, considering that the facts alleged
in the information do not charge an offense.22
With the denial of the motion for reconsideration before the CA, petitioner filed a petition before the Court in this
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court based on the following grounds:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RENDERED ITS DECISION DATED DECEMBER 17, 2009
GRANTING RESPONDENT’S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND THE RESOLUTION DATED MARCH 4, 2010 DENYING
PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE INFORMATION CHARGING RESPONDENT OF BIGAMY SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGES ALL THE ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING SAID
OFFENSE.
II.
THE SUBSEQUENT COURT JUDGMENT DECLARING RESPONDENT’S FIRST MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO DID NOT EXTINGUISH
RESPONDENT’S CRIMINAL LIABILITY WHICH ALREADY ATTACHED PRIOR TO SAID JUDGMENT.23
The petition is meritorious.
The issues are not novel and have been squarely ruled upon by this Court in Montañez v. Cipriano,24 Teves v.
People,25 and Antone v. Beronilla.26
In Montañez, respondent Cipriano married Socrates in April 1976, but during the subsistence of their marriage on January
24, 1983, respondent married Silverio. In 2001, respondent filed a petition for the annulment of her marriage with
Socrates on the ground of psychological incapacity which was granted on July 18, 2003. On May 14, 2004, petitioner filed
a complaint for bigamy against respondent. The latter, however, moved for the quashal of the information and dismissal
of the criminal complaint alleging that her first marriage had already been declared void ab initio prior to the filing of the
bigamy case.
In Teves, petitioner married Thelma on November 26, 1992. During the subsistence of their marriage on December 10,
2001, he again married Edita. On May 4, 2006, petitioner obtained a declaration of her marriage with Thelma null and
void on the ground that the latter is physically incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations. On June 8, 2006, an
Information for Bigamy was filed against petitioner. The court eventually convicted petitioner of the crime charged.
In Antone, petitioner married respondent in 1978, but during the subsistence of their marriage, respondent contracted a
second marriage in 1991. On April 26, 2007, respondent obtained a declaration of nullity of her first marriage which
decision became final and executory on May 15, 2007. On June 21, 2007, the prosecution filed an information for bigamy
against respondent which the latter sought to be quashed on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense.
The present case stemmed from similar procedural and factual antecedents as in the above cases. As in Antone and
Montañez, respondent moved to quash the information on the grounds that the facts do not charge the offense of
bigamy and that his criminal liability has been extinguished both because of the declaration of nullity of the first marriage.
The RTC refused to quash the information. On petition for certiorari, the CA, however, reached a different conclusion.
As defined in Antone, "a motion to quash information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal
complaint or information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in
the face of the information." It is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information. The fundamental test in
determining the sufficiency of the material averments in an Information is whether or not the facts alleged therein, which
are hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde or
matters extrinsic of the information are not to be considered.27 To be sure, a motion to quash should be based on a defect
in the information which is evident on its fact.28 Thus, if the defect can be cured by amendment or if it is based on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution is given by the court the opportunity to
correct the defect by amendment.29 If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that another complaint or
information be filed30 except when the information is quashed on the ground of extinction of criminal liability or double
jeopardy.31
An examination of the information filed against respondent, however, shows the sufficiency of the allegations therein to
constitute the crime of bigamy as it contained all the elements of the crime as provided for in Article 34932 of the Revised
Penal Code, to wit:
(1) That the offender has been legally married;
(2) That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.33
Here, the information contained the following allegations: (1) that respondent is legally married to Modina; (2) that
without such marriage having been legally dissolved; (3) that respondent willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously contracted
a second marriage with Alagon; and (4) that the second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. Respondent’s
evidence showing the court’s declaration that his marriage to Modina is null and void from the beginning because of the
absence of a marriage license is only an evidence that seeks to establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the information
that a first valid marriage was subsisting at the time he contracted the second marriage. This should not be considered at
all, because matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash.34 It is notproper, therefore, to resolve the charges
at the very outset without the benefit of a full blown trial. The issues require a fuller examination and it would be unfair
to shut off the prosecution at this stage of the proceedings and to quash the information on the basis of the document
presented by respondent.35 With the presentation of the court decree, no facts have been brought out which destroyed
the prima facie truth accorded to the allegations of the information on the hypothetical admission thereof.
Respondent’s motion to quash was founded on the trial court’s declaration that his marriage with Modina is null and void
ab initio. He claims that with such declaration, one of the elements of the crime is wanting. Thus, the allegations in the
information do not charge the offense of bigamy, or at the very least, such court decree extinguished his criminal liability.
Both respondent and the CA heavily relied on the Court’s pronouncement in Morigo v. People36 where the accused
therein was acquitted because the elements of the crime of bigamy were incomplete. In said case, the first marriage was
declared null and void, because the parties only signed the marriage contract without the presence of a solemnizing
officer. Considering, therefore, that the declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage, the Court held
that there was no marriage to speak of when the accused contracted the second marriage. Logically, the accused was
acquitted.
The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter.1âwphi1 A declaration of the
absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense.37 It has been
held in a number of cases that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be
contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.38
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage.39 Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for
the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.40 If we allow respondent’s line of defense and the CA’s ratiocination, a person who
commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier
marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him.41
Respondent, likewise, claims that there are more reasons to quash the information against him, because he obtained the
declaration of nullity of marriage before the filing of the complaint for bigamy against him. Again, we cannot sustain such
contention. In addition to the discussion above, settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon
the commission of the offense and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law and
that the time of filing of the criminal complaint or information is material only for determining prescription.42
Thus, as held in Antone:
To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent only after the
latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged
in the information for Bigamy does not constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such defense be
interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by way of exception to the established rule that facts contrary to the
allegations in the information are matters of defense which may be raised only during the presentation of evidence.43
In view of the foregoing, the CA erred in granting the petition for certiorari filed by respondent. The RTC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to quash and to allow him to present evidence to support his omnibus
motion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated December 17, 2009 and Resolution
dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108616 are SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 05-235814 is REMANDED to the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27 for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 169823-24 September 11, 2013
HERMINIO T. DISINI, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 174764-65
HERMINIO T. DISINI, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over the criminal action involving petitioner notwithstanding that he
is a private individual considering that his criminal prosecution is intimately related to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of
the Marcoses, their immediate family, subordinates and close associates.
The Case
Petitioner Herminio T. Disini assails via petition for certiorari there solutions promulgated by the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 28001and Criminal Case No. 28002, both entitled People v. Herminio T. Disini, on January 17, 2005
(denying his motion to quash the informations)1 and August 10, 2005 (denying his motion for reconsideration of the
