Alonzo v.

Intermediate Appellate Court

G. R. No. 72873 may 28, 1987

Topic. Characteristics of construction: Necessary when legislative intent cannot be ascertained

Case. Appeal of lower court decision dismissing redemption claim
Facts: Five siblings equally inherited pro indiviso* land from their deceased parents. Sibling 1 sold his
share to Alonzos. Sibling 2 also sold his share to Alonzos a year after. Alonzos built a house and a fence in
their bought land. Sibling 3 lived in inherited land, which was next to the Alonzo’s house. Sibling 2 lived
there with her. Sibling 3 is friends with Alonzos in that their children went to school together. 13 years
after, Sibling 4 filed for redemption but revoked because he is American citizen. Year after, Sibling 3 filed
complaint for redemption.
Trial court dismissed complaint saying that 30-day period for filing after notice of sale had lapsed. Art.
1623 of the Civil Code which states that “the right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised
except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor/s.” Since 13 years has passed,
the court presumes that at some point, the siblings have been informed and that the prescription has
passed. Though no written notice was served to the siblings, court held complainants had actual
knowledge given that they are neighbors.
Issue: Did the lower court interpret and apply the relevant law correctly? -Yes
Ratio: Yes, the lower court was correct in its application of the law because the facts prove the likelihood
of the notice happening at one point. The relevant law is Art. 1623 of the Civil Code which states that “the
right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in
writing by the prospective vendor/s.” (1) One of the issues here is whether notice was given the
complainants. Even if we grant that there was no written notice, it is impossible to deem there being no
notice at all. They live next to each other. (2) When did the notice begin? The Court does not know but it
assumes that it had begun and elapsed in the 13 years.
Regarding the prescription of the right of redemption, the law specifically states that it should be 30 days
after notice. Given the 13 years, the court assumes that the prescription has as well lapsed.
Doctrine: By letter of the law, the complainants would have won this case. But, due to the circumstances,
the Court stuck to the spirit of the law and gave leeway to the Alonzos.
“The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its construction, hence, a statute must be read
according to its spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit is within the letter but although it is not within
the letter thereof, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Stated
differently, a thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the
letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of
the lawmakers.” -Agpalo

*Pro indiviso it was not divided legally nor formally but only equally among the heirs.
People v Veneracion 249 SCRA 247
GR No – 119987-88 Oct. 12, 1995

FACTS:
On August 2, 1994, the lifeless body of Angel Alquiza, 7 years old, was found floating along Del Pan St.,
near the corner of Lavesares st., Binondo Manila. Abundio Lagunday a.k.a. Jr. Jeofrey of no fixed address
and Lagarto of Tondo Manila were later charged with the crime of Rape with Homicide. Subsequently,
Cordero, Manlangit, Baltazar and Yaon were accused of the same crime of Rape with Homicide.
On January 31, 1995 finding the defendants Henry Lagarto and Ernesto Cordero guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced with “reclusion perpetua with all the accessories
provided by law”. The City Prosecutor of Manila filed a motion for Reconsideration on February 8, 1995
praying that the decision be “modified in that the penalty of death be imposed” against the respondents
Lagarto and Cordero. On February 10, 1995, the judge issued an order denying the same for lack of
jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction when
he failed and/or refused to impose the mandatory penalty of death under RA # 7659, after finding the
accused guilty of the crime Rape with Homicide.

RULING:
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of the justice system. If judges under the guise of religious
or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by
law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men,
excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority.
In the case of bench, since the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime for which respondent
judge found the accused guilty, of he was bound by its provisions. After an adjudication of guilt, the judge
should impose “the proper penalty and civil liability provided for the law on the accused. This is a case in
which a judge, fully aware of the appropriate provisions of the law refuses to impose a penalty to which he
disagrees”.
The instant petition is Granted. The case is hereby Remanded to the RTC for the imposition of the penalty
of death upon private respondents in consonance with respondent judge’s findings that the private
respondents had committed the crime of Rape with Homicide under Art 335 of the RPC, as amended by
section 11 of RA # 7659, subject to automatic review by this court of the decision imposing the death
penalty
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005

FACTS:
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia.
He prayed that the child's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother's surname, and that her
surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir, and pursuant to Art.
189 of the Family Code, she is now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should be allowed to use the
surname Garcia as her middle name.
The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her natural mother should
be maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship in the future, and under Article 189
she remains to be an intestate heir of her mother.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name.

