Chapter II – CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION Chapter IV – ADHERENCE TO, OR DEPARTURE FROM, LANGUAGE OF

STATUTE LITERAL INTERPRETATION

B. POWER TO CONSTRUE
6. Index animi sermo est.
1. Legis interpretation legis vim obtinet. Speech is the index of intention.
Judicial construction and interpretation of a statute acquires the force of
law. Animus hominis est anima scripti.
The intention of the party is the soul.
Chapter III – AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION
Verba legis non est recedendum.
C. CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION From the words of the statute there should be no departure.

2. Contemporanea exposition est optima et fortissimo in lege. Maledicta et exposition quae corrumpit textum.
Contemporary construction is strongest in law. It is bad construction which corrupts the text.

Optima est legum interpres consuetudo. Littera scripta manet.

Custom is the best interpreter of a statute. The written word endures.

Regula pro lege, si deficit lex. Clausula rebus sic stantibus.

In default of the law, the maxim rules. Things thus standing.

3. Optimus interpres rerum usus. 7. Absoluta sentential expositore non indigent.

The best interpreter of the law is usage. When the language of the law is clear, no explanation is required.

Communis error facit jus. Dura lex sed lex.

Common error sometimes passes as current law. The law may be harsh but it is the law.

Quod ab initio non valet in tractu temporis non convalescit. Hoc quidem perquam durum est, sed ita lex scripta est.
That which was originally void, does not by lapse of time become valid. It is exceedingly hard, but so the law is written.

4. Ratihabitio mandato aequiparatur. B. DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL INTERPRETATION

Legislative ratification is equivalent to a mandate.
8. Aequitas nunquam contravenit legis.
5. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Equity never acts in contravention of the law.
Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled.
Aequum et bonum est lex legume.
Interest republicae ut sit finis litium. What is good and equal is the law of laws.
The interest of the state demands that there be an end to litigation.
Jus ars boni et aequi.
Law is the art of equity.
 It is better that words should have no operation at all than that they
9. Ratio legis est anima legis. should operate absurdly.
The reason of the law is the soul of the law.
Lex simper intendit quod convenit rationi.
Littera necat spiritus vivificate. The law always intends that which is in accordance with reason.
The letter kills but the spirit gives life.
Ubi eadem ratio ibi idem jus.
Verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservice. Like reason doth make like law.
Words ought to be more subservient to the intent, and not the intent to
the words. Argumentum a simili valet in lege.
An argument drawn from a similar case, or analogy, prevails in law.
Benignus leges interpretandae sunt, quod voluntas eraum conservetur.
Laws are to be construed liberally, so that their spirit and reason be De similibus idem est judicium.
preserved. Concerning similars, the judgment is the same.

Qui haret in littera haret in cortice.
He who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin deep
into its meaning.
Quando verba statute sunt speciali, ratio autem generalia, statum
generaliter est intelligendum.
When the words used in a statute are special, but the purpose of the law is
general, it should be read as the general expression.
Ubi eadem est ratio, ibi est eadem legis disposition.
Where there is the same reason, there is the same law
12. Ea est accipienda interpretation quae vitio caret.
That interpretation is to be adopted which is free from evil or injustice.
Lex injusta non est lex.
An unjust law is not a law.

10. Cessante rationi legis, cessat et ipsa lex. 13. Fiat justitia, ruat coelum .
When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. Let right be done, though the heavens fall.

11. Interpretatio talis in ambiguis simper fienda est ut evitetur Nemo est supra legis.
inconveniens et absurdum. Nobody is above the law.
Where there is ambiguity, the interpretation of such that will avoid
inconveniences and absurdity is to be adopted. Nulla potential supra legis esse debet.
No power must be above the law.
Legis construction non facit injuriam.
The construction of the law will not be such as to work injury or injustice. 14. Jurae naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria
fieri locupletiorem.
Argumentum ab inconvenient plurimum valet in lege. It is certainly not agreeable to natural justice that a stranger should reap
An argument drawn from inconvenience is forcible in law. the pecuniary produce of another man’s work.

Verba nihil operari melius est quam absurde. 15. Surplusagium non nocet.
Surplusage does not vitiate a statute.
 By the necessary implication of law.
Utile per inutile non vitiatur.
The useful is not vitiated by the non-useful. In eo quod plus sit, simper inest et minus.
16. Falsa demostratio non nocet, cum de corpore constat. The greater includes the lesser.
False description does not preclude construction nor vitiate the meaning
of the statute. Cui jurisdiction data est, ea quoque concessa esse videntur sine quibus
jurisdiction explicari non potuit.
Nil facit error nominis cum de corpora vel persona constat.
Error in name does not make an instrument inoperative when the When jurisdiction is given, all powers and means essential to its exercise
description is sufficiently clear. are also given.

Certum est quod certum reddi potest. 21. Ubi jus, ibi remedium.
That is sufficiently certain which can be made certain. Where there is a right, there is a remedy for violation thereof.

17. Ibi quid generaliter conceditur, inest haec exception, si non aliquid sit
contras jus basque.
Where anything is granted generally, exemption from rigid application of
law is implied; that nothing shall be contrary to law and right.
18. Summum jus, summa injuria.
The rigor of the law would be the highest injustice.
Jus summum saepe, summa est militia.
Extreme law is often extreme wrong.
19. Nemo tenetur ad impossibilia.
The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility.
Impossibilum nulla obigatio est.
There is no obligation to do an impossible thing.
Ubi jus incertum, ibi jus nullum.
Where the law is uncertain, there is no right.
22. Ex dolo malo non oritur action.
An action does not arise from fraud.
Nullius commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria.
No one may derive advantage from his own unlawful act.
In pari delicto potior est condition defendentis.
Where the parties are equally at fault, the position of the defending party
is the better one.
23. Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum.
What cannot, by law, be done directly cannot be done indirectly.

Lex non cogit ad impossibilia.

The law does not require an impossibility.

Lex non intendit aliquid impossible.

The law does not intend the impossible.

