Human Relations (n) intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive
or highhanded method shall give rise to a right of action by the
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter
for the same.
Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 22. Every person who through an act of performance by
another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession
of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him.
Article 23. Even when an act or event causing damage to
another's property was not due to the fault or negligence of the
defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the
act or event he was benefited.
Article 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when
one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral
dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender
age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his
protection.
Article 25. Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure
or display during a period of acute public want or emergency
may be stopped by order of the courts at the instance of any
government or private charitable institution.
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons.
The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages,
prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family
relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his
friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his
religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth,
physical defect, or other personal condition.
Article 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because
a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just
cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages
and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any
disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.
Article 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or
industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force,
person who thereby suffers damage.
Article 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the
same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires
only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the
defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to
answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be
malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon
reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of
any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of
the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
Article 30. When a separate civil action is brought to demand
civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal
proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case,
a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove
the act complained of.
Article 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not
arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such
civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private
individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or
in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and
liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a
periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due
process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private
property is taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
 (12) The right to become a member of associations or
societies for purposes not contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to
petition the Government for redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in
any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
Article 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal
offense, charges another with the same, for which no
independent civil action is granted in this Code or any special
law, but the justice of the peace finds no reasonable grounds to
believe that a crime has been committed, or the prosecuting
attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the
complaint may bring a civil action for damages against the
alleged offender. Such civil action may be supported by a
preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant's motion, the
court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the
defendant in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness
in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness
against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt,
or from being induced by a promise of immunity or
reward to make such confession, except when the
person confessing becomes a State witness;
If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should
be presented by the prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be
suspended until the termination of the criminal proceedings.
Article 36. Pre-judicial questions, which must be decided before
any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall
be governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall
promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions
of this Code

(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual

punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in
accordance with a statute which has not been judicially
declared unconstitutional; and

(19) Freedom of access to the courts.

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or

not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a
criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to
commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action
for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if
the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a
preponderance of evidence.

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary

damages may also be adjudicated.

The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a

judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the
Penal Code or other penal statute.

Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a

civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

Article 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force

refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case
of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily
liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be
subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein
recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings,
and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such
action.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960
FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
Regino Hermosisima for petitioner.
F.P. Gabriel, Jr. for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
An appeal by certiorari, taken by petitioner Francisco
Hermosisima, from a decision of Court of Appeals modifying that
of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as
complaint, filed with said of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as
natural child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise.
Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed
willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever promised
to marry the complainant. Upon her motion, said court ordered
petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimony
pendente lite, P50.00 a month, which was, on February 16,
1955, reduced to P30.00 a month. In due course, later on, said
court rendered a decision the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring
the child, Chris Hermosisima, as the natural daughter of
defendant, and confirming the order pendente lite,
ordering defendant to pay to the said child, through
plaintiff, the sum of thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or
before the fifth day of every month sentencing defendant
to pay to plaintiff the sum of FOUR THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P4,500.00) for actual and
compensatory damages; the sum of FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P5,000.00) as moral damages; and the further
sum of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) as
attorney's fees for plaintiff, with costs against defendant.
On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this
decision, except as to the actual and compensatory damages
and the moral damages, which were increased to P5,614.25 and
P7,000.00, respectively.
The main issue before us is whether moral damages are
recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry. The
pertinent facts are:
Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since
1950, Soledad then a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High
School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years
younger than she, used to go around together and were
regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of
marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and
became a life insurance underwriter in the City of Cebu, where
intimacy developed among her and the petitioner, since one
evening in 1953, when after coming from the movies, they had
sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V "Escaño," to which
he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954,
Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way,
whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris
Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity
and clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954,
defendant married one Romanita Perez. Hence, the present
action, which was commenced on or about October 4, 1954.
Referring now to the issue above referred to, it will be noted that
the Civil Code of Spain permitted the recovery of damages for
breach to marry. Article 43 and 44 of said Code provides:
ART. 43. A mutual promise of marriage shall not give
rise to an obligation to contract marriage. No court shall
entertain any complaint by which the enforcement of
such promise is sought.
ART. 44. If the promise has been in a public or private
instrument by an adult, or by a minor with the
concurrence of the person whose consent is necessary
for the celebration of the marriage, or if the banns have
been published, the one who without just cause refuses
to marry shall be obliged to reimburse the other for the
expenses which he or she may have incurred by reason
of the promised marriage.
The action for reimbursement of expenses to which the
foregoing article refers must be brought within one year,
computed from the day of the refusal to celebrate the
marriage.
Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the Philippines,
this Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866), that "the
action for breach of promises to marry has no standing in the
civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property
advanced . . . upon the faith of such promise". The Code
Commission charged with the drafting of the Proposed Civil
Code of the Philippines deem it best, however, to change the law
thereon. We quote from the report of the Code Commission on
said Proposed Civil Code:
Articles 43 and 44 the Civil Code of 1889 refer to the
promise of marriage. But these articles are not enforced
in the Philippines. The subject is regulated in the
Proposed Civil Code not only as to the aspect treated of
in said articles but also in other particulars. It is
advisable to furnish legislative solutions to some
questions that might arise relative to betrothal. Among
the provisions proposed are: That authorizing the
adjudication of moral damages, in case of breach of
promise of marriage, and that creating liability for
causing a marriage engagement to be
broken.1awphîl.nèt
Accordingly, the following provisions were inserted in said
Proposed Civil Code, under Chapter I, Title III, Book I thereof:
Art. 56. A mutual promise to marry may be made
expressly or impliedly.
Art. 57. An engagement to be married must be agreed
directly by the future spouses.
Art. 58. A contract for a future marriage cannot, without
the consent of the parent or guardian, be entered into by
a male between the ages of sixteen and twenty years or
 by a female between the ages of sixteen and eighteen
years. Without such consent of the parents or guardian,
the engagement to marry cannot be the basis of a civil
action for damages in case of breach of the promise.
Art. 59. A promise to marry when made by a female
under the age of fourteen years is not civilly actionable,
even though approved by the parent or guardian.
Art. 60. In cases referred to in the proceeding articles,
the criminal and civil responsibility of a male for
seduction shall not be affected.
Art. 61. No action for specific performance of a mutual
promise to marry may be brought.
Art. 62. An action for breach of promise to marry may be
brought by the aggrieved party even though a minor
without the assistance of his parent or guardian. Should
the minor refuse to bring suit, the parent or guardian
may institute the action.
Art. 63. Damages for breach of promise to marry shall
include not only material and pecuniary losses but also
compensation for mental and moral suffering.
Art. 64. Any person, other than a rival, the parents,
guardians and grandparents, of the affianced parties,
who cause a marriage engagement to be broken shall
be liable for damages, both material and moral, to the
engaged person who is rejected.
Art. 65. In case of breach of promise to marry, the party
breaking the engagement shall be obliged to return what
he or she has received from the other as gift on account
of the promise of the marriage.
These article were, however, eliminated in Congress. The
reason therefor are set forth in the report of the corresponding
Senate Committee, from which we quote:
The elimination of this Chapter is proposed. That breach of
promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decide in
the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866. The history of
breach of promise suit in the United States and in England has
shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by
designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience
which has led to the abolition of the rights of action in the so-
called Balm suit in many of the American States.
See statutes of:
Florida 1945 — pp. 1342 — 1344
Maryland 1945 — pp. 1759 — 1762
Nevada 1943 — p. 75
Maine 1941 — pp. 140 — 141
New Hampshire 1941 — p. 223
California 1939 — p. 1245
Massachusetts 1938 — p. 326
Indiana 1936 — p. 1009
Michigan 1935 — p. 201
New York 1935
Pennsylvania p. 450
The Commission perhaps though that it has followed the
more progression trend in legislation when it provided
for breach of promise to marry suits. But it is clear that
the creation of such causes of action at a time when so
many States, in consequence of years of experience are
doing away with them, may well prove to be a step in
the wrong direction. (Congressional Record, Vol. IV, No.
79, Thursday, May 19, 1949, p. 2352.)
The views thus expressed were accepted by both houses of
Congress. In the light of the clear and manifest intent of our law
making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to
marry, the award of moral damages made by the lower courts is,
accordingly, untenable. The Court of Appeals said award:
Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-
appellant's seduction power, plaintiff-appellee,
overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his
sexual desires in spite of her age and self-control, she
being a woman after all, we hold that said defendant-
appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moral
damages may be recovered from him under the
provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the new Civil
Code.
Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219,
particularly the paragraphs preceding and those following the
one cited by the Court of Appeals, and the language used in said
paragraph strongly indicates that the "seduction" therein
contemplated is the crime punished as such in Article as such in
Article 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code, which admittedly
does not exist in the present case, we find ourselves unable to
say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because
he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant
— who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly
enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance
agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with
petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the
court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered
herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for
him, she "wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement
even before they had the benefit of clergy."
The court of first instance sentenced petitioner to pay the
following: (1) a monthly pension of P30.00 for the support of the
child: (2) P4,500, representing the income that complainant had
allegedly failed to earn during her pregnancy and shortly after
the birth of the child, as actual and compensation damages; (3)
P5,000, as moral damages; and (4) P500.00, as attorney's fees.
The Court of Appeals added to the second item the sum of
P1,114.25 — consisting of P144.20, for hospitalization and
medical attendance, in connection with the parturiation, and the
balance representing expenses incurred to support the child —
and increased the moral damages to P7,000.00.
With the elimination of this award for damages, the decision of
the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, therefore, in all other
respects, without special pronouncement as to cost in this
instance. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-17396 May 30, 1962
CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee.
Cecilio L. Pe for and in his own behalf as plaintiff-appellant.
Leodegario L. Mogol for defendant-appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Plaintiffs brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Manila
to recover moral, compensatory, exemplary and corrective damages in
the amount of P94,000.00 exclusive of attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation.
Defendant, after denying some allegations contained in the complaint,
set up as a defense that the facts alleged therein, even if true, do not
constitute a valid cause of action.
After trial, the lower court, after finding that defendant had carried on a
love affair with one Lolita Pe, an unmarried woman, being a married man
himself, declared that defendant cannot be held liable for moral
damages it appearing that plaintiffs failed to prove that defendant, being
aware of his marital status, deliberately and in bad faith tried to win
Lolita's affection. So it rendered decision dismissing the
complaint.1äwphï1.ñët
Plaintiffs brought this case on appeal before this Court on the ground
that the issues involved are purely of law.
The facts as found by the trial court are: Plaintiffs are the parents,
brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the time of her disappearance
on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a
married man and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette
Factory. He used to stay in the town of Gasan, Marinduque, in
connection with his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying with her
parents in the same town. Defendant was an adopted son of a
Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of Lolita's father.
Because of such fact and the similarity in their family name, defendant
became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as a member of their
family. Sometime in 1952, defendant frequented the house of Lolita on
the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The
two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine
trysts not only in the town of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used
to teach in a barrio school. They exchanged love notes with each other
the contents of which reveal not only their infatuation for each other but
also the extent to which they had carried their relationship. The rumors
about their love affairs reached the ears of Lolita's parents sometime, in
1955, and since then defendant was forbidden from going to their house
and from further seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs even filed deportation
proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. The affair
between defendant and Lolita continued nonetheless.
Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters
at their residence at 54-B España Extension, Quezon City. On April 14,
1957, Lolita disappeared from said house. After she left, her brothers
and sisters checked up her thing and found that Lolita's clothes were
gone. However, plaintiffs found a note on a crumpled piece of paper
inside Lolita's aparador. Said note, written on a small slip of paper
approximately 4" by 3" in size, was in a handwriting recognized to be
that of defendant's. In English it reads:
Honey, suppose I leave here on Sunday night, and that's 13th
of this month and we will have a date on the 14th, that's
Monday morning at 10 a.m.
Reply
Love
The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and
the NBI but up to the present there is no news or trace of her
whereabouts.
The present action is based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code which
provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner which is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
There is no doubt that the claim of plaintiffs for damages is based on the
fact that defendant, being a married man, carried on a love affair with
Lolita Pe thereby causing plaintiffs injury in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy. But in spite of the fact that plaintiffs
have clearly established that in illicit affair was carried on between
defendant and Lolita which caused great damage to the name and
reputation of plaintiffs who are her parents, brothers and sisters, the trial
court considered their complaint not actionable for the reason that they
failed to prove that defendant deliberately and in bad faith tried to win
Lolita's affection Thus, the trial court said: "In the absence of proof on
this point, the court may not presume that it was the defendant who
deliberately induced such relationship. We cannot be unmindful of the
uncertainties and sometimes inexplicable mysteries of the human
emotions. It is a possibility that the defendant and Lolita simply fell in
love with each other, not only without any desire on their part, but also
against their better judgment and in full consciousness of what it will
bring to both of them. This is specially so with respect to Lolita, being an
unmarried woman, falling in love with defendant who is a married man."
We disagree with this view. The circumstances under which defendant
tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead, to any other conclusion than
that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the
latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by
the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that
he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the
frequency of his visits to the latter's family who was allowed free access
because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member
of her family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and
conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but also in Boac
where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about
their illicit affairs reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was
forbidden from going to their house and even from seeing Lolita.
Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a
Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with
Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other
conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant
not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in
winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit
relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed
immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he
has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new
Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is
hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages
and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigations. Costs
against appellee.
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES,
respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to review and set aside the Decision1 of the
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which
affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of Branch 38
(Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in
Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or not
damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on
the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance
of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint2 for
damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their
agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that:
she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass
of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her
community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen
residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is
an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum
Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987,
the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his
love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore
agreed to get married after the end of the school semester,
which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the
private respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to
secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August
1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano
Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a
week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude
towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to
kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries;
during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay
captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint,
petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her
not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already
married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent
then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her
damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00,
reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00,
attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and
remedies as may be just and equitable. The complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the
personal circumstances of the parties as averred in the
complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his Special
and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never
proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private
respondent; he neither sought the consent and approval of her
parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not
maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place
because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing
his money and passport; and finally, no confrontation took place
with a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his
Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and
that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court
and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental
anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of
P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral
damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court
issued a Pre-Trial Order4 embodying the stipulated facts which
the parties had agreed upon, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of
Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the
defendant is single, Iranian citizen and resident
(sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City
since September 1, 1987 up to the present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at
Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan City, College
of Medicine, second year medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at
Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez Avenue,
Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the
present and a (sic) high school graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each
other when the manager of the Mabuhay
Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced the
defendant to the plaintiff on August 3, 1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the
Civil Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision5 favoring
the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay
the latter damages and attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the
plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand
(P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the
plaintiff the sum of three thousand (P3,000.00)
pesos as atty's fees and two thousand
(P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation expenses
and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied.6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and
conclusions that (a) petitioner and private respondent were
lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or
questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual advances, (c)
petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses,
promised to marry private respondent, d) because of his
persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be
deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise,
private respondent and her parents — in accordance with
Filipino customs and traditions — made some preparations for
the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by
looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and
contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to
marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner
and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our
sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial
court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony
because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and
courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation
to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.7
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the
detailed summary of the evidence for the private respondent in
the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court as
follows:
According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was
a virgin at the time and that she never had a
boyfriend before, defendant started courting her
just a few days after they first met. He later
proposed marriage to her several times and she
accepted his love as well as his proposal of
marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same
day he went with her to her hometown of
Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted
to meet her parents and inform them of their
relationship and their intention to get married.
The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their
submarkings) of defendant with members of
plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken that
day. Also on that occasion, defendant told
plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that
he intended to marry her during the semestral
break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's
parents thought he was good and trusted him,
they agreed to his proposal for him to marry
their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to
stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff
during the few days that they were in Bugallon.
When plaintiff and defendant later returned to
Dagupan City, they continued to live together in
defendant's apartment. However, in the early
days of October, 1987, defendant would tie
plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to
school, and he even gave her medicine at 4
o'clock in the morning that made her sleep the
whole day and night until the following day. As
a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff
became pregnant, but defendant gave her
some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff
continued to live with defendant and kept
reminding him of his promise to marry her until
he told her that he could not do so because he
was already married to a girl in Bacolod City.
That was the time plaintiff left defendant, went
home to her parents, and thereafter consulted a
lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay
captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer,
her godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by
the barangay captain went to talk to defendant
to still convince him to marry plaintiff, but
defendant insisted that he could not do so
because he was already married to a girl in
Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated
by the parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant
is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed
that after defendant had informed them of his
desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for
sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for
the reception by looking for pigs and chickens,
and even already invited many relatives and
friends to the forthcoming wedding. 8
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent
Court of Appeals which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No.
24256. In his Brief,9 he contended that the trial court erred (a) in
not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and (b)
in ordering him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the
challenged decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of
16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact,
respondent Court made the following analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when
she met defendant who was already 29 years
old at the time, does not appear to be a girl of
loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she was
a virgin prior to her unfortunate experience with
defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as
described by the lower court, a barrio lass "not
used and accustomed to trend of modern urban
life", and certainly would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if
there was no persuasive promise made by the
defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with
the lower court that plaintiff and defendant must
have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must
have thought because of the deception of
defendant, for otherwise, she would not have
allowed herself to be photographed with
defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender
poses as those depicted in the pictures Exhs.
"D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore,
defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody
to him except a waitress at the restaurant
where he usually ate. Defendant in fact
admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown of
Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice;
at (sic) the town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p.
54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party
together with the manager and employees of
the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987
(p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 when he
allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told
him to marry her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.).
 Would defendant have left Dagupan City where
he was involved in the serious study of
medicine to go to plaintiff's hometown in
Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some
kind of special relationship between them? And
this special relationship must indeed have led to
defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to
plaintiff, communicated not only to her but also
to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the
owner of the restaurant where plaintiff was
working and where defendant first proposed
marriage to her, also knew of this love affair
and defendant's proposal of marriage to
plaintiff, which she declared was the reason
why plaintiff resigned from her job at the
restaurant after she had accepted defendant's
proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear
to be a man of good moral character and must
think so low and have so little respect and
regard for Filipino women that he openly
admitted that when he studied in Bacolod City
for several years where he finished his B.S.
Biology before he came to Dagupan City to
study medicine, he had a common-law wife in
Bacolod City. In other words, he also lived with
another woman in Bacolod City but did not
marry that woman, just like what he did to
plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that he felt so
little compunction or remorse in pretending to
love and promising to marry plaintiff, a young,
innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy
his lust on her. 11
and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold
that it was defendant-appellant's fraudulent and
deceptive protestations of love for and promise
to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her
virtue and womanhood to him and to live with
him on the honest and sincere belief that he
would keep said promise, and it was likewise
these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's
part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their
daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their
supposed marriage. And as these acts of
appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against
morals, good customs, and public policy, and
are even gravely and deeply derogatory and
insulting to our women, coming as they do from
a foreigner who has been enjoying the
hospitality of our people and taking advantage
of the opportunity to study in one of our
institutions of learning, defendant-appellant
should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate for
the moral damages and injury that he had
caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him
to do in its decision in this case. 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition
on 26 March 1991; he raises therein the single issue of whether
or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable
because he had not committed any moral wrong or injury or
violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed
love or proposed marriage to the private respondent; and he has
never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally
invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the
fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such
Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem,
he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses
that even if he had made a promise to marry, the subsequent
failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of his
Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which
purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes
that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he
does not posses good moral character. Moreover, his
controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as their
marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian
Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private
respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be
pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the private respondent
should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement.
Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed
arguendo that he had professed his love to the private
respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts would
not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the
case. The mere breach of promise is not actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her
Comment to the petition and the petitioner had filed his Reply
thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and required
the parties to submit their respective Memoranda, which they
subsequently complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the
petitioner's arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear that
questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of
witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that
appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the
credibility of witnesses, the latter court having heard the
witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely
their deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court
had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case. 15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the
appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact of substance
or values which could alter the result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be
raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or
weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the parties
before the lower court. There are, however, recognized
exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina vs. Asistio, Jr., 16 this
Court took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
 (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures
(Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2)
When the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurb or impossible (Luna v.
Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is
a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People,
95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v.
Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings
of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-
9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court
of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case and the same is contrary
to the admissions of both appellate and
appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and
Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v.
Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay
v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8)
When the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact
of the Court of Appeals is premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and is
contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar
v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of
any of the above quoted exceptions in this case. Consequently,
the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts must be
respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is
not an actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated
from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would
have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of
the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which
We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed.
That breach of promise to marry is not
actionable has been definitely decided in the
case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history of
breach of promise suits in the United States
and in England has shown that no other action
lends itself more readily to abuse by designing
women and unscrupulous men. It is this
experience which has led to the abolition of
rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits
in many of the American states. . . . 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article
21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-
delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for
the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the
statute books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther
than the sphere of wrongs defined or
determined by positive law. Fully sensible that
there are countless gaps in the statutes, which
leave so many victims of moral wrongs
helpless, even though they have actually
suffered material and moral injury, the
Commission has deemed it necessary, in the
interest of justice, to incorporate in the
proposed Civil Code the following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the
damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the
foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year
old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage
either has not been made, or can not be
proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the
present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is
above nineteen years of age. Neither can any
civil action for breach of promise of marriage be
filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral
wrong has been committed, and though the girl
and family have suffered incalculable moral
damage, she and her parents cannot bring
action for damages. But under the proposed
article, she and her parents would have such a
right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing
rule is approved, would vouchsafe adequate
legal remedy for that untold number of moral
wrongs which it is impossible for human
foresight to provide for specifically in the
statutes. 21
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes
the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in
Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law
concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common
law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana
because it includes not only negligence, but
 international criminal acts as well such as assault and but, also, because the court of first instance
battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to
scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love"
Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a
intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, fruit of their engagement even before they had
are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while the benefit of clergy.
negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article
2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In between these opposite In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise
spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of hinted at possible recovery if there had been moral seduction,
Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, recovery was eventually denied because We were not convinced
Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that that such seduction existed. The following enlightening
together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case:
21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil
wrongs; it has become much more supple and
adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23 The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked
that the example set forth in the Code
Commission's memorandum refers to a tort
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of upon a minor who had been seduced. The
the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is essential feature is seduction, that in law is
in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach
woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially
becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power
a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of or abuse of confidence on the part of the
marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S.
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs.
obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to
marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case
willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed
(supra) that —
thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have
been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy. To constitute seduction there
must in all cases be some
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the sufficient promise or
petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for inducement and the woman
and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue must yield because of the
and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and promise or other inducement.
sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was If she consents merely from
carnal lust and the intercourse
likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made
is from mutual desire, there is
plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit.
preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private
Seduction, par. 56) She must
respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession
be induced to depart from the
of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral
path of virtue by the use of
seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its
some species of arts,
example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held
persuasions and wiles, which
liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or
are calculated to have and do
Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private
have that effect, and which
respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of
the seduction. result in her person to
ultimately submitting her
person to the sexual
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may embraces of her seducer (27
be applied in a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a Phil. 123).
victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of
Appeals,25 this Court denied recovery of damages to the woman
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
because:

. . . we find ourselves unable to say that On the other hand, in an

petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only action by the woman, the
because he is approximately ten (10) years enticement, persuasion or
younger than the complainant — who was deception is the essence of
the injury; and a mere proof of
around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as
intercourse is insufficient to
highly enlightened as a former high school
warrant a recovery.
teacher and a life insurance agent are
supposed to be — when she became intimate
with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot,
 Accordingly it is not seduction
where the willingness arises
out of sexual desire of
curiosity of the female, and the
defendant merely affords her
the needed opportunity for the
commission of the act. It has
been emphasized that to allow
a recovery in all such cases
would tend to the
demoralization of the female
sex, and would be a reward
for unchastity by which a class
of adventuresses would be
swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur.
662)
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the
fact stand out that for one whole year, from
1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of
adult age, maintain intimate sexual relations
with appellant, with repeated acts of
intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with
the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here
voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the
appellant been deceived, had she surrendered
exclusively because of the deceit, artful
persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she
would not have again yielded to his embraces,
much less for one year, without exacting early
fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage,
and would have cut short all sexual relations
upon finding that defendant did not intend to
fulfill his defendant did not intend to fulfill his
promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is
made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no
other cause of action being alleged, no error
was committed by the Court of First Instance in
dismissing the complaint. 27
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice
Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from this Court, opined
that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal
knowledge, moral damages may be recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but
not if the intercourse was due to mutual lust.
(Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay,
Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs.
Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29,
1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the
promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the
carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there
was criminal or moral seduction, hence
recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be
the other way around, there can be no recovery
of moral damages, because here mutual lust
has intervened). . . .
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any,
such as the expenses for the wedding presentations
(See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs.
Marcos, 30 still subsists, notwithstanding the
incorporation of the present article31 in the
Code. The example given by the Code
Commission is correct, if there was seduction,
not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the
vulgar sense of deception. But when the sexual
act is accomplished without any deceit or
qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or
influence, but the woman, already of age, has
knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be
said that there is an injury which can be the
basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is
characterized by willfulness (sic), the action
lies. The court, however, must weigh the
degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the
woman under the circumstances, because an
act which would deceive a girl sixteen years of
age may not constitute deceit as to an
experienced woman thirty years of age. But so
long as there is a wrongful act and a resulting
injury, there should be civil liability, even if the
act is not punishable under the criminal law and
there should have been an acquittal or
dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative
proposition to the effect that granting, for argument's sake, that
he did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is
nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both parties are in
pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code
and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the private
respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The
latter even goes as far as stating that if the private respondent
had "sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is
primarily because of her own doing, 33 for:
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as
the latter will become a doctor sooner or later.
Take notice that she is a plain high school
graduate and a mere employee . . . (Annex "C")
or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in
a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of
a man who can give her economic security. Her
family is in dire need of financial assistance.
(TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this
predicament prompted her to accept a
proposition that may have been offered by the
petitioner. 34
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the
petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a condescending, if not
sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the
latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty
and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. Obviously
then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by good
faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so SO ORDERED.
circumstances could not have even remotely occurred to him.
Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty
words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive
the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and
would want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure
lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly
believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of
marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security.
Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and
brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their
women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such
deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code
which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his
due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his obligations.

No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws,

customs and traditions.

The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed,
the private respondent may not have been impelled by the purest
of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual
congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact,
it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire
episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not
going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in
pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault;
in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35 At
most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.

Equity often interferes for the relief of the less

guilty of the parties, where his transgression
has been brought about by the imposition of
undue influence of the party on whom the
burden of the original wrong principally rests, or
where his consent to the transaction was itself
procured by
fraud. 36

In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:

Appellants likewise stress that both parties

being at fault, there should be no action by one
against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code).
This rule, however, has been interpreted as
applicable only where the fault on both sides is,
more or less, equivalent. It does not apply
where one party is literate or intelligent and the
other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40
Phil. 209).

