Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 41

BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

TEAM CODE-BTC 16

BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

Before

THE HONOURABLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

PETITION U/ART. 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950

IN THE MATTER OF

WRIT PETITION _____ OF 2019

ANDRONIX CORPORATION PETITIONER

V.

THE UNION OF INDIA RESPONDENT

IN THE MATTER OF

WRIT PETITION _____ OF 2019

CITIZENS FOR DIGITAL PRIVACY PETITIONER

V.

THE UNION OF INDIA& THE STATE OF RESPONDENT

UTTAR PRADESH

MEMORIAL FILED ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS


1|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS......................................................................................................4

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.......................................................................................................5

TABLE OF CASES..................................................................................................................7

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION...........................................................................................11

STATEMENT OF FACTS.......................................................................................................12

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS................................................................................................14

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED....................................................................................................16

1. THE WRIT PETITION FILED BY ANDRONIX CORPORATION IS MAINTAINABLE IN

LAW.........................................................................................................................16

A. EQUALITY OF TREATMENT UNDER ART 14…….......................................................16

[A1] PERSON…………………........................................................................................17

[A2] VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14…………………………………….............................18

B. RIGHT TO SEEK REMEDY UNDER ART. 32.................................................................20

2. THE 2018 AMENDMENTS TO IT RULES AND UAV REGULATIONS 1.0


IS ULTRA VIRES THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA.......................................................22

A. 2018 AMENDMENTS TO IT RULES ARE NOT ULTRA VIRES THE CONSTITUTION..........22

[A1] VIOLATION OF RIGHT OF PRIAVCY...............................................................................22

[A1.1] SURVEILLANCE……………………………..........................................24

[A2] THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY….............................................................................25

[A3] VIOLATION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES……............................................................................26

B. UAV REGULATIONS 1.0 ARE ULTRA VIRES THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA.................27

[B1]THERE IS A VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS.............................................28


[B1.1]VIOLATION OF ART.14...............................................................................28

COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS


2|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

[B1.2]VIOLATION OF ART 19(1)(D)………………............................................30

[B1.3] VIOLATION OF ART 21………………….................................................30

[B2]VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS....................................................31

3. THE ADRP IS ULTRA VIRES THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA...................................31

A. ADRP INFRINGES RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND LIVELIHOOD UNDER …………………...32


[A1] INFRINGEMENT OF RIGHT TO PRIVACY…………...............................................32
[A2] INFRINGEMENT OF RIGHT TO LIVELIHOOD….....................................................34
B. ADRP NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 21…………….....................................35
[B1] VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14……………………………………………………35
[B2] VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 19……………………………………………………36
[B2.1] INFRINGEMENT OF RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION……36
[B3] ADRP NOT FAIR, JUST OR REASONABLE……………………………………….37

C. SECURITY OF STATE NOT REASONABLE RESTRICTION TO CURTAIL RIGHT OF PRIVACY.. .38

PRAYER FOR RELIEF............................................................................................................42

COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS


3|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

& And
ADRP Advance Data-driven Response Policy
AIR All India Reports
ANR. Another
ART. Article
DGCA Directorate General of Civil Aviation
E.G Exampli Gratia
ECHR European Court of Human Rights
Ed. Edition
EU European Union
HC High Court
Hon’ble Honourable
I.E Id Est
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Ltd. Limited

No. Number
ORS. Others
RPAS Remotely Piloted Aircraft System
S. Section
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UNCRC United Nations Convention on the Rights of Child
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UOI Union of India
V. Versus

COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS


4|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

LIST OF BOOKS REFERRED:


1. M.P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, Lexis Nexis (7thed, May).
2. V.N Shukla, Constitution of India, Eastern Book Company, 11th Ed., 2010.
3. Sandeep Bhalla, Commentary on Information Technology Act, 2000 (India),(2014 ed).
4. PavanDuggal ,Textbook on Cyber Law , Universal Law Publishing, Lexis Nexis (2nd
ed).
5. Justice Yatindra Singh , Cyber Laws, Universal Law Publishing ,Lexis Nexis
(6thed).

LIST OF LEXICONS REFERRED:

1. Wharton’s Concise Law Dictionary, Lexis Nexis.


2. Black’s Law Dictionary, (10th ed).
3. P. RamanathaAiyar’s Advanced Law Lexicon, Lexis Nexis, Vol.1, (5th ed).
4. Duhaime’s Online Law Dictionary

LIST OF STATUTES REFERRED

1. Constitution of India ,1950


2. Information Technology Act, 2000
3. Companies Act, 2013
4. General Clauses Act, 1897
5. Indian Penal Code, 1960
6. Income Tax Act, 1961

LIST OF TREATIES:

1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 th December 1996, United


Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 999, Para 171
2. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, 1950
3. Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989.

COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS


5|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

LIST OF DECLARATION AND RESOLUTIONS:


1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948

LIST OF WEBSITES REFERRED:

1. https://indiankanoon.org/
2. https://www.scconline.in/
3. http://manupatra.in/
4. https://www.livelaw.in/
5. http://www.legalservicesindia.com/
6. https://barandbench.com/
7. https://ssrana.in/News/CL%20Connect%20NewsLetter/2017/23/India-DGCA-
releases-draft-regulations-on-the-civil-use-of-drones.htm#fn11.
8. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuius_est_solum,_eius_est_usque_ad_coelum_et_ad_in
feros#cite_note-2
9. https://www.icao.int/safety/UA/UASToolkit/Pages/Toolkit-Guidelines.aspx

LIST OF JOURNALS REFFERED

1. Andrew Keane Woods, Against Data Exceptionalism‘, 68(4) Stanford Law Review
729, 748 (April 2016).
2. AnupamChander&Uyen P. Le, Data Nationalism, Emory Law Journal, Vol. 64, No.
3, 2015
3. Telstra Cyber Security Report, 2017
4. Sri Krishna Committee Report, 2018.

COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS


6|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

TABLE OF CASES

INDIAN CASES

SNO. NAME OF THE CASE CITATION PG.NO

1. Ameronissa v. Mehboob AIR 1953 SC 71 28


2. Anwar v. State of J&K (1971) 3 SCC 104. 16
3. BashesharNath v. Commissioner of 1959 SC 149 18
Income-tax, Delhi and Rajasthan
&Anr.
4. Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, AIR 1987 SC 748 37
5. Board of Trustees of the Port of AIR (1983) 1 SCC 124 34
Bombay v.
DilipkumarRaghvendraNandkarni
6. Budhan Choudhry And Other vs The AIR 1955 SC 191; 28
State Of Bihar
7. Calcutta Gas Co. Ltd. V. State of AIR 1962 SC 1044. 20
West Bengal,
8. Chairman, Railway Board and Ors. (2000) 2 SCC 465. 17,28
v. Chandrima Das (Mrs.) and Ors
9. CharanjitLalChowdhary v. Union of AIR 1951 SC 41. 19
India
10. Court in Secretary, Ministry of 1995 AIR 1236 36
Information and Broadcasting, Govt.
of India v. Cricket Association of
Bengal,
11. Daryao v. State of U.P., (1962) 1 SCR 574, 582. 21
12. Deena alias DeenDayala and Ors. v. AIR 1983 SC 1155 17
Union of India and Ors..
13. Francis Coralie v. Union Territory of AIR 1981 SC 1746. 38
Delhi
14. Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1975 AIR 1378, 1975 SCR (3) 946 30, 32
15. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking v. WP No.388 of 2003 21

COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS


7|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

Union Of India.
16. Jabbar v. State of U.P, AIR 1966 All 590. 17
17. Jasbhai v. Roshan, AIR 1976 SC 578. 20
18. Joseph Shine v. UOI, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1676 29, 32
19. Justice K.S Puttaswamy v. Union of (2017) 10 SCC 1 22,23,
India, 24,25,27,
32
20. K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union (2015) 8 SCC 735. 37,38,40
of India,
21. KathiRanningRawat v. State of AIR 1952 SC 123; 35
Saurashtra,
22. KedarNathBajoria v. State of West AIR 1953 SC 404 28, 35
Bengal,
23. Kesavananda Bharti v. State of AIR 1973 SC 1461 38
Kerala
24. Kharak Singh v. State of U.P AIR 1963 SC 1295 24, 29,
32, 38
25. LIC v. Manubhai (1993) S.C. 171 36
26. Lumbini Industries Pvt. Ltd vs Union W.P. No. 533 of 2004. 21
Of India &Ors
27. MadhuLimaye v. SupdtTihar jail 1975 AIR (SC) 1505 29
Delhi
28. Maneka Gandhi v. UOI 1978 AIR 597, 1978 SCR (2) 621 30, 32,
35
29. MarutiShripatiDubal vs. State of (1986) 88 BOMLR 589. 35
Maharashtra,
30. Moulana Mufti Syed Md. Noorur v. AIR 1999 Cal 15 37
State Of West Bengal and Ors.,
31. Mr. Louis De Raedt&Ors vs Union 1991 AIR 1886, 1991 SCR (3) 149 17
Of India And Ors
32. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal AIR (1986) SC 180 34
Corporation,
33. P.A. Jacob v. Superintend of Police, AIR 1993 Ker 1 35

COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS


8|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

Kottayam,
34. ParagDalmia v. Dcit ITA No.5499/Del/2017 34
35. People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. (1997) 1 SCC 301 39
Union of India
36. People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. AIR 1991 SC 207 35
Union of India.
37. Power Measurement Ltd. vs U.P. 2003 (2) AWC 1642 B. 18
Power Corporation Ltd
38. R K Dalmia v. Justice Tendulkar, AIR 1958 SC 538. 39
39. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1995 SC 264 30, 32
40. RamlilaMaidan Incident v. Home (2012) 5 SCC 1 35
Secretary, Union of India
41. Ranjit v. State of Maharashtra, AIR1965 SC 881. 38
42. Re Special Courts Bill Case, AIR 1978 SC 478 35
43. RomeshThappar v. State of Madras, 1950 SCR 594, 597. 20
44. Sharda v. Dharmpal (2003) 4 SCC 493 38
45. Shiv Prasad v. Punjab State AIR 1957 Punj 150, 151. 18
46. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2013) 12 S.C.C. 73, 26
47. SiddharamSatlingappaMhetre v. (2011) 1 C CR LR (SC 488) 32
State of Maharashtra and Ors,
48. Smiths Detection Asia-Pacific Pte. (2004) 2 ALD 878. 18
Ltd v. Electronic Corporation of
India and Ors.,
49. State (N.C.T. Of Delhi) vs Navjot (2005)11 SCC 600,AIR 2005 SC 24
Sandhu, 3820
50. State of Madras v. AIR 1951 SC 228 39
ChampakamDorarirajan,
51. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain, (1975 AIR 865, 1975 SCR (3) 333) 26, 36
52. State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant (2010) 3 SCC 402. 21
Singh Chaufal And Others
53. State Trading Corporation of India v. AIR 1963 SC 1811 17
Commercial Tax Officer and Ors.,.
54. Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz (2014) 1 SCC 1. 29

COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS


9|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

Foundation
55. Thomson-Csf and Ors. v. National AIR (1993) Delhi 252. 17,19,20
Airport Authority
56. Union of India v. Col. L.S.N. Murthy (2012) 1 SCC 718. 27
57. V.K Javali v. State of Mysore, AIR 1966 SC 1387 39
58. VajravelluMudaliar v. Special AIR 1965 SC 1017 28
Deputy Collector for Land
Acquisition

INTERNATIONAL CASES

59. Campbell v. MGN 2004 UKHL 22. 33


60. Case C-293/12, Digital Rights Ireland, 43, at 29-34 23
61. Copland v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 37 (2007) 23
62. Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC [1992] 2 AC 1 22
63. Hinman v. Pac. Air Lines Transp. Corp. 84 F.2d 755, 757 (9th Cir. 1936 30
64. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 37
& Bisexual Group of Boston,
65. Jackson Mun. Airport Auth. v. Evans 191 So. 2d 126, 128 33
66. Mosul Boundary case (1925) PCIJ. 20
67. Nuclear Tests Case, (New Zealand v. (1973), ICJ 457. 20
France)
68. Peter Semayne v Richard Gresham, 77 ER 194. 32
69. R v The Commissioner of Police of the [2011] UKSC 21 25
Metropolis
70. Weber and Saravia v. Germany 46 Eur. Ct. H.R. 47, 77 (2006) 23

COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS


10|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Counsel for the Petitioner, most humbly and respectfully, submits that this Hon’ble Apex
Court of India has the requisite jurisdiction to entertain this instant writ petition filed under
Article 32 of the Constitution of India, 19501. It is further submitted that all procedural
requirements have been adhered to in the prescribed manner. The present memorandum sets
forth the facts, contentions and arguments in the present case.

1
32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred
by this Part is guaranteed
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of
habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the
enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause ( 1 ) and ( 2 ), Parliament may by
law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers
exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause ( 2 )
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this
Constitution

COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS


11|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Andronix Corporation is reputed world-wide for its end-to-end drone/ unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) solutions, is a private limited company incorporated in Cayman Islands with
its majority shareholders (60%) as Chinese venture funds and the remaining 40% with two
United States promoters (20% each). The data gathered by Andronix drones are sent back to
servers located in China, where they are analysed in extremely granular ways, pursuant to
which detailed reports containing their analysis is sent to respective clients.

2. The State of Uttar Pradesh, the quality of output offered by Andronix, and appreciating the
immense potential offered by the application of UAV technologies, executed a five-year
contract with Andronix in 2016. Under this contract, Andronix was to assist the State of Uttar
Pradesh by deploying its UAV technology in event of natural disasters, law enforcement, and
inspection of repair and maintenance operations in government properties and any other case
as the government may deem fit from time to time.

3. The Uttar Pradesh government bureaucracy formulated a policy titled Advance Data-
driven Response Policy which had a stated objective of integrating emerging technologies
like artificial intelligence and deep learning solutions and specifically spelt out the use of
drones to track human movement and capture facial images, and match it with databases of
known offenders for law enforcement and public order concerns.

4. Andronix ran a drone surveillance pilot in certain parts of Allahabad, reporting on near
real-time basis the movement of suspicious individuals and the occurrence of seemingly
suspicious activities.

5. But Andronix could not carry out many more activities under this contract because the
regulatory environment in India was not favourable to the technology. However, in August
2018 things started looking up as the Union of India finalised the UAV Regulations and made
it come into effect conditional upon a reg-tech solution, “Digital Sky”, being put in place. In
addition to these regulations, the Union of India also amended the Information Technology
(Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information)
Rules, 2011 with effect from December 30, 2018 mandating that locational and facial data
would qualify as sensitive personal data and that all sensitive personal data of Indian citizens
must be stored in servers located in India.
COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
12|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

6. Andronix was not happy with these regulations and the amended IT Rules because they
would operate jointly and severally to hamper ease of doing business for foreign
corporations, as well as hinder next generation innovation in ways that Andronix considered
undesirable. Therefore, Andronix approached the Supreme Court of India challenging the
UAV Regulations as well as the amended IT Rules. At the same time, a citizens’ action
group, Citizens for Digital Privacy, validly incorporated as a non-government organization,
publicly called for a ban on UAV technology in urban settings and densely populated regions
claiming it is violative of privacy, bodily, and property interests. They have now approached
the Supreme Court of India challenging the amended IT Rules and UAV regulations (against
the Union of India) and the ADRP (against the State of U.P).

COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS


13|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

ISSUES RAISED

1. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION FILED BY ANDRONIX CORPORATION IS MAINTAINABLE IN


LAW?

2. WHETHER THE 2018 AMENDMENTS TO THE IT RULES AND THE UAV REGULATIONS 1.0 ARE
ULTRA VIRES THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA?

3. WHETHER THE ADRP IS ULTRA VIRES THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA?

COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS


14|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION FILED BY ANDRONIX CORPORATION IS MAINTAINABLE IN


LAW?

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the writ petition filed by Andronix
Corporation under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution is maintainable under the eyes of the
law. Andronix Corporation is a foreign corporate that possess the locus standi to file a
petition in this Hon’ble Court. Equality of treatment is to be accorded to every person having
an interest within the territory of India vide Art 14 of the Indian Constitution. It is also
humbly submitted that a foreign company reserves the right to seek remedy under Article 32
of the Indian Constitution.

2. WHETHER THE 2018 AMENDMENTS TO THE IT RULES AND THE UAV REGULATIONS 1.0
ARE ULTRA VIRES THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA?

It is humbly submitted to this Hon’ble Supreme Court that the amendment made to the
Information Technology (Reasonable Security Practices And Procedures And Sensitive
Personal Data Or Information) Rules, 2011 in 2018 as well as the UAV Regulations 1.0
introduced in August 2018 are ultra vires the Indian Constitution. The doctrine of ultra vires
literally means ‘beyond the powers’. The amendments that were introduced to both the above
laws are beyond the scope of the Constitution of India and were made in an arbitrary, and
mala fide manner.

3. WHETHER THE ADRP IS ULTRA VIRES THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA?

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Supreme Court that the ADRP is definitely ultra
vires the constitution as it comprehensibly violates Art.21, Art.19 and Art.14 of the Indian
Constitution. The right to privacy has been accepted as an intrinsic part of right to life and
liberty and thus, violation of privacy is not warranted by any person. Further, the policy is not
in accordance with “procedure established by law”, a prerequisite of Art.21. The Counsel also
contends that there is no good ground to curtail the right to privacy in absence of an imminent
security threat to the state. Union of India’s international obligations have also been
vehemently violated by the Uttar Pradesh government’s ADRP.

COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS


15|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

1. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION FILED BY ANDRONIX CORPORATION IS MAINTAINABLE IN


LAW?