C. IMPLICATIONS

20. Ex necessitate legis.

 Statutory Construction made easy by a Freshman Sources of legislative intent

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 2012 Courts frequently look to the following sources in attempting to determine the
Rule1. Apply the Law when it is CLEAR. Do not Interpret or CONSTRUE. goals and purposes that the legislative body had in mind when it passed the
law:
Rule2 in StatCon is IBC, interpret before you  the text of the bill as proposed to the legislative body,
CONSTRUE. You CONSTRUE only when the written law is not enough to  amendments to the bill that were proposed and accepted or rejected,
give meaning and EFFECT to the INTENT of the LAW.  the record of hearings on the topic,
 legislative records or journals,
 speeches and floor debate made prior to the vote on the bill,
literal meaning or plain meaning rule  legislative subcommittee minutes, factual findings, and/or reports,
dura lex sed lex  other relevant statutes which can be used to understand the definitions in the
doctrine of necessary implication statute on question,
ejusdem generis  other relevant statutes which indicate the limits of the statute in question,
limitations of ejusdem generis  legislative files of the executive branch, such as the governor or president,
expressio unios est exclusio alterius  case law prior to the statute or following it which demonstrates the problems
negative- opposite doctrine the legislature was attempting to address with the bill, or
application of expressio unius rule  constitutional determinations (i.e. "Would Congress still have passed certain
doctrine of casus omissus sections of a statute 'had it known' about the constitutional invalidity of the
doctrine of last antecedent other portions of the statute?").
reddeddo singula singulis  legislative intent- the reason for passing the law
stare decisis
res judicata literal meaning or plain meaning rule. If the statute is clear, plain and
obiter dictum free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation.
A legislature is a kind of deliberative assembly with the power to pass, you get the meaning of the law from the word per word written law. Literal
amend, and repeal laws.[1] The law created by a legislature is meaning or plain rule means INTERPRETATION of the LAW. ALL
called legislation or statutory law. In addition to enacting laws, legislatures WORDS words in a statute should if possible, be given effect.
usually have exclusive authority to raise or lower taxes and adopt the
budget and other money bills. Legislatures are known by many names, the Where a statute defines a word or phrase employed therein, the word or
most common being parliament and congress, although these terms also phrase should not, by CONSTRUCTION, be given a different meaning. When
have more specific meanings. the legislature defines a word used in a statute, it does not usurp the courts
function to interpret the laws but it merely LEGISLATES what should form
part of the law itself.
Legislative intent
In law, the legislative intent of the legislature in enacting legislation may It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to define words, words
sometimes be considered by the judiciary when interpreting the law
and phrases used in statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and
(see judicial interpretation). The judiciary may attempt to assess legislative
common usage meaning which is supported by the maxim generalia verba
intent where legislation is ambiguous, or does not appear to directly or
sunt generaliter intelligenda or what is generally spoken shall be generally
adequately address a particular issue, or when there appears to have been
a legislative drafting error. understood. It is also the same as GENERALI DICTUM GENERALITIR EST
When a statute is clear and unambiguous, the courts have said, repeatedly, INTERPRETANDUM a general statement is understood in a general sense.
that the inquiry into legislative intent ends at that point. It is only when a
statute could be interpreted in more than one fashion that legislative intent WORDS MUST BE SUBSERVIENT TO THE INTENT and not intent to
must be inferred from sources other than the actual text of the statute. words.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. When the law does not
distinguish, do not distinguish.
dura lex sed lex or HOC QUIDEM PERQUAM DURUM EST, SED ITA LEX
SCRIPTA EST.
The law maybe harsh, but is still the law. It is exceedingly hard, but
so the law is written.
doctrine of necessary implication this doctrine states that what is implied
in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is
expressed. Every statute is understand by implication to contain all
such provision as may be necessary to effectuate to its object and
purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which
it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may
be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. The principle is expressed in
the maxim EX NECESSITATE LEGIS or from the necessity of the law.
ejusdem generis . THE SAME KIND OR SPECIE. This is to give effect to
both the particular and general words, by treating the particular words as
indicating the class and the general words as indicating all that is
embraced in said class, although not specifically named by the particular
words.
The rule of ejusdem generis is not of universal application; it should be used
to carry out, not to defeat the intent or purpose of the law; the rule must
give way in favor of the legislative intent;
limitations of ejusdem generis
requisites:
1. Statue contains an enumeration of particular and specific words,
followed by a general word or phrase;
2. The particular and specific words constitute a class or are of the
same kind;
3. The enumeration of the particular and specific words is not
exhaustive or is not merely by examples;
4. There is no indication of legislative intent to give general words
or phrases a broader meaning.
expressio unios est exclusio alterius.
the expression of 1 person, thing or consequence IMPLIES
the EXCLUSION of OTHERS or
What is expressed puts an end to that which is implied.
EXPRESSUM FACIT CESSARE TACITUM, where a Statute, by its terms, is
expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or
CONSTRUCTION, be extended to other matters.
These also follows that when a statute specifically lists downs the exceptions,
what is not list down as an exception is ACCEPTED express in the
maxim EXCEPTIO FIRMAT REGULAM IN CASIBUS NON EXCEPTIS,
the express exception, exemption or savings excludes others.
application of expressio unius rule. This auxiliary rule is used
in CONSTRUCTION of statutes granting
powers, creating rights and remedies, restricting common rights,
and imposing penalties and forfeitures, as well as those statutes which
are strictly construed. It is only a tool and not a mandatory rule used for
ascertaining the legislative intent. The rule must also yield to legislative
intent.
negative- opposite doctrine, WHAT IS EXPRESSED PUTS AN END TO
WHAT IS IMPLIED is known as negative-opposite doctrine or argumentum
a contrario.
doctrine of casus omissus (case of omission) pro omisso habendus
est. A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to
have been omitted intentionally. This rule is not absolute if it can be
shown that the legislature did not intend to exclude the person, thing or
object from the enumeration. If such legislative intent is clearly indicated, the
COURT may supply the omission if to do so will carry out the intent of the
legislature and will not do violence to its language.
doctrine of last antecedent or AD PROXIMUM ANTECEDENS FIAL
RELATIO NISI IMPEDIATUR SENTENTIA or relative words refer to the
nearest antecedents, unless the context otherwise requires. QUALIFYING
WORDS restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they
are immediately associated.
The last antecedent rule is a doctrine of interpretation of a statute, by
which "Referential and qualifying phrases, where no contrary intention
appears, refer solely to the last antecedent." The rule is typically bound by
"common sense" and is flexible enough to avoid application that "would
involve an absurdity, do violence to the plain intent of the language, or if the
context for other reason requires a deviation from the rule." Evidence that
a qualifying phrase is supposed to apply to all antecedents instead
of only to the immediately preceding one may be found in the fact
that it is separated from the antecedents by a comma."
reddendo singula singulis when two descriptions makes it
impossible to reconcile, reconcile it to have a “singular meaning” to
settle the issue.
refers to each phrase or expression to its appropriate object, or let each be
put in its proper place, that is, the words should be taken DISTRIBUTIVELY
to effect that each word is to be applied to the subject to which it appears
by context most appropriate related and to which it is most applicable.
REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS, construction. By rendering each his
own; for example, when two descriptions of property are given together in
one mass, both the next of kin and the heir cannot take, unless in cases
where a construction can be made reddendo singula singulis, that the next
of kin shall take the personal estate and the heir at law the real estate. 14
Ves. 490. Vide 11 East,, 513, n.; Bac. Ab. Conditions, L.
Stare Decisis [Latin, Let the decision stand.] The policy of courts to abide