denial of his motion to quash),2 alleging that the Sandiganbayan (First Division) thereby committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations dated June 30,2004 charging Disini in the Sandiganbayan with
corruption of public officials, penalized under Article 212 in relation to Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal
Case No. 28001), and with a violation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act 3019 (R.A. No. 3019), also known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act (Criminal Case No. 28002).
The accusatory portions of the informations read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 28001
That during the period from 1974 to February 1986, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring together and confederating with the then President of the Philippines
Ferdinand E. Marcos, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously offer, promise and give gifts and presents to
said Ferdinand E. Marcos, consisting of accused DISINI’s ownership of two billion and five hundred (2.5 billion) shares of
stock in Vulcan Industrial and Mining Corporation and four billion (4 billion)shares of stock in The Energy Corporation,
with both shares of stock having then a book value of ₱100.00 per share of stock, and subcontracts, to Engineering and
Construction Company of Asia, owned and controlled by said Ferdinand E. Marcos, on the mechanical and electrical
construction work on the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project("Project") of the National Power Corporation at Morong,
Bataan, all for and in consideration of accused Disini seeking and obtaining for Burns and Roe and Westinghouse Electrical
Corporation (Westinghouse), the contracts to do the engineering and architectural design and to construct, respectively,
the Project, as in fact said Ferdinand E. Marcos, taking undue advantage of his position and committing the offense in
relation to his office and in consideration of the aforesaid gifts and presents, did award or cause to be awarded to said
Burns and Roe and Westinghouse, the contracts to do the engineering and architectural design and to construct the
Project, respectively, which acts constitute the crime of corruption of public officials.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Criminal Case No. 28002
That during the period 1974 to February 1986, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court,
accused HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring together and confederating with the then President of the Philippines, Ferdinand
E. Marcos, being then the close personal friend and golfing partner of said Ferdinand E. Marcos, and being further the
husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini who was the first cousin of then First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos and family
physicianof the Marcos family, taking advantage of such close personal relation, intimacy and free access, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, in connection with the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP)Project
("PROJECT") of the National Power Corporation (NPC) at Morong, Bataan, request and receive from Burns and Roe, a
foreign consultant, the total amount of One Million U.S. Dollars ($1,000,000.00),more or less, and also from
Westinghouse Electric Corporation(WESTINGHOUSE), the total amount of Seventeen Million U.S. Dollars($17,000,000.00),
more or less, both of which entities were then having business, transaction, and application with the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, all for and in consideration of accused DISINI securing and obtaining, as accused Disini did
secure and obtain, the contract for the said Burns and Roe and Westinghouse to do the engineering and architectural
design, and construct, respectively, the said PROJECT, and subsequently, request and receive subcontracts for Power
Contractors, Inc. owned by accused DISINI, and Engineering and Construction Company of Asia (ECCO-Asia), owned and
controlled by said Ferdinand E. Marcos, which stated amounts and subcontracts constituted kickbacks, commissions and
gifts as material or pecuniary advantages, for securing and obtaining, as accused DISINI did secure and obtain, through
the direct intervention of said Ferdinand E. Marcos, for Burns and Roe the engineering and architectural contract, and for
Westinghouse the construction contract, for the PROJECT.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On August 2, 2004, Disini filed a motion to quash,5 alleging that the criminal actions had been extinguished by
prescription, and that the informations did not conform to the prescribed form. The Prosecution opposed the motion to
quash.6
On September 16, 2004, Disini voluntarily submitted himself for arraignment to obtain the Sandiganbayan’s favorable
action on his motion for permission to travel abroad.7 He then entered a plea of not guilty to both informations.
As stated, on January 17, 2005, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated its first assailed resolution denying the
motion to quash.8
Disini moved for the reconsideration of the resolution dated January 17, 2005,9 but the Sandiganbayan (First Division)
denied his motion on August 10, 2005 through the second assailed resolution.10
Issues
Undaunted, Disini commenced this special civil action for certiorari, alleging that:
A. THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THEOFFENSES CHARGED.
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ITRULED THAT SECTION 4, PARAGRAPHS (A)
AND (B) OFREPUBLIC ACT NO. 8249 DO NOT APPLY SINCE THEINFORMATIONS WERE "FILED
PURSUANT TO E.O. NOS. 1,2, 14 AND 14-A".
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ITASSUMED JURISDICTION WITHOUT HAVING
MET THEREQUISITE UNDER SECTION 4 OF R.A. 8249 THAT THEACCUSED MUST BE A PUBLIC
OFFICER.
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH SUCH GRAVEABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT EFFECTIVELY
IGNORED, DISREGARDED, AND DENIED PETITIONER’SCONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHT
TOPRESCRIPTION.
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING THE APPLICABLE PRESCRIPTIVE
PERIOD.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING THE COMMENCEMENT OF
THEPRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.
3. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING THE POINT OF INTERRUPTION OF
THEPRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.
C. BY MERELY ASSUMING THE PRESENCE OF GLARINGLYABSENT ELEMENTS IN THE OFFENSES CHARGED
TOUPHOLD THE ‘SUFFICIENCY’ OF THE INFORMATIONS INCRIMINAL CASE NOS. 28001 AND 28002, THE
RESPONDENTCOURT DEMONSTRATED ITS PREJUDGMENT OVER THE SUBJECT CASES AND ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF ITSDISCRETION.
D. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OFDISCRETION IN REFUSING TO QUASH THE
INFORMATIONSDESPITE THEIR UTTER FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THEPRESCRIBED FORM, THUS EFFECTIVELY
DENYING THEACCUSED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTTO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND
CAUSE OF THEACCUSATION AGAINST HIM.11
Ruling
The petition for certiorari has no merit.
1.Preliminary Considerations
To properly resolve this case, reference is made to the ruling of the Court in G.R. No. 175730 entitled Herminio Disini v.
Sandiganbayan,12 which involved the civil action for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages (Civil
Case No. 0013 entitled Republic v. HerminioT. Disini, et al.) filed by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government(PCGG) against Disini and others.13 The amended complaint in Civil Case No. 0013 alleged that Disini had
acted in unlawful concert with his co-defendants in acquiring and accumulating ill-gotten wealth through them is
appropriation of public funds, plunder of the nation’s wealth, extortion, embezzlement, and other acts of corruption,14 as
follows:
4. Defendant HERMINIO T. DISINI is a close associate of defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos and the husband of the first
cousin of Defendant Imelda R. Marcos. By reason of this relationship xxx defendant Herminio Disini obtained staggering
commissions from the Westinghouse in exchange for securing the nuclear power plant contract from the Philippine
government.
 xxxx that the records of the same should be forwarded to the Ombudsman, who as an independent constitutional officer has
primary jurisdiction over cases of this nature, to conduct such preliminary investigation and take appropriate
action.19 (Bold emphasis supplied)
13. Defendants Herminio T. Disini and Rodolfo Jacob, by themselves and/or in unlawful concert, active collaboration and
willing participation of defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue advantage of their
association and influence with the latter defendant spouses in order to prevent disclosure and recovery of ill-gotten It appears that the resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman, following its conduct of the preliminary investigation on
assets, engaged in devices, schemes, and stratagems such as: the criminal complaints thus transmitted by the PCGG, were reversed and set aside by the Court in Presidential
Commission on Good Government v. Desierto,20
xxxx
with the Court requiring the Office of the Ombudsman to file the informations that became the subject of Disini’s motion
to quash in Criminal Case No.28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.
(c) unlawfully utilizing the Herdis Group of Companies and Asia Industries, Inc. as conduits through which defendants
received, kept, and/or invested improper payments such as unconscionably large commissions from foreign corporations
like the Westinghouse Corporation; (d) secured special concessions, privileges and/or benefits from defendants Ferdinand 2.
E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, such as a contract awarded to Westinghouse Corporation which built an inoperable
nuclear facility in the country for a scandalously exorbitant amount that included defendant’s staggering commissions –
Sandiganbayan has exclusive and
defendant Rodolfo Jacob executed for HGI the contract for the aforesaid nuclear plant;15