We should stress, however, that while We find for the private

respondent, let it not be said that this Court condones the
deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the
petitioner stay together in the same room in their house after
giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents
to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the
higher values of morality and dignity.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged

decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, with costs
against the petitioner.
G.R. No. 57227 May 14, 1992
AMELITA CONSTANTINO and MICHAEL CONSTANTINO, the
latter represented herein by the former, his mother and
natural guardian, petitioners,
vs.
IVAN MENDEZ and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
Roberto M. Sarenas for petitioners.
Bienvinido D. Cariaga for private respondent.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari questioning the
decision1 dated April 30, 1981 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. 61552-R which dismissed petitioner's complaint and set
aside the resolution2 dated October 21, 1976 of the then Court
of First Instance of Davao, 16th Judicial District, amending the
dispositive portion of its decision dated June 21, 1976 and
ordering private respondent Ivan Mendez: (1) to acknowledge
the minor Michael Constantino as his illegitimate child; (2) to give
a monthly support of P300.00 to the minor child; (3) to pay
complainant Amelita Constantino the sum of P8,200.00 as actual
and moral damages; and (4) to pay attorney's fees in the sum of
P5,000 plus costs.
It appears on record that on June 5, 1975, petitioner Amelita
Constantino filed an action for acknowledgment, support and
damages against private respondent Ivan Mendez. The case
was filed with the then CFI of Davao, 10th Judicial District and
docketed as Civil Case No. 8881. In her complaint, Amelita
Constantino alleges, among others, that sometime in the month
of August, 1974, she met Ivan Mendez at Tony's Restaurant
located at Sta. Cruz, Manila, where she worked as a waitress;
that the day following their first meeting, Ivan invited Amelita to
dine with him at Hotel Enrico where he was billeted; that while
dining, Ivan professed his love and courted Amelita; that Amelita
asked for time to think about Ivan's proposal; that at about 11:00
o'clock in the evening, Amelita asked Ivan to bring her home to
which the latter agreed, that on the pretext of getting something,
Ivan brought Amelita inside his hotel room and through a
promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with
the latter; that after the sexual contact, Ivan confessed to Amelita
that he is a married man; that they repeated their sexual contact
in the months of September and November, 1974, whenever
Ivan is in Manila, as a result of which Amelita got pregnant; that
her pleas for help and support fell on deaf ears; that Amelita had
no sexual relations with any other man except Ivan who is the
father of the child yet to be born at the time of the filing of the
complaint; that because of her pregnancy, Amelita was forced to
leave her work as a waitress; that Ivan is a prosperous
businessman of Davao City with a monthly income of P5,000 to
P8,000. As relief, Amelita prayed for the recognition of the
unborn child, the payment of actual, moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees plus costs.
In his answer dated August 5, 1975, Ivan admitted that he met
Amelita at Tony's Cocktail Lounge but denied having sexual
knowledge or illicit relations with her. He prayed for the dismissal
of the complaint for lack of cause of action. By way of
counterclaim, he further prayed for the payment of exemplary
damages and litigation expense including attorney's fees for the
filing of the malicious complaint.
On September 1, 1975, Amelita Constantino filed a motion for
leave to amend the complaint impleading as co-plaintiff her son
Michael Constantino who was born on August 3, 1975. In its
order dated September 4, 1975, the trial court admitted the
amended complaint.
On September 11, 1975, Ivan Mendez filed his answer to the
amended complaint reiterating his previous answer denying that
Michael Constantino is his illegitimate son.
After hearing, the trial court rendered a decision dated June 21,
1976, the dispositive portion of which reads, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff
Amelita Constantino and against defendant
Ivan Mendez, ordering the latter to pay Amelita
Constantino the sum of P8,000.00 by way of
actual and moral damages; and, the sum of
P3,000.00, as and by way of attorney's fees.
The defendant shall pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.
From the above decision, both parties filed their separate motion
for reconsideration. Ivan Mendez anchored his motion on the
ground that the award of damages was not supported by
evidence. Amelita Constantino, on the other hand, sought the
recognition and support of her son Michael Constantino as the
illegitimate son of Ivan Mendez.
In its resolution dated October 21, 1976, the trial court granted
Amelita Constantino's motion for reconsideration, and amended
the dispositive portion of its decision dated June 21, 1976 to read
as follows, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff
Amelita Constantino and plaintiff-minor Michael
Constantino, and against defendant Ivan
Mendez ordering the latter to pay Amelita
Constantino the sum of P8,000.00 by way of
actual and moral damages and the sum of
P200.00 as and by way of payment of the
hospital and medical bills incurred during the
delivery of plaintiff-minor Michael Constantino;
to recognize as his own illegitimate child the
plaintiff-minor Michael Constantino who shall be
entitled to all the rights, privileges and benefits
appertaining to a child of such status; to give a
permanent monthly support in favor of plaintiff
Michael Constantino the amount of P300.00;
and the sum of P5,000.00 as and by way of
attorney's fees. The defendant shall pay the
costs of this suit.
Let this Order form part of the decision dated
June 21, 1976.
 SO ORDERED.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the above amended decision
was set aside and the complaint was dismissed. Hence, this
petition for review.
Basically, the issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether
or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
setting aside the decision of the trial court and in dismissing the
complaint.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing
the factual findings of the trial and in not affirming the decision of
the trial court. They also pointed out that the appellate court
committed a misapprehension of facts when it concluded that
Ivan did not have sexual access with Amelita during the first or
second week of November, 1976 (should be 1974), the time of
the conception of the child.
It must be stressed at the outset that factual findings of the trial
court have only a persuasive and not a conclusive effect on the
Court of Appeals. In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, it is
the duty of the Court of Appeals to review the factual findings of
the trial court and rectify the errors it committed as may have
been properly assigned and as could be established by a re-
examination of the evidence on record. It is the factual findings of
the Court of Appeals, not those of the trial court, that as a rule
are considered final and conclusive even on this Court (Hermo v.
Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., 155 SCRA 24 [1987]). This being a
petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, this
Court will review only errors of law committed by the Court of
Appeals. It is not the function of this Court to re-examine all over
again the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the
parties unless the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals is not
supported by the evidence on record or the judgment is based
on misapprehension of facts (Remalante v. Tibe, et al., 158
SCRA 138 [1988]; Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, et al., 149
SCRA 97 [1987]).
It is the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, based on the
evidence on record, that Amelita Constantino has not proved by
clear and convincing evidence her claim that Ivan Mendez is the
father of her son Michael Constantino. Such conclusion based
on the evaluation of the evidence on record is controlling on this
Court as the same is supported by the evidence on record. Even
the trial court initially entertained such posture. It ordered the
recognition of Michael as the illegitimate son of Ivan only when
acting on the motions for reconsideration, it reconsidered, on
October 21, 1976, its earlier decision dated June 21, 1976.
Amelita's testimony on cross-examination that she had sexual
contact with Ivan in Manila in the first or second week of
November, 1974 (TSN, December 8, 1975, p. 108) is
inconsistent with her response that she could not remember the
date of their last sexual intercourse in November, 1974 (Ibid, p.
106). Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first or second
week of November, 1974 is the crucial point that was not even
established on direct examination as she merely testified that
she had sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months of
September, October and November, 1974.
Michael Constantino is a full-term baby born on August 3, 1975
(Exhibit 6) so that as correctly pointed out by private
respondent's counsel, citing medical science (Williams
Obstetrics, Tenth Ed., p. 198) to the effect that "the mean
duration of actual pregnancy, counting from the day of
conception must be close to 267 days", the conception of the
child (Michael) must have taken place about 267 days before
August 3, 1975 or sometime in the second week of November,
1974. While Amelita testified that she had sexual contact with
Ivan in November, 1974, nevertheless said testimony is
contradicted by her own evidence (Exh. F), the letter dated
February 11, 1975, addressed to Ivan Mendez requesting for a
conference, prepared by her own counsel Atty. Roberto Sarenas
to whom she must have confided the attendant circumstances of
her pregnancy while still fresh in her memory, informing Ivan that
Amelita is four (4) months pregnant so that applying the period of
the duration of actual pregnancy, the child was conceived on or
about October 11, 1974.
Petitioner's assertion that Ivan is her first and only boyfriend
(TSN, December 8, 1975, p. 65) is belied by Exhibit 2, her own
letter addressed to Mrs. Mendez where she revealed the reason
for her attachment to Ivan who possessed certain traits not
possessed by her boyfriend. She also confided that she had a
quarrel with her boyfriend because of gossips so she left her
work. An order for recognition and support may create an
unwholesome atmosphere or may be an irritant in the family or
lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or
filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence. The
burden of proof is on Amelita to establish her affirmative
allegations that Ivan is the father of her son. Consequently, in the
absence of clear and convincing evidence establishing paternity
or filiation, the complaint must be dismissed.
As regards Amelita's claim for damages which is based on
Articles 193 & 214 of the Civil Code on the theory that through
Ivan's promise of marriage, she surrendered her virginity, we
cannot but agree with the Court of Appeals that more sexual
intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery. Damages could
only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of
voluntariness and mutual desire. At the time she met Ivan at
Tony's Restaurant, Amelita was already 28 years old and she
admitted that she was attracted to Ivan (TSN, December 3,
1975, p. 83). Her attraction to Ivan is the reason why she
surrendered her womanhood. Had she been induced or
deceived because of a promise of marriage, she could have
immediately severed her relation with Ivan when she was
informed after their first sexual contact sometime in August,
1974, that he was a married man. Her declaration that in the
months of September, October and November, 1974, they
repeated their sexual intercourse only indicates that passion and
not the alleged promise of marriage was the moving force that
made her submit herself to Ivan.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is Dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 101749 July 10, 1992
CONRADO BUNAG, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, First Division, and ZENAIDA B.
CIRILO, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner appeals for the reversal of the decision 1 of
respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on May 17, 1991 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 07054, entitled "Zenaida B. Cirilo vs. Conrado
Bunag, Sr. and Conrado Bunag, Jr.," which affirmed in toto the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XI at Bacoor, Cavite,
and, implicitly, respondent court's resolution of September 3,
1991 2 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Respondent court having assiduously discussed the salient
antecedents of this case, vis-a-vis the factual findings of the
court below, the evidence of record and the contentions of the
parties, it is appropriate that its findings, which we approve and
adopt, be extensively reproduced hereunder:
Based on the evidence on record, the following
facts are considered indisputable: On the
afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-
appellant Bunag, Jr. brought plaintiff-appellant
to a motel or hotel where they had sexual
intercourse. Later that evening, said defendant-
appellant brought plaintiff-appellant to the
house of his grandmother Juana de Leon in
Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, where they
lived together as husband and wife for 21 days,
or until September 29, 1973. On September 10,
1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and
plaintiff-appellant filed their respective
applications for a marriage license with the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bacoor,
Cavite. On October 1, 1973, after leaving
plaintiff-appellant, defendant-appellant Bunag,
Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing his application
for a marriage license.
Plaintiff-appellant contends that on the
afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-
appellant Bunag, Jr., together with an
unidentified male companion, abducted her in
the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital in
Pasay City and brought her to a motel where
she was raped. The court a quo, which adopted
her evidence, summarized the same which we
paraphrased as follows:
Plaintiff was 26 years old on
November 5, 1974 when she
testified, single and had
finished a college course in
Commerce (t.s.n., p. 4, Nov. 5,
1974). It appears that on
September 8, 1973, at about
4:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
while she was walking along
Figueras Street, Pasay City on
her way to the San Juan de
Dios Canteen to take her
snack, defendant, Conrado
Bunag, Jr., came riding in a
car driven by a male
companion. Plaintiff and
defendant Bunag, Jr. were
sweethearts, but two weeks
before September 8, 1973,
they had a quarrel, and
Bunag, Jr. wanted to talk
matters over with plaintiff, so
that he invited her to take their
merienda at the Aristocrat
Restaurant in Manila instead
of at the San Juan de Dios
Canteen, to which plaintiff
obliged, as she believed in his
sincerity (t.s.n., pp. 8-10, Nov.
5, 1974).
Plaintiff rode in the car and
took the front seat beside the
driver while Bunag, Jr. seated
himself by her right side. The
car travelled north on its way
to the Aristocrat Restaurant
but upon reaching San Juan
Street in Pasay City, it turned
abruptly to the right, to which
plaintiff protested, but which
the duo ignored and instead
threatened her not to make
any noise as they were ready
to die and would bump the car
against the post if she
persisted. Frightened and
silenced, the car travelled its
course thru F.B. Harrison
Boulevard until they reached a
motel. Plaintiff was then pulled
and dragged from the car
against her will, and amidst
her cries and pleas. In spite of
her struggle she was no match
to the joint strength of the two
male combatants because of
her natural weakness being a
woman and her small stature.
Eventually, she was brought
inside the hotel where the
defendant Bunag, Jr.
deflowered her against her will
and consent. She could not
fight back and repel the attack
because after Bunag, Jr. had
forced her to lie down and
embraced her, his companion
held her two feet, removed her
panty, after which he left.
Bunag, Jr. threatened her that
he would ask his companion
to come back and hold her
feet if she did not surrender
her womanhood to him, thus
he succeeded in feasting on
her virginity. Plaintiff described
the pains she felt and how
blood came out of her private
parts after her vagina was
penetrated by the penis of the
defendant Bunag, Jr. (t.s.n.
pp. 17-24, Nov. 5, 1974).
After that outrage on her
virginity, plaintiff asked Bunag,
Jr. once more to allow her to
go home but the latter would
not consent and stated that he
would only let her go after they
were married as he intended
to marry her, so much so that
she promised not to make any
scandal and to marry him.
Thereafter, they took a taxi
together after the car that they
used had already gone, and
proceeded to the house of
Juana de Leon, Bunag, Jr.'s
grandmother in Pamplona,
Las Piñas, Metro Manila
where they arrived at 9:30
o'clock in the evening (t.s.n.,
p. 26, Nov. 5, 1974). At about
ten (10) o'clock that same
evening, defendant Conrado
Bunag, Sr., father of Bunag,
Jr. arrived and assured plaintiff
that the following day which
was a Monday, she and
Bunag, Jr. would go to
Bacoor, to apply for a
marriage license, which they
did. They filed their
applications for marriage
license (Exhibits "A" and "C")
and after that plaintiff and
defendant Bunag, Jr. returned
to the house of Juana de Leon
and lived there as husband
and wife from September 8,
1973 to September 29, 1973.
On September 29, 1973
defendant Bunag, Jr. left and
never returned, humiliating
plaintiff and compelled her to
go back to her parents on
October 3, 1973. Plaintiff was
ashamed when she went
home and could not sleep and
eat because of the deception
done against her by
defendants-appellants (t.s.n.,
p. 35, Nov. 5, 1974).
The testimony of plaintiff was
corroborated in toto by her
uncle, Vivencio Bansagan who
declared that on September 8,
1973 when plaintiff failed to
arrive home at 9:00 o'clock in
the evening, his sister who is
the mother of plaintiff asked
him to look for her but his
efforts proved futile, and he
told his sister that plaintiff
might have married (baka nag-
asawa, t.s.n., pp. 5-6, March
18, 1976). However, in the
afternoon of the next day
(Sunday), his sister told him
that Francisco Cabrera,
accompanied by barrio captain
Jacinto Manalili of Ligas,
Bacoor, Cavite, informed her
that plaintiff and Bunag, Jr.
were in Cabrera's house, so
that her sister requested him
to go and see the plaintiff,
which he did, and at the house
of Mrs. Juana de Leon in
Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro
Manila he met defendant
Conrado Bunag, Sr., who told
him, "Pare, the children are
here already. Let us settle the
matter and have them
married."
He conferred with plaintiff who told him that as
she had already lost her honor, she would bear
her sufferings as Boy Bunag, Jr. and his father
promised they would be married.
Defendants-appellants, on the other hand, deny
that defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr.
abducted and raped plaintiff-appellant on
September 8, 1973. On the contrary, plaintiff-
appellant and defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr.
eloped on that date because of the opposition
of the latter's father to their relationship.
Defendant-appellants claim that defendant-
appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant had
earlier made plans to elope and get married,
and this fact was known to their friends, among
them, Architect Chito Rodriguez. The couple
made good their plans to elope on the
afternoon of September 8, 1973, when
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., accompanied
by his friend Guillermo Ramos, Jr., met plaintiff-
appellant and her officemate named Lydia in
the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital.
The foursome then proceeded to (the) aforesaid
hospital's canteen where they had some
snacks. Later, Guillermo Ramos, Jr. took Lydia
to Quirino Avenue where she could get a ride
home, thereby leaving the defendant-appellant
Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant alone.
According to defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr.,
after Guillermo Ramos, Jr. and Lydia left, he
and plaintiff-appellant took a taxi to the Golden
 Gate and Flamingo Hotels where they tried to
get a room, but these were full. They finally got
a room at the Holiday Hotel, where defendant-
appellant registered using his real name and
residence certificate number. Three hours later,
the couple check out of the hotel and
proceeded to the house of Juana de Leon at
Pamplona, Las Piñas, where they stayed until
September 19, 1873. Defendant-appellant
claims that bitter disagreements with the
plaintiff-appellant over money and the threats
made to his life prompted him to break off their
plan to get married.
During this period, defendant-appellant Bunag,
Sr. denied having gone to the house of Juan de
Leon and telling plaintiff-appellant that she
would be wed to defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr.
In fact, he phoned Atty. Conrado Adreneda,
member of the board of directors of Mandala
Corporation, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr.'s
employer, three times between the evening of
September 8, 1973 and September 9, 1973
inquiring as to the whereabouts of his son. He
came to know about his son's whereabouts
when he was told of the couple's elopement
late in the afternoon of September 9, 1973 by
his mother Candida Gawaran. He likewise
denied having met relatives and emissaries of
plaintiff-appellant and agreeing to her marriage
to his son. 3
A complaint for damages for alleged breach of promise to marry
was filed by herein private respondent Zenaida B. Cirilo against
petitioner Conrado Bunag, Jr. and his father, Conrado Bunag,
Sr., as Civil Case No. N-2028 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
XIX at Bacoor, Cavite. On August 20, 1983, on a finding, inter
alia, that petitioner had forcibly abducted and raped private
respondent, the trial court rendered a decision 4 ordering
petitioner Bunag, Jr. to pay private respondent P80,000.00 as
moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages,
P20,000.00 by way of temperate damages, and P10,000.00 for
and as attorney's fees, as well as the costs of suit. Defendant
Conrado Bunag, Sr. was absolved from any and all liability.
Private respondent appealed that portion of the lower court's
decision disculpating Conrado Bunag, Sr. from civil liability in this
case. On the other hand, the Bunags, as defendants-appellants,
assigned in their appeal several errors allegedly committed by
trial court, which were summarized by respondent court as
follows: (1) in finding that defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag,
Jr. forcibly abducted and raped plaintiff-appellant; (2) in finding
that defendants-appellants promised plaintiff-appellant that she
would be wed to defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr.; and
(3) in awarding plaintiff-appellant damages for the breach of
defendants-appellants' promise of marriage. 5
As stated at the outset, on May 17, 1991 respondent Court of
Appeals rendered judgment dismissing both appeals and
affirming in toto the decision of the trial court. His motion for
reconsideration having been denied, petitioner Bunag, Jr. is
before us on a petition for review, contending that (1) respondent
court failed to consider vital exhibits, testimonies and incidents
for petitioner's defense, resulting in the misapprehensions of
facts and violative of the law on preparation of judgment; and (2)
it erred in the application of the proper law and jurisprudence by
holding that there was forcible abduction with rape, not just a
simple elopement and an agreement to marry, and in the award
of excessive damages. 6
Petitioner Bunag, Jr. first contends that both the trial and
appellate courts failed to take into consideration the alleged fact
that he and private respondent had agreed to marry, and that
there was no case of forcible abduction with rape, but one of
simple elopement and agreement to marry. It is averred that the
agreement to marry has been sufficiently proven by the
testimonies of the witnesses for both parties and the exhibits
presented in court.
This submission, therefore, clearly hinges on the credibility of the
witnesses and evidence presented by the parties and the weight
accorded thereto in the factual findings of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals. In effect, what petitioner would want this Court
to do is to evaluate and analyze anew the evidence, both
testimonial and documentary, presented before and calibrated by
the trial court, and as further meticulously reviewed and
discussed by respondent court.
The issue raised primarily and ineluctably involves questions of
fact. We are, therefore, once again constrained to stress the
well-entrenched statutory and jurisprudential mandate that
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are, as a rule, conclusive
upon this Court. Only questions of law, distinctly set forth, may
be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, subject to clearly settled exceptions in case
law.
Our jurisdiction in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals
is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to
the latter, its findings of fact being conclusive. This Court has
emphatically declared that it is not its function to analyze or
weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited
to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the
lower court. Barring, therefore, a showing that the findings
complained of are totally devoid of support in the record, or that
they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of
discretion, such findings must stand, for this Court is not
expected or required to examine or contrast the oral and
documentary evidence submitted by the parties. 7 Neither does
the instant case reveal any feature falling within, any of the
exceptions which under our decisional rules may warrant a
review of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. On the
foregoing considerations and our review of the records, we
sustain the holding of respondent court in favor of private
respondent.
Petitioner likewise asserts that since action involves a breach of
promise to marry, the trial court erred in awarding damages.
It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored
rule that an action for breach of promise to marry has no
standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or
property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise.
8 Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to marry per se is not
actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually incurred
expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents thereof.
However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases for rape be first instituted and prosecuted to final judgment
specified in or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the before a civil action based on said offense in favor of the
Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in offended woman can likewise be instituted and prosecuted to
relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person who final judgment.
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit,
compensate the latter for moral damages. 9 Article 21 was and the assailed judgment and resolution are hereby
adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which AFFIRMED.
leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though
they have actually suffered material and moral injury, and is
SO ORDERED.
intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight
to specifically provide for in the statutes. 10

Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of

petitioner in forcibly abducting private respondent and having
carnal knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter
promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to
thereafter renege on such promise after cohabiting with her for
twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute acts contrary to morals
and good customs. These are grossly insensate and
reprehensible transgressions which indisputably warrant and
abundantly justify the award of moral and exemplary damages,
pursuant to Article 21 in relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article
2219, and Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code.

Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said damages

were awarded by the trial court on the basis of a finding that he
is guilty of forcible abduction with rape, despite the prior
dismissal of the complaint therefor filed by private respondent
with the Pasay City Fiscal's Office.

Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental

postulate of our law that every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable. In other words, criminal liability will
give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act
or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the
direct and proximate cause thereof. 11 Hence, extinction of the
penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability
unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist. 12

In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible

abduction with rape was by mere resolution of the fiscal at the
preliminary investigation stage. There is no declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did
not exist. Consequently, the dismissal did not in any way affect
the right of herein private respondent to institute a civil action
arising from the offense because such preliminary dismissal of
the penal action did not carry with it the extinction of the civil
action.