by or adhere to principles established by decisions in earlier cases. (stah-ray
duh-see-sis) n. Latin for "to stand by a decision," the doctrine that a trial
court is bound by appellate court decisions (precedents) on a legal question
which is raised in the lower court. Reliance on such precedents is required
of trial courts until such time as an appellate court changes the rule, for the
trial court cannot ignore the precedent (even when the trial judge believes it
is "bad law")
Res Judicata [Latin, A thing adjudged.] A rule that a final judgment on the
merits by a court having jurisdiction is conclusive between the parties to a
suit as to all matters that were litigated or that could have been litigated in
that suit.
The party asserting res judicata, having introduced a final judgment on the
merits, must then show that the decision in the first lawsuit was conclusive
as to the matters in the second suit. For example, assume that the plaintiff
in the first lawsuit asserted that she was injured in an auto accident. She
sues the driver of the other auto under a theory of Negligence. A jury returns
a verdict that finds that the defendant was not negligent. The injured driver
then files a second lawsuit alleging additional facts that would help her prove
that the other driver was negligent. A court would dismiss the second
lawsuit under res judicata because the second lawsuit is based on the
same Cause of Action (negligence) and the same injury claim.
Obiter Dictum[Latin, By the way.] Words of an
opinion entirely unnecessary for the decision of the case. A remark made or
opinion expressed by a judge in a decision upon a cause, "by the way", that
is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before the
court or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the
cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are
not binding as precedent.
AEQUITAS NUNQUAM CONTRAVENIT LEGIS . EQUITY never acts in
contravention of the law.
The reason of the Law is the Life of the Law or RATIO LEGIS ET
ANIMA.
Interpretation and CONSTRUCTION of Statutes must be done to
avoid evil and injustice. EA EST ACCIPIENDA INTERPRETATIO
QUAE VITIO CARET.
Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat, the
interpretation that will give the thing the EFFICACY is to be adopted. Law
must receive sensible interpretation to promote the ends for which they are
enacted. They should be given practical CONSTRUCTION that will give LIFE
to them, IF IT CAN BE DONE without doing VIOLENCE to reason.
UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT, A STATUTE must be interpreted
to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole avoiding the nullification
of provisions. IT is so that a legal provision must not be so construed as to
be a useless SURPLUSAGE. Accordingly, in case of Doubt or obscurity, that
construction should make the statute fully operative and effective. IT IS
PRESUMED THAT THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT DO A VAIN THING IN THE
ENACTMENT OF THE STATUTE.
In PARE MATERIA, of the same person or thing.
INTERPRETARE ET CONCORDARE LEGES LEGIBUS EST OPTIMUS
INTERPRETANDI MODUS, or every statute must be so CONSTRUED and
harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
Jurisprudence. ALL laws are presumed to be consistent with each
other.
DISTINGUE TEMPORA ET CONCORDABIS JURA, distinguish times
and you will harmonize laws.
IN enacting a STATUTE, the legislature is presumed to have been aware,
and taken into account, PRIOR LAWS on the subject of legislation. Thus,
conflict on same subject is not intended and if such occur, Court must
construe, through reconciliation to give effect to the statute. If it is
impossible to reconcile and harmonize, one statute has to give way
to the other. The latest statute shall prevail being the latest expression of
the legislative WILL.
A GENERAL LAW and a SPECIAL LAW are in pare materia. The fact that
one is general and the other special creates a presumption that the special
act is to be considered as remaining an exception of the General Act. One
as a General Law of the Land, the other as a LAW for a Particular
case. This shall apply all the time regardless of which law was enacted first.
CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTIONS or CONTEMPORARY
CONSTRUCTIONS are made by the EXECUTIVE Departments.
First type of Contemporary Constructions are the interpretations of the
Executive on Statutes, for them to implement it, they must understand it and
interpret it if the language of the law is AMBIGUOUS. The executive makes
RULES or IRRs for this statutes, or ADMINISTRATIVE RULES and
PROCEDURES. These IRRs or RULES issued by the executive to execute the
Statute are CONTEMPORARY Construction.
Second Type of Contemporary Constructions are the INTERPRETATIONS of
the JUSTICE Secretary in carrying out PENAL LAWS and all OTHER LAWS,
under her are the PROSECUTORS, FISCALS of the Philippine Republic. The
issuances on how laws are to be prosecuted are CONTEMPORARY
CONSTRUCTION of the Justice Secretary.
The third type are the DECISIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES
handling disputes in a QUASI-JUDICIAL MANNER. These decisions are based
on their UNDERSTANDING of Statutes passed by congress, laws that are
enforced. These are CONTEMPORARY INTERPRETATIONS and
Constructions.
THESE CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTIONS STATUTES HAPPEN, WHEN
THERE ARE NO ACTUAL CONTROVERSIES QUESTIONING THE
VALIDITY OF STATUTES IN THE SUPREME COURT, therefore,NO
STARE DECISIS HAVE YET BEEN MADE. IF THERE ARE JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATIONS AND CONSTRUCTIONS, THEN THE JUDICIAL
CONSTRUCTIONS ARE governing and are THE ONES followed BY
THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS once promulgated by the Supreme
Court.
CONGRESS, NOT BEING THE CONSTITUTIONALLY POWER TO INTERPRET
AND CONSTRUE THE LAWS THEY MAKE, MAY ALSO DO CONTEMPORARY
CONSTRUCTION IN FOLLOWING STATUTES THAT THEY THEMSELVES ARE
BOUND TO FOLLOW.
WITH THE GRANT OF POWERS, RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES IS ALSO THE
RIGHT TO INCIDENTAL POWERS OF THE POWERS, RIGHTS AND
PRIVILEGES. THE GREATER POWER IMPLIES INCIDENTAL LESSER
POWER. This is so because the greater includes the lesser as
expressed in the maxim, in eo quod plus sit, simper inest et
minus.THERE SHALL BE NO CONSTRUCTION TO GIVE EFFECT TO A
LAW THAT SHALL MAKE IT MORE POWERFUL THAN WHAT WAS
INTENDED BY THE LAW.
Every statute is understood by IMPLICATION, to contain such provisions as
maybe necessary to EFFECTUATE its object and purpose, or to make
effective Rights, powers, privileges or JURISDICTION which it grants,
including all such COLLATERAL and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly
and LOGICALLY inferred from its TERMS, as expressed in the maxim, Ex
necessitate legis or from the NECESSITY of the LAW. Doctrine of
Necessary Implication.
WHAT CANNOT BE DONE DIRECTLY CANNOT BE DONE INDIRECTLY.
QUANDO ALIQUID PROHIBETUR EX DIRECTO, PROHIBETUR ET PER
OBLIQUUM.
WHAT IS AUTOLIMITATION?
Doctrine of Autolimitation—It is the doctrine where the Philippines adheres
to principles of international law as a limitation to the exercise of its sovereignty.
Functus officio an officer or agency whose mandate has expired either
because of the arrival of an expiry date or because an agency has
accomplished the purpose for which it was created. Function is mere
FORMALITY.
Sin perjuico judgments are judgment, w/o any stated facts in support
of the conclusion.
RULES in STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The solemn decisions of the judges upon a statute become part of the
statute ; and the security of men's lives and property, require that they should be
adhered to: for precedents serve to regulate our conduct ; and there is more danger
to be apprehended from uncertainty, than from any exposition; because, when the
rule is settled, men know how to conform to it; but, when all is uncertain, they are
left in the dark, and constantly liable to error; for the same offence which, at one
time, was thought entitled to clergy, at another, may be deemed capital ; and thus the
life or death of the citizen will be made to depend, not upon a fixt rule, but upon the
opinion of the judge, who may happen to try him, than which a more miserable state
of things cannot be conceived.
1. Presumption of Correctness
a. "When testing the constitutional validity of statutes, courts shall presume the
statute to be valid." Consequently, the burden to show the constitutional defect is on
the challenger. "Every act of the legislature is presumed to be constitutional, and the
Constitution is to be given a liberal construction so as to sustain the enactment in
question, if practicable." "When the constitutionality of an act is challenged, a heavy
burden of proof is thrust upon the party making the challenge. All laws are presumed
to be constitutional and this presumption is one of the strongest known to the law.
b. "Another rule of statutory construction requires the presumption that, in enacting
statutes, the CONGRESS has full knowledge of existing law and interpretations
thereof . Although the repeal of statutes by implication is not favored, if two statutes
are in pari materia, then to the extent that their provisions are irreconcilably
inconsistent and repugnant, the latter enactment repeals or amends the earlier
enacted statute.
