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Affect, Critical Thinking, and Decision Making
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Affect, Critical Thinking, and Decision Making
Alexander Ryan Hough
Shippensburg University
AFFECT, CRITICAL THINKING, AND DECISIONS 1

Abstract
Individuals make decisions every day. Most require little effort (e.g., what to eat), while
others require careful thought and impact the population (e.g., government policy). According to
the decision making literature, there are two different kinds of cognitive information processing
(e.g., System 1 and System 2). System 1 is similar to our perceptual systems, it automatically
creates meaning, emotional reactions, and generates conclusions out of limited information.
System 2 processing is essentially analytical thought activated by conscious deliberation, or
when System 1 has a problem generating a conclusion. The literature has consistently
demonstrated that System 1 processing occurs first and is usually responsible for our decisions,
however, System 2 processing leads to higher quality decisions (Halpern, 2014; Kahneman,
2011). The purpose of this study was to challenge Mikels, Maglio, Reed, and Kaplowitz’s 2011
study, which found that participants were able to choose the best option, out of four possible
choices, more often when using System 1 compared to System 2 processing. They hypothesized
that memory and System 1 processing were responsible for these results. This thesis assessed the
reliability of the Mikels et al. (2011) experiment, then tested an alternative hypothesis with an
additional experiment including a memory manipulation. Results for the replication were similar
to those found by Mikels et al. (2011). However, overall results suggested that memory and
System 2 processing were responsible for Mikels et al.’s (2011) findings. An additional analysis
demonstrated that predispositions to rely on System 1 or System 2 can significantly affect
performance during decision tasks. Overall, the current results challenge Mikels et al. (2011),
support the decision making literature, and also warrant further investigation into individual
differences in thinking strategies.
Keywords: Judgment, feelings, critical thinking, heuristics, choice


Affect, Critical Thinking, and Decision Making.
Decision making is an important process which is involved in everyday activities. An
individual usually chooses when to get out of bed, what to eat for breakfast, and what to wear.
Some decisions are more important, like choosing a career path or purchasing a car. Since most
decisions are simple and require little effort, individuals tend to rely on generalized strategies to
increase efficiency. However, when making complex or important decisions, these general
strategies are not sufficient (e.g., purchasing or adopting a cat without considering money, time
and effort involved). To better understand how and why individuals make certain types of
decisions, the following literature review and research study focused on the influences of mental
processes, intuition, affect, and critical thinking on judgments and decisions. A major concern in
this study was whether individuals made better overall decisions while relying on intuition or
affect compared to critical thinking.
How and Why We Make Decisions
There are few things in life that can be determined with absolute certainty. Everything
else involves varying levels of uncertainty and can only be judged in terms of probabilities.
Mathematically, probability is calculated by determining the number of ways that an event can
occur and dividing this number by the total number of possible events (Gray & Kinnear, 2012).
However, as human’s process information, there are two ways to determine probabilities:
objectively or subjectively.
Objective probability involves using numbers to determine the mathematical likelihood
of an event occurring in the long run (Halpern, 2014). The objective probability of rolling a two
with a normal six sided die is 1/6 or 16.6 percent, because there is only one way to roll a two and
there are six possible outcomes. However, there is an issue with objective probability, since

calculations reflect the average outcome over time. For instance, if an individual was approached
and asked to make a large bet on how many times a two will be rolled in 1000 attempts, this
individual can be relatively confident betting that this will be the case 16.6 percent of the time.
However, confidence would be decreased if an individual is asked to make a large bet on one roll
of the die. The second bet is referring to a chance event, which is more difficult to determine
objectively. This is because it is possible to roll a die ten times in a row and not roll a two. The
point here is that long-run probabilities are not always representative in the short-run, they are
theoretical estimates based on mathematical principles.
In situations where numbers or values are not available, an individual can determine
probability subjectively. If a student is asked to generate the probability of getting an A on an
exam, the student may estimate a subjective probability based on factors such as amount of time
studying, difficulty of the material, or performance on past tests. When using subjective
probabilities, the outcome is determined by the quality of the personal estimates, which may or
may not be accurate.
The literature on judgment and decision making often makes little distinction between a
judgment and a decision, but it is important to understand the difference. Halpern (2014)
provided a definition for decision making, which “always involves making a choice between a
set of possible alternatives.” (p. 399). For example, if an individual is ready to purchase a new
car at a dealership, they are presented with an assortment of cars and must ultimately make a
choice between these possible alternatives. Halpern (2014) also mentions that decision making is
not an “exact science like mathematics” due to differences in personal values (p. 403), which is
evident in the fact that people do not choose the same cars or careers. In contrast to a decision, a
judgment is the process of evaluating one or possibly two pieces of information. In the car

example, this could mean subjectively judging which aspects of each car are preferred (e.g., I
like the interior or I do not like the seats). After judging the pros (i.e., likes) and cons (i.e.,
dislikes) for each car, a decision can be made which considers all the cars at the same time. In
this example, judgments come first and are used to give values for attributes of each car before
an actual decision can be made.
In order to make quality decisions, an individual needs to be able to think critically (e.g.,
the decision example above). Thinking critically can reduce errors and increase the quality of the
judgments and decisions we make (Halpern, 2014). However, research has shown that many
individuals lack the ability to think critically. In a telephone survey of over 2,000 American
adults, more than 25 percent did not know that the Earth revolves around the sun (Asimov,
1989). This is rather frightening, since there is a lot of available information to show otherwise.
Asimov (1989) also mentioned that reports in 1988 and 1989 indicated that American students
were mathematically and scientifically illiterate. According to the National Science Board
(NSB), the level of scientific literacy of the public has not changed significantly in the last two
decades. For instance, in 1992, approximately 60 percent of the public that were surveyed could
correctly answer factual knowledge questions, compared to 64 percent in 2012 (NSB, 2014). One
would hope that a college education would improve knowledge and thinking skills for these
individuals. However, after investigating how education improves critical thinking, Arum and
Roksa (2011) found that approximately 760 of the 2,300 students (i.e., 33 percent) sampled from
24 universities showed no improvement in critical thinking over four years. After thinking about
these statistics, one may conclude that the problem may lie in the education system. However,
Halpern (2014) suggests that attitudes towards critical thinking may be the main problem,

because individuals can always improve critical thinking skills if they are specifically instructed
and are willing to put forth the effort.
To understand the thought processes involved in decision making, researchers have
suggested two systems or processes (Kahneman, 2003; Sjöberg, 1971; Zajonc, 1980), which
were described in Kahneman’s recent book (2011). System 1 is characterized as fast, intuitive,
emotional, automatic, and impulsive. It uses associative memories, emotions, and stereotypes to
construct a coherent picture of the world (Kahneman, 2011). System 1 works unconsciously and
is behind most of the judgments and decisions that individuals make. System 1 thinking provides
an innate framework to understand the world, it never shuts off or stops making conclusions. It is
efficient and right most of the time. However, due to the nature of automatic functioning, errors
can be made without awareness. We tend not to doubt the information and conclusions created
by System 1 thinking. System 2 becomes more active when System 1 encounters a problem or
when an individual consciously deliberates. Critical thinking is considered System 2 processing.
Anytime an individual is aware of their thoughts or knowledge (i.e., metacognition), System 2 is
active. It is conscious, rational, analytical, and effortful. System 2 “calls the shots” and is able to
“reprogram” the way System 1 operates (Kahneman, 2011). However, since System 1 operates
automatically and with a sense of ease, System 2 usually endorses its responses. This cognitive
ease, created by automatic assumptions of System 1, causes a sense of confidence that everything
is under control and reduces the involvement of System 2. Cognitive ease can be thought of as
“if it’s easy, it’s accurate”. In addition to cognitive ease, System 2 thinking can also be reduced
since it can be aversive in the same way physical exercise can be. However, using System 2 to
“run the numbers” will always lead to higher quality decisions compared to “running” with the
first answer that comes to mind (i.e., System 1). It is important to note that memory is involved

in both systems. Memory has been called the mediator of all cognitive processes (Halpern,
2014). Taking this into consideration, anything that affects memory can also affect both
processing systems.
Decision making can be stressful, aversive, and time consuming which can promote
negative attitudes and avoidance. Most people do not have good critical thinking skills,
knowledge of probabilities, large amounts of time, or have the motivation to engage in high
effort strategies. This is why individuals tend to rely more on System 1. For example, even if
individuals do use effortful decision strategies (i.e., System 2), there is no guarantee that
resulting decisions will be optimal. This is partly because it is difficult to determine the quality
of a decision, because the other possible outcomes are never known, and the accuracy of the
information can be ambiguous at times. The only way to evaluate a decision is by evaluating the
processes that went into making the decision (i.e., the amount of effort, the quality of the thought
processes, and the accuracy of information used) (Halpern, 2014). This evaluation requires
critical thinking (i.e., System 2 processing), which can significantly improve the likelihood of
successful outcomes from decision making. Unfortunately, individuals often endorse initial
answers resulting from general strategies that decrease mental effort (i.e., System 1), which
reduces the likelihood of successful outcomes from the decision making process.
Intuitive Strategies
Individuals frequently use heuristics or shortcut strategies as a guide for making
judgments and decisions. A heuristic is defined as an exploratory problem solving aid that
increases performance (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 2014). Kahneman (2011) suggests
that using heuristics is a strategy of substituting an easier question for one that is hard to solve,
which reduces cognitive effort and increases efficiency. After investigating how individuals

made errors in decision making, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) described three intuitive
heuristics that individuals commonly use: representativeness, availability, and anchoring. These
heuristics played significant roles in developing the field of judgment and decision making, but
for the purposes of this thesis, only availability will be discussed.
Availability of Memory
The availability heuristic is characterized by assessing probability or frequency by
relying on the ease that an object or event can be retrieved from memory. The availability
heuristic is mostly explained by System 1 as an automatic operation of associative memory
(Kahneman, 2011), however, an individual can activate System 2 by consciously searching for
information that is less available in memory. The feeling of cognitive ease and confidence is
closely tied to the availability of information in memory. To demonstrate how the availability
heuristic works, consider asking an individual to indicate which pet is most prevalent in the
United States. It is likely that the response will be cat or dog. In fact, freshwater fish are the most
prevalent pet in the U.S., outnumbering cats and dogs by 50 percent (American Pet Products
Association, 2013). This response is given because individuals have more memories with cats
and dogs as pets. When objects or events are easier to recall, individuals assume there is a higher
probability or frequency of occurrence. An early experiment by Tversky and Kahneman (1973)
presented participants with a list of male and female names, which were either famous or less
famous. Results showed that 80 percent reported that there were more names in a list when the
list contained more famous names, that is, those names were easier to retrieve due to their
familiarity and were, therefore, more “available”. In a replication of these findings, McKelvie
(1997) found that 78.9 percent of participants indicated that the list with famous names had a
larger amount of names.