The reason most often given for this holding is that the two
proceedings involved are not between the same parties.
Furthermore, it has long been emphasized, with continuing
validity up to now, that there are different rules as to the
competency of witnesses and the quantum of evidence in
criminal and civil proceedings. In a criminal action, the State
must prove its case by evidence which shows the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it is
sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by preponderance
of evidence only. 13 Thus, in Rillon, et al. vs. Rillon, 14 we
stressed that it is not now necessary that a criminal prosecution
G.R. No. 88582 March 5, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HEINRICH S. RITTER, accused-appellant,
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Esteban B. Bautista for accused-appellant.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The appellant challenges his conviction of the crime involving a
young girl of about 12 years old who had been allegedly raped
and who later died because of a foreign object left inside her
vaginal canal.
Heinrich Stefan Ritter was charged with the crime of rape with
homicide under an information which reads:
That on or about the tenth (10th day of October, 1986 in
the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused with lewd design and with intent to kill one
Rosario Baluyot, a woman under twelve (12) years of
age, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of said Rosario
Baluyot and inserted a foreign object into the vaginal
canal of said Rosario Baluyot which caused her death
shortly thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of her
relatives. (66)
When arraigned, the accused pleaded "Not Guilty". Thereafter,
the case was set for trial on the merits.
To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecutor presented the
following witnesses, namely: (1) Jessie Ramirez, (2) Maria
Burgos y Turla, (3) P/Cpl. Mariano Victoria, (4) Policarpio
Baluyot, (5) Dr. Reino Rosete, (6) Sumulong Daniel, (7) Jessica
Herrera, (8) Sister Eva Palencia, (9) Conrado Salonga, (10) Dr.
Devonne Loop, (11) Dr. Leo Cruz, (12) Paul Maclor, (13) Aida
Sarmiento, (14) Patricia Prollamanta (15) Mel Santos, (16) Lorna
Limos, (17) Eduard Lee Bungarner, (18) Ronaldo Marquez, (19)
Tom Bonte, (20) 2nd Asst. City Fiscal Nini Alcala, (21) lst Asst.
City Fiscal Dorentino Z. Floresta, (22) Corazon Caber, (23)
Rodolfo Mercurio and (24) Fe Israel.
On the other hand, the defense offered in evidence Exhibits "1"
to "24" and the testimonies of (1) Heinrich S. Ritter, (2) Father
Roque Villanueva, (3) Angelita Amulong (4) Gaspar Alcantara,
(5) Dr. Val Barcinal and (6) Dr. Pedro C. Solis.
The facts of the case upon which the lower court based its
finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt are summarized in its
decision, as follows:
The people's evidence show that on October 10, 1986
about midnight, accused Heinrich Stefan Ritter brought
a boy and girl namely: Jessie Ramirez and Rosario
Baluyot inside his hotel room at MGM Hotel along
Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo City. These two (2) children
were chosen from among a bunch of street children.
Once inside the hotel room accused told them to take a
bath. Jessie Ramirez, alias "Egan", was the first to take
a bath and when he came out Rosario Baluyot went to
the bathroom to do the same. While Rosario Baluyot
was inside the bathroom, accused Ritter took out some
pictures depicting dressed up young boys, and put them
on top of the table. Other things which were taken out
and placed on top of a table were three (3) other objects
which he described as like that of a vicks inhaler. One of
these objects the accused played with his hands and
placed it on his palms. The color of which is grayish blue
which turned out later to be the foreign object which was
inserted inside the vagina of Rosario Baluyot. The other
objects were later established to be anti-nasal inhalers
against pollution purchased by the accused in Bangkok
when he went there as a tourist. While Rosario was in
the bathroom, accused told Ramirez to lay down on bed,
and so did the accused. He then started masturbating
the young boy and also guided the boy's hand for him to
be masturbated, so that they masturbated each other,
while they were both naked, and he gave Jessie
Ramirez an erection. When Rosario Baluyot came out of
the bathroom, she was told to remove her clothes by
accused and to join him in bed. The accused then
placed himself between the two (2) children and
accused started fingering Rosario.
At this time, Ramirez was already sleepy, but Rosario
touched him to call his attention. He looked, and he saw
accused placing his penis against the vagina of Rosario
and that he was trying to penetrate the vagina but it
would not fit. After what he saw, Ramirez did not
anymore bother to look because he was sleepy and fell
asleep.
The following morning, the accused, whom the juveniles
described as an "American, paid Ramirez alias "Egan"
P200.00 and Rosario P300.00. He then left them in the
hotel. After the American left, they went downstairs, and
Rosario told Egan that the American inserted something
in her vagina. But they could not do anything anymore,
because the American had already left, and neither did
they report the matter to the police. Sometime the
following day, Jessie saw Rosario and he asked her
whether the object was already removed from her body
and Rosario said "Yes". However, Jessie Ramirez
claimed that on the evening of that same date, he saw
Rosario and she was complaining of pain in her vagina
and when Egan asked her, she said that the foreign
object was not yet removed. Then there was another
occasion wherein Jessie was summoned and when he
came he saw Rosario writhing in pain and when he tried
to talk to Rosario she scolded him with defamatory
remarks. Thereafter, he did not see Rosario anymore
because he already went home to his aunt's house who
resided at Barrio Barretto and resumed his studies in the
primary grades.
On May 14, 1987, Gaspar Alcantara, a defense witness,
while garbage scavenging at Lot 21, near the gate of the
U.S. Naval Base saw Rosario at Magsaysay Drive near
the Happy Bake Shop near Lot 21, being ogled by
people because Rosario's skirt was bloodied and she
was unconscious and foul smelling. Since nobody
helped Rosario, he took pity on her condition and
brought her to the Olongapo City General Hospital in an
unconscious condition, via jeepney. He went to the
Information desk and he was the one who gave the
personal circumstances of Rosario as to her name, age,
her residence as Nagbakulaw, Lower Kalaklan, and
Gaspar Alcantara signed as "guardian" of Rosario, while
Rosario was already in the emergency room. Although
Gaspar Alcantara denied that he did not know the name
of Rosario Baluyot when he brought her to the hospital,
this is belied by the testimony of the Information clerk
Lorna Limos, who was then on duty. Limos testified that
it was Alcantara who supplied the personal
circumstances of Rosario. The Court gives more
credence to the testimony of Miss Limos as against
Gaspar Alcantara who became a defense witness, for
the reason that through his own testimony, Gaspar
Alcantara claimed that even prior to May 14, 1987, he
had already known Rosario Baluyot for more than one
(1) year, because he has seen the said girl go to the
house of his twin brother, Melchor Alcantara, who is his
immediate neighbor. Rosario used to visit a girl by the
name of "Nora" who was then in the custody of his
brother. His brother Melchor was also living with their
mother, brother and sister-in-law and their two (2)
children in his house. Rosario as per Gaspar's testimony
even stays for one week or a few days at his brother's
house when she visits Nora. So the Court can safely
assume that of all the more than one (1) year that he
had regularly seen Rosario at his brother's house, he
must have already did come to know the name of
Rosario Baluyot including her age. In his testimony in
Court he stated that he even asked Rosario for movie
and softdrinks money which can safely be concluded
that he knows her very well. It is against normal
behavior especially to a Filipino who have a
characteristic of curiosity not to have found out the real
name of the girl he claims to know only as "Tomboy".
While Rosario Baluyot was confined at the Olongapo
City General Hospital, nobody was attending to her
since she is a street child, having stowed away from the
custody of her grandmother. Three (3) good samaritans
who belong to religious and civic organizations, in the
persons of Jessica Herrera, Fe Israel and Sr. Eva
Palencia, in one of their missions in the hospital
chanced upon Rosario Baluyot who was all alone with
no relatives attending to her and after finding out that
she was only 12 years old decided to help her. After a
short interview with Rosario, regarding her name and
age only because she clamped up about her residence
and her relatives, they decided to help her by providing
her the medicine she needed during her confinement in
readiness for an operation. It was Fe Israel who was
able to get the name and age of Rosario Baluyot from
Rosario Baluyot herself when she saw her for the first
time. For Fe Israel, the age of Rosario Baluyot was an
important factor because their program assisted only
indigent patients from infants up to 13 years old.
Rosario's first ailment at the Olongapo City General
Hospital was loose bowel movement and vomiting,
which was first suspected as gastro-enteritis, but which
came out later as symptoms of peritonitis due to a
massive infection in the abdominal cavity. Subsequently,
on May 17, 1987, after she was examined by the
physicians at the hospital, it was found out that there
was a foreign object lodged in her vaginal canal and she
had vaginal discharge tinged with blood and foul
smelling odor emanating from her body. One of the
doctors who attended to her was Dr. Barcinal, an OB-
GYNE. Dr. Barcinal tried to extract the foreign object by
means of a forceps, but several attempts proved futile
because said object was deeply embedded in the
vaginal canal and was covered by tissues. Her abdomen
was enlarged, tender and distended, symptoms of
peritonitis. The patient was feverish and incoherent
when she was scheduled for operation on May 19,
1987, after the first attempt for an operation on May 17
was aborted allegedly because the consent of Dr. Reino
Rosete, the hospital director was not obtained. The
surgeon who operated on her was Dr. Rosete himself.
He testified that Rosario had to be operated even in that
condition in order to save her life. Her condition was
guarded. This was corroborated by Dr. Leo Cruz, the
anesthesiologist during Rosario's operation. It was in the
evening of May 19 at about 7:00 p.m. when Dr. Rosete
opened her abdomen by making a 5 inch incision on her
stomach. He found out that the fallopian tubes were
congested with pus and so with the peritonieum, and the
pelvic cavity, and patches of pus in the liver, although
the gallbladder and kidney appeared to have
septicemia, poisoning of the blood. The peritonitis and
septicemia were traced to have been caused through
infection by the foreign object which has been lodged in
the intra-vaginal canal of Rosario. The foreign object
which was already agreed upon by both parties that it is
a portion of a sexual vibrator was extracted from the
vagina of Rosario while under anesthesia. Said object
was coated with tissues, pus and blood. Dr. Rosete
gave it to the assisting surgical nurse for safekeeping
and gave instructions to release it to the authorized
person. This object was shown by the nurse to Dr. Leo
Cruz. Dr. Rosete considered the operation successful
and the patient was alive when he left her under Dr.
Cruz. Dr. Cruz stayed with said patient in the ward for
about 30 minutes and thereafter he left. The following
day, Rosario got serious and it was Dr. Leo Cruz who
pronounced her death at 2:00 to 2:15 in the afternoon of
May 20, 1987.
Thereafter, a death certificate was prepared under the
direction of Dr. Cruz which was indicated therein that the
cause of death was cardio-respiratory arrest, secondary
to septicemia caused by the foreign object lodged in the
intra uteral vaginal canal of Rosario Baluyot.
The foreign object was washed by nurse Obedina, then
placed it in a transparent small jar and labelled "Rosario
Baluyot". Jessica Herrera asked the nurse for the
foreign object, and it was given to her under proper
receipt. Herrera then showed the same to the persons
who helped financially Rosario's case, and afterwards
she gave it to Sister Eva Palencia. Sis. Palencia was in
custody of the said object until Mr. Salonga came and
asked her for the object.
After Rosario Baluyot died, Sis. Palencia and a
companion went to Gaspar Alcantara to ask him in
locating the relatives of Rosario. They were able to trace
Rosario's grandmother, Mrs. Maria Burgos Turla, and
informed her that her granddaughter was already dead
and lying in state at St. Martin Funeral Parlor. Mrs. Turla
went there with her son, who shouldered all the burial
expenses for Rosario.
Subsequently, Sis. Palencia, Fr. Cullens and Mr.
Salonga came to her residence at Sta. Rita and asked
her if she was interested in filing a case against the
person who caused the death of her granddaughter. Of
course she agreed. Hence, she was brought to the
Fiscal's (City) Office to file the same.
After the case was filed against the herein accused,
Atty. Edmundo Legaspi with his messenger came to her
house and told her that the accused was willing to settle
the case, but that accused Ritter had only P15,000.00.
The old woman did not accept it because she knows
that the accused is liable to pay damages anyway. After
that, she received a letter from Atty. Legaspi telling her
to get a lawyer for her case. By this time, Mrs. Turla,
who wanted to have the case settled once and for all
giving the reason that she can no longer bear the
situation, sent her nephew, Conrado Marcelo to Atty.
Legaspi. Her nephew obliged and told her that she will
be paid at the office of Atty. Legaspi. On a date not clear
in the records, she went with her nephew Conrado
Marcelo, and Roberto Sundiam, an assistant barangay
tanod of Sta. Rita, and while they were there, she saw
Ritter arrive at the law office. Ritter and Atty. Legaspi
talked at the office near the bathroom, and thereafter
Ritter left. After he left, Atty. Legaspi told Rosario's
grandmother that they are willing to settle for
P20,000.00, but that Ritter left only P15,000.00, so she
received the money with the understanding that there
was a balance of P5,000.00 yet. She was made to sign
a statement, and she was asked to change the age of
her granddaughter Rosario. With the document
prepared, she and the lawyer's messenger went to the
Fiscal's office to have it subscribed, and was subscribed
before an assistant city fiscal. But the balance of
P5,000.00 was not paid, because later on Atty. Legaspi
became the OIC of Olongapo City and he could no
longer attend to it. Atty. Legaspi, during one of the
hearings before the Court even apologized to her.
As to the case, P/Cpl. Marino Victoria, as criminal
investigator of Station "A", was directed by Col. Daos,
Station Commander of the Olongapo Police Department
to make a follow up of the case of Rosario Baluyot. On
the other hand, since the suspect who inserted the
foreign object inside Rosario's vagina was said to be an
American, the NISRA Subic Naval Base also conducted
its investigation headed by criminal investigator Agent
Conrado Salonga. Coordinating with the local police and
with Sister Eva Palencia, since Rosario was a street
child at Magsaysay Drive, they rounded up about 43
street children and from some of them they learned that
Rosario Baluyot was with Jessie Ramirez with an
American at the MGM Hotel when the foreign object was
inserted in her vagina. After finding Jessie Ramirez, they
asked him about Rosario Baluyot. They found out that
indeed he was with Rosario Baluyot sometime before
Christmas of 1986 with an American, who brought them
to the said hotel. Jessie Ramirez was taken inside the
U.S. Naval Base, Olongapo City and took his statement.
Then he was brought to Mr. Edward Lee Bungarner, a
cartographer, and out of the description supplied by
Ramirez, a composite drawing was photocopied and
copies thereof were distributed to the local police and to
the sentries at the gate of the U.S. Naval Base. Some
American servicemen who had resemblance to the
composite drawing were photographed and these were
shown to Jessie Ramirez, but the result was negative.
Aside from the physical description by Ramirez about
the appearance of the suspect, he also described him
as having the mannerisms of a homo-sexual.
After obtaining information that foreign homo-sexuals
frequented Ermita, Manila, and thinking that the so-
called American may be European or Australian
national, the team composed of Agent Salonga, Mr.
Heinsell, P/Cpl. Marino Victoria and P/Cpl. Andres
Montaon, Jessie Ramirez and Michael Johnson, another
juvenile, proceeded to Manila. They first went to the
Manila NISRA Office, and thereafter checked in a hotel.
That was on September 23, 1987. On the first night,
they went to Luneta Park where foreign homo-sexuals
were said to be frequenting, but the result was negative.
Then on September 25, at about 11:00 p.m., while they
were standing at the corner of A. Mabini and M.H. del
Pilar Street, a male caucasian who looked like a homo-
sexual stopped by admiringly infront of the two (2)
juveniles, Ramirez and Johnson. Jessie Ramirez then
reported to Mr. Salonga that this foreigner had a
similarity with the American suspect, so the two minors
were instructed to follow the foreigner and to strike a
conversation. They did, and when they returned, Jessie
Ramirez told them that indeed the said foreigner was
the one who brought him and Rosario Baluyot to the
MGM Hotel. Bobby Salonga told Ramirez that this
foreigner had no beard while the one previously
described by Ramirez had a beard. Jessie Ramirez told
them that maybe he have just shaved it off. The said
caucasian then entered a bar, and after several minutes
he came out, and Jessie Ramirez upon his signal with
his thumbs up, as a signal to confirm that the said
foreigner is the suspect, arrested Ritter and brought him
to the Manila Western Police District. It could be
mentioned at this stage that in this operation they were
accompanied by two (2) policemen from the Western
Police District. The foreigner was hand cuffed and was
told that he was a suspect for Rape with Homicide. After
the arrest, they first went to the pension house of the
suspect in Ermita, Manila to get his shoulder bag which
contained his personal belongings, and from there they
brought him to the Western Police Department. At the
said police headquarters, they were allowed a
permissive search by the foreigner of his clutch bag and
his small shoulder bag and confiscated his passport,
I.D., 3 inhalers, money in the form of dollars and
travellers checks amounting about $1,500.00 and about
P100.00, all duly receipted for. From the passport they
learned that the suspect's name was Heinrich Stefan
Ritter, an Austrian national. During the questioning of
Hitter, Salonga and his team already left the
headquarters and went to their hotel, because at this
time Jessie Ramirez was already shaking with fear after
he identified the accused.
The following day, they brought the accused to
Olongapo and was detained at the Olongapo City Jail.
 The case for Rape with Homicide was filed against him
at the City Fiscal of Olongapo. At the preliminary
investigation, accused was assisted by his own counsel.
The private complainant was Maria Burgos Turla
because it was she who had custody of Rosario Baluyot
after her mother Anita Burgos died on January 12, 1982,
and their father Policarpio Baluyot had left them under
her custody. When this case was filed, the father's
whereabouts was unknown, and he only appeared when
the trial of this case before the Court was already in
progress. And upon his (Policarpio Baluyot) own
admission, he only learned about the death of his
daughter Rosario Baluyot from the newspaper, long
after Rosario was already gone.
The defense tried to dislodge the case by claiming that
there could be no crime of Rape with Homicide because
the suspect was described as an American while Ritter
is an Austrian. Also advanced by the defense is that, it is
a case of mistaken identity. That Rosario Baluyot was at
the time of the commission of the offense, already more
than 13 years old, she having been born on December
26, 1973 as per baptismal certificate, wherein it appears
that Rosario Baluyot was baptized on December 25,
1974 and was born on December 26, 1973 as testified
to by Fr. Roque Villanueva of St. James Parish Church
who issued the Baptismal Certificate, having custody
and possession of the book of baptism for the year
1975, but admitted that he had no personal knowledge
about the matters or entries entered therein. Likewise,
the defense's stand is that the accused cannot be liable
for Homicide because a vibrator is not a weapon of
death but it is a thing for the purpose of giving sexual
pleasure, and that the death of Rosario Baluyot was due
to the incompetence of Dr. Rosete, the surgeon and
Director of the Olongapo City General Hospital, who
operated on her. (Rollo, pp. 109-116)
On March 29, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING,
the Court holds, that the prosecution has established the
GUILT of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of Rape with Homicide as defined and penalized
in Art. 335 No. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby
sentences HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER to a penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P60,000.00) Philippine Currency, and TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (Pl0,000.00) by way of attorney's
fees to the private prosecutors and to pay the costs.
(Rollo, p. 126)
The accused now comes to this Court on the following assigned
errors allegedly committed by the court:
I remembered Rosario's birth date because her brother died in
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED
OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED ON OCTOBER 10, 1986
AND THAT IT WAS ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHO
COMMITTED IT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT ROSARIO
BALUYOT WAS LESS THAN TWELVE (12) YEARS
OLD WHEN THE ALLEGED OFFENSE WAS
COMMITTED AND IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS
RAPE WITH HOMICIDE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING CREDENCE TO AND
NOT REJECTING THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE
AND IN NOT UPHOLDING THAT OF THE DEFENSE
AND ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED.
Inasmuch as it is the bounden duty of this Court to affirm a
judgment of conviction only if the guilt of the accused has been
proved beyond reasonable doubt, it behooves us to exert the
most painstaking effort to examine the records in the light of the
arguments of both parties if only to satisfy judicial conscience
that the appellant indeed committed the criminal act (See People
v. Villapaña, 161 SCRA 73 [1988]).
The appellant was convicted by the trial court of the crime of
rape with homicide of a young girl who died after the rape
because of a foreign object, believed to be a sexual vibrator, left
inside her vagina.
As stated by the trial court one crucial issue in this case is the
age of the victim—whether or not Rosario Baluyot was less than
twelve (12) years old at the time the alleged incident happened
on October 10, 1986. The age is important in determining
whether or not there was statutory rape, Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code defines the third type of rape as having
carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age, in which
case force, intimidation, deprivation of reason or unconscious
state do not have to be present.
The trial court found that Rosario was below 12 years old when
she was sexually abused by the accused and, therefore, rape
was committed inspite of the absence of force or intimidation.
In resolving the issue, the trial court put great weight on the
testimonies of the victim's grandmother and father who testified
that she was born on December 22, 1975. These oral
declarations were admitted pursuant to then Rule 130, Section
33 of the Rules of Court where, in the absence of a birth
certificate, the act or declaration about pedigree may be received
in evidence on any notable fact in the life of a member of the
family. Since birth is a matter of pedigree within the rule which
permits the admission of hearsay evidence, oral declarations are
therefore admissible as proof of birth (Decision, p. 54).
The grandmother, Maria Burgos Turla, testified that she
Pampanga and her daughter, Anita (Rosario's mother) was the
only one who failed to attend the funeral because the latter has
just given birth allegedly to Rosario (T.S.N. p. 8, Jan. 13, 1988).
The father likewise testified that as far as he could remember,
Rosario was born on December 22, 1975 (T.S.N., p. 4, Jan. 27,
1988) and he was certain that Rosario was more than one (1)
year old when she was baptized (T.S.N., p. 45, Jan. 27, 1988).
The trial court further added that their testimony is supported by
the clinical record and the death certificate indicating that she
was 12 years old when she was admitted at the Olongapo City
General Hospital for treatment. The age was supplied by
Rosario's alleged guardian, Gaspar Alcantara to the hospital's
clinical record clerk, Lorna Limos. Fe Israel, a social worker who
interviewed Rosario Baluyot also testified that she was told by
Rosario that she was 12 years old. The trial court accepted this
as adequate evidence of the truth. Moreover, Jessie Ramirez,
the principal witness in this case declared that he was born on
September 5, 1973 and that he was older than Rosario Baluyot.
Therefore, since he was 13 years old in 1986, Rosario must
have been less than 12 yeas old in 1986. (Decision, p. 55)
The trial court concluded that the oral declarations of the
grandmother and father supported by other independent
evidence such as the clinical record, death certificate and the
testimonies of Fe Israel and Jessie Ramirez, rendered the
baptismal certificate presented by the defense without any
probative or evidentiary value. (Decision, p. 55)
The findings of the trial court with respect to Rosario Baluyot's
age cannot stand the application of evidentiary rules.
The trial court relied on Section 33, Rule 130 (now Section 40 of
Rule 130 of the 1989 Revised Rules of Court).
For oral evidence to be admissible under this Rule, the requisites
are:
(1) That the declarant must be dead or outside of the
Philippines or unable to testify;
(2) That pedigree is in issue;
(3) That the person whose pedigree is in question must
be related to the declarant by birth or marriage;
(4) That the declaration must be made before the
controversy occurred or ante litem motam; and
(5) That the relationship between the declarant and the
person whose pedigree is in question must as a general
rule be shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.
These requirements were not satisfied by the evidence for the
prosecution nor do the declarations fall within the purview of the
rule.
The victim's grandmother and father whose declarations
regarding Rosario's age were admitted by the trial court are both
alive, in the Philippines and able to testify as they both did testify
in court. Their declarations were made at the trial which is
certainly not before the controversy arose. The other witnesses
who testified on Rosario's age are not members of the victim's
family. The testimonies of Rosario's relatives must be weighed
according to their own personal knowledge of what happened
and not as hearsay evidence on matters of family history.
At this point, we find the evidence regarding Rosario's age of
doubtful value.
The trial court justified the admissibility of the grandmother's
testimony pursuant to the ruling laid down in U.S. v. Bergantino,
(3 Phil., 118 [1903]) where the Court accepted the testimony of
the mother that her daughter was 14 years old and 4 months old.
The mother stated that she knew the age because the child was
born about the time of the cholera epidemic of 1889. This was
not hearsay, but came from one who had direct knowledge of the
child's birth.
It is however, equally true that human memory on dates or days
is frail and unless the day is an extraordinary or unusual one for
the witness, there is no reasonable assurance of its correctness.
(People v. Dasig 93 Phil. 618, 632 [1953])
With respect to the grandmother's testimony, the date of the
brother's death or funeral was never established, which indicates
that the day was rather insignificant to be remembered. The
father's declaration is likewise not entirely reliable. His testimony
in court does not at all show that he had direct knowledge of his
daughter's birth. He was certain though that she was more than
one (1) year old at the time she was baptized.
The other witnesses are not at all competent to testify on the
victim's age, nor was there any basis shown to establish their
competence for the purpose. The clinical records were based on
Gaspar Alcantara's incompetent information given when he
brought the victim to the hospital. Alcantara came to know her
only about a year before her death. He had absolutely no
knowledge about the circumstances of Rosario's birth. The death
certificate relied upon by the trial court was merely based on the
clinical records. It is even less reliable as a record of birth.
All the evidence presented by the prosecution showing that
Rosario Baluyot was less than 12 years old at the time of the
alleged incident are not adequate to establish the exact date of
birth, much less offset a documentary record showing a different
date.
The defense presented Rosario Baluyot's baptismal certificate
which the trial court rejected as being hearsay and of no value.
As against the oral declarations made by interested witnesses
establishing Rosario's age to be less than 12 years old, the
evidence on record is more convincing and worthy of belief. (See
Filinvest Land, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 664, 673
[1990]).
By virtue of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum,
issued by the lower court to the St. James Parish Church, Subic,
Zambales, Fr. Roque Villanueva a Roman Catholic priest
testified and stated that he is the head of said parish. He brought
with him Baptismal Register No. 9 entitled "Liber Baptisnorum", a
latin term for baptismal book or record. On page 151, No. 3 of
the said Registry Book, there appears the name of Rosario
Baluyot who was baptized on December 25, 1974, and born on
December 26, 1973. Parents are Policarpio Baluyot and Anita
Burgos, residents of Subic, Zambales. Edita R. Milan appears as
the only sponsor with Olongapo City as her address.
In the case of Macadangdang v. Court of appeals (100 SCRA 73
[1980]), we held that:
 xxx xxx xxx
In our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite
in its pronouncements on the value of baptismal
certificates. It thus ruled that while baptismal and
marriage certificates may be considered public
documents, they are evidence only to prove the
administration of the sacraments on the dates therein
specified—but not the veracity of the status or
declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk
and/or citizenship (Paa v. Chan, L-25945, Oct. 31,
1967). Again, in the case of Fortus v. Novero (L-22378,
23 SCRA 1331 [1968]), this Court held that a baptismal
certificate is conclusive proof only of the baptism
administered, in conformity with the rites of the Catholic
Church by the priest who baptized the child, but it does
not prove the veracity of the declarations and
statements contained in the certificate that concern the
relationship of the person baptized. Such declarations
and statements, in order that their truth may be
admitted, must indispensably be shown by proof
recognized by law. (At pp. 84-85)
In the same light, the entries made in the Registry Book may be
considered as entries made in the course of business under
Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an exception to the hearsay
rule. The baptisms administered by the church are one of its
transactions in the exercise of ecclesiastical duties and recorded
in a book of the church during the course of its business. (U.S. v.
de Vera, 28 Phil. 105 [1914] Hence, the certificate (Exhibit "22")
presented by the defense that Rosario Baluyot was baptized on
December 25, 1974 may be admitted in evidence as proof of
baptism. Policarpio Baluyot, the victim's father testified that he
had in his possession a baptismal certificate different from the
one presented in court. However, no other baptismal record was
ever presented to prove a date different from that brought by the
official custodian. Since the baptismal certificate states that
Rosario was baptized on December 25, 1974, it is therefore
highly improbable that Rosario could have been born on
December 22, 1975. She could not have been baptized before
she was born. Exhibit "22" may be proof only of baptism but it
puts a lie to the declaration that Rosario was born in 1975. With
the father's assertion that Rosario was more than one (1) year
old when she was baptized, we are then more inclined to agree
that Rosario was born in 1973 as stated in the Baptismal
Registry.
In the case of People v. Rebancos (172 SCRA 425 [1989]), the
Court stated:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Although no birth certificate was presented because
her birth had allegedly not been registered, her
baptismal certificate, coupled by her mother's testimony,
was sufficient to establish that Mary Rose was below
twelve years old when she was violated by Rebancos.
(At. p. 426)
Unfortunately, in the instant case, nobody could corroborate the
date on a more reliable document as to Rosario's birth which
could serve as sufficient proof that she was born on December
26, 1973. Therefore, she was more than 12 years old at the time
of the alleged incident on October 10, 1986.
Moreover, it is not incumbent upon the defense to prove
Rosario's age. The burden of proof lies on the prosecution to
prove that Rosario was less than 12 years old at the time of the
alleged incident in a charge of statutory rape. The prosecution
failed in this respect.
Since Rosario was not established to have been under 12 years
of age at the time of the alleged sexual violation, it was
necessary to prove that the usual elements of rape were present;
i.e. that there was force of intimidation or that she was deprived
of reason or otherwise unconscious in accordance with Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code.
We agree with the defense that there was no proof of such facts.
On the contrary, the evidence shows that Rosario submitted
herself to the sexual advances of the appellant. In fact, she
appears to have consented to the act as she was paid P300.00
the next morning while her companion, Jessie Ramirez was paid
P200.00 (T.S.N. p. 50, January 6, 1988). The environmental
circumstances coupled with the testimonies and evidence
presented in court clearly give the impression that Rosario
Baluyot, a poor street child, was a prostitute inspite of her tender
age. Circumstances in life may have forced her to submit to sex
at such a young age but the circumstances do not come under
the purview of force or intimidation needed to convict for rape.
In view of these clear facts which the prosecution failed to refute,
no rape was committed. But was Ritter guilty of homicide?
The trial court justified its ruling by saying that the death of the
victim was a consequence of the insertion of the foreign object
into the victim's vagina by the appellant.
We now ask "Was the appellant responsible for the sexual
vibrator left inside Rosario's vagina which led to her death?
The trial court convicted the accused based on circumstantial
evidence. Unfortunately, the circumstances are capable of
varying interpretations and are not enough to justify conviction.
Jessie Ramirez, the principal witness did not actually see the
object inserted in Rosario's vagina. Neither could he identify the
object (Exhibit "C-2") taken from Rosario as the same object
which the appellant was holding at that time of the alleged
incident.
In his sworn statement given to the police investigator on
September 4, 1987, he answered that:
xxx xxx xxx
T Habang kayo ay nasa loob ng kuwarto ng otel,
mayroon ka bang napansin na inilabas ng kano sa
kanyang daladalahan kung mayroon man?
S Ang Amerikano ay may dala-dalang shoulder bag na
kulay itim, at napansin ko na may inilabas siya sa
kanyang bag na parang vicks inhaler, na kanyang
inamoy-amoy habang nasa otel kami at pagkatapos niya
ay inilapag niya sa lamiseta.
 T Ilarawan mo nga sa akin ang bagay na nakita mong
inilabas ng Amerikano?
S Ito ay may habang tatlong pulgada at ang takip nito ay
may habang dalawang pulgada. Iyong takip ay bilog na
patulis at may tabang mga kalahating pulgada. Hindi ko
napansin ang hugis ng dulo ng bagay na may takip dahil
natatakpan ng kamay at ilong ng Amerikano.
T Ipinakikita ko sa iyo ang isang larawan. Tignan mong
mabuti ang larawang ito at sabihin mo nga sa akin kung
makikilala mo ang mga bagay na nasa larawang ito, na
may kinalaman sa nakita mong kinuha ng Amerikano sa
kanyang bag?
S Napansin ko na ang kulay asul na bagay sa larawan
ay katulad na katulad noong takip ng bagay na inilabas
ng Amerikano sa kanyang bag. Kaya lang ay bakit
naging kulay asul gayong ng makita ko ito ay kulay puti?
(Exhibit "A", p. 2; Emphasis Supplied)
Presumably, what Jessie Ramirez saw was merely the Vicks
inhaler which the appellant does not deny having possessed at
that time. He was certain that the object was white. (T.S.N. p. 91,
January 6, 1988)
Later, Ramirez retracted and corrected himself. He said that it
was grayish in color with color blue (Medyo kulay abo na may
kulay na parang blue). (T.S.N. p. 92, January 6, 1988) The
inconsistency of the witness' testimony casts doubt as to the
veracity of the statements made especially when he answered
on additional cross-examination that the reason why he
concluded that Exhibit "C-2" was the same object being held by
Ritter was because it was the only one shown to him by the
prosecution (T.S.N. pp. 109-110, January 6, 1988). Jessie
Ramirez was not all certain about the sexual vibrator because he
did not actually see it in the possession of the appellant.
What he merely remembers is the revelation made by Rosario
the next morning that the foreigner inserted something inside her
vagina. The trial court admitted such statement as part of the res
gestae. In a strained effort to accept such statement as part of
res gestae, the trial court focused the test of admissibility on the
lapse of time between the event and the utterance. For the
average 13 years old, the insertion of a mechanical device or
anything for that matter into the vagina of a young girl is
undoubtedly startling. For Rosario and Jessie, however, there
must be more evidence to show that the statement, given after a
night's sleep had intervened, was given instinctively because the
event was so startling Res gestae does not apply. (Section 42,
Rule 130, Rules of Court)
Even if it were established that the appellant did insert something
inside Rosario's vagina, the evidence is still not adequate to
impute the death of Rosario to the appellant's alleged act.
Jessie Ramirez testified that Rosario was able to remove the
object inserted in her vagina. We quote:
Q Now, you also stated on direct examination that later
on Rosario even categorically admitted to you that she
was already able to remove the object allegedly inserted
inside her vagina, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. CARAAN:
Q Will you kindly tell to this Honorable Court the exact
words used by Rosario Baluyot later on when you met
her when you asked her and when she told you that she
was already able to remove that object from her vagina?
A "Oy, Jessie, natanggal na, "she told me that. I asked
her, "Was it already removed?" And she answered,
"Yes, it was removed." But the same night, she again
complained of pain of her stomach. She sent one of her
friends to call for me. And as a matter of fact, Tomboy
was uttering defamatory words against me as she was
groaning in pain. (TSN, Jan. 6,1988, pp. 72-73)
This encounter happened on the night of the day following the
day after both children were invited by the foreigner to the hotel.
(T.S.N. p. 73, January 6, 1988). Rosario was said to be groaning
in pain so we can just imagine the distress she was undergoing
at this point in time. If the device inserted by the appellant
caused the pain, it is highly inconceivable how she was able to
endure the pain and discomfort until May, 1987, seven (7)
months after the alleged incident. Evidence must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be
credible in itself such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. (People vs. Patog, 144 SCRA 429 [1986]).
At this juncture, we find Dr. Pedro Solis' testimony rather
significant. Dr. Pedro Solis, a witness for the defense is
considered an expert witness. (A Doctor of Medicine and a
graduate of the State University in 1940, a degree of Bachelor of
Laws and member of the Bar 1949, and a graduate of the
Institute of Criminology University. He was awarded Post
Graduate Diploma in Criminology in 1963, and also a graduate of
United Nations Asia and Far East Asia Institute on the
Prevention of Crimes in Tokyo Japan 1965. He was appointed
Medico Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation in
1940 until 1944. He became Chief Medico Legal Officer in 1970
and became the Deputy Director of the NBI up to 1984. He is at
present a Professorial Lecturer on Legal Medicine at the UP,
FEU, UE, and Fatima College of Medicine; a Medico Legal
Consultant of the PGH Medical Center, Makati Medical Center,
UERM Medical Center, MCU Medical Center. He has been with
the NBI for 43 years. He has attended no less than 13
conferences abroad. He is the author of the textbooks entitled
"Legal Medicine" and "Medical Jurisprudence".) With his
impressive legal and medical background, his testimony is too
authoritative to ignore. We quote the pertinent portions of his
testimony:
Q Now Dr. Solis, would you kindly go over this object
marked as Exh. "C-2" which object was described as a
part of a sexual vibrator battery operated. Now, given
this kind of object, would you kindly tell us what would
be the probable effect upon a 12 years old girl when it is
inserted into her vagina?
A Well, this vibrator must be considered a foreign body
placed into a human being and as such be considered a
foreign object. As a foreign object, the tendency of the
body may be: No. 1—expel the foreign body—No. 2.—
The tendency of the body is to react to that foreign body.
One of the reactions that maybe manifested by the
person wherein such foreign body is concerned is to
cover the foreign body with human tissue, in a way to
avoid its further injury to the body.
Now, the second reaction is irritation thereby producing
certain manifest symptoms and changes in the area
where the foreign body is located.
In severe cases, the symptoms manifestation might not
only be localized but may be felt all over the body, we
call it systemic reaction. Now, considering the fact that
this foreign body as shown to me is already not
complete, this shows exposure of its different parts for
the body to react. If there is mechanism to cause the
foreign body to vibrate, there must be some sort of
power from within and that power must be a dry cell
battery. [The] composition of the battery are,
manganese dioxide ammonium, salts, water and any
substance that will cause current flow. All of these
substances are irritants including areas of the container
and as such, the primary reaction of the body is to
cause irritation on the tissues, thereby inflammatory
changes develop and in all likelihood, aside from those
inflammatory changes would be a supervening infection
in a way that the whole generative organ of the woman
will suffer from diseased process causing her the
systemic reaction like fever, swelling of the area, and
other systemic symptoms. . . . . (TSN., pp. 13-15,
October 19,1988)
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, given this object, how long would it take, Doctor
before any reaction such as an infection would set in,
how many days after the insertion of this object in the
vagina of a 12 year old girl?
A In the example given to me, considering that one of
the ends is exposed, in a way that vaginal secretion has
more chance to get in, well, liberation of this irritant
chemicals would be enhanced and therefore in a shorter
period of time, there being this vaginal reaction.
Q How many days or weeks would you say would that
follow after the insertion?
A As I said, with my experience at the NBI, insertion of
any foreign body in the vaginal canal usually developed
within, a period of two (2) weeks . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Q . . . [T]he subject in this case was allegedly raped,
and a sexual vibrator was inserted in her vagina on
October 10, 1986 and she was operated on, on May 19,
1987 the following year, so it took more than 7 months
before this was extracted, would you say that it will take
that long before any adverse infection could set in inside
the vagina?
A Infection and inflamatory changes will develop in a
shorter time. (TSN., Oct. 19,1988, p. 18)
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you said shorter, how long would that be,
Doctor?
A As I said, in my personal experience, hair pins,
cottonballs and even this lipstick of women usually,
there are only about two (2) weeks time that the patient
suffer some abnormal symptoms.
Q Now, considering that this is a bigger object to the
object that you mentioned, this object has a shorter
time?
A Yes, Sir shorter time. (TSN., Oct. 19. 1988, p. 20)
The trial court, however, ruled that "there is no hard and fast rule
as to the time frame wherein infection sets in upon insertion of a
foreign body in the vagina canal. For Dr. Solis, the time frame is
not more than 10 months, and this case is still within the said
time frame."
A more generous time interval may be allowed in non-criminal
cases. But where an accused is facing a penalty of reclusion
perpetua, the evidence against him cannot be based on
probabilities which are less likely than those probabilities which
favor him.
It should be clarified that the time frame depends upon the kind
of foreign body lodged inside the body. An examination of the
object gave the following results:
(1) Color: Blue
Size: (a) Circumference—3.031
inches (b) Length—approximately
2.179 inches.
Composition: Showed the general
characteristics of a styrene-butadiene plastic.
(2) The specimen can be electrically operated by means
of a battery as per certification dated 01 June 1988,
signed by Mr. Rodolfo D. Mercuric, Shipboard Electrical
Systems Mechanics, Foreman II, SRF Shop 51, Subic
(see attached certification).
(3) No comparative examination was made on specimen
#1 and vibrator depicted in the catalog because no
actual physical dimensions and/or mechanical
characteristics were shown in the catalog. (Exhibit "LL")
The vibrator end was further subjected to a macro-photographic
examination on the open end portion which revealed the
following:
Result of Examination
 Macro-photographic examination on the open end
portion of specimen #1 shows the following inscription:
MABUCHI MOTOR JAPAN RE 14 PAT (Exhibit "MM")
From the above results, the subject object is certainly not
considered as inert and based on Dr. Solis' testimony, it is more
likely that infection should set in much earlier. Considering also
that the object was inserted inside the vagina which is part of the
generative organ of a woman, an organ which is lined with a very
thin layer of membrane with plenty of blood supply, this part of
the body is more susceptible to infection. (T.S.N. p. 34, October
19, 1988)
The truth of Dr. Solis' testimony is more probable under the
circumstances of the case. We see no reason why his opinions
qualified by training and experience should not be controlling and
binding upon the Court in the determination of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. (People v. Tolentino, 166 SCRA 469 [1988]).
Dr. Barcinal, another witness for the defense also testified that
he examined Rosario Baluyot on May 17, 1986 as a referral
patient from the Department of Surgery to give an OB-GYN
clearance to the patient prior to operation. (T.S.N. p. 6,
September 28, 1988)
Q And how many times did you examine this patient
Rosario Baluyot on that day?
A I examined her twice on that day.
Q The first time that you examined her, what is the
result of your findings, if any?
A My first examination, I examined the patient inside the
delivery room. The patient was brought to the delivery
room wheel-chaired then from the wheel chair, the
patient was ambigatory (sic). She was able to walk from
the door to the examining table. On examination, the
patient is conscious, she was fairly nourished, fairly
developed, she had fever, she was uncooperative at
that time and examination deals more on the abdomen
which shows slightly distended abdomen with muscle
guarding with tenderness all over, with maximum
tenderness over the hypogastric area. (T.S.N. p. 5,
September 28, 1988)
xxx xxx xxx
Q What about your second examination to the patient,
what was your findings, if any?
A In my second examination, I repeated the internal
examination wherein I placed my index finger and
middle finger inside the vagina of the patient and was
able to palpate a hard object. After which, I made a
speculum examination wherein I was able to visualize
the inner portion of the vaginal canal, there I saw
purulent foul smelling, blood tints, discharge in the
vaginal canal and a foreign body invaded on the
posterior part of the vaginal canal.
xxx xxx xxx
A I referred back to Dr. Fernandez about my findings
and he asked me to try to remove the said foreign object
by the use of forceps which I tried to do so also but I
failed to extract the same.
Q All this time that you were examining the patient
Rosario Baluyot both in the first and second instance,
Rosario Baluyot was conscious and were you able to
talk to her when you were examining her?
A Yes, sir.
Q And did you ask her why there is a foreign object
lodge inside her vagina?
A Yes, Sir I asked her.
Q And what did she tell you, if any?
A She said in her own words that "GINAMIT AKO NG
NEGRO AT SIYA ANG NAGLAGAY NITO."
Q Did she also tell you when, this Negro who used her
and who inserted and placed the foreign object on her
vagina?
A Yes, Sir I asked her and she said he used me three
(3) months ago from the time I examined her.
Q Now, you said that you referred the patient to the
ward, what happened next with your patient?
A To my knowledge, the patient is already scheduled on
operation on that date.
Q Meaning, May 17, 1987?
A Yes, Sir I was presuming that the patient would
undergo surgery after that?
(TSN, Sept. 28,1988, pp. 8-9; Emphasis supplied)
The trial court debunked Dr. Barcinals testimony considering
Rosario's condition at that time. It ruled that it is inconceivable
that she would be striking a normal conversation with the doctors
and would be sitting on the examination table since Gaspar
Alcantara stated that when he brought Rosario Baluyot to the
hospital, she was unconscious and writhing in pain.
It was not improbable for Rosario Baluyot to still be conscious
and ambulant at that time because there were several instances
testified to by different witnesses that she was still able to talk
prior to her operation:
(1) Fe Israel, a witness for the prosecution and a member of the
Olongapo Catholic Charismatic Renewal Movement testified that
as a member of this group she visits indigent children in the
hospital every Saturday and after office hours on working days.
On the Saturday prior to Rosario's death which was May 17, she
was still able to talk to Rosario Baluyot. In fact, one of her
groupmates helped Rosario go to the comfort room to urinate.
(T.S.N., pp. 16-19, May 25, 1988)
(2) Angelita Amulong, a witness for the defense is another para
social worker who worked at Pope John 23rd Community Center
under Sister Eva Palencia. In one of her hospital visits, she
encountered Rosario Baluyot in the month of May, 1987. She
actually saw a child who happened to be Rosario Baluyot seated
on the cement floor and when she asked why she was seated
there, she was told that it was too hot in the bed. She saw
Rosario Baluyot for about 2 or 3 days successively. (T.S.N. pp.
10-13, September 7, 1988)
(3) Gaspar Alcantara, the person who brought Rosario to the
hospital actually testified that she was conscious (T.S.N. p. 36,
September 14, 1988) but writhing in pain. He took pity on her so
he brought her to the hospital (T.S.N. p. 12, September 14,
1988)
From the above testimonies, it is clear that Rosario was still
conscious and could still answer questions asked of her although
she was complaining of stomach pains. Unfortunately, the
medical attention given to her failed to halt the aggravation of her
condition. The operation on May 19 was too late.
Rosario died because of septicemia, which in layman's language
is blood poisoning, and peritonitis, which is massive infection, in
the abdominal cavity caused by the foreign object or the cut
sexual vibrator lodged in the vagina of the victim. This led to the
infection from the uterus to the fallopian tubes and into the
peritoneum and the abdominal cavity.
The trial court convicted the accused citing the rationale of
Article 4 of the RPC
He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil
caused.
But before the conviction is affirmed, we must first follow the rule
as stated in the case of Urbano vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
(157 SCRA 1 [1988]) to wit:
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the
direct, natural and logical consequence of the wounds
inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are
dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the
accused caused the victim's death must convince a
rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. (Emphasis
supplied)
In People v. Tempongko, Jr., (144 SCRA 583, 592 [1986]), we
explained that:
xxx xxx xxx
The basic principle in every criminal prosecution is that
accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The accused is
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved by the
prosecution. If the prosecution fails, it fails utterly, even
if the defense is weak or, indeed, even if there is no
defense at all. The defendant faces the full panoply of
state authority with all "The People of the Philippines"
arrayed against him. In a manner of speaking, he goes
to bat with all the bases loaded. The odds are heavily
against him. It is important, therefore, to equalize the
positions of the prosecution and the defense by
presuming the innocence of the accused until the state
is able to refute the presumption by proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. (At. p. 592)
The evidence for the accused maybe numerically less as against
the number of witnesses and preponderance of evidence
presented by the prosecution but there is no direct and
convincing proof that the accused was responsible for the
vibrator left inside the victim's vagina which caused her death
seven (7) months after its insertion. What the prosecution
managed to establish were mere circumstances which were not
sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence. While circumstantial evidence may suffice to support
a conviction it is imperative, though, that the following requisites
should concur:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as
to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. (Rule
133, Sec. 4 Revised Rules of Court)
For the well-entrenched rule in evidence is that "before
conviction can be had upon circumstantial evidence, the
circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain
which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the
crime (People v. Subano, 73 Phil. 692 [1942]; Emphasis
supplied). It must fairly exclude every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence (Dorado v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 420, 433
[1987]). In this case the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution does not conclusively point to the liability of the
appellant for the crime charged. (People v. Tolentino, supra)
We are aware of the wide publicity given to the plight of Rosario
Baluyot and how her death exemplified starkly the daily terrors
that most street children encounter as they sell their bodies in
order to survive. At an age when innocence and youthful joys
should preponderate in their lives, they experience life in its most
heartless and inhuman form. Instead of nothing more than gentle
disappointments occupying their young minds, they daily cope
with tragedies that even adults should never be made to carry.
It is with distressing reluctance that we have to seemingly set
back the efforts of Government to dramatize the death of Rosario
Baluyot as a means of galvanizing the nation to care for its street
children. It would have meant a lot to social workers and
prosecutors alike if one pedophile-killer could be brought to
justice so that his example would arouse public concern,
sufficient for the formulation and implementation of meaningful
remedies. However, we cannot convict on anything less than
proof beyond reasonable doubt. The protections of the Bill of
Rights and our criminal justice system are as much, if not more
so, for the perverts and outcasts of society as they are for
normal, decent, and law-abiding people.
The requirement of proof which produces in an unprejudiced
mind moral certainty or conviction that the accused did commit
the offense has not been satisfied.
By way of emphasis, we reiterate some of the factors arousing
reasonable doubt:
1. The evidence on Rosario Baluyot's baptism creates
reasonable doubt about her being less than 12 years old
when the carnal knowledge took place. If the evidence
for the prosecution is to be believed, she was not yet
born on the date she was baptized.
2. Since the proof of Rosario's being under 12 years of
age is not satisfactory, the prosecution has to prove
force, intimidation, or deprivation of reason in order to
convict for rape. There is no such proof. In fact, the
evidence shows a willingness to submit to the sexual act
for monetary considerations.
3. The only witness to the fact of Ritter's placing a
vibrator inside the vagina of Rosario was Jessie
Ramirez. This witness did not see Ritter insert the
vibrator. The morning after the insertion, he was only
told by Rosario about it. Two days later, he allegedly
met Rosario who informed him that she was able to
remove the object. And yet, Ramirez testified that on the
night of that second encounter, he saw Rosario
groaning because of pain in her stomach. She was even
hurling invectives. Ramirez' testimony is not only
hearsay, it is also contradictory.
4. It was improbable, according to expert medical
testimony, for a foreign object with active properties to
cause pain, discomfort, and serious infection only after
seven months inside a young girl's vaginal canal.
Infection would have set in much earlier. Jessie Ramirez
recalled that the incident happened in December of
1986. (TSN., January 6, 1988, pp. 15-17) The evidence,
however shows that the appellant was not here in the
Philippines that December. As per the Commission on
Immigration Arrival and Departure Report, Heinrich
Ritter arrived in the Philippines on October 7, 1986 and
left on October 12, 1986. He never returned until
September 23, 1987 (Exhibits "DD" and "EE") The
incident could have happened only in October, but then
it would have been highly improbable for the sexual
vibrator to stay inside the vagina for seven (7) months
with the kind of serious complications it creates.
5. The gynecologist who attended to Rosario during her
hospital confinement testified that she told him "Ginamit
ako ng Negro at siya ang naglagay nito." The accused is
not a black.
Noteworthy is the fact that nothing was mentioned about
Rosario's activities after the hotel incident. Considering Dr.
Barcinal's testimony indicating that she was "used" by a "Negro"
three (3) months prior to admission in the hospital and Rosario's
unfortunate profession, there is always the possibility that she
could have allowed herself to be violated by this perverse kind of
sexual behavior where a vibrator or vibrators were inserted into
her vagina between October, 1986 and May, 1987.
Moreover, the long delay of seven (7) months after the incident
in reporting the alleged crime renders the evidence for the
prosecution insufficient to establish appellant's guilty connection
with the requisite moral certainty. (See People v. Mula Cruz, 129
SCRA 156 [1984]).
The established facts do not entirely rule out the possibility that
the appellant could have inserted a foreign object inside
Rosario's vagina. This object may have caused her death. It is
possible that the appellant could be the guilty person. However,
the Court cannot base an affirmance of conviction upon mere
possibilities. Suspicions and possibilities are not evidence and
therefore should not be taken against the accused. (People v.
Tolentino, supra)
Well-established is the rule that every circumstance favorable to
the accused should be duly taken into account. This rule applies
even to hardened criminals or those whose bizarre behaviour
violates the mores of civilized society. The evidence against the
accused must survive the test of reason. The strongest suspicion
must not be allowed to sway judgment. (See Sacay v.
Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]). As stated in the case of
People v. Ng (142 SCRA 615 [1986]):
. . . [F]rom the earliest years of this Court, it has
emphasized the rule that reasonable doubt in criminal
cases must be resolved in favor of the accused. The
requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt calls for
moral certainty of guilt. It has been defined as meaning
such proof "to the satisfaction of the court, keeping in
mind the presumption of innocence, as precludes every
reasonable hypothesis except that which it is given to
support. It is not sufficient for the proof to establish a
probability, even though strong, that the fact charged is
more likely to be true than the contrary. It must establish
the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral
certainty—a certainty that convinces and satisfies the
reason and the conscience of those who are to act upon
it. (Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 Edition, p.
379, citing U.S. v. Reyes, 3 Phil. 3). . . .
In the instant case, since there are circumstances which prevent
our being morally certain of the guilt of the appellant, he is,
therefore, entitled to an acquittal.
This notwithstanding, the Court can not ignore the acts of the
appellant on the children, Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in
October, 1986 at the MGM Hotel. Inspite of his flat denials, we
are convinced that he comes to this country not to look at
historical sights, enrich his intellect or indulge in legitimate
pleasures but in order to satisfy the urgings of a sick mind.
With the positive Identification and testimony by Jessie Ramirez
that it was the appellant who picked him and Rosario from
among the children and invited them to the hotel; and that in the
hotel he was shown pictures of young boys like him and the two
masturbated each other, such actuations clearly show that the
appellant is a pedophile. When apprehended in Ermita, he was
sizing up young children. Dr. Solis defined pedophilia in his book
entitled Legal Medicine, 1987 edition, as follows:
Pedophilia—A form of sexual perversion wherein a
person has the compulsive desire to have sexual
intercourse with a child of either sex. Children of various
ages participate in sexual activities, like fellatio,
cunnilingus, fondling with sex organs, or anal sexual
intercourse. Usually committed by a homosexual
between a man and a boy the latter being a passive
partner.
Ritter was prosecuted for rape with homicide and not pedophilia,
assuming this is a crime by itself. Pedophilia is clearly a behavior
offensive to public morals and violative of the declared policy of
the state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and
social well-being of our youth. (Article II, Section 13, 1987
Constitution) (Harvey v. Defensor Santiago, 162 SCRA 840, 848
[1989]). Pedophiles, especially thrill seeking aliens have no place
in our country.
In this case, there is reasonable ground to believe that the
appellant committed acts injurious not only to Rosario Baluyot
but also to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people.
The state has expressly committed itself to defend the right of
children to assistance and special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions
prejudicial to their development. (Art. XV, Section 3 [2] . . .
(Harvey v. Santiago, supra). The appellant has abused Filipino
children, enticing them with money. The appellant should be
expelled from the country.
Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that the appellant is
also free from civil liability which is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action. (Rule III, Section 1) The well-settled doctrine is
that a person while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable.
We reiterate what has been stated in Urbano v. IAC, supra.
. . . While the guilt of the accused in a criminal
prosecution must be established beyond reasonable
doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a
civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The
judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the
accused only when it includes a declaration that the
facts from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).
The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil
Code, which provides that the acquittal of the accused
on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from
civil liability for the same act or omission, has been
explained by the Code Commission as follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in
a criminal case also releases him from civil
liability is one of the most serious flaws in the
Philippine legal system. It has given rise to
numberless instances of miscarriage of justice,
where the acquittal was due to a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of
the accused. The reasoning followed is that
inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived
from the criminal offense, when the latter is not
proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those causes where confused
thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable
consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a
clear line of demarcation between criminal
liability and civil responsibility, and to determine
the logical result of the distinction. The two
liabilities are separate and distinct from each
other. One affects the social order and the
other, private rights. One is for the punishment
or correction of the offender while the other is
for the reparation of damages suffered by the
aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so
different from each other that article 1813 of the
present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There
may be a compromise upon the civil action
arising from a crime; but the public action for
the imposition of the legal penalty shall not
thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper
that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or
fine upon the accused, the offense should be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the
purpose of indemnifying the complaining party,
why should the offense also be proved beyond
reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or
violation of every private right to be proved only
by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of
the aggrieved person any less private because
the wrongful act is also punishable by the
criminal law?
For these reasons, the Commission
recommends the adoption of the reform under
discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our
law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of
injustice—a cause for disillusionment on the
part of the innumerable persons injured or
wronged.
Rosario Baluyot is a street child who ran away from her
grandmother's house.1âwphi1 Circumstances forced her to
succumb and enter this unfortunate profession. Nonetheless,
she has left behind heirs who have certainly suffered mental
anguish, anxiety and moral shock by her sudden and incredulous
death as reflected in the records of the case. Though we are
acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape with homicide, we
emphasize that we are not ruling that he is innocent or
blameless. It is only the constitutional presumption of innocence
and the failure of the prosecution to build an airtight case for
conviction which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful
conduct do not exist. As earlier stated, there is the likelihood that
he did insert the vibrator whose end was left inside Rosario's
vaginal canal and that the vibrator may have caused her death.
True, we cannot convict on probabilities or possibilities but civil
liability does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt. The
Court can order the payment of indemnity on the facts found in
the records of this case.
The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to morals, good
customs, public order or public policy (see Article 21 Civil Code).
As earlier mentioned, the appellant has abused Filipino children,
enticing them with money. We can not overstress the
responsibility for proper behavior of all adults in the Philippines,
including the appellant towards young children. The sexual
exploitation committed by the appellant should not and can not
be condoned. Thus, considering the circumstances of the case,
we are awarding damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot in the
amount of P30,000.00.