c. "The legislature is presumed to know the law when enacting legislation.
d. When amendments are enacted soon after controversies arise "as to the
interpretation of the original act, it is logical to regard the amendment as a
legislative interpretation of the original act, a formal change-rebutting the
presumption of substantial change.
e. " We "assume that the legislature chose, with care, the words it
used when it enacted the relevant statute."
f. when current and prior versions of a statute are at issue, there is a
presumption that the CONGRESS, in amending a statute, intended to
effect a substantive change in the law. "Further, we assume that
CONGRESS’ amendments to a statute are purposeful, rather than
unnecessary.
g. "The Supreme Court repeatedly has affirmed that it is a presumption of
statutory construction that, where both general and specific statutes appear to
address a matter, CONGRESS intends the specific statute to control the subject
h. "When a statute begins with the phrase "notwithstanding any other provision
of law," it is presumed that CONGRESS intended to override any potential
conflicts with earlier legislation.
i. "The construction of statutes by agencies charged with
administration of those statutes is entitled to great weight. A
decision of an agency specified to execute the law made by CONGRESS carries
great weight and is entitled to deference unless it is proven the agency erred. The
grant of regulatory authority extends only to duties or powers conferred by law. As
such, "regulations, promulgated pursuant to definitive statutory authority, have the
force and effect of law. Moreover, those regulations which "clearly and explicitly
mirror" statutory authority are likeliest to be sustained. Any regulation of the
Department must be reasonably grounded in an identifiable and definitive statutory
foundation. "Generally, the court accords substantial deference to an agency's
interpretations of its own regulations. Provided the interpretation "does not
violate the Constitution, it must be given 'controlling weight unless it is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.
j. we will overturn COURT’s decision only if it can be fairly characterized
as "arbitrary or capricious" and thus a "clear abuse of delegated discretion."
On the other hand, an "agency does not possess specialized competence
over the interpretation of a statute merely because it addresses topics within
the agency's delegable authority. Pure statutory construction, a matter
within the "core competency of the judiciary," . "This axiom stems from
basic principles of separation of powers. It is emphatically the province and
duty of the JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT to say what the law is. It necessarily
follows that the a priori question whether the statute delegates or withholds
discretion is itself a question of statutory interpretation, one implicating our
duty of de novo review."
k. "The circuit court nonetheless deferred to the Technical Review Board's
reasoning, correctly noting that courts give "great deference" to an agency's
interpretation of its own regulations. This deference stems from Code § 2.2-
4027, which requires that reviewing courts "take due account" of the
"experience and specialized competence of the agency" promulgating the
regulation. Even so, "deference is not abdication, and it requires us to accept
only those agency interpretations that are reasonable in light of the principles
of construction courts normally employ. No matter how one calibrates judicial
deference, the administrative power to interpret a regulation does not
include the power to rewrite it. When a regulation is "not ambiguous,"
judicial deference "to the agency's position would be to permit the agency,
under the guise of interpreting a regulation, to create de facto a new
regulation." Though agencies may be tempted to adjudicate their way
around unwanted regulations, such overreaching undermines the notice and
public hearing procedures of the rulemaking process - thereby putting in
jeopardy the "enhanced political accountability of agency policy decisions
adopted through the rulemaking process" and the democratic virtue of
allowing "all potentially affected members of the public an opportunity to
participate in the process of determining the rules that affect them.
l. "However, whenever an "agency's statutory interpretation conflicts with the
language of the statute or when the interpretation has not been consistently and
regularly applied, the usual deference accorded to an agency's interpretation should
be withheld.
m. When Congress enacts an imprecise statute that it commits to the
implementation of an executive agency, it has no control over that
implementation (except, of course, through further, more precise,
legislation). The legislative and executive functions are not
combined. But when an agency promulgates an imprecise rule, it leaves to itself
the implementation of that rule, and thus the initial determination of the rule's
meaning. And though the adoption of a rule is an exercise of the executive rather
than the legislative power, a properly adopted rule has fully the effect of law. It
seems contrary to fundamental principles of separation of powers to permit
the person who promulgates a law to interpret it as well.
Deferring to an agency's interpretation of a statute does not encourage Congress, out
of a desire to expand its power, to enact vague statutes; the vagueness effectively
cedes power to the Executive. By contrast, deferring to an agency's interpretation of
its own rule encourages the agency to enact vague rules which give it the power, in
future adjudications, to do what it pleases.
Construed Against the State/ Vagueness
a. "It is an ancient maxim of the law that all such statutes must be
construed strictly against the state and favorably to the liberty of
the citizen. The maxim is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of
individuals and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the
legislature and not in the judicial department. No man incurs a penalty unless the act
which subjects him to it is clearly within the spirit and letter of the statute which
imposes such penalty. There can be no constructive offenses, and before a man can
be punished his case must be plainly and unmistakably within the statute. If these
principals are violated, the fate of the accused is determined by the arbitrary
discretion of the judges and not by the express authority of the law."
b. "When a statute is penal in nature, it "must be strictly construed against the
STATE and in favor of an accused.
c. "While it is true that penal statutes must be strictly construed against the
STATE in criminal cases, "we will not apply 'an unreasonably restrictive
interpretation of the statute' that would subvert the legislative intent expressed
therein.
d. "In determining whether a legislative enactment is unconstitutionally vague, the
Supreme Court has considered whether the words used have a well-settled . . .
meaning . . . (citing dictionary to determine "generally understood" meaning for
adjective in ordinance). "A penal statute is void for vagueness if it both fails to give
a person of ordinary intelligence notice that her contemplated conduct is forbidden
by the statute and encourages selective prosecution
Statutory Exceptions, Negative Element v. Affirmative Defense
1) "When construing PENAL STATUTES which contain qualifications,
exceptions or exemptions to their application, the limiting language may be viewed
as a negative element of the offense which the prosecution must
disprove. Alternately, the court may determine that the exemption is a statutory
defense, which the accused can assert to defeat the prima facie case of the
prosecution. In determining whether specific limiting language is an element of the
offense or a statutory defense, a court should look both to the intent of the statute as
a whole and the ability of the respective parties to assert the existence or absence of
the underlying facts sustaining the applicability of the limitation. When determining
whether the limiting language is a negative element or a statutory defense, this Court
has identified four factors to be considered: 'the wording of the exception and its role
in relation to the other words in the statute; whether in light of the situation
prompting legislative action, the exception is essential to complete the general
prohibition intended; whether the exception makes an excuse or justification for what
would otherwise be criminal conduct, i.e., sets forth an affirmative defense; and
whether the matter is peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant.' An
application of these factors to the present case demonstrates that the phrase "except
as provided by law," as used in Code § 29.1-553, establishes a statutory defense as
opposed to a negative element
2) "In order to resolve whether there is a due process violation in this case, we first
must address the threshold issue of whether the absence of a valid prescription is an
affirmative defense or a negative element of the offense. If it is the latter, the burden
of proof is on the STATE, and it cannot be shifted to the accused...When construing
penal statutes which contain qualifications, exceptions or exemptions to their
application, the limiting language may be viewed as a negative element of the offense
which the prosecution must disprove. Alternately, the court may determine that the