In another demonstration of availability, Kahneman and Tversky (1973) asked
participants if there are more words that start with the letter R, or have R as the third letter. Most
of the participants believed there were more words beginning with R, however, there are actually
more words with R as the third letter (Berger, 1995). It was easier for participants to retrieve
instances where R was the first letter of a word, which caused them to believe that more words
begin with R.
Availability can also affect judgments of the perceived frequency of events. In a series of
experiments, Folkes (1988) found ease of recalling product failure or success was correlated with
judged likelihood of future outcomes. If failure or success could be easily brought to mind, then
participants assumed a greater frequency of this occurrence. Another study found that frequency
of dramatic deaths are overestimated compared to less dramatic deaths, particularly due to
inaccurate frequencies reported by the media or from direct experiences (Lichtenstein, Slovic,
Fischhoff, Layman, & Combs, 1978). This overestimation of dramatic events may be caused by
the common belief that memories of emotional events are accurate, even though research has
shown that these memories are often distorted (Phelps & Sharot, 2008).
The availability heuristic also works when little can be brought to mind, in what
Kahneman (2011) labels the “unexplained unavailability heuristic” (p. 133). Fox (2006) provided
a demonstration of this phenomenon by asking participants to generate ways to improve a
recently taken college class. One group was asked to generate two ways and the second group
was asked to generate ten ways. The second group had difficulty generating ten ways to improve
the class, which caused these participants to indicate that they liked the class more than the first
group. In the earlier discussion of availability, cognitive ease increased confidence, but Fox’s
(2006) experiment showed that lack of cognitive ease can have the reverse effect. These results

suggested that the ease of recalling objects or events were powerful, which reduced the
activation of System 2. However, it is possible to reduce the bias caused by availability, if
participants are made aware of the reason that they experience or do not experience cognitive
ease, which can activate System 2 (Kahneman, 2011). Even if System 2 is activated, the
information provided by System 1 is still available and can be difficult to ignore.
There are, however, instances when information that is more available can increase the
quality of a decision. In these cases, individuals first engage in effortful processing (i.e., System
2 thinking) to organize and categorize information in memory to enhance the availability of
information, quality, and speed of recall. This type of memory organization explains why experts
are able to generate quick and accurate answers, because they acquired large amounts of
information over their career and frequently engage in critical thinking. Although this seems like
intuition, it is often referred to as automatic or fast thinking, because it is based on extensive
knowledge and experience engaging in critical thinking (Halpern, 2014; Kahneman, 2011).
Laypeople (i.e., non-experts) can also use this strategy if they realize that they need to be able to
recall this information at a later time. One of the first researchers to explore this type of
organization was George Miller (1956), who demonstrated that individuals can only hold five to
nine pieces or chunks of information in memory at a given time (i.e., working memory). When
this information is grouped into a category (i.e., chunked), individuals are able to hold more
information in working memory (i.e., greater availability). For example, consider this list of eight
words: monkey, zoo, young, enclosure, employee, banana, jumped, and eat. According to
Miller’s (1956) research, it would be difficult for individuals to recall all eight words after
studying the list. However, individuals could remember all eight words if they were grouped into
four chunks, such as: young monkey, jumped enclosure, zoo employee, and eat banana. By

grouping the words together, we have reduced the pieces of information from eight to four; now
an individual should be able to recall all eight words. In addition to the benefits of chunking
information to reduce mental load, memory is improved when there is more meaning attached to
stimuli. For example, years after leaving college, individuals tended to remember important ideas
and concepts better than less meaningful names and dates (Conway, Cohen, & Stanhope, 1991).
The importance of memory in decision making is well demonstrated and documented (Folkes,
1988; Fox, 2006; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; McKelvie, 1997; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974),
however, some research (e.g., Johnson & Tversky, 1983) suggests that there is more to the story.
After various experiments and literature reviews, many researchers now agree that affect plays
an important role in the decision making process (Peters, Vāstfjäll, Gärling, & Slovic, 2006;
Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002).
The Influence and Availability of Affect
Zajonc (1968, 1980, 2001) was one of the first researchers to focus on the importance of
affect during decision making. After completing many studies, he concluded that affective
reactions occur first when making decisions, are independent of further cognitive processing, and
are present in all perceptions of stimuli. Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, and Damasio (1997)
conducted a study that supported Zajonc’s theory. Their task involved participants choosing a
card out of four decks of cards, half of which have a greater likelihood of winning and the other
half had a greater likelihood of losing. The participants could not have known when they were
going to win or lose; however, they generated changes in skin conductance and brain activity
prior to choosing a card. These physiological changes correlated with card choice, which showed
that unconscious biases preceded conscious thought. A large amount of research has investigated
the function of an “affect heuristic” while making decisions (Peters et al., 2006; Pfister & Böhm,

2008; Slovic et al., 2002), influencing decision researchers to consider that affect may underlie
some of the more rational heuristics, such as anchoring (Kahneman & Frederick, 2001). When an
individual uses the “affect heuristic”, they rely on immediate emotional reactions (e.g., good or
bad) caused by stimuli to guide their decisions (Slovic et al., 2002). The affect heuristic is similar
to the other heuristics previously mentioned; it can increase the efficiency of judgments and
decisions, but as an operation of System 1 it is prone to error.
Probability and Frequency
In a series of experiments, Johnson and Tversky (1983) investigated the effect of mood
on judgments of risky event frequencies. Results indicated that while participants’ evaluated
frequencies of negative events, positive affect decreased perceived frequency judgments, while
negative affect increased perceived frequency judgments (Johnson & Tversky, 1983). This study
will be discussed in more detail in the following sections. Other studies investigating how affect
influences probability and frequency judgments showed similar types of results (Denes-Raj &
Epstein, 1994; Lowenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001).
Affect can change how an individual perceives the chances of winning during gambling
tasks, even when the probability of winning is provided. Lowenstein et al. (2001) showed how
individual’s feelings about winning a lottery show little variation whether the probability of
winning is one in 10,000, or one in a million. Denes-Raj and Epstein (1994) found that
individuals prefer the odds of 7 in 100 versus 1 in 10 during a gambling situation. To win during
these gambles, participants had to draw a jelly bean out of a bowl of kidney beans. Participants
were given the opportunity to choose between two bowls. The first bowl consisted of one jelly
bean and ten kidney beans, while the other bowl contained seven jelly beans and 100 kidney
beans. Apparently seeing the larger number of jelly beans in the second bowl induced positive

affect, which caused participants to choose this bowl, even though there was actually less chance
of winning. An interesting finding of this study is that participants realized that these decisions
were irrational, however, the feelings associated with this judgment were too powerful to
overcome (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994). Participants in the previous two studies were strongly
influenced by System 1, even after activating System 2. This is partially due to the cognitive ease
of System 1, and also the tendency to assign more weight to strong feelings, which may serve as
an anchor (i.e., reference point). However, individuals can always engage in System 2 thinking
to determine why they experienced cognitive ease and if the weight assigned to feelings was, in
fact, rational. The previous studies also seem to imply that individuals disregard probability
information when they have other information to rely on (e.g., affect or frequencies).
Type and Intensity of Affect
Affective states appear to have different degrees of influence, based on the intensity and
type of emotion that are present during the decision making process. As mentioned earlier, a
study using a card gambling task demonstrated that participants had affective reactions prior to
cognitive deliberation (Bechara et al., 1997). Another study using the same gambling task
demonstrated that positive mood states increased the reliance on these initial affective reactions,
which actually led to better outcomes early in the experiment (de Vries, Holland, & Witteman,
2008). Early in the experiment, there was no way to accurately determine which card would
produce a win or loss, but participants showed a tendency toward the two more advantageous
decks. Later in the experiment, participants were able to consciously recognize which decks were
more advantageous (de Vries et al., 2008). Depending on how the choices are presented, the
intensity of feelings associated with outcomes can vary. When decisions are known to have a
high degree of uncertainty, the intensity of affect is reduced (van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2006), but

over time, affect associated with outcomes from prior decisions increases in intensity (Ritov,
2006). In addition to the level of affect, different types of affect are likely to result in different
outcomes as well (Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Schwartz & Clore, 1988).
Most of the research that has been presented, specifically how individuals tend to rely on
intuition or affect to make judgments and decisions, implies that humans are not very good at
making decisions. This could be partially due to the trend in psychology to focus on errors and
problems in an attempt to understand where individuals go wrong or deviate from the norm.
There are, however, some positive findings regarding the use of heuristics. Gigerenzer and
Goldstein (2011) have shown that heuristics based on intuition can be quite accurate in many
situations, especially when the questions relate to real life or when factual information is scarce.
When the most accurate or appropriate choice is uncertain, individuals use the information that is
available to make the best possible decision. Gigerenzer also criticized some of the literature on
heuristics, stating that they used trick questions. This emphasizes the importance of how
questions are framed, which is discussed later.
Kahneman (2011) also acknowledged that humans are capable of making good, rational
decisions, by mentioning that biases can sometimes be overcome by being vigilant and aware of
the possible pitfalls of trusting one’s own intuition. In essence, Kahneman was saying that we
should be aware that many of our conclusions come from System 1 and should be checked for
accuracy by engaging in System 2 thinking. This is similar to the conclusion made by Halpern
(2014), who stated that thinking critically (i.e., System 2 processing) is an important process
which can help individuals reduce errors and make higher quality judgments and decisions.
However, sometimes the context of a situation can influence whether an individual uses System
1 or System 2 to make a judgment or decision.