And finally, the Court deplores the lack of criminal laws which will
adequately protect street children from exploitation by
pedophiles, pimps, and, perhaps, their own parents or guardians
who profit from the sale of young bodies. The provisions on
statutory rape and other related offenses were never intended for
the relatively recent influx of pedophiles taking advantage of
rampant poverty among the forgotten segments of our society.
Newspaper and magazine articles, media exposes, college
dissertations, and other studies deal at length with this serious
social problem but pedophiles like the appellant will continue to
enter the Philippines and foreign publications catering to them
will continue to advertise the availability of Filipino street children
unless the Government acts and acts soon. We have to acquit
the appellant because the Bill of Rights commands us to do so.
We, however, express the Court's concern about the problem of
street children and the evils committed against them. Something
must be done about it.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and SET

ASIDE. Appellant HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER is ACQUITTED
on grounds of reasonable doubt. The appellant is ordered to pay
the amount of P30,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary
damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot. The Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation is hereby directed to institute proper
deportation proceedings against the appellant and to
immediately expel him thereafter with prejudice to re-entry into
the country.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA," respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel
Manila Garden (Hotel Nikko)1 and Ruby Lim assail the Decision2
of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 reversing the
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 104, as well as the Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals
dated 09 July 2002 which denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.
The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages
brought under the human relations provisions of the New Civil
Code. Plaintiff thereat (respondent herein) Roberto Reyes, more
popularly known by the screen name "Amay Bisaya," alleged
that at around 6:00 o’clock in the evening of 13 October 1994,
while he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko,5 he was
spotted by his friend of several years, Dr. Violeta Filart, who then
approached him.6 Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a party at
the hotel’s penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotel’s
manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka.7 Mr. Reyes asked if she
could vouch for him for which she replied: "of course."8 Mr.
Reyes then went up with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the
basket of fruits which was the latter’s present for the celebrant.9
At the penthouse, they first had their picture taken with the
celebrant after which Mr. Reyes sat with the party of Dr. Filart.10
After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr.
Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame
and embarrassment, he was stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby
Lim, who claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive
Secretary thereof.11 In a loud voice and within the presence and
hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at the
buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party ("huwag ka
nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang").12 Mr.
Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart.13 Dr.
Filart, who was within hearing distance, however, completely
ignored him thus adding to his shame and humiliation.14 Not
long after, while he was still recovering from the traumatic
experience, a Makati policeman approached and asked him to
step out of the hotel.15 Like a common criminal, he was escorted
out of the party by the policeman.16 Claiming damages, Mr.
Reyes asked for One Million Pesos actual damages, One Million
Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages and Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos attorney’s fees.17
Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to
leave the party but not under the ignominious circumstance
painted by the latter. Ms. Lim narrated that she was the Hotel’s
Executive Secretary for the past twenty (20) years.18 One of her
functions included organizing the birthday party of the hotel’s
former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka.19 The year 1994 was
no different. For Mr. Tsuruoka’s party, Ms. Lim generated an
exclusive guest list and extended invitations accordingly.20 The
guest list was limited to approximately sixty (60) of Mr.
Tsuruoka’s closest friends and some hotel employees and that
Mr. Reyes was not one of those invited.21 At the party, Ms. Lim
first noticed Mr. Reyes at the bar counter ordering a drink.22
Mindful of Mr. Tsuruoka’s wishes to keep the party intimate, Ms.
Lim approached Mr. Boy Miller, the "captain waiter," to inquire as
to the presence of Mr. Reyes who was not invited.23 Mr. Miller
replied that he saw Mr. Reyes with the group of Dr. Filart.24 As
Dr. Filart was engaged in conversation with another guest and as
Ms. Lim did not want to interrupt, she inquired instead from the
sister of Dr. Filart, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, who told her that Dr. Filart
did not invite Mr. Reyes.25 Ms. Lim then requested Ms. Fruto to
tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited.26 Mr.
Reyes, however, lingered prompting Ms. Lim to inquire from Ms.
Fruto who said that Mr. Reyes did not want to leave.27 When
Ms. Lim turned around, she saw Mr. Reyes conversing with a
Captain Batung whom she later approached.28 Believing that
Captain Batung and Mr. Reyes knew each other, Ms. Lim
requested from him the same favor from Ms. Fruto, i.e., for
Captain Batung to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not
invited.29 Still, Mr. Reyes lingered. When Ms. Lim spotted Mr.
Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to speak to him herself as
there were no other guests in the immediate vicinity.30 However,
as Mr. Reyes was already helping himself to the food, she
decided to wait.31 When Mr. Reyes went to a corner and started
to eat, Ms. Lim approached him and said: "alam ninyo, hindo ho
kayo dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain,
ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis
na kayo."32 She then turned around trusting that Mr. Reyes
would show enough decency to leave, but to her surprise, he
began screaming and making a big scene, and even threatened
to dump food on her.33 1awphi1.nét
Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before the
lower court, also gave her version of the story to the effect that
she never invited Mr. Reyes to the party.34 According to her, it
was Mr. Reyes who volunteered to carry the basket of fruits
intended for the celebrant as he was likewise going to take the
elevator, not to the penthouse but to Altitude 49.35 When they
reached the penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes to go down as
he was not properly dressed and was not invited.36 All the while,
she thought that Mr. Reyes already left the place, but she later
saw him at the bar talking to Col. Batung.37 Then there was a
commotion and she saw Mr. Reyes shouting.38 She ignored Mr.
Reyes.39 She was embarrassed and did not want the celebrant
to think that she invited him.40
After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the
complaint,41 giving more credence to the testimony of Ms. Lim
that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The
trial court likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk
of being thrown out of the party as he was uninvited:
Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he was not
a guest of Mr. Tsuruoka, the birthday celebrant. He assumed the
risk of being asked to leave for attending a party to which he was
not invited by the host. Damages are pecuniary consequences
which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the
violation of some right. Thus, no recovery can be had against
defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim because he himself was
at fault (Garciano v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 436). He knew
that it was not the party of defendant Violeta Filart even if she
allowed him to join her and took responsibility for his attendance
at the party. His action against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby
Lim must therefore fail.42
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial
court as it found more commanding of belief the testimony of Mr.
Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave in a loud voice within
hearing distance of several guests:
In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation, telling him
that he should not finish his food and to leave the place within
the hearing distance of other guests is an act which is contrary to
morals, good customs . . ., for which appellees should
compensate the appellant for the damage suffered by the latter
as a consequence therefore (Art. 21, New Civil Code). The
liability arises from the acts which are in themselves legal or not
prohibited, but contrary to morals or good customs. Conversely,
even in the exercise of a formal right, [one] cannot with impunity
intentionally cause damage to another in a manner contrary to
morals or good customs.43
The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the actuation of Ms. Lim
in approaching several people to inquire into the presence of Mr.
Reyes exposed the latter to ridicule and was uncalled for as she
should have approached Dr. Filart first and both of them should
have talked to Mr. Reyes in private:
Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What should have
been done by appellee Lim was to approach appellee Mrs. Filart
and together they should have told appellant Reyes in private
that the latter should leave the party as the celebrant only
wanted close friends around. It is necessary that Mrs. Filart be
the one to approach appellant because it was she who invited
appellant in that occasion. Were it not for Mrs. Filart’s invitation,
appellant could not have suffered such humiliation. For that,
appellee Filart is equally liable.
...
The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which are
predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one
person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but
respect of such dignity. Under Article 20 of the Civil Code, every
person who violates this duty becomes liable for damages,
especially if said acts were attended by malice or bad faith. Bad
faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple
negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known
duty to some motive or interest or ill-will that partakes of the
nature of fraud (Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA, et al., 309 SCRA 603).44
Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel Nikko,
Ruby Lim and Dr. Violeta Filart the solidary obligation to pay Mr.
Reyes (1) exemplary damages in the amount of Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P200,000); (2) moral damages in the amount
of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); and (3) attorney’s
fees in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000).45 On
motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its
earlier decision as the argument raised in the motion had "been
amply discussed and passed upon in the decision sought to be
reconsidered."46
Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim
contend that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in –
I.
… NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT
INJURIA CONSIDERING THAT BY ITS OWN FINDINGS, AMAY
BISAYA WAS A GATE-CRASHER
II.
… HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH DR. FILART FOR DAMAGES
SINCE BY ITS OWN RULING, AMAY BISAYA "COULD NOT
HAVE SUFFERED SUCH HUMILIATION," "WERE IT NOT FOR
DR. FILART’S INVITATION"
III.
… DEPARTING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE
TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT
ALLEGEDLY CAUSED THE HUMILIATION OF AMAY BISAYA
IV.
… IN CONCLUDING THAT AMAY BISAYA WAS TREATED
UNJUSTLY BECAUSE OF HIS POVERTY, CONSIDERING
THAT THIS WAS NEVER AN ISSUE AND NO EVIDENCE WAS
PRESENTED IN THIS REGARD
V.
… IN FAILING TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE ON THE DEFECTS
OF THE APPELLANT’S BRIEF, THEREBY DEPARTING FROM
THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS
Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the
doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for
damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked
to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process)
as he was a "gate-crasher."
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents
is not esteemed in law as injury"47 ) refers to self-inflicted
injury48 or to the consent to injury49 which precludes the
recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily
exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing
so.50 As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does
not find application to the case at bar because even if
respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the
party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil
Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to
expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.
Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim acted
abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. "Amay Bisaya," to
leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant thereof
thereby becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil
Code. Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim were so liable, whether or
not Hotel Nikko, as her employer, is solidarily liable with her.
As the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent and
irreconcilable conclusions concerning the same facts and
evidence of the case, this Court is left without choice but to use
its latent power to review such findings of facts. Indeed, the
general rule is that we are not a trier of facts as our jurisdiction is
limited to reviewing and revising errors of law.51 One of the
exceptions to this general rule, however, obtains herein as the
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court.52 The lower court ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her
right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party as she talked to him
politely and discreetly. The appellate court, on the other hand,
held that Ms. Lim is liable for damages as she needlessly
embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling him not to finish his food and
to leave the place within hearing distance of the other guests.
Both courts, however, were in agreement that it was Dr. Filart’s
invitation that brought Mr. Reyes to the party.
The consequential question then is: Which version is credible?
From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible
the lower court’s findings of fact.
First, let us put things in the proper perspective.
We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-star hotel,53
for-invitation-only, thrown for the hotel’s former Manager, a
Japanese national. Then came a person who was clearly
uninvited (by the celebrant)54 and who could not just disappear
into the crowd as his face is known by many, being an actor.
While he was already spotted by the organizer of the party, Ms.
Lim, the very person who generated the guest list, it did not yet
appear that the celebrant was aware of his presence. Ms. Lim,
mindful of the celebrant’s instruction to keep the party intimate,
would naturally want to get rid of the "gate-crasher" in the most
hush-hush manner in order not to call attention to a glitch in an
otherwise seamless affair and, in the process, risk the
displeasure of the celebrant, her former boss. To unnecessarily
call attention to the presence of Mr. Reyes would certainly reflect
badly on Ms. Lim’s ability to follow the instructions of the
celebrant to invite only his close friends and some of the hotel’s
personnel. Mr. Reyes, upon whom the burden rests to prove that
indeed Ms. Lim loudly and rudely ordered him to leave, could not
offer any satisfactory explanation why Ms. Lim would do that and
risk ruining a formal and intimate affair. On the contrary, Mr.
Reyes, on cross-examination, had unwittingly sealed his fate by
admitting that when Ms. Lim talked to him, she was very close.
Close enough for him to kiss:
Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that Miss Lim
approached you while you were at the buffet table? How
close was she when she approached you?
A: Very close because we nearly kissed each other.
Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go down? She was
that close and she shouted?
A: Yes. She said, "wag kang kumain, hindi ka imbitado
dito, bumaba ka na lang."
Q: So, you are testifying that she did this in a loud
voice?
...
A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be heard by many.55
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to
humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is
highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close
distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty
years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be
emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the
contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus,
the lower court was correct in observing that –
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the
request for the latter to leave the party was made such that they
nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by
him only and there could have been no intention on her part to
cause embarrassment to him. It was plaintiff’s reaction to the
request that must have made the other guests aware of what
transpired between them. . .
Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no
need for the police to take him out.56
Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyes’s version of the story
is that it is unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil cases that he
who alleges proves. Mr. Reyes, however, had not presented any
witness to back his story up. All his witnesses – Danny Rodinas,
Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva - proved only that it was Dr.
Filart who invited him to the party.57
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave
the party to which he was not invited, cannot be made liable to
pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held
liable as its liability springs from that of its employee.58
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights,59 is not a panacea for all human
hurts and social grievances. Article 19 states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.1awphi1.nét
Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
responsible."60 The object of this article, therefore, is to set
certain standards which must be observed not only in the
exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s
duties.61 These standards are the following: act with justice, give
everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.62 Its
antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to
injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or
duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another.63 When Article 19 is violated, an
action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil
Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of
law64 which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly
within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on the other
hand, states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 2165 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the
following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but
which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public
policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.66
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21,67 and that is,
the act complained of must be intentional.68
Ruby Lim. Consequently, the conclusion reached by the
appellate court cannot withstand scrutiny as it is without basis.
All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned,
any damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered through Ms.
Lim’s exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of
propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone.