The Petitioner most reverently submits that the Writ Petition filed under Art 322 of the Indian
Constitution by Andronix Corporation is maintainable before this Hon’ble Supreme Court as
[A.] Equality of treatment is to be accorded to every person having an interest within the
territory of India vide Art 14 and [B.] A Foreign Incorporated Company has the right to seek
remedy under Art. 32.

A. EQUALITY OF TREATMENT

Andronix Corporation is a private limited company incorporated in Cayman Islands 3, thereby


granting it the status of a ‘foreign company’ within the meaning of Section 2(42) of the
Companies Act, 20134 which states -

2. Definitions(42) ―foreign company means any company or body corporate incorporated


outside India which—

(a) has a place of business in India whether by itself or through an agent, physically or
through electronic mode; and

(b) conducts any business activity in India in any other manner.

As per the Indian Constitution, The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law
or the equal protection of the laws5.This is in consonance with Article 7 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights declares the right to equality 6. The first expression denotes that
no particular individual would be granted special treatment while the second expression is a
pledge of protection or guarantee of equal laws. 7It is the humble contention of the Petitioner
that Andronix Corporation falls under the ambit of ‘person’ per Article 14.

2
Art.32, Constitution of India, 1950.
3
Paragraph ¶1, Moot Proposition, Page 1.
4
S2(42), Companies Act, 2013.
5
Art 14, Constitution of India, 1950.
6
UDHR, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3712c.html
[accessed 7 March 2019].
7
Shukla, V.N., Constitution of India, Eastern Book Company, 11th Ed., 2010.
COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
16|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

[A1.] Person

(a) It is the vehement contention of the Petitioners that Andronix Corporation is a person
within meaning of Article 14 which guarantees the right to equality. , legal persons are beings
real or imaginary who for the purposes of legal reasoning are treated in greater or less degree
in the same way as human beings. In legal theory, a person is any being whom the law
regards as capable of rights or duties. 8

(b) According to Section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which statesa person shall
include any company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not 9,
which evidently proves that Andronix Corporation falls under the garb of ‘person’ in Article
14. The provision in the General Clauses Act shows the intention of the legislature to treat
artificial persons as persons. 10The Indian Penal Code,11 and the Income Tax Act, 196112
contemplate a person to be a company.

(c) Relying upon the decisions in Chairman, Railway Board and Ors. v. Chandrima Das
(Mrs.) and Ors.,13Article 14 is a fundamental right which is available to any person
irrespective of whether he is a citizen of India or an alien or whether a natural or an artificial
person and for the enforcement of this right, a writ petition is maintainable. 14 Article 14 of the
Constitution embodies the principles of equality before law and equal protection of laws. The
protective umbrella of the equality clause is available to all persons. 15A fundamental right is
made available to a foreigner as can be digressed from several Supreme Court cases. 16

(d) Certain rights under Part III are available only to citizens while certain others by using the
words ‘persons’ are available to everyone, be it citizen or non-citizen. 17The purpose of this
Part is to safeguard the basic human rights from the vicissitudes of political controversy and
to place them beyond the reach of the political parties who, by virtue of their majority, may
come to form the Government at the Centre or in the State.18The Punjab and Haryana High

8
Salmond, Jurisprudence, 11th Ed., pp. 350-351.
9
Section 3(42), General Clauses Act, 1897.
10
Jabbar v. State of U.P, AIR 1966 All 590.
11
Section 11
12
Section 2 (31)
13
(2000) 2 SCC 465.
14
Deena alias DeenDayala and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.. AIR 1983 SC 1155 and State Trading
Corporation of India v. Commercial Tax Officer and Ors., AIR 1963 SC 1811.
15
Thomson-Csf and Ors. v. National Airport Authority, AIR (1993) Delhi 252.
16
Mr. Louis De Raedt&Ors vs Union Of India AndOrs, 1991 AIR 1886, 1991 SCR (3) 149; See Also, Anwar v.
State of J&K, (1971) 3 SCC 104.
17
Ibid.
18
Supra Note 13.
COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
17|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

Court, held that the term person used in Art. 14 does not include state but however includes
natural persons and artificial persons like corporations and joint stock companies. 19

(e) The actions of the Government and the governmental authorities can be questionedby
invoking Article 14, since the right under Article 14 is available to all 'persons'.20A foreigner
is also entitled to avail the personal rights which are enshrined in Article 14 of the
Constitution. 21Therefore, it is evident that the Law and the Courts guarantee Art. 14 to
foreigner persons, which also includes companies. The Supreme Court laid down that the
benefit of Article 14 is not limited to citizens alone but is also available to any person within
the territory of India 22.Therefore the Petitioner who is a foreign Company can avail of this
right and question the government on actions done by it in violation of this right.

(f) A wholesome reading of Art. 14 shows that what the Article means is that there should be
equality of treatment of all persons within the territory of India, i.e. every person, within the
Territory of India should have the same rights as granted to persons on similar footing. The
words “within the territory of India” must be taken to mean that every person who has a right
in India granted by the State should be assured of the protection of Art.14.

Hence, it is the submission of the petitioner that Andronix Corporation is a ‘person’ under
Article 14, and that its fundamental right to equality stands violated by the Union of India.

[A2.] Violation of Article 14

(a) It is the humble contention of the Petitioners that the right to equality of Andronix
Corporation has been violated by the Union of India.For the violation of Article 14 of the
Constitution, it is not necessary that a person should be a citizen of the country.23 The
protection is also available to a non-citizen. 24For the infringement of Article 14 of the
Constitution, any person can maintain the writ petition and as such, the petitioner has every
right to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution.

(b) The Honourable Apex Court in this regard has also relied on Article 14 of the ICCPR 25
which provides that every person should be treated equally before Courts and Tribunals. A

19
Shiv Prasad v. Punjab State AIR 1957 Punj 150, 151.
20
Smiths Detection Asia-Pacific Pte. Ltd v. Electronic Corporation of India and Ors., (2004) 2 ALD 878.
21
Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi and Rajasthan &Anr. 1959 SC 149
22
Ibid.
23
Power Measurement Ltd. vs U.P. Power Corporation Ltd, 2003 (2) AWC 1642 B.
24
Ibid.
25
Art 14. UN General Assembly, ICCPR, 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p.
171, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3aa0.html [accessed 7 March 2019].
COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
18|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

juristic person is entitled to the right to equality. 26Andronix Corporation is a foreign


Company within the meaning of the Companies Act, 201327, and registered thereunder. So
Art. 14 can be claimed by the Petitioner since Andronix Corporation is a company situated in
India. To enforce this right under Art. 14.

(c) The right to equality of the petitioners, has been violated by the State with the
introduction of the amended IT Rules, 2011 as well as the UAV Regulations as it “hampers
the ease of doing business for foreign corporation”, 28 as well as the fact that it puts such
foreign corporates on the backfoot, thereby curbing the equal rights of such bodies of doing
business on the same footing as Indian companies.

(d) Article 14 prohibits hostile discrimination of any person by the State. It is well settled
that Article 14 ensures that the State metes out just, fair and reasonable treatment with in the
territory of India to every individual. 29The Apex Court held that equality is the antithesis of
arbitrariness and where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according
to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Art. 1430. By framing the
amended IT Rules, the Union of India took an arbitrary decision without taking into
consideration the presence of the many foreign companies doing business in India.

(e) The services that are being provided by Andronix Corporation are essential services
which have been indulged in for the well-being of the persons of the country. When the
object at hand is something that concerns the welfare of the people at hand, it is the humble
contention of the Petitioners that Andronix should be allowed to file the petition so that the
corporation may continue rendering services to the State Government vide its 5 year contract
for the betterment and protection of the people in society. 31

(f) The application of the principles of natural justice that have been enshrined in Article 14,
and the concept of audialterempartemwhich literally translates into “Hear the other party, or
the rule of fair hearing, or the rule that no one should be condemned unheard.”These
principles are also affirmed by the UDHR, 1948 to which India is a signatory32The ICCPR

26
CharanjitLalChowdhary v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41.
27
S2(42), Companies Act, 2013.
28
Moot Proposition, Paragraph 7, Page 4.
29
Thomson-Csf and Ors. v. National Airport Authority, AIR (1993) Delhi 252.
30
E.P. Royappa v. State of TamilNadu AIR 1974 SC 555.
31
Moot Proposition, Paragraph 5, Page 3.
32
Supra Note 22.
COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
19|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

also reaffirms the guarantee of the principles of natural justice. 33 This has also been reiterated
by the International Court of Justice in an avalanche of cases. 34

(g) It is pertinent to note that by not allowing Andronix Corporation the right to be heard, its
rights to natural justice are in violation. The petitioner seeks its right to state that the current
petition is maintainable under the eyes of the law.

Thus, it is the humble contention of the Petitioners that the fundamental right of Andronix
Corporation has been violated.

B. A FOREIGN INCORPORATED COMPANY HAS THE RIGHT TO SEEK REMEDY UNDER ART.
32.

(a) Locus standi means a place of standing or a right of appearance in a Court of Justice. It
signifies the right to bring an action and to be heard.35When a person acquires a locus standi,
he has to have a personal or individual right which was violated or threatened to be
violated.36 As established above, there has been a clear cut violation of the rights of Andronix
Corporation by the Union of India.