original jurisdiction over the offenses charged

Through its letter dated April 8, 1991,16 the PCGG transmitted the records of Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case
No. 28002 to then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez for appropriate action, to wit:
Disini challenges the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offenses charged in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal
Case No. 28002.He contends that: (1) the informations did not allege that the charges were being filed pursuant to and in
In line with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of EduardoM. Cojuangco, Jr. versus the PCGG (G.R. Nos. 92319–
connection with Executive Order (E.O.) Nos.1, 2, 14 and 14-A; (2) the offenses charged were not of the nature
92320) dated October 2, 1990, we are hereby transmitting to your Office for appropriate action the records of the
contemplated by E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A because the allegations in the informations neither pertained to the recovery
attached criminal case which we believe is similar to the said Cojuangco case in certain aspects, such as: (i) some parts or
of ill-gotten wealth, nor involved sequestration cases; (3) the cases were filed by the Office of the Ombudsman instead of
elements are also parts of the causes of action in the civil complaints[-]filed with the Sandiganbayan; (ii) some properties
by the PCGG; and (4) being a private individual not charged as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer,
or assets of the respondents have been sequestered; (iii) some of the respondents are also party defendants in the civil
he should be prosecuted in the regular courts instead of in the Sandiganbayan.
cases.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offenses charged
Although the authority of the PCGG has been upheld by the Supreme Court, we are constrained to refer to you for proper
because Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 were filed within the purview of Section 4 (c) of R.A. No.
action the herein-attached case in view of the suspicion that the PCGG cannot conduct an impartial investigation in cases
8249; and that both cases stemmed from the criminal complaints initially filed by the PCGG pursuant to its mandate
similar to that of the Cojuangco case. x x x
under E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A to investigate and file the appropriate civil or criminal cases to recover ill-gotten wealth
not only of the Marcoses and their immediately family but also of their relatives, subordinates and close associates.
Ostensibly, the PCGG’s letter of transmittal was adverting to the ruling in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on
Good Government (Cojuangco, Jr.),17 viz:
We hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.

x x x The PCGG and the Solicitor General finding a prima facie basis filed a civil complaint against petitioner and
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 was the law that established the Sandiganbayan and defined its jurisdiction. The law
intervenors alleging substantially the same illegal or criminal acts subject of the subsequent criminal complaints the
was amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249. Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan was vested with
Solicitor General filed with the PCGG for preliminary investigation. x x x.
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving:

Moreover, when the PCGG issued the sequestration and freeze orders against petitioner’s properties, it was on the basis
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
of a prima facie finding that the same were ill-gotten and/or were acquired in relation to the illegal disposition of coconut
Act, Republic Act No.1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
levy funds. Thus, the Court finds that the PCGG cannot possibly conduct the preliminary investigation of said criminal
more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government whether in a
complaints with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," as it has prejudged the matter. x x x18
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

xxxx
xxxx

The Court finds that under the circumstances of the case, the PCGG cannot inspire belief that it could be impartial in the
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials
conduct of the preliminary investigation of the aforesaid complaints against petitioner and intervenors. It cannot possibly
and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
preside in the said preliminary investigation with an even hand.