As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby
has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against him. Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is GRANTED. The Decision
These two people did not know each other personally before the of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and its
evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer Resolution dated 09 July 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET
for an explanation for Ms. Lim’s alleged abusive conduct except ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
the statement that Ms. Lim, being "single at 44 years old," had a Branch 104, dated 26 April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
"very strong bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly
influenced by her associates in her work at the hotel with foreign SO ORDERED.
businessmen."69 The lameness of this argument need not be
belabored. Suffice it to say that a complaint based on Articles 19
and 21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to
recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.

Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes

to leave was likewise acceptable and humane under the
circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on
the appellate court’s declaration that Ms. Lim’s act of personally
approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying from Mrs. Filart if
indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action
"predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one
person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but
respect of such dignity."70 Without proof of any ill-motive on her
part, Ms. Lim’s act of by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount to
abusive conduct especially because she did inquire from Mrs.
Filart’s companion who told her that Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr.
Reyes.71 If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment which, if
done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.

Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can
petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko be made answerable for
exemplary damages72 especially for the reason stated by the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held –

Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt
because of the latter’s lowly station in life.l^vvphi1.net This has to
be limited somewhere. In a democracy, such a limit must be
established. Social equality is not sought by the legal provisions
under consideration, but due regard for decency and propriety
(Code Commission, pp. 33-34). And by way of example or
correction for public good and to avert further commission of
such acts, exemplary damages should be imposed upon
appellees.73

The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted findings is that it

runs counter with the very facts of the case and the evidence on
hand.l^vvphi1.net It is not disputed that at the time of the incident
in question, Mr. Reyes was "an actor of long standing; a co-host
of a radio program over DZRH; a Board Member of the Music
Singer Composer (MUSICO) chaired by popular singer Imelda
Papin; a showbiz Coordinator of Citizen Crime Watch; and 1992
official candidate of the KBL Party for Governor of Bohol; and an
awardee of a number of humanitarian organizations of the
Philippines."74 During his direct examination on rebuttal, Mr.
Reyes stressed that he had income75 and nowhere did he say
otherwise. On the other hand, the records are bereft of any
information as to the social and economic standing of petitioner

G.R. No. 147614 January 29, 2004
H.L. CARLOS CONSTRUCTION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
MARINA PROPERTIES CORPORATION, JESUS K. TYPOCO
SR. and TAN YU, Respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
There is unjust enrichment when a building contractor is denied
payment for increased labor cost validly incurred and additional
work validly rendered with the owner’s express or implied
agreement.
The Case
The Petition for Review1 before the Court, filed under Rule 45,
seeks the reversal of the Decision2 dated March 29, 2001,
issued by the Court of Appeals3 in CA-GR CV No. 60975. The
assailed Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one entered
DISMISSING the [petitioner’s] Complaint, and partially granting
the [respondent-corporation’s] Counterclaim, in that the
[petitioner] is directed to pay unto the [respondent-corporation]
the sum of ₱4,604,579.00 in actual damages plus ₱3,549,416.00
as and for liquidated damages."4
The Facts
The facts of the case, summarized by the Court of Appeals (CA),
are as follows:
"[Respondent] MARINA PROPERTIES CORPORATION (MPC
for brevity) is engaged in the business of real estate
development. On May 10, 1988, MPC entered into a contract5
with [Petitioner] H.[L.] CARLOS CONSTRUCTION, INC. (HLC)
to construct Phase III of a condominium complex called MARINA
BAYHOMES CONDOMINIUM PROJECT, consisting of
townhouses and villas, totaling 31 housing units, for a total
consideration of ₱38,580,609.00, within a period of 365 days
from receipt of ‘Notice to Proceed’. The original completion date
of the project was May 16, 1989, but it was extended to October
31, 1989 with a grace period until November 30, 1989.6
"The contract was signed by Jovencio F. Cinco, president of
MPC, and Honorio L. Carlos, president of HLC.
"On December 15, 1989, HLC instituted this case for sum of
money against not only MPC but also against the latter’s alleged
president, [Respondent] Jesus K. Typoco, Sr. (Typoco) and
[Respondent] Tan Yu (Tan), seeking the payment of various
sums with an aggregate amount of ₱14 million pesos, broken
down as follows:
a) ₱7,065,885.03 for costs of labor escalation, change orders
and material price escalation;
b) ₱2,000,000.00 as additional compensatory damages,
exclusive of the cost of suit.
c) ₱3,147,992.00 representing retention money allegedly
withheld by MPC on HLC’s Progress Billings as of January 1990,
and
d) ₱2,000,000.00 representing the value of construction
materials allegedly withheld/detained by MPC.
"Traversing the allegations of the complaint, [respondents] filed
separate answers, whereby the two individual [respondents]
alleged that they are not parties to the Construction Contract and
Amendatory Contract and are therefore not liable to HLC.
[Respondent] MPC on the other hand alleged that the [petitioner]
has no cause of action against it and that it (HLC) is not entitled
to its various claims. MPC interposed a counterclaim in the
aggregate sum of ₱68,296,227.14 for actual and compensatory
damages, liquidated damages, unliquidated advances, and
attorney’s fees."7
On May 15, 1997, the trial court8 ruled as follows:9
"WHEREFORE, premises above considered, judgment is hereby
rendered for [Petitioner] H.L. CARLOS CONSTRUCTION, INC.
and as against [Respondents] MARINA PROPERTIES
CORPORATION, TAN YU, and JESUS K. TYPOCO, SR., who
are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the [petitioner],
as follows:
"1. the amount of ₱7,065,885.03, representing unpaid labor
escalation costs, change orders and material price escalations,
plus 12% interest per annum from date of filing of the complaint,
until fully paid;
"2. the amount of ₱3,147,992.39 representing the 10% retention
money withheld by the [respondents] [from] [petitioner’s]
progress billing as of January 1990, plus 12% interest per annum
from the date of filing of the complaint, until fully paid;
"3. the amount of ₱2,000,000.00 representing the value of
construction materials and the like detained by the
[respondents], plus 12% legal interest from the date of filing of
the complaint, until fully paid;
"4. the sum equivalent to 15% of the principal sum as and by
way of attorney’s fees; and to
"5. [p]ay the costs of this suit.
"The counterclaim for liquidated damages, are hereby
DISMISSED for lack of evidence. Liquidated damages can only
be awarded under paragraph 2 of the amended construction
contract that extended the completion period and mainly on the
finding of the 85% substantial completion of the project, and that
the delay and stoppage of the project was caused by
[respondents’] default in payment of [the] progress billings that
would have allowed [petitioner] to have the capability to continue
and complete the project."
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA held that respondents were not liable for
escalations in the cost of labor and construction materials,
because of the following reasons: (1) the contract between the
parties was for a lump sum consideration, which did not allow for
cost escalation; and (2) petitioner failed to show any basis for the
award sought.
Respondents were also absolved from paying for change orders
and extra work, inasmuch as there was no supplemental
agreement covering them as required in the main Construction
Contract. Although Progress Billing No. 24 apparently indicates
that extra work was rendered by petitioner, this claim is not
supported by sufficient evidence.
The CA further failed to find any basis for the release of the 10
percent retention fee. The Construction Contract had provided
that such release would be made only under certain conditions,
none of which was complied with, as petitioner failed to complete
the work required. Furthermore, MPC was not held liable for
detained or withheld construction materials, since petitioner had
eventually withdrawn them.
Nothing in the records indicated any personal liability on the part
of Typoco and Tan. Moreover, they had nothing to assume, as
MPC was not held liable to petitioner.
Furthermore, the CA ruled that petitioner was liable for actual
and liquidated damages. The latter had abandoned the project
prior to its completion; hence, MPC contracted out the work to
another entity and incurred actual damages in excess of the
remaining balance of the contract price. In addition, the
Construction Contract had stipulated payment of liquidated
damages in an amount equivalent to 1/1000 of the contract price
for each calendar day of delay.
Hence, this Petition.10
Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
"a. Whether or not the respondents are liable to pay the
petitioner its claim for price escalation of construction materials
and labor cost escalation.
"b. Whether or not the respondents are liable to the petitioner for
cost of change orders and extra works.
"c. Whether or not the respondents are liable to the petitioner for
the ten percent retention money.
"d. Whether or not the respondents are liable to pay the
petitioner attorney’s fees.
"e. Whether or not the respondents are liable to the petitioner for
the cost of illegally detained materials.
"f. Whether or not the respondents Jesus Typoco Sr., and Tan
Yu are jointly and solidarily liable to the petitioner for the latter’s
claims.
"g. Whether or not the petitioner is liable to the respondents for
actual and liquidated damages."11
In simpler terms, the issues to be resolved are as follows:
(1) Whether petitioner is entitled to (a) a price escalation for labor
and material cost, (b) the cost of change orders and extra work,
(c) the release of the 10 percent retention money, (d) the cost of
illegally detained materials, and (e) attorney’s fees
(2) Whether Typoco and Tan are solidarily liable with MPC
(3) Whether petitioner is liable for actual and liquidated damages
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Liability for Additional Costs
Petitioner argues that it is entitled to price escalation for both
labor and materials, because MPC was delayed in paying for its
obligations. The former admits that it is normally not entitled to
any price increase for labor and materials, because a contractor
is expected to build into its price a contingency factor to protect it
from cost increases that may occur during the contract period.12
It justifies its claim, however, on the ground that a contractor
cannot be expected to anticipate price increases beyond the
original contract period. Respondents, on the other hand, aver
that it was delayed in finishing the project; hence, it is not entitled
to any price increase.
It must be pointed out that the reason for the CA’s denial of
petitioner’s claim was that the contract between the parties was
for a lump sum consideration, and petitioner was guilty of delay
in completing the project.
Labor and Material
Cost Escalation
We agree with petitioner that it is entitled to price escalation, but
only for the labor component of Progress Billing No. 24. The
Construction Contract contains the following provision on the
considerations therefor:
"6.1 For and in consideration of the true and faithful performance
of the work by the CONTRACTOR, the OWNER shall pay the
Lump Sum Contract Price of PESOS: THIRTY EIGHT MILLION
FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED NINE
(₱38,580,609.00) broken down as shown in the Bid Form. No
cost escalation shall be allowed except on the labor component
of the work x x x."13
Since the Contract allows escalation only of the "labor
component," the implication is that material cost escalations are
barred. There appears to be no provision, either in the original or
in the amended contract, that would justify billing of increased
cost of materials. Furthermore, no evidence -- like official
economic data showing an increase in the price index of
construction materials -- was even adduced by petitioner to
prove that there had indeed been increases in material costs.14
Petitioner attempts to pass off these cost escalations as a form
of damages suffered by it as a natural consequence of the delay
in the payment of billings and claims for additional work. It
argues that the baseless and malicious refusal to pay for those
claims renders respondents liable for damages under Article
2201 of the Civil Code.
We disagree. Without tackling the issue of delay, we find that the
contentious Progress Billing No. 24 contains no claim for
material cost escalation. The other unsettled bills claimed by
petitioner are those for change orders or extra work, which have
not been shown to be related to the increase in cost of materials.
Dealt with in separate contracts between the parties were such
claims, the costs of which were to be determined and agreed
upon only when required by MPC. Materials used for those
additional jobs were to be purchased only when the work was
contracted, not prior thereto. As admitted by petitioner, expenses
for change orders/additional work were not included in the
agreed contract price15 and, hence, were not subject to
increases.
MPC admits that the labor cost escalation clause was adopted
by the parties to safeguard the contractor against losses in the
event that, during the execution of the Contract, the government
would order a minimum wage adjustment, which would then
inflate the labor cost.16 Respondents deny liability for this added
expense because, according to the Contract, the allowance for
labor cost escalation is available only within the duration of the
original construction period.
We clarify. The claimed cost of labor escalation pertains to the
period September 1 to December 15, 1989, in the amount of
₱170,722.10; and December 16 to January 27, 1990,
₱45,983.91. During those periods, petitioner had not yet incurred
any delay in the project, originally stipulated to be finished by
May 16, 1989. But by mutual agreement, the period was
extended up to October 31, 1989, with a grace period until
November 30, 1989.
Furthermore, a legislated wage increase became effective after
the expiration of the original period.17 Respondents are,
therefore, liable for this increase in labor cost, because they
allowed petitioner to continue working on the project until April
20, 1990 (even beyond November 30, 1989).
MPC argues that to allow the claim for labor cost escalation
would be to reward petitioner for incurring delay, thereby
breaching a contractual obligation.
This contention is untenable. Before the expiration of the
extended period, petitioner was not yet in delay. It was granted
by MPC an extension to complete the project until November 30,
1989. Moreover, despite the expiration of the extended period,
MPC allowed it to continue working on the project until the
former took over and awarded that project to another contractor.
Hence, labor costs were actually incurred by petitioner until April
20, 1990. It was thus entitled to reimbursement for labor cost
escalation until that date. MPC cannot now be allowed to
question the true valuation of the additional labor because,
instead of submitting to an independent evaluator, it violated the
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) issued by the trial court and
hired another contractor to finish the project.
Noteworthy is the fact that MPC paid for the labor cost escalation
during the period August 1-15, 1989,18 which was past the
expiration of the original period. Apparently, it thereafter stopped
paying for labor cost escalation in response to the suit filed
against it by petitioner.
The CA denied the labor cost escalation claim because, despite
having billed MPC therefor, petitioner accepted payments that
did not include such claim. The appellate court construed the
acceptance by petitioner as a waiver of the latter’s right to be
reimbursed for the increased labor cost.
We believe that this position is untenable. The CA mistook
Exhibits "C-7-B"19 and "D-1"20 as bills coming from petitioner,
when in truth they were Accomplishment Evaluation Sheets
issued by MPC. The notation "labor escalation not included" in
the said Exhibits was an admission on the part of MPC that it
had not paid such amount, upon the advice of Atty. Jose C.
Laureta, its resident counsel. According to him, petitioner should
be faulted for having incurred labor cost increases after the
expiration of the original period (after May 16, 1989). Not having
waived such increases, it should thus bear them.21
To allow MPC to acquire the partially accomplished project
without paying for labor cost escalation validly incurred would
constitute unjust enrichment at the expense of petitioner.22
There is unjust enrichment under Article 22 of the Civil Code
when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is
derived at the expense of or with damages to another.23 Since
petitioner had rendered services that were accepted by MPC,
then the former should be compensated for them. Labor cost
escalation, in this case, has already been earned by petitioner.
Change Orders and Extra Work
Petitioner claims entitlement to compensation for change orders
and extra work that were covered by construction memoranda.
MPC counters, however, that the former never presented any
cost estimate for additional work. The estimate would have
formed the basis for a consensual agreement and a computation
of actual accomplishment, for which MPC could have been
unilaterally billed. Worse, the extra work was allegedly assessed
by its engineer to be worth only ₱705.41.
We side with petitioner. The "General Conditions to the
Construction Contract" provides:
"13. CLAIMS FOR EXTRA AND FORCE ACCOUNT WORK:
If the Contractor claims that any construction by drawings or
otherwise involve extra cost under this Contract, he shall give the
Owner and/or the Architect, written notice thereof within a
reasonable time after receipt of such instructions, and in any
event before proceeding to execute the work, except in
emergency endangering life or property. No such claim shall be
valid unless so made.
Extra work for which no price is provided in the proposal shall be
covered by a supplementary agreement to be signed by both
parties before such work is commenced." 24
The CA is correct in holding that there is no supplemental
agreement covering the claimed extra work and change orders.
Exhibits "C-1," "C-2," "C-2-A," "C-3" and "C-4" show billings for
extra work sent by petitioner to MPC. But the former did not
submit in evidence the alleged construction memoranda covering
them. Neither were they mentioned in the letter25 of Roilo Golez
dated November 24, 1989.
Progress Billing No. 24, which pertained to the project as
covered by the Construction Contract, did not mention any claim
for extra work or change orders. These additional jobs were
covered by separate bills other than the twenty-four Progress
Billings sent by petitioner.
MPC, however, never denied having ordered additional work. In
Item No. 12 of its Amended Answer,26 it averred that petitioner’s
claim for change orders and extra work were premature. Limneo
P. Miranda, respondent’s work engineer, manifested that
additional work was indeed done, but that claims therefor were
not settled for the following reasons: (1) reconciliation between
the parties was never completed due to the absence of
petitioner’s representative in scheduled meetings; (2) difference
in opinion on the proper valuation of the additional work, as MPC
wanted to use the net quantity method, while petitioner preferred
the gross method; and (3) some claims were rejected by MPC,
because they had not been properly approved in accordance
with the Contract.27
Evidence on record further reveals that MPC approved some
change order jobs despite the absence of any supplementary
agreement. In its "Over-all Summary of Reconciled Quantities"
as of September 6, 1989 (Annex "C"),28 it valued petitioner’s
valid claim therefor at ₱79,340.52. After noting that the claim had
extremely been bloated, Atty. Laureta, in-house counsel for
respondent corporation, affirmed as valid the amount stated in
the summary.29
Petitioner may have failed to show the construction memoranda
covering its claim, but it inarguably performed extra work that
was accepted by MPC. Hence, we will consider Annex "C" as the
proper valuation thereof.
Under the principle of quantum meruit, a contractor is allowed to
recover the reasonable value of the thing or services rendered
despite the lack of a written contract, in order to avoid unjust
enrichment.30 Quantum meruit means that in an action for work
and labor, payment shall be made in such amount as the plaintiff
reasonably deserves.31 To deny payment for a building almost
completed and already occupied would be to permit unjust
enrichment at the expense of the contractor.32
The CA held that since Billing No. 24 did not include any claim
for additional work, such work had presumably been previously
paid for. This reasoning is not correct. It is beyond dispute that
the change orders and extra work were billed separately from the
usual progress billings petitioner sent to MPC.
Retention Money
The CA denied the claim for the 10 percent retention money,
because petitioner had failed to comply with the conditions under
paragraph 6.3 of the Construction Contract. On the other hand,
the latter avers that these conditions were deemed fulfilled under
Article 1186 of the Civil Code because, when its contract was
terminated, MPC prevented the fulfillment of those conditions. It
would allegedly be unfair and unreasonable for petitioner to
guarantee a project finished by another contractor.
We disagree with petitioner. In the construction industry, the 10
percent retention money is a portion of the contract price
automatically deducted from the contractor’s billings, as security
for the execution of corrective work -- if any -- becomes
necessary. This amount is to be released one year after the
completion of the project, minus the cost of corrective work.33
The conditions for its release are stated in the Construction
Contract as follows:
"6.3 In all cases, however, payment of the progress billings shall
be subject to deduction of twenty percent (20%) recoupment of
the downpayment, ten percent (10%) retention and expanded
withholding tax on CONTRACTOR’S income. Upon issuance of
the Certificate of Completion of the work by the OWNER and
upon submission of Guaranty Bond, Ninety Percent (90%) of the
retained amount shall be released to the CONTRACTOR and the
balance thereof shall be released by the OWNER within thirty
(30) days after the expiration of the guaranty period which is 365
days after issuance of the certificate of completion." 34
None of the foregoing conditions were satisfied; hence, the CA
was correct in forfeiting the retention fee. The completion of the
work was stipulated in the Contract to be within 365 days from
the issuance of a Notice to Proceed or until May 16, 1989. Then
the period was extended up to November 30, 1989. Petitioner
worked on the project till April 20, 1990. It was given by MPC
ample time and two extensions to complete the project. The
simple truth is that in failing to finish the project, the former failed
to fulfill a prerequisite for the release of the retention money.
Detained Materials
Petitioner claims cost reimbursement of illegally detained
materials, as it was allowed to withdraw them from the site only
after two years from the unilateral termination of the Contract. By
1992, only 30 percent of the materials detained were
salvageable, while the rest had depreciated.
This contention has no merit. According to the CA’s ruling, the
only proof that MPC detained materials belonging to petitioner
was the denial of the request, contained in the latter’s February
1990 letter,35 for the release of used form lumber. Aside from
that letter, however, no other attempt was shown to have been
made by petitioner to obtain its request. It should have tried
again to do so before claiming that respondents unreasonably
prevented it from removing its construction materials from the
premises. As to the other materials, there was absolutely no
attempt to remove them from the construction site. Hence, we
cannot say that these were ever withheld from petitioner.
Detention is not proved by Atty. Laureta’s letter36 dated July 4,
1992, allowing petitioner to remove its materials from the site.
The letter was merely a directive for it to clear out its belongings
therefrom, in view of the hiring of a second contractor to finish
the project.
Moreover, in a specifically designated yard inside the
construction site, petitioner maintained a warehouse that was
guarded by its own security complement and completely
inaccessible to MPC personnel.37 It therefore had control over
those materials and should have made provisions to keep them
safe from the elements and from pilferage.
Attorney’s Fees
Petitioner argues that it is entitled to attorney’s fees based on
Article 2208 of the Civil Code, because (1) respondents’ act or
omission has compelled it to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect its interest; and (2) respondents acted in
gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy its plainly valid,
just and demandable claim.
The grant of some of the claims of petitioner does not change
the fact that it did not finish the project. Attorney’s fees are not
granted every time a party prevails in a suit, because no
premium should be placed on the right to litigate.38 Petitioner is
not, after all, blameless in the present controversy. Just because
MPC withheld some payments from petitioner does not mean
that the former was in gross or evident bad faith. MPC had
claims that it wanted to offset with those of the latter.
Second Issue:
Typoco and Tan’s Liabilities
Petitioner claims that Respondents Jesus Typoco and Tan Yu
are solidarily liable with MPC.
We concur with the CA that these two respondents are not liable.
Section 31 of the Corporation Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 68)
provides:
"Section 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers. Directors or
trustees who willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently
unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of gross
negligence or bad faith x x x shall be liable jointly and severally
for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation,
its stockholders and other persons."
The personal liability of corporate officers validly attaches only
when (a) they assent to a patently unlawful act of the
corporation; or (b) they are guilty of bad faith or gross negligence
in directing its affairs; or (c) they incur conflict of interest,
resulting in damages to the corporation, its stockholders or other
persons.39
The records are bereft of any evidence that Typoco acted in bad
faith with gross or inexcusable negligence, or that he acted
outside the scope of his authority as company president. The
unilateral termination of the Contract during the existence of the
TRO was indeed contemptible -- for which MPC should have
merely been cited for contempt of court at the most -- and a
preliminary injunction would have then stopped work by the
second contractor. Besides, there is no showing that the
unilateral termination of the Contract was null and void.
Respondent Tan is not an officer or a director of MPC. His
participation is limited to an alleged conversation between him
and Engineer Mario Cornista, petitioner’s project manager.
Supposedly, the former verbally agreed therein to guarantee the
payment of the latter’s progress billings. We find no satisfactory
evidence to show respondent’s alleged solidary liability to
petitioner.
Third Issue:
Liability for Actual and Liquidated Damages
Petitioner avers that it should be exonerated from the
counterclaims for actual and liquidated damages, because its
failure to complete the project was due to respondents’ acts.
Central to the resolution of this issue is the question of which
party was in delay. Aside from the contentious Progress Billing
No. 24, there are no other unpaid claims. The bills for extra work
and change orders, aside from those for the beams and
columns, were premature and still subject to reconciliation and
adjustment. Hence, we cannot hold MPC liable for them.
In comparison, petitioner did not fulfill its contractual obligations.
It could not totally pass the blame to MPC for hiring a second
contractor, because the latter was allowed to terminate the
services of the contractor.
"10.1 The OWNER shall have the right to terminate this Contract
in the event that the CONTRACTOR incurs a fifteen percent
(15%) or greater slippage in the prosecution of the overall work
evaluated against the Project schedule as indicated by the
critical path of the approved PERT/CPM network for the Project
or as amended by Art. II herein.
Either party shall have the right to terminate this Contract for
reason of violation or non-compliance by the other party of the
terms and conditions herein agreed upon."40
As of November 30, 1989, petitioner accomplished only
approximately 80 percent of the project. In other words, it was
already in delay at the time. In addition, Engineer Miranda
testified that it would lose money even if it finished the project;41
thus, respondents already suspected that it had no intention of
finishing the project at all.
Petitioner was in delay and in breach of contract. Clearly, the
obligor is liable for damages that are the natural and probable
consequences of its breach of obligation.42 Petitioner was
already paid by MPC in the amount of ₱31,435,187 out of the
total contract price of ₱38,580,609; thus, only ₱7,145,422
remained outstanding. In order to finish the project, the latter had
to contract the services of a second construction firm for
₱11,750,000. Hence, MPC suffered actual damages in the
amount of ₱4,604,579 for the completion of the project.
Petitioner is also liable for liquidated damages as provided in the
Contract,43 the pertinent portion of which is quoted as follows:
"4.1 Time is an essential feature of this Contract and in the event
that the CONTRACTOR fails to complete the contracted work
within the stipulated time inclusive of any granted extension of
time, the CONTRACTOR shall pay the OWNER, as liquidated
damages, the amount of one over one thousand (1/1000) of the
value of the contract price for each and every calendar day of
delay (Sundays and Holidays included), not to exceed 15% of
[the] Contract amount, in the completion of the work as specified
in Article II above. It is understood that the liquidated damages
herein provided are fixed, agreed upon and not by way of
penalty, and as such, the OWNER shall not be further required
to prove that he has incurred actual damages to be entitled
thereto. In the case of such delays, the OWNER is hereby
authorized to deduct the amount of liquidated damages from any
money due or which may become due the CONTRACTOR in this
or any other contract or to collect such amount from the
CONTRACTOR’s performance bond whichever is convenient
and expeditious to the OWNER."

Liquidated damages are those that the parties agree to be paid

in case of a breach.44 As worded, the amount agreed upon
answers for damages suffered by the owner due to delays in the
completion of the project. Under Philippine laws, these damages
take the nature of penalties.45 A penal clause is an accessory
undertaking to assume greater liability in case of a breach. It is
attached to an obligation in order to ensure performance.

Thus, as held by the CA, petitioner is bound to pay liquidated

damages for 92 days, or from the expiration of the grace period
in the Amended Contract until February 1, 1990, when it
effectively abandoned the project.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is partly GRANTED and the assailed

Decision MODIFIED. Petitioner is AWARDED labor cost
escalation in the sum of ₱1,196,202 and cost of extra work in the
sum of ₱79,340.52. In all other respects, the appealed Decision
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152411 September 29, 2004 Supplier : Trans-Oriental Woodworks, Inc.
1st Avenue, Bagumbayan Tanyag, Ta
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, Metro Manila
vs.
Downpayment : 50% or ₱286,687.504
PHILAB INDUSTRIES, INC., respondent.

DECISION Padolina assured Lirio that the contract would be prepared as

soon as possible before the issuance of the purchase orders and
the downpayment for the goods, and would be transmitted to the
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FEMF as soon as possible.