(b) In Thomson-Csf and Ors. v. National Airport Authority37 that when Article 14 can be
granted to National Companies, it should also be provided to foreign companies. A person
can approach the Supreme Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution only when a fundamental
right that that person has a claim to, is violated.38 Art. 32 guarantees the right to constitutional
remedies.

(c) In order to protect the right to equality, the Petitioner can approach this Hon’ble Court
under Art. 32 and has the locus standi to do the same. As expressed by PatanjaliSastri, J.,
“The Supreme Court should regard itself as the protector and guarantor of fundamental rights
and should declare that it cannot, consistently with the responsibility laid upon it, refuse to
entertain applications seeking protection against infringements of such rights.”39 The Court

33
Art 14. UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December
1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171, available at:
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3aa0.html [accessed 7 March 2019].
34
Nuclear Tests Case, (New Zealand v. France), (1973), ICJ 457. Also in: Mosul Boundary case, (1925) PCIJ.
35
AiyarRamanatha, P., Concise Law Dictionary, LexisNexis ButtersworthWadhwa Nagpur, 2009.
36
Calcutta Gas Co. Ltd. V. State of West Bengal, AIR 1962 SC 1044.
37
Supra Note 26.
38
Jasbhai v. Roshan, AIR 1976 SC 578.
39
RomeshThappar v. State of Madras, 1950 SCR 594, 597.
COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
20|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

should regard it as a solemn duty to protect the fundamental rights zealously and
vigilantly. 40”

(d) There is no specific bar in the Constitution that prevents a corporation incorporated
outside the country to maintain a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The
basic requirement for invoking the jurisdiction of the Writ Court is that the legal right of the
complainant should be breached by any person or authority, who fits the description of
"State" under Article 12of the Constitution of India. 4142 The Union of India, in this current
matter falls under the ambit of the definition of Article 12. Article 32 does not lay down any
eligibility criteria based on citizenship of the seeker of the constitutional remedy.

(e) The Courts, over a period of time, have recognized the availability to the recourse to
Article 32 of the Constitution of India to persons other than natural persons who are Indians.
A juristic person carrying on business in India has been recognized to be entitled to maintain
and obtain relief under Article 32 of the Constitution.43. Similarly in the case cited above, the
company who filed the petition was incorporated in Nepal. A foreign company in any event
has a right to sue and there is no bar under the Civil Procedure Code also in that regard.44

(f) The Petitioners would also like to prove that the petition filed by the Citizens for Digital
Privacy is maintainable under the law as it is a NGO and The rules of locus standi have been
relaxed and a person acting bonafide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of PIL
will have a locus standi and can approach the court to wipe out violation of fundamental
rights and genuine infraction of statutory provisions, but not for personal gain or private
profit or political motive or any oblique consideration45.

Thus, Counsel for the Petitioners submits that the petition that has been filed by Andronix
Corporation and Citizens for Digital Privacy is maintainable under the eyes of the law and
that the Petitioner has the locus standi to file the writ petition and that the fundamental right
of the corporation has been affected vide the amendments made by the Union of India.

40
Daryao v. State of U.P., (1962) 1 SCR 574, 582.
41
HongKong& Shanghai Banking v. Union Of India, WP No.388 of 2003.
42
Ibid.
43
Lumbini Industries Pvt. Ltd vs Union Of India &Ors, W.P. No. 533 of 2004.
44
Supra Note 9.
45
State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh ChaufalAnd Others (2010) 3 SCC 402.
COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
21|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

2. WHETHER THE 2018 AMENDMENTS TO THE IT RULES AND THE UAV REGULATIONS 1.0
ARE ULTRA VIRES THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA?

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the 2018 amendment to the Information
Technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or
Information) Rules, 2011 along with the UAV Regulations 1.0 are ultra vires the Constitution
of India. The arguments for the above issue are subdivided into [A.] 2018 amendment of It
Rules is ultra vires the Constitution of India [B.] UAV Regulations 1.0 is ultra vires the
Constitution of India.

A. AMENDMENT TO IT RULES ARE ULTRA VIRES

Statutory and governmental bodies have limits upon the acts and activities which they legally
engage in.46 It is the humble submission of the counsel for Petitioners that the 2018
Amendment that was made to the IT Rules is violatory of the fundamental rights guaranteed
by the Indian Constitution. The amendment mandatedthat locational and facial data would
qualify as sensitive personal data and that all sensitive personal data of Indian citizens must
be stored in servers located in India.47The main aim of the 2018 amendment 48 to the IT Rules
is to localise sensitive personal data, which essentially translates to the process of localisation
of data.

[A1.] Violation of Right to Privacy

(a) Data localization is the act of storing data on any device that is physically present within
the borders of a specific country where the data was generated.49 Rule 3 of the IT Rules, 2011
define what sensitive personal information50is. Any of the personal information which is
mentioned in this particular rule falls under the ambit of what data should be mandated to be
localised within the servers of India, as per the 2018 amendment.51Data localisation requires
companies to store and process data on servers physically located within national borders.

46
Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC [1992] 2 AC 1
47
Moot Proposition, Para6, Page 4.
48
Ibid
49
SriKrishnaCommitteee Report
50
Rule 3, IT Rules, 2011.
51
Supra Note 47
COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
22|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

(b) The Supreme Court of India recognised that there exists a fundamental right to privacy
under the Indian Constitution52. The Court, in a wide ranging declaratory judgment, found
privacy to be an integral component of numerous fundamental rights, notably rights to
equality53, speech and expression54, and the protection of life and liberty55. The court
recognised that the right could have multiple facets such as informational privacy, freedom
from unwarranted stimuli, autonomy to take decisions, etc.

(c) The Hon’ble bench in this landmark decision56, made the point that any interference in the
right to privacy should satisfy the requirement of a “fair, just and reasonable” procedure
established by law. Further, the majority of judges also converged on certain additional tests
to be used for analysing any privacy infringements. These tests include: the existence of a
law, that the law should seek to achieve a legitimate state aim, and there should be a rational
nexus between the objects and means to adopt them (proportionality). Localisation measures
infringe on the autonomy of individuals in respect of their personal information, the measures
would have to satisfy the Puttaswamy tests.57

(d) The right to privacy includes the right to respect for digital communications. If the
Government (or any other entity) infringes the right of privacy, the injury spreads far beyond
the particular citizens targeted, it intimidates many more. Collection as well as retention of
the communication/content along with the meta-data or other ‘physical’ links is an
infringement of the right to privacy, regardless of whether it is utilized for a purpose of not.58

(e) The 2014 UN General Assembly Resolution 69/166, 'The Right to Privacy in the Digital
Age' follows the Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 59 states the eventual
victim is always individual freedoms and thus, societal well-being. data relating to a person's
private life and to his communications, for the purpose of possible access to them by the

52
Justice K.S Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.
53
Art 14, Constitution of India
54
Art 19(1)(a), Constitution of India
55
Art 21, Constitution of India
56
Justice K.S Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.
57
Justice K.S Puttaswamy v. Union of India WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 833 OF 2013
58
See G.A. Res. 68/167 (Dec. 18, 2013); Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of
human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, 16-18, U.N. Doc. A/69/397 (Sept. 23,
2014); see also Copland v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 37 (2007); Weber and Saravia v. Germany, 46
Eur. Ct. H.R. 47, 77 (2006).
59
The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, GA Res 69/166, UN GAOR, 3rd Comm, 69th sess, 73rd plenmtg,
Agenda Item 68(b), UN Doc A/RES/69/166 (10 February 2015, adopted 18 December 2014) ('Resolution
69/166').
COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
23|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

competent national authorities, directly and specifically affects private life and consequently,
violates relevant articles of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.60

[A1.1] Surveillance of citizens

(a) The amendment introduced may also increase the risk of local surveillance by law
enforcement agencies.The country in which the data is located in had laws that gave the state
greater powers of restricting access to content, or if the country the data was located in did
not have the capacity or will to ensure proper oversight and accountability of its executive
agencies, there exists the possibility of the blatant violation of a citizens’ right to privacy.