RULING:
Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use,
as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing Illegitimate
Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a child may use. Article
365 of the CC merely provides that “an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.” Article 189
of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.
Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child by virtue of her adoption,
Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any
kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.
Barcellano vs Banas
GR No. 165287

FACTS:
Respondent Dolores Banās, an heir of Bartolome Banās owned a lot in Bacacay, Albay. Adjoining the said
lot is a property owned by Vicente Medina. In 1997, Medina offered his lot for sale to the owners of the
adjoining lots. The property was eventually sold to Armando Barcellano. The heirs of Banās contested the
sale, and conveyed their intention to redeem the property. However, according to Medina, the deed of sale
has been executed. There was also mention that the Banās heirs failed to give the amount required by
Medina for them to redeem the lot. Action to redeem the property was filed before the RTC. It denied the
petition on the ground that the Banās heirs failed to exercise their right to redemption within the period
provided in article 1623 of NCC. On appeal, such ruling was reversed.

ISSUE:
W/N the RTC decision to deny the Banās heirs of their right of legal redemption is valid

HELD:
The court denied the petition, and affirmed the appellate court decision granting the Banās heirs the right
to redeem the subject property. The decision was based on the provisions of article 1623 NCC.
We need only to discuss the requirement of notice under Art. 1623 of the New Civil Code, which provides
that:
The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice
in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be
recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an af davit of the vendor that he has given
written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
A written notice must be issued by the prospective vendor. Nothing in the record and pleadings submitted
by the parties showed that there was a written notice sent to the respondents. Without a written notice, the
period of 30 days within which the right of legal redemption may be exercised does not exist. In this case,
the law was clear. A written notice by the vendor is mandatory.
JULY 30, 1979 (UNDOCKETED CASE) PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF
THE FIRM NAME “SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO.”

Facts:
Petitions were filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975 and by
the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be
allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed away.
Petitioners contend that the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by
local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through
this use. They also contend that no local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner’s name
in a professional firm’s name; there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater
Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily identifies the individual members
of the firm.

Issue:
WON the surviving partners may be allowed by the court to retain the name of the partners who already
passed away in the name of the firm? NO

Held:
In the case of Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation, the SC said:
The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between attorney
and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no practice should be
allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are
accordingly advised to drop the names of the deceased partners from their firm name.
The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and
disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make a
name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on
that old firm’s reputation established by deceased partners.
The court also made the difference from the law firms and business corporations:
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association for a
particular purpose. … It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or business or of
holding property.” Thus, it has been stated that “the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law
practice is improper.
We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute the same,
wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice does not mean that Courts can
rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom.
Petition suffers legal and ethical impediment.
YAO KEE VS. AIDA SY-GONZALES
[G.R. No. 55960. November 24, 1988.]

Facts:
Sy Kiat was a Chinese national who died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was then residing.
He left behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth P300,000.00.

Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition for the grant
of letters of administration alleging that:
a) they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego;
b) that Sy Kiat died intestate;
c) they do not recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him; and
d) they nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of the
deceased

The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen who alleged that:
a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on January 19, 1931 in China;
b) the other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee; and,
c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is competent, willing and desirous to become the
administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat

Probate Court (PC): held in favor of the petitioners (Yao Kee et al.) and appointed Sze Sook Wah as the
administratrix.

CA: modified the PC’s decision by declaring that:

a) Respondents as acknowledged natural children of Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego
b) Legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in China had not been proven to be
valid to the laws of the Chinese People's Republic of China
Issue:
W/N the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee was conclusively proven valid in accordance with the laws of the
People’s Republic of China.
Ruling:
No. The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code which states that:
Art. 71.All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous,
polygamous, or incestuous marriages, as determined by Philippine law.
This Court has held that to establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the
existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing
evidence [Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49 (1922).].
In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court. With respect to an unwritten
foreign law, Rule 130 section 45 states that:
Sec. 45.Unwritten law. — The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled therein, is admissible as evidence of the
unwritten law of a foreign country, as are also printed and published books of reports of decisions of the
courts of the foreign country, if proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.

Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule 132 section 25, thus:
Sec. 25.Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an entry therein, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines,
with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign
country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office.

In the case at bar, petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of
China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of China's law or
custom on marriage not only because they are self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no
showing that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or
custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage
between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.