exemption is a statutory defense, which the accused can assert to defeat the prima
facie case of the prosecution. The ACCUSED BEARS THE BURDEN OF
PRODUCING EVIDENCE OF THE NEGATION of circumstances sufficient to
raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt. In determining whether specific limiting
language is an element of the offense or a statutory defense, a court should
look both to the intent of the statute as a whole and the ability of
the respective parties to assert the existence or absence of the underlying
facts sustaining the applicability of the limitation. Accordingly, we should
consider the wording of the exception and its role in relation to the other words in
the statute; whether in light of the situation prompting legislative action, the
exception is essential to complete the general prohibition intended; whether the
exception makes an excuse or justification for what would otherwise be
criminal conduct, i.e., sets forth an affirmative defense; and whether the matter is
peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant. (It is undoubtedly the general
rule that the state must prove all the essential facts entering into the
description of the offense. But it has been held in many cases that when a
negation of a fact lies peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant it is
incumbent on him to establish that fact).
We next observe that the "valid prescription" exemption of Code § 18.2-250 relates
to a fact that would be solely within the knowledge of the accused. If we accept
appellant's contention that the STATE must prove appellant had no valid
prescription, the offense would be virtually unprovable. Under appellant's theory, to
obtain a conviction under the facts of this case, the STATE would be required to
prove that no medical professional, wherever located, in this Commonwealth or
elsewhere, had prescribed the drug to appellant. This would involve a nationwide
search of chain drugstores, as well as independent pharmacies, hospitals, prison
infirmaries, etc. Appellant, at oral argument, conceded that such an undertaking
would most likely be impossible. CONGRESS clearly did not intend such a result, 7) "We review arguments regarding the CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE DE
nor would they enact such an impotent statute NOVO. When the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, we are guided by the
principle that all acts of CONGRESS are presumed to be constitutional. Where a
statute is constitutional as applied to a litigant, the litigant has no standing to
challenge the statute on the ground that it may be unconstitutional on its face, that
Constitutional Construction is, as applied to a third person in a hypothetical situation. As a general rule, "a party
1) "The rights enumerated in this Bill of Rights shall not be construed to limit other has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it has an
rights of the people not therein expressed. adverse impact on his own rights
8) "However, when a court, in determining the constitutionality of a statute,
2)“The office and purpose of the constitution is to shape and fix the limits of
departs from the express limitations of the Constitution and relies instead on
governmental activity. It thus proclaims, safeguards and preserves in basic
form the pre-existing laws, rights, mores, habits, and modes of thought and implied constitutional restrictions, the legislative usurpation must be very clear and
life of the people as developed under the common law and as existing at the palpable to justify the court’s holding that an enactment is unconstitutional.
time of its adoption to the extent and therein stated…The purpose and object
sought to be attained by the framers of the constitution is to be looked for, 9) "This Court’s jurisprudence with respect to Article IV, Section 12 is well
and the will and intent of the people who ratified it is to be made effective. As established. “The fact that many things of a diverse nature are authorized or
we have stated, CONGRESS may enact any law or take any action “not required to be done in the body of the act, though not expressed in its title is not
prohibited by express terms, or by necessary implications by the objectionable, if what is authorized by the act is germane to the object expressed
Constitution. in the title, or has a legitimate and natural association therewith, or is congruous
3)“A fundamental right is one EXPLICITLY OR IMPLICITLY implied therewith, the title is sufficient. “[I]f there is doubt as to the sufficiency of the
guaranteed by the constitution title, the doubt must be resolved in favor of its sufficiency, as courts will not
4) "It is an "established principle of constitutional law that a court will not rule upon declare an act of the legislature unconstitutional unless it is plainly so. The analysis
the constitutionality of a statute unless such a determination is absolutely necessary of a particular act must necessarily “stand on its own,” and we must look to both
to decide the merits of the case. A statute will be construed to avoid a constitutional the body and to the title of the act under scrutiny to determine whether the act
question whenever this is possible. violates the Constitution.
10) "As a general rule, where a statute is constitutional as applied to a litigant,
5) "The construction of a constitutional provision by CONGRESS (note it is
the litigant has no standing to challenge the statute on the ground that it may be
congress construing, not the supreme court, that is why it is unconstitutional on its face, that is, as applied to a third person in a hypothetical
CALLED “CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION”)is entitled to situation." We have said that classification ordinarily will be upheld "if any state of
consideration, and if the construction is contemporaneous with adoption of the facts can be reasonably conceived that would support it." But where the statute
constitutional provision, it is entitled to great weight. In addition, Long creates a "suspect classification" (e.g. race, sex, or religion) or where it affects a
acquiescence in such an announced construction so strengthens it that it should not fundamental constitutional right, the presumption of constitutionality fades, and the
be changed unless plainly wrong. "strict scrutiny" test, rather than the more relaxed "rational relationship" test applies.
6) Constitutional provisions are EITHER SELF-EXECUTING OR 11) "Statutory interpretation presents a pure question of law and is accordingly
MANDATORY. subject to de novo review by this Court.
de novo is a Latin expression meaning "from the beginning," "afresh,"
A self-executing provision does not require enabling legislation for its "anew," "beginning again."
enforcement. Retroactive Enactment of Laws
1) "Accordingly, when a statute is amended while an action is pending, the rights of
A mandatory provision declares or imposes a duty or requirement that must be the parties are to be deemed in accordance with the law in effect when the action is
followed. begun, unless the amended statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights. (Our
analysis is guided by the fundamental principles of statutory construction that
A Directory provision sets forth procedures or " confers discretion on retroactive laws are not favored, and that a statute is always construed to operate
the legislature" for its implementation. prospectively unless a contrary legislative intent is manifest.); New laws will apply
only to future cases unless there is something in the very nature of the case, or
in the language of the new provision, which shows that the new law was intended
to have a retrospective effect. Further, every reasonable doubt is resolved
against a retroactive operation of a statute, and words of a statute ought not to
have a retrospective operation unless they are so clear, strong and imperative
that no other meaning can be annexed to them . Retroactive effect will be
given to a statute only when legislative intent that a statute be so applied is stated
in clear, explicit, and unequivocal terms.
Common Law
1) In construing statutes, the statutory definition must prevail over the
common law definition
2) CONGRESS is presumed to have known and to have had the common law
in mind in the enactment of a statute. The statute must therefore be read
along with the provisions of the common law, and the latter will be read into
the statute unless it clearly appears from express language or by necessary
implication that the purpose of the statute was to change the common law.
3) "We also apply the established principle that a statutory provision will not be
held to change the common law unless the legislative intent to do so is plainly
manifested. Therefore, a statutory change in the common law will be recognized
only in that which is expressly stated in the words of the statute or is necessarily
implied by its language.
4) " A statutory provision will not be held to change the common law unless the
legislative intent to do so is plainly manifested. "Statutes in derogation of the
common law are to be strictly construed and not to be enlarged in their operation by
construction beyond their express terms. Accordingly, "[a] statutory change in the
common law is limited to that which is expressly stated in the statute or necessarily