(b) The use of extra-legal measures is also more tempting should data be localized, as there is
no real incentive for law enforcement agencies to consistently adhere to due process norms
given that Indian law does not bar the introduction or use of illegally acquired evidence.61The
resulting sharing of data between law enforcement agencies, intelligence bodies and other
State organs risks violating Article 17 of the Covenant 62, because surveillance measures that
may be necessary and proportionate for one legitimate aim may not be so for the purposes of
another.63

(c) Currently, jurisdictional claims against foreign entities are enforced through Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaties. The presence of personal information in the territory of a country could
trigger the territorial basis for jurisdiction, thus giving additional powers to police and other
law enforcement agencies. 64

(d) Physically locating all data within the territory of a state leads to a significant increase in
the capacity of law enforcement agencies to access that information, and consequently surveil
domestic residents65, which is in direct violation of the Supreme Court pronouncement of
Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh &Ors.66

(e) Current Indian laws pertaining to surveillance provide significant leeway for the state to
exercise fairly intrusive powers. It is in fact arguable that current laws pertaining to

60
Case C-293/12, Digital Rights Ireland, 43, at 29-34. Rona, Gabor, and Lauren Aarons. "State Responsibility
to Respect, Protect and Fulfill Human Rights Obligations in Cyberspace." Journal of National Security Law &
Policy, vol. 8, no. 3, 2016, pp. 1-33.
61
(State (N.C.T. Of Delhi) vs Navjot Sandhu, (2005)11 SCC 600,AIR 2005 SC 3820
62
UN General Assembly, ICCPR, 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171, available
at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3aa0.html [accessed 7 March 2019].
63
Supra Note 60.
64
Andrew Keane Woods, ‗Against Data Exceptionalism‘, 68(4) Stanford Law Review 729, 748 (April 2016).
65
See Chander and Le (2015) and J. Hill (2014).
66
1963 AIR 1295, 1964 SCR (1) 332
COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
24|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

surveillance (as contained in the IT Act and Telegraph Act, 1885) do not comply with
Supreme Court’s dicta laid down in thePuttaswamy67case.

[A2.] Threat to National Security

(a) For the data to be stored locally, data centres need to be established, regulated and
function under the law. The demand for companies to host their data in India stemmed from
security perspective. The major issues with data localisation is not only of cyber security but
also jurisdiction. Cloud computing softwares have taken advantage of the economies of scale
and an infrastructural architecture across the world.

(b) Thus when there is a threat presumed in one part of the world, the algorithm would move
the data to another location or even in multiple locations. In addition to this, businesses in
India were most at risk to cyber security attacks. Further the organisations in India have
experienced the highest number of weekly security incidents of all Asian countries
surveyed. 68

(c) Localisation on its own is not likely to be a sufficient barrier against sophisticated
intelligence threats from abroad. In today’s geo-political ecosystem, personal data can be
viewed as a currency to be traded between nation states – implying that all countries have a
rationale to capture as much data as possible.69

(d) The Snowden revelations, for instance, revealed not only the broad information sharing
arrangements between the 5-eyes countries (the United States, the United Kingdom,
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand) but also how numerous other countries (including
India) have signed up as third party partners 70

(e) From R v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis71 and the Puttaswamy72verdict it
can be clearly understoodthe right to privacy is deeply connected with national security. It is
humbly submitted to this Hon’ble Court that the newly introduced amendment clearly
violated the fundamental rights of privacy of citizens under Part III of the Indian constitution.

67
Justice K.S Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.
68
Cyber Security Report, 2017 released by Telstra
69
Sargsyan, 2016
70
See Borger (2013) and Geist, Gjerding, Moltke and Poitras (2014)
71
[2011] UKSC 21
72
(2017) 10 SCC 1
COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
25|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

[A3.] Violation of Civil Liberties

(a) Moving beyond the realm of privacy, data localisation mandates also have a bearing on
other civil liberties. Prominent among these are issues of free speech, censorship, and the
right to carry on any trade or business 73, subject only to reasonable restrictions74.Article
19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution protects the right to speech and expression, which may be
restricted only on the grounds provided in Article 19(2).75 Article 19(2) uses the phrase
‘reasonable’ to qualify the permissible scope of a restriction.This generally implies a lack of
arbitrariness, vagueness or excessiveness in the measures adopted76.

(b) The right to expression has been held to include within it the right to both disseminate and
receive information. 77 Indian courts have also recognised the important role of the Internet in
enabling the right to expression, notably in the Shreya Singhal v. Union of India78 case.
Localisation could affect expression rights in a number of ways given that the Internet is built
on the principle of easy transfer of information across borders79. Localisation may also permit
greater censorship of domestic dissident or political voices and affect the extent to which
Indian content is accessible abroad80

(c) The process of data localisation can also have a negative effect on the ability of the
scientific and business community to innovate with big data solutions at a global scale, and
hinder innovation based on the Internet of Things and the sharing economy 81

(d) The state has the power to block online content using either specific laws under the IT
Act, 2000 or general laws such as the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Sections 69A and 79
of the IT Act permit executive authorities to order the blocking of online information on
similar grounds82 as present in Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India. Procedural
guidelines have also been laid down to restrict how the state may exercise its powers of
censorship.83

73
Art 19(1)(a), Constitution of India.
74
Art 19(2), Constitution of India.
75
Constitution of India, 1950.
76
Basu, 2012.
77
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain, (1975 AIR 865, 1975 SCR (3) 333)
78
(2013) 12 S.C.C. 73,
79
(Chander and Le (2015) and Plaum (2014)).
80
Chander and Le (2015) and Chander (2011)
81
See Zittrain (1974), Ursic, Nurullaev, Cuevas and Szulewski (2018) and Ahmed and Chander (2016).
82
IT Act, 2000.
83
IT (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009, (Blocking
Rules), as well as the IT (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011.
COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
26|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

(e) The broad data localisation requirements may indeed harm the expression rights of Indian
citizens due to the increased ability of the state to restrict access to content hosted locally, as
well as by limiting access to content of smaller services (domestic or foreign), which may not
be able or willing to bear the costs of localisation.

A study indicates that it is hard to distinguish personal data from non-personal data for
purposes of data localisation. 84The local data storage requirement is arbitrary, goes against
the ethos of free and open internet, reduces competition in the digital economy, acts as a
disincentive to enter India and gives rise to tax concerns.Any action must also be necessary
and proportionate, and absolute data localisation as described in above is
unconstitutional.Thus, it is humbly submitted to this Hon’ble Court that, the 2018
Amendment mandating the localisation of sensitive personal information is ultra vires the
Indian Constitution.

B. UAV REGULATIONS 1.0 ARE ULTRA VIRES.

UAV’s can be broadly defined as “A powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human
operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted
remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or non-lethal payload.”85
The DGCA formulated the UAV Regulations 1.0 in August 2018 and made it come into
effect upon a reg-tech solution “Digital Sky” 86. The key feature of this regulation was the
Civil Aviation Requirements (CAR) for civil use of Remotely Piloted Aircraft System
(RPAS) commonly known as drones 87.

It is most humbly submitted that DGCA, a governmental regulatory body which formulated
the UAV Regulations 1.0 comes within the definition of state under Art.1288 . .Further the
term ‘law’ includes any ordinances, order, bye-laws, rule, regulation, notification, custom or
usages having in the territory of India 89. Hence the regulations fall within the ambit of
Art.13(3)(a). Therefore it is clear that not only law made by legislature but also an order or

84
Neha Mishra, ‗Data Localisation Laws in a Digital World- Data Protection or Data Protectionism?‘, Public
Sphere, 141 (2016), available at:
http://publicspherejournal.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/02/06.data_protection.pdf, (last accessed 17 November
2017); referring to Matthias Bauer et al., ‗The Economic Importance of Getting Data Protection Right:
Protecting Privacy, Transmitting Data, Moving Commerce‘, ECIPE for U.S Chamber of Commerce (March
2013)
85
https://fas.org/irp/program/collect/uav_roadmap2005.pdf
86
Moot Proposition, Para 4, pg. no 2
87
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=183093
88
Art 12 of Constitution of India, 1950
89
Art.13(3)(a) of Constitution of India, 1950
COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
27|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

notification which takes away or abridges the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the
Constitution would be void 90.

[B1.] Violation of Fundamental Rights of persons

[B1.1] Violation of Art.14

(a)Art.1491 guarantees equality to all persons, both citizens and non-citizens of the country92.
The UAV Regulations 1.0 laid down the eligibility of a person to operate drones in ‘Rule 6 of
RPAS Requirements’93-

1. Citizen of India

2. Associated with central/state government or any company/corporation owned or


controlled by central/state government

3. A corporate body-

 Which is registered in India


 Having its principal place of business in India
 Having its chairman and at least two-thirds of its directors as Indian citizens
 Whose substantial ownership is vested in Indian nationals
 Which is registered elsewhere, provided that such company has leased the RPA’s to
any organization

The eligibility criterion clearly differentiates and discriminates foreign companies94.


Corporations like Andronix cannot fly drones owing to these restrictions which are neither
reasonable nor fair. Since Art.14 is guaranteed to Andronix Corporation as substantiated in
the above issue, violation of the same would be unconstitutional and ultra vires the
constitution.

(b) Two tests have been provided by the SC overtime, which any law passed by the
government is required to satisfy, in order to fulfil the requirements of Art. 14 of the
Constitution and the UAV Regulations 1.0 are unable to satisfy the requirements so laid
down.
90
Union of India v. Col. L.S.N. Murthy, (2012) 1 SCC 718.
91
Art.14 Constitution of India, 1950
92
Chairman, Railway Board v. Chandrima Das, AIR 2000 SC 988(2000) 2 SCC 465
93
Rule 6, Requirements for operation of RPAS,2017 http://www.dgca.nic.in/misc/draft%20cars/CAR%20-
%20UAS%20(Draft_Nov2017).pdf
94
S2(42), Companies Act, 2013.
COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
28|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

1. TEST OF REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION

While Art. 14 allows reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation it forbids any
sort of class legislation95. The test of reasonable classification was laid down by SC in
Budhan Chaudhary v. State of Bihar96, which provides that: (1) the classification proposed in
the legislation must be founded on intelligible differentia and that, (2) there must be close
nexus between the classification and the object of the Act.