Furthermore, well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved as any other fact.
Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is the
same as ours. Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that there was no solemnizing officer as is known
here in the Philippines when her alleged marriage to Sy Kiat was celebrated, it therefore follows that her
marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
A.M NO. 00-2-14-SC
February 29, 2000

Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court relied upon by petitioner provides:

Section 1. How to compute time. – In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules,
or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated
period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the
period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits,
the time shall not run until the next working day.

We then clarified the above-quoted provision when we issued A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC dated February 29,
2000 (Re: Computation of Time When the Last Day Falls on a Saturday, Sunday or a Legal Holiday and a
Motion for Extension on Next Working Day is Granted) which reads:

xxxx

Whereas, the aforecited provision [Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court] applies in the matter of filing
of pleadings in courts when the due date falls on a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, in which case, the
filing of the said pleading on the next working day is deemed on time;

Whereas, the question has been raised if the period is extended ipso jure to the next working day
immediately following where the last day of the period is a Saturday, Sunday or a legal holiday, so that
when a motion for extension of time is filed, the period of extension is to be reckoned from the next working
day and not from the original expiration of the period.
DOMINGO NEYPES, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

G.R. No. 141524 (September 14, 2005)

FACTS:
Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or
reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against the private respondents. Later, in an order,
the trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed.
Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day
thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued
another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five
days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late.
This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too
was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65,
petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the CA. In the appellate court, petitioners
claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary
period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of
the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27,
1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal. On
September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have
been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their
complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the “final order” appealable under the Rules.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not receipt of a final order triggers the start of the 15-day reglmentary period to appeal, the
February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the Motion for
Reconsideration.
(2) Whether or not petitioners file their notice of appeal on time.

HELD:
(1) The July 1, 1998 order dismissing the motion for reconsideration should be deemed as the final order.
In the case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial court declared petitioner non-suited and
accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to
set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had
lapsed. He later on received another order, this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice
of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed ― for having been filed out of time. The court a quo ruled that
petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final
order that was appealable under the Rules. The SC reversed the trial court and declared that it was the denial
of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order
as it was what ended the issues raised there. This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of
Apuyan v. Haldeman et al. where the SC again considered the order denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case. Based on the
aforementioned cases, the SC sustained petitioners’ view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their
motion for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.
(2) YES. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity
to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the
notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion
for reconsideration. Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and
Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of
the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final
order or resolution.
The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days,
counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This
pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall
be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive
word “or” signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be
construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of “or” in the above provision supposes
that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from
notice of the “final order,” which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the
motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal
period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case
March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15
days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review
the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases
with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to
deliver justice fairly.
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the RTC’s
decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the “final order”) denying his motion for new
trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either
motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal
period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five
days from receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice
of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.

IMPORTANT NOTES:
The “FRESH PERIOD RULE” do not apply to Rule 64 (Review of Judgments and Final Orders or
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit) because Rule 64 is derived
from the Constitution. It is likewise doubtful whether it will apply to criminal cases.

SOURCE: http://mclaw08.wordpress.com/2009/10/01/neypes-vs-court-of-appeals/

IMPORTANT NOTES:

The Neypes Rule

STATEMENT OF THE RULE
The "Neypes Rule," otherwise known as the “Fresh Period Rule,” states that “a party litigant may
either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court’s decision or file it
within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration.” (Domingo Neypes versus Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005)

PURPOSE OF THE RULE

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal
their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or
motion for reconsideration. (supra)

The raison d’être for the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules and
do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day period
to appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration;
litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the balance of the 15-day period to appeal since
the 15-day period is now counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration or any final order or resolution. (Judith Yu versus Hon. Rosa Samson-Tatad, G.R. No.
170979, 09 Feb. 2011)

THE RULE PRIOR TO NEYPES

Before the Supreme Court prmulgated Neypes, the rules mandate that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration interrupts the running of the period to appeal; and that an appeal should be taken within 15
days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. While the period to file an appeal is counted
from the denial of the motion for reconsideration, the appellant does not have the full fifteen (15) days. The
appellant only has the remaining time of the 15-day appeal period to file the notice of appeal. Thus, some
rules on appeals are:

Sec. 39. [B.P. 129] Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or
decisions of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order,
resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases,
the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of judgment appealed from. x x x

SEC. 3. [Rule 41] Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from the
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant
shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of judgment or
final order.