Influence of Context on Decision Strategies
Presentation and Focus
The way information is presented (i.e., framed) or the outcome associated with a decision
(i.e., context) can influence the decision strategy an individual uses while making a judgment.
For instance, individuals appear to rely on affective information when they have to make
decisions in short periods of time and have limited attentional resources. Shiv and Fedorikhin
(1999) found that when individuals have to divide attention between tasks (i.e., multitasking),
there is a greater reliance on System 1 due to reduced availability of mental resources, but when
attentional resources are more available, individuals increase engagement of System 2. Many
individuals multitask frequently (Carrier, Cheever, Rosen, Benitez & Chang, 2009), because they
tend to be overconfident that they can retain a high level of performance while multitasking;
however, research has shown that those who multitask most often are actually less capable then
those who multitask less often (Sanbonmatsu, Strayer, Medeiros-Ward, & Watson, 2013).
Overconfidence is another reason why individuals make decisions based on System 1 processing.
In a similar fashion, when individuals are under time pressure, they must make decisions in short
periods of time without much opportunity to deliberate. Research has shown that time pressure
triggers affect, arousal, and reduction of cognitive deliberation (Maule & Svenson, 1993), which
causes a greater reliance on System 1 and can improve the efficiency of judgments, since
evaluations of criteria are derived from one source (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson,
2000). Even though System 1 may increase efficiency under time pressure, it is likely that the
quality of these decisions would be reduced.
In Söllner, Bröder, and Hillbig’s (2013) experiment, individuals tended to use intuitive
strategies (i.e., System 1) when information was easily accessed, but used a more deliberate

strategy (i.e., System 2) when situations required a more active search for information relevant to
a decision. However, when information relevant to a decision is not available, even by effortful
searching, individuals tend to rely on affect for discriminating between alternatives (Pachur,
Hertwig, & Steinmann, 2012). For example, Hsee (1996, 1998) investigated how context affects
mental processing in single and dual evaluations. In Hsee’s (1996) study, participants had the
choice between two dictionaries (i.e., dual evaluation). One was new and included 10,000
entries, the other one was also new, but had a torn cover and contained 20,000 entries.
Participants were willing to pay more for the dictionary that had more entries. However, in a
single evaluation condition, participants were presented with either the new dictionary or the one
with a torn cover. Both groups were instructed to indicate how much they would pay for the
dictionary. The willingness to pay for those presented with the new dictionary was higher than
the willingness to pay for the dictionary with the torn cover. Hsee (1996) explains that
individuals based their decisions solely on the attractiveness of the dictionary, which is an
operation of System 1 and is not a very important indication of the usefulness of a dictionary.
The participants in the single evaluation condition were not presented with information that
could be used to compare the number of entries with another dictionary, which could have
activated System 2. Due to the lack of information for comparison, participants used the most
available resource to guide their decision (e.g., affect). An additional experiment supported this
conclusion by showing that participants were willing to pay more money for an ice cream
container that was overflowing, rather than a larger non overflowing container containing more
ice cream (Hsee, 1998).
Affective information also appears to be more available when decision outcomes are
known to directly impact individuals. For instance, Sjöberg (2003) presented participants with 28

decision situations and asked them to indicate which decisions should be made with an intuitive
or analytical approach. The 28 decision situations involved hypothetical outcomes that would or
would not directly affect each participant. Results indicated that participants tended to make
more analytical decisions (i.e., System 2 processing) when the outcome did not affect them
personally or when there was little ability to influence outcomes, compared to more affective
decisions (i.e., System 1 processing) when the outcome had personal significance or when there
was a greater ability to influence outcomes. Individuals may be better able to imagine which
feelings will accompany an outcome when they have some control, which could induce feelings
of empathy that may guide their decision strategy. In contrast, when outcomes are not personal
and are not able to be influenced, individuals take a colder analytical approach (i.e., System 2
thinking).
There are benefits of relying on System 1 while making decisions, but these benefits are
typically only found with experts, not laypeople. For example, after becoming an expert at a task,
such as chess, individuals tend to make automatic decisions of high quality (Kahneman &
Frederick, 2001). When experts, like the chess player, focus on deliberation, automatic decisions
can be interfered with, which may cause a drop in performance. This effect has been
characterized as “choking under pressure” (Beilock & Carr, 2001). It is important to note that
this drop in performance is not found with all types of experts, especially those that frequently
engage in System 2 thinking (e.g., cognitive psychologists, physicists, or philosophers).
Individual Differences
Individuals may be more or less prone to System 1 or System 2 thinking while making
judgments or decisions. To test individual differences in decision strategies, researchers created
the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996). These

researchers used a modified Need for Cognition Scale (NFC; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) for
analytical or rational styles, and created a new scale to measure intuitive or affective decisions,
called Faith in Intuition (i.e., FI). In essence, these scales measure an individual’s predisposition
to rely more heavily on System 1 or System 2. Epstein et al. (1996) found that participants
scoring higher on the FI accepted intuition as being rational and logical, which reduced
flexibility in being able to shift between strategies. Based on these findings and an additional
experiment, these researchers concluded that quality decisions require the ability to use both
decision strategies, depending on the context of the situation (Epstein et al., 1996). Individuals
who score high on the FI scale will rely more heavily on System 1, have greater difficulty
engaging in System 2 thinking, and will therefore make lower quality decisions. To further
investigate these individual differences, Mata, Ferreira, and Sherman (2012) used the Cognitive
Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005) to differentiate between deliberate and intuitive
responders before asking participants to rate their own performance and the performance of
others. The deliberate responders consistently gave the correct response to every problem, and
the intuitive responders consistently gave an intuitive answer for every problem. Results
indicated that deliberate responders accurately rated their own performance and the performance
of others. In contrast, intuitive responders overestimated their own performance, as well as the
performance of others. Further implications of the study by Mata et al. (2012) will be discussed
in the next section.
Integration of Processing Systems
Typically, System 1 and System 2 are discussed as separate processing systems, however,
some recent studies have suggested that there is a mediating mechanism between them. For
instance, Thompson, Prowse Turner, and Pennycook (2011) conducted an experiment to


determine if metacognition, in the form of a feeling of rightness (i.e., FOR), guides the decision
whether to endorse a first initial judgment (i.e., System 1) or to engage in further processing (i.e.,
System 2). Findings indicated that judgments made with ease, which is an indication of System 1
activation, were highly correlated with high FOR scores, while lower FOR scores had a robust
relationship with rethinking and answer changes (i.e., activation of System 2). These researchers
concluded that a first initial judgment is made, then metacognitive processes determine if further
deliberation is needed, in the form of analytical thinking. Results from Mata et al.’s (2012)
previously mentioned study, which discussed differences between deliberate and intuitive
thinkers, elaborated on Epstein et al.’s (1996) findings. The intuitive responders could only think
of one solution to the problem, however, the deliberate responders were aware of both the
intuitive (i.e., wrong) answer and the more rational (i.e., right) answer. The researchers
concluded that the deliberate responders had greater metacognitive awareness, which explains
why they were able to accurately judge their own performance, as well as others. To further
investigate this conclusion, Mata et al. (2012) included a condition where participants completed
the CRT, and then were given clues to focus attention (e.g., underlined words) on the alternative
answer to the problem. During this condition, the participants who initially responded intuitively
changed their responses to the correct answer. This is particularly interesting, because it showed
that participants predisposed to relying solely on intuition were easily influenced to think more
deliberately when contextual cues caused them to refocus their attention, which improved their
metacognitive awareness and response accuracy.
Pachur et al. (2012) conducted an interesting experiment on risk perception by comparing
and contrasting the availability heuristic against the affect heuristic, both of which are guided by
memory. During the experiment, types of cancers were presented to participants in pairs.

Participants were then instructed to list the number of instances that could be recalled (i.e.,
availability), rate their feeling of dread (i.e., affect), and indicate how much money should be
spent to help reduce each type of cancer (i.e., value of a statistical life, or VSL). All three
assessments were made separately for both cancer types. The type of cancer that had more
recalled instances was the answer provided by the availability heuristic, and the cancer type that
had a higher rating of dread was the answer made by the affect heuristic. Occasionally,
participants recalled or rated both types of cancer equally, in these cases the heuristics failed to
discriminate. Results demonstrated that participants were better able to discriminate between the
two types of cancer by using the affect heuristic (63.8 percent), compared to the availability
heuristic (25.2 percent) (Pachur et al., 2012). It is important to note that discrimination does not
mean quality. When participants were able to recall instances of individuals developing or dying
from cancer, the use of the availability heuristic produced more accurate judgments of frequency.
However, the influence of affect was more prominent when deciding how much money should
be spent to reduce each type of cancer (i.e., VSL). Although affect was more prominent, there
was not a significant difference between affect and availability by recall for the VSL decisions. It
is possible that availability by recall induced affect when participants had direct experience with
a type of cancer. However, if individuals could not recall such instances (i.e., low availability),
then participants may have imagined what it would be like to suffer from a certain type of
cancer, which induced affect to guide their decision. In either case, availability clearly influenced
decisions and feelings of affect, but results indicated that affect contributed more than or equal to
availability by recall while making this decision. In summary, this experiment suggested that
individuals can use the availability heuristic and affect heuristic in combination or in a serial
fashion. During the experiment, participants used the availability heuristic before the affect

heuristic (i.e., serial use) when asked to indicate the frequency of occurrence or death regarding
types of cancer, but used both availability and affect (i.e., combined use) to indicate how much
money should be allotted to reducing types of cancer (i.e., VSL judgment). When deciding how
much money should be allotted to researching cancer types, individuals considered the amount of
instances that could be recalled (i.e., availability), as well as evaluating the degree of suffering
(i.e., affect) that the type of cancer could produce. In a second experiment, Pachur et al. (2012)
further experimentally investigated the availability heuristic by differentiating between direct
(i.e., social environment) and indirect (i.e., media) experience. Results for this second
experiment showed that direct experience plays a key role in individuals risk judgments, but
when taking affect and direct experience into account, indirect experience does not. However, it
may be possible that indirect experience is more tied to affect than availability. Consider the
topic of nuclear power. Most people do not possess the real frequency of accidents that have
occurred, however it is probable that they have heard of at least one or two accidents (e.g.,
Chernobyl or Three Mile Island). Due to the news reports of these rare and emotion inducing
accidents, individuals have likely associated (i.e., tagged) nuclear facilities with negative
feelings. News reports usually focus on the negative impacts of events and do not typically
include the actual frequency of occurrence. It seems that the news corporations are aware of the
power of negative, rare, and dramatic events to get one’s attention, which encourages people to
tune in or read articles. As mentioned earlier, individuals are overconfident about their emotional
memories which are often distorted (Phelps & Sharot, 2008). It is likely that individual’s feelings
about these events could integrate into their knowledge, which may influence how they think
about it (i.e., as an exemplar), and how they assess the frequency of accidents.