implied by its language because there is a presumption that no change was intended.
"When an enactment does not encompass the entire subject covered by the common
law, it abrogates the common-law rule only to the extent that its terms are directly
and irreconcilably opposed to the rule
Previous Construction of a Statute
1) "Where a statute has been construed by the courts, and is then re-enacted
by the legislature, the construction given to it is presumed to be sanctioned by
the legislature, and thenceforth becomes obligatory upon the
courts." Hence, when the court finds the old construction should be
modified, it cannot anymore, since the court is BOUND by its old
construction because such statute was RE-Enacted.
2) "The term "battery" possesses "a long history of definition by" the courts,
and therefore, it "carries its historical construction" when used by CONGRESS
in a statute.
3) "We have said that “when judicial interpretations have settled the meaning
of an existing statutory provision, repetition of the same language in a new
statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate its judicial
interpretations as well.” (STARE DECIS becomes the interpretation and
construction of a law or STATUTE that is ambiguous even if it was applied to a
private case)
New Law New Remedy
4) "It is an established principle of statutory interpretation that "a statute
prescribing a new remedy for an existing right should never be construed to
abolish a pre-existing remedy in the absence of express words or necessary
implication. Further, " 'when a statute gives a new remedy, and contains no
negative, express or implied, of the old remedy, the new one provided by it is
cumulative, and the party may elect between the two.'
Two Statutes Pertaining to the Same Subject
1) "It is well accepted that statutes relating to the same subject should not
be read in isolation. Such statutes should be considered in pari
materia. Moreover, statutes dealing with the same subject matter should
be construed together to achieve a harmonious result, resolving conflicts to give
effect to legislative intent. An accepted principle of statutory construction is
that, when it is not clear which of two statutes applies, the more specific statute
prevails over the more general. Also, when statutes provide different
procedures on the same subject matter, "the general must give way
to the specific.
"As a preliminary matter applicable to all of your questions and in accord
with the rule of statutory construction in pari materia,
statutory provisions are not to be considered as isolated fragments
of law. Such provisions are to be considered as a whole, or as parts of a
greater connected, homogeneous system of laws, or a single and complete
statutory compilation.
Statutes in pari materia are considered as if they constituted but
one act, so that sections of one act may be considered as though they were
parts of the other act.
As a general rule, where legislation dealing with a particular subject
consists of a system of related general provisions indicative of a settled
policy, new enactments of a fragmentary nature on that subject are to be
taken as intended to fit into the existing system and to be carried into effect
conformably to it, and they should be so construed as to harmonize the
general tenor or purport of the system and make the scheme consistent in
all its parts and uniform in its operation, unless a different purpose is shown
plainly or with irresistible clearness. It will be assumed or presumed, in the
absence of words specifically indicating the contrary, that the legislature did
not intend to innovate on, unsettle, disregard, alter or violate a general
statute or system of statutory provisions the entire subject matter of which
is not directly or necessarily involved in the act (noting that in absence of
words to contrary, legislature did not intend to alter or repeal general statute
or system).
3) Closely related statutes must be read as being consistent with one another. Two
statutes which are closely interrelated must be read and construed
together and effect given to all of their provisions. Statutes should
be construed, if possible, so as to harmonize, and force and effect should be
given the provisions of each.
4) The primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to
legislative intent. 'In interpreting statutes, "courts should give the fullest possible
effect to the legislative intent embodied in the entire statutory enactment. Potentially
conflicting statutes should be harmonized to give force and effect to each.
5) City and municipal ordinances must be consistent with the laws of the
Constitution. Thus, if a statute and a local ordinance both can be given effect, courts
must harmonize them and apply them together.
The Meaning of Words
1) In the absence of a contrary definition, the words in a statute are presumed to
have their usual and ordinary meaning.
3) A fundamental rule of statutory construction requires that every part of a statute
be presumed to have some effect, and not be treated as meaningless unless absolutely
necessary. "We must assume that the legislature did not intend to do a vain
and useless thing. "It is a well established rule of construction that a statute
ought to be interpreted in such a manner that it may have effect, and
not found to be vain and elusive. "A word or clause contained in a
statute may only be rejected as surplusage if it "appears to have been
inserted through inadvertence or mistake, and which is incapable of any
sensible meaning," or is otherwise repugnant to the rest of the statute.
4) "We will not construe a statute by singling out a particular term or phrase,
but will construe the words and terms at issue in the context of the other
language used in the statute.
5) While in the construction of statutes the constant endeavor of the courts is to
ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, that intention must be
gathered from the words used, unless a literal construction would involve a manifest
absurdity. "The Court has stated the related principle that "the plain, obvious, and
rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, or
strained construction." Statutes should not be interpreted in ways that
produce absurd or irrational consequences.
6) "A statute must be construed with reference to its subject matter, the object sought
to be attained, and the legislative purpose in enacting it; the provisions should
receive a construction that will render it harmonious with that purpose rather
than one which will defeat it.
7)[i]f the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, and its meaning perfectly
clear and definite, effect must be given to it. It is unnecessary to resort to any rules
of statutory construction when the language of a statute is unambiguous. In those
situations, the statute's plain meaning and intent govern.
"Language is ambiguous if it admits of being understood in more than
one way, refers to two or more things simultaneously, is difficult to
comprehend, is of doubtful import, or lacks clearness and definiteness.”
9) "Black's Law Dictionary 1586 (8th ed. 2004) defines "valid" as "Legally
sufficient; binding." (noting that if the STATUTE does not provide a statutory
definition we may look to the dictionary definition to determine legislative intent
10) "In drafting the statute, the legislature separated the two prohibitions with
a comma followed by the disjunctive word "nor." We have noted that, pursuant to
the rules of grammar, "phrases separated by a comma and [a] disjunctive . .
. are independent. The disjunctive serves to connect the two parts of the
sentence but also to keep them separate and independent.”
12) "The word [willful] often denotes an act which is intentional, or knowing, or
voluntary, as distinguished from accidental. But when used in a criminal statute it
generally means an act done with a bad purpose; without justifiable excuse;
stubbornly, obstinately, perversely[.] The word is also employed to characterize a
thing done without ground for believing it is lawful. The term "willful act" imports
knowledge and consciousness that injury will result from the act done. The
act done must be intended or it must involve a reckless disregard for the rights of
another and will probably result in an injury. [T]he term "gross, wanton, and
culpable" describes conduct. The word "gross" means "aggravated or
increased negligence" while the word "culpable" means "deserving of blame or
censure." 'Gross negligence' is culpable or criminal when accompanied by acts
of commission or omission of a wanton or willful nature, showing a reckless or
indifferent disregard of the rights of others, under circumstances reasonably
calculated to produce injury, or which make it not improbable that injury will be
occasioned, and the offender knows, or is charged with the knowledge of, the
probable result of his acts
13) "But, courts are not permitted to add language to a statute nor are
they permitted to accomplish the same result by judicial
interpretation." Rather, when the language of a statute is unambiguous, courts are
bound by the plain meaning of that language and may not assign a construction that
amounts to holding that the General Assembly did not mean what it actually has
stated.
14) "It is equally well established, however, that if the language of a statute is clear
and unambiguous, a regulatory interpretation by the Department that is in conflict
with the plain language of the statute cannot be sustained.
