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Under Sections 5 and 12, Rule 57 above reproduced it is provided that the counterbond is
intended to secure the payment of "any judgment" that the attaching creditor may recover in the
action. Under Section 17 of same rule it provides that when "the execution be returned
unsatisfied in whole or in part" it is only then that "payment of the judgment shall become
charged on such counterbond."
The counterbond was issued in accordance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 57 of the Rules
of Court as provided in the second paragraph aforecited which is deemed reproduced as part of
the counterbond. In the third paragraph it is also stipulated that the counterbond is to be "applied
for the payment of the judgment." Neither the rules nor the provisions of the counterbond limited
its application to a final and executory judgment. Indeed, it is specified that it applies to the
payment of any judgment that maybe recovered by plaintiff. Thus, the only logical conclusion is
that an execution of any judgment including one pending appeal if returned unsatisfied maybe
charged against such a counterbond.
It is well recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.
Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguere debemos. 13 "The rule, founded on logic, is a corollary of the principle
that general words and phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance. 14 The rule requires
that a general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one part distinguished from the other so as to justify its exclusion
from the operation of the law. 15 In other words, there should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated.16
For courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law makes no distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think
it ought to be but as they find it and without regard to consequences. 17
A corollary of the principle is the rule that where the law does not make any
exception, courts may not except something therefrom, unless there is compelling
reason apparent in the law to justify it.18 TV
Juanito Pilar v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 115245, July 11, 1995)
People v. Hon. Judge Antonio Evangelista et al. (G.R. No. 110898, February 20,
1996)
However, petitioner argues that the check in question was drawn against the dollar
account of petitioner with a foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by the
Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22).
But it will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the
case. As the trial court correctly ruled in its order dated July 5, 1988:
Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided they are
either drawn and issued in the Philippines though payable outside thereof . . . are
within the coverage of said law.
It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where the law does not
distinguish courts should not distinguish. Parenthetically, the rule is that where the
law does not make any exception, courts may not except something unless compelling
reasons exist to justify it (Phil. British Assurance Co., Inc. vs. IAC, 150 SCRA 520
[1987]).
B. Ejusdem Generis (Where general words of a particular, and specific meaning, such
general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as
applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned
Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General, but the latter or, December
4, 1958 affirmed the ruling of the auditor of the Central Bank,
maintaining that the term "stabilizer and flavors" mentioned in section
2 of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the preparation
or manufacture of food or food products. Not satisfied, the petitioner
brought the case to this Court thru the present petition for review.
The decisive issue to be resolved is whether or not the foreign exchange
used by petitioner for the importation of dental cream stabilizers and
flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax imposed by the
Exchange Tax Law, (Republic Act No. 601) so as to entitle it to refund.
The ruling of the Auditor General that the term "stabilizer and flavors"
as used in the law refers only to those materials actually used in the
preparation or manufacture of food and food products is based,
apparently, on the principle of statutory construction that "general
terms may be restricted by specific words, with the result that the
general language will be limited by the specific language which
indicates the statute's object and purpose." (Statutory Construction by
Crawford, 1940 ed. p. 324-325.) The rule, however, is, in our opinion,
applicable only to cases where, except for one general term, all the
items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class. In
the case at bar, it is true that the term "stabilizer and flavors" is
preceded by a number of articles that may be classified as food or food
products, but it is likewise true that the other items immediately
following it do not belong to the same classification. Thus "fertilizer"
and "poultry feed" do not fall under the category of food or food
products because they are used in the farming and poultry industries,
respectively. "Vitamin concentrate" appears to be more of a medicine
than food or food product, for, as matter of fact, vitamins are among
those enumerated in the list of medicines and drugs appearing in the
appendix to the law. It should also here be stated that "cattle", which is
among those listed preceding the term in question, includes not only
those intended for slaughter but also those for breeding purposes.
Republic v. Hon. Eutropio Migrinio et al. (G.R. No. 89483, August 30, 1990)
the term "subordinate" as used in E.O. Nos. 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys
a close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife, similar to
the immediate family member, relative, and close associate in E.O. No. 1 and the
close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in E.O. No. 2.
It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government
official or employee during the administration of former Pres. Marcos. There must
be a prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by
virtue of his close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his
wife.
People v. Hon. Vicente B. Echavez, Jr. et al. (G.R. Nos. L-47757-61, January 28,
1980)
The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial
court does not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It
is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal
constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory
construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain (Genato
Commercial Corp. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 104 Phil. 615,618; 28 C.J.S. 1049-
50).