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the

In a Letter dated July 23, 1982, Padolina informed Hector
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44209, as
Navasero, the President of PHILAB, to proceed with the
well as its Resolution2 denying the petitioner’s motion for the
fabrication of the laboratory furniture, per the directive of FEMF
reconsideration thereof. Themo1 mo2 Court of Appeals set aside the
Executive Assistant Lirio. Padolina also requested for copies of
Decision3 of Branch 150 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
the shop drawings and a sample contract5 for the project, and
Makati City, which dismissed the complaint of the respondent
that such contract and drawings had to be finalized before the
against the petitioner for sum of money and damages.
down payment could be remitted to the PHILAB the following
week. However, PHILAB failed to forward any sample contract.
The Facts of the Case
Subsequently, PHILAB made partial deliveries of office and
Sometime in 1979, the University of the Philippines (UP) decided laboratory furniture to BIOTECH after having been duly
to construct an integrated system of research organization inspected by their representatives and FEMF Executive
known as the Research Complex. As part of the project, Assistant Lirio.
laboratory equipment and furniture were purchased for the
National Institute of Biotechnology and Applied Microbiology
On August 24, 1982, FEMF remitted ₱600,000 to PHILAB as
(BIOTECH) at the UP Los Baños. Providentially, the Ferdinand
downpayment for the laboratory furniture for the BIOTECH
E. Marcos Foundation (FEMF) came forward and agreed to fund
project, for which PHILAB issued Official Receipt No. 253 to
the acquisition of the laboratory furniture, including the
FEMF. On October 22, 1982, FEMF made another partial
fabrication thereof.
payment of ₱800,000 to PHILAB, for which the latter issued
Official Receipt No. 256 to FEMF. The remittances were in the
Renato E. Lirio, the Executive Assistant of the FEMF, gave the form of checks drawn by FEMF and delivered to PHILAB,
go-signal to BIOTECH to contact a corporation to accomplish the through Padolina.
project. On July 23, 1982, Dr. William Padolina, the Executive
Deputy Director of BIOTECH, arranged for Philippine Laboratory
On October 16, 1982, UP, through Emil Q. Javier, the Chancellor
Industries, Inc. (PHILAB), to fabricate the laboratory furniture and
of UP Los Baños and FEMF, represented by its Executive
deliver the same to BIOTECH for the BIOTECH Building Project,
Officer, Rolando Gapud, executed a Memorandum of Agreement
for the account of the FEMF. Lirio directed Padolina to give the
(MOA) in which FEMF agreed to grant financial support and
go-signal to PHILAB to proceed with the fabrication of the
donate sums of money to UP for the construction of buildings,
laboratory furniture, and requested Padolina to forward the
installation of laboratory and other capitalization for the project,
contract of the project to FEMF for its approval.
not to exceed ₱29,000,000.00. The obligations of FEMF under
the MOA are the following:
On July 13, 1982, Padolina wrote Lirio and requested for the
issuance of the purchase order and downpayment for the office
ARTICLE II
and laboratory furniture for the project, thus:

OBLIGATIONS OF THE FOUNDATION

1. Supply and Installation of Laboratory furniture for the BIOTECH
Building Project
2.1. The FOUNDATION, in carrying out its principal
Amount : P2,934,068.90 objectives of promoting philantrophic and scientific
projects through financial support to such projects that
Supplier : Philippine Laboratory Furniture Co.,
will contribute to the country’s economic development,
College, Laguna
shall grant such financial support and donate such sums
Attention : Mr. Hector C. Navasero of money to the RESEARCH COMPLEX as may be
President necessary for the construction of buildings, installation
of laboratories, setting up of offices and physical plants
Downpayment : 40% or ₱1,173,627.56 and facilities and other capital investment of the
2. Fabrication and Supply of office furniture for the BIOTECH RESEARCH COMPLEX and/or any of its component
Building Project Research Institutes not to exceed ₱29 Million. For this
purpose, the FOUNDATION shall:
Amount : P573,375.00
(a) Acquire and donate to the UNIVERSITY the
site for the RESEARCH COMPLEX; and
 (b) Donate or cause to be donated to the
UNIVERSITY the sum of TWENTY-NINE
MILLION PESOS (₱29,000,000.00) for the
construction of the buildings of the National
Institutes of Biotechnology and Applied
Microbiology (BIOTECH) and the installation of
their laboratories and their physical plants and
other facilities to enable them to commence
operations.
2.2. In addition, the FOUNDATION shall, subject to the
approval of the Board of Trustees of the FOUNDATION,
continue to support the activities of the RESEARCH
COMPLEX by way of recurrent additional grants and
donations for specific research and development
projects which may be mutually agreed upon and, from
time to time, additional grants and donations of such
amounts as may be necessary to provide the
RESEARCH COMPLEX and/or any of its Research
Institutes with operational flexibility especially with
regard to incentives to staff purchase of
equipment/facilities, travel abroad, recruitment of local
and expatriate staff and such other activities and inputs
which are difficult to obtain under usual government
rules and regulations.6
The Board of Regents of the UP approved the MOA on
November 25, 1982.7
In the meantime, Navasero promised to submit the contract for
the installation of laboratory furniture to BIOTECH, by January
12, 1983. However, Navasero failed to do so. In a Letter dated
February 1, 1983, BIOTECH reminded Navasero of the need to
submit the contract so that it could be submitted to FEMF for its
evaluation and approval.8 Instead of submitting the said contract,
PHILAB submitted to BIOTECH an accomplishment report on
the project as of February 28, 1983, and requested payment
thereon.9 By May 1983, PHILAB had completed 78% of the
project, amounting to ₱2,288,573.74 out of the total cost of
₱2,934,068.90. The FEMF had already paid forty percent (40%)
of the total cost of the project. On May 12, 1983, Padolina wrote
Lirio and furnished him the progress billing from PHILAB.10 On
August 11, 1983, the FEMF made another partial payment of
₱836,119.52 representing the already delivered laboratory and
office furniture after the requisite inspection and verification
thereof by representatives from the BIOTECH, FEMF, and
PHILAB. The payment was made in the form of a check, for
which PHILAB issued Official Receipt No. 202 to FEMF through
Padolina.11
On July 1, 1984, PHILAB submitted to BIOTECH Invoice No.
01643 in the amount of ₱702,939.40 for the final payment of
laboratory furniture. Representatives from BIOTECH, PHILAB,
and Lirio for the FEMF, conducted a verification of the
accomplishment of the work and confirmed the same. BIOTECH
forwarded the invoice to Lirio on December 18, 1984 for its
payment.12 Lirio, in turn, forwarded the invoice to Gapud,
presumably sometime in the early part of 1985. However, the
FEMF failed to pay the bill. PHILAB reiterated its request for
payment through a letter on May 9, 1985.13 BIOTECH again
wrote Lirio on March 21, 1985, requesting the payment of
PHILAB’s bill.14 It sent another letter to Gapud, on November 22,
1985, again appealing for the payment of PHILAB’s bill.15 In a
Letter to BIOTECH dated December 5, 1985, PHILAB requested
payment of ₱702,939.40 plus interest thereon of ₱224,940.61.16
There was, however, no response from the FEMF. On February
24, 1986, PHILAB wrote BIOTECH, appealing for the payment of
its bill even on installment basis.17
President Marcos was ousted from office during the February
1986 EDSA Revolution. On March 26, 1986, Navasero wrote
BIOTECH requesting for its much-needed assistance for the
payment of the balance already due plus interest of ₱295,234.55
for its fabrication and supply of laboratory furniture.18
On April 22, 1986, PHILAB wrote President Corazon C. Aquino
asking her help to secure the payment of the amount due from
the FEMF.19 The letter was referred to then Budget Minister
Alberto Romulo, who referred the letter to then UP President
Edgardo Angara on June 9, 1986. On September 30, 1986, Raul
P. de Guzman, the Chancellor of UP Los Baños, wrote then
Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) Jovito Salonga, submitting PHILAB’s claim to be
officially entered as "accounts payable" as soon as the assets of
FEMF were liquidated by the PCGG.20
In the meantime, the PCGG wrote UP requesting for a copy of
the relevant contract and the MOA for its perusal.21
Chancellor De Guzman wrote Navasero requesting for a copy of
the contract executed between PHILAB and FEMF. In a Letter
dated October 20, 1987, Navasero informed De Guzman that
PHILAB and FEMF did not execute any contract regarding the
fabrication and delivery of laboratory furniture to BIOTECH.
Exasperated, PHILAB filed a complaint for sum of money and
damages against UP. In the complaint, PHILAB prayed that it be
paid the following:
(1) PESOS: SEVEN HUNDRED TWO THOUSAND
NINE HUNDRED THIRTY NINE & 40/100
(₱702,939.40) plus an additional amount (as shall be
determined during the hearing) to cover the actual cost
of money which at the time of transaction the value of
the peso was eleven to a dollar (₱11.00:$1) and twenty
seven (27%) percent interest on the total amount from
August 1982 until fully paid;
(2) PESOS: ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(₱100,000.00) exemplary damages;
(3) FIFTY THOUSAND [PESOS] (₱50,000.00) as and
for attorney’s fees; and
(4) Cost of suit.22
PHILAB alleged, inter alia, that:
3. Sometime in August 1982, defendant, through its
officials, particularly MR. WILLIAM PADOLINA, Director,
asked plaintiff to supply and install several laboratory
furnitures and equipment at BIOTECH, a research
laboratory of herein defendant located at its campus in
College, Laguna, for a total contract price of PESOS:
TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED THIRTY-NINE
THOUSAND FIFTY-EIGHT & 90/100 (₱2,939,058.90);
 4. After the completion of the delivery and installation of
said laboratory furnitures and equipment at defendant’s
BIOTECH Laboratory, defendant paid three (3) times on
installment basis:
a) ₱600,000.00 as per Official Receipt No. 253
dated August 24, 1982;
b) ₱800,000.00 as per Official Receipt No. 256
dated October 22, 1982;
c) ₱836,119.52 as per Official Receipt No. 202
dated August 11, 1983;
thus leaving a balance of PESOS: SEVEN HUNDRED
TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY-NINE &
40/100 (₱702,939.40).
5. That notwithstanding repeated demands for the past
eight years, defendant arrogantly and maliciously made
plaintiff believe that it was going to pay the balance
aforestated, that was why plaintiff’s President and
General Manager himself, HECTOR C. NAVASERO,
personally went to and from UP Los Baños to talk with
defendant’s responsible officers in the hope of expecting
payment, when, in truth and in fact, defendant had no
intention to pay whatsoever right from the start on a
misplaced ground of technicalities. Some of plaintiff’s
demand letters since year 1983 up to the present are
hereto attached as Annexes A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H
hereof;
6. That by reason of defendant’s malicious, evil and
unnecessary misrepresentations that it was going to pay
its obligation and asking plaintiff so many red tapes and
requirements to submit, compliance of all of which took
plaintiff almost eight (8) years to finish, when, in truth
and in fact, defendant had no intention to pay, defendant
should be ordered to pay plaintiff no less than PESOS:
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (₱100,000.00) exemplary
damages, so that other government institutions may be
warned that they must not unjustly enrich themselves at
the expense of the people they serve.23
In its answer, UP denied liability and alleged that PHILAB had no
cause of action against it because it was merely the
donee/beneficiary of the laboratory furniture in the BIOTECH;
and that the FEMF, which funded the project, was liable to the
PHILAB for the purchase price of the laboratory furniture. UP
specifically denied obliging itself to pay for the laboratory
furniture supplied by PHILAB.
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment
dismissing the complaint without prejudice to PHILAB’s recourse
against the FEMF. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit without prejudice to plaintiff's recourse to the
assets of the Marcos Foundation for the unpaid balance
of ₱792,939.49.
SO ORDERED.24
Undaunted, PHILAB appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA)
alleging that the trial court erred in finding that:
1. the contract for the supply and installation of subject
laboratory furniture and equipment was between
PHILAB and the Marcos Foundation; and,
2. the Marcos Foundation, not the University of the
Philippines, is liable to pay the respondent the balance
of the purchase price.25
The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and held
that there was never a contract between FEMF and PHILAB.
Consequently, PHILAB could not be bound by the MOA between
the FEMF and UP since it was never a party thereto. The
appellate court ruled that, although UP did not bind itself to pay
for the laboratory furniture; nevertheless, it is liable to PHILAB
under the maxim: "No one should unjustly enrich himself at the
expense of another."
The Present Petition
Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration of the appellate
court’s decision, UP, now the petitioner, filed its petition for
review contending that:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
FAILED TO APPLY THE LAW ON CONTRACTS
BETWEEN PHILAB AND THE MARCOS
FOUNDATION.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING
THE LEGAL PRINCIPLE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT
WHEN IT HELD THAT THE UNIVERSITY, AND NOT
THE MARCOS FOUNDATION, IS LIABLE TO
PHILAB.26
Prefatorily, the doctrinal rule is that pure questions of facts may
not be the subject of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as this mode of appeal is
generally restricted to questions of law.27 However, this rule is
not absolute. The Court may review the factual findings of the
CA should they be contrary to those of the trial court.28
Correspondingly, this Court may review findings of facts when
the judgment of the CA is premised on a misapprehension of
facts.29
On the first assigned error, the petitioner argues that the CA
overlooked the evidentiary effect and substance of the
corresponding letters and communications which support the
statements of the witnesses showing affirmatively that an implied
contract of sale existed between PHILAB and the FEMF. The
petitioner furthermore asserts that no contract existed between it
and the respondent as it could not have entered into any
agreement without the requisite public bidding and a formal
written contract.
The respondent, on the other hand, submits that the CA did not
err in not applying the law on contracts between the respondent
and the FEMF. It, likewise, attests that it was never privy to the
MOA entered into between the petitioner and the FEMF. The
respondent adds that what the FEMF donated was a sum of
money equivalent to ₱29,000,000, and not the laboratory
equipment supplied by it to the petitioner. The respondent
submits that the petitioner, being the recipient of the laboratory
furniture, should not enrich itself at the expense of the
respondent.
The petition is meritorious.
It bears stressing that the respondent’s cause of action is one for
sum of money predicated on the alleged promise of the petitioner
to pay for the purchase price of the furniture, which, despite
demands, the petitioner failed to do. However, the respondent
failed to prove that the petitioner ever obliged itself to pay for the
laboratory furniture supplied by it. Hence, the respondent is not
entitled to its claim against the petitioner.
There is no dispute that the respondent is not privy to the MOA
executed by the petitioner and FEMF; hence, it is not bound by
the said agreement. Contracts take effect only between the
parties and their assigns.30 A contract cannot be binding upon
and cannot be enforced against one who is not a party to it, even
if he is aware of such contract and has acted with knowledge
thereof.31 Likewise admitted by the parties, is the fact that there
was no written contract executed by the petitioner, the
respondent and FEMF relating to the fabrication and delivery of
office and laboratory furniture to the BIOTECH. Even the CA
failed to specifically declare that the petitioner and the
respondent entered into a contract of sale over the said
laboratory furniture. The parties are in accord that the FEMF had
remitted to the respondent partial payments via checks drawn
and issued by the FEMF to the respondent, through Padolina, in
the total amount of ₱2,288,573.74 out of the total cost of the
project of ₱2,934,068.90 and that the respondent received the
said checks and issued receipts therefor to the FEMF. There is
also no controversy that the petitioner did not pay a single
centavo for the said furniture delivered by the respondent that
the petitioner had been using ever since.
We agree with the petitioner that, based on the records, an
implied-in-fact contract of sale was entered into between the
respondent and FEMF. A contract implied in fact is one implied
from facts and circumstances showing a mutual intention to
contract. It arises where the intention of the parties is not
expressed, but an agreement in fact creating an obligation. It is a
contract, the existence and terms of which are manifested by
conduct and not by direct or explicit words between parties but is
to be deduced from conduct of the parties, language used, or
things done by them, or other pertinent circumstances attending
the transaction. To create contracts implied in fact,
circumstances must warrant inference that one expected
compensation and the other to pay.32 An implied-in-fact contract
requires the parties’ intent to enter into a contract; it is a true
contract.33 The conduct of the parties is to be viewed as a
reasonable man would view it, to determine the existence or not
of an implied-in-fact contract.34 The totality of the acts/conducts
of the parties must be considered to determine their intention. An
implied-in-fact contract will not arise unless the meeting of minds
is indicated by some intelligent conduct, act or sign.35
In this case, the respondent was aware, from the time Padolina
contacted it for the fabrication and supply of the laboratory
furniture until the go-signal was given to it to fabricate and deliver
the furniture to BIOTECH as beneficiary, that the FEMF was to
pay for the same. Indeed, Padolina asked the respondent to
prepare the draft of the contract to be received by the FEMF
prior to the execution of the parties (the respondent and FEMF),
but somehow, the respondent failed to prepare one. The
respondent knew that the petitioner was merely the donee-
beneficiary of the laboratory furniture and not the buyer; nor was
it liable for the payment of the purchase price thereof. From the
inception, the FEMF paid for the bills and statement of accounts
of the respondent, for which the latter unconditionally issued
receipts to and under the name of the FEMF. Indeed, witness
Lirio testified:
Q: Now, did you know, Mr. Witness, if PHILAB
Industries was aware that it was the Marcos Foundation
who would be paying for this particular transaction for
the completion of this particular transaction?
A: I think they are fully aware.
Q: What is your basis for saying so?
A: First, I think they were appraised by Dr. Padolina.
Secondly, there were occasions during our inspection in
Los Baños, at the installation site, there were occasions,
two or three occasions, when we met with Mr. Navasero
who is the President, I think, or manager of PHILAB,
and we appraised him that it was really between the
foundation and him to which includes (sic) the
construction company constructing the building. He is
fully aware that it is the foundation who (sic) engaged
them and issued the payments.36
The respondent, in its Letter dated March 26, 1986, informed the
petitioner and sought its assistance for the collection of the
amount due from the FEMF:
Dear Dr. Padolina:
May we request for your much-needed assistance in the
payment of the balance still due us on the laboratory
furniture we supplied and installed two years ago?
Business is still slow and we will appreciate having
these funds as soon as possible to keep up our
operations.
We look forward to hearing from you regarding this
matter.
Very truly yours,
PHILAB INDUSTRIES, INC.37
The respondent even wrote former President Aquino seeking her
assistance for the payment of the amount due, in which the
respondent admitted it tried to collect from her predecessor,
namely, the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos:
YOUR EXCELLENCY:
At the instance of the national government, subject
laboratory furnitures were supplied by our company to
the National Institute of Biotechnology & Applied
 Microbiology (BIOTECH), University of the Philippines,
Los Baños, Laguna, in 1984.
Out of the total contract price of PESOS: TWO MILLION
NINE HUNDRED THIRTY-NINE THOUSAND FIFTY-
EIGHT & 90/100 (₱2,939,058.90), the previous
administration had so far paid us the sum of
₱2,236,119.52 thus leaving a balance of PESOS: ONE
MILLION FOUR HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND
SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY-EIGHT & 61/100
(₱1,412.748.61) inclusive of interest of 24% per annum
and 30% exchange rate adjustment.
On several occasions, we have tried to collect this
amount from your predecessor, the latest of which was
subject invoice (01643) we submitted to DR. W.
PADOLINA, deputy director of BIOTECH. But this,
notwithstanding, our claim has remained unacted upon
up to now. Copy of said invoice is hereto attached for
easy reference.
Now that your excellency is the head of our government,
we sincerely hope that payment of this obligation will
soon be made as this is one project the Republic of the
Philippines has use of and derives benefit from.38
Admittedly, the respondent sent to the petitioner its bills and
statements of accounts for the payments of the laboratory
furniture it delivered to the petitioner which the petitioner, through
Padolina, transmitted to the FEMF for its payment. However, the
FEMF failed to pay the last statement of account of the
respondent because of the onset of the EDSA upheaval. It was
only when the respondent lost all hope of collecting its claim from
the government and/or the PCGG did it file the complaint against
the petitioner for the collection of the payment of its last delivery
of laboratory furniture.
possession of something at the expense of the latter
without just or legal ground, shall return the same to
him. (Boldface supplied)
In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential
elements must be present: (1) that the defendant has been
enriched, (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss, (3) that the
enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal ground, and
(4) that the plaintiff has no other action based on contract, quasi-
contract, crime or quasi-delict.43
An accion in rem verso is considered merely an auxiliary action,
available only when there is no other remedy on contract, quasi-
contract, crime, and quasi-delict. If there is an obtainable action
under any other institution of positive law, that action must be
resorted to, and the principle of accion in rem verso will not lie.44
The essential requisites for the application of Article 22 of the
New Civil Code do not obtain in this case. The respondent had a
remedy against the FEMF via an action based on an implied-in-
fact contract with the FEMF for the payment of its claim. The
petitioner legally acquired the laboratory furniture under the MOA
with FEMF; hence, it is entitled to keep the laboratory furniture.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED.
The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Makati City, Branch 150, is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

We reject the ruling of the CA holding the petitioner liable for the
claim of the respondent based on the maxim that no one should
enrich itself at the expense of another.

Unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party

benefits from the efforts or obligations of others, but instead it
must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the sense
that the term unjustly could mean illegally or unlawfully.39

Moreover, to substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the

claimant must unequivocally prove that another party knowingly
received something of value to which he was not entitled and
that the state of affairs are such that it would be unjust for the
person to keep the benefit.40 Unjust enrichment is a term used to
depict result or effect of failure to make remuneration of or for
property or benefits received under circumstances that give rise
to legal or equitable obligation to account for them; to be entitled
to remuneration, one must confer benefit by mistake, fraud,
coercion, or request.41 Unjust enrichment is not itself a theory of
reconvey. Rather, it is a prerequisite for the enforcement of the
doctrine of restitution.42

Article 22 of the New Civil Code reads:

Every person who, through an act of performance by

another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
G.R. No. 183984 April 13, 2011
ARTURO SARTE FLORES, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES ENRICO L. LINDO, JR. and EDNA C. LINDO,
Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 30 May 2008
Decision2 and the 4 August 2008 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 94003.
The Antecedent Facts
The facts, as gleaned from the Court of Appeals’ Decision, are as
follows:
On 31 October 1995, Edna Lindo (Edna) obtained a loan from Arturo
Flores (petitioner) amounting to ₱400,000 payable on 1 December
1995 with 3% compounded monthly interest and 3% surcharge in
case of late payment. To secure the loan, Edna executed a Deed of
Real Estate Mortgage4 (the Deed) covering a property in the name
of Edna and her husband Enrico (Enrico) Lindo, Jr. (collectively,
respondents). Edna also signed a Promissory Note5 and the Deed
for herself and for Enrico as his attorney-in-fact.
Edna issued three checks as partial payments for the loan. All
checks were dishonored for insufficiency of funds, prompting
petitioner to file a Complaint for Foreclosure of Mortgage with
Damages against respondents. The case was raffled to the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33 (RTC, Branch 33) and docketed as
Civil Case No. 00-97942.
In its 30 September 2003 Decision,6 the RTC, Branch 33 ruled that
petitioner was not entitled to judicial foreclosure of the mortgage.
The RTC, Branch 33 found that the Deed was executed by Edna
without the consent and authority of Enrico. The RTC, Branch 33
noted that the Deed was executed on 31 October 1995 while the
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by Enrico was only dated
4 November 1995.
The RTC, Branch 33 further ruled that petitioner was not precluded
from recovering the loan from Edna as he could file a personal
action against her. However, the RTC, Branch 33 ruled that it had no
jurisdiction over the personal action which should be filed in the
place where the plaintiff or the defendant resides in accordance with
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its Order7 dated 8
January 2004, the RTC, Branch 33 denied the motion for lack of
merit.
On 8 September 2004, petitioner filed a Complaint for Sum of Money
with Damages against respondents. It was raffled to Branch 42
(RTC, Branch 42) of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, and
docketed as Civil Case No. 04-110858.
Respondents filed their Answer with Affirmative Defenses and
Counterclaims where they admitted the loan but stated that it only
amounted to ₱340,000. Respondents further alleged that Enrico was
not a party to the loan because it was contracted by Edna without
Enrico’s signature. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case
on the grounds of improper venue, res judicata and forum-shopping,
invoking the Decision of the RTC, Branch 33. On 7 March 2005,
respondents also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of res
judicata and lack of cause of action.
The Decision of the Trial Court
On 22 July 2005, the RTC, Branch 42 issued an Order8 denying the
motion to dismiss. The RTC, Branch 42 ruled that res judicata will
not apply to rights, claims or demands which, although growing out
of the same subject matter, constitute separate or distinct causes of
action and were not put in issue in the former action. Respondents
filed a motion for reconsideration. In its Order9 dated 8 February
2006, the RTC, Branch 42 denied respondents’ motion. The RTC,
Branch 42 ruled that the RTC, Branch 33 expressly stated that its
decision did not mean that petitioner could no longer recover the
loan petitioner extended to Edna.
Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with
Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order before the Court of Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 30 May 2008 Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside the 22
July 2005 and 8 February 2006 Orders of the RTC, Branch 42 for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The Court of Appeals ruled that while the general rule is that a
motion to dismiss is interlocutory and not appealable, the rule admits
of exceptions. The Court of Appeals ruled that the RTC, Branch 42
acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying respondents’ motion
to dismiss.
The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 3, Rule 2 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may not institute more than one
suit for a single cause of action. If two or more suits are instituted on
the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one on a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available ground for the
dismissal of the others. The Court of Appeals ruled that on a
nonpayment of a note secured by a mortgage, the creditor has a
single cause of action against the debtor, that is recovery of the
credit with execution of the suit. Thus, the creditor may institute two
alternative remedies: either a personal action for the collection of
debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage, but not both. The
Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner had only one cause of action
against Edna for her failure to pay her obligation and he could not
split the single cause of action by filing separately a foreclosure
proceeding and a collection case. By filing a petition for foreclosure
of the real estate mortgage, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner
had already waived his personal action to recover the amount
covered by the promissory note.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 4 August 2008
Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
 The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals
committed a reversible error in dismissing the complaint for
collection of sum of money on the ground of multiplicity of suits.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
The rule is that a mortgage-creditor has a single cause of action
against a mortgagor-debtor, that is, to recover the debt.10 The
mortgage-creditor has the option of either filing a personal action for
collection of sum of money or instituting a real action to foreclose on
the mortgage security.11 An election of the first bars recourse to the
second, otherwise there would be multiplicity of suits in which the
debtor would be tossed from one venue to another depending on the
location of the mortgaged properties and the residence of the
parties.12
The two remedies are alternative and each remedy is complete by
itself.13 If the mortgagee opts to foreclose the real estate mortgage,
he waives the action for the collection of the debt, and vice versa.14
The Court explained:
x x x in the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage
creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal
action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. In other
words, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By
such election, his cause of action can by no means be impaired, for
each of the two remedies is complete in itself. Thus, an election to
bring a personal action will leave open to him all the properties of the
debtor for attachment and execution, even including the mortgaged
property itself. And, if he waives such personal action and pursues
his remedy against the mortgaged property, an unsatisfied judgment
thereon would still give him the right to sue for deficiency judgment,
in which case, all the properties of the defendant, other than the
mortgaged property, are again open to him for the satisfaction of the
deficiency. In either case, his remedy is complete, his cause of
action undiminished, and any advantages attendant to the pursuit of
one or the other remedy are purely accidental and are all under his
right of election. On the other hand, a rule that would authorize the
plaintiff to bring a personal action against the debtor and
simultaneously or successively another action against the
mortgaged property, would result not only in multiplicity of suits so
offensive to justice (Soriano v. Enriques, 24 Phil. 584) and
obnoxious to law and equity (Osorio v. San Agustin, 25 Phil. 404),
but also in subjecting the defendant to the vexation of being sued in
the place of his residence or of the residence of the plaintiff, and
then again in the place where the property lies.15
The Court has ruled that if a creditor is allowed to file his separate
complaints simultaneously or successively, one to recover his credit
and another to foreclose his mortgage, he will, in effect, be
authorized plural redress for a single breach of contract at so much
costs to the court and with so much vexation and oppressiveness to
the debtor.16
In this case, however, there are circumstances that the Court takes
into consideration.
Petitioner filed an action for foreclosure of mortgage. The RTC,
Branch 33 ruled that petitioner was not entitled to judicial foreclosure
because the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed without
Enrico’s consent. The RTC, Branch 33 stated:
All these circumstances certainly conspired against the plaintiff who
has the burden of proving his cause of action. On the other hand,
said circumstances tend to support the claim of defendant Edna
Lindo that her husband did not consent to the mortgage of their
conjugal property and that the loan application was her personal
decision.
Accordingly, since the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed
by defendant Edna Lindo lacks the consent or authority of her
husband Enrico Lindo, the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage is void
pursuant to Article 96 of the Family Code.
This does not mean, however, that the plaintiff cannot recover the
₱400,000 loan plus interest which he extended to defendant Edna
Lindo. He can institute a personal action against the defendant for
the amount due which should be filed in the place where the plaintiff
resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides at the election of the plaintiff in accordance with Section 2,
Rule 4 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure. This Court has no
jurisdiction to try such personal action.17
Edna did not deny before the RTC, Branch 33 that she obtained the
loan. She claimed, however, that her husband did not give his
consent and that he was not aware of the transaction.18 Hence, the
RTC, Branch 33 held that petitioner could still recover the amount
due from Edna through a personal action over which it had no
jurisdiction.
Edna also filed an action for declaratory relief before the RTC,
Branch 93 of San Pedro Laguna (RTC, Branch 93), which ruled:
At issue in this case is the validity of the promissory note and the
Real Estate Mortgage executed by Edna Lindo without the consent
of her husband.
The real estate mortgage executed by petition Edna Lindo over their
conjugal property is undoubtedly an act of strict dominion and must
be consented to by her husband to be effective. In the instant case,
the real estate mortgage, absent the authority or consent of the
husband, is necessarily void. Indeed, the real estate mortgage is this
case was executed on October 31, 1995 and the subsequent special
power of attorney dated November 4, 1995 cannot be made to
retroact to October 31, 1995 to validate the mortgage previously
made by petitioner.
The liability of Edna Lindo on the principal contract of the loan
however subsists notwithstanding the illegality of the mortgage.
Indeed, where a mortgage is not valid, the principal obligation which
it guarantees is not thereby rendered null and void. That obligation
matures and becomes demandable in accordance with the
stipulation pertaining to it. Under the foregoing circumstances, what
is lost is merely the right to foreclose the mortgage as a special
remedy for satisfying or settling the indebtedness which is the
principal obligation. In case of nullity, the mortgage deed remains as
evidence or proof of a personal obligation of the debtor and the
amount due to the creditor may be enforced in an ordinary action.
In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
deed of real estate mortgage as void in the absence of the authority
or consent of petitioner’s spouse therein. The liability of petitioner on
the principal contract of loan however subsists notwithstanding the
illegality of the real estate mortgage.19
The RTC, Branch 93 also ruled that Edna’s liability is not affected by
the illegality of the real estate mortgage.
Both the RTC, Branch 33 and the RTC, Branch 93 misapplied the
rules.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be
availed of within five years from the date of contract implementing
such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers
do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the
third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the
court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
(Emphasis supplied)
Article 124 of the Family Code of which applies to conjugal
partnership property, is a reproduction of Article 96 of the Family
Code which applies to community property.
Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family Code provide that the
powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without the
written consent of the other spouse. Any disposition or encumbrance
without the written consent shall be void. However, both provisions
also state that "the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by
the other spouse x x x before the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerors."
In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage were executed on 31 October 1995. The Special Power of
Attorney was executed on 4 November 1995. The execution of the
SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the
continuing offer as a binding contract between the parties,
making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract.
However, as the Court of Appeals noted, petitioner allowed the
decisions of the RTC, Branch 33 and the RTC, Branch 93 to become
final and executory without asking the courts for an alternative relief.
The Court of Appeals stated that petitioner merely relied on the
declarations of these courts that he could file a separate personal
action and thus failed to observe the rules and settled jurisprudence
on multiplicity of suits, closing petitioner’s avenue for recovery of the
loan.
Nevertheless, petitioner still has a remedy under the law.
In Chieng v. Santos,20 this Court ruled that a mortgage-creditor may
institute against the mortgage-debtor either a personal action for
debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. The Court ruled that
the remedies are alternative and not cumulative and held that the
filing of a criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
was in effect a collection suit or a suit for the recovery of the
mortgage-debt.21 In that case, however, this Court pro hac vice,
ruled that respondents could still be held liable for the balance of the
loan, applying the principle that no person may unjustly enrich
himself at the expense of another.22
The principle of unjust enrichment is provided under Article 22 of the
Civil Code which provides:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by
another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of
something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground,
shall return the same to him.
There is unjust enrichment "when a person unjustly retains a benefit
to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of
another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and
good conscience."23 The principle of unjust enrichment requires two
conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without a valid basis or
justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at the expense of
another.241avvphi1
The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to
prevent one from enriching himself at the expense of another without
just cause or consideration.25 The principle is applicable in this case
considering that Edna admitted obtaining a loan from petitioners,
and the same has not been fully paid without just cause. The Deed
was declared void erroneously at the instance of Edna, first when
she raised it as a defense before the RTC, Branch 33 and second,
when she filed an action for declaratory relief before the RTC,
Branch 93. Petitioner could not be expected to ask the RTC, Branch
33 for an alternative remedy, as what the Court of Appeals ruled that
he should have done, because the RTC, Branch 33 already stated
that it had no jurisdiction over any personal action that petitioner
might have against Edna.
Considering the circumstances of this case, the principle against
unjust enrichment, being a substantive law, should prevail over the
procedural rule on multiplicity of suits. The Court of Appeals, in the
assailed decision, found that Edna admitted the loan, except that
she claimed it only amounted to ₱340,000. Edna should not be
allowed to unjustly enrich herself because of the erroneous
decisions of the two trial courts when she questioned the validity of
the Deed. Moreover, Edna still has an opportunity to submit her
defenses before the RTC, Branch 42 on her claim as to the amount
of her indebtedness.
WHEREFORE, the 30 May 2008 Decision and the 4 August 2008
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94003 are
SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42 is
directed to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. 04-110858.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 120706 January 31, 2000
RODRIGO CONCEPCION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. NESTOR NICOLAS and
ALLEM NICOLAS, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Petitioner Rodrigo Concepcion assails in this petition for review
on certiorari the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 12
December 1994 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City ordering him to pay respondent spouses
Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas the sums of P50,000.00 for
moral damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages and
P10,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus the costs of suit.* Petitioner
claims absence of factual and legal basis for the award of
damages.
The courts a quo found that sometime in 1985 the spouses
Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas resided at No. 51 M.
Concepcion St., San Joaquin, Pasig City, in an apartment leased
to them by the owner thereof, Florence "Bing" Concepcion, who
also resided in the same compound where the apartment was
located. Nestor Nicolas was then engaged in the business of
supplying government agencies and private entities with office
equipment, appliances and other fixtures on a cash purchase or
credit basis. Florence Concepcion joined this venture by
contributing capital on condition that after her capital investment
was returned to her, any profit earned would be divided equally
between her and Nestor.
Sometime in the second week of July 1985 Rodrigo Concepcion,
brother of the deceased husband of Florence, angrily accosted
Nestor at the latter's apartment and accused him of conducting
an adulterous relationship with Florence. He shouted, "Hoy
Nestor, kabit ka ni Bing! . . . Binigyan ka pa pala ni Bing
Concepcion ng P100,000.00 para umakyat ng Baguio.
Pagkaakyat mo at ng asawa mo doon ay bababa ka uli para
magkasarilinan kayo ni Bing."1
To clarify matters, Nestor went with Rodrigo, upon the latter's
dare, to see some relatives of the Concepcion family who
allegedly knew about the relationship. However, those whom
they were able to see denied knowledge of the alleged affair.
The same accusation was hurled by Rodrigo against Nestor
when the two (2) confronted Florence at the terrace of her
residence. Florence denied the imputations and Rodrigo
backtracked saying that he just heard the rumor from a relative.
Thereafter, however, Rodrigo called Florence over the telephone
reiterating his accusation and threatening her that should
something happen to his sick mother, in case the latter learned
about the affair, he would kill Florence.1âwphi1.nêt
As a result of this incident, Nestor Nicolas felt extreme
embarrassment and shame to the extent that he could no longer
face his neighbors. Florence Concepcion also ceased to do
business with him by not contributing capital anymore so much
so that the business venture of the Nicolas spouses declined as
they could no longer cope with their commitments to their clients
and customers. To make matters worse, Allem Nicolas started to
doubt Nestor's fidelity resulting in frequent bickerings and
quarrels during which Allem even expressed her desire to leave
her husband. Consequently, Nestor was forced to write Rodrigo
demanding public apology and payment of damages. Rodrigo
pointedly ignored the demand, for which reason the Nicolas
spouses filed a civil suit against him for damages.
In his defense, Rodrigo denied that he maligned Nestor by
accusing him publicly of being Florence's lover. He reasoned out
that he only desired to protect the name and reputation of the
Concepcion family which was why he sought an appointment
with Nestor through Florence's son Roncali to ventilate his
feelings about the matter. Initially, he discussed with Nestor
certain aspects of the joint venture in a friendly and amiable
manner, and then only casually asked the latter about his
rumored affair with his sister-in-law.
In contesting the decision of the appellate court, petitioner
Rodrigo Concepcion raises the following issues: (a) whether
there is basis in law for the award of damages to private
respondents, the Nicolas spouses; and, (b) whether there is
basis to review the facts which are of weight and influence but
which were overlooked and misapplied by the respondent
appellate court.
Petitioner argues that in awarding damages to private
respondents, the Court of Appeals was without legal basis to
justify its verdict. The alleged act imputed to him by respondent
spouses does not fall under Arts. 262 and 22193 of the Civil
Code since it does not constitute libel, slander, or any other form
of defamation. Neither does it involve prying into the privacy of
another's residence or meddling with or disturbing the private life
or family relation of another. Petitioner also insists that certain
facts and circumstances of the case were manifestly overlooked,
misunderstood or glossed over by respondent court which, if
considered, would change the verdict. Impugning the credibility
of the witnesses for private respondents and the manner by
which the testimonial evidence was analyzed and evaluated by
the trial court, petitioner criticized the appellate court for not
taking into account the fact that the trial judge who penned the
decision was in no position to observe first-hand the demeanor
of the witnesses of respondent spouses as he was not the
original judge who heard the case. Thus, his decision rendered
was flawed.
The Court has ruled often enough that its jurisdiction in a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless
the factual findings complained of are devoid of support by the
evidence on record or the assailed judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts.4 The reason behind this is that the
Supreme Court respects the findings of the trial court on the
issue of credibility of witnesses, considering that it is in a better
position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial.5 Thus it accords the highest respect,
even finality, to the evaluation made by the lower court of the
testimonies of the witnesses presented before it.
The Court is also aware of the long settled rule that when the
issue is on the credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will not
generally disturb the findings of the trial court; however, its
factual findings may nonetheless be reversed if by the evidence
on record or lack of it, it appears that the trial court erred.6 In this
respect, the Court is not generally inclined to review the findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals unless its findings are erroneous,
absurd, speculative, conjectural, conflicting, tainted with grave
abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings culled by the trial
court of origin.7 This rule of course cannot be unqualifiedly
applied to a case where the judge who penned the decision was
not the one who heard the case, because not having heard the
testimonies himself, the judge would not be in a better position
than the appellate courts to make such determination.8
However, it is also axiomatic that the fact alone that the judge
who heard the evidence was not the one who rendered the
judgment but merely relied on the record of the case does not
render his judgment erroneous or irregular. This is so even if the
judge did not have the fullest opportunity to weigh the
testimonies not having heard all the witnesses speak nor
observed their deportment and manner of testifying. Thus the
Court generally will not find any misapprehension of facts as it
can be fairly assumed under the principle of regularity of
performance of duties of public officers that the transcripts of
stenographic notes were thoroughly scrutinized and evaluated by
the judge himself.
Has sufficient reason then been laid before us by petitioner to
engender doubt as to the factual findings of the court a quo? We
find none. A painstaking review of the evidence on record
convinces us not to disturb the judgment appealed from. The fact
that the case was handled by different judges brooks no
consideration at all, for preponderant evidence consistent with
their claim for damages has been adduced by private
respondents as to foreclose a reversal. Otherwise, everytime a
Judge who heard a case, wholly or partially, dies or lives the
service, the case cannot be decided and a new trial will have to
be conducted. That would be absurb; inconceivable.
According to petitioner, private respondents' evidence is
inconsistent as to time, place and persons who heard the alleged
defamatory statement. We find this to be a gratuitous
observation, for the testimonies of all the witnesses for the
respondents are unanimous that the defamatory incident
happened in the afternoon at the front door of the apartment of
the Nicolas spouses in the presence of some friends and
neighbors, and later on, with the accusation being repeated in
the presence of Florence, at the terrace of her house. That this
finding appears to be in conflict with the allegation in the
complaint as to the time of the incident bears no momentous
significance since an allegation in a pleading is not evidence; it is
a declaration that has to be proved by evidence. If evidence
contrary to the allegation is presented, such evidence controls,
not the allegation in the pleading itself, although admittedly it
may dent the credibility of the witnesses. But not in the instant
case.
It is also argued by petitioner that private respondents failed to
present as witnesses the persons they named as eyewitnesses
to the incident and that they presented instead one Romeo
Villaruel who was not named as a possible witness during the
pre-trial proceedings. Charging that Villaruel's testimony is not
credible and should never have been accorded any weight at all,
petitioner capitalizes on the fact that a great distance separates
Villaruel's residence and that of private respondents as reflected
in their house numbers, the former's number being No. 223 M.
Concepcion St., while that of the Nicolas spouses, No. 51 along
the same street. This being so, petitioner concludes, Villaruel
could not have witnessed the ugly confrontation between
Rodrigo and Nestor. It appears however from Villaruel's
testimony that at the time of the incident complained of, he was
staying in an apartment inside the compound adjacent to that of
the Nicolas spouses. Whether his apartment was then numbered
223 is not stated. What is definite and clear is his statement that
he and Nestor Nicolas were neighbors on 14 July 1985.
There are other inconsistencies pointed out by petitioner in the
testimonial evidence of private respondents but these are not of
such significance as to alter the finding of facts of the lower
court. Minor inconsistencies even guarantee truthfulness and
candor, for they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.9
Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses with on minor
details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their
testimonies.10
All told, these factual findings provide enough basis in law for the
award of damages by the Court of Appeals in favor of
respondents. We reject petitioner's posture that no legal
provision supports such award, the incident complained of
neither falling under Art. 2219 nor Art. 26 of the Civil Code. It
does not need further elucidation that the incident charged of
petitioner was no less than an invasion on the right of
respondent Nestor as a person. The philosophy behind Art. 26
underscores the necessity for its inclusion in our civil law. The
Code Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that the human
personality must be exalted. The sacredness of human
personality is a concomitant consideration of every plan for
human amelioration. The touchstone of every system of law, of
the culture and civilization of every country, is how far it dignifies
man. If the statutes insufficiently protect a person from being
unjustly humiliated, in short, if human personality is not exalted
— then the laws are indeed defective.11 Thus, under this article,
the rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are
provided for violations of a person's dignity, personality, privacy
and peace of mind.
It is petitioner's position that the act imputed to him does not
constitute any of those enumerated in Arts 26 and 2219. In this
respect, the law is clear. The violations mentioned in the codal
provisions are not exclusive but are merely examples and do not
preclude other similar or analogous acts. Damages therefore are
allowable for actions against a person's dignity, such as profane,
insulting, humiliating, scandalous or abusive language.12 Under
Art. 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages which include
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury, although incapable of pecuniary
computation, may be recovered if they are the proximate result
of the defendant's wrongful act or omission.
There is no question that private respondent Nestor Nicolas
suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings and social humiliation as a proximate result of
petitioner's abusive, scandalous and insulting language.
Petitioner attempted to exculpate himself by claiming that he
made an appointment to see Nestor through a nephew, Roncali,
the son of Florence, so he could talk with Nestor to find out the
truth about his rumored illicit relationship with Florence. He said
that he wanted to protect his nephews and nieces and the name
of his late brother (Florence's husband).13 How he could be
convinced by some way other than a denial by Nestor, and how
he would protect his nephews and nieces and his family's name
if the rumor were true, he did not say. Petitioner admitted that he SO ORDERED.
had already talked with Florence herself over the telephone
about the issue, with the latter vehemently denying the alleged
immoral relationship. Yet, he could not let the matter rest on the
strength of the denial of his sister-in-law. He had to go and
confront Nestor, even in public, to the latter's humiliation.

Testifying that until that very afternoon of his meeting with Nestor
he never knew respondent, had never seen him before, and was
unaware of his business partnership with Florence, his
subsequent declarations on the witness stand however belie this
lack of knowledge about the business venture for in that alleged
encounter he asked Nestor how the business was going, what
were the collection problems, and how was the money being
spent. He even knew that the name of the business, Floral
Enterprises, was coined by combining the first syllables of the
name Florence and Allem, the name of Nestor's wife. He said
that he casually asked Nestor about the rumor between him and
Florence which Nestor denied. Not content with such denial, he
dared Nestor to go with him to speak to his relatives who were
the source of his information. Nestor went with him and those
they were able to talk to denied the rumor.

We cannot help noting this inordinate interest of petitioner to

know the truth about the rumor and why he was not satisfied with
the separate denials made by Florence and Nestor. He had to
confront Nestor face to face, invade the latter's privacy and hurl
defamatory words at him in the presence of his wife and children,
neighbors and friends, accusing him — a married man — of
having an adulterous relationship with Florence. This definitely
caused private respondent much shame and embarrassment
that he could no longer show himself in his neighborhood without
feeling distraught and debased. This brought dissension and
distrust in his family where before there was none. This is why a
few days after the incident, he communicated with petitioner
demanding public apology and payment of damages, which
petitioner ignored.

If indeed the confrontation as described by private respondents

did not actually happen, then there would have been no cause or
motive at all for them to consult with their lawyer, immediately
demand an apology, and not obtaining a response from
petitioner, file an action for damages against the latter. That they
decided to go to court to seek redress bespeaks of the validity of
their claim. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that while
explaining at great length why Florence Concepcion testified
against him, petitioner never advanced any reason why the
Nicolas spouses, persons he never knew and with whom he had
no dealings in the past, would sue him for damages. It also has
not escaped our attention that, faced with a lawsuit by private
respondents, petitioner sent his lawyer, a certain Atty. Causapin,
to talk not to the Nicolas spouses but to Florence, asking her not
to be involved in the case, otherwise her name would be messily
dragged into it. Quite succinctly, Florence told the lawyer that it
was not for her to decide and that she could not do anything
about it as she was not a party to the court case.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the assailed

Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Br. 167, holding Rodrigo
Concepcion liable to the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem
Nicolas for F50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 for
exemplary damages, P10,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus costs
of suit, is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and
DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners,
vs.
ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO,
and JOHN DOES, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The individual's desire for privacy is never absolute, since
participation in society is an equally powerful desire. Thus each
individual is continually engaged in a personal adjustment
process in which he balances the desire for privacy with the
desire for disclosure and communication of himself to others, in
light of the environmental conditions and social norms set by the
society in which he lives.
- Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)
The Case
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 19 of A.M. No. 08-1-16-
SC,1 otherwise known as the "Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data."
Petitioners herein assail the July 27, 2012 Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City (RTC) in SP. Proc.
No. 19251-CEB, which dismissed their habeas data petition.
The Facts
Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara
(Julienne), both minors, were, during the period material,
graduating high school students at St. Theresa's College (STC),
Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their
swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and
Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of
themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures
were then uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her
Facebook3 profile.
Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a
computer teacher at STC’s high school department, learned from
her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online,
depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only in
brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they knew who
the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia,
Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes Taboada (Chloe), among others.
Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their
respective personal Facebook accounts and showed her photos
of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne
drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b)
Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of
clothing that show virtually the entirety of their black brassieres.
What is more, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times
when access to or the availability of the identified students’
photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook friends,4 but
were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.5
Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one
of her student’s Facebook page, showed the photosto Kristine
Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate
action. Thereafter, following an investigation, STC found the
identified students to have deported themselves in a manner
proscribed by the school’s Student Handbook, to wit:
1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school
campus;
2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;
3. Smoking and drinking alcoholicbeverages in public
places;
4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;
5. Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts
obscenity; contains sexually suggestive messages,
language or symbols; and 6. Posing and uploading
pictures on the Internet that entail ample body exposure.
On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other
students in the pictures in question, reported, as required, to the
office of Sr. Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe (Sr. Purisima), STC’s high
school principal and ICM6 Directress. They claimed that during
the meeting, they were castigated and verbally abused by the
STC officials present in the conference, including Assistant
Principal Mussolini S. Yap (Yap), Roswinda Jumiller, and Tigol.
What is more, Sr. Purisima informed their parents the following
day that, as part of their penalty, they are barred from joining the
commencement exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012.
A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s
mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed a Petition for Injunction
and Damages before the RTC of Cebu City against STC, et al.,
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-38594.7 In it, Tan prayed that
defendants therein be enjoined from implementing the sanction
that precluded Angela from joining the commencement
exercises.
On March 25, 2012,petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the
mother of Julia, joined the fray as an intervenor. On March 28,
2012, defendants inCivil Case No. CEB-38594 filed their
memorandum, containing printed copies of the photographs in
issue as annexes. That same day, the RTC issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO) allowing the students to attend the
graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a motion for
reconsideration.
Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the
sanctioned students from participating in the graduation rites,
arguing that, on the date of the commencement exercises, its
adverted motion for reconsideration on the issuance ofthe TRO
remained unresolved.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data, docketed as SP. Proc. No.
19251-CEB8 on the basis of the following considerations:
1. The photos of their children in their undergarments
(e.g., bra) were taken for posterity before they changed
 into their swimsuits on the occasion of a birthday beach
party;
2. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook
accounts was set at "Friends Only." They, thus, have a
reasonable expectation of privacy which must be
respected.
3. Respondents, being involved in the field of education,
knew or ought to have known of laws that safeguard the
right to privacy. Corollarily, respondents knew or ought
to have known that the girls, whose privacy has been
invaded, are the victims in this case, and not the
offenders. Worse, after viewing the photos, the minors
were called "immoral" and were punished outright;
4. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus,
cannot be used and reproduced without their consent.
Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital
copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them
to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of
petitioners’ children were intruded upon;
5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as
the copying of information, data, and digital images
happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory; and
6. All the data and digital images that were extracted
were boldly broadcasted by respondents through their
memorandum submitted to the RTC in connection with
Civil Case No. CEB-38594. To petitioners, the interplay
of the foregoing constitutes an invasion of their
children’s privacy and, thus, prayed that: (a) a writ of
habeas databe issued; (b) respondents be ordered to
surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed
copies of the subjectdata before or at the preliminary
hearing; and (c) after trial, judgment be rendered
declaring all information, data, and digital images
accessed, saved or stored, reproduced, spread and
used, to have been illegally obtained inviolation of the
children’s right to privacy.
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC,
through an Order dated July 5, 2012, issued the writ of habeas
data. Through the same Order, herein respondents were
directed to file their verified written return, together with the
supporting affidavits, within five (5) working days from service of
the writ.
In time, respondents complied with the RTC’s directive and filed
their verified written return, laying down the following grounds for
the denial of the petition, viz: (a) petitioners are not the proper
parties to file the petition; (b) petitioners are engaging in forum
shopping; (c) the instant case is not one where a writ of habeas
data may issue;and (d) there can be no violation of their right to
privacy as there is no reasonable expectation of privacy on
Facebook.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the
petition for habeas data. The dispositive portion of the Decision
pertinently states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is
hereby DISMISSED.
The parties and media must observe the aforestated
confidentiality.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.9
To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an
actual or threatened violation of the minors’ right to privacy, one
of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data.
Moreover, the court a quoheld that the photos, having been
uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who may view
them, lost their privacy in some way. Besides, the RTC noted,
STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a
legal purpose, that is, the implementation of the school’s policies
and rules on discipline.
Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this
Court pursuant to Section 19 of the Rule on Habeas Data.10
The Issues
The main issue to be threshed out inthis case is whether or not a
writ of habeas datashould be issued given the factual milieu.
Crucial in resolving the controversy, however, is the pivotal point
of whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the
minors involved in this case.
Our Ruling
We find no merit in the petition.
Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of
Habeas Data
The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding
the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party.11 It is an independent and summary remedy designed to
protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce
one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to
protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself,
particularly in instances in which such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful
ends.12
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect
an individual’s right to informational privacy, among others. A
comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas dataas "a
procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse
in the information age."13 The writ, however, will not issue on the
basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information
about a person.Availment of the writ requires the existence of a
nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right
to life, liberty or security on the other.14 Thus, the existence of a
person’s right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by
substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the
right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are
indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be
extended.15
Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to
informational privacy, a habeas datapetition will not prosper.
Viewed from the perspective of the case at bar,this requisite
begs this question: given the nature of an online social network
(OSN)––(1) that it facilitates and promotes real-time interaction
among millions, if not billions, of users, sans the spatial
barriers,16 bridging the gap created by physical space; and (2)
that any information uploaded in OSNs leavesan indelible trace
in the provider’s databases, which are outside the control of the
end-users––is there a right to informational privacy in OSN
activities of its users? Before addressing this point, We must first
resolve the procedural issues in this case.
a. The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
Contrary to respondents’ submission, the Writ of Habeas
Datawas not enacted solely for the purpose of complementing
the Writ of Amparoin cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party may file a petition
for the writ of habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed
by:
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the
aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children and
parents; or
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of
the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degreeof
consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in
the preceding paragraph. (emphasis supplied)
Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of
the writ only to cases of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances, the above underscored portion of Section 2,
reflecting a variance of habeas data situations, would not have
been made.
Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual
freedom from abuse in the information age."17 As such, it is
erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances only. In fact, the annotations to the
Rule preparedby the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of
Court, after explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data
complements the Writ of Amparo, pointed out that:
The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an
independent remedy to enforce one’s right to privacy, more
specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies
against the violation of such right can include the updating,
rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or
information or files in possession or in control of respondents.18
(emphasis Ours) Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Datamay also be availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances.
b. Meaning of "engaged" in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information
Respondents’ contention that the habeas data writ may not issue
against STC, it not being an entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person,
family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party, while
valid to a point, is, nonetheless, erroneous.
To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas
data protection shall be available only against abuses of a
person or entity engaged in the businessof gathering, storing,
and collecting of data. As provided under Section 1 of the Rule:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas datais a remedy
available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis Ours)
The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole,
irresistibly conveys the idea that habeas data is a protection
against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of
private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or
storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her
correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or
entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data.
To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a
business endeavour. To "engage" means "to do or take part in
something."19 It does not necessarily mean that the activity must
be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the person
or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or
information about the aggrieved party or his or her family.
Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as
when one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal
endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is
immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to said
person or entity.
To agree with respondents’ above argument, would mean unduly
limiting the reach of the writ to a very small group, i.e., private
persons and entities whose business is data gathering and
storage, and in the process decreasing the effectiveness of the
writ asan instrument designed to protect a right which is easily
violated in view of rapid advancements in the information and
communications technology––a right which a great majority of
the users of technology themselves are not capable of
protecting.
Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now
proceed to the core of the controversy.
The right to informational privacy on Facebook
a. The Right to Informational Privacy
The concept of privacyhas, through time, greatly evolved, with
technological advancements having an influential part therein.
This evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno’s speech, The Common Right to Privacy,20
where he explained the three strands of the right to privacy, viz:
(1) locational or situational privacy;21 (2) informational privacy;
and (3) decisional privacy.22 Of the three, what is relevant to the
case at bar is the right to informational privacy––usually defined
as the right of individuals to control information about
themselves.23
With the availability of numerous avenues for information
gathering and data sharing nowadays, not to mention each
system’s inherent vulnerability to attacks and intrusions, there is
more reason that every individual’s right to control said flow of
information should be protected and that each individual should
have at least a reasonable expectation of privacy in cyberspace.
Several commentators regarding privacy and social networking
sites, however, all agree that given the millions of OSN users,
"[i]n this [Social Networking] environment, privacy is no longer
grounded in reasonable expectations, but rather in some
theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking."24
It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to
provide for judicial remedies that would allow a summary hearing
of the unlawful use of data or information and to remedy possible
violations of the right to privacy.25 In the same vein, the South
African High Court, in its Decision in the landmark case, H v.
W,26 promulgated on January30, 2013, recognized that "[t]he
law has to take into account the changing realities not only
technologically but also socially or else it will lose credibility in
the eyes of the people. x x x It is imperative that the courts
respond appropriately to changing times, acting cautiously and
with wisdom." Consistent with this, the Court, by developing what
may be viewed as the Philippine model of the writ of habeas
data, in effect, recognized that, generally speaking, having an
expectation of informational privacy is not necessarily
incompatible with engaging in cyberspace activities, including
those that occur in OSNs.
The question now though is up to whatextent is the right to
privacy protected in OSNs? Bear in mind that informational
privacy involves personal information. At the same time, the very
purpose of OSNs is socializing––sharing a myriad of
information,27 some of which would have otherwise remained
personal.
b. Facebook’s Privacy Tools: a response to the clamor for
privacy in OSN activities
Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the
ability to interact and to stay connected to other members of the
same or different social media platform through the sharing of
statuses, photos, videos, among others, depending on the
services provided by the site. It is akin to having a room filled
with millions of personal bulletin boards or "walls," the contents
of which are under the control of each and every user. In his or
her bulletin board, a user/owner can post anything––from text, to
pictures, to music and videos––access to which would depend
on whether he or she allows one, some or all of the other users
to see his or her posts. Since gaining popularity, the OSN
phenomenon has paved the way to the creation of various social
networking sites, includingthe one involved in the case at bar,
www.facebook.com (Facebook), which, according to its
developers, people use "to stay connected with friends and
family, to discover what’s going on in the world, and to share and
express what matters to them."28
Facebook connections are established through the process of
"friending" another user. By sending a "friend request," the user
invites another to connect their accounts so that they can view
any and all "Public" and "Friends Only" posts of the other.Once
the request is accepted, the link is established and both users
are permitted to view the other user’s "Public" or "Friends Only"
posts, among others. "Friending," therefore, allows the user to
form or maintain one-to-one relationships with other users,
whereby the user gives his or her "Facebook friend" access to
his or her profile and shares certain information to the latter.29
To address concerns about privacy,30 but without defeating its
purpose, Facebook was armed with different privacy tools
designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile31 as well
as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W,32 the South
Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users to
"customize their privacy settings," but did so with this caveat:
"Facebook states in its policies that, although it makes every
effort to protect a user’s information, these privacy settings are
not foolproof."33
For instance, a Facebook user canregulate the visibility and
accessibility of digital images(photos), posted on his or her
personal bulletin or "wall," except for the user’sprofile picture and
ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy setting:
(a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can
view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends
and their friends can view the photo;
(b) Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends can view
the photo;
(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular
friends and/or networks of the Facebook user; and
(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by
the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users,
designed to set up barriers to broaden or limit the visibility of his
or her specific profile content, statuses, and photos, among
others, from another user’s point of view. In other words,
Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the availability of
their Facebook activities reflect their choice as to "when and to
what extent to disclose facts about [themselves] – and to put
others in the position of receiving such confidences."34 Ideally,
the selected setting will be based on one’s desire to interact with
others, coupled with the opposing need to withhold certain
information as well as to regulate the spreading of his or her
personal information. Needless to say, as the privacy setting
becomes more limiting, fewer Facebook users can view that
user’s particular post.
STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy
Without these privacy settings, respondents’ contention that
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in Facebook would,
in context, be correct. However, such is not the case. It is
through the availability of said privacy tools that many OSN
users are said to have a subjective expectation that only those to
whomthey grant access to their profile will view the information
they post or upload thereto.35
This, however, does not mean thatany Facebook user
automatically has a protected expectation of privacy inall of his
or her Facebook activities.
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN
activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this case the
children of petitioners,manifest the intention to keepcertain posts
private, through the employment of measures to prevent access
thereto or to limit its visibility.36 And this intention can materialize
in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools.
In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the
manifestation,in cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his or her
right to informational privacy.37
Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy
tool to grant or deny access to his or her post orprofile detail
should not be denied the informational privacy right which
necessarily accompanies said choice.38 Otherwise, using these
privacy tools would be a feckless exercise, such that if, for
instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal information to
his or her Facebook page and sets its privacy level at "Only Me"
or a custom list so that only the user or a chosen few can view it,
said photo would still be deemed public by the courts as if the
user never chose to limit the photo’s visibility and accessibility.
Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of
their function but it would also disregard the very intention of the
user to keep said photo or information within the confines of his
or her private space.
We must now determine the extent that the images in question
were visible to other Facebook users and whether the disclosure
was confidential in nature. In other words, did the minors limit the
disclosure of the photos such that the images were kept within
their zones of privacy? This determination is necessary in
resolving the issue of whether the minors carved out a zone of
privacy when the photos were uploaded to Facebook so that the
images will be protected against unauthorized access and
disclosure.
Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their children’s
privacy right being violated, insist that Escudero intruded upon
their children’s Facebook accounts, downloaded copies ofthe
pictures and showed said photos to Tigol. To them, this was a
breach of the minors’ privacy since their Facebook accounts,
allegedly, were under "very private" or "Only Friends" setting
safeguarded with a password.39 Ultimately, they posit that their
children’s disclosure was only limited since their profiles were not
open to public viewing. Therefore, according to them, people
who are not their Facebook friends, including respondents, are
barred from accessing said post without their knowledge and
consent. Aspetitioner’s children testified, it was Angelawho
uploaded the subjectphotos which were only viewable by the five
of them,40 although who these five are do not appear on the
records.
Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit41 that "my
students showed me some pictures of girls cladin brassieres.
This student [sic] of mine informed me that these are senior high
school [students] of STC, who are their friends in [F]acebook. x x
x They then said [that] there are still many other photos posted
on the Facebook accounts of these girls. At the computer lab,
these students then logged into their Facebook account [sic],
and accessed from there the various photographs x x x. They
even told me that there had been times when these photos were
‘public’ i.e., not confined to their friends in Facebook."
In this regard, We cannot give muchweight to the minors’
testimonies for one key reason: failure to question the students’
act of showing the photos to Tigol disproves their allegation that
the photos were viewable only by the five of them. Without any
evidence to corroborate their statement that the images were
visible only to the five of them, and without their challenging
Escudero’s claim that the other students were able to view the
photos, their statements are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving
scant consideration.42
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s
sworn account that her students, who are the minors’ Facebook
"friends," showed her the photos using their own Facebook
accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be
able to viewthe allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by
Escudero’s students,43 and that it is reasonable to assume,
therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1)
their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts
is"Public," it can be surmised that the photographs in question
were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that
petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the
photograph. If suchwere the case, they cannot invoke the
protection attached to the right to informational privacy. The
ensuing pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez44 is most
instructive:
[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely
intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such
imagery, particularly under circumstances suchas here, where
the Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices
that would have controlled access to the Web page or the
photograph itself.45
Also, United States v. Maxwell46 held that "[t]he more open the
method of transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably
expect. Messages sent to the public at large inthe chat room or
e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent
loses any semblance of privacy."
That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not
necessarily bolster the petitioners’ contention. In this regard, the
cyber community is agreed that the digital images under this
setting still remain to be outside the confines of the zones of
privacy in view of the following:
(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and
connected by giving its users the tools to interact and
share in any conceivable way;"47
 (2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other
users who are total strangers;48
(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually
by the hundreds; and
(4) A user’s Facebook friend can "share"49 the former’s
post, or "tag"50 others who are not Facebook friends
with the former, despite its being visible only tohis or her
own Facebook friends.
It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile
detail’s privacy to "Friends" is no assurance that it can no longer
be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the
source of the content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share
said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto,
regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook
friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or
when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the
person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the
post, the privacy setting of which was set at "Friends."
To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has
200. A and B are not Facebook friends. If C, A’s Facebook
friend, tags B in A’s post, which is set at "Friends," the initial
audience of 100 (A’s own Facebook friends) is dramatically
increased to 300 (A’s 100 friends plus B’s 200 friends or the
public, depending upon B’s privacy setting). As a result, the
audience who can view the post is effectively expanded––and to
a very large extent.
This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of
Facebook’s proclivity towards user interaction and socialization
rather than seclusion or privacy, as it encourages broadcasting
of individual user posts. In fact, it has been said that OSNs have
facilitated their users’ self-tribute, thereby resulting into the
"democratization of fame."51 Thus, it is suggested, that a profile,
or even a post, with visibility set at "Friends Only" cannot easily,
more so automatically, be said to be "very private," contrary to
petitioners’ argument.
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible
only to the sanctioned students’ Facebook friends, respondent
STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy
invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed
the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what
were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of
gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by
persons who had legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the
fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough,
however, neither the minors nor their parents imputed any
violation of privacy against the students who showed the images
to Escudero.
Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that
respondents reproduced and broadcasted the photographs. In
fact, what petitioners attributed to respondents as an act of
offensive disclosure was no more than the actuality that
respondents appended said photographs in their memorandum
submitted to the trial court in connection with Civil Case No.
CEB-38594.52 These are not tantamount to a violation of the
minor’s informational privacy rights, contrary to petitioners’
assertion.
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or
to be more precise, the photos of minor students scantily clad,
are personal in nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately
circulated, the reputation of the minors enrolled in a conservative
institution. However, the records are bereft of any evidence,
other than bare assertions that they utilized Facebook’s privacy
settings to make the photos visible only to them or to a select
few. Without proof that they placed the photographs subject of
this case within the ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they
cannot now insist that they have an expectation of privacy with
respect to the photographs in question.
Had it been proved that the access tothe pictures posted were
limited to the original uploader, through the "Me Only" privacy
setting, or that the user’s contact list has been screened to limit
access to a select few, through the "Custom" setting, the result
may have been different, for in such instances, the intention to
limit access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted
to the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse, becomes
more manifest and palpable.
On Cyber Responsibility
It has been said that "the best filter is the one between your
children’s ears."53 This means that self-regulation on the part of
OSN users and internet consumers ingeneral is the best means
of avoiding privacy rights violations.54 As a cyberspace
communitymember, one has to be proactive in protecting his or
her own privacy.55 It is in this regard that many OSN users,
especially minors, fail.Responsible social networking or
observance of the "netiquettes"56 on the part of teenagers has
been the concern of many due to the widespreadnotion that
teenagers can sometimes go too far since they generally lack the
people skills or general wisdom to conduct themselves sensibly
in a public forum.57
Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating
lessons on good cyber citizenship in its curriculum to educate its
students on proper online conduct may be mosttimely. Too, it is
not only STC but a number of schools and organizations have
already deemed it important to include digital literacy and good
cyber citizenshipin their respective programs and curricula in
view of the risks that the children are exposed to every time they
participate in online activities.58 Furthermore, considering the
complexity of the cyber world and its pervasiveness,as well as
the dangers that these children are wittingly or unwittingly
exposed to in view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace,
the participation of the parents in disciplining and educating their
children about being a good digital citizen is encouraged by
these institutions and organizations. In fact, it is believed that "to
limit such risks, there’s no substitute for parental involvement
and supervision."59
As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of
teaching its students to beresponsible in their dealings and
activities in cyberspace, particularly in OSNs, whenit enforced
the disciplinary actions specified in the Student Handbook,
absenta showing that, in the process, it violated the students’
rights.
OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose
themselves to whenever they engage incyberspace
activities.1âwphi1 Accordingly, they should be cautious enough
to control their privacy and to exercise sound discretion
regarding how much information about themselves they are
willing to give up. Internet consumers ought to be aware that, by
entering or uploading any kind of data or information online, they
are automatically and inevitably making it permanently available
online, the perpetuation of which is outside the ambit of their
control. Furthermore, and more importantly, information,
otherwise private, voluntarily surrendered by them can be
opened, read, or copied by third parties who may or may not be
allowed access to such.