The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.

SEC. 6. [Rule 122] When appeal to be taken. — An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This period for perfecting an
appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the
order overruling the motion has been served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of
the period begins to run.

IN WHAT CASES APPLICABLE

`Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial
Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the
Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies31 to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45
governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.32 The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal
period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution. (Neypes, supra)

Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision
becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section
3. (Neypes, supra)

The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given
another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment.
While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some definite
time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly. (Neypes, supra)

APPLICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES

While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Court’s pronouncement of a "fresh period"
to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:

First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes no distinction
between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically
states that "[t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any
court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award,
judgment, or decision appealed from." Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law
makes no distinction, we (this Court) also ought not to recognize any distinction. 17

Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule
122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly the same. There
is no substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results are concerned – the appeal
period stops running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and starts to run again upon
receipt of the order denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration. It was this situation that Neypes
addressed in civil cases. No reason exists why this situation in criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed.

Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases under Section
6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it did include
Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals
(CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals by certiorari to this Court, both
of which also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, thus:

SEC. 3. How appeal taken. — x x x x

(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.
xxxx

Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court
shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction) and
to this Court in civil and criminal cases are the same, no cogent reason exists why the periods to appeal
from the RTC (in the exercise of its original jurisdiction) to the CA in civil and criminal cases under Section
3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure should be treated differently.

Were we to strictly interpret the "fresh period rule" in Neypes and make it applicable only to the period to
appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively foster and encourage an absurd situation where a litigant in a civil
case will have a better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal case – a situation that gives undue favor
to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates against the accused-appellants. It suggests a double standard of
treatment when we favor a situation where property interests are at stake, as against a situation where liberty
stands to be prejudiced. We must emphatically reject this double and unequal standard for being contrary
to reason. Over time, courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is contrary to reason
is not allowed in law – Quod est inconveniens, aut contra rationem non permissum est in lege. 18 (Judith
Yu versus Hon. Rosa Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, 09 Feb. 2011)

RETROACTIVE EFFECT

The determinative issue is whether the "fresh period" rule announced in Neypes could retroactively apply
in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005 when Neypes was promulgated.
That question may be answered with the guidance of the general rule that procedural laws may be given
retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested
rights in the rules of procedure.17 Amendments to procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character
as they do not create new or remove vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or
confirmation of rights already existing.18

Sps. De los Santos reaffirms these principles and categorically warrants that Neypes bears the quested
retroactive effect, to wit:

Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that courts
may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive
law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statues ― they may be given retroactive effect
on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a
person who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of
procedure.

The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within which an appeal
may be made in the event that the motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower court. Following the
rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the "fresh period rule" should be applied to pending actions, such
as the present case.

Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the "fresh period rule" will amount to injustice, if not
absurdity, since the subject notice of judgment and final order were issued two years later or in the year
2000, as compared to the notice of judgment and final order in Neypes which were issued in 1998. It will
be incongruous and illogical that parties receiving notices of judgment and final orders issued in the year
1998 will enjoy the benefit of the "fresh period rule" while those later rulings of the lower courts such as in
the instant case, will not.19

Notably, the subject incidents in Sps. De los Santos occurred in August 2000, at the same month as the
relevant incidents at bar. There is no reason to adopt herein a rule that is divergent from that in Sps. De los
Santos. (Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. versus Hon. Marietta Homena J. Valencia, G.R. No. 173942, 25 June
2008)

NOT INCONSISTENT WITH RULES OF COURT

This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal
shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the
disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a
rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies.33 Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision
supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15
days from notice of the "final order," which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying
the motion for a new trial or reconsideration. (Neypes, supra)
NEYPES RULE NOT APPLIED

Petitioner was charged with and found guilty of perjury. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 4
months and 1 day to 1 year, a period which is considered as a correctional penalty. Under Article 9 of the
Revised Penal Code, light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of which the penalty of
arresto menor (one to thirty days of imprisonment) or a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos (P200), or
both are imposable. Thus, perjury is not a light felony or offense contemplated by Rule 120, Sec. 6. It was
therefore mandatory for petitioner to be present at the promulgation of the judgment.