Misael P. Vera et al. v. Hon. Serafin R. Cuevas et al. (G.R. Nos. L 33693-94, May
31, 1979)
Moreover, it seems apparent that Section 169 of the Tax Code does not
apply to filled milk. The use of the specific and qualifying terms
"skimmed milk" in the headnote and "condensed skimmed milk" in the
text of the cited section, would restrict the scope of the general clause
"all milk, in whatever form, from which the fatty pat has been removed
totally or in part." In other words, the general clause is restricted by the
specific term "skimmed milk" under the familiar rule of ejusdem
generis that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by
the particular terms they follow in the statute.
Skimmed milk is different from filled milk. According to the
"Definitions, Standards of Purity, Rules and Regulations of the Board
of Food Inspection," skimmed milk is milk in whatever form from
which the fatty part has been removed. Filled milk, on the other hand, is
any milk, whether or not condensed, evaporated concentrated,
powdered, dried, dessicated, to which has been added or which has
been blended or compounded with any fat or oil other than milk fat so
that the resulting product is an imitation or semblance of milk cream or
skim milk." The difference, therefore, between skimmed milk and filled
milk is that in the former, the fatty part has been removed while in the
latter, the fatty part is likewise removed but is substituted with refined
coconut oil or corn oil or both. It cannot then be readily or safely
assumed that Section 169 applies both to skimmed milk and filled milk.
C. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius (The express mention of one person, thing or
consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others.)
The language of the exempting clause of Section 168 of the 1987 Tax
Code was clear. The tax exemption applied only to the exportation of
rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-products and dessicated coconuts,
whether in their original state or as an ingredient or part of any
manufactured article or products, by the proprietor or operator of the
factory or by the miller himself.
The language of the exemption proviso did not warrant the
interpretation advanced by SPMC. Nowhere did it provide that the
exportation made by the purchaser of the materials enumerated in the
exempting clause or the manufacturer of products utilizing the said
materials was covered by the exemption. Since SPMC’s situation was
not within the ambit of the exemption, it was subject to the 3% miller’s
tax imposed under Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code.
SPMC’s proposed interpretation unduly enlarged the scope of the
exemption clause. The rule is that the exemption must not be so
enlarged by construction since the reasonable presumption is that the
State has granted in express terms all it intended to grant and that,
unless the privilege is limited to the very terms of the statute, the favor
would be intended beyond what was meant.19
Where the law enumerates the subject or condition upon which it
applies, it is to be construed as excluding from its effects all those not
expressly mentioned. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Anything
that is not included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom and a
meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very
language of the statute cannot be placed therein.20 The rule proceeds
from the premise that the legislature would not have made specific
enumerations in a statute if it had the intention not to restrict its
meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.21
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a canon of restrictive
interpretation.22 Its application in this case is consistent with the
construction of tax exemptions in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer.
To allow SPMC’s claim for tax exemption will violate these established
principles and unduly derogate sovereign authority.
Dra. Brigida S. Buenaseda, et al. v. Sec. Juan Flavier, et al. (G.R. No. 106719,
September 21, 1993)
When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power "to recommend the
suspension" of a public official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to
"suspension," as a punitive measure. All the words associated with the word
"suspension" in said provision referred to penalties in administrative cases, e.g.
removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of Noscitor a sociis, the word
"suspension" should be given the same sense as the other words with which it is
associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its
correct construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in
which it is found or with which it is associated (Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh,
75 Phil. 371 [1945]; Caltex (Phils.) Inc. v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 [1966]).
E. Use of Negative and Affirmative Words
Manolo P. Fule v. The Honorable Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-79094, June 22,
1988)
Purita Bersabal v. Hon. Judge Serafin Salvador (G.R. No. L-35910, July 21, 1978)
Jenette Marie B. Crisolog v. Globe Telecom, Inc., et al. (G.R. No. 167631,
December 16, 2005)
The pertinent provision of the Corporation Code that is the focal point of controversy in this case
states:
Sec. 46. Adoption of by-laws. - Every corporation formed under this Code, must within one (1) month
after receipt of official notice of the issuance of its certificate of incorporation by the Securities and
Exchange Commission, adopt a code of by-laws for its government not inconsistent with this Code.
Ordinarily, the word "must" connotes an imposition of duty which must be enforced.
However, the word "must" in a statute, like "shall," is not always imperative. It may be
consistent with an ecercise of discretion. If the language of a statute, considered as a
whole with due regard to its nature and object, reveals that the legislature intended to use
the words "shall" and "must" to be directory, they should be given that meaning.
The legislative deliberations of the Corporation Code reveals that it was not the intention
of Congress to automatically dissolve a corporation for failure to file the By-Laws on time.