It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due

diligence in their online dealings and activities and must not be
negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant.
Demanding relief from the courts, as here, requires that
claimants themselves take utmost care in safeguarding a right
which they allege to have been violated. These are
indispensable. We cannot afford protection to persons if they
themselves did nothing to place the matter within the confines of
their private zone. OSN users must be mindful enough to learn
the use of privacy tools, to use them if they desire to keep the
information private, and to keep track of changes in the available
privacy settings, such as those of Facebook, especially because
Facebook is notorious for changing these settings and the site's
layout often.

In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the
minors' privacy rights, We find no cogent reason to disturb the
findings and case disposition of the court a quo.

In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other
assigned errors.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby

DENIED. The Decision dated July 27, 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB is
hereby AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 160054-55 July 21, 2004
MANOLO P. SAMSON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. REYNALDO B. DAWAY, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 90,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CATERPILLAR, INC.,
respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the March 26, 2003
Order1 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 90,
which denied petitioner’s – (1) motion to quash the information;
and (2) motion for reconsideration of the August 9, 2002 Order
denying his motion to suspend the arraignment and other
proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44. Petitioner
also questioned its August 5, 2003 Order2 which denied his
motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts show that on March 7, 2002, two
informations for unfair competition under Section 168.3 (a), in
relation to Section 170, of the Intellectual Property Code
(Republic Act No. 8293), similarly worded save for the dates and
places of commission, were filed against petitioner Manolo P.
Samson, the registered owner of ITTI Shoes. The accusatory
portion of said informations read:
That on or about the first week of November 1999 and
sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named accused, owner/proprietor of ITTI
Shoes/Mano Shoes Manufactuirng Corporation located
at Robinson’s Galleria, EDSA corner Ortigas Avenue,
Quezon City, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously distribute, sell and/or offer for sale
CATERPILLAR products such as footwear, garments,
clothing, bags, accessories and paraphernalia which are
closely identical to and/or colorable imitations of the
authentic Caterpillar products and likewise using
trademarks, symbols and/or designs as would cause
confusion, mistake or deception on the part of the
buying public to the damage and prejudice of
CATERPILLAR, INC., the prior adopter, user and owner
of the following internationally: "CATERPILLAR", "CAT",
"CATERPILLAR & DESIGN", "CAT AND DESIGN",
"WALKING MACHINES" and "TRACK-TYPE TRACTOR
& DESIGN."
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
On April 19, 2002, petitioner filed a motion to suspend
arraignment and other proceedings in view of the existence of an
alleged prejudicial question involved in Civil Case No. Q-00-
41446 for unfair competition pending with the same branch; and
also in view of the pendency of a petition for review filed with the
Secretary of Justice assailing the Chief State Prosecutor’s
resolution finding probable cause to charge petitioner with unfair
competition. In an Order dated August 9, 2002, the trial court
denied the motion to suspend arraignment and other
proceedings.
On August 20, 2002, petitioner filed a twin motion to quash the
informations and motion for reconsideration of the order denying
motion to suspend, this time challenging the jurisdiction of the
trial court over the offense charged. He contended that since
under Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, the penalty4 of
imprisonment for unfair competition does not exceed six years,
the offense is cognizable by the Municipal Trial Courts and not
by the Regional Trial Court, per R.A. No. 7691.
In its assailed March 26, 2003 Order, the trial court denied
petitioner’s twin motions.6 A motion for reconsideration thereof
was likewise denied on August 5, 2003.
Hence, the instant petition alleging that respondent Judge
gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed orders.
The issues posed for resolution are – (1) Which court has
jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases for violation of
intellectual property rights? (2) Did the respondent Judge gravely
abuse his discretion in refusing to suspend the arraignment and
other proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44 on the
ground of – (a) the existence of a prejudicial question; and (b)
the pendency of a petition for review with the Secretary of
Justice on the finding of probable cause for unfair competition?
Under Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, which took effect on
January 1, 1998, the criminal penalty for infringement of
registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of origin
and false description or representation, is imprisonment from 2 to
5 years and a fine ranging from Fifty Thousand Pesos to Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos, to wit:
SEC. 170. Penalties. – Independent of the civil and
administrative sanctions imposed by law, a criminal
penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years to five (5)
years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00), shall be imposed on any person who is
found guilty of committing any of the acts mentioned in
Section 155 [Infringement], Section 168 [Unfair
Competition] and Section 169.1 [False Designation of
Origin and False Description or Representation].
Corollarily, Section 163 of the same Code states that actions
(including criminal and civil) under Sections 150, 155, 164, 166,
167, 168 and 169 shall be brought before the proper courts with
appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws, thus –
SEC. 163. Jurisdiction of Court. – All actions under
Sections 150, 155, 164 and 166 to 169 shall be brought
before the proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction
under existing laws. (Emphasis supplied)
The existing law referred to in the foregoing provision is Section
27 of R.A. No. 166 (The Trademark Law) which provides that
jurisdiction over cases for infringement of registered marks,
unfair competition, false designation of origin and false
description or representation, is lodged with the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) –
SEC. 27. Jurisdiction of Court of First Instance. – All
actions under this Chapter [V – Infringement] and
Chapters VI [Unfair Competition] and VII [False
Designation of Origin and False Description or
Representation], hereof shall be brought before the
Court of First Instance.
We find no merit in the claim of petitioner that R.A. No. 166 was
expressly repealed by R.A. No. 8293. The repealing clause of
R.A. No. 8293, reads –
SEC. 239. Repeals. – 239.1. All Acts and parts of Acts
inconsistent herewith, more particularly Republic Act
No. 165, as amended; Republic Act No. 166, as
amended; and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised
Penal Code; Presidential Decree No. 49, including
Presidential Decree No. 285, as amended, are hereby
repealed. (Emphasis added)
Notably, the aforequoted clause did not expressly repeal R.A.
No. 166 in its entirety, otherwise, it would not have used the
phrases "parts of Acts" and "inconsistent herewith;" and it would
have simply stated "Republic Act No. 165, as amended; Republic
Act No. 166, as amended; and Articles 188 and 189 of the
Revised Penal Code; Presidential Decree No. 49, including
Presidential Decree No. 285, as amended are hereby repealed."
It would have removed all doubts that said specific laws had
been rendered without force and effect. The use of the phrases
"parts of Acts" and "inconsistent herewith" only means that the
repeal pertains only to provisions which are repugnant or not
susceptible of harmonization with R.A. No. 8293.6 Section 27 of
R.A. No. 166, however, is consistent and in harmony with
Section 163 of R.A. No. 8293. Had R.A. No. 8293 intended to
vest jurisdiction over violations of intellectual property rights with
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, it would have expressly stated so
under Section 163 thereof.
Moreover, the settled rule in statutory construction is that in case
of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter
must prevail. Jurisdiction conferred by a special law to Regional
Trial Courts must prevail over that granted by a general law to
Municipal Trial Courts.7
In the case at bar, R.A. No. 8293 and R.A. No. 166 are special
laws8 conferring jurisdiction over violations of intellectual
property rights to the Regional Trial Court. They should therefore
prevail over R.A. No. 7691, which is a general law.9 Hence,
jurisdiction over the instant criminal case for unfair competition is
properly lodged with the Regional Trial Court even if the penalty
therefor is imprisonment of less than 6 years, or from 2 to 5
years and a fine ranging from P50,000.00 to P200,000.00.
In fact, to implement and ensure the speedy disposition of cases
involving violations of intellectual property rights under R.A. No.
8293, the Court issued A.M. No. 02-1-11-SC dated February 19,
2002 designating certain Regional Trial Courts as Intellectual
Property Courts. On June 17, 2003, the Court further issued a
Resolution consolidating jurisdiction to hear and decide
Intellectual Property Code and Securities and Exchange
Commission cases in specific Regional Trial Courts designated
as Special Commercial Courts.
The case of Mirpuri v. Court of Appeals,10 invoked by petitioner
finds no application in the present case. Nowhere in Mirpuri did
we state that Section 27 of R.A. No. 166 was repealed by R.A.
No. 8293. Neither did we make a categorical ruling therein that
jurisdiction over cases for violation of intellectual property rights
is lodged with the Municipal Trial Courts. The passing remark in
Mirpuri on the repeal of R.A. No. 166 by R.A. No. 8293 was
merely a backgrounder to the enactment of the present
Intellectual Property Code and cannot thus be construed as a
jurisdictional pronouncement in cases for violation of intellectual
property rights.
Anent the second issue, petitioner failed to substantiate his claim
that there was a prejudicial question. In his petition, he prayed
for the reversal of the March 26, 2003 order which sustained the
denial of his motion to suspend arraignment and other
proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44. For
unknown reasons, however, he made no discussion in support of
said prayer in his petition and reply to comment. Neither did he
attach a copy of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 nor
quote the pertinent portion thereof to prove the existence of a
prejudicial question.
At any rate, there is no prejudicial question if the civil and the
criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of
each other.11 Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may
be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently
of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.
In the case at bar, the common element in the acts constituting
unfair competition under Section 168 of R.A. No. 8293 is
fraud.12 Pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, in cases of
defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action,
may be brought by the injured party. Hence, Civil Case No. Q-
00-41446, which as admitted13 by private respondent also relate
to unfair competition, is an independent civil action under Article
33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial
question that will justify the suspension of the criminal cases at
bar.
Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides –
SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment. – Upon motion by
the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in
the following cases –
xxxxxxxxx
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the
prosecutor is pending at either the Department of
Justice, or the Office of the President; Provided, that the
period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days
counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing
office.
While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for
suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the
deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned
from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows,
therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is
bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer
arraignment.

In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish that respondent

Judge abused his discretion in denying his motion to suspend.
His pleadings and annexes submitted before the Court do not
show the date of filing of the petition for review with the
Secretary of Justice.14 Moreover, the Order dated August 9,
2002 denying his motion to suspend was not appended to the
petition. He thus failed to discharge the burden of proving that he
was entitled to a suspension of his arraignment and that the
questioned orders are contrary to Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Indeed, the age-old but
familiar rule is that he who alleges must prove his allegations.

In sum, the dismissal of the petition is proper considering that

petitioner has not established that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion. So also, his failure to attach documents
relevant to his allegations warrants the dismissal of the petition,
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
which states:

SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-

compliance with requirements. — The petition shall
contain the full names and actual addresses of all the
petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the
matters involved, the factual background of the case,
and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for.

It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies

together with proof of service thereof on the respondent
with the original copy intended for the court indicated as
such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a
clearly legible duplicate original or certified true
copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling
subject thereof, such material portions of the record
as are referred to therein, and other documents
relevant or pertinent thereto.

xxxxxxxxx

The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of

the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal of the petition. (Emphasis
added)

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is

dismissed.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 122150 March 17, 2003
GEORGE (CULHI) HAMBON, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND VALENTINO U. CARANTES,
respondents.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Petitioner George (Culhi) Hambon filed herein petition for review
on certiorari, raising the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT A CIVIL CASE FOR DAMAGES BASED
ON AN INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION FALLING UNDER
ARTICLE 32, 33, 34 AND 2176 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE BE
DULY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO MAKE RESERVATION
TO FILE A SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION IN A CRIMINAL CASE
FILED ARISING FROM THE SAME ACT OR OMISSION OF
THE ACCUSED PURSUANT TO RULE 111, SECTION 1 OF
THE RULES OF COURT, THE FAILURE TO MAKE
RESERVATION BEING DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE
CRIMINAL CASE WAS DISMISSED BEFORE THE
PROSECUTION STARTED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE FOR
FAILURE OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO APPEAR
DESPITE NOTICE
SHOULD A STRICT INTERPRETATION OF RULE 111,
SECTION 1 OF THE RULES OF COURT WHICH INFRINGES
ON A RIGHT OF A PARTY BASED ON A SUBSTANTIVE LAW
BE PERMITTED WHEN TO DO SO WOULD DIMINISH,
MODIFY AND/OR AMEND A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
The factual background that led to the filing of the petition is as
follows:
On June 6, 1989, the petitioner filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio (Branch 6), a complaint for damages2 for the
injuries and expenses he sustained after the truck driven by the
respondent bumped him on the night of December 9, 1985.3 In
answer thereto, respondent contended that the criminal case
arising from the same incident, Criminal Case No. 2049 for
Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence, earlier filed
on January 8, 1986,4 had already been provisionally dismissed
by the Municipal Trial Court of Tuba, Benguet on March 23,
1987, due to petitioner’s lack of interest;5 and that the dismissal
was with respect to both criminal and civil liabilities of
respondent.6
After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision, dated
December 18, 1991, ruling that the civil case was not barred by
the dismissal of the criminal case, and that petitioner is entitled
to damages. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered,
sentencing defendant Valentino Cerantes to pay plaintiff
George Hambon the sum of P60,000.00 for
hospitalization and medical expenses and P10,000.00
for native rituals, as Actual Damages; the sum of
P10,000.00 as Moral Damages, P5,000.00 as
Exemplary Damages and P5,000.00 as Attorney’s fees
and costs.
SO ORDERED.7
On appeal,8 the Court of Appeals, in its decision promulgated on
March 8, 1995,9 reversed and set aside the decision of the trial
court, and dismissed petitioner’s complaint for damages.
According to the appellate court, since the petitioner did not
make any reservation to institute a separate civil action for
damages, it was impliedly instituted with the criminal case, and
the dismissal of the criminal case carried with it the dismissal of
the suit for damages, notwithstanding the fact that the dismissal
was provisional as it amounted to an acquittal and had the effect
of an adjudication on the merits. 10
Hence, herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
Petitioner argues that the ruling in the case of Abellana v.
Marave11 should be observed, i.e., a civil action for damages
may be filed and proceed independently of the criminal action
even without reservation to file the same has been made; 12 and
that the requirement of reservation, as provided in Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court, practically diminished/amended/modified his
substantial right.13
The petition must be denied.
Petitioner filed the complaint for damages on June 6, 1989.
Hence, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended in 1988,14 is the prevailing and
governing law in this case, viz.:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. –
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under
the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Article 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
...
Under the foregoing rule, civil actions to recover liability arising
from crime (ex delicto) and under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code (quasi-delict) are deemed impliedly instituted with
the criminal action unless waived, reserved or previously
instituted.
Thus, in Maniago v. Court of Appeals,15 the Court ruled that the
right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must
be reserved, as required by Section 1, Rule 111, otherwise it
should be dismissed;16 and that the reservation requirement
does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights, but only
regulates their exercise in the general interest of orderly
procedure.17
In the Maniago case, petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner
of the bus driven by Herminio Andaya that figured in a vehicular
accident with the jeepney owned by respondent Alfredo Boado.
The petitioner therein initially sought for the suspension of the
civil case for damages filed against him in view of the pendency
of the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage
to property and multiple physical injuries filed against his driver.
The respondent, in the criminal case, did not reserve the right to
bring the separate civil action against the petitioner or his driver.
The criminal case was later dismissed for the failure of the
prosecution to prosecute its case. On appeal, the Court identified
the issues as (1) whether the respondent can file a civil action for
damages despite the absence of reservation; (2) whether the
dismissal of the criminal case brought with it the dismissal of the
civil action; and (3) whether the reservation requirement is
substantive in character and beyond the rule-making power of
the Court.18
Thus, herein petitioner Hambon should have reserved his right to
separately institute the civil action for damages in Criminal Case
No. 2049. Having failed to do so, Civil Case No. 1761-R for
damages subsequently filed by him without prior reservation
should be dismissed. With the dismissal of Criminal Case No.
2049, whatever civil action for the recovery of civil liability that
was impliedly instituted therein was likewise dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated March 8, 1995, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

The Court expounded:

. . . §1quite clearly requires that a reservation must be

made to institute separately all civil actions for the
recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will de deemed
to have been instituted with the criminal case. … In
other words the right of the injured party to sue
separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether
arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi-delict
under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved
otherwise they will de deemed instituted with the
criminal action.

...

Contrary to private respondent’s contention, the

requirement that before a separate civil action may be
brought it must be reserved does not impair, diminish or
defeat substantive rights, but only regulates their
exercise in the general interest of procedure. The
requirement is merely procedural in nature. For that
matter the Revised Penal Code, by providing in Art. 100
that any person criminally liable is also civilly liable,
gives the offended party the right to bring a separate
civil action, yet no one has ever questioned the rule that
such action must be reserved before it may be brought
separately.19

While the Abellana case ruled that a reservation is not

necessary, the 1988 amendment of the rule explicitly requires
reservation of the civil action.

x x x Prior reservation is a condition sine qua non before

any of these independent civil actions can be instituted
and thereafter have a continuous determination apart
from or simultaneous with the criminal action.

. . . Far from altering substantive rights, the primary

purpose of the reservation is, to borrow the words of the
Court in "Caños v. Peralta":

‘. . . to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard

against oppression and abuse, to prevent
delays, to clear congested dockets, to simplify
the work of the trial court; in short, the
attainment of justice with the least expense and
vexation to the parties-litigants.’20
 RULE 111 During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of
prescription of the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose
proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled. (n)
Prosecution of Civil Action

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a) When a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from
the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be
made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under
circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make
such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused
by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without
specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the filing fees
thereof shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the
complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the
offended party upon the filing thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required
for actual damages.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil
action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that
the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. (2a)
Section 3. When civil action may proceeded independently. — In the cases
provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended
party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended
party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action. (3a)
Section 4. Effect of death on civil actions. — The death of the accused after
arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish
the civil liability arising from the delict. However, the independent civil action
instituted under section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to
enforce liability arising from other sources of obligation may be continued
against the estate or legal representative of the accused after proper
substitution or against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the
accused may be substituted for the deceased without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the
accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been
the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (1a)
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be
deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such
civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party
shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved,
which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the
complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional
filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so
alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court,
the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application
with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of
both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions. (cir. 57-97)
Section 2. When separate civil action is suspended. — After the criminal
action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom
cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal
action.
appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in
the manner especially provided in these rules for prosecuting claims against
the estate of the deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without
prejudice to any civil action the offended party may file against the estate of
the deceased. (n)
Section 5. Judgment in civil action not a bar. — A final judgment rendered in
a civil action absolving the defendant from civil liability is not a bar to a
criminal action against the defendant for the same act or omission subject of
the civil action. (4a)
Section 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. — A petition for
suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial
question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the
court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has
been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same
criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests. (6a)
Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. — The elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar
or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed. (5a)

If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been
instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found
before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment
is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the
merits is rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of the
offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the
criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the
civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action
without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the
witnesses presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the
parties to present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil
actions shall be tried and decided jointly.
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant.
Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and
hopes, followed by appropriate planning and serious endeavors,
but terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public
humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their
mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set
September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez
left this note for his bride-to-be:
Dear Bet —
Will have to postpone wedding — My mother
opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people about the
reason why — That would only create a
scandal.
Paquing
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following
telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED
RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE
MAMA PAPA LOVE .
PAKING
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was
declared in default. Plaintiff adduced evidence before the clerk of
court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment was
rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual
damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages;
P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs.
On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from
orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for new trial and
reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut. But the court, on
August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear
before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the
proceedings the possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement."
It added that should any of them fail to appear "the petition for
relief and the opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for
resolution."
On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court.
Instead, on the following day his counsel filed a motion to defer
for two weeks the resolution on defendants petition for relief. The
counsel stated that he would confer with defendant in Cagayan
de Oro City — the latter's residence — on the possibility of an
amicable element. The court granted two weeks counted from
August 25, 1955.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given
by the court had expired on September 8, 1955 but that
defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court
in its order of July 6, 1956 calling the parties and their attorneys
to appear on July 13, 1956. This time. however, defendant's
counsel informed the court that chances of settling the case
amicably were nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's
aforesaid petition. Defendant has appealed to this Court. In his
petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a quo defendant alleged
excusable negligence as ground to set aside the judgment by
default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no answer
in the belief that an amicable settlement was being negotiated.
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence, must be duly supported by an
affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec.
3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.) Defendant's affidavit of merits
attached to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a
good and valid defense against plaintiff's cause of action, his
failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to
fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his control." An
affidavit of merits like this stating mere conclusions or opinions
instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct.
10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December
29, 1960.)
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits
was in fact unnecessary, or a mere surplusage, because the
judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it having
been based on evidence adduced before the clerk of court. In
Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962,
this Court pointed out that the procedure of designating the clerk
of court as commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by
Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to
defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did not have to
be obtained for he was declared in default and thus had no
standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court
of First Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration,"
defendant asserts that the judgment is contrary to law. The
reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code
authorizing" an action for breach of promise to marry. Indeed,
our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept.
30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept.
30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an
actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress deliberately
eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions
that would have it so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts
not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not
limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person
who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."

The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and

defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which was
subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for
September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to
relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-
to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel for the
important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the
maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial
bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given
and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but two days
before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,:
simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone
wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home
city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding,
he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon."
But he never returned and was never heard from again.

Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As

stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable
wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the
above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it
when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different.
This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for
which defendant must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.

Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages

awarded were excessive. No question is raised as to the award
of actual damages. What defendant would really assert
hereunder is that the award of moral and exemplary damages, in
the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.

Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code,
moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article
21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends
that the same could not be adjudged against him because under
Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that
"the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of
merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case
defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and]
oppressive manner." This Court's opinion, however, is that
considering the particular circumstances of this case,
P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a
reasonable award.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated

modification, the lower court's judgment is hereby affirmed, with
costs.