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice can be promoted if the PCGG would be prohibited from
issued in 1986. (Bold emphasis supplied)
conducting the preliminary investigation of the complaints subject of this petition and the petition for intervention and
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or higher, as prescribed in
the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be
vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court, as
the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
xxxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees,
including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public
officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them. x x x x
It is underscored that it was the PCGG that had initially filed the criminal complaints in the Sandiganbayan, with the Office
of the Ombudsman taking over the investigation of Disini only after the Court issued in Cojuangco, Jr. the directive to the
PCGG to refer the criminal cases to the Office of the Ombudsman on the ground that the PCGG would not be an impartial
office following its finding of a prima facie case being established against Disini to sustain the institution of Civil Case No.
0013.
Also underscored is that the complaint in Civil Case No. 0013 and the informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 and
Criminal Case No. 28002involved the same transaction, specifically the contracts awarded through the intervention of
Disini and President Marcos in favor of Burns & Roe to do the engineering and architectural design, and Westinghouse to
do the construction of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project (PNPPP). Given their sameness in subject matter, to still
expressly aver in Criminal Case No.28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 that the charges involved the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth was no longer necessary.21 With Criminal Case No.28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 being intertwined with Civil
Case No.0013, the PCGG had the authority to institute the criminal prosecutions against Disini pursuant to E.O. Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A.
That Disini was a private individual did not remove the offenses charged from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Section 2 of E.O. No.1, which tasked the PCGG with assisting the President in "the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth
accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates,
whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and
entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage
of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship," expressly granted the
authority of the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth covered President Marcos’ immediate family, relatives, subordinates
and close associates, without distinction as to their private or public status.
Contrary to Disini’s argument, too, the qualifying clause found in Section 4 of R.A. No. 824922
applied only to the cases listed in Subsection 4aand Subsection 4b of R.A. No. 8249, the full text of which follows:
xxxx
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No.1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989(Republic Act
No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors
engineers and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and
those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of
the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade‘27’ and up under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ‘27’and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989. b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their
office. (bold emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Unquestionably, public officials occupying positions classified as Grade 27 or higher are mentioned only in Subsection 4a
and Subsection 4b,signifying the plain legislative intent of limiting the qualifying clause to such public officials. To include
within the ambit of the qualifying clause the persons covered by Subsection 4c would contravene the exclusive mandate
of the PCGG to bring the civil and criminal cases pursuant to and in connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. In view of
this, the Sandiganbayan properly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 despite Disini’s
being a private individual, and despite the lack of any allegation of his being the co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a
public official in the commission of the offenses charged.
3.
The offenses charged in the
informations have not yet prescribed
In resolving the issue of prescription, the following must be considered, namely: (1) the period of prescription for the
offense charged;(2) the time when the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time when the prescriptive period
is interrupted.23
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleged that Disini had offered, promised and given gifts and presents to
Ferdinand E. Marcos; that said gifts were in consideration of Disini obtaining for Burns & Roe and Westinghouse Electrical
Corporation (Westinghouse) the contracts, respectively, to do the engineering and architectural design of and to
construct the PNPPP; and that President Marcos did award or cause to be awarded the respective contracts to Burns &
Roe and Westinghouse, which acts constituted the crime of corruption of public officials.24
The crime of corruption of public officials charged in Criminal Case No. 28001 is punished by Article 212 of the Revised
Penal Code with the" same penalties imposed upon the officer corrupted."25 Under the second paragraph of Article 210 of
the Revised Penal Code (direct bribery),26 if the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act
that does not constitute a crime, and the officer executes the act, he shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its
medium and minimum periods and a fine of not less than three times the value of the gift. Conformably with Article 90 of
the Revised Penal Code,27 the period of prescription for this specie of corruption of public officials charged against Disini is
15 years.
As for Criminal Case No. 28002, Disini was charged with a violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019. By express provision
of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, the offenses committed under R.A. No. 3019
shall prescribe in 15 years. Prior to the amendment, the prescriptive period was only 10 years. It became settled in People
v. Pacificador,28 however, that the longer prescriptive period of 15years would not apply to crimes committed prior to the
effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which was approved on March 16, 1982, because the longer period could not be
given retroactive effect for not being favorable to the accused. With the information alleging the period from 1974 to
February1986 as the time of the commission of the crime charged, the applicable prescriptive period is 10 years in order
to accord with People v. Pacificador .
For crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof provides that prescription starts to run from the day
on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. As to offenses punishable by R.A.
No. 3019, Section 2 of R.A. No. 332629 states:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be
not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy.
The ruling on the issue of prescription in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto30 is also
enlightening, viz:
Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the crime is committed. That an aggrieved person
"entitled to an action has no knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises," does not prevent
the running of the prescriptive period. An exception to this rule is the "blameless ignorance" doctrine, incorporated in
Section 2 of Act No. 3326. Under this doctrine, "the statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the
invasion of a right which will support a cause of action. In other words, the courts would decline to apply the statute of
limitations where the plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of action."
It was in this accord that the Court confronted the question on the running of the prescriptive period in People v. Duque
which became the cornerstone of our 1999 Decision in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto (G.R. No. 130149), and the subsequent cases which Ombudsman Desierto dismissed, emphatically, on the
ground of prescription too. Thus, we held in a catena of cases, that if the violation of the special law was not known at the
time of its commission, the prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful
nature of the constitutive act or acts.
Corollary, it is safe to conclude that the prescriptive period for the crime which is the subject herein, commenced from
the date of its discovery in 1992 after the Committee made an exhaustive investigation. When the complaint was filed in
1997, only five years have elapsed, and, hence, prescription has not yet set in. The rationale for this was succinctly
discussed in the 1999 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, that "it was well-high impossible for
the State, the aggrieved party, to have known these crimes committed prior to the 1986EDSA Revolution, because of the
alleged connivance and conspiracy among involved public officials and the beneficiaries of the loans." In yet another
pronouncement, in the 2001 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130817),
the Court held that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to question the legality of these transactions.
(Citations omitted)31
Accordingly, we are not persuaded to hold here that the prescriptive period began to run from 1974, the time when the
contracts for the PNPP Project were awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse. Although the criminal cases were the
offshoot of the sequestration case to recover ill-gotten wealth instead of behest loans like in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, the connivance and conspiracy among the public officials involved and
the beneficiaries of the favors illegally extended rendered it similarly well-nigh impossible for the State, as the aggrieved
party, to have known of the commission of the crimes charged prior to the EDSA Revolution in 1986. Notwithstanding the
highly publicized and widely-known nature of the PNPPP, the unlawful acts or transactions in relation to it were
discovered only through the PCGG’s exhaustive investigation, resulting in the establishment of a prima facie case