15) "Under the rule of ejusdem generis, when a particular class of persons or things
is enumerated in a statute and general words follow, the general words are to be
restricted in their meaning to a sense analogous to the less general, particular
words. Likewise, according to the maxim noscitur a sociis (associated
words) when general and specific words are grouped, the general words are limited
by the specific and will be construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to
those things identified by the specific words.
16) If a statute expressly excepts a class which would otherwise fall within
its terms, the exception negates the idea that any other class is to be
excepted.
17) One such rule, sometimes referred to as the last antecedent doctrine, is
particularly applicable here and can be summarized as follows: Referential and
qualifying words and phrases, where no contrary intention
appears, refer solely to the last antecedent. The last antecedent is 'the
last word, phrase, or clause that can be made an antecedent without impairing the
meaning of the sentence.' Thus a proviso usually is construed to apply to the
provision or clause immediately preceding it. (explaining and applying "the
grammatical 'rule of the last antecedent,' according to which a limiting clause or
phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it
immediately follows . . . ."); (noting that construction of a statute according to the
last antecedent rule is "quite sensible as a matter of grammar
19) "An erroneous interpretation of a statute by those charged with its
enforcement cannot be permitted to override [the statute's] clear
meaning. Amendments of statutes can only be made by the legislature and
not by the courts or administrative officers charged with their enforcement
20) "But principles of statutory construction are not so rigid. Although we presume
that the same term has the same meaning when it occurs here and there in a single
statute, the Court of Appeals mischaracterized that presumption as “effectively
irrebuttable.” We also understand that “[m]ost words have different shades of
meaning and consequently may be variously construed, not only when they occur in
different statutes, but when used more than once in the same statute or even in the
same section.” Thus, the “natural presumption that identical words used in different
parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning … is not rigid and
readily yields whenever there is such variation in the connection in which the words
are used as reasonably to warrant the conclusion that they were employed in different
parts of the act with different intent.” Ibid. A given term in the same statute may take
on distinct characters from association with distinct statutory objects calling for
different implementation strategies."
Ibid. (Latin, short for ibidem, meaning "the same place") is the term used to
provide an endnote or footnote citation orreference for a source that was
cited in the preceding endnote or footnote. It is similar in meaning
to idem (meaning something that has been mentioned previously; the same),
abbreviated Id., which is commonly used in legal citation.[1] To find
the ibid.source, one must look at the reference preceding it.
21) "Generally, phrases separated by a comma and the disjunctive "or," are
independent. (finding that, the word "or" connects two parts of a sentence, "'but
disconnect[s] their meaning'"); (noting disjunctive results in alternatives, which must
be treated separately); (finding that limiting phrase in statute is independent of and
does not modify two earlier phrases because the limiting phrase is separated from
the first two by a comma and the disjunctive "or"); (interpreting the use of a comma
and the disjunctive "or" as implying two separate and independent phrases in a
Virginia statute authorizing payment of dividends by corporation "out of net
earnings, or out of its net assets in excess of its capital"). Accordingly, the phrase,
"made by the Defendant to any law enforcement officer," is independent of and does
not modify the phrase, "[a]ny written or recorded statement or confessions."
The Terms May/Shall
1) The term "may," as used in a statute, should be given its ordinary
meaning intended by the CONGRESS -permission, importing discretion.
2) It is also true, however, that the Supreme Court has held that the
word "may," while ordinarily importing permission, will be construed to
be mandatory when it is necessary to accomplish the
manifest purpose of the legislature.
3) The use of the word "shall" in a statute generally implies that its
terms are intended to be mandatory, rather than permissive or directive.
4) "[T]he use of ‘shall,’ in a statute requiring action by a public official, is
directory and not mandatory unless the statute manifests a contrary intent."14
"A statute directing the mode of proceeding by public officers is to be deemed
directory, and a precise compliance is not to be deemed essential to the validity of
the proceedings, unless so declared by statute.
The Term Aggrieved “Locus Standi”
1) ""The term 'aggrieved' has a settled meaning when it becomes necessary to
determine who is a proper party to seek court relief from an adverse decision. In
order for a petitioner to be 'aggrieved,' it must affirmatively appear
that such person had some direct interest in the subject matter of the
proceeding that he seeks to attack. . . . The petitioner 'must show that he has an
immediate, pecuniary and substantial interest in the litigation, and not a
remote or indirect interest.' . . . Thus, it is not sufficient that the sole
interest of the petitioner is to advance some perceived public right
 or to redress some anticipated public injury when the only wrong
he has suffered is in common with other persons similarly
situated. The word 'aggrieved' in a statute contemplates a substantial grievance
and means a denial of some personal or property right, legal or equitable, or
imposition of a burden or obligation upon the petitioner different from that suffered
by the public generally.
Mens Rea/ Scienter/ Intent
1) "In the final analysis, the issue whether mens rea or scienter is a necessary element
in the indictment and proof of a particular crime becomes a question of legislative
intent to be construed by the court. Thus, to insert a mens rea element into the
offense, and to require proof thereof, would defeat the statutory purpose, which is to
criminalize the introduction of firearms into a school environment. So we will not
add, by implication, language to the statute that the legislature expressly has chosen
not to include. Consequently, we hold that the trial court correctly decided, in
refusing the instruction in question, that this statute is one of strict criminal liability,
and that the Commonwealth was required to prove only that the defendant had
possessed, on school property, a firearm of the type described in the statute.
2) "The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by
intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in
mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent
ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.
A relation between some mental element and punishment for a harmful act is
almost as instinctive as the child's familiar exculpatory "But I didn't mean to," and
has afforded the rational basis for a tardy and unfinished substitution of deterrence
and reformation in place of retaliation and vengeance as the motivation for public
prosecution.
Unqualified acceptance of this doctrine by English common law in the
Eighteenth Century was indicated by Blackstone's sweeping statement
that to constitute any crime there must first be a "vicious
will." Common-law commentators of the Nineteenth Century early
pronounced the same principle, although a few exceptions not relevant to
our present problem came to be recognized.
Crime, as a compound concept, generally constituted only from concurrence
of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand, was congenial to an intense
individualism.
As the states codified the common law of crimes, even if their enactments were
silent on the subject, their courts assumed that the omission did not signify
disapproval of the principle but merely recognized that intent was so inherent in
the idea of the offense that it required no statutory affirmation.
Courts, with little hesitation or division, found an implication of the
requirement as to offenses that were taken over from the common law. The
unanimity with which they have adhered to the central thought that
wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal is emphasized by the variety,
disparity and confusion of their definitions of the requisite but elusive mental
element.
However, courts of various jurisdictions, and for the purposes of different offenses,
have devised working formulae, if not scientific ones, for the instruction of juries
around such terms as "felonious intent," "criminal intent," "malice aforethought,"
"guilty knowledge," "fraudulent intent," "wilfulness," "scienter," to denote guilty
knowledge, or "mens rea," to signify an evil purpose or mental culpability.
By use or combination of these various tokens, they have sought to protect
those who were not blameworthy in mind from conviction of infamous
common-law crimes....The Government asks us by a feat of construction
radically to change the weights and balances in the scales of justice.