Overall, the study by Pachur et al. (2012) demonstrates that the use of information is
better for making quality decisions, but when knowledge is low and the risks become personal,
affect gains the upper hand. Depending on the context, the affect heuristic can substitute for the
availability heuristic (e.g., while deciding the VSL) and vice versa (e.g., judging the frequency of
death from a type of cancer). Even though affect may gain the upper hand in certain situations, it
does not increase the quality of a decision, it merely allows an individual to make a choice when
there is no relevant information to depend on (e.g., discriminating which type of cancer has the
greatest risk of death).
The literature, particularly with risks and benefits, has indicated that affect can be quite
influential when making judgments and decisions, even if the affect does not provide information
to increase the quality of conclusions. Affect is so influential, because it is the first psychological
reaction to a stimulus and may help determine the amount of deliberation. However, affect and
rationality are intimately linked and both exert influence on judgments. Using critical thinking to
consider all the evidence is the best option for most decisions, but the quality of the available
information, knowledge, and other factors influencing the judgment are important. Depending on
the quality of information, both strategies can fail or succeed. For instance, a fast intuitive
judgment can be very accurate when based on sound information (e.g., experts automatic
thinking), and a more deliberate time consuming approach can fail when information is faulty or
biased (e.g., the Challenger Disaster, overconfidence, and the confirmation bias). It seems that
the main contributor for how risks and benefits are evaluated is the context of a situation, which
determines the resources that are available to make conclusions, however, availability of
information, quality of information, and associated affect also influence initial judgments and
later decisions.

The literature on judgment and decision making sought to understand how and why
individuals made errors. Kahneman and Tversky (1974) convincingly showed how individuals
made errors in judgment when using heuristics based on “rational intuition”. More recently,
researchers emphasized the influence of feelings in decision making, which became the “affect
heuristic” (Finucane et al., 2000). Researchers typically used affect to explain how individuals
perceive risks and benefits to be negatively correlated and how feelings can guide or influence
judgments and decisions (Alhakami & Slovic, 1994; Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994; Finucane et al.,
2000; Fischhoff et al., 1978; Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Savadori et al., 2004). These researchers
generally do not claim that reliance on affect (i.e., System 1) increases the quality of decisions,
compared to deliberation (i.e., System 2). However, they do suggest that affect can serve as an
anchor (i.e., reference point), increase cognitive ease, or can tag information (e.g., learning about
a nuclear power plant meltdown could cause an individual to associate nuclear power plants with
negative affect), which can increase an individual’s confidence and reliance on such information
while making judgments and decisions. In some cases, it may appear that reliance on feelings,
intuition, or automatic processing results in higher quality decisions, but this is typically found
only when relevant information is scarce (Pachur et al., 2012) or when individuals have a high
degree of knowledge and experience (e.g., experts) in that specific area (Kahneman & Frederick,
2001; Savadori et al., 2004; Slovic, 1999). However, a recent study (Mikels, Maglio, Reed, &
Kaplowitz, 2011) concluded that “affective strategies are indeed an effective means to making
good decisions…when the going gets tough, go with your gut—but with the qualification that
one should not overthink their decision” (Mikels et al., 2011, p. 10). These researchers based
their methodology and theory on Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, and Van Baaren’s (2006)
research, which focused on unconscious thought theory (i.e., UTT). According to UTT, effortless

unconscious thought can result in better outcomes for complex matters compared to effortful
deliberate thought. The conclusions made by Mikels et al. (2011) and UTT seem to be
inconsistent with the literature on judgment and decision making, particularly with the affect
heuristic, which implied that most errors in decision making occur because individuals tend to
rely on their feelings and intuition (i.e., System 1 processes), instead of engaging in critical
thinking (i.e., System 2). To better understand how Mikels et al. (2011) came to this conclusion,
all four experiments from the study will discussed in detail.
During the first experiment, participants in four conditions (i.e., feeling focused simple,
feeling focused complex, detail focused simple, and detail focused complex) were instructed to
choose the best option out of a group of four cars (e.g., Car A, Car B, Car C, and Car D). The
simple conditions exposed participants to four attributes per car, and the complex conditions
presented 12 attributes per car. These attributes were either framed as good or bad (e.g., this car
gets poor/good gas mileage) to ensure participants perceived them as positive or negative.
Participants in the feeling focused conditions were instructed to follow their feelings, then rate
how they felt about each attribute on a seven point scale (e.g., 1 = very negative and 7 = very
positive). Participants in the detail focused conditions were instructed to attempt to remember all
the attributes and to indicate how well they were remembering the previous attributes on a seven
point scale (e.g., 1 = not at all and 7 = very well). All attributes were presented on a computer
screen one at a time, for four seconds each, then participants made a rating before the
presentation of the next attribute. After all attributes (i.e., four for simple trial and 12 for
complex trial) were presented for each car option, participants were instructed to choose the best
option. Out of the four cars, one car had 75 percent positive attributes, two had 50 percent
positive attributes, and one car had 25 percent positive attributes. After making the decision,

participants were asked to write down all the attributes that could be recalled. Results for the
simple decision indicated that 47.4 percent of participants in the detail focused condition chose
the best car option, compared to 31.6 percent in the feeling focused condition. However, a Chi
square test indicated that this difference was not significant (p > .05). During the complex
decision, those in the feeling focused condition chose the best car option significantly more often
(68.4 percent) than those in the detail focused condition (26.3 percent). There were no significant
differences in recalled attributes due to focus, however, there was a significant difference
between the simple and complex conditions. The researchers concluded that focusing on feelings
can result in higher quality objective decisions than focusing on details. However, it is possible
that this experiment was confounded with memory. Participants may have experienced difficulty
attempting to hold all 48 attributes (e.g., during the complex trial) in working memory in the
detail focused condition, but were able to simplify the information by grouping the attributes into
categories (e.g., good or bad) in the feeling focused condition. This would allow participants to
remember how many attributes were good or bad instead of attempting to remember entire
attributes. This would also help explain why there were no differences in amount of attributes
recalled between the feeling focused and detail focused conditions, even though there was a
difference in performance. The interpretation of the results will be discussed in more detail later
in this section.
In the second experiment, the researchers investigated subjective choice quality. The
methods were similar to experiment one, except participants were assigned to either a feeling
focused condition or a detail focused condition and made only the complex decision. Also, there
was not a dominating alternative like the first experiment (e.g., a car with 75 percent positive
attributes), each car had equal amounts of positive and negative attributes (i.e., 50 percent). After

participants made car choices, they rated their confidence, satisfaction, and attempted to recall all
attributes for each car. Results indicated that participants in the feeling focused condition were
significantly more confident and satisfied with their choice, but were not able to recall more
attributes than the detail focused condition. These results are consistent with research
investigating choices based on feelings (i.e., System 1). Thompson et al. (2011) showed that
higher levels of confidence and satisfaction (i.e., the feeling of rightness) are highly correlated
with System 1 thinking, while low levels are correlated with System 2 thinking.
In the third experiment, the relative framework from experiment one was used, except
participants made only complex decisions and either deliberated for three minutes or were
distracted by a working memory task before deciding the best car option. Results indicated that
participants in the detail focused condition performed equally well whether they deliberated for
three minutes or were distracted before making a decision. However, in the feeling focused
condition, participants who deliberated performed significantly worse than participants who were
distracted by the working memory task. To ensure that these results were not due to the
performance on the working memory task, the researchers examined scores for both conditions
and found no difference in performance on the task. The researchers concluded that additional
deliberation was beneficial for participants that were focusing on details, but impaired choice
quality for participants focusing on their feelings. These results are consistent with previous
literature, which has indicated that affective reactions occur automatically, but are reduced with
conscious deliberation, since they are typically not rational.
In the fourth experiment, the researchers utilized a within subjects design. All participants
made a decision in four different domains (e.g., apartments, vacations, physicians, and medical
treatments) for each of three strategies (e.g., feeling focused, reason focused, and no focus), for a

total of 12 decisions. For each decision, participants had four choices (e.g., Apartment A,
Apartment B, Apartment C, and Apartment D) and 12 attributes that were either positive or
negative for each choice. As in the first experiment, choices had varying degrees of positive
attributes (e.g., 75 percent, 50 percent, and 25 percent), with one choice being the best option
(i.e., 75 percent positive attributes). Results indicated that the feeling focused decisions were
higher in choice quality, compared to decisions based on reason or without a focus. However,
affective decisions were only found to be significantly better than reasoned decisions in the
domain of apartments. The researchers concluded that affective decisions were of better quality
overall, compared to decisions without a focus, or those focusing on reason.
All of these experiments implied that reliance on affect (i.e., System 1) increased the
probability of choosing the best option under complex choice, compared to reliance on details
and deliberation (i.e., System 2). However, it appears that Mikels et al.’s (2011) conclusions are
inconsistent with the decision making literature, especially concerning the affect heuristic and
how affect influences judgments and decisions (e.g., serving as an anchor, reducing activation of
System 2). Their conclusions are somewhat consistent with the idea of tagging (i.e., associating)
information with affect (e.g., tagging nuclear power plants with negative affect after learning
about a meltdown). However, individuals typically tag objects or information with affect based
on their own personal attitudes or feelings (Alhakami & Slovic, 1994). However, in the Mikels et
al. (2011) experiment, participants were explicitly given information that basically informs them
which car is the best choice. It seems that in this experiment, attributes were tagged subjectively,
but were based on objective information. Affective information is typically only used to
discriminate between options when there is no other guiding information (e.g., memory