sufficient for the PCGG to institute Civil Case No. 0013 against Disini. Before the discovery, the PNPPP contracts, which
partook of a public character, enjoyed the presumption of their execution having been regularly done in the course of
official functions.32
Considering further that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to assail the legality of the transactions,
it would be unreasonable to expect that the discovery of the unlawful transactions was possible prior to 1986.
We note, too, that the criminal complaints were filed and their records transmitted by the PCGG to the Office of the
Ombudsman on April 8, 1991for the conduct the preliminary investigation. 33 In accordance with Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code34 and the ruling in Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice,35 the filing of the criminal complaints in
the Office of the Ombudsman effectively interrupted the running of the period of prescription. According to Panaguiton:36
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, which involved violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act(R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293),which are both special laws, the Court
ruled that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the
accused. In the more recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, the Court
ruled that the nature and purpose of the investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on
violations of the Revised Securities Act, another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by
the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.
The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case is instructive, thus:
While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before" investigation and
punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of
prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings" should now be
understood either executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the investigation phase and judicial when
it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the
guilty person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not
under his control.
The prevailing rule is, therefore, that irrespective of whether the offense charged is punishable by the Revised Penal Code
or by a special law, it is the filing of the complaint or information in the office of the public prosecutor for purposes of the
preliminary investigation that interrupts the period of prescription. Consequently, prescription did not yet set in because
only five years elapsed from 1986, the time of the discovery of the offenses charged, up to April 1991, the time of the
filing of the criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman.
The informations were sufficient in form and substance
It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact necessary to constitute the offense charged;
otherwise, a motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground that the complaint or information charges no offense may be
properly sustained. The fundamental test in determining whether a motion to quash may be sustained based on this
ground is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will establish the essential elements of the offense as
defined in the law.37 Extrinsic matters or evidence aliunde are not considered.38
The test does not require absolute certainty as to the presence of the elements of the offense; otherwise, there would no
longer be any need for the Prosecution to proceed to trial.
The informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 (corruption of public officials) and Criminal Case No. 28002 (violation of
Section 4(a) of RA No.3019) have sufficiently complied with the requirements of Section 6, Rule110 of the Rules of Court,
viz:
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where
the offense was committed.
When the offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information.
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleging corruption of public officers specifically put forth that Disini, in the
period from 1974 to February 1986 in Manila, Philippines, conspiring and confederating with then President Marcos,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously offered, promised and gave gifts and presents to President Marcos, who, by taking
undue advantage of his position as President, committed the offense in relation to his office, and in consideration of the
gifts and presents offered, promised and given by Disini, President Marcos caused to be awarded to Burns & Roe and
Westinghouse the respective contracts to do the engineering and architectural design of and to construct the PNPPP. The
felonious act consisted of causing the contracts for the PNPPP to be awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by reason
of the gifts and promises offered by Disini to President Marcos.
The elements of corruption of public officials under Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code are:
1. That the offender makes offers or promises, or gives gifts or presents to a public officer; and
2. That the offers or promises are made or the gifts or presents are given to a public officer under
circumstances that will make the public officer liable for direct bribery or indirect bribery.
The allegations in the information for corruption of public officials, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the
essential elements of the crime. The information stated that: (1) Disini made an offer and promise, and gave gifts to
President Marcos, a public officer; and (2) in consideration of the offers, promises and gifts, President Marcos, in causing
the award of the contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by taking advantage of his position and in committing said
act in relation to his office, was placed under circumstances that would make him liable for direct bribery.39
The second element of corruption of public officers simply required the public officer to be placed under circumstances,
not absolute certainty, that would make him liable for direct or indirect bribery. Thus, even without alleging that
President Marcos received or accepted Disini’s offers, promises and gifts – an essential element in direct bribery – the
allegation that President Marcos caused the award of the contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse sufficed to place
him under circumstances of being liable for direct bribery.
The sufficiency of the allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 is similarly
upheld. The elements of the offense under Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 are:
1. That the offender has family or close personal relation with a public official;
2. That he capitalizes or exploits or takes advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or
indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift, material or pecuniary advantage from any person having
some business, transaction, application, request or contract with the government;
3. That the public official with whom the offender has family or close personal relation has to intervene in the
business transaction, application, request, or contract with the government.
The allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019, if hypothetically admitted,
would establish the elements of the offense, considering that: (1) Disini, being the husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini, the
first cousin of First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, and at the same time the family physician of the Marcoses, had close
personal relations and intimacy with and free access to President Marcos, a public official; (2) Disini, taking advantage of
such family and close personal relations, requested and received $1,000,000.00 from Burns & Roe and $17,000,000.00
from Westinghouse, the entities then having business, transaction, and application with the Government in connection
with the PNPPP; (3) President Marcos, the public officer with whom Disini had family or close personal relations,
intervened to secure and obtain for Burns & Roe the engineering and architectural contract, and for Westinghouse the
construction of the PNPPP.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari; AFFIRMS the resolutions promulgated on January 17, 2005
and August 10, 2005 by the Sandiganbayan (First Division) in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002; and
DIRECTS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2367 January 13, 2014
(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 12-3879-RTJ)
SR. REMY ANGELA JUNIO, SPC and JOSEPHINE D. LORICA, Complainants,
vs.
JUDGE MARIVIC A. CACATIAN-BELTRAN, BRANCH 3, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT TUGUEGARAO CITY,
CAGAYAN, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.: On August 12, 2011, Junio and Lorica filed a manifestation and motion before the RTC, praying for the cancellation of
their scheduled arraignment, and for the dismissal of the cases against them.
For our resolution is the Report and Recommendation1 dated August 13, 2013 of the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) in OCA LP.I. No. 12-3879-RTJ. On September 5, 2011, the City Prosecutor, Junio and Lorica filed a joint motion to withdraw informations in view of
Secretary De Lima’s August 8, 2011 resolution.
The Antecedents
On September 14, 2011, Judge Cacatian-Beltran issued an order stating that "the motion relative to the resolution of the
Department of Justice is deemed submitted for resolution."2
Claire Ann Campos, a 17-year old student, filed an affidavit-complaint for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 (the
Child Abuse Law) and R.A. No. 7277 (the Magna Carta for the Disabled) before the Tuguegarao City Prosecution Office
against Sr. Remy Angela Junio and Dr. Josephine D. Lorica, the President and the Dean of the School of Health Services, On December 20, 2011, Junio, Lorica and the City Prosecutor filed a joint motion for resolution.
respectively, of St. Paul University of the Philippines (SPUP).
In its order of January 6, 2012, the RTC denied the joint motion to withdraw informations for lack of merit.
In her complaint, Claire alleged that she was refused enrolment by SPUP for the B.S. Nursing course in her sophomore
year because of her cleft palate; she alleged that the refusal was made despite her completion of SPUP’s College
The City Prosecutor, Junio and Lorica moved to reconsider this order, but the RTC denied their motion in its order dated
Freshmen Program Curriculum.
April 10, 2012.