Moreover, By-Laws may be necessary to govern the corporation, but By-Laws are still
subordinate to the Articles of Incorporation and the Corporation Code. In fact, there are
cases where By-Laws are unnecessary to the corporate existence and to the valid
exercise of corporate powers.
The Corporation Code does not expressly provide for the effects of non-filing of By-Laws.
However, these have been rectified by Section 6 of PD 902-A which provides that SEC
shall possess the power to suspend or revoke, after proper notice and hearing, the
franchise or certificate of registration of corporations upon failure to file By-Laws within
the required period.
This shows that there must be notice and hearing before a corporation is dissolved for
failure to file its By-Laws. Even assuming that the existence of a ground, the penalty is
not necessarily revocation, but may only be suspension.
By-Laws are indispensable to corporations, since they are required by law for an orderly
management of corporations. However, failure to file them within the period prescribed
does not equate to the automatic dissolution of a corporation.
H. Computing Time
I. Use of a ―Proviso‖
Petitioners next claim that their service to NSC of more than six (6)
years should qualify them as regular employees. We believe this claim
is without legal basis. The simple fact that the employment of
petitioners as project employees had gone beyond one (1) year, does
not detract from, or legally dissolve, their status as project employees.
10
The second paragraph of Article 280 of the Labor Code, quoted
above, providing that an employee who has served for at least one (1)
year, shall be considered a regular employee, relates to casual
employees, not to project employees.
In the case of Mercado, Sr. vs. National Labor Relations Commission,
11
this Court ruled that the proviso in the second paragraph of Article
280 relates only to casual employees and is not applicable to those who
fall within the definition of said Article's first paragraph, i.e., project
employees. The familiar grammatical rule is that a proviso is to be
construed with reference to the immediately preceding part of the
provision to which it is attached, and not to other sections thereof,
unless the clear legislative intent is to restrict or qualify not only the
phrase immediately preceding the proviso but also earlier provisions of
the statute or even the statute itself as a whole. No such intent is
observable in Article 280 of the Labor Code, which has been quoted
earlier.
VII. Presumptions
A. Against Unconstitutionality
Execution pending appeal is interlinked with the right to appeal. One cannot be
divorced from the other. The latter may be availed of by the losing party or a party
who is not satisfied with a judgment, while the former may be applied for by the
prevailing party during the pendency of the appeal. The right to appeal, however,
is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right. It is a statutory privilege of
statutory origin 18 and, therefore, available only if granted or provided by statute.
The law may then validly provide limitations or qualifications thereto or relief to
the prevailing party in the event an appeal is interposed by the losing party.
Execution pending appeal is one such relief long recognized in this jurisdiction.
The Revised Rules of Court allows execution pending appeal and the grant thereof
is left to the discretion of the court upon good reasons to be stated in a special
order.
Lim v. Pacquing et al. (G.R. No. 115044, January 27, 1995) and Guingona et al. v.
Reyes et al. (G.R. No. 117263, January 27, 1995)
Lim et al. v. People et al. (G.R. No. 149276, September 27, 2002)
B. Against Injustice
Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of R.A. 6426,
as amended by P.D. 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act
be made applicable to a foreign transient?
Petitioner deserves to receive the damages awarded to her by the court. But this
petition for declaratory relief can only be entertained and treated as a petition for
mandamus to require respondents to honor and comply with the writ of execution
in Civil Case No. 89-3214.
This Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for
declaratory relief. 2 However, exceptions to this rule have been
recognized. Thus, where the petition has far-reaching implications and
raises questions that should be resolved, it may be treated as one for
mandamus. 3
Here is a child, a 12-year old girl, who in her belief that all Americans
are good and in her gesture of kindness by teaching his alleged niece
the Filipino language as requested by the American, trustingly went
with said stranger to his apartment, and there she was raped by said
American tourist Greg Bartelli. Not once, but ten times. She was
detained therein for four (4) days. This American tourist was able to
escape from the jail and avoid punishment. On the other hand, the
child, having received a favorable judgment in the Civil Case for
damages in the amount of more than P1,000,000.00, which amount
could alleviate the humiliation, anxiety, and besmirched reputation she
had suffered and may continue to suffer for a long, long time; and
knowing that this person who had wronged her has the money, could
not, however get the award of damages because of this unreasonable
law. This questioned law, therefore makes futile the favorable judgment
and award of damages that she and her parents fully deserve. As stated
by the trial court in its decision.
In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice.
Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any
other order or process of any court, legislative body, government
agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a
foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved
by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article
10 of the New Civil Code which provides that "in case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking
body intended right and justice to prevail. "Ninguno non deue
enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro." Simply stated, when the
statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions
that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience. (Padilla vs.
Padilla, 74 Phil. 377).