availability, objective information, or provided information), but when information is available,
individuals reduce their reliance on affect (Pachur et al., 2012).
There may be other explanations for the results in Mikels et al. studies. One possible
reason Mikels et al. (2011) found greater involvement of System 1, in the complex condition,
could be that participants had to divide attention by keeping the attributes for each car in working
memory while also paying attention to the next attributes that were presented every four seconds.
When individuals divide attention or are under time pressure, they tend to make decisions based
on System 1 processing (Maule & Svenson, 1993; Finucane et al., 2000). However, in this
experiment, individuals were only under time pressure when given the attributes, but could spend
time deliberating options before making a decision. Mikels et al. (2011) explained that
individuals may have encoded information in memory in conjunction with affect, which
facilitated subsequent recall. This may be true, however, it is more likely that individuals
grouped or categorized information (i.e., chunked), which reduced the attributes down to a single
value or category (i.e., good or bad). This process could have reduced the mental workload and
amount of effort needed by System 2, which could have allowed participants to utilize the
information without having to remember whole attributes. If this is the case, then it may be
misleading to imply that the increased quality of decisions was due to the affective tagging of
information.
Based on these interpretations, it is possible that the feeling focused participants in
Mikels et al.’s (2011) study chunked information into two categories (i.e., good or bad), which
decreased mental workload, compared to those in the detail focused condition who were
encouraged to remember entire attributes. Therefore, Mikels et al.’s (2011) findings might to be
due to memory load and not affect. To test this alternate explanation, the present investigation

was designed to test whether the individuals in the feeling focused condition based their
decisions on their feelings or by simplifying the details of the attributes and making a decision
based on critical thinking. To test this interpretation, the first experiment by Mikels et al. (2011)
was first replicated and then extended with two additional conditions. An overview of the entire
study is presented below.
In order to replicate the first experiment, two trials were conducted using only the feeling
focused and detail focused conditions. Participants in both of these conditions made a simple and
complex decision based on the methodology from Mikels et al. (2011). The replication was
conducted as a 2 (complexity) x 2 (focus) mixed factorial design, with complexity as a within
subjects variable and focus as a between subjects variable. It was believed that feeling focused
participants would make significantly better decisions than the detail focused participants, for the
complex decisions, which would replicate the findings from Mikels et al. (2011) and allow for
further comparison with the two additional conditions.
After the replication experiment, all participants completed the main experiment, which
consisted of three simple (i.e., four attributes per option) and three complex decisions (i.e., 12
attributes per option). Two additional conditions were added as a manipulation: a feeling focused
note taking condition and a detail focused note taking condition. In total, there were four
conditions for the main experiment: feeling focused no notes, feeling focused notes, detail
focused no notes, and detail focused notes. The addition of the memory manipulation changed
the design to a mixed 2 (complexity) x 2 (focus) x 2 (notes). Participants did not make ratings in
the main experiment, as it would have been counterproductive for participants to make ratings
and take notes. Also, it was believed that the ratings for the feeling focused participants were
more useful than the ratings made by the detail focused participants, however, note taking was

expected to be equally useful for both focus conditions. The note taking manipulation was added
to challenge the overall conclusion by Mikels et al. (2011) (i.e., focusing on feelings results in
better decisions than thinking critically) by testing whether individuals actually focused on their
feelings when they decided which option was the best choice or if they were merely grouping the
information into a category (i.e., good or bad), which increased cognitive ease, efficiency, and
the quality of decisions.
In the Mikels et al. (2011) experiment, attributes were shown to participants for four
seconds and then participants were given time to make ratings about feelings or how well they
remembered previous attributes. This could have been a potential problem for note taking
conditions in the current study, since participants could have written down the entire set of
attributes. To account for this possible problem, participants were presented with attributes in
blocks of four. Attributes were still presented one at a time, for four seconds each, but
participants were only allowed to take notes after four attributes had been presented. Following
the presentation of an attribute block, participants were given a 16 second delay to take notes
before moving on to the next option (e.g., simple trials) or next four attribute block (e.g.,
complex trials). To allow for equal treatment, participants in the no note taking conditions also
had a 16 second delay; however, they were instructed to think about the last four attributes while
focusing on the details (i.e., detail focused) or their own feelings (i.e., feeling focused).
Participants in the detail focused condition were expected to make more accurate choices,
compared to those in the feeling focused condition, based on the assumption that participants in
the feeling focused conditions actually focused on their feelings.
To summarize, this thesis project attempted to challenge the idea that participants in the
Mikels et al. (2011) experiment made better decisions by focusing on their feelings, compared to

thinking critically, when making decisions. It was believed that these findings could be explained
by memory, not the affect heuristic or UTT. Participants could have reduced the information into
groups (i.e., good or bad), which may have reduced the amount of cognitive effort required to
make the best choice, yielding a result that looked like affect or unconscious thought led to better
decision making than critical thinking.
This study had three hypotheses:

1) Participants in the feeling focused no notes condition were expected to make better
complex decisions than those in the detail focused no notes condition.
2) Participants in the detail focused notes condition were expected to make better complex
decisions, compared to those in the feeling focused notes condition.
3) Participants in the detail focused notes condition were expected to outperform those in
the detail focused no notes condition.
Method
Participants
One hundred and ninety two participants (61% female; mean age = 18.6) were recruited
from general psychology classes at Shippensburg University of Pennsylvania between July 29th
and October 15th of 2014. The majority of the participants were freshman (152), with some
sophomores (31), juniors (8), and seniors (1). The frequency of academic majors from greatest to
least were: Undeclared (46), Education (28), Biology/Health (25), Psychology (20), Criminology
(17), Business (17), Communications (9), Accounting (7), Social Work (7), History (3), Art (3),
English (2), Marketing (2), Economics (2), Computer Science (2), Political Science (2),
Engineering (2), Sociology (1), Chemistry (1), Journalism (1), Public Administration (1). Mean

GPA could not be calculated due to the high number of participants (N = 133) who did not know
their GPA.
Materials and Procedure
Participants (N = 192) were recruited in small groups (M = 4.5) and were randomly
assigned to one of four conditions: feeling focused no notes (n = 49), feeling focused notes (n =
47), detail focused no notes (n = 50), and detail focused notes (n = 46), and one of four orders for
counterbalancing. All participants in the study completed a replication of the Mikels et al. (2011)
experiment, followed by the main experiment with an added memory manipulation. Both of the
current experiments had the same basic elements. Participants made choices based on provided
information. Two trials (i.e., a simple and complex) were completed for each category (e.g., car,
job, apartment, and computer). There were four options in each category (e.g., Car A, Car B, Car
C, and Car D). Information given for each option was in the form of positive or negative
attributes (e.g., “this car gets above average or below average gas mileage”, “this job has above
or below average wages”, “this apartment includes or does not include utilities”, or “this
computer has below or above average chance of overheating”; See Appendix A). There were
four attributes given for each option during simple trials and 12 given during complex trials. All
attributes for each option were presented before moving on to the next option. Each option
possessed a different amount of positive and negative attributes. One option had 75 percent
positive attributes, two had 50 percent positive attributes, and one had 25 percent positive
attributes. The option with 75 percent positive attributes was defined as the correct choice. These
methods were adapted from Mikels et al. (2011), except participants made both simple and
complex decisions, and all data were recorded on paper instead of using a computer program.

Prior to starting the study, participants filled out a consent form (See Appendix B) and
then were given the basic instructions for the entire study verbally. Participants were given the
following instructions: 1) “you will be making choices based on information presented on
PowerPoint slides”, 2) “an object or category (e.g., car) will be presented”, 3) “then you will be
given information about four different options (e.g., Car A, Car B, Car C, and Car D), which will
be presented one at a time”, 4) “the information will give value to each option”, 5) “after all
information for each option is presented you will choose which option (e.g., Car A – D) you
believe is the best choice by circling an option on the provided choice sheet” (See Appendix C).
The choice sheet was used to record all choices throughout the experiment. Specific instructions
for focus and note taking were then given before the start of the replication and the main
experiment.
Replication. The design for the replication experiment was a 2 (Complexity) x 2 (Focus)
mixed design. There were only two different conditions (i.e., feeling focused and detail focused)
and participants completed both a simple and complex trial. As previously mentioned,
participants were given a consent form and basic instructions. Prior to starting the replication,
rating sheets were passed out (See Appendix D) and participants were given further instructions.
Participants were instructed to focus on their feelings (i.e., feeling focused) or on the details of
the provided information (i.e., detail focused), depending on which condition they were
randomly assigned to. Next, participants were informed that they “would be given an eight
second delay between each attribute presentation to make ratings”. The feeling focused
participants were instructed to rate how they felt about the attributes for each option on a 7-point
scale, where 1 = very negative and 7 = very positive. Participants in the detail focused condition
were instructed to rate how well they were remembering the attributes for each option on a

similar 7-point scale, where 1 = not at all and 7 = very well. Before starting the PowerPoint,
participants were informed that “the current option (e.g., Car A, Car B, etc.) would always be
shown at the top of the screen” and that they would be shown four pieces of information for each
option (i.e., simple trial). After making sure participants were clear on how to perform, the
PowerPoint presentation began. The first PowerPoint slide indicated the category (i.e., car for the
replication experiment), before moving on to the first option (i.e., Car A). All four pieces of
information were presented for an option before moving on to the next option, which were
presented in the following order: A, B, C, and D. Pieces of information were presented one at a
time, for four seconds each, followed by an eight second rating period. After the information for
all options was presented, the choice sheet was passed out, and participants were instructed to
circle which option they believed to be the optimal choice. After participants made their choice,
the rating sheet for the complex trial was passed out and participants were informed that the next
trial would follow the same procedure, except there would be 12 pieces of information for each
option. After participants finished the complex trial, the replication experiment was complete.
Main Experiment. After participants completed the replication experiment, they were
given further instructions for the remainder of the experiment. Participants were informed that
the remaining trials had the same procedure, except 1) “four pieces of information would be
presented before the delay period, which is now extended to 16 seconds”, and 2) “instead of
making ratings during the delay, there will be a different task”. At this time, note taking sheets
(See Appendix E) were passed out to the participants in the note taking conditions. Note taking
participants were instructed to take short notes about information based on the details (i.e., detail
focused) or how they felt about it (i.e., feeling focused). The participants not taking notes were
instructed to think about the details (i.e., detail focused), or how they felt about the information

for the current option (i.e., feeling focused). After verifying that participants were clear on the
instructions, the experiment began using the same procedure as the replication experiment with
the addition of the note taking manipulation and four attribute blocks. The addition of the note
taking conditions for the main experiment changed the design to a mixed 2 (Complexity) x 2
(Focus) x 2 (Notes). Participants completed two trials (i.e., a simple and complex trial) for job,
apartment, and computer categories. In total, there were six trials: three simple and three
complex. After completion of all six trials, a demographic form (See Appendix F) and the
Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI-revised; Pacini & Epstein, 1999; See Appendix G) were
passed out to each participant. Participants were instructed to read and fill out both the
demographic form and questionnaire. After completing both forms, participants were informed
that the experiment was over and were given an experimental debriefing (See Appendix H).
Results
Replication Trials
Although all participants completed the replication trials, only the data from 110
participants (63% female; mean age = 18.8) could be used, as the rest of the data had been
compromised due to a repeating attribute which resulted in two correct answers for the simple
trial. This error was corrected for the 110 participants used in the analysis. The data were
analyzed by comparing the number of correct choices between the two conditions using chi-
square tests, which was the same method used by Mikels et al. (2011). Refer to Table 1 for
comparisons between the focus conditions.
Table 1