The purpose and obvious effect of doing away with the requirement of a guilty
intent is to ease the prosecution's path to conviction, to strip the defendant of such
benefit as he derived at common law from innocence of evil purpose, and to
circumscribe the freedom heretofore allowed juries.
Such a manifest impairment of the immunities of the individual should not be
extended to common-law crimes on judicial initiative.
3) "The presence of a "vicious will" or mens rea was long a requirement of
criminal responsibility. But the list of exceptions grew, especially in the
expanding regulatory area involving activities affecting public health, safety,
and welfare. Id., at 254. The statutory offense of embezzlement, borrowed
from the common law where scienter was historically required, was in a
different category. 13 Id., at 260-261.
"[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal
tradition and meaning [401 U.S. 601, 608] of centuries of practice, it
presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each
borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the
meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed."
The Dillon Rule and Grants of Authority
The Dillon Rule of strict construction controls our determination of the powers of
local governing bodies. This rule provides that municipal corporations have only
those powers that are expressly granted, those necessarily or fairly implied from
expressly granted powers, and those that are essential and indispensable.
"In determining legislative intent, the rule is clear that where a power is
conferred and the mode of its execution is specified, no other method may be
selected; any other means would be contrary to legislative intent and, therefore,
unreasonable. A necessary corollary is that where a grant of power is silent upon
its mode of execution, a method of exercise clearly contrary to legislative intent, or
inappropriate to the ends sought to be accomplished by the grant, also would be
unreasonable.
"Consistent with the necessity to uphold legislative intent, the doctrine of
implied powers should never be applied to create a power that does
not exist or to expand an existing power beyond rational limits. Always,
the test in application of the doctrine is reasonableness, in which concern for what
is necessary to promote the public interest is a key element.
Finally, when a statute creates a specific grant of authority, the authority exists only
to the extent specifically granted in the statute. It can never go beyond the
authority given .
6) “When the legislature delegates authority to an administrative agency to
promulgate regulations, those regulations must neither exceed the scope of
the authority delegated nor be inconsistent with it. Furthermore, "delegations
of legislative power are valid only if they establish specific policies and fix definite
standards to guide the official, agency, or board in the exercise of the power.
Delegations of legislative power which lack such policies and standards are
unconstitutional and void." For example, language in an enabling statute which
provides merely "that the regulations be designed to protect and promote the
safety and health of employees" is insufficient.
7) "We consistently have held that when the primary purpose of an
enactment is to raise revenue, the enactment will be considered a tax,
regardless of the name attached to the act. The General Assembly is directly
prohibited from enacting “any local, special, or private law . . . [f]or the
assessment and collection of taxes. There is, however, an exception to this
specific prohibition. The General Assembly may by special act like RA
7160(Local Government Code) delegating the power of taxation to
any province, city, municipality.
Inconsistent Regulations/Laws
As a preliminary matter, we agree with Manassas' statements that regulations of
Executive Departments have the force of law, and that any Executive Department
concerned with the execution of a statute’s interpretation of its governing statutes,
as reflected in its regulations, is entitled to great weight. Regulations, however,
may not conflict with the authorizing statute. Whether a regulation
is inconsistent with its enabling legislation is properly a subject of judicial
review.
If both the statute and the ordinance can stand together and be given effect, it is
the duty of the courts to harmonize them and not nullify the ordinance.
City and municipal ordinances must be consistent with
STATUTES. Such ordinances are inconsistent with state law when they cannot co-
exist with a statute. The fact that a county or municipal ordinance enlarges on a
statute's provisions does not create a conflict with the statute unless the statute limits
the requirements (Separability Clause is inserted)for all cases to its own terms.
Thus, if a statute and a local ordinance both can be given effect, courts must
harmonize them and apply them together.
A Single Body of Law
1) "When attempting to define terms in one part of the Code, courts should read a
statute with "a view toward harmonizing it with other statutes. "Ordinarily, when
a particular word in a statute is not defined therein, a court must give it its ordinary
meaning.
2) "When asked to interpret various code sections, the SUPREME
Court often examines other related statutes that contain similar
or contrasting language to help determine legislative intent.
The Exclusion Rule
Ambiguity
1) "Language is ambiguous when it may be understood in more
than one way, or simultaneously refers to two or more things.
2) "When the language of a statute is ambiguous, it must be interpreted in a
manner that will give effect to the intent of CONGRESS.
3) "The primary goal of statutory construction is to discern and give
effect to legislative intent, with the reading of a statute as a whole influencing the
proper construction of ambiguous individual provisions
4) Doctrine of Contra proferentem: "Used in the connection with the construction
of written documents to the effect that an ambiguous provision is construed most
strongly against the person who selected the language." Black's Law Dictionary, 5th
Ed.
5) "Instead, we find the restrictive covenant, in particular the phrase "residential
purposes," to be ambiguous in several respects....Indeed, even the circuit court's
interpretation that the term " '[r]esidence' means more than mere physical presence
and less than domicile" is ambiguous. It can be argued that a nightly or weekly rental
is more than mere physical presence. Moreover, if the phrase "residential purposes"
carries with it a "duration of use" component, it is ambiguous as to when a rental of
the property moves from short-term to long-term. Under our case law, a restrictive
covenant of "substantial doubt or ambiguity" must be interpreted "in favor of the free
use of property and against restrictions
Criminal Versus Civil Intent of a Statute
The question whether a particular statutorily defined penalty is civil or criminal is
a matter of statutory construction." First, one must determine whether the
legislature, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicates either expressly
or impliedly a preference for one label or the other. Second, where the legislature
has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, one must address "whether
the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that
intention
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution
1) "By virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution supersedes any conflicting
state law. The preemption of Local laws by STATUTES may occur by express
statutory language or other clear indication that Congress intended to legislate
exclusively in the area. Even if Congress does not intend the enactment of a
STATUTORY scheme completely to preempt Local laws in the area, congressional
enactments in the same field override Local laws with which they conflict.
The Supreme Court has identified three ways in which preemption may occur:
(1) Congress may adopt express language setting forth the existence and scope of
preemption;
(2) Congress may adopt a framework for regulation that "occupies the field" and
leaves no room for states to adopt supplemental laws; and
(3) when statute actually conflicts with the constitution, typically when compliance
with both laws is a "physical impossibility" or the statute stands "as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
2) "Settled legal principles provide that the Constitution, not a state court
erroneous interpretation of it, is controlling. (in context of determining whether
to apply retroactively a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions, adopting
Blackstonian view that judges...find the law rather than make the law and that
judicial declaration of law is merely a statement of what the law has always been.

Public Policy
1) "A court may not "second-guess the lawmakers on matters of economics,
sociology and public policy. . . . Those considerations belong exclusively in the
legislative domain. Regardless of whether it "may or may not be better public
policy". Meaning COURTS do not interpret provisions for ECONOMICS,
SOCIOLOGY and PUBLIC POLICY.
2) "Judicial review does not evaluate the "propriety, wisdom, necessity and
expediency" of legislation. We ask only whether the statutory classification
erects an irrational, arbitrary distinction - one that no conceivable state of facts
could reasonably sustain.