MONZON, Jessa Marie M.

LAW 2E

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge,

Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.
[G.R. No. 139465. January 18, 2000]

FACTS:

Department of Justice (DOJ) received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. a
request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. for violation of
Conspiracy to Commit Offence, Attempt to Evade Tax, Fraud by Wire, Radio or Television, False
Statement and Election Contribution in Name of Another.

During the evaluation process of the extradition the private respondent requested the
petitioner, Secretary of Justice, to furnish him copies of the extradition request from the U.S.
government, that he be given ample time to comment regarding the extradition request against him
after he shall have received copies of the requested papers, and to suspend the proceeding in the
meantime.

The petitioner denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition
Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the United
States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.

Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Manila the “Extradition Treaty between the Government of the Philippines
and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the due process right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process

HELD:

The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused
guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting
state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they
collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we
recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of
international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
 The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with
situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
provision of the constitution or statute of the local state.

Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the

extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period
within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.

“Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the
land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic
sphere.

“The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with
situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.

“Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to
be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted
principles of international law in observance of the incorporation clause in the above cited
constitutional provision.

“In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made
between a rule of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law
should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal
law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.

“The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain
to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere.
The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law
are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly,
the principle lex posterior derogate priori takes effect – a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute
may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the
Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict
with the constitution
MONZON, Jessa Marie M. LAW 2E

EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR, petitioner, vs. LUIS BUNDALIAN, RONALDO B.

ZAMORA, Executive Secretary, Office of the President, AND GREGORIO R. VIGILAR,
Secretary, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), respondents.
[G.R. No. 149335. July 1, 2003]

FACTS:

An unverified letter-complaint was addressed by private respondent LUIS BUNDALIAN

to the Philippine Consulate General accusing petitioner, then OIC-Regional Director of the
DPWH, of accumulating unexplained wealth, in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019.
Private respondent charged among others that petitioner and his wife purchased a house and lot in
Los Angeles, California and that petitioner’s in-laws who were living in California had a poor
credit standing due to a number of debts they could not have purchased such an expensive property
for petitioner and his wife. Private respondent also accused petitioner of amassing wealth from
lahar funds and other public works projects.

The PCAGC conducted its own investigation of the complaint. Petitioner fully participated
in the proceedings. After the investigation, the PCAGC found that petitioner purchased a house
and lot in California, for US$195,000.00 evidenced by a Grant Deed. The body concluded that the
petitioner could not have been able to afford to buy the property on his annual income of P168,
648.00 as appearing on his Service Record. The PCAGC concluded that as petitioner’s acquisition
of the subject property was manifestly out of proportion to his salary, it has been unlawfully
acquired. Thus, it recommended petitioner’s dismissal from service pursuant to Section 8 of R.A.
No. 3019.

The Office of the President, concurring with the findings and adopting the recommendation
of the PCAGC, issued Administrative Order No. 12,4 ordering petitioner’s dismissal from service
with forfeiture of all government benefits.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner was denied due process in the investigation before the PCAGC.

HELD:
NO. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain
one’s side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties
are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are
sufficiently met. In the case at bar, the PCAGC exerted efforts to notify the complainant of the
proceedings but his Philippine residence could not be located.
Be that as it may, petitioner cannot argue that he was deprived of due process because he
failed to confront and cross-examine the complainant. Petitioner voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the PCAGC by participating in the proceedings before it. He was duly represented
by counsel. He filed his counter-affidavit, submitted documentary evidence, attended the hearings,
moved for a reconsideration of Administrative Order No. issued by the President and eventually
filed his appeal before the Court of Appeals. His active participation in every step of the
investigation effectively removed any badge of procedural deficiency, if there was any, and
satisfied the due process requirement. He cannot now be allowed to challenge the procedure
adopted by the PCAGC in the investigation.
It is well to remember that in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due
process in its strict judicial sense for it is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard
before the case against him is decided. This was afforded to the petitioner in the case at bar.