Percent of Participants in the Feeling Focused and Detail Focused Conditions with Correct
Choices, Correct Ratings, and Rating Based Decisions.
Correct Choice Correct Rating Rating Based Decisions

Trials n Simple Complex Simple Complex Simple Complex
Feeling Focused 55 69% 95% 70% 96% 73% 98%
Detail Focused 55 51% 62% 22% 31% 31% 31%
Mean 110 60% 78% 46% 64% 52% 65%
Participants in the feeling focused condition (69%) significantly outperformed those in
the detail focused condition (51%) for the simple trial, χ2 (1, N = 110) = 3.76, p < .05. For the
complex trial, the feeling focused participants (95%) also outperformed the detail focused
participants (62%), χ2 (1, N = 110) = 17.268, p < .001. Differences between simple and complex
trials were also analyzed using chi-square tests. Participants in the feeling focused condition
performed significantly better for the complex trial (95%) compared to the simple trial (69%), χ2
(1, N = 55) = 11.96, p < .001. Participants in the detail focused condition also performed better
for the complex trial (62%), compared to the simple trial (51%), however, this difference was not
significant, χ2 (1, N = 55) = 1.33, p > .10.
Participant’s ratings were analyzed using chi-square tests to compare how often the
highest rated option corresponded to the correct choice and how often the decision was based on
the highest rated option. For the simple trial, the feeling focused ratings corresponded with the
correct choice more often (70%) than detail focused ratings (22%), χ2 (1, N = 110) = 26.65, p <
.001. The feeling focused participants also based decisions on the highest rated option more often
(73%) than the detail focused participants (31%), χ2 (1, N = 110) = 19.26, p < .001. For the
complex trial, the same pattern was found. The feeling focused participant ratings corresponded
with the correct choice more often (96%), compared to the detail focused participant ratings

(31%), χ2 (1, N = 110) = 50.91, p < .001. The feeling focused participants also based decisions
on the highest rated option (98%) more often than the detail focused participants (31%), χ2 (1, N
= 110) = 54.38, p < .001.
Main Experiment
The data for all 192 participants were analyzed using a 2 (Complexity) x 2 (Focus) x 2
(Notes) mixed factorial design with proportion correct as the dependent variable, complexity as a
within subjects variable, and focus and notes as between subjects variables. Refer to Table 2 for
differences in proportion correct and standard deviations across conditions.
Table 2
Mean Proportion Correct and Standard Deviations in Simple and Complex Trials for Feeling
Focused No Notes, Feeling Focused Notes, Detail Focused No Notes, and Detail Focused Notes.
Feeling Focused Detail Focused

Notes Without With Without With All
n = 49 n = 47 n = 50 n = 46 N = 192
.83 .86 .74 .83 .81
Simple
(.205) (.206) (.318) (.26) (.254)
.79 .84 .79 .87 .82
Complex
(.233) (.229) (.3) (.192) (.243)
.81 .85 .77 .85 .82
Total
(.17) (.188) (.259) (.189) (.206)
Results showed a main effect for notes, F (1, 188) = 4.181, p = .042, η2p = .022, which
indicated that participants performed better, regardless of focus, when they were able to take
notes (Refer to Figure 1).


Main Effect for Notes
0.9
Mean Proportion Correct
0.85
0.8
0.75 No Notes
Notes
0.7
Feeling focused Detail focused

Figure. 1. Mean proportion correct for all trials and conditions.
An interaction between complexity and focus nearly reached significance, F(1, 188) =
3.797, p = .053, η2p = .02. This interaction was significant when notes and no notes conditions
were collapsed and analyzed using a 2 (complexity) x 2 (focus) mixed ANOVA, F(1, 190) =
3.885, p = .05, η2p = .02. (Refer to Figure 2).
Interaction between Complexity and Focus
0.86
Mean Proportion Correct
0.84
0.82
0.8
0.78
Feeling focus
0.76 Detail focus
0.74
Simple Complex
Complexity
Figure 2. Mean proportion correct for complexity and focus.
T-tests revealed that this interaction was driven by the difference between feeling focus
(M = .84) and detail focus (M = .78) conditions for simple trials, t(95) = -1.75, p = .041. The

difference between feeling focus (M = .82) and detail focus (M = .83) conditions for the complex
trials was not significant, p > .05.
Although the main argument about memory was supported by the main effect for notes,
there was no evidence to support the three main hypotheses (e.g., predicted interactions were not
significant). However, t-tests were used to explore differences in means between conditions.
First, participants in the feeling focused no notes condition (M = .81) did not significantly
outperform those in the detail focused no notes condition (M = .77), p > .05. Second, participants
in the detail focused notes condition (M = .85) did not significantly outperform those in the
feeling focused notes condition (M = .85), p > .05. Third, participants in the detail focused notes
condition (M = .85) did not significantly outperform those in the detail focused no notes
condition (M = .77), p > .05. However, the trend was in the right direction (see Figure 1). Fourth,
participants in the feeling focus notes condition (M = .85) did not significantly outperform those
in the feeling focus no notes condition (M = .81), p > .05.
Chi-square tests were used to investigate if there were any differences in note taking
between the two focus conditions. Four variables were used to investigate these differences, they
were: large amount of notes, large amount of detail, including emotional content (e.g., good, bad,
smiley faces), and use of symbols (e.g., arrows, pluses and minuses). Although all the tests
revealed results that were not significant (i.e., p > .05), there were some notable trends. More
participants in the detail focused condition wrote a large amount of notes (87%), included a large
amount of detail (93.5%), and used symbols (65.2%), compared to those in the feeling focused
condition (e.g., 72.3% for large amount of notes, 83% for large amount of detail , and 51% for
use of symbols). More participants in the feeling focused condition (21.3%) included emotional
content, compared to those in the detail focused condition (19.5%).


To investigate individual differences, participants filled out the Rational-Experiential
Inventory (REI-revised; Pacini & Epstein, 1999). As mentioned previously, this inventory
contains two scales to measure the predisposition for thinking with System 1 (e.g., FI or Faith in
Intuition) or System 2 (e.g., NFC or Need for Cognition). Participants were split up into three
groups (e.g., High NFC, Medium NFC, and Low NFC) depending the difference between NFC
and FI scores (e.g., NFC – FI). A 2 (complexity) x 3 (NFC group) mixed factorial design was
then used to determine if there were any differences between the three NFC groups for
proportion correct on simple and complex trials.
Table 4.
Mean Proportion Correct and Standard Deviations in Simple (N = 3) and Complex (N = 3)
Trials for High, Medium, and Low NFC Groups.
High NFC Medium NFC Low NFC All

n = 64 n = 64 n = 64 N = 192
.83 .85 .76 .81
Simple
(.222) (.205) (.316) (.254)
.84 .86 .77 .82
Complex
(.229) (.22) (.27) (.243)
.84 .85 .76 .82
Total
(.19) (.175) (.239) (.206)
The results showed a significant main effect for NFC group, F(2, 189) = 3.805, p = .024,
η2p = .039. Post hoc tests (i.e., LSD) indicated that participants in the High NFC group (M = .84)
performed significantly better than those in the Low NFC group (M =.76), p = .033. Participants
in the Medium NFC group (M =.85) also significantly outperformed those in the Low NFC
group (M =.76), p = .011. To ensure that this effect is indeed due to thinking strategy and not
condition, a mixed factorial ANCOVA was completed with notes and focus as covariates. This

test also revealed a main effect for NFC group, F(2, 187) = 3.134, p = .046, η2p = .032. Post hoc
tests (i.e., LSD) only revealed a significant difference between the Medium NFC group (M =.85)
and the Low NFC group (M = .76), p = .018. These results suggest that predispositions for
thinking styles can affect performance on decision tasks.
Discussion
The main purpose of this thesis was to investigate and challenge the findings from Mikels
et al. (2011), who concluded: “when the going gets tough, go with your gut—but with the
qualification that one should not overthink their decision” (Mikels et al., 2011, p. 10). Based on
the results of the replication and experiment, some evidence was obtained to challenge this
conclusion.
Replication Trials and Ratings
In support of Mikels et al. (2011), participants in the feeling focused condition performed
better than those in the detail focused condition for the complex trial. Also, feeling focused
participants performed better for the complex trial compared to the simple trial. However, the
current study found that feeling focused participants performed better than detail focused
participants for both the simple and complex trial. Since there were more participants in the
current study and participants completed both the simple and complex trial, it may be possible
that individual differences played a role in Mikels et al. (2011).
The analysis for ratings in the replication experiment indicated that when feeling focused
participants made choices, 85.5 percent relied on their highest rated option, which was correct 83
percent of the time. This seems to indicate that ratings for the feeling focused participants were
used to make relatively accurate decisions. Participants may have judged each attribute
subjectively, but this judgment was guided by the objective nature of the attributes, which were