In its resolution dated August 22, 2008, the prosecutor’s office found probable cause to indict Junio and Lorica of the
The Administrative Complaint
crimes charged, and recommended the filing of the corresponding informations against them.

Junio and Lorica filed an affidavit-complaint against Judge Cacatian-Beltran for violation of Rules 1.02, 3.01, 3.02, and 3.05
On September 8, 2008, Junio and Lorica appealed the August 22, 2008 resolution of the prosecutor’s office, but
of the Code of Judicial Conduct. They alleged that Judge Cacatian-Beltran only resolved the joint motion to withdraw
Undersecretary Jose Vicente Salazar of the Department of Justice (DOJ) denied their petition for review in his resolution
informations after almost four months from the time it was submitted for resolution. They claimed that four months was
of February 24, 2011.
beyond the period prescribed by existing rules for the resolution of simple motions.

On March 31, 2011, the prosecutor’s office filed two informations against Junio and Lorica for violations of Section 10(a),
Junio and Lorica further alleged that Judge Cacatian-Beltran "arrogated unto herself the role of a prosecutor and a
Article VI, in relation with Article 3(a) and (b) of R.A. No. 7610, and Section 12 of R.A. No. 7277 before the Regional Trial
judge"3 when she insisted that they stand for trial although she did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of
Court (RTC), Branch 4, Tuguegarao City, presided by Judge Lyliha Aquino.
Justice Secretary De Lima.

On April 27, 2011, the cases were assigned to Judge Marivic A. Cacatian-Beltran of the RTC, Branch 3, Tuguegarao City,
due to the inhibition of Judge Aquino.
On April 4, 2011, Junio and Lorica sought a reconsideration of the DOJ’s February 24, 2011 resolution.
In her comment, Judge Cacatian-Beltran explained that Junio and Lorica might have conducted a follow-up of the motions
to dismiss at Branch 4 where the records of the criminal cases had been retained, and that the staff of Branch 4 failed to
inform her of any follow-up by Junio and Lorica and/or by their counsel. She maintained that she "lost no time in finishing
the draft"4 of her January 6, 2012 order when the joint motion for resolution was brought to her attention.