To recall, despite notice, petitioner was absent when the MTCC promulgated its judgment on 25 August
2009. Pursuant to Rule 120, Sec. 6, it is only when the accused is convicted of a light offense that a
promulgation may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. In case the accused failed
to appear on the scheduled date of promulgation despite notice, and the failure to appear was without
justifiable cause, the accused shall lose all the remedies available in the Rules against the judgment. One
such remedy was the Motion for Reconsideration of the judgment of the MTCC filed by petitioner on 28
August 2009. Absent a motion for leave to avail of the remedies against the judgment, the MTCC should
not have entertained petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, petitioner had only 15 days from 25
August 2009 or until 9 September 2009 to file his Motion for Probation. The MTCC thus committed grave
abuse of discretion when it entertained the motion instead of immediately denying it. xxx

Petitioner, however, did not file a motion for leave to avail himself of the remedies prior to filing his Motion
for Reconsideration. The hearing on the motion for leave would have been the proper opportunity for the
parties to allege and contest whatever cause prevented petitioner from appearing on 25 August 2009, and
whether that cause was indeed justifiable. If granted, petitioner would have been allowed to avail himself
of other remedies under the Rules of Court, including a motion for reconsideration. xxx
As a final point, while we held in Yu v. Samson-Tatad that the rule in Neypes is also applicable to criminal
cases regarding appeals from convictions in criminal cases under Rule 122 of the Rules of Court,
nevertheless, the doctrine is not applicable to this case, considering that petitioner’s Motion for Probation
was filed out of time. (Anselmo de Leon Cuyo versus People of the Phils., G.R. No.
192164 October 12, 2011)
Montajes v. People
G.R. No. 183449 March 12, 2012.
a.k.a. Saturday Case

Facts:
Petitioner was found GUILTY on the crime of direct assault as affirmed by the RTC. Petitioner prayed to
the CA for an extended period to file a petition for review for 15 days, from May 21 to June 5. The CA
dismissed the petition for being filed out of time. The Petitioner argues that under the Rules of Court, the
period shall commenced on the next working day if due date falls on Saturday or Sunday, not on the original
date (Saturday).

Issue:
Whether or not the period of extension commenced on May 19 (original date)

Ruling:
Yes. The Court clarified that the period shall be counted form the original due date, not on the next working
day on which the motion for extension was filed.
G.R. No. 157020 June 19, 2013
REINIER PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING, INC. and NEPTUNE SHIP MANAGEMENT
SVCS., PTE., LTD., petitioners
vs
CAPTAIN FRANCISCO B. GUEVARRA, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS, respondents

Facts:
Petitioner Reinier Shipping, as agent of Neptune Ship Management Services, hired Captain
Guevarra to work as master of MV NOL SHEDAR. In the course of his work on board, Reinier Shipping
sent him Notice, relieving him of command of the vessel upon the insistence of its charterers and owners.
As a result, Guevarra filed a case for illegal dismissal and damages against Reinier Shipping and its
principal. The Labor Arbiter found Guevarra’s dismissal illegal. Reinier Shipping appealed to the NLRC
but it, likewise, affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision.
The due date to file a petition for special civil action of certiorari fell on July 26, a Friday. However, Reiner
Shipping succeeded in obtaining an extension of 15 days, and the due date fell on August 10, a Saturday.
Consequently, Reinier Shipping filed its petition on the following working day, August 12, Monday.
The CA dismissed the petition for having been filed out of time and ruled that it violated the SC’s A.M. 00-
2-14-SC. Since August 10, the last day of the extended period, fell on a Saturday, automatic deferment to
the next working day did not apply and the petition should have filed its petition before August 10.

Issue:
Whether or not CA erroneously ruled in dismissing the petition.

Ruling:
Yes, it did. The CA’s interpretation of A.M. 00-2-14-SC is misplaced.
A.M. 00-2-14-SC clarifies the application of Sec. 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court when the last
day on which a pleading is due falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday and the original period is
extended. It actually covers a situation where the due date falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday. Precisely,
what such clarification wanted to address is the erroneous claim that "the period of extension" in such a
case "is to be reckoned from the next working day and not from the original expiration of the period." The
correct rule, according to it, is that “any extension to file the required pleading should be counted from the
expiration of the period regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.”
The situation of Reinier Shipping is actually different. In this case, the due date fell on a Saturday
when courts are close, thus, Sec. 1, Rule 22 should apply. As a result, Reinier Shipping has up to Monday
(August 12), the next working day, within which to file its petition. Hence, the petition was filed on time.
And so, the Court reversed and set aside the CA’s decision.