essentially framed as pros and cons (e.g., “this car gets above average gas mileage” or “this car
gets below average gas mileage”). Most people would agree that a fuel efficient car is good;
however, the exact value or intensity of affect may vary slightly from person to person (e.g.,
good to very good). It is interesting that feeling focused participants performed better for the
complex trial (95%) than the simple trial (69%). It is possible that this slight variation in
judgment could have been reduced when participants made more subjective judgments during
the complex trial. For instance, the quality of an average (e.g., average student test score)
increases when there is more data (e.g., more students). However, since all participants
completed the simple trial prior to the complex trial, this finding could have been due to a
practice effect.
In the Mikels et al. (2011) experiment, participants did not have a rating sheet to assist
them in making a choice, they were only able to rely on memory. In an attempt to show that
participants in the feeling focused group performed better due to focus, Mikels et al. (2011)
compared the amount of recalled attributes for the feeling focused and detail focused conditions,
which was not significant. This seems to strengthen the point that participants in the feeling
focused condition only had to remember how many attributes were good (i.e., pros) or bad (i.e.,
cons) instead of having to remember the attributes themselves.
Main Experiment
This experiment was designed to investigate an alternate explanation of the results found
by Mikels et al. (2011) by adding a memory manipulation. Since it was conceivable that ratings
were partially responsible for the increased performance of the feeling focused condition,
participants did not make any kind of ratings during the experiment. In contrast to Mikels et al.
(2011) and the replication, there were no differences between the focus conditions. That is, no

differences in performance were noted between feeling focused and detail focused conditions.
The only significant difference in choice accuracy was due to the memory manipulation, which
was demonstrated by the main effect for notes.
Based on the replication and experiment, it appears that the findings from the Mikels et
al. (2011) study were confounded with memory as hypothesized. For instance, participants in the
feeling focused condition only had to remember how many attributes were rated as good (i.e.,
pros) or bad (i.e., cons), which gave them an advantage since there was less strain on memory.
When participants did not make ratings or take notes, differences between focus conditions were
nonexistent. Also, there were no differences in the amount of notes, amount of detail, emotional
content, or use of symbols between the feeling focused and detail focused participants who took
notes. It seems clear that participants in the feeling focused conditions performed better due to
the nature of the ratings and reduced strain on memory instead of focus.
In addition to being confounded with memory, the results seem to be inconsistent with
the affect heuristic and UTT. According to the affect heuristic, individuals use immediate
emotional reactions to guide decisions (Slovic et al., 2002), not multiple subjective judgments.
UTT states that individuals make better decisions when relying on System 1 processing,
compared to System 2 processing. Although it is possible for an individual to make relatively
accurate decisions based on numerous subjective judgments that may or may not be made with
ease, this depends on the quality of the subjective estimates, the context in which they are used,
and the amount of deliberation (Halpern, 2014). It is also difficult to determine the quality of
these judgments, because of their subjective nature. However, during the Mikels et al. (2011) and
replication experiment, participants made subjective judgments based on objective information,
which may have decreased the impact of personal attitudes. With this in mind, it is possible that

feeling focused participants in both experiments were making higher quality decisions because
they had less strain on memory, were utilizing multiple judgments, and were thinking critically
about each option before making a decision (i.e., engaging in System 2 over System 1).
Experiments using both feeling focus and detail focus conditions may be able to test these ideas
by 1) creating an attribute chunking condition for half of the participants, 2) by having half of
participants only rate the value of each four attribute block, or 3) by putting half of the
participants under time pressure when making the decision, thereby reducing time to deliberate.
Research in decision making typically does not look at individual differences, however,
some studies have found that individual differences play a significant role (Fleischhauer et al.,
2010; Mata et al., 2012; Peters et al. 2006; Thompson et. al., 2011). The analysis of High,
Medium, and Low NFC groups in the current study suggests that differences in thinking
strategies are good indicators of performance in decision making tasks. These findings suggest
that people who prefer to engage in System 2 thinking over System 1 thinking make higher
quality decisions, which is in agreement with the majority of decision making literature (e.g.,
Kahneman, 2011; Halpern, 2014). Results also suggest that those who equally engage in both
System 1 and System 2 thinking could potentially make the best decisions overall, which agrees
with the individual difference literature previously discussed (Mata et al., 2012; Thompson et al.,
2011). Other researchers investigating individual differences in decision making have found
similar results. For instance, Peters et al. (2006) conducted an interesting study to investigate
individual differences in numerical ability (i.e., the ability to understand numerical concepts and
formats) and found that individuals low in numeracy (i.e., lower critical thinking skills) were
more likely to succumb to pitfalls of decision making, such as: framing effects, and reliance on

affect. Another study (Fleischhauer et al., 2010), investigated the relationship between the need
for cognition and various personality traits using confirmatory factor analysis, correlations, and
F-tests. Results indicated that those with a higher need for cognition (i.e., predisposition to
engage in System 2 processing) have more cognitive motivation to be correct, are more
cognitively active, have stronger goal orientation, and persistence.
Limitations and Future Research
In the current study, there were some limitations that should be considered. First, the
sample (61% female; mean age = 18.6; 79% freshman; 24% undeclared) was not very
representative of the general population. Second, participants made ratings in the replication
trials on physical rating sheets compared to the computer software used by Mikels et al. (2011).
This could have created a stronger reliance on ratings, since participants were able to see all of
their ratings, and were able to use them to make decisions. Third, the order of simple and
complex trials could have been counterbalanced. However, in the current experiment, there were
four conditions and four different orderings of options for a total of 16 separate conditions.
Adding these additional orderings would bring the total of separate conditions to 32, which
would have created difficultly when attempting to distribute participants equally throughout all
conditions. Fourth, the methodology to measure and focus on feelings in Mikels et al. (2011)
experiment and the replication experiment may have been tied to deliberate thought. It could be
argued that numerical values still represented feelings better than deliberation during both the
Mikels et al. (2011) study and the replication experiment. However, it is possible that
participants could have increased reliance on feelings if they were put under time pressure,
instead of having unlimited time, when making decisions. As mentioned earlier, research has
demonstrated that when individuals make decisions under time pressure, they rely more heavily

on affect (Finucane et al., 2000) and reduce cognitive deliberation (Maule & Svenson, 1993). It
is also possible that participants could have focused more on feelings if the attributes were more
ambiguous and open to interpretation, instead of being framed as either pros or cons. For
instance, instead of saying “this car gets above average gas mileage”, the attribute could say “this
car gets about 30 miles per gallon”. 5) It would have been more beneficial to have participants
fill out the REI prior to the start of the experiment to ensure an equal distribution for System 1
and System 2 thinkers. This had been considered, but was rejected based on time concerns and
the possibility that it would inform participants of the purposes of the study. Based on evidence
from the current study and others (Peters et al. 2006), individual differences in thinking styles
should be considered in future studies involving judgment and decision making.
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Appendix A
Attribute Lists for All Four Trial Sets
Table B1
The 12 Negative and Positive Attributes Used for Car in Complex Trials, Attributes Used
in Simple Trials are marked with an Asterisk.
Negative Positive
This car has poor gas mileage* This car has good gas mileage*
This car is not good for the environment* This car is relatively good for the environment*
This car has a poor sound system* This car has a good sound system*
This car is not very new* This car is very new*
This car has poor handling This car has good handling
This car has a small trunk This car has a large trunk
This car is not available in many colors This car is available in many different colors
This car has poor service This car has excellent service
This car has poor legroom This car has a lot of leg room
This car is difficult to drive This car is easy to drive
This car has no cup holders This car has cup holders
This car does not have a sunroof This car has a sunroof

Table B2
The 12 Negative and Positive Attributes Used for Job in Complex Trials, Attributes
Used in Simple Trials are marked with an Asterisk.
Negative Positive
This Job has lower than average wages* This Job has higher than average wages*
This Job has no opportunities for advancement* This Job has opportunities for advancement*
This Job has a high stress level* This Job has a low stress level*
This Job is not very flexible with work schedules* This Job is very flexible with work schedules*
The workplace temperature is not well controlled The workplace temperature is well controlled
The other employees argue and complain a lot The other employees do not argue or complain a lot
This Job does not have paid breaks This Job has paid breaks
The managers and supervisors are rude to employees The managers and supervisors are polite to employees
This work environment contains health hazards This work environment contains no health hazards
This work environment is small and cramped This work environment is large and open
This Job does not provide health insurance or benefits This Job provides health insurance or benefits
This Job has a strict dress policy This Job does not have a strict dress policy
Table B3

The 12 Negative and Positive Attributes Used for Apartment in Complex Trials,
Attributes Used in Simple Trials are marked with an Asterisk.
Negative Positive
This apartment has smaller than average bedrooms* This apartment has larger than average bedrooms*
This apartment has higher than average rent* This apartment has lower than average rent*
This apartment does not have air conditioning* This apartment has air conditioning*
This apartment has not been renovated recently* This apartment has been renovated recently*
This apartment does not have a washer and dryer This apartment has a washer and dryer
This apartment is not walking distance from campus This apartment is walking distance from campus
This apartment has low quality maintenance service This apartment has high quality maintenance service
This apartment does not have closets or storage space This apartment has closets or storage space
This apartment does not have a patio or balcony This apartment has a patio or balcony
This apartment has a small living room This apartment has a large living room
This apartment does not have a parking lot This apartment has a parking lot
This apartment does not have kitchen appliances This apartment has kitchen appliances
Table B4
The 12 Negative and Positive Attributes Used for Computer in Complex Trials,
Attributes Used in Simple Trials are marked with an Asterisk.
Negative Positive
This Computer does not come with a word This Computer comes with a word
processor* processor*
This Computer has no wireless internet This Computer has wireless internet
capabilities* capabilities*
This Computer has a lower than average This Computer has a higher than average
lifespan* lifespan*
This Computer has difficulty running multiple This Computer has no difficulty running
programs* multiple programs*
This Computer does not come with virus
This Computer comes with virus protection
protection
This Computer has lower than average This Computer has higher than average
processing speed processing speed
This Computer is above average in chance of This Computer is below average in chance of
overheating overheating
This Computer has no built in speaker system This Computer has a built in speaker system
This Computer does not come with a warranty This Computer comes with a warranty

This Computer is smaller and lighter than

This Computer is larger and heavier than average
average
This Computer has below average memory This Computer has above average memory
This Computer has lower than average battery This Computer has higher than average
life battery life

Appendix B
Consent Form Given to Participants Prior to Experiment
Human Subjects Consent Form