On May 5, 2011, the RTC found probable cause to issue warrants of arrest against Junio and Lorica. Accordingly, it issued
the warrants of arrest against them.
On May 24, 2011, Lorica posted bail for her provisional liberty.
On May 25, 2011, Junio and Lorica filed an urgent motion to hold in abeyance further proceedings and to recall warrants
of arrest. Junio posted bail on the same day.
In its order dated June 14, 2011, the RTC denied Junio and Lorica’s urgent motion to hold in abeyance further proceedings
and to recall warrants of arrest.
Meanwhile, DOJ Secretary Leila de Lima granted Junio and Lorica’s motion for reconsideration and set aside the February
24, 2011 resolution of Undersecretary Salazar. Accordingly, in her resolution dated August 8, 2011, she directed the
Cagayan Provincial Prosecutor to immediately cause the withdrawal of the informations for violations of R.A. Nos. 7610
and 7277 against Junio and Lorica for lack of probable cause.
Judge Cacatian-Beltran maintained that the RTC was not bound by the findings of the Secretary of Justice since her court
had already acquired jurisdiction over the case. She added that she made an independent assessment of the evidence
before denying the motion. She further stated that she acted promptly on all other incidents in the case.
The OCA’s Report and Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation dated August 13, 2013, the OCA recommended that: (1) the administrative complaint
against Judge Cacatian-Beltran be dismissed for being judicial in nature; and (2) Judge Cacatian-Beltran be admonished to
strictly comply with the reglementary periods to act on pending motions and other incidents in her court.
The OCA held that errors committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through
administrative proceedings. It explained that the aberrant acts allegedly committed by Judge Cacatian-Beltran relate to
the exercise of her judicial functions, and added that only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance,
bad faith or deliberate intent to do an injustice should be administratively sanctioned.
The OCA, nonetheless, ruled that Judge Cacatian-Beltran should be admonished to be more mindful of the reglementary
periods to resolve pending motions.
 Our Ruling
After due consideration, we approve and adopt the OCA’s recommendations as our own ruling.
Delay in resolving a motion
Section 15(1), Article VIII of the Constitution requires lower court judges to decide a case within the period of ninety (90)
days. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct likewise holds that judges should administer justice without
delay and directs every judge to dispose of the courts’ business promptly within the period prescribed by law. Rules
prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly
and speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the ninety (90) day period is mandatory. This mandate applies even to motions or
interlocutory matters or incidents pending before a magistrate.5
In the present case, the City Prosecutor’s joint motion to withdraw informations was deemed submitted for resolution on
September 14, 2011. Judge Cacatian-Beltran, however, did not act on the motion within the prescribed three (3) month
period (or up to December 13, 2011), and instead ruled on it only on January 6, 2012.
In her defense, Judge Cacatian-Beltran explained that Junio and Lorica might have conducted a follow-up of the motions
to dismiss at Branch 4 where the records of the criminal cases were retained, and that the staff of Branch 4 failed to
inform her of any follow-up by Junio and Lorica and/or their counsel. We note, however, that Branch 4 is paired with
Judge Cacatian-Beltran’s Branch 3 per Circular No. 7-74, as amended by SC Circular No. 19-98. Since Criminal Case Nos.
14053-54 had been assigned to Judge Cacatian-Beltran, it was incumbent upon her to update herself on the
developments in these consolidated cases; she should have kept her own record of cases and noted therein the status of
each case to ensure prompt and effective action. To do this, Judge Cacatian-Beltran should have adopted a record
management system and organized her docket – an approach that she appears not to have done.
Sections 9 and 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, classifies undue delay in rendering
a decision or order as a less serious charge, with the following administrative sanctions: (a) suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or (b) a fine of more than
₱10,000.00 but not exceeding ₱20,000.00.
However, the records are bereft of any evidence showing that there had been undue delay (as shown by the records), any
attendant bad faith, any intent to prejudice a party to the case, or some other ulterior ends. The OCA, in fact, pointedly
ruled that the inaction was not attended with malice: Judge Cacatian-Beltran resolved the joint motion to withdraw
informations two (2) days after she learned of its existence on January 4, 2012.
To our mind, these circumstances are sufficient to mitigate the liability of Judge Cacatian-Beltran and keep us from
imposing a fine or suspension from office. Accordingly, we find sufficient and warranted the OCA’s recommended penalty
of admonition.
Denial of the joint motion to withdraw informations
The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice since it is mandated to independently
evaluate or assess the merits of the case; in the exercise of its discretion, it may agree or disagree with the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. Reliance on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice alone would be an
abdication of the trial court's duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case.6 We stress that once a criminal
complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case (whether it be a dismissal, an acquittal or a
conviction of the accused) rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court; it is the
best and sole judge of what to do with the case before it.7
In resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw the information filed by the public prosecutor (on his own initiative
or pursuant to the directive of the Secretary of Justice), either for insufficiency of evidence in the possession of the
prosecutor or for lack of probable cause, the trial court should not merely rely on the findings of the public prosecutor or
of the Secretary of Justice that no crime had been committed or that the evidence in the possession of the public
prosecutor is insufficient to support a judgment of conviction of the accused.8 To do so is to surrender a power
constitutionally vested in the Judiciary to the Executive.
In the present case, Judge Cacatian-Beltran does not appear to have arbitrarily denied the joint motion to withdraw
informations. The records show that she evaluated and assessed the informations, the resolution of the City Prosecutor,
the affidavit and reply-affidavit of the complainants, the counter-affidavit and rejoinder and the appeal memorandum of
Junio and Lorica, and the supporting documents attached to them.
In her January 6, 2012 order, Judge Cacatian-Beltran notably explained the basis for her denial. No proof whatsoever
exists in all these, showing that bad faith, malice or any corrupt purpose attended the issuance of her order. It is also
important to note in this regard that the issue of whether Judge Cacatian-Beltran correctly denied the joint motion to
withdraw informations, despite the finding of Secretary De Lima of lack of probable cause, is judicial in nature: Junio and
Lorica’s remedy under the circumstances should have been made with the proper court for the appropriate judicial
action, not with the OCA by means of an administrative complaint.
We also find unmeritorious Junio and Lorica’s argument that Judge Cacatian-Beltran "arrogated unto herself the role of a
prosecutor and a judge"9 when she insisted that the accused stand trial although she did not find any grave abuse of
discretion on the part of Justice Secretary de Lima. When a court acts, whether its action is consistent or inconsistent with
a prosecutor’s recommendation, it rules on the prosecutor’s action and does not thereby assume the role of a prosecutor.
The case of Hipos, Sr. v. Bay10 best explains why we so rule:
To clarify, we never stated in Ledesma that a judge is allowed to deny a Motion to Withdraw Information from the
prosecution only when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors moving for such withdrawal.
Neither did we rule therein that where there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors, the denial of
the Motion to Withdraw Information is void. What we held therein is that a trial judge commits grave abuse of discretion
if he denies a Motion to Withdraw Information without an independent and complete assessment of the issues presented
in such Motion.
With the independent and thorough assessment and evaluation of the merits of the joint motion to withdraw information
that Judge Cacatian-Beltran undertook before dismissing it, she acted as a judge should and can in no way be said to have
assumed the role of a prosecutor. The parties for their part are not without any remedy as the Rules of Court amply
provide for the remedy against a judicial action believed to· be grossly abusive when the remedy of direct appeal is not
available. We cannot rule on this point in the present case however as this is a matter not before us in this administrative
recourse against Judge Cacatian-Beltran.
WHEREFORE, premises considered we APPROVE AND ADOPT as our own the August 13, 2013 Report and
Recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator. Judge Marivic A Cacatian-Beltran is hereby ADMONISHED and
REMINDED that she should dispose of her cases within the period required by law.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164682 September 14, 2011
JOEL GALZOTE y SORIAGA, Petitioner, The CA held that the petitioner lost his right to appeal when he failed to appeal within the 15-day reglementary period
vs. under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA explained that the petitioner should have filed an appeal, instead of a
JONATHAN BRIONES and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. special civil action for certiorari, upon receipt of the RTC’s denial of his motion for reconsideration. The CA also noted that
the petitioner failed to implead the People of the Philippines as party-respondent in his petition.
DECISION
The CA saw no merit in the petitioner’s argument that the lower courts erred in denying his motion to quash. It explained
that the allegation of conspiracy in his case need not be alleged with particularity since it was not charged as an offense in
BRION, J.:
itself, but only as a manner of incurring criminal liability. The fact that the petitioner’s alleged co-conspirator had been
convicted of the lesser offense of malicious mischief in another case is not a bar to the petitioner’s prosecution for the
Before this Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the twin crime of robbery.
resolutions1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated April 30, 2004 and July 23, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 76783. The assailed
April 30, 2004 resolution dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by Joel S. Galzote (petitioner), while the challenged July
The petitioner moved to reconsider this resolution, but the CA denied his motion in its resolution10 dated July 23, 2004.
23, 2004 resolution denied his motion for reconsideration.