Principle of Intelligible Differentia

The expression intelligible differentia means difference capable of being understood and
should be reasonable and not arbitrary97. In the present case, the government seeks to
differentiate between foreign companies with substantial Indian owners and Directors with
those foreign companies having no Indian ownership but doing business in India with a state
government for the welfare and benefit of Indian citizens 98. Such differentiation is arbitrary
and unreasonable.

There should be Rational Nexus between Classification and Objective Sought

It is contended that the law can only make and set apart the classes according to the needs
and exigencies of the society99. The object of the UAV Regulations 1.0 is to merely regulate
and monitor drone surveillance, it has absolutely nothing to do with the above classification
and therefore the classification is not only unreasonable but also promotes class legislation.

2. TEST OF ARBITRARINESS

It is humbly contended that the differentiation on the basis of nationality of persons is


arbitrary, unfair and unreasonable 100. Andronix Corporation’s business is being hampered by
disallowing them to operate drones in the Indian Territory only because they are a foreign
company.

Thus, in absence of reasonable restriction to curtail Art.14, the UAV Regulation 1.0 are ultra
vires the constitution of India.

95
AIR 1955 SC 191; See also, Ameronissa v. Mehboob, AIR 1953 SC 71; KedarNathBajoria v. State of West
Bengal, AIR 1953 SC 404; VajravelluMudaliar v. Special Deputy Collector for Land Acquisition, AIR 1965 SC
1017.
96
AIR 1955 SC 191
97
M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 876 (7th ed., Lexis-Nexis Butterworth Wadhwa Publications, Nagpur,
2016)
98
Moot Proposition, Para 3, Page No. 2
99
Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation (2014) 1 SCC 1.
100
MadhuLimaye v. SupdtTihar jail Delhi , 1975 AIR (SC) 1505
COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
29|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

[B1.2] Violation of Art.19(1)(d)

(c) Every citizen has been guaranteed the right to move freely throughout the territory of
India by virtue of Art.19(1)(d)101. Surveillance violates this freedom of movement 102. Since
the regulations permit the flying of drones in all areas except some restricted areas as
mentioned in 13.4 of RPAS procedures103, it violates this fundamental right of the citizens.

(d) Further, In the landmark judgement of Justice K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v.UOI and
Ors104., it was held that “right to privacy” has multiple facetsemanating from Article 19(1)(a)
and (d) and Article 21.” It is evident that Art.19(1)(d) imbibes in it the right to privacy as
well and since drones violate the bodily privacy of individuals, Art.19(1)(d) stands violated.

[B1.3] Violation of Art.21

(e) It is humbly brought to the notice of this Hon’ble supreme court that the ambit of Art.21
was expanded to include right to privacy as a fundamental right after the judgements of
Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh 105, Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu106andManeka
107
Gandhi v. UOI .Privacy enables the individual to retain the autonomy of the body and
mind108. Operation of drones in the airspace is a clear infringement of this privacy. Previously
on October 7, 2014 the DGCA had issued a public notice banning the use of UAV’s in Indian
Territory. The notice recognized the menace of drones and acknowledged the underlining
issue of safety and privacy in it 109.

(f) The Counsel would like to rely on the Doctrine of ad coelum110which prolifically states
that an individual also owns the airspace above his head 111 and trespass into the same by
UAV’s is not warranted in view of right to privacy. The Procedures for Operation of RPAS
under 13.6.12(i) state that the privacy of individuals must be protected 112 but flying nano

101
Art.19(1)(d) Constitution of India , 1950
102
Kharak Singh vs The State Of U. P. & Others, 1963 AIR 1295, 1964 SCR (1) 332
103
Rule 13.4, Procedures for operation of RPAS in Indian Airspace ; effective from 1 Dec,2018
file:///C:/Users/ADMIN/Downloads/AIPS_2018_164.pdf
104
(2017) 10 SCC 1.
105
1975 AIR 1378, 1975 SCR (3) 946
106
AIR 1995 SC 264
107
1978 AIR 597, 1978 SCR (2) 621
108
Joseph Shine v. UOI, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1676
109
https://ssrana.in/News/CL%20Connect%20NewsLetter/2017/23/India-DGCA-releases-draft-regulations-on-
the-civil-use-of-drones.htm#fn11
110
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuius_est_solum,_eius_est_usque_ad_coelum_et_ad_inferos#cite_note-2
111
Hinman v. Pac. Air Lines Transp. Corp., 84 F.2d 755, 757 (9th Cir. 1936)
112
Rule 13.6.12(i), Procedures for operation of RPAS in Indian Airspace ; effective from 1 Dec,2018
file:///C:/Users/ADMIN/Downloads/AIPS_2018_164.pdf
COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
30|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

drones without permission 15m over a person’s head definitely does not protect privacy.
Thus, when the flying of drones itself is a violation to privacy, the rules concerning them
would also infringe Art.21 of the Constitution.

It can efficiently be concluded from all above arguments that the UAV Regulations 1.0
formulated by the DGCA are ultra vires the constitution of India as they do not conform with
the fundamental rights under Art.14,Art.19 and Art.21.

[B2.] Violation of International obligations of Union of India

(a)India is a party in UN’s International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO),1944113. This


organization has put forth some rules and guidelines that have to be followed by member
countries while drafting their own national regulations. Rule 4 of ICAO that deals with Safety
Management Systems(SMS) states that UAV size and physical characteristics (mass and
materials) must be specified as they could influence the likelihood of the aircraft injuring
people, damaging property or damaging another aircraft 114. The UAV Regulations 1.0 drafted
by the DGCA does not comprise rules for size, mass or material of the UAV. Rule 5 of the
same convention calls for specific performance limitations 115, for example mass, speed,
ceiling, rate of climb and rate of descent. Once again the UAV Regulations 1.0 has failed to
encompass these specifications.

(b)The Counsel for the Petitioners humbly conclude that since the UAV Regulations 1.0
overlook the international obligations of Union of India and also violate fundamental right of
persons pledged to them under Art.14, Art.19 and Art.21, it is ultra vires the Indian
Constitution.

3. WHETHER THE ADRP IS ULTRA VIRES THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA?

It is most reverently submitted before this Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that the Counsel
for the Petitioners firmly believe that the ADRP (Advance Data driven Response Policy)
formulated by the Uttar Pradesh government is ultra vires the Constitution of India because
[A.] it infringes the right to privacy conferred to every individual by virtue of Art.21; [B.]
The policy is not in accordance with “procedure established by law” as per Art.21; [C.]
113
International Civil Aviation Organisation(ICAO),1944 (Drawn on Dec 7, 1944)
114
https://www.icao.int/safety/UA/UASToolkit/Pages/Toolkit-Guidelines.aspx
115
https://www.icao.int/safety/UA/UASToolkit/Pages/Toolkit-Guidelines.aspx
COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
31|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

Security and welfare of the state is not a reasonable restriction to curtail the right to privacy
and [D.] it is also contradictory to various UN Conventions supporting data privacy.

A. ADRP INFRINGES THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND LIVELIHOODGUARANTEED TO EVERY

INDIVIDUAL.

[A1.] Infringement of Right to Privacy

(a) Art. 21 of the Constitution of India states that no person shall be deprived of his life or
personal liberty except according to a procedure established by law116. The Preamble of the
Indian Constitution guarantees liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship to all
the citizens of the country117. This in itself reveals how important and expansive the term
“liberty” was for the drafters of the Indian Constitution. The Supreme Court of India has time
and again emphasized to give an expansive interpretation to the term “personal liberty” under
Art. 21 of the Indian Constitution.

(b) The Court has stated, “The expression personal liberty is of the widest amplitude covering
a variety of rights”. ‘Personal liberty’ includes all kinds of freedom except those in Art.19118
(i.e) ‘personal liberty’ excludes the freedom dealt with in Art.19.119 As evident, privacy is not
a freedom dealt with under Art.19 and thus, can definitely be classified as a liberty under
Art.21.

(c) It is humbly brought to the notice of this court that the ambit of Art.21 was expanded to
include right to privacy after the landmark judgement of Govind v. State of Madhya
Pradesh120. The same judgement was reiterated in Maneka Gandhi v. UOI.121 Further it was
recently enunciated by this Hon’ble Supreme Court that right to privacy was an intrinsic part
of Art.21122 and inseparable from human element in human being and core of human
dignity123. It is equally important to note that right to privacy was not only recognized as an
integral part of Art.21 but was also explained to be a distinct right 124 under tort law125. These
judgements are binding on the entire country by virtue of Art 141126.

116
Art.21, Constitution of India, 1950
117
M.P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, Sixth Ed. 2010
118
Kharak Singh v. State of U.P, AIR 1963 SC 1295
119
SiddharamSatlingappaMhetre v. State of Maharashtra and Ors, (2011) 1 C CR LR (SC 488)
120
1975 AIR 1378, 1975 SCR (3) 946
121
1978 AIR 597, 1978 SCR (2) 621
122
Justice K.S.Puttaswamy(Retd) v. UOI, (2017) 10 SCC 1
123
Ibid
124
Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu ,AIR 1995 SC 264
COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
32|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

(d) It has been mentioned explicitly in the facts that that the ADRP specifically spelt out the
use of drones to track human location and capture facial images127. It is important to note that
these images and location of an individual constitute personal sensitive data under Sec.3 of
the IT(Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or
Information) Rules,2011.Further such images were to be captured and location was to be
traced without the knowledge or consent of the individual which is a conspicuous violation of
the ‘Collection Limitation Principle’ 128 given under OECD Guidelines on the Protection of
Privacy and Trans border Flows of Personal Data, 2013. In the case of Campbell v. MGN129 ,
the court held that if “there is an intrusion in a situation where a person can reasonably expect
his privacy to be respected, that intrusion will be capable of giving rise to liability”. The non-
consensual tracking of personal sensitive data ‘merely for prevention’ 130 and not in the wake
of an imminent danger is a clear and unjustified intrusion to privacy.

(e) Privacy enables the individual to retain the autonomy of the body and mind131. The
autonomy of the individual is the ability to make decisions on vital matters of concern to life.
In the present case at hand since ADRP policy is clearly violative of an individual’s
autonomy over his body, it is consequentially violative of Art.21 as well. The Latin maxim
Cuiusest solum, eiusestusqueadcoelum et ad inferos literally means that a person owns the
soil over which he is standing, all the way to heaven and all the way to hell132. It is explicitly
derived from this maxim that every person owns the air space above him too133. Thus, the use
of drones in the airspace to track an individual’s movement is trespass into his property and
violation of his bodily privacy as well, which is not warranted by Art. 21 of the Indian
Constitution.

(f) Further the Counsel would to throw light on Sec. 2(1)(ze) and Sec 43 of the IT Act, 2000
which deal with secure systems and data security. The ADRP policy as mentioned in the
moot proposition is silent about the security measures that would be taken to prevent a breach
of privacy as pronounced under Sec 72 of the IT Act, 2000.In JusticeK.S.Puttaswamy (Retd)

125
Peter Semayne v Richard Gresham, 77 ER 194.
126
Art.141, Constitution of India
127
Moot Proposition, Para 4, Page no. 2.
128
Para 7 of OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Trans border Flows of Personal Data, 2013.
129
2004 UKHL 22.
130
Moot Proposition, Para 4, Page no. 2
131
Joseph Shine v. UOI, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1676
132
Jackson Mun. Airport Auth. v. Evans, 191 So. 2d 126, 128
133
http://www.lawjournal.mcgill.ca/userfiles/other/8509457-abramovitch.pdf
COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
33|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

v. UOI134 it was held that the collection of identity data without adequate safeguards
interferes with the fundamental right of privacy protected under Art. 21 of the Indian
Constitution.

(g) Furthermore the ‘Security Safeguards Principle’ 135 under the OECD Guidelines on the
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, 2013whichexplicitly calls for
reasonable security safeguards to eliminate any risk of data leak is also being overlooked by
the ADRP Policy of the UP Government. This strengthens the belief of the Counsel for the
Petitioners that collecting personal sensitive data combined with the absence of appropriate
security measures is a clear violation of Art.21.

(h) The risk that ADRP poses to an individual’s privacy is enormous as information would
now be scattered in the public domain and this could aggravate data leaks 136. Authorities
could easily misuse this personal information constituting biometric, locational and facial
data. The collection and identification of such sensitive data can be understood as a breach of
one’s territorial privacy and one’s data privacy.

[A2.]Infringement of Right to livelihood

(a) The “right to life” guaranteed by Art.21 includes right to livelihood137. It was held by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court that an equally important facet of the right to life is right to
livelihood because no person can live without the means of livelihood 138. The Counsel for the
Petitioners humbly contends that the ADRP prominently violates the right to livelihood of
Andronix Company by using drones to track human movement which is the main function of
operation of Andronix Corporation139as well. Despite executing a five year contract with
Andronix for advanced data analytics and use of UAV’s 140, the Uttar Pradesh government’s
ADRP policy is consequentially violating the company’s right to livelihood guaranteed under
Art 21.

(b) Ultra vires is a Latin phrase meaning "beyond the powers"141. Since the ADRP policy
formulated by the Uttar Pradesh Government is ‘beyond the powers’ of the constitution due

134
(2017) 10 SCC 1
135
Para 11 of OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, 2013
136
ParagDalmia v. Dcit, ITA No.5499/Del/2017
137
Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. DilipkumarRaghvendrNandkarni, AIR (1983) 1 SCC 124
138
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR (1986) SC 180
139
Moot Proposition, Para 1, Page no. 2
140
Ibid.
141
M.P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, Sixth Ed. 2010
COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
34|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

to recurring violation of Art 21, it can be firmly concluded that the policy is ultra vires the
Constitution of India.

[B.] ADRP IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH “PROCEDURE ESTABLISHED BY LAW” AS PER

ART.21 OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION

(a) Right to privacy is an integral part of Right to life and Personal Liberty142 and it can be
curtailed only in accordance with the “Procedure established by Law”, as provided under Art.
21 of the Constitution of India 143.ICCPR of which India is a signatory also provides that it is
duty of the state to protect the liberty of the people and it can be restricted, only in
accordance with such procedure as are established by law 144.
(b)The SC in Maneka Gandhi145, has laid down a “triple test” for any law to be considered to
being accordance with the ‘Procedure established by law’:
(1) The law must prescribe procedure
(2) The procedure must satisfy the requirements of Arts. 14 and 19
(3) It should be just, fair and reasonable.
The ADRP violates all 3 prescribed conditions and therefore is not in accordance with
‘procedure established by law’. The facts do not mention any set procedure established with
regard to the policy and thus, this amounts to violation of the first test. The Counsel would
now strive to prove to this Hon’ble court about how this policy is not fair, just or reasonable
and also enumerate about how Art.14 and 19 are being vehemently violated.

[B1.] Violation of Art.14 of the Constitution


(a) It is humbly brought to the notice of this court that Art.14 which provides for equality has
two tests laid down by the Supreme Court of India which every law is required to satisfy in
order to fulfill the requirements of Art.14. The two tests are:-
 Test of reasonable classification
 Test of arbitrariness
The Counsel humbly contends that the ADRP policy does not pass the second test (i.e) test of
arbitrariness. The test calls for proper guidelines being laid down for the implementation of

142
RamlilaMaidan Incident v. Home Secretary, Union of India, (2012) 5 SCC 1.
143
People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 207.
144
Art. 9UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December
1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171, available at:
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3aa0.html [accessed 16 March 2019],.
145
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597.
COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
35|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

the law146. Since, no proper guidelines have been mentioned in the facts for the
implementation of ADRP by the executive, the policy is rendered as arbitrary which is the
antithesis of right to equality guaranteed to every person by the Constitution 147.

[B2.] VIOLATION OF ART.19 OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION

[B2.1]Infringement of Right to freedom of speech and expression

Right to receive information concerning their interest

(a) Art. 19(1)(a)148constitutes freedom of speech and expression which is the bulwark of
democratic government. This freedom is essential for the proper functioning of the
democratic process. The freedom of speech and liberty is regarded as a basic human right149.
It occupies a preferred position in the hierarchy liberties giving succour and protection to all
other liberties. It is the mother of all liberties 150. It is humbly brought to the notice of this
Hon’ble Supreme Court that this article deals not only with freedom to impart and
disseminate information but also freedom to receive information 151. In State of Uttar Pradesh
v Raj Narain152, it was held that Art. 19(1)(a), in addition, to guaranteeing freedom of speech
and expression, guarantees the right to receive information on matters concerning their
interest.

(b) In view of the above lines it is evident that every individual must receive information of
the data being collected under the ADRP policy as it is his data being collected in his own
interest. In the present case at hand no individual is being informed about when or where the
drones are collecting their personal sensitive data and thus, since location is being tracked
without the knowledge or information of the individual it leads to a violation of
Art.19(1)(a).‘Individual participation principle’153 under the OECD Guidelines on the
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, 2013states that every
individual must have the right to receive all information about his data collected but since the
present case at hand does not allow the same it is violative of the above principle.
146
KathiRanningRawat v. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1952 SC 123; See also, Re Special Courts Bill Case, AIR
1978 SC 478; KedarNathBajoria v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1953 SC 404.
147
E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555.
148
Art. 19(1)(a), Constitution of India, 1950.
149
LIC v. Manubhai, (1993) S.C. 171
150
Report of the Second Press Comm., Vol. I,34-35
151
Court in Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India v. Cricket Association of
Bengal, 1995 AIR 1236
152
1975 AIR 865
153
Para 13 of OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, 2013
COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
36|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

(c) The Counsel for the Petitioners would also state the case of PUCL v. UOI154which
affirmed that right to freedom of speech and expression included in its blanket the right to
privacy. As it has been proven earlier the right to privacy is being brutally violated by the
ADRP Policy and this consequentially leads to a violation of Art.19(1)(a).

Right to remain silent

(d) Right to remain silent has been recognised by the Supreme Court as within the definition
of freedom of speech and expression in the case of Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala155. The
right includes by necessary implication, freedom not to listen and/or to remain silent156.
Silence postulates a realm of privacy. The privacy of the individual recognizesan inviolable
right to determine how freedom shall be exercised. An individual may perceive that the best
form of expression is to remain silent 157. An important manifestation of the principle of free
speech is that one who chooses to speak and divulge data may also decide what not today158.
The right of freedom of thought as guaranteed by the Constitution against state action
includes both right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all 159. Thus, every
citizen has the right to remain silent and not divulge any data about himself.

(e) In the present case, the ADRP involves collection of data of citizens, some of which is
personal sensitive data. This statement has been inferred from the fact that deep learning
solutions, internet-of-things, etc. are being integrated for the purpose of ADRP. These
emerging technologies specifically deal with data and its transfer. Citizens have been
compelled to part with their demographic information combined with their location data that
is being collected by drones. This is a clear violation of their right to remain silent.
[B3.] ADRP is not fair, just or reasonable

(a)For any law to be valid it must be in conformity with not only Art.14 and Art.19 but also
satisfy the principles of ‘Natural Justice’ which includes fair, just and reasonable. In the
present case dignity of the people is grossly being violated by keeping them in constant
surveillance.

154
(1997) 1 SCC 301
155
Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, AIR 1987 SC 748; See also, P.A. Jacob v. Superintend of Police,
Kottayam, AIR 1993 Ker 1; MarutiShripatiDubal vs. State of Maharashtra, (1986) 88 BOMLR 589.
156
Moulana Mufti Syed Md. Noorur v. State Of West Bengal and Ors., AIR 1999 Cal 15
157
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.), and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 2015 SC 3081
158
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
159
Ibid, Bamette, 319 U.S at 645 (Murphy J, concurring).
COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
37|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

(b) Dignity is an integral part of the constitution 160. Right to life under Art.21 does not mean
‘mere animal existence’ but rather right to live with dignity161.The right to privacy is an
element of human dignity162. Privacy ensures that a human being can lead a life of dignity by
securing the inner recesses of the human personality from unwanted intrusion 163. In the
present case there has definitely been unwarranted intrusion of privacy (by collection of
location and facial data) as proven in preceding arguments and thus, this violates the dignity
of an individual.

(c) Right to privacy which is an integral part of Right to life ensures freedom from
unwarranted state intervention164.Constant state surveillance through drones to track all
human movement compromises with the individual’s autonomy which is a well enshrined
concept in human rights. Thus, due to violation of dignity through constant surveillance, the
ADRP passes as unfair, unjust and unreasonable.

The Counsel for the Petitioners concludes from all above arguments that since the policy is
violative of Art.14, Art.19(1)(a), Art.19(1)(d) in addition to being in violation of the
principles of Natural Justice , it is ultra vires the Indian Constitution.

C. SECURITY OF THE STATE IS NOT A REASONABLE RESTRICTION TO CURTAIL THE RIGHT


TO PRIVACY

(a) Like any other fundamental right, the right to privacy also cannot be treated as an absolute
right165 and is subject to certain restrictions. In the present context, the Supreme Court opined
that right to privacy could be curtailed by “Compelling state interest” comprising of ‘security
of the state’. The term“security of state “refers only to serious and aggravated forms of public
order e.g. rebellion, waging war against the State, insurrection and not ordinary breaches of
public order and public safety, e.g. unlawful assembly, riot, affray 166. In the present case there
has not been any such situation demanding security of the state and thus, right to privacy
cannot be curtailed by stating welfare or security of the state. Further, it has been explicitly

160
Francis Coralie v. Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1981 SC 1746.
161
Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors., AIR 1963 SC 1295
162
Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461.
163
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.), and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 2015 SC 3081.
164
Anna Jonsson Cornell, “Right To Privacy”, Max Planck Encyclopedia Constitutional Law, 2015
165
Sharda v. Dharmpal, (2003) 4 SCC 493
166
Ranjit v. State of Maharashtra, AIR1965 SC 881.
COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
38|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

mentioned in the facts that the ADRP was merely prevention and not a cure167 proving that
there was no immediate threat to the security of the state.

(b) Further, it has been observed by the Court in PUCL v. UOI168, that any restriction on
fundamental right to personal liberty can be imposed whenthere is grave danger to ‘public
safety’ arising due to sudden circumstances. In the presentcase, there is no sudden danger or
threat. Since the nexus between restriction and public order or public security is farfetched in
the present case,the restriction cannot be sustainedas being in the interests of public order or
security of the state169.

(c) The Directive Principles of State Policy under Art.38170 mandates that the state has to work
towards promotion of welfare of the people but this does not mean that fundamental rights of the
citizens can be violated171. The Directive Principles has to conform and run as a subsidiary to the
chapter on fundamental rights and in case of any conflict between fundamental rights and
directive principles, fundamental rights would prevail 172.

D. VIOLATION OF VARIOUS UN CONVENTIONS

It is humbly brought to the notice of this Hon’bleSupreme Court that the ADRP Policy
formulated by the Uttar Pradesh government is not in consonance with various UN
Conventions to which the Union of India is a signatory.

(a) UDHR, 1948173underArt. 12 providesthat: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary


interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, or to attacks upon his honour
and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference
or attacks."174The UDHR protects any interference from the State to a person’s privacy.

167
Moot Proposition, Para 4, Page No. 2
168
People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 301
169
V.K Javali v. State of Mysore, AIR 1966 SC 1387
170
Art.38, Constitution of India, 1950.
171
R K Dalmia v. Justice Tendulkar, AIR 1958 SC 538.
172
State of Madras v. ChampakamDorarirajan, AIR 1951 SC 228
173
UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III), available at:
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3712c.html [accessed 16 March 2019]
174
Art.12, UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A
(III), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3712c.html [accessed 16 March 2019]
COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
39|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

TheICCPR, 1976175under Art. 17 resonates the same sentiments. The ECHR, 1950176
guarantees the right to privacy under Art.8 of the Convention by stating that"Everyone has
the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence."

(b) With due regard to all above mentioned conventions, the ADRP is a definite interference
with an individual’s privacy as proven by the Petitioners in all above arguments. Right to
privacy acts as an embargo on the State from committing an intrusion upon the life and
personal liberty of a citizen and also imposes an obligation on the state to take all necessary
measures to protect the privacy of the individual177. It is vehemently contended by the
Counsel for the Petitioners that despite having an obligation to protect the privacy of
individuals, the state in the present case (i.e) State of Uttar Pradesh is itself violating the
privacy of individuals by its ADRP policy. The state has clearly failed to perform their duties.

(c) Further, Art. 16 of the UNCRC, 1989178 provides protection to a minor from any unlawful
interference to his/her right to privacy and imposes a positive obligation on States who have
ratified the convention to enact a law protecting the same. The functioning of drones to track
all human movement without any justification would violate the rights of a child and
consequently lead to a disregard of the UNCRC convention. Art.4 of the same convention
explicitly states that “Governments have a responsibility to take all available measures to
make sure children’s rights are respected, protected and fulfilled”179. As stated numerous
times the Uttar Pradesh government would be infringing the rights of privacy pledged to
every child in contrast to actually being obligated to protect and respect them.

(d) Art.51(c) of the Indian Constitution asserts that all international laws and treaties must be
respected but the ADRP will not only disrespect and disregard the above conventions but also
infringe the basic fundamental right of privacy pledged to every individual.

Thus, the Counsel for the Petitioners vehemently contends that ADRP is ultra vires the
constitution as it infringes various fundamental rights guaranteed to every person in India.

175
UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3aa0.html [accessed
16 March 2019]
176
Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as
amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5, available at:
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3b04.html [accessed 16 March 2019]
177
K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2015) 8 SCC 735.
178
UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, United Nations, Treaty
Series, vol. 1577, p. 3, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38f0.html [accessed 16 March 2019]
179
Art.4, UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, United Nations,
Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38f0.html [accessed 16 March
2019]
COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
40|P a g e
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, in light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is
humbly prayed before this Hon’ble Court to adjudge and declare that:

1. The writ petition filed by Andronix Corporation is maintainable in law


2. The 2018 amendments to the IT Rules and the UAV Regulations 1.0 are ultra vires
the Constitution of India, and;
3. The ADRP is ultra vires the Constitution of India.

AND/OR pass any other order/orders as this Hon’ble Court deems fit and proper in the
circumstances of the given case and in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience.

And for this act of kindness and justice the Petitioners shall be duty bound and forever pray.

All of which is most humbly and respectfully submitted.

Place: ________ , India S/d_____________


Date: March, 2019

COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONERS

COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS


41|P a g e

Вам также может понравиться