Alonzo et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court et al. (G.R. No. L-72873, May 28,
1987)
Berces, Jr. v. Guingona, Jr. et al. (G.R. No. 112099, February 21, 1995)
An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a
substantial conflict must be found between the new and prior laws. In the absence
of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior
law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of
the new and old laws (Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. v.
Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 [1965]). There must be such a repugnancy between the
laws that they cannot be made to stand together (Crawford, Construction of
Statutes 631 [1940]).
We find that the provisions of Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 68 of R.A.
No. 7160 and Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 are not irreconcilably
inconsistent and repugnant and the two laws must in fact be read together.
The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an "appeal shall not prevent
a decision from becoming final or executory." As worded, there is room to
construe said provision as giving discretion to the reviewing officials to stay the
execution of the appealed decision. There is nothing to infer therefrom that the
reviewing officials are deprived of the authority to order a stay of the appealed
order. If the intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6 of Administrative Order
No. 18, it could have used more direct language expressive of such intention.
However, while petitioner had made some valid points of argument, its
position must, of necessity, crumble on the fourth issue raised in its
petition. Petitioner itself admits that the fees imposed are precisely
regulatory and supervision fees, and not taxes. This necessarily implies,
however, that such fees must be commensurate to the costs and
expenses involved in discharging its supervisory and regulatory
functions. In the words of Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act itself,
the fees and charges which petitioner NTC is authorized to collect from
any public service or applicant are limited to the "reimbursement of its
expenses in the authorization, supervision and/or regulation of public
services." It is difficult to comprehend how the cost of licensing,
regulating, and surveillance could amount to P1,190,750.50. The CA
was correct in finding the amount imposed as permit fee exorbitant and
in complete disregard of the basic limitation that the fee should be at
least approximately commensurate to the expense. Petitioner itself
admits that it had imposed the maximum amount possible under the
Public Service Act, as amended. That is hardly taking into
consideration the actual costs of fulfilling its regulatory and supervisory
functions.
GSIS v. City Assessor of Iloilo City et al. (G.R. No. 147192, June 27, 2006)
D. Against Ineffectiveness
Legislature intends to impart to its enactments such a meaning as will render them
operative and effective.
E. Against Absurdity
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does
not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under
which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business transactions which
the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the
circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature
in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid presumption that
undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a
construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid
all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious
consequences.
Miriam Defensor Santiago et al. v. Comelec et al. (G.R. No. 127325, March 19,
1997)
While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum
(Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no
subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous
silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is
initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress
intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for
a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy
of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the
initiative on national and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and
Referendum because it is national in scope. Our reading of Subtitle II
(National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative
and Referendum) leaves no room for doubt that the classification is not
based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on its nature and
character. It is "national initiative," if what is proposed to be adopted
or enacted is a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It
is "local initiative" if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a
law, ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of the
governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays can pass.
P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but
such can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law.
The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and from the
situation, circumstances and conditions it sought to remedy, must be
enforced. On this point, a leading authority on statutory construction
stressed:
The intent of a statute is the law. . . . The intent is the vital part, the
essence of the law, and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain
and give effect to the intent. The intention of the legislature in enacting
a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained,
although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute.
Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the
true intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. . . . In construing
statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the trite intent of the
legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the
context and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and
objects of the legislature.1 (emphasis supplied.)
It goes without saying that, as an instrument of social justice, the law
must favor the weak and the disadvantaged, including, in this instance,
small lot buyers and aspiring homeowners. P.D. 957 was enacted with
no other end in view than to provide a protective mantle over helpless
citizens who may fall prey to the manipulations and machinations of
"unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers", and such intent is
nowhere expressed more clearly than in its preamble.
People v. Echavez, Jr. et al. (G.R. Nos. L-47757-61, January 28, 1980)
We hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands
because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities
or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals.
The squating complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas.
A. Penal Statutes
B. Tax Laws
Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court et al., GR No. 69344, April 26, 1991
Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders Inc. v. Department of Finance
Secretary, et al. (GR No. 108524, November 10, 1994)
D. Election Rules
Philippine National Bank v. Cruz, et al., GR No. 80593, December 18, 1989
Lopez, Jr v. Civil Service Commission et al., GR No. 87119, April 16, 1991
Gordon v. Veridiano II et al., GR No. L-55230, November 8, 1988
City of Manila v. Teotico et al., GR No. L-23053, January 29, 1968
Arenas v. City of San Carlos et al. GR No. L-34024, April 5, 1978
Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals, GR Nos. 120865-71,
December 7, 1995
Leynes v. COA et al., GR No. 143596, December 11, 2003
Self-Executing Provisions
Prohibitory Provisions
Special Provisions
Suprema Lex