THE PETITION
ANTECEDENT FACTS

In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner claims that his recourse to a petition for certiorari before
On January 23, 1997, the prosecution filed an Information for robbery in an uninhabited place against the petitioner
the CA was proper. He argues that both the MeTC and the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when they denied his
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 1, Manila. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
motion to quash. He alleges that the trial courts failed to see that the information filed against him was flawed both in
form and in substance.
The undersigned accuses JOEL GALZOTE Y SORIAGA of the crime of Robbery in an Uninhabited Place, committed as
follows:
The petitioner additionally claims that his failure to implead the People of the Philippines as party-respondent was not
fatal to his petition.
That on or about July 22, 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with one
ROSENDO OQUINA Y ESMALI who is already charged with the same offense with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
THE COURT’S RULING
docketed as Criminal Case No. 304765, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain, by
means of force upon things, break into and enter the Administration Office of the Prince Town Inn Corporation located at
Valenzuela Street, Sta. Mesa, this City, which is an uninhabited place, by then and there destroying the Jipson board We deny the petition for lack of merit.
ceiling of the said establishment with the use of a fan knife and passing through the same, an opening not intended for
entrance or egress, and once inside, and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, took, stole and carried
Remedy from the Denial of a Motion to Quash
away cash money in the amount of ₱109,000.00 belonging to said Prince Town Inn Corporation, to the damage and
prejudice of said owner in the aforesaid amount of ₱109,000.00, Philippine Currency [sic].
A preliminary consideration in this case relates to the propriety of the chosen legal remedies availed of by the petitioner
in the lower courts to question the denial of his motion to quash. In the usual course of procedure, a denial of a motion to
Contrary to law.2
quash filed by the accused results in the continuation of the trial and the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. If a judgment of conviction is rendered and the lower court’s decision of conviction is appealed, the accused can
The petitioner moved to quash the above information by alleging that it was patently irregular and fatally flawed in form then raise the denial of his motion to quash not only as an error committed by the trial court but as an added ground to
and in substance. The MeTC denied the petitioner’s motion to quash in its order of September 15, 1997.3 Likewise, the overturn the latter’s ruling.
MeTC denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the order of denial.4
In this case, the petitioner did not proceed to trial but opted to immediately question the denial of his motion to quash
Via a petition for certiorari,5 the petitioner elevated the unfavorable ruling of the MeTC to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Branch 8, Manila. The petitioner argued that the MeTC committed grave abuse of discretion in not granting his motion to
quash. Respondent Jonathan Briones (respondent) moved to dismiss the petition for certiorari, arguing that: (a) the
As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and is not appealable; an appeal from an interlocutory
petitioner failed to prosecute the petition for an unreasonably long period of time; (b) a petition for certiorari is not the
order is not allowed under Section 1(b), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Neither can it be a proper subject of a petition for
proper remedy to address the denial of a motion to quash; and (c) the MeTC did not abuse its discretion in denying the
certiorari which can be used only in the absence of an appeal or any other adequate, plain and speedy remedy.11 The
petitioner’s motion to quash.6
plain and speedy remedy upon denial of an interlocutory order is to proceed to trial as discussed above.

In its order7 of March 22, 2002, the RTC granted the respondent’s motion and dismissed the petition for certiorari. The
RTC also denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner.8
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 76783. The CA dismissed the
petition in its resolution of April 30, 2004.9
Thus, a direct resort to a special civil action for certiorari is an exception rather than the general rule, and is a recourse
that must be firmly grounded on compelling reasons. In past cases, we have cited the interest of a "more enlightened and
substantial justice";12 the promotion of public welfare and public policy;13 cases that "have attracted nationwide
attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof";14 or judgments on order attended by
grave abuse of discretion, as compelling reasons to justify a petition for certiorari.15
In grave abuse of discretion cases, certiorari is appropriate if the petitioner can establish that the lower court issued the
judgment or order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and the remedy of appeal would
not afford adequate and expeditious relief. The petitioner carries the burden of showing that the attendant facts and
circumstances fall within any of the cited instances.
At the RTC
(a) Ordinary appeal. – The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
Given the plain, speedy and adequate remedy of appeal, the petitioner cannot avail of the remedy of
certiorari.19 1avvphi1

We find no compelling reason to justify a resort to a petition for certiorari against the orders of the MeTC as the Even on the substantive aspect, the petition for certiorari filed with the CA must fail considering the petitioner’s failure to
petitioner failed to show that the factual circumstances of his case fall under any of the above exceptional circumstances. show any justifiable reason for his chosen mode of review. In addition, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by
The MeTC in fact did not commit any grave abuse of discretion as its denial of the motion to quash was consistent with the RTC since it was merely affirming a correct ruling of denial by the MeTC of the petitioner’s motion to quash.
the existing rules and applicable jurisprudence. The ground used by the petitioner in his motion to quash (i.e., that his co-
conspirator had been convicted of an offense lesser than the crime of robbery) is not among the exclusive grounds
As a final word, we cannot allow a party to delay litigation by filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 based on scant
enumerated under Section 3, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that warrant the quashal of a
allegations of grave abuse of discretion.20 We repeat that it is only in the presence of extraordinary circumstances where
criminal information.16
a resort to a petition for certiorari is proper.21 Under the circumstances, the petitioner’s recourses cannot but be dilatory
moves that deserve sanction from this Court.
This ground, too, is an extraneous matter that has no bearing and is irrelevant to the validity of the criminal information
filed against the accused; the designated purpose of a motion to quash is to assail the validity of the criminal information
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit, and accordingly AFFIRM the challenged
(or criminal complaint) for defects or defenses apparent on the face of the information.17 A facial examination of the
resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2004 and July 23, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 76783. Treble costs against
criminal information against the petitioner shows it to be valid and regular on its face considering its conformity with the
the petitioner.
guidelines under Section 6, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. This section provides:

SO ORDERED.
SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where
the offense was committed.

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information.

Under the circumstances, the criminal information is sufficient in form and substance for it states: (a) the name of the
petitioner as the accused; (b) the offense of robbery as the designated offense committed; (c) the manner on how the
offense of robbery was committed and the petitioner’s participation were alleged with particularity; and (d) the date and
the place of the commission of the robbery were also stated therein. Thus, as the RTC correctly ruled, the petitioner can
be properly tried under the allegations of the information.

The CA Resolution

To proceed to the merits of the CA resolution that is the main subject of this review, we find no reversible error in the
CA’s dismissal of the petitioner’s petition for certiorari assailing the RTC’s order; the petition was both procedurally and
substantively infirm.

We find that the petition for certiorari filed with the CA was a wrong legal remedy to question the RTC order. The petition
for certiorari filed by the petitioner before the RTC was an original action whose resulting decision is a final order that
completely disposed of the petition;18 the assailed CA resolution was in all respect a ruling on the propriety of the petition
for certiorari filed with the RTC. Hence, the petitioner’s remedy was to appeal the RTC order to the CA pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 2. Modes of appeal. –