Making Decisions When Relevant Information is Available
Alexander Hough
Shippensburg University
Department of Psychology
During this experiment, you will be provided with information about hypothetical objects
and will be asked to choose which hypothetical object you believe is the best choice. You will
also be asked to complete a demographics form and a questionnaire concerning your attitudes
towards making choices. Overall, this experiment will take approximately one hour.
Participant’s rights
I understand that this study may contribute to the understanding of how people make
decisions when information is available to them. I understand that there are no risks involved in
this study that differ from everyday decision processes. I understand that my responses will be
kept confidential along with my personal information. This consent form will be kept separate
from the collected data. Names will not appear in the final report; participants will be labeled by
number. I understand that I may skip any questions that I do not feel comfortable answering and
may decide to withdraw from this study at any time. After completion, I will be a given a full
explanation of the purposes of this study. If any part of this study makes me uncomfortable, I
may contact Dr. Lea Adams by telephone (717) 477-1115 or by email at ltadam@ship.edu, or I
may contact Dr. Jennifer Clements by telephone (717) 477-1633 or by email at
jaclem@ship.edu.
Consent to participate
I acknowledge that I am at least eighteen years of age and understand my rights as a
research participant as described above. I also acknowledge that my participation in this
study is completely voluntary.
Print name:______________________________
Signature:_______________________________
Date:___________________________________

Appendix C
Choice Sheet for Entire Experiment
Choice Sheet
First Set (Cars)
1. First Trial (Four pieces of information)
Car A Car B Car C Car D
2. Second Trial (Twelve pieces of information)
Car A Car B Car C Car D
Second Set (Jobs)
Job A Job B Job C Job D
Job A Job B Job C Job D
Third Set (Apartments)
Apartment A Apartment B Apartment C Apartment D
Apartment A Apartment B Apartment C Apartment D
Fourth Set (Computers)
Computer A Computer B Computer C Computer D
Computer A Computer B Computer C Computer D


Appendix D
Rating Sheet used during Simple Trials for the Feeling Focused Condition
First trial set

Please indicate your feelings about the current option by circling a number after each
attribute. 1 (very negative) 2 (negative) 3 (somewhat negative) 4 (neutral) 5 (somewhat positive)
6 (positive) 7 (very positive)
Car A
1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Car B
1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Car C
1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Car D
1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Rating Sheet used during Complex Trials for the Detail Focused Condition
First trial set

Please indicate how well you are remembering the current option by circling a number after
each attribute. 1 (not at all) 2 (not much) 3 (very little) 4 (neutral) 5 (somewhat) 6 (pretty well) 7
(very well).
Car A
5. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
12. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
13. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
14. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
15. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
16. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Car B
1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
12. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Car C
1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
12. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Car D
1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
12. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Appendix E
Note Sheet used for Note Taking Conditions
A B C D
Trial 1
Trial 2
Trial 3
Trial 4
Trial 5
Trial 6

Appendix F
Demographic Questionnaire
Demographics
Age: ____________________
Gender: Male Female
Major: ____________________
Current GPA: ____________________
Class Standing: Freshman Sophomore Junior Senior Graduate Student


Appendix G
The Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI-revised; Pacini & Epstein, 1999)
The items are rated using a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (definitely not true of myself) to
5 (definitely true of myself).
Rationality scale (Modified Need for Cognition Scale)

I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something. (re‒)
I’m not that good at figuring out complicated problems. (ra‒)
I enjoy intellectual challenges. (re)
I am not very good at solving problems that require careful logical analysis. (ra‒)
I don’t like to have to do a lot of thinking. (re‒)
I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking. (re)
Thinking is not my idea of an enjoyable activity. (re‒)
I am not a very analytical thinker. (ra‒)
Reasoning things out carefully is not one of my strong points. (ra‒)
I prefer complex problems to simple problems. (re)
Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction. (re‒)
I don’t reason well under pressure. (ra‒)
I am much better at figuring things out logically than most people. (ra) I have a logical mind. (ra)
I enjoy thinking in abstract term. (re)
I have no problem thinking things through carefully. (ra)
Using logic usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life. (ra)
Knowing the answer without having to understand the reasoning behind it is good enough for
me. (re‒)
I usually have clear, explainable reasons for my decisions. (ra)
Learning new ways to think would be very appealing to me. (re)
Experientiality scale (Modified Faith in Intuition Scale)

I like to rely on my intuitive impressions. (ee)
I don’t have a very good sense of intuition. (ea‒)
Using my gut feelings usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life. (ea)
I believe in trusting my hunches. (ea)
Intuition can be a very useful way to solve problems. (ee)
I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action. (ee)
I trust my initial feelings about people. (ea)
When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my gut feelings. (ea)
If I were to rely on my gut feelings, I would often make mistakes. (ea‒)
I don’t like situations in which I have to rely on intuition. (ee‒)
I think there are times when one should rely on one’s intuition. (ee)
I think it is foolish to make important decisions based on feelings. (ee‒)
I don’t think it is a good idea to rely on one’s intuition for important decisions. (ee‒)
I generally don’t depend on my feelings to help me make decisions. (ee‒)
I hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my deepest gut feelings to find an answer. (ea)

I would not want to depend on anyone who described himself or herself as intuitive. (ee‒)
My snap judgments are probably not as good as most people’s. (ea‒)
I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions. (ee)
I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong, even if I can’t explain how I know. (ea)
I suspect my hunches are inaccurate as often as they are accurate. (ea‒)
Note . The name of the subscale to which each item belongs appears in parentheses, ee =
Experiential Engagement; ea = Experiential Ability; re = Rational Engagement; ra = Rational
Ability. A minus sign (—) with a scale name denotes reverse scoring.

Appendix H
Experimental Debriefing
Thank you for participating in my study. I know it may have been a little mentally
exhausting. In this debriefing, I will tell you a little bit about my study, and then I will briefly
discuss the field of decision making and why it is important.
We are required to make decisions every day, whether we decide what to eat for breakfast
or what to wear. When it comes to making choices, there are two ways of thinking that help us
make decisions. These ways of thinking are usually called system one and system two. For
instance, an individual could use their feelings and intuitions to make a decision (i.e., system
one) or an individual could use critical thinking or analytical thought, which requires effortful
thinking (i.e., system two). The main goal of this experiment is to determine whether
feelings/intuitions or critical thinking/analytical thought can help an individual remember
information and use it to make a decision. A second goal of this experiment is to determine
which type of thinking can lead to better decisions. By studying these types of issues within the
field of decision making, we could help individuals make better decisions. This is particularly
useful for large corporations, the military, recovering drug addicts, college students, etc.
Most studies in decision making have demonstrated that individuals tend to make higher
quality decisions when they engage in critical thinking and consider all possible alternatives.
Typically, people make lower quality decisions when they use their feelings or intuitions to make
a decision, unless they are an expert with the subject matter (e.g., a chess expert). There are times
when a non-expert’s feelings or intuitions can lead to decisions better than chance (e.g., 50/50),
but this is only found when there is no relevant information, or when individuals have no
knowledge about the subject matter. It is common for individuals to make decisions based on
feelings and intuitions, even when it would be more beneficial to engage in more effortful
thinking. People tend to do this because they do not like making decisions, and they perceive
critical thinking to be time consuming and aversive. Although most decisions are not too
important, remember that when you face an important decision, you are more likely to make a
good decision if you think hard about it and consider all the possible outcomes before deciding
which option to take.
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Affect, Critical Thinking, and Decision Making

Thesis · January 2015

Cognitive effort in individual and group tasks View project

Cuttlefish learning View project

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

Alexander Ryan Hough

System 2 processing is essentially analytical thought activated by conscious deliberation, or

demonstrated that predispositions to rely on System 1 or System 2 can significantly affect

differences in thinking strategies.

Keywords: Judgment, feelings, critical thinking, heuristics, choice

Affect, Critical Thinking, and Decision Making.

Decision making is an important process which is involved in everyday activities. An

affect compared to critical thinking.

How and Why We Make Decisions

Objective probability involves using numbers to determine the mathematical likelihood

theoretical estimates based on mathematical principles.

probability subjectively. If a student is asked to generate the probability of getting an A on an

may not be accurate.

an actual decision can be made.

and are willing to put forth the effort.

To understand the thought processes involved in decision making, researchers have

when an individual consciously deliberates. Critical thinking is considered System 2 processing.

Anytime an individual is aware of their thoughts or knowledge (i.e., metacognition), System 2 is

Individuals frequently use heuristics or shortcut strategies as a guide for making

increases performance (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 2014). Kahneman (2011) suggests

for the purposes of this thesis, only availability will be discussed.

The availability heuristic is characterized by assessing probability or frequency by

heuristic is mostly explained by System 1 as an automatic operation of associative memory

probability or frequency of occurrence. An early experiment by Tversky and Kahneman (1973)

larger amount of names.

In another demonstration of availability, Kahneman and Tversky (1973) asked

a demonstration of this phenomenon by asking participants to generate ways to improve a

activation of System 2. However, it is possible to reduce the bias caused by availability, if

information provided by System 1 is still available and can be difficult to ignore.

2 thinking) to organize and categorize information in memory to enhance the availability of

intuition, it is often referred to as automatic or fast thinking, because it is based on extensive

Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002).

The Influence and Availability of Affect

decisions, but as an operation of System 1 it is prone to error.

Probability and Frequency

Epstein, 1994; Lowenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001).

Type and Intensity of Affect

questions are framed, which is discussed later.

1 or System 2 to make a judgment or decision.

Influence of Context on Decision Strategies

Presentation and Focus

quality of these decisions would be reduced.

ice cream (Hsee, 1998).

engage in System 2 thinking (e.g., cognitive psychologists, physicists, or philosophers).

judgments or decisions. To test individual differences in decision strategies, researchers created

in the next section.

Integration of Processing Systems

instance, Thompson, Prowse Turner, and Pennycook (2011) conducted an experiment to

metacognitive awareness and response accuracy.

Pachur et al. (2012) conducted an interesting experiment on risk perception by comparing

further experimentally investigated the availability heuristic by differentiating between direct

greatest risk of death).

all four experiments from the study will discussed in detail.

conscious deliberation, since they are typically not rational.

overall, compared to decisions without a focus, or those focusing on reason.

availability, objective information, or provided information), but when information is available,

individuals reduce their reliance on affect (Pachur et